consti cases set 2, last 9 cases

8/12/2019 Consti Cases Set 2, Last 9 Cases

1/45

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 104654 June 6, 1994

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,vs.HON. ROSALIO G. DE LA ROSA, PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 28, MANILA and JUAN G.FRIVALDO, respondents.

G.R. No. 105715 June 6, 1994

RAUL R. LEE, petitioner,vs.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JUAN G. FRIVALDO, respondents.

G.R. No. 105735 June 6, 1994


The Solicitor General for petitioner in G.R. No. 104654.

Yolando F. Lim counsel for private respondent.

QUIASON, J.:

In Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections, 174 SCRA 245 (1989), this Court declared private respondent, Juan G. Frivaldo, an alienand therefore disqualified from serving as Governor of the Province of Sorsogon.

Once more, the citizenship of private respondent is put in issue inthese petitions docketed as G.R. No.104654 and G.R. No. 105715 and G.R. No. 105735. The petitions were consolidated since theyprincipally involve the same issues and parties.

I

G.R. No. 104654

This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court in relation to R.A. No. 5440 and Section 25 of the InterimRules, filed by the Republic of the Philippines: (1) to annul the Decision dated February 27, 1992 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch28, Manila, in SP Proc. No. 91-58645, which re-admitted private respondent as a Filipino citizen under the Revised NaturalizationLaw (C.A. No. 63 as amended by C.A. No. 473); and (2) to nullify the oath of allegiance taken by private respondent on February 27,1992.

On September 20, 1991, petitioner filed a petition for naturalization captioned: "In the Matter of Petition of Juan G. Frivaldo to be Re-admitted as a Citizen of the Philippines under Commonwealth Act No. 63" (Rollo, pp. 17-23).

In an Order dated October 7, 1991 respondent Judge set the petition for hearing on March 16, 1992, and directed the publication ofthe said order and petition in the Official Gazette and a newspaper of general circulation, for three consecutive weeks, the lastpublication of which should be at least six months before the said date of hearing. The order further required the posting of a copythereof and the petition in a conspicuous place in the Office of the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court, Manila (Rollo, pp. 24-26).

On January 14, 1992, private respondent filed a "Motion to Set Hearing Ahead of Schedule," where he manifested his intention torun for public office in the May 1992 elections. He alleged that the deadline for filing the certificate of candidacy was March 15, oneday before the scheduled hearing. He asked that the hearing set on March 16 be cancelled and be moved to January 24 (Rollo, pp.27-28).

The motion was granted in an Order dated January 24, 1992, wherein the hearing of the petition was moved to February 21, 1992.The said order was not published nor a copy thereof posted.


2/45

On February 21, the hearing proceeded with private respondent as the sole witness. He submitted the following documentaryevidence: (1) Affidavit of Publication of the Order dated October 7, 1991 issued by the publisher of The Philippine Star (Exh. "A"); (2)Certificate of Publication of the order issuedby the National Printing Office (Exh. "B"); (3) Notice of Hearing of Petition (Exh. "B-1"); (4) Photocopy of a Citation issued by theNational Press Club with private respondents picture (Exhs. "C" and "C-2"); (5) Certificate of Appreciation issued by the Rotary Clubof Davao (Exh. "D"); (6) Photocopyof a Plaque of Appreciation issued by the Republican College, Quezon City (Exh. "E"); (7) Photocopy of a Plaque of Appreciationissued by the Davao-Bicol Association (Exh. "F"); (8) Certification issued by the Records Management and Archives Office that the

record of birth of private respondent was not on file (Exh. "G"); and (8) Certificate of Naturalization issued by the United StatesDistrict Court (Exh. "H").

Six days later, on February 27, respondent Judge rendered the assailed Decision, disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Petitioner JUAN G. FRIVALDO, is re-admitted as a citizen of the Republic of thePhilippines by naturalization, thereby vesting upon him, all the rights and privileges of a natural born Filipino citizen (Rollo, p. 33).

On the same day, private respondent was allowed to take his oath of allegiance before respondent Judge (Rollo, p. 34).

On March 16, a "Motion for Leave of Court to Intervene and to Admit Motion for Reconsideration" was filed by Quiterio H. Hermo.He alleged that the proceedings were tainted with jurisdictional defects, and prayed for a new trial to conform with the requirementsof the Naturalization Law.

After receiving a copy of the Decision on March 18, 1992, the Solicitor General interposed a timely appeal directly with the SupremeCourt.

G.R. No. 105715

This is a petition for certiorari, mandamus with injunction under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court in relation to Section 5(2) ofArticle VIII of the Constitution with prayer for temporary restraining order filed by Raul R. Lee against the Commission on Elections(COMELEC) and private respondent, to annul the en banc Resolution of the COMELEC, which dismissed his petition docketed asSPC Case No. 92-273. The said petition sought to annul the proclamation of private respondent as Governor-elect of the Provinceof Sorsogon.

Petitioner was the official candidate of the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) for the position of governor of the Province ofSorsogon in the May 1992 elections. Private respondent was the official candidate of the Lakas-National Union of ChristianDemocrats (Lakas-NUCD) for the same position.

Private respondent was proclaimed winner on May 22, 1992.

On June 1, petitioner filed a petition with the COMELEC to annul the proclamation of private respondent as Governor-elect of the

Province of Sorsogon on the grounds: (1) that the proceedings and composition of the Provincial Board of Canvassers were not inaccordance with law; (2) that private respondent is an alien, whose grant of Philippine citizenship is being questioned by the State inG.R. No. 104654; and (3) that private respondent is not a duly registered voter. Petitioner further prayed that the votes case in favorof private respondent be considered as stray votes, and that he, on the basis of the remaining valid votes cast, be proclaimedwinner.

On June 10, the COMELEC issued the questioned en banc resolution which dismissed the petition for having been filed out of time,citing Section 19 of R.A. No. 7166. Said section provides that the period to appeal a ruling of the board of canvassers on questionsaffecting its composition or proceedings was three days.

In this petition, petitioner argues that the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion when it ignored the fundamental issue ofprivate respondents disqualification in the guise of technicality.

