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Yoel Tobin

From: Steve Dunne

Sent: Tuesday, April 27, 2004 3:40 PM

To: '[email protected]'

Cc: '[email protected]'; [email protected]; Dan Marcus; Team 1; Dianna Campagna

Subject: FBI document request no. 42

Pat: Attached as a Word document is FBI document request no. 42. Please call Yoel Tobin at 202-

331-4071 with any questions about this request and to arrange for production. Feel free to call Dan or

me as well if any issues arise. Thanks. Steve

4/27/2004



HKeanC H A I R

H. HamikonVICE CHAIR

Ben-Veniste

F.Fielding

S.Gorelick

Gorton

Keney

Tollman

Roemer

Thompson

D. ZelikowDIRECTOR

FBI DOCUMENT REQUEST No. 42

The National Commission onTerrorist Attacks Upon theUnited States (the

"Commission") requests that theFederal Bureau of Investigation (FBI or the

"respondent") provide the Commission with copies of the following documents no

later than May 4, 2004:

1. To the extent it exists, a classified 1995 FBI analysis of global terrorism

referenced on pages 278 and 279 of Ghost Wars: The SecretHistory of the CIA,

Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, From th e Soviet Invasion to September 10 , 2001.

(Copies of the referenced pages are attached.)

The Commission requests that thedocuments requested abovebe provided as soon asthey are available, even though all requested documents may not be provided at the

same tune, through means of a "rolling" production.

If any requested documents arewithheld from production, even temporarily, based on

an alleged claim of privilege or for any other reason, the Commission requests that

the respondent, as soon as possible and in no event later than the production date,

identify and describe each such document or class of documents, as well as the

alleged basis for not producing it, with sufficient specificity to allow ameaningful

challenge to any such withholding.

If the respondent does not have possession, custody or control of any requesteddocuments but has information about where such documents may be located, the

Commission requests that the respondent provide such information as soon as

possible and in no event later than theproduction date.

If the respondent has anyquestions or concerns about the interpretation or scope of

these document requests, theCommission requests that any such questions or

concerns be raised with the Commission as soon as possible so that any such issues

can be addressed and resolved prior to the production date.

April 27, 2004 Daniel Marcus

General Counsel

T E L (202) 331-4060

F A X (202) 296-5545

www.9-1 lcommission.gov



Page 1 of 1

Yoel Tobin

From: Yoel Tobin

Sent: Tuesday, April 27, 2004 11:05 AM

To: Steve Dunne

Subject: FW: FBI doc request (Ghost Wars) -- could we get this out very quickly?

P.S. I have placed the docs onyour chair - the Ghost Warpages should be faxed to the FBI. Thanks.

Original MessageFrom: Yoel Tobin


To: Steve Dunne

Cc: Team 1Subject: FBI doc request (Ghost Wars) - could we get this outvery quickly?

Steve:

Attached is a document request for the FBI. I have put down a production date of this Friday, because it isrelevant to my report chapter (which as you know is due Friday), and because it asks for a single, specific

document. If we could this out as quickly as possible, that would be great. I will give you by hand a copy of thepages from the Ghost Wars book that are cited in the document request. Thanks.

Yoel

4/27/2004



Page 1 of 1

Yoel Tobin

From: Yoel Tobin


To: Steve Dunne

Cc: Team 1

Subject: FBI doc request (Ghost Wars) -- could we get this out very quickly?

Steve:

Attached is a document request for the FBI. I have put down a production date of this Friday, because it is

relevant to my report chapter (which as you know is due Friday), and because it asks for a single, specificdocument. If we could this out as quickly as possible, that would be great. I will give you by hand a copy of thepages from the Ghost Wars book that are cited in the document request. Thanks.

Yoel

4/27/2004



FBI DOCUMENT REQUEST NO.

The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Up on the United States (the"Commission") requests that the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI or "respondent")

provide the Commission with a copy of the following document no later than April 30,2004 (the "production date"):

1. To the extent it exists, a classified 1995 FBI analysis of global terrorismreferenced on pages 278 and 279 of Ghost Wars: The Secret History of th e CIA,Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, From th e Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001.

(These pages are attached for your reference.)

The Commission requests that the document requested above be provided as soon as it is

available.

If the document is withheld from production, even temporarily, based on an alleged claimof privilege or for any other reason, the Commission requests that the respondent, as soonas possible and in no event later than the production date, identify and describe thealleged basis for not producing it, with sufficient specificity to allow a meaningfulchallenge to any such withholding.

If the respondent does not have possession, custody or control of the docum ent but hasinformation about where such docum ent may be located, the Com mission requests thatthe respondent p rovide such information as soon as possible and in no event later than theproduction date.

