deleuze and time-phenomeno

In the Still of the Moment: DeleuzesPhenomena of Motionless Time

Corry Shores Bilkent University

Abstract

A process philosophical interpretation of Deleuzes theories of timeencounters problems when formulating an account of Deleuzesportrayal of temporality in The Time-Image, where time is understoodas having the structure of instantaneity and simultaneity. I remedythis shortcoming of process philosophical readings by formulating aphenomenological interpretation of Deleuzes second synthesis of time.By employing Deleuzes logic of affirmative synthetic disjunction incombination with his differential calculus interpretation of Spinozasand Bergsons duration, this phenomenological interpretation portraystime as given to our awareness in immediacy rather than througha continuous process of unfolding. The viability of this alternateapproach calls into question the claims that Deleuze is strictly a processphilosopher and anti-phenomenologist.

Keywords: Deleuze, time consciousness, phenomenology, Bergson,cinema

I. Introduction

Husserls and Merleau-Pontys analyses of time-consciousness portrayphenomenal time as flowing continuously on account of a progressingsynthesis that blends the moments of our awareness.1 Their accounts aresuited for a description of temporality as it appears to us as a flowingsuccession, for instance when time seems to drag on slowly while weare bored waiting for a bus or train. Yet, does time always appear to

Deleuze Studies 8.2 (2014): 199229DOI: 10.3366/dls.2014.0143 Edinburgh University Presswww.euppublishing.com/dls

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us as an extending, continuous flux? Consider for example when welook in the mirror and for the first time suddenly notice signs of ouraging. In that shocking instant, we do not feel the gradual passage ofsome number of years; rather, we are given those years all at once ina phenomenal flash. So, it seems temporal phenomena are not alwayscontinuous, and thus our phenomenological analyses of time wouldbenefit from a description of non-flowing temporal appearings. We willexamine how Deleuzes cinematic examples of motionless temporalityillustrate the disjunctive synthesis of virtually simultaneous momentsthat are given instantaneously. Our account runs contrary to processreadings of Deleuzes time syntheses, as for example the one we find inJames Williamss recent book Deleuzes Philosophy of Time: A CriticalIntroduction and Guide. According to such a process-philosophicalreading, Deleuzes time syntheses cannot be instantaneous; for, processesrequire more than one moment to transpire. So, one of the reasonsWilliams excludes Deleuzes second cinema book The Time-Image fromhis account is because it says the past and present synthesise each instant(Williams 2011: 162).Nonetheless, The Time-Image is quite useful for phenomenologists

who wish to analyse temporal appearings, because cinematic experiencesare uniquely able to present to our awareness a little time in itspure state. So, by first examining Deleuzes notion of instantaneousbecoming, we will find that The Time-Image builds upon Deleuzesearlier treatment of the second synthesis in Difference and Repetition,rather than contradicting it as the process interpretation would argue.Thus, a danger we risk by reading Deleuzes temporal synthesis solely inprocess terms is that it limits our ability to obtain the phenomenologicalvalue of Deleuzes philosophy of time.

II. Motionless Becoming: The Logic of Intensive Temporality

To explore the basic logic of Deleuzes motionless temporal synthesis,we will first follow his treatment of Lewis Carrolls Alice in Wonderlandat the very beginning of The Logic of Sense. Deleuze refers us here to thescenes when Alices size increases, so that he may illustrate the pureevent of becoming. As Alice becomes larger, she of course becomeslarger than the size she just was. But in that same stroke, she is aswell growing smaller than the size she is now becoming: as she moves-toward a larger size, this motion is a movement into another relation, inthis case, a relation with an even larger size. In this way, the pure eventof becoming places before and after past and future together as two

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Figure 1. Alice becoming larger and smaller simultaneously. (Source: adaptedfrom Carroll and Tenniel 1866.)

incompatible but coincident states of affairs. Before and after, in thisway, become simultaneous (Figure 1):

When I say Alice becomes larger, I mean that she becomes larger than shewas. By the same token, however, she becomes smaller than she is now.Certainly, she is not bigger and smaller at the same time. She is larger now;she was smaller before. But it is at the same moment that one becomes largerthan one was and smaller than one becomes. This is the simultaneity of abecoming whose characteristic is to elude the present. Insofar as it eludes thepresent, becoming does not tolerate the separation or the distinction of beforeand after, or of past and future. It pertains to the essence of becoming to moveand to pull in both directions at once. (Deleuze 1990a: 3/9)2

In a strange way, the pure event occurs between before and after,yet also somehow the two are simultaneous. We will explain this throughDeleuzes distinctions between intensity and extensity. Note that whenDeleuze discusses Spinozas duration and affect in a class lecture from1981, he offers a description similar to his account of pure becoming.In this Spinozistic context, an affection is the instantaneous effect ofan image of a thing on me (Deleuze 1981). So, consider if we first seeour enemy Peter and then turn our head and notice our charming friendPaul. Here we are affected by a succession of images that with eachinstant increases our power of acting (Deleuze 1978). Our affections arealways varying continuously in this way like waves or curves, but at any

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Figure 2. Finding instantaneous velocity.

one given moment, we experience an instantaneous affection, which isthe degree to which we are tending to increase or decrease in power.Deleuze, building from his calculus interpretation of Spinozas diagramof infinity, portrays the instantaneous affection as being somethinglike a curves tangent that has been found by using the infinitesimalanalysis of Leibnizs early calculus techniques (Deleuze 1981).3 Solets first consider how we may use differential calculus to determineinstantaneous velocities, because this will aid us in understanding whatDeleuze means by instantaneous affection. We could graph a curveshowing an accelerating increase in velocity (the change in distance perthe change in time). We can then determine the average velocity withinan extent of time by drawing a line that connects the points on thecurve at the beginning and at the end of the delineated time interval.Now, by using a technique from infinitesimal calculus, we can bringtogether the distant points along the curve keeping in mind the degreeof change between themuntil they are infinitely close, that is, untilonly an infinitely small amount of distance lies between them (Figure 2).The line that the infinitely close points now draw is the tangent, whichtells us how fast the object was tending to go in that instant. This is itsinstantaneous velocity at that moment along its motion.To explain the duration involved in instantaneous affection, Deleuze

turns to the phenomenon of passage in Bergsons duration:

you can consider psychic states as close together as you want in time, you canconsider the state A and the state A, as separated by a minute, but just as wellby a second, by a thousandth of a second, that is you can make more and morecuts, increasingly tight, increasingly close to one another. You may well go tothe infinite, says Bergson, in your decomposition of time, by establishing cutswith increasing rapidity, but you will only ever reach states. (Deleuze 1981)


Figure 3. Using infinitesimal calculus to find instantaneous affection.