Petitioner claims that the inclusion of private respondents name in the list of registered voters in Sta. Magdalena, Sorsogon wasinvalid because at the time he registered as a voter in 1987, he was as American citizen.

Petitioner further claims that the grant of Filipino citizenship to private respondent is not yet conclusive because the case is still onappeal before us.

Petitioner prays for: (1) the annulment of private respondents proclamation as Governor of the Province of Sorsogon; (2) thedeletion of private respondents name from the list of candidates for the position of governor; (3) the proclamation of the governor-elect based on the remaining votes, after the exclusion of the votes for private respondent; (4) the issuance of a temporaryrestraining order to enjoin private respondent from taking his oath and assuming office; and (5) the issuance of a writof mandamus to compel the COMELEC to resolve the pending disqualification case docketed as SPA Case No. 92-016, againstprivate respondent.

G.R. No. 105735


3/45

This is a petition for mandamus under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court in relation to Section 5(2) of Article VIII of theConstitution, with prayer for temporary restraining order. The parties herein are identical with the parties in G.R. No. 105715.

In substance, petitioner prays for the COMELECs immediate resolution of SPA Case No. 92-016, which is a petition for thecancellation of private respondents certificate of candidacy filed on March 23, 1992 by Quiterio H. Hermo, the intervenor inG.R. No.104654 (Rollo, p. 18).

The petition for cancellation alleged: (1) that private respondent is an American citizen, and therefore ineligible to run as candidate

for the position of governor of the Province of Sorsogon; (2) that the trial courts decisionre-admitting private respondent as a Filipino citizen was fraught with legal infirmities rendering it null and void; (3) that assuming thedecision to be valid, private respondents oath of allegiance, which was taken on the same day the questioned decision was

promulgated, violated Republic Act No. 530, which provides for a two-year waiting period before the oath of allegiance can be takenby the applicant; and (4) that the hearing of the petition on February 27, 1992, was held less than four months from the date of thelast publication of the order and petition. The petition prayed for the cancellation of private respondents certificate of candidacy andthe deletion of his name from the list of registered voters in Sta. Magdalena, Sorsogon.

In his answer to the petition for cancellation, private respondent denied the allegations therein and averred: (1) that Quiterio H.Hermo, not being a candidate for the same office for which private respondent was aspiring, had no standing to file the petition; (2)that the decision re-admitting him to Philippine citizenship was presumed to be valid; and (3) that no case had been filed to excludehis name as a registered voter.

Raul R. Lee intervened in the petition for cancellation of private respondents certificate of candidacy (Rollo, p. 37.).

On May 13, 1992, said intervenor urged the COMELEC to decide the petition for cancellation, citing Section 78 of the Omnibus

Election Code, which provides that all petitions on matters involving the cancellation of a certificate of candidacy must be decided"not later than fifteen days before election," and the case of Alonto v. Commission on Election, 22 SCRA 878 (1968), which ruledthat all pre-proclamation controversies should be summarily decided (Rollo,p. 50).

The COMELEC concedes that private respondent has not yet reacquired his Filipino citizenship because the decision granting himthe same is not yet final and executory (Rollo, p. 63). However, it submits that the issue of disqualification of a candidate is notamong the grounds allowed in apre-proclamation controversy, like SPC Case No. 92-273. Moreover, the said petition was filed out of time.

The COMELEC contends that the preparation for the elections occupied much of its time, thus its failure to immediately resolve SPACase No. 92-016. It argues that under Section 5 of Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, it is excused from deciding adisqualification case within the period provided by law for reasons beyond its control. It also assumed that the same action wassubsequently abandoned by petitioner when he filed before it a petition for quo warranto docketed as EPC No. 92-35. The quowarranto proceedings sought private respondents disqualification because of his American citizenship.

II

G.R. No. 104654

We shall first resolve the issue concerning private respondents citizenship.

In his comment to the States appeal of the decision granting him Philippine citizenship in G.R. No. 104654, private respondentalleges that the precarious political atmosphere in the country during Martial Law compelled him to seek political asylum in theUnited States, and eventually to renounce his Philippine citizenship.

He claims that his petition for naturalization was his only available remedy for his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. He tried toreacquire his Philippine citizenship through repatriation and direct act of Congress. However, he was later informed that repatriationproceedings were limited to army deserters or Filipino women who had lost their citizenship by reason of their marriage to foreigners(Rollo, pp. 49-50). His request to Congress for sponsorship of a bill allowing him to reacquire his Philippine citizenship failed tomaterialize, notwithstanding the endorsement of several members of the House of Representatives in his favor (Rollo, p. 51). Heattributed this to the maneuvers of his political rivals.

He also claims that the re-scheduling of the hearing of the petition to an earlier date, without publication, was made without objectionfrom the Office of the Solicitor General. He makes mention that on the date of the hearing, the court was jam-packed.

It is private respondents posture that there was substantial compliance with the law and that the public was well-informed of hispetition for naturalization due to the publicity given by the media.

Anent the issue of the mandatory two-year waiting period prior to the taking of the oath of allegiance, private respondent theorizesthat the rationale of the law imposing the waiting period is to grant the public an opportunity to investigate the background of theapplicant and to oppose the grant of Philippine citizenship if there is basis to do so. In his case, private respondent alleges that suchrequirement may be dispensed with, claiming that his life, both private and public, was well-known. Private respondent cites hisachievement as a freedom fighter and a former Governor of the Province of Sorsogon for six terms.


4/45

The appeal of the Solicitor General in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines is meritorious. The naturalization proceedings in SPProc. No. 91-58645 was full of procedural flaws, rendering the decision an anomaly.

Private respondent, having opted to reacquire Philippine citizenship thru naturalization under the Revised Naturalization Law, is dutybound to follow the procedure prescribed by the said law. It is not for an applicant to decide for himself and to select therequirements which he believes, even sincerely, are applicable to his case and discard those which be believes are inconvenient ormerely of nuisance value. The law does not distinguish between an applicant who was formerly a Filipino citizen and one who wasnever such a citizen. It does not provide a special procedure for the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship by former Filipino citizens

akin to the repatriation of a woman who had lost her Philippine citizenship by reason of her marriage to an alien.