If the respondent has any questions or concerns abou t the interpretation or scope of thisrequest, the C omm ission requests that any such questions or concerns be raised w ith the

Commission as soon as possible so that any such issues can be addressed and resolvedprior to the production date.

April_,2004Daniel Marcus

General Counsel



278 G H O S T W A R S '

official channels. Several retired Riyadh station chiefs and senior I\ear iDivision managers went on the Saudi payroll as consultants during then^ j

1990s.32

American Arabists had studied the Middle East for decades thro

Cold War lens, their vision narrowed by continuous intimate contact withi

ular Arab elites. American spies and strategists rarely entered the lower-n

class mosques of Algiers, Tunis, Cairo, Karachi, or Jedda, where anti-Arnc

cassette tape sermons were for sale on folding tables at the door.

Despite all these limitations, American intelligence analysts deve

by mid-1995 a clearer picture of the new terrorist enemy. For the first j

the image of a global network began to emerge. The FBI and the CIA <

produced ambitious classified intelligence reports during the second?!

of 1995 that sifted the evidence in the Yousef case and pushed s trong)

forecasts.

As part of a long review of global terrorism circulated by the FBI,(

fied Secret, the bureau's analysts assessed the emerging threat under the he"Ramzi Ahmed Yousef: A New Generation of Sunni Islamic Terroris

The Yousef case "has led us to conclude that a new generation of terroril

has appeared on the world stage over the past few years," the FBI's anaty

wrote. Yousef and his associates"have access to a worldwide network of s u

port for funding, training and safe haven." Increasingly, "Islamic extremist^

ar e working together to fu r t her their cause." It was "no coincidence" thlt

their terrorism increased as the anti-Soviet Af g ha n w ar ended. Afghanistan^

training camps were crucial to Yousef. The camps provided technical ie«#

sources and allowed him to meet an d recruit like-minded radicals. Pakistan

and Bosnia had also become important bases for the jihadists.

The FBI's report noted the vulnerability of the American homeland toat - ,

tacks. It specifically cited Murad's confessed plot to hijack a plane and fly it

into CIA headquarters as an exam ple.

"Unlike t radi t ional fo rms o f t e r ro r i sm, such as state-sponsored or t r . c

Iran/Hezbollah model, Sunni extremists ar e neither surrogates of nor

strongly inf luenced by one nation," th e FBI's analysts wrote. "They are au-

tonomous and indigenous." There was now reason to "suspect Yousefand

his associates receive support from Osama bin Laden and may be able to tap

into bin Laden's mujahedin support network." In addition, they may also have

been able to draw on Islamic charities for support. The FBI analysis listed the

huge semiofficial Saudi Arabian charity, th e International Islamic Relief Oi-jganization, and the largest government-sponsored Saudi religious proselyoz-



" A N e w G e n e r a t i o n " 279

organization, the Muslim World League, as important resources for the

.f W terrorists. The cable concluded: "Yousef's group fits the mold for this

n e w generation of Sunni Islamic terrorists. . . . The WTC bombing, the

M a n il a plot, and the recent [Islamic Group] attack against Mubarak demon-

itrate that Islamic extremists can operate anywhere in the world. We believe

th e threat is not over."34

The CIAalso saw Yousef's gang as independent from any hierachy. 'As far

n we know," reported a classified agency cable in 1995, "Yousef and his con-

f e d e r a t e s ... are not allied with an organized terrorist group and cannot read-

iK call upon such an organized unit to execute retaliatory strikes against the

t'.S. or countries that have cooperated with the U.S. in the extradition of

Vousef and his associates." That same year, working through the National In-

telligence Council, the CIA circulated to Clinton's Cabinet an annual National

Inlclligence Estimate on terrorism classified Secret. The estimate drew on ca-

bles andanalyses from across the American intelligence community. Echoing

the FBI's language, the estimate called Yousef's gang a "new breed" of radi-

C tl Sunni Islamic terrorist. It then suggested what this plan might forecast

ibout future attacks inside the United States. "Several targets are especially at

8»k: national symbols such as the White House and the Capitol, and symbols

, O f US. capitalism such as WallStreet," the estimate predicted. "We assess that

CW aviation will figure prominently among possible terrorist targets in the

^united States. This stems from the increasing domestic threat posed by for-

i terrorists, the continuing appeal of civil aviation as a target, and a do-

•tatic aviation security system [whose weaknesses have] been the focus of

i*edia attention."35

was now clear that Yousef and his colleagues had developed their ter-

• plans by studying American airline security procedures. "If terrorists

; in this country are similarly methodical, they will identify serious

abilities in the security system for domestic flights." The National In-

- ' Estimate made no mention of Osama bin Laden.36

J

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