Deleuze draws a parallel between Bergsons psychic states andSpinozas levels of affection. As we noted, things affect us in waysthat either increase or decrease our power, and these changes arecontinuously varying. At an instant of our affection, we are at somelevel of power. But from one instant to its immediate successor, there isno temporal gap extending between them; however, there is an intensityof change that we experience as the phenomenon of passage. Bergsonsand Spinozas duration, according to Deleuze, is found between instantsbrought infinitely close together. He explains:

duration is always behind our backs, it is at our backs that it happens. It isbetween two blinks of the eye. If you want an approximation of duration:I look at someone, I look at someone, duration is neither here nor there.Duration is: what has happened between the two? Even if I would have goneas quickly as I would like, duration goes even more quickly, by definition,as if it was affected by a variable coefficient of speed: as quickly as I go, myduration goes more quickly. [. . . ] A, A, A; A is the instantaneous affection,of the present moment, A is that of a little while ago, A is what is goingto come. Even though I have brought them together as close as possible,there is always something which separates them, namely the phenomenonof passage. This phenomenon of passage, insofar as it is a lived phenomenon,is duration.4 (Deleuze 1981)

Deleuze interprets the continuous variation between the curves inSpinozas circle diagram in his 12th letter, The Letter on Infinity, tobe like an infinite series of instantaneous affections. So, we might depictthis using a curve and tangent like we did when finding instantaneousvelocity (Figure 3).Thus, duration here is not merely something occurring over the course

of a series of moments but can rather be what happens between moments

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brought infinitely close together such that no time extends between them.Duration in this sense is a matter of the extensive simultaneity of abefore and an after, whose differential relation implies an intensivesuccession, an intending or inner tension from the incompatibilitiesbetween before and after. Because no extent of time separates beforeand after, they temporally coincide, extensively speaking; however,after intends or is striving to extend past before with a certain degreeof intensity, just as the moving body is tending to go at a certain velocityin that instant.Deleuzes logic of synthesis, then, will allow for the temporal

convergence of before and after without their assimilation. We callit logic here, because it makes use of the logic of exclusive disjunction;yet, also involved are what he considers Leibnizs alogical concepts,compossibility and incompossibility. They are alogical, because theyare not matters of identity and contradiction, which apply only towhat is possible and impossible (Deleuze 1990a: 196/201). Yet unlikeLeibniz, for Deleuze the incompatibility or incompossibility of statesof affairs is the condition for events to occur. If at any instant all thestates of affairs in the world were compatible or compossible, thenthere are no conditions in the world calling for resolution, and henceeverything might be at rest or in redundant motion. Or as for Leibniz,all events would be precalculated in advance by God on the basis ofthe compossibility of monads predicates. Yet as Bergson notes whendiscussing mathematical predictions of future eclipses, this strips theseries of events of their temporal character by placing all forthcomingoccurrences together simultaneously in that single calculation (Bergson2001b: 1947/14950). So, compossibility does not account for howevents unfold through time. But if time and becoming are real, then everyinstant would need to contain incompossible states of affairs whoseincompatibilities on the one hand provide the motive force for bringingabout alterations in the succeeding moment while also on the other handleave indeterminate and un-precalculable these future events.So recall the prior example: as Alices size increases, she becomes

larger and smaller than herself. But, it is logically impossible that shebe larger and smaller than herself. Her largerness and her smallernesscan only coincide in the case when she is caught in the act of changing,when her growth is the intensive degree of variation between infinitelyclose moments. So the combined states of affairs, Alice is larger thanherself and also she is smaller than herself, is a logical impossibilityand can never actually be so. Yet, Alice becomes larger than herselfand in the same stroke she becomes smaller than herself are not so


much impossible when combined as they are incompossible, meaningthat throughout her continuous growing, these states of affairs reallydo coincide, but they cannot stay that way for longer than a fleetinginstant. If they remained so for longer than an infinitely short moment,the becomes of becomes larger and smaller turns into the is of islarger and smaller, which we said was impossible. Thus, for as longas her largerness coincides with her smallerness, there will necessarilybe a forthcoming successive moment when either she keeps growing(transforming her given largerness into a smallerness related to a newlargerness) or she stops growing (causing her smallerness to cease beingsmaller than another larger size, because there will be no larger size thatshe is attaining to).For Deleuze, incompossible states of affairs are combinable on

account of a synthesis, namely, what he calls affirmative syntheticdisjunction. In an exclusive disjunction, either A or B can be true,but not both. However, in Deleuzes synthetic disjunction, A and B arenot compatible states of affairs, yet both are affirmed and coincident.There is a classic example in the field of intensional logic and semanticsthat will illustrate. Oedipus had every reason to believe he was not thecriminal bringing the curse upon Thebes. Yet, there arrived a momentwhen it became undeniable that he was the man who killed his father andmarried his mother. In that transitional moment, Oedipus affirms twoincompatible states of affairs: that (1) he could not possibly be his wifesson and yet nonetheless that (2) he did indeed marry his mother.5 Andalso, at this moment in the tale, Oedipus undergoes an instantaneousalteration, an intense moment of becoming, changing from great king toblind vagrant. Just as his both being the son and not the son of Jocastaare simultaneously affirmed in the moment of transition, so too is hisbeing both the king and an exile of Thebes. The logic of affirmativesynthetic disjunction, then, allows for the coincidence of before andafter in pure becoming.