The trial court never acquired jurisdiction to hear the petition for naturalization of private respondent. The proceedings conducted,the decision rendered and the oath of allegiance taken therein, are null and void for failure to comply with the publication andposting requirements under the Revised Naturalization Law.

Under Section 9 of the said law, both the petition for naturalization and the order setting it for hearing must be published once aweek for three consecutive weeks in the Official Gazette and a newspaper of general circulation respondent cites his achievementsas a freedom fighter and a former Governor of the Province of Sorsogon for six terms.

The appeal of the Solicitor General in behalf of the Republic ofthe Philippines is meritorious. The naturalization proceedings in SP Proc.No. 91-58645 was full of procedural flaws, rendering the decision an anomaly.

Private respondent, having opted to reacquire Philippine citizenship thru naturalization under the Revised Naturalization Law, is dutybound to follow the procedure prescribed by the said law. It is not for an applicant to decide for himself and to select the

requirements which he believes, even sincerely, are applicable to his case and discard those which he believes are inconvenient ormerely of nuisance value. The law does not distinguish between an applicant who was formerly a Filipino citizen and one who wasnever such a citizen. It does not provide a special procedure for the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship by former Filipino citizensakin to the repatriation of a woman who had lost her Philippine citizenship by reason of her marriage to an alien.

The trial court never acquired jurisdiction to hear the petition for naturalization of private respondent. The proceedings conducted,the decision rendered and the oath of allegiance taken therein, are null and void for failure to comply with the publication andposting requirements under the Revised Naturalization Law.

Under Section 9 of the said law, both the petition for naturalization and the order setting it for hearing must be published once aweek for three consecutive weeks in the Official Gazette and a newspaper of general circulation. Compliance therewith is

jurisdictional (Po Yi Bo v. Republic, 205 SCRA 400 [1992]). Moreover, the publication and posting of the petition and the order mustbe in its full test for the court to acquire jurisdiction (Sy v. Republic, 55 SCRA 724 [1974]).

The petition for naturalization lacks several allegations required by Sections 2 and 6 of the Revised Naturalization Law, particularly:(1) that the petitioner is of good moral character; (2) that he resided continuously in the Philippines for at least ten years; (3) that he

is able to speak and write English and any one of the principal dialects; (4) that he will reside continuously in the Philipp ines from thedate of the filing of the petition until his admission to Philippine citizenship; and (5) that he has filed a declaration of intention or if heis excused from said filing, the justification therefor.

The absence of such allegations is fatal to the petition (Po Yi Bi v. Republic, 205 SCRA 400 [1992]).

Likewise, the petition is not supported by the affidavit of at least two credible persons who vouched for the good moral character ofprivate respondent as required by Section 7 of the Revised Naturalization Law. Private respondent also failed to attach a copy of hiscertificate of arrival to the petition as required by Section 7 of the said law.

The proceedings of the trial court was marred by the following irregularities: (1) the hearing of the petition was set ahead of thescheduled date of hearing, without a publication of the order advancing the date of hearing, and the petition itself; (2) the petitionwas heard within six months from the last publication of the petition; (3) petitioner was allowed to take his oath of allegiance beforethe finality of the judgment; and (4) petitioner took his oath of allegiance without observing the two-year waiting period.

A decision in a petition for naturalization becomes final only after 30 days from its promulgation and, insofar as the Solicitor General

is concerned, that period is counted from the date of his receipt of the copy of the decision (Republic v. Court of First Instance ofAlbay, 60 SCRA 195 [1974]).

Section 1 of R.A. No. 530 provides that no decision granting citizenship in naturalization proceedings shall be executory until aftertwo years from its promulgation in order to be able to observe if: (1) the applicant has left the country; (2) the applicant hasdedicated himself continuously to a lawful calling or profession; (3) the applicant has not been convicted of any offense or violationof government promulgated rules; and (4) the applicant has committed any act prejudicial to the interest of the country or contrary togovernment announced policies.

Even discounting the provisions of R.A. No. 530, the courts cannot implement any decision granting the petition for naturalizationbefore its finality.


5/45

G.R. No. 105715

In view of the finding in G.R. No. 104654 that private respondent is not yet a Filipino citizen, we have to grant the petition in G.R. No.105715 after treating it as a petition for certiorari instead of a petition for mandamus. Said petition assails the en banc resolution ofthe COMELEC, dismissing SPC Case No. 92-273, which in turn is a petition to annul private respondents proclamation on threegrounds: 1) that the proceedings and composition of the Provincial Board of Canvassers were not in accordance with law; 2) thatprivate respondent is an alien, whose grant of Filipino citizenship is being questioned by the State in G.R. No. 104654; and 3) thatprivate respondent is not a duly registered voter. The COMELEC dismissed the petition on the grounds that it was filed outside the

three-day period for questioning the proceedingsand composition of the Provincial Board of Canvassers under Section 19 of R.A. No. 7166.

The COMELEC failed to resolve the more serious issue the disqualification of private respondent to be proclaimed Governor ongrounds of lack of Filipino citizenship. In this aspect, the petition is one for quo warranto. In Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections,174 SCRA 245 (1989), we held that a petition for quo warranto, questioning the respondents title and seeking to prevent him fromholding office as Governor for alienage, is not covered by the ten-day period for appeal prescribed in Section 253 of the OmnibusElection Code. Furthermore, we explained that "qualifications for public office are continuing requirements and must be possessednot only at the time of appointment or election or assumption of office but during the officers entire tenure; once any of the requiredqualification is lost, his title may be seasonably challenged."

Petitioners argument, that to unseat him will frustrate the will of the electorate, is untenable. Both the Local Government Code andthe Constitution require that only Filipino citizens can run and be elected to public office. We can only surmise that the electorate, atthe time they voted for private respondent, was of the mistaken belief that he had legally reacquired Filipino citizenship.