III. The Second Synthesis of Time

Mementos can cause our minds to flash back to an earlier time. Thesemoments, which have fallen away to the past, appear now to our currentawareness. And yet we do not mistake them for the present; in fact,we might even be charmed or perhaps shocked by how different thingsonce were. What we notice, then, is not merely the past state of affairs;we are aware as well of the temporal differences that make them soforeign to the present. Thus, flashbacks can serve as a fertile source for

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Figure 4. Innermost circuit of Bergsons memory circuit diagram. (Source:adapted from Bergson 1911: 128.)

the investigation of time as a phenomenon, that is, for when time its veryself appears to our awareness. We now explore the way Deleuze explainsBergsons pure past through cinematic flashbacks. This will allow us tocharacterise the second synthesis of time in Difference and Repetition asbeing the then of the past combined with the now of the present; theintensive temporal difference between them is a phenomenon of time.Deleuze turns our attention to Bergsons expanding circuits diagrams

to help explain the contemporaneity of the past and the present inflashback recollections. Bergson first has us consider what he calls anafter image (image conscutive). It is always a part of our perception.We look at some object, then abruptly avert our gaze to another place.For a split second, the image of the initial object will carry into andoverlay upon the new scene we see (Bergson 2001a: 125/105). The priorobject remains in our field of perception, even though it is actually nolonger there. Instead, it is virtually there. The virtual past image insertsitself so thoroughly into the new actual image that we are no longerable to discern what is perception and what is memory (125/106).Perhaps this is why fast moving objects leave a blurry trail behind them.For example, as David Hume notes, when we rapidly swing around aburning coal in the dark, we perceive a full red circle (Hume 2007:28). According to Bergson, just while the perceived image is sent to ourbrain, the most recent image in our memory has already arrived uponand overlaid our current perception, with both moving lightning fast ina continuous circuit (Figure 4) (Bergson 2001a: 127/107).So when we are looking at something, already mixed into this

perception are the remnants from the prior perception. This is thetight OA circuit in Bergsons diagram. Keep in mind how time is


Figure 5. A successive memory-perception circuit. (Source: adapted fromBergson 1911: 128.)

ever-passing, so even if what we perceive seemingly remains unchanged,it will still differ from what we just saw. The flow of time leavesits mark on the prior image, giving it the character of having-passed(Bergson 1922: 2/2). A new OA circuit always arises each instant ofour perception, no matter how noticeable the variations are in what wesee. But then, we might wonder, what happens to the even older imagesas the new ones continue entering our memory? Bergson says they getpushed out into wider and more encompassing circuits (Figure 5).When we turn away our gaze, what was previously object O now

becomes what we call past-object B. (Former object O is not actuallythere, but it is a part of the past that is implied in what is actuallypresent.) All the while, memory-image A has become what we now callmemory-image B, which corresponds to the past-object B that it is animage of. This is all because a new object O and its new memory Ahave entered our perceptual awareness. But note how in the diagram, thewider B circuit channels into the new OA circuit. This is because boththe most recent memory-image and the next most recent one together

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Figure 6. Growing memory-perception circuits. (Source: adapted fromBergson 1911: 128.)

overlay upon our field of perception, even though we might not noticethe two. In a way, our older memories still keep contracting with thepresent, but only in an implicit manner. So even if the previous after-image is no longer vibrantly apparent to our perception, it still is helpingto shape the way we see the current image. This is important for Bergson,because the whole of our past is at least implicitly superposed intoour present experience. In truth, writes Bergson, every perception isalready memory. Practically we perceive only the past, the pure presentbeing the invisible progress of the past gnawing into the future (Bergson2001a: 194/163; original emphasis).With this in mind, we might imagine how the circuits of our

perception continue billowing outward as time passes on. The oldercircuits keep enlarging as our perception alters perpetually (Figure 6).Yet even though all of our past is always interposed in the present

in an implicit way, sometimes what we see causes one recollection tostand out more explicitly among the rest. Often we observe somethingin our daily life that causes certain prior memories to flare out beforeour minds eye (Figure 7). And sometimes our flashbacks can be sovivid that they drown out the actual things we see. We then begin to feelas though we are reliving that past experience.Deleuze illustrates these recollection circuits with the cinematic

flashbacks in Marcel Carns movie Daybreak (Le Jour se lve, 1939)


Figure 7. Flashback as not excluding other layers of memory. (Source:adapted from Bergson 1911: 128.)

(Deleuze 1989: 48/46/678). The film follows events happening fromsundown to dawn. During this short period, a murderer flashes backinto his past. The movie begins with a man being shot and falling down aflight of stairs in an apartment building. The murderer barricades himselfin his room so that the police cannot force their way in. Throughoutthe night he has three flashbacks, each one triggered by some visualreminder. This first one takes us back to him meeting a young woman hefalls in love with. This flashback loop draws us the deepest into the past,so it would correspond to one of the widest circles in Bergsons circuitdiagram. But, whenever we return to the present, we hear a heavy doom-filled bass and drum beat. It gives us the feeling we are moving inevitablytoward a fatal end. So during the flashbacks, the past is so vibrant that itcompletely covers over the actual present things standing before him inhis room. As viewers, we only see what he is remembering and not theevents still carrying on in the present while he dreams. But, because uponreturning we hear that fatal march toward the end, we are reminded thateven while reminiscing, we never escaped the current doomed situation.Throughout our own lives, we are always experiencing the combinationof the past and present, no matter how attentive we are to the presentor how vibrantly the past flashes into our mind. The events of themurderers next flashback, then, continue after those of the prior one,so it is a smaller circuit closer to the current inner loop. Here we learnmore about the rivalry he has with an older man over the young woman.When we return from this flashback, day breaks, and his building issurrounded by police and a crowd of spectators. He rages at them fromhis window high above, furious that they would treat him like a freak.

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This outburst triggers him to recall his explosion of anger that led to themurder he just committed last night. In this final flashback, we now seehim shoot the love rival in his room. The victim falls down the stairs, justas we saw when the film began. This is the tightest recollection circuit sofar. It brings us to his final act, in the present: he shoots himself in theheart. In a way, this is like all the painful events of his life contractedinto his current action.Now, consider if we were to memorise a series of spoken lines for

a play. Each time we practise it, we create a new individual memory.When it comes time to perform, we merely begin with the first word,and the rest seem to follow automatically, without our needing to recallany single rehearsal. All the previous times were contracted into thatpresent moment of automatic habitual bodily performance. But after theshow, someone might ask us about how we memorised the lines. Thenwe could relax and daydream about those moments, seeing them in theirvivid detail (Bergson 2001a: 8992/758).Bergson illustrates this with his famous cone diagram. As new things

enter our memory, they add to a cone (Bergson 2001a: 1967/1623).If we are acting automatically, like when performing something werehearsed, then we are down closer to the S point. Being near this tip doesnot mean our memories have gone away. Rather, they are all contractedinto our physical actions, like how a performance expresses physicallyall our memories of past recitals. When instead we daydream about thepast, the images expand out in our minds, as during a flashback. In thesemoments, we reside at a higher layer of the cone. Always we are varyingsomewhere between automatic action and dreamful reflection, so wemight be at any of the many possible layers of expansion or contractionof our memory (Figure 8) (Bergson 2001a: 21012/1768).So during flashback scenes, the characters memory leaps up to a

higher level. But during an action scene where she acts automatically, hermemory is contracted into the present moment, down at the cones tip.We are always changing level, varying melodically between our intensephysical engagement in the present moment and our drifting somewherein dreamland (Deleuze 1994: 834/11314). So the larger circuits aremore distant memories, and the higher cone levels are increased degreesof expansion of one part of those memories.The cone levels and the circuits are not equivalent, but we might place

them in correspondence by noting that when moving to a distant circuit,we are also expanding our memories. To illustrate this, we first observeone of Deleuzes references: Bazins explanation of Carns flashbacktechniques. Bazin notes how in literature, action happening in the past


Figure 8. Varying layers of memory expansions that are contemporaneouswith the present. (Source: adapted from Bergson 1911: 211.)

can be described by using past tenses of a verb. However, in film thereis no easy way to clearly demarcate past and present events, especiallyones happening in the same locations, because they will look aboutthe same when projected on the screen. In Daybreak, for example, thehero has his final flashback while sitting in his room, and it takes himback to the events the day before also happening in that very place.The table as it is there now appeared about the same the day prior.So Carn must convince our eyes that the story is moving in and outof the past even though the scene looks nearly identical in both cases.Bazin observes that when a scene shifts between the present and the pastevents recalled in the mind of the hero, Carn uses an exceptionally longdissolve where the image of the previous scene fades out little by little soas to allow the next image to gradually fade into clarity. The dissolvehas the effect of recreating the way we physiologically experience atransition to recollective daydream: our eyes become fixed, our pupilsenlarge, and the images we see become blurred as our imagination growsmore vibrant (Figure 9) (Bazin 1998: 7880).The other sort of flashback Deleuze discusses is Mankiewiczs

forking or bifurcation (Deleuze 1989: 489/47/68). We noted beforehow incompossibility for Deleuze is prerequisite for an event to occur.In terms of forking, this means that events take place when they veer offdown an unforeseen path, yet as we will see, this also means that at themoment of divergence, circumstances have multiple virtual tendencies ofdevelopment that were incompossible with one another. Such forkingsfor Deleuze also correspond to a sort of flashback that unites past,present and future into a single instant. Thus, bifurcations not onlyintroduce newness into our lives, they also are partly responsible forthe continual coexistence of the before and after in our experiences.When there is an unforeseen forking, this event is momentous; it ismemorable even while it is still happening. We can tell already that we

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will recall it often in the future. So from the beginning it appears to us asa memory for future recollections. But also, these events are momentousfor another reason. They cause us to recall another event in the past,lighting up one of the various circuits in our memory.The two senses of bifurcation are tightly bound together. To illustrate,

Deleuze refers us to a scientific model from Prigogine and StengerssOrder Out of Chaos (1984) (Deleuze 1989: 49/47/69). Imagine thatwe are running a faucet at a low enough level of flow that the waterfalls in a straight column. We then very gradually increase the flowuntil suddenly, when we reach a critical moment in the increase, thesmooth column becomes chaotically turbulent. To further describe thesesensitive transition points in complex systems, Prigogine and Stengersquote J. C. Maxwell:

the system has the quantity of potential energy, [. . . ] which cannot beginto be so transformed till the system has reached a certain configuration, toattain which requires an expenditure of work, which in certain cases maybe infinitesimally small, and in general bears no definite proportion to theenergy developed in consequence thereof. For example, [. . . ] the little sparkwhich kindles the great forest, the little word which sets the world a fighting,[. . . ] the little spore which blights all the potatoes [. . . ]. (Maxwell, quoted inPrigogine and Stengers 1984: 73)

But, there are systems that when reaching such a singular point candevelop in one of two different directions of qualitative evolution. Forexample, in certain chemical systems, if you increase one parameter, suchas the concentration of one chemical, the system is pushed further andfurther away from a state of equilibrium. If pushed far enough, it reachesa bifurcation point where, for instance, the spatial distribution of thatchemical can follow one or another opposite path of configuration, withthe choice being entirely unpredictable (Prigogine and Stengers 1984:1612) (Figure 10).

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Figure 11. Multiple indeterminate branching variations. (Source: based on afigure in Prigogine and Stengers 1984: 170.)