Petitioner in G.R. No. 105715, prays that the votes cast in favor of private respondent be considered stray and that he, being the

candidate obtaining the second highest number of votes, be declared winner. In Labo, Jr. v. COMELEC, 176 SCRA 1 (1989), weruled that where the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes is later declared to be disqualified to hold the office towhich he was elected, the candidate who garnered the second highest number of votes is not entitled to be declared winner (Seealso Geronimo v. Ramos, 136 SCRA 435 [1985]; Topacio v. Paredes, 23 Phil. 238 [1912]).

G.R. No. 105735

In view of the discussions of G.R. No. 104654 and G.R. No. 105715, we find the petition in G.R. No. 105735 moot and academic.

WHEREFORE, the petitions in G.R. No. 104654 and G.R. No. 105715 are both GRANTED while the petition in G.R. No. 105735 isDISMISSED. Private respondent is declared NOT a citizen of the Philippines and therefore DISQUALIFIED from continuing to serveas GOVERNOR of the Province of Sorsogon. He is ordered to VACATE his office and to SURRENDER the same to the Vice-Governor of the Province of Sorsogon once this decision becomes final and executory. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.


EN BANC

G.R. Nos. 178831-32 July 30, 2009

JOCELYN SY LIMKAICHONG, Petitioner,vs.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, NAPOLEON N. CAMERO and RENALD F. VILLANDO, Respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

G.R. No. 179120 July 30, 2009

LOUIS C. BIRAOGO, Petitioner,vs.HON. PROSPERO NOGRALES, Speaker of the House of Representatives of the Congress of the Philippines, and JOCELYN SYLIMKAICHONG, Respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

G.R. Nos. 179132-33 July 30, 2009

OLIVIA P. PARAS, Petitioner,vs.


6/45

HON. PROSPERO NOGRALES, in his capacity as Speaker of the House of Representatives; HON. ROBERTO NAZARENO, in hiscapacity as Secretary General of the House of Representatives; HON. RHODORA SEVILLA, in her capacity as Deputy SecretaryGeneral for Finance of the House of Representatives; THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JOCELYN SYLIMKAICHONG, Respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

G.R. Nos. 179240-41 July 30, 2009

RENALD F. VILLANDO, Petitioner,vs.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JOCELYN SY LIMKAICHONG, Respondents.

R E S O L U T I O N

PERALTA, J.:

The instant motion with prayer for oral argument filed by Louis C. Biraogo, petitioner in G.R. No. 179120, seeks a reconsideration ofthe Courts April 1, 2009 Decision, which granted Jocelyn D. Sy Limkaichongs petition forcertiorariin G.R. Nos. 178831-32. TheCourt dismissed all the other petitions, including Biraogos petition, and reversed the Joint Resolution of the Commission onElections (COMELEC) Second Division dated May 17, 2007 in SPA Nos. 07-247 and 07-248 disqualifying Limkaichong fromrunning as a congressional candidate in the First District of Negros Oriental due to lack of citizenship requirement.

Biraogo prefaced his motion by stating that justice and constitutionalism must remain entrenched in Philippine case law. To achieve

this end, he maintained that the Court should reconsider its April 1, 2009 Decision. He also prayed for an oral argument, which heposited, would help the Court in the just and proper disposition of the pending incident.

After an assiduous review of the motion for reconsideration, we resolve that the same should be denied for lack of merit.

Most of the arguments advanced by Biraogo are a mere rehash of his previous arguments, which we have all considered and foundwithout merit in the Decision dated April 1, 2009. Nonetheless, in order to lay to rest once and for all Biraogo's misgivings, we shalldiscuss only the relevant issues and revalidate our Decision by ruling on his motion as follows:

The core issue in the consolidated petitions is the qualification of Limkaichong to run for, be elected to, and assume and discharge,the position of Representative for the First District of Negros Oriental. The contention of the parties who sought her disqualification isthat she is not a natural-born citizen, hence, she lacks the citizenship requirement in Section 6,1Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.In the election that ensued, she was voted for by the constituents of Negros Oriental and garnered the highest votes. She waseventually proclaimed as the winner and has since performed her duties and responsibilities as Member of the House ofRepresentatives.

Indeed, the citizenship requirement was enshrined in our Constitution in order to ensure that our people and country do not end upbeing governed by aliens.2With this principle in mind, we have said in Aquino v. COMELEC3that if one of the essentialqualifications for running for membership in the House of Representatives is lacking, then not even the will of a majority or pluralityof the voters would substitute for a requirement mandated by the fundamental law itself. Hence assuming, time constraintsnotwithstanding, and after proper proceedings before the proper tribunal be had, that Limkaichong would prove to be an alien, thecourt of justice would tilt against her favor and would not sanction such an imperfection in her qualification to hold office. But, firstthings first.

The proponents against Limkaichong's qualification stated that she is not a natural-born citizen because her parents were Chinesecitizens at the time of her birth. They went on to claim that the proceedings for the naturalization of Julio Ong Sy, her father, neverattained finality due to procedural and substantial defects.

In our Decision, We held that:

However, in assailing the citizenship of the father, the proper proceeding should be in accordance with Section 18 ofCommonwealth Act No. 473 which provides that:

Sec. 18. Cancellation of Naturalization Certificate Issued. - Upon motion made in the proper proceedings by the Solicitor General orhis representative, or by the proper provincial fiscal, the competent judge may cancel the naturalization certificate issued and itsregistration in the Civil Register:

1. If it is shown that said naturalization certificate was obtained fraudulently or illegally;

2. If the person naturalized shall, within five years next following the issuance of said naturalization certificate, return to his nativecountry or to some foreign country and establish his permanent residence there: Provided, That the fact of the person naturalizedremaining more than one year in his native country or the country of his former nationality, or two years in any other foreign country,shall be considered asprima facie evidence of his intention of taking up his permanent residence in the same:
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/jul2009/gr_178831_2009.html#fnt1http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/jul2009/gr_178831_2009.html#fnt1http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/jul2009/gr_178831_2009.html#fnt1http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/jul2009/gr_178831_2009.html#fnt2http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/jul2009/gr_178831_2009.html#fnt2http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/jul2009/gr_178831_2009.html#fnt2http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/jul2009/gr_178831_2009.html#fnt3http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/jul2009/gr_178831_2009.html#fnt3http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/jul2009/gr_178831_2009.html#fnt3http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/jul2009/gr_178831_2009.html#fnt2http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/jul2009/gr_178831_2009.html#fnt1