In fact, in some complex systems, there can be bifurcations ofbifurcations. As Deleuze writes, each of the forkings constantly splitup any state of equilibrium and each time impose a new meander, anew break in causality, which itself forks from the previous one, in acollection of non-linear relations (Deleuze 1989: 49/47/69). Prigogineand Stengers explain that

the historical path along which the system evolves as the control parametergrows is characterized by a succession of stable regions, where deterministiclaws dominate, and of instable ones, near the bifurcation points, wherethe system can choose between or among more than one possible future.(Prigogine and Stengers 1984: 16970) (Figure 11)

Deleuze further elaborates on the structure of simultaneouslybranching paths with Borgess short story, The Garden of ForkingPaths (1962) (Deleuze 1989: 49/47/68). It describes a Chinese monksunfinished manuscripts for a novel with this same title. The novel wentunpublished because it was incomprehensible. The chapters did notproceed just sequentially. A following chapter would be like an alternateversion of the same prior one: in the third chapter the hero dies, in thefourth he is alive (Borges 1962: 24). Each of these variations is like oneof the possible paths the chemical system can choose; however, in thecase of the novel, the story chooses all possible lines of development atthe same time:


the garden of forking paths was the chaotic novel [. . . ] forking in time,not in space. [. . . ] In all fictional works, each time a man is confronted withseveral alternatives, he chooses one and eliminates the others; in the fictionof Tsui Pn, he chooses simultaneously all of them. He creates, in thisway, diverse futures, diverse times which themselves also proliferate and fork.(Borges 1962: 26)

Thus:

all possible outcomes occur; each one is the point of departure for otherforkings. Sometimes, the paths of this labyrinth converge: for example, youarrive at this house, but in one of the possible pasts you are my enemy, inanother, my friend. (Borges 1962: 26)

For this reason, the structure of the novel is

an infinite series of times, [. . . ] a growing, dizzying net of divergent,convergent and parallel times. This network of times which approached oneanother, forked, broke off, or were unaware of one another for centuries,embraces all possibilities of time. We do not exist in the majority of thesetimes; in some you exist, and not I; in others I, and not you; in others, bothof us. (Borges 1962: 28)

In Mankiewiczs Barefoot Contessa (1954), there is a remarkablescene that showcases both senses of bifurcation (the veering off into anew direction and the simultaneity of alternate lines of development)(Deleuze 1989: 49/47/68). The soon-to-be Contessa quite abruptlyswitches companions, taking her down a drastically different path.But this scene was remembered by two different people, each in theirown way and with their own slight variations. Each recollection of theevent occurs at a different time in the movie, and they have their ownunique camera angles and divergent details, even though the dialogueis the same. What we note especially is the sudden instant of the slap,that crack in the flow of time, when the next moment is completelyundetermined, entirely discontinuous with the present. But we alsoobserve the simultaneous forking paths: in one recollection, the slappedman looks longer to the Contessa after the slap, while in the other case,he quickly looks to the Count (Figure 12). So there are two sorts oftemporal simultaneity in that dramatic moment: (1) the Contessas priorcourse and the new detour converge upon one another at the moment ofthe slap, bringing before and after together all at once; and also (2),there is a simultaneity of the different perspectival renditions of the samecourse of action.

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Figure 12. Mankiewiczs Barefoot Contessa (1954). Top: the Count slaps thesoon-to-be Contessas current lover, causing a fork in the storys development;bottom: the subsequent deviation in the story is remembered with slightvariations by different people (left and right).

Now, is it not also the case that when we recall the past, we oftenfill in missing details that we were previously unsure about, and in thatway create bifurcations of the same remembered event? Each time werecall some incident, the recollection seems to vary slightly from theother times when we remembered it. If it were exactly the same witheach recollection, then would it not be a sort of automatism on accountof the boring redundancy? Perhaps these memories have the character ofthe past not merely because they differ from the present but also becauseeach recollection differs from the others. That might suggest that whena memorable bifurcation occurs, implied in it are many virtual ways torecall it.We will keep this in mind while examining another of Deleuzes

examples of bifurcating time: Mankiewiczs A Letter to Three Wives(1949) (Deleuze 1989: 49/47/68). In this story, there are three marriedcouples. All the husbands share a common female friend, Addie.


One day, she writes a letter to all three wives, which they read together.Addie explains she ran off with one of their husbands. However, shedoes not specify which man it is. The wives will be unable to find outuntil later that night when they see if their husband comes home tothem. During that day, each wife reflects on her marriage, looking forwhat might have gone wrong in the past. So the unpredictable forking ofreceiving the surprising letter spurs each one to flash back to a momentin the past where their relationship seemed to take a turn (or fork) forthe worse. A forking in the present, then, recalls a different forkingin the past. In one case, a wife, new to her social circle, feels out ofplace. Then at a dinner event, she suddenly happens upon her husbandand Addie chatting privately outside in the dark. We can see in thewifes face that she recognises even back then there is some implicitimportance to this event, even though it is not yet evident. So, thepresent forking event of receiving the letter calls her mind back to theprevious forking when she discovered her husband chatting outside inthe dark with Addie. But then later in the story, she receives a messagethat seems to confirm her suspicions, although it is still ambiguous, andshe makes that same facial expression again, linking all three momentstogether. Hence, the present bifurcation is not just a flashback; it alsoin a way is preparing itself for future recollections, by having implicitand indeterminate significances that might later unfold through anotherdually recollective and precollective forking. Thus, we see even furtherhow bifurcational flashbacks render befores simultaneous with afters(Figure 13).Yet, these cinematic examples show the union of particular past

memories with actual present ones. The second synthesis of time,however, involves an even more basic simultaneity of before and after.But, first we need to observe the danger of seeing time as initially an eventhappening purely in the present, then secondly moving into the past. Theproblem is that the past itself has a temporal character that is differentfrom that of the present. Seeing a past event merely as a former presentis regarding the past as a modification or as a degree of the present. Yet,if the past and present are different in kind, then the past is not just aformer presence; it has a temporal character all its own.Daybreak beginsin the present, with the hero having just shot his love rival. At the end ofthe film, that same initial event is recalled with the moments just leadingup to it. But throughout the movie, we come to see the heros loving,calm and patient side. His murder, with all its violent passionate anger,loses its character of actual presence, as moments of calm humanity takeits place. It is an act he cannot change, unlike how he is in control of his