7/45


8/45

23, 2007. Accordingly, we ruled in our April 1, 2009 Decision that the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET), and nolonger the COMELEC, should now assume jurisdiction over the disqualification cases. Pertinently, we held:

x x x The Court has invariably held that once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, andassumed office as aMember of the House of Representatives, the COMELEC's jurisdiction over election contests relating to his election, returns, andqualifications ends, and the HRET's own jurisdiction begins.8It follows then that the proclamation of a winning candidate divests theCOMELEC of its jurisdiction over matters pending before it at the time of the proclamation. The party questioning his qualificationshould now present his case in a proper proceeding before the HRET, the constitutionally mandated tribunal to hear and decide a

case involving a Member of the House of Representatives with respect to the latter's election, returns and qualifications. The use ofthe word "sole" in Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution and in Section 2509of the OEC underscores the exclusivity of theElectoral Tribunals' jurisdiction over election contests relating to its members.10

Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution provides:

Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of allcontests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composedof nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remainingsix shall be Members of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis ofproportional representation from the political parties and the parties or organizations registered under the party-list systemrepresented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman.

x x x x

Petitioners (in G.R. Nos. 179120, 179132-33, and 179240-41) steadfastly maintained that Limkaichongs proclamation was tainted

with irregularity, which will effectively prevent the HRET from acquiring jurisdiction.

The fact that the proclamation of the winning candidate, as in this case, was alleged to have been tainted with irregularity does notdivest the HRET of its jurisdiction.11The Court has shed light on this in the case of Vinzons-Chato,12to the effect that:

In the present case, it is not disputed that respondent Unico has already been proclaimed and taken his oath of office as a Memberof the House of Representatives (Thirteenth Congress); hence, the COMELEC correctly ruled that it had already lost jurisdictionover petitioner Chato's petition. The issues raised by petitioner Chato essentially relate to the canvassing of returns and allegedinvalidity of respondent Unico's proclamation. These are matters that are best addressed to the sound judgment and discretion ofthe HRET. Significantly, the allegation that respondent Unico's proclamation is null and void does not divest the HRET of its

jurisdiction:

x x x [I]n an electoral contest where the validity of the proclamation of a winning candidate who has taken his oath of office andassumed his post as congressman is raised, that issue is best addressed to the HRET. The reason for this ruling is self-evident, forit avoids duplicity of proceedings and a clash of jurisdiction between constitutional bodies, with due regard to the people's mandate.

Further, for the Court to take cognizance of petitioner Chato's election protest against respondent Unico would be to usurp t heconstitutionally mandated functions of the HRET.

In fine, any allegations as to the invalidity of the proclamation will not prevent the HRET from assuming jurisdiction over all mattersessential to a members qualification to sit in the House of Representatives.

The 1998 HRET Rules, as amended, provide for the manner of filing either an election protest or a petition for quo warranto againsta Member of the House of Representatives. In our Decision, we ruled that the ten-day prescriptive period under the 1998 HRETRules does not apply to disqualification based on citizenship, because qualifications for public office are continuing requirementsand must be possessed not only at the time of appointment or election or assumption of office but during the officer's entire tenure.Once any of the required qualifications is lost, his title may be seasonably challenged.13Accordingly, the 1987 Constitution requiresthat Members of the House of Representatives must be natural-born citizens not only at the time of their election but during theirentire tenure. Being a continuing requirement, one who assails a member's citizenship or lack of it may still question the same atany time, the ten-day prescriptive period notwithstanding.lavvphi1

In fine, we hold that Biraogo had not successfully convinced us to reconsider our Decision and grant his motion for reconsideration.

In a last-ditched attempt to muddle the issues, Biraogo observed that the Decision dated April 1, 2009 is a complete turn-aroundfrom the ruling embodied in the Decision written by Justice Ruben T. Reyes which, although unpromulgated, was nonethelesssigned by fourteen (14) Associate Justices and approved by the Court en banc on July 15, 2008. He decried the absence of anexplanation in the Decision dated April 1, 2009 for the said departure or turn-around.

Such a position deserves scant consideration.

The Court in Belac v. Commision on Elections,14held that a decision must not only be signed by the Justices who took part in thedeliberation, but must also be promulgated to be considered a Decision, to wit:
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/jul2009/gr_178831_2009.html#fnt8http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/jul2009/gr_178831_2009.html#fnt8http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/jul2009/gr_178831_2009.html#fnt8http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/jul2009/gr_178831_2009.html#fnt9http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/jul2009/gr_178831_2009.html#fnt9http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/jul2009/gr_178831_2009.html#fnt9http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/jul2009/gr_178831_2009.html#fnt10http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/jul2009/gr_178831_2009.html#fnt10http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/jul2009/gr_178831_2009.html#fnt10http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/jul2009/gr_178831_2009.html#fnt11http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/jul2009/gr_178831_2009.html#fnt11http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/jul2009/gr_178831_2009.html#fnt11http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/jul2009/gr_178831_2009.html#fnt12http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/jul2009/gr_178831_2009.html#fnt12http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/jul2009/gr_178831_2009.html#fnt12http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/jul2009/gr_178831_2009.html#fnt13http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/jul2009/gr_178831_2009.html#fnt13http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/jul2009/gr_178831_2009.html#fnt13http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/jul2009/gr_178831_2009.html#fnt14http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/jul2009/gr_178831_2009.html#fnt14http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/jul2009/gr_178831_2009.html#fnt14http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/jul2009/gr_178831_2009.html#fnt14http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/jul2009/gr_178831_2009.html#fnt13http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/jul2009/gr_178831_2009.html#fnt12http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/jul2009/gr_178831_2009.html#fnt11http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/jul2009/gr_178831_2009.html#fnt10http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/jul2009/gr_178831_2009.html#fnt9http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/jul2009/gr_178831_2009.html#fnt8


9/45

[A] true decision of the Court is the decision signed by the Justices and duly promulgated. Before that decision is so signed andpromulgated, there is no decision of the Court to speak of. The vote cast by a member of the Court after the deliberation is alwaysunderstood to be subject to confirmation at the time he has to sign the decision that is to be promulgated. The vote is of no value if i tis not thus confirmed by the Justice casting it. The purpose of this practice is apparent. Members of this Court, even after they havecast their votes, wish to preserve their freedom of action till the last moment when they have to sign the decision, so that they maytake full advantage of what they may believe to be the best fruit of their most mature reflection and deliberation. In consonance withthis practice, before a decision is signed and promulgated, all opinions and conclusions stated during and after the deliberation ofthe Court, remain in the breasts of the Justices, binding upon no one, not even upon the Justices themselves. Of course, they may

serve for determining what the opinion of the majority provisionally is and for designating a member to prepare the decision of theCourt, but inno way is that decision binding unless and until signed and promulgated.