218 Corry Shores

Figure 13. A wife in Mankiewiczs A Letter to Three Wives (1949)experiences three bifurcational moments, the middle of which being duallyboth a recollection and a precollection.

current actions, as for example his own willing decision to kill himselfat the end. Present moments somehow become radically different sortsof moments in time, not as being less present but as being somethingreal that is recalled in the present as a moment completely different thanthe present one. The past has something relatively established about it,while the present is more indeterminate.This poses two problems for explaining memory. One is that the

present moment in a way disappears from presence, in that it ceasesto be an influenceable and active present, and yet all the while it stillexists in another form, with its own unique temporal character andtraits that differ in kind and not in degree from the present in passage.So, it is not even a matter of the present fading away, becoming lessof a present. The present becomes something it is not, the past. Buthow can this radical transition be explained if it is not a graduatedcontinuous modification? Yet also, if there is exclusively the presentthat abruptly becomes past, then we have another similar difficulty inexplaining memory. As a present moment goes deeper into the past, if thechange is continuous, then it remains tied to the present moment it oncewas, because in a way, it still is that present, only in a diminished form.But if after succeeds before without any overlap or graduated change


between them, then passing moments have no actual connection to thepresent they once were. The murder at the beginning ofDaybreak ceasesto be. The viewer and hero are constantly living through a changingpresent. But, the ending recollection of the murder is presumably tied toa present that we experienced at the films opening. So, how does thepassing present maintain its recollective correspondence to the presentit once was, if the transition is abrupt and the former present ceases toexist? According to Deleuze, Bergsons solution to these problems is thepast in general (le pass en gnral) (Deleuze 1991: 569/515; Deleuze1994: 812/11011). Bergson himself, however, does not frequently usethis specific phrase. In one of the rare instances, Bergson writes:

Whenever we are trying to recover a recollection [. . . ] we detach ourselvesfrom the present in order to replace ourselves, first in the past in general,then in a certain region of the past a work of adjustment, something likethe focusing of a camera. But our recollection still remains virtual [. . . ]. Littleby little it comes into view like a condensing cloud [. . . ]. (Bergson 2001a:171/148; my emphasis)

Deleuze and Deleuzian Bergsonists, according to Mathew Kelly,interpret this to mean that there is a general past that is coexistentwith the present, as would be suggested by the cone diagram, andthat present events have a dual character, being both past and presentsimultaneously (Kelly 2008: 20). It is important to broaden the analysisfrom the particular pasts as in the cinema examples to the past ingeneral, because the second synthesis is not so much a process of activelyoverlaying past memories synthetically with present events; rather, thesimultaneity of past and present is already inherent to the structure ofour immediate temporalised consciousness. It is not just that a presentmoment passes into the past while its virtual memorial content remainsin our consciousness. No moment, not even the first in our lives, is ableto pass unless it did not already begin in the past in general. So thegeneral past is a prerequisite for the passage of the present:

How would any present whatsoever pass, if it were not past at the sametime as present? The past would never be constituted if it had not beenconstituted first of all, at the same time that it was present. [. . . ] The pastis contemporaneous with the present that it has been. (Deleuze 1991: 58/54;original emphasis)

Or as Deleuze further puts it, past and present, before and after,are crystallized together. Bergson speaks of crystallisation whenelaborating on his cone diagram, discussing the general idea, whoseessence is to be unceasingly going backwards and forwards between

220 Corry Shores

the plane of action and that of pure memory (Bergson 2001a: 220/180).In the cone diagram, the general idea at point S would take the clearlydefined form of a bodily attitude or of an uttered word, but at the toplayer AB, it would wear the aspect, no less defined, of the thousandindividual images into which its fragile unity would break up (see againFigure 8) (220/180). Yet, the general idea does not remain fixed at eitherextremity; rather, it consists in the double current which goes fromthe one to the other, always ready either to crystallize into utteredwords or to evaporate into memories (221/180). Here Bergson is notusing crystallize in exactly the same sense as Deleuze uses it. ForBergson, it refers to the condensation of memory down into currentbodily expression. Yet, note that this crystallisation happens at the tipof the cone, at the immediacy of action, where the entirety of ourmemory makes direct contact with the present instant of our actualbodily activity. It is not that some memories are further up in the conewhile others are found lower within it. Each layer has every memory;but in the higher cuts, the memories are more expanded into discreteimages. Down at the tip, all memories are still being expressed, justnone are regarded in their distinction from the others. This is like howwhen finally performing a practised piece, the musicians fingers do notexpress each prior recital individually; rather, the movements expressall past enactments together at once in the present motion. Deleuzescrystallisation, then, is not so far off from Bergsons meaning of the term,because for Deleuze it is the intensely tight union of the past in generalwith the immediate present. Deleuze also speaks of this interlocking ofthe past and present as being two contracted but divergent tendencies,like with Bergsons symmetrical jets of time. Bergson notes that theformation of memory is never posterior to the formation of perception;it is contemporaneous with it. Step by step, as perception is created, thememory of it is projected beside it, as the shadow falls beside the body(Bergson 1920: 157/138). Memory, then, is twofold at every moment,its very up-rush being in two jets exactly symmetrical, one of whichfalls back towards the past whilst the other springs forward towardsthe future (Bergson 1920: 160/140). To illustrate, Deleuze suggests hisown diagram in Cinema 2: The Time-Image (Figure 14).Deleuze writes that this fundamental operation of time is what

constitutes the crystal-image:

since the past is constituted not after the present that it was but at the sametime, time has to split itself in two at each moment as present and past, whichdiffer from each other in nature, or, what amounts to the same thing, it hasto split the present in two heterogeneous directions, one of which is launchedtowards the future while the other falls into the past. Time has to split at the


Figure 14. Deleuzes diagram for Bergsons double jets of time, withadditional description. (Source: based on a figure in Deleuze 1989:295/285/109.)

same time as it sets itself out or unrolls itself: it splits in two dissymmetricaljets, one of which makes all the present pass on, while the other preserves allthe past. Time consists of this split, and it is this, it is time, that we see inthe crystal. [. . . ] We see in the crystal the perpetual foundation of time, non-chronological time [. . . ]. (Deleuze 1989: 81/79/1089; original emphasis)

Thus, the present moment immediately self-distinguishes itself:

What we see in the crystal is therefore a dividing in two that the crystal itselfconstantly causes to turn on itself, that it prevents from reaching completion,because it is a perpetual self-distinguishing, a distinction in the process ofbeing produced; which always resumes the distinct terms in itself, in orderconstantly to relaunch them. (Deleuze 1989: 812/79/109; original emphasis)

This self-distinguishing will be important later when we examineKamlers Chronopolis (1983). For now, we note Bergsons example ofparamnesia or dj vu, the illusion of already having been there. As wellin this description we find his other rare usage of past in general, forhe writes that in such a false recognition of paramnesia, the illusorymemory is never localized in a particular point of the past; it dwellsin an indeterminate past, the past in general (Bergson 1920: 137/119).Deleuze emphasises here that because dj vu is both a recollection ofa presumed past but also a direct perception of the present, there isa recollection of the present, contemporaneous with the present itself(Deleuze 1989: 79/77/106; my emphasis). Deleuze then refers us to anumber of filmed musicals with dream sequences that resemble dj vu-like recollections. These memories do not recall real events in the past,

222 Corry Shores

Figure 15. The dreamlike past in general. Left: Minnellis Yolanda and theThief (1945); right: Minnellis The Band Wagon (1953).

but rather they merely have the feeling of the past as if given presently,although in a dream-like way. The colours are vibrantly bright yet witha pastel softening; and while the scenes depicted are fantastical, they,like dreams, vaguely and indirectly play out the dramatic tensions goingon during that part of the storys progress. We see this, for example, inMinnellis Yolanda and the Thief (1945) and The Band Wagon (1953)(Figure 15). This unspecified past in the dream scenes, then, illustratesthe present memorial facet of Bergsons past in general.But, if the present moment is unique from the past, then duration

also involves injections of radical difference and newness into presentaction. To help us conceptualise this, Deleuze refers to scenes in worksby comedic performer, actor and director Jerry Lewis, where the chaoticforces of variation reverberate through his body and the world aroundhim (Deleuze 1989: 656/623/8890). These forceful energies producenew phenomenal data that push duration forward by infusing it withwaves of original differential content. Consider, for example, howLewiss body spasmodically collides with a malfunctioning, catastrophicworld around him inWhos Minding the Store? (1963), The Patsy (1964)and Its Only Money (1962) (Figure 16).Recall how the present instant is always in a state of self-distinction:

it is both the moment that it is tending to become while also beingthe moment that is right on the verge of passing away. Now considerDeleuzes analysis of the creation of temporality in a Polish animatedfilm: In [. . . ] Chronopolis, Piotr Kamler fashioned time out of twoelements, small balls manipulated with pointed instruments, and supplesheets covering the balls. The two elements formed moments (Deleuze1989: 105/1012/1378; original emphasis). Notice he speaks here offorming moments, and not a flow of time, and also not an extending


Figure 16. Jerry Lewis and catastrophic world variation. Top: Tashlins WhosMinding the Store? (1963); middle: Lewiss The Patsy (1964); bottom:Tashlins Its Only Money (1962).

224 Corry Shores

passage of time. When the two elements make contact, some new vari-ation results in the sheets of clay. The figure, with each contact, becomessomething different (Figure 17). But, it does so by changing from whatit already was. What it was, and what it is becoming its before andits after coincide with each moment of contact, because the figuresalways seem to be in-between different and unique formations.The portrayal of time in this scene is not the extending and flowing

passage of duration through which the changes happen, like how eachframe of the movie-film blurs together with its neighbours. Each momentis a variation; all are bifurcations, because not everything in eachmoment is explicitly predictable in the prior one. Synthesis is foundcompletely in each single frame alone, where the before is beingsynthesised simultaneously with its after. So even though there is asteady flow of alteration throughout this sequence, in any one createdmoment, there is already the temporality of becoming.Deleuze also offers Ozus still life scenes as examples of images of

the pure form of time:

The vase in Late Spring is interposed between the daughters half smile andthe beginning of her tears. There is becoming, change, passage. But the formof what changes does not itself change, does not pass on. This is time, timeitself, a little time in its pure state [. . . ] The still life is time, for everythingthat changes is in time, but time does not itself change [. . . ] Ozus still lifesendure, have a duration, over ten seconds of the vase: this duration of the vaseis precisely the representation of that which endures, through the successionof changing states. A bicycle may also [. . . ] represent the unchanging form ofthat which moves, so long as it is at rest, motionless, stood against the wall[. . . ]. The bicycle, the vase and the still lifes are the pure and direct images oftime. (Deleuze 1989: 17/1617/278)

The daughter has been reluctant to marry, because this would leave herwidowed father all alone, creating too much drastic change in both hisand her lives. Yet in this scene, she consents to her fathers wishes, anddecides in fact that she will marry. However, at that moment of herdecision, Ozu shows the still life scene of the vase. This grand climacticmoment of the films narrative is substituted by a pure visual stillness.We feel an intense dramatic change while perceiving a motionless image.The actual events coming before and after are not present in the still life,but they are both implied in the same still image, because this transitionpoint in the story marks the most drastically different before and after.We feel in this moment the coincidence of before and after in theirmotionless simultaneity (Figure 18).