We add that at any time before promulgation, the ponencia may be changed by the ponente. Indeed, if any member of the court whomay have already signed it so desires, he may still withdraw his concurrence and register a qualification or dissent as long as thedecision has not yet been promulgated. A promulgation signifies that on the date it was made the judge or judges who signed thedecision continued to support it.

Thus, an unpromulgated decision is no decision at all. At the very least, they are part of the confidential internal deliberations of theCourt which must not be released to the public. A decision becomes binding only after it is validly promulgated.15Until suchoperative act occurs, there is really no decision to speak of, even if some or all of the Justices have already affixed their signaturesthereto. During the intervening period from the time of signing until the promulgation of the decision, any one who took part in thedeliberation and had signed the decision may, for a reason, validly withdraw one's vote, thereby preserving one's freedom of action.

In sum, we hold that Biraogos Motion for Reconsideration with Prayer for Oral Argument must be denied. This Court did not err inruling that the proper remedy of those who may assail Limkaichong's disqualification based on citizenship is to file before the HRETthe proper petition at any time during her incumbency.

WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration with Prayer for Oral Argument filed by petitioner Louis C. Biraogo in G.R. No.179120 is DENIED with FINALITY.

SO ORDERED.


EN BANC

G.R. No. 151914 July 31, 2002

TEODULO M. COQUILLA, petitioner,

vs.THE HON. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and MR. NEIL M. ALVAREZ, respondents.

MENDOZA, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari to set aside the resolution,1 dated July 19, 2001, of the Second Division of the Commission onElections (COMELEC), ordering the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy of petitioner Teodulo M. Coquilla for the position ofmayor of Oras, Eastern Samar in the May 14, 2001 elections and the order, dated January 30, 2002, of the COMELEC enbanc denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.

The facts are as follows:

Petitioner Coquilla was born on February 17, 1938 of Filipino parents in Oras, Eastern Samar. He grew up and resided there until1965, when he joined the United States Navy. He was subsequently naturalized as a U.S. citizen.2 From 1970 to 1973, petitionerthrice visited the Philippines while on leave from the U.S. Navy.3 Otherwise, even after his retirement from the U.S. Navy in 1985,he remained in the United States.

On October 15, 1998, petitioner came to the Philippines and took out a residence certificate, although he continued making severaltrips to the United States, the last of which took place on July 6, 2000 and lasted until August 5, 2000.4 Subsequently, petitionerapplied for repatriation under R.A. No. 81715 to the Special Committee on Naturalization. His application was approved onNovember 7, 2000, and, on November 10, 2000, he took his oath as a citizen of the Philippines. Petitioner was issued Certificate ofRepatriation No. 000737 on November 10, 2000 and Bureau of Immigration Identification Certificate No. 115123 on November 13,2000.

On November 21, 2000, petitioner applied for registration as a voter of Butnga, Oras, Eastern Samar. His application was approvedby the Election Registration Board on January 12, 2001.6 On February 27, 2001, he filed his certificate of candidacy stating thereinthat he had been a resident of Oras, Eastern Samar for "two (2) years."7
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/jul2009/gr_178831_2009.html#fnt15http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/jul2009/gr_178831_2009.html#fnt15http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/jul2009/gr_178831_2009.html#fnt15http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/jul2009/gr_178831_2009.html#fnt15


10/45

On March 5, 2001, respondent Neil M. Alvarez, who was the incumbent mayor of Oras and who was running for reelection, soughtthe cancellation of petitioners certificate of candidacy on the ground that the latter had made a material misrepresentation in hiscertificate of candidacy by stating that he had been a resident of Oras for two years when in truth he had resided therein for onlyabout six months since November 10, 2000, when he took his oath as a citizen of the Philippines.

The COMELEC was unable to render judgment on the case before the elections on May 14, 2001. Meanwhile, petitioner was votedfor and received the highest number of votes (6,131) against private respondents 5,752 votes, or a margin of 379 votes. On May17, 2001, petitioner was proclaimed mayor of Oras by the Municipal Board of Canvassers.8 He subsequently took his oath of office.

On July 19, 2001, the Second Division of the COMELEC granted private respondents petition and ordered the cancellation ofpetitioners certificate of candidacy on the basis of the following findings:

Respondents frequent or regular trips to the Philippines and stay in Oras, Eastern Samar after his retirement from the U.S. Navy in1985 cannot be considered as a waiver of his status as a permanent resident or immigrant . . . of the U.S.A. prior to November 10,2000 as would qualify him to acquire the status of residency for purposes of compliance with the one-year residency requirement ofSection 39(a) of the Local Government Code of 1991 in relation to Sections 65 and 68 of the Omnibus Election Code. The one (1)year residency requirement contemplates of the actual residence of a Filipino citizen in the constituency where he seeks to beelected.

All things considered, the number of years he claimed to have resided or stayed in Oras, Eastern Samar since 1985 as an Americancitizen and permanent resident of the U.S.A. before November 10, 2000 when he reacquired his Philippine citizenship by[repatriation] cannot be added to his actual residence thereat after November 10, 2000 until May 14, 2001 to cure his deficiency indays, months, and year to allow or render him eligible to run for an elective office in the Philippines. Under such circumstances, bywhatever formula of computation used, respondent is short of the one-year residence requirement before the May 14, 2001

elections.9

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but his motion was denied by the COMELEC en banc on January 30, 2002. Hence thispetition.

I.

Two questions must first be resolved before considering the merits of this case: (a) whether the 30-day period for appealing theresolution of the COMELEC was suspended by the filing of a motion for reconsideration by petitioner and (b) whether theCOMELEC retained jurisdiction to decide this case notwithstanding the proclamation of petitioner.

A. With respect to the first question, private respondent contends that the petition in this case should be dismissed because itwas filed late; that the COMELEC en banc had denied petitioners motion for reconsideration for being pro forma; and that, pursuantto Rule 19, 4 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, the said motion did not suspend the running of the 30-day period for filing thispetition. He points out that petitioner received a copy of the resolution, dated July 19, 2001, of the COMELECs Second Division onJuly 28, 2001, so that he had only until August 27, 2001 within which to file this petition. Since the petition in this case was filed on

February 11, 2002, the same should be considered as having been filed late and should be dismissed.

Private respondents contention has no merit.

Rule 19 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure provides in pertinent parts:

Sec. 2. Period for Filing Motions for Reconsideration.A motion to reconsider a decision, resolution, order, or ruling of a Divisionshall be filed within five days from the promulgation thereof. Such motion, if not pro-forma, suspends the execution forimplementation of the decision, resolution, order, or ruling.

Sec. 4. Effect of Motion for Reconsideration on Period to Appeal.A motion to reconsider a decision, resolution, order, or ruling,when not pro-forma, suspends the running of the period to elevate the matter to the Supreme Court.

The five-day period for filing a motion for reconsideration under Rule 19, 2 should be counted from the receipt of the decision,resolution, order, or ruling of the COMELEC Division.10 In this case, petitioner received a copy of the resolution of July 19, 2001 ofthe COMELECs Second Division on July 28, 2001. Five days later, on August 2, 2001, he filed his motion for reconsideration. On

February 6, 2002, he received a copy of the order, dated January 30, 2002, of the COMELEC en banc denying his motion forreconsideration. Five days later, on February 11, 2002, he filed this petition for certiorari. There is no question, therefore, thatpetitioners motion for reconsiderationof the resolution of the COMELEC Second Division, as well as his petition for certiorari to setaside of the order of the COMELEC en banc, was filed within the period provided for in Rule 19, 2 of the COMELEC Rules ofProcedure and in Art. IX(A), 7 of the Constitution.

It is contended, however, that petitioners motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC en banc did not suspend the running ofthe period for filing this petition because the motion was pro forma and, consequently, this petition should have been filed on orbefore August 27, 2001. It was actually filed, however, only on February 11, 2002. Private respondent cites the finding of theCOMELEC en banc that


11/45

An incisive examination of the allegations in the Motion for Reconsideration shows that the same [are] a mere rehash of hisaverments contained in his Verified Answer and Memorandum. Neither did respondent raise new matters that would sufficientlywarrant a reversal of the assailed resolution of the Second Division. This makes the said Motion pro forma.11

We do not think this contention is correct. The motion for reconsideration was not pro forma and its filing did suspend the period forfiling the petition for certiorari in this case. The mere reiteration in a motion for reconsideration of the issues raised by the partiesand passed upon by the court does not make a motion pro forma; otherwise, the movants remedy would not be a reconsideration ofthe decision but a new trial or some other remedy.12 But, as we have held in another case:13

Among the ends to which a motion for reconsideration is addressed, one is precisely to convince the court that its ruling iserroneous and improper, contrary to the law or the evidence; and in doing so, the movant has to dwell of necessity upon the issuespassed upon by the court. If a motion for reconsideration may not discuss these issues, the consequence would be that after adecision is rendered, the losing party would be confined to filing only motions for reopening and new trial.

Indeed, in the cases where a motion for reconsideration was held to be pro forma, the motion was so held because (1) it was asecond motion for reconsideration,14 or (2) it did not comply with the rule that the motion must specify the findings and conclusionsalleged to be contrary to law or not supported by the evidence,15 or (3) it failed to substantiate the alleged errors,15 or (4) it merelyalleged that the decision in question was contrary to law,17 or (5) the adverse party was not given notice thereof.18 The 16-pagemotion for reconsideration filed by petitioner in the COMELEC en banc suffers from none of the foregoing defects, and it was errorfor the COMELEC en banc to rule that petitioners motion for reconsideration was pro forma because the allegations raised thereinare a mere "rehash" of his earlier pleadings or did not raise "new matters." Hence, the filing of the motion suspended the running ofthe 30-day period to file the petition in this case, which, as earlier shown, was done within the reglementary period provided by law.

B. As stated before, the COMELEC failed to resolve private respondents petition for cancellation of petitioners certificate of

candidacy before the elections on May 14, 2001. In the meantime, the votes were canvassed and petitioner was proclaimed electedwith a margin of 379 votes over private respondent. Did the COMELEC thereby lose authority to act on the petition filed by privaterespondent?

R.A. No. 6646 provides:

SECTION 6. Effect of Disqualification Case.Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not bevoted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before anelection to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commissionshall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, mayduring the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt isstrong. (Emphasis added)

SECTION 7. Petition to Deny Due Course To or Cancel a Certificate of Candidacy. The procedure hereinabove provided shallapply to petitions to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy as provided in Section 78 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881.

The rule then is that candidates who are disqualified by final judgment before the election shall not be voted for and the votes castfor them shall not be counted. But those against whom no final judgment of disqualification had been rendered may be voted for andproclaimed, unless, on motion of the complainant, the COMELEC suspends their proclamation because the grounds for theirdisqualification or cancellation of their certificates of candidacy are strong. Meanwhile, the proceedings for disqualification ofcandidates or for the cancellation or denial of certificates of candidacy, which have been begun before the elections, shouldcontinue even after such elections and proclamation of the winners. In Abella v. COMELEC19 and Salcedo II v. COMELEC,20 thecandidates whose certificates of candidacy were the subject of petitions for cancellation were voted for and, having received thehighest number of votes, were duly proclaimed winners. This Court, in the first case, affirmed and, in the second, reversed thedecisions of the COMELEC rendered after the proclamation of candidates, not on the ground that the latter had been divested of

jurisdiction upon the candidates proclamation but on the merits.