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226 Corry Shores

IV. Conclusion

So contrary to time as an extending process in motion, we have insteada still image of time. James Williamss process interpretation was ableto explain the second synthesis of time, Bergsons pure past, as it is inDifference and Repetition, but not as it is in Cinema 2: The Time-Image,where time is evidently a matter of instantaneity and simultaneity.For Williams the problem is that the cinema books fall short of asatisfactory rendition of Deleuzes philosophy of time, and so we shouldnot consider them as a principle source when accounting for Deleuzesnotion of temporality (Williams 2011: 161, 163). What we insteadpropose here is that the process reading alone provides an unsatisfactoryaccount of Deleuzes philosophy of time, because it is unable to bringtogether Deleuzes major writings on temporality, and also it does notdo justice to their phenomenological value. And Deleuze, a life-longcinephile, tells us that when studying philosophy, cinema was a majorpart of his intellectual endeavours: after the war, I started going to themovies again, but this time I was a philosophy student. [. . . ] It was nota matter of applying philosophy to cinema. I just went straight fromphilosophy to cinema and back again (Deleuze 2006: 2834/2634).6

So, would we be surprised if throughout his life Deleuze developed hisideas on temporality while he watched and studied films, and only laterin his career devoted entire books to the art form?7 There seems to bereason enough to regard Deleuzes Cinema 2: The Time-Image as a coreresource for investigating his theory of time. And as we have seen, it is inthis text that Deleuze gives a buggered reading of Bergsons duration.Deleuze saw his task of reading texts in the history of philosophy asinterpreting them in such a way that they give birth to monstrousoffspring that are really the product of that philosophers thought, whileat the same time being in some way alien to it (Deleuze 1995: 6/15). Inthe case of his reading of Bergson, Deleuze uncovers a sort of temporalitythat is fully given even before there is the motion of succession. BecauseDeleuze refers us to specific cinema scenes, we can actively experiencethe collisions of images that give us impressions of still temporality.Also, because we are given these impressions, Deleuzes explication ofmotionless time is of particular interest to phenomenological analyses. InCarnsDaybreak, when the hero returns from a flashback, images of thepast collide with those of the present, and the tensions between them giveus the viewers the impression of the time in-between. This is time givento our awareness as a phenomenon. And Deleuze provides the theoretical


material for concrete analyses of this sort of motionless time that isintensive, rather than flowing and extensive. Thus, phenomenologycould expand its analyses of time consciousness to include a differentsort of temporal phenomenon, if it takes note of Deleuzes writings oncinema.

Notes1. For Husserls analyses of the consciousness of the flowing succession of time,

see for example the lectures from the year 1905 in Husserl 1991/1966a: 745 and from this texts Supplement, paragraphs 152, 567, 239, 2523,25763, 2724, 31325. The continuous running-off of retentions along withthe horizontal integration of retentions, intentions and protentions constitutestime-consciousness in its unbroken flow. For more on the passive synthesis ofmoments of our awareness combined on the basis of associating similarities,which constitutes the continuity of the flow of phenomena, see Husserl 1974:3708; 1966b: 135, 6578, 11748; 2001: 2772, 10621, 16295. Merleau-Ponty builds from Husserls horizontal integration model of time-consciousnessand characterises the flow of phenomenal time as a thrust of transition synthesis(synthse de transition/bergangssynthesis): there is time as [. . . ] a fountain: thewater changes while the fountain remains [. . . ]; each successive wave takes overthe functions of its predecessor: from being the thrusting wave in relation to theone in front of it, it becomes, in its turn and in relation to another, the wave thatis pushed; [. . . ] from the source to the fountain jet, the waves are not separate;there is only one thrust . . . ]. Hence the justification for the metaphor of the river(Merleau-Ponty 1958: 48990/484).

2. In parenthetical citations, the pages for the English version are given first andthe French second, with the exception of Deleuzes Cinema 2: The Time-Image,where we give the first English edition first, the second English edition secondand the French edition third.

3. The first and second chapters of Simon Duffys The Logic of Expression:Quality, Quantity and Intensity in Spinoza, Hegel and Deleuze (2006) give anexcellent, detailed account of Deleuzes calculus reading of Spinozas 12th Letter.

4. The prime-markings for the As are based on the French transcription by DenisLemarchand at La Voix de Gilles Deleuze en ligne ()rather than on the one at . See either the Gallicabibliothque numrique () or the Voix de Gilles Deleuzerecordings, part 2, at around 07.50 minutes.

5. In his Metalogical Theory of Reference: Realism and Essentialism in Semantics,Roger Vergauwen offers a formulation of this example. Consider the followinginference (1) Oedipus wants to marry Jocasta, (2) Jocasta is the mother ofOedipus, thus (3) Oedipus wants to marry his mother. If we only look at theextensional meanings, the normal denotations of the expressions, this is a validinference. But, if we consider the intensional meanings that are more contextdependent, this is not a valid inference (Vergauwen 1993: 278).

6. Michel Ciment describes Deleuze as being a cinephile already in 1956 (Dosse2010: 1056).

7. This idea along with numerous others in this article (for example, time asdifference, and the non-redundancy of recollection) are the contributions ofRoland Breeur of the University of Leuven, Belgium.

228 Corry Shores

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Banshun [Late Spring], directed by Yasujir Ozu. Japan: Shchiku Eiga, 1949.Bazin, Andr [1983] (1998) Le Cinma franais de la Libration la Nouvelle Vague(19451958), ed. Jean Narboni, Paris: Cahiers du cinma.

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Its Only Money, directed by Frank Tashlin. USA: Paramount, 1962.Kelly, Michael R. (2008) Husserl, Deleuzean Bergsonism and the Sense of the Pastin General, Husserl Studies, 24:April, pp. 1530.

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The Band Wagon, directed by Vincente Minnelli. USA: MGM, 1953.The Barefoot Contessa, directed by Joseph L. Mankiewicz. USA: MGM, 1954.The Patsy, directed by Jerry Lewis. USA: Paramount Pictures, 1964.Vergauwen, Roger (1993) A Metalogical Theory of Reference: Realism andEssentialism in Semantics, Lanham, New York and London: University Press ofAmerica.

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deleuze and time-phenomeno

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