II.

On the merits, the question is whether petitioner had been a resident of Oras, Eastern Samar at least one (1) year before theelections held on May 14, 2001 as he represented in his certificate of candidacy. We find that he had not.

First, 39(a) of the Local Government Code (R.A No. 7160) provides:

Qualifications. - (a) An elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines; a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city,or province or, in the case of a member of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, or sangguniang bayan, thedistrict where he intends to be elected; a resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election; andable to read and write Filipino or any other local language or dialect. (Emphasis added)

The term "residence" is to be understood not in its common acceptation as referring to "dwelling" or "habitation,"21but rather to"domicile" or legal residence,22 that is, " the place where a party actually or constructively has his permanent home, where he, nomatter where he may be found at any given time, eventually intends to return and remain (animus manendi)."23 A domicile of origin


12/45

is acquired by every person at birth. It is usually the place where the childs parents reside and continues until the same isabandoned by acquisition of new domicile (domicile of choice).24

In the case at bar, petitioner lost his domicile of origin in Oras by becoming a U.S. citizen after enlisting in the U.S. Navy in 1965.From then on and until November 10, 2000, when he reacquired Philippine citizenship, petitioner was an alien without any right toreside in the Philippines save as our immigration laws may have allowed him to stay as a visitor or as a resident alien.

Indeed, residence in the United States is a requirement for naturalization as a U.S. citizen. Title 8, 1427(a) of the United States

Code provides:

Requirements of naturalization.Residence

(a) No person, except as otherwise provided in this subchapter, shall be naturalized unless such applicant, (1) immediatelypreceding the date of filing his application for naturalization has resided continuously, after being lawfully admitted for permanentresidence, within the United States for at least five years and during the five years immediately preceding the date of filing hispetition has been physically present therein for periods totaling at least half of that time, and who has resided within the State orwithin the district of the Service in the United States in which the applicant filed the application for at least three months, (2) hasresided continuously within the United States from the date of the application up to the time of admission to citizenship, and (3)during all the period referred to in this subsection has been and still is a person of good moral character, attached to the principles ofthe Constitution of the United States, and well disposed to the good order and happiness of the United States. (Emphasis added)

In Caasi v. Court of Appeals,25 this Court ruled that immigration to the United States by virtue of a "greencard," which entitles one toreside permanently in that country, constitutes abandonment of domicile in the Philippines. With more reason then doesnaturalization in a foreign country result in an abandonment of domicile in the Philippines.

Nor can petitioner contend that he was "compelled to adopt American citizenship" only by reason of his service in the U.S. armedforces.26 It is noteworthy that petitioner was repatriated not under R.A. No. 2630, which applies to the repatriation of those who losttheir Philippine citizenship by accepting commission in the Armed Forces of the United States, but under R.A. No. 8171, which, asearlier mentioned, provides for the repatriation of, among others, natural-born Filipinos who lost their citizenship on account ofpolitical or economic necessity. In any event, the fact is that, by having been naturalized abroad, he lost his Philippine citizenshipand with it his residence in the Philippines. Until his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship on November 10, 2000, petitioner did notreacquire his legal residence in this country.

Second, it is not true, as petitioner contends, that he reestablished residence in this country in 1998 when he came back to preparefor the mayoralty elections of Oras by securing a Community Tax Certificate in that year and by "constantly declaring" to histownmates of his intention to seek repatriation and run for mayor in the May 14, 2001 elections.27 The status of being an alien anda non-resident can be waived either separately, when one acquires the status of a resident alien before acquiring Philippinecitizenship, or at the same time when one acquires Philippine citizenship. As an alien, an individual may obtain an immigrant visaunder 1328 of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1948 and an Immigrant Certificate of Residence (ICR)29 and thus waive his statusas a non-resident. On the other hand, he may acquire Philippine citizenship by naturalization under C.A. No. 473, as amended, or, if

he is a former Philippine national, he may reacquire Philippine citizenship by repatriation or by an act of Congress,30 in which casehe waives not only his status as an alien but also his status as a non-resident alien.

In the case at bar, the only evidence of petitioners status when he entered the country on October 15, 1998, December 20, 1998,October 16, 1999, and June 23, 2000 is the statement "Philippine Immigration [] Balikbayan" in his 1998-2008 U.S. passport. As forhis entry on August 5, 2000, the stamp bore the added inscription "good for one year stay."31 Under 2 of R.A. No. 6768 (An ActInstituting a Balikbayan Program), the term balikbayanincludes a former Filipino citizen who had been naturalized in a foreigncountry and comes or returns to the Philippines and, if so, he is entitled, among others, to a "visa-free entry to the Philippines for aperiod of one (1) year" (3(c)). It would appear then that when petitioner entered the country on the dates in question, he did so as avisa-free balikbayan visitor whose stay as such was valid for one year only. Hence, petitioner can only be held to have waived hisstatus as an alien and as a non-resident only on November 10, 2000 upon taking his oath as a citizen of the Philippines under R.A.No. 8171.32 He lacked the requisite residency to qualify him for the mayorship of Oras, Eastern, Samar.

Petitioner invokes the ruling in Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections33 in support of his contention that the residency requirement in39(a) of the Local Government Code includes the residency of one who is not a citizen of the Philippines. Residency, however,was not an issue in that case and this Court did not make any ruling on the issue now at bar. The question in Frivaldo was whetherpetitioner, who took his oath of repatriation on the same day that his term as governor of Sorsogon began on June 30, 1995,complied with the citizenship requirement under 39(a). It was held that he had, because citizenship may be possessed even on theday the candidate assumes office. But in the case of residency, as already noted, 39(a) of the Local Government Code requiresthat the candidate must have been a resident of the municipality "for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of theelection."

Nor can petitioner invoke this Courts ruling inBengzon III v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal.34 What the Court held inthat case was that, upon repatriation, a former natural-born Filipino is deemed to have recovered his original status as a natural-born citizen.


13/45

Third, petitioner nonetheless says that his registration as a voter of Butnga, Oras, Eastern Samar in January 2001 is conclusive ofhis residency as a candidate because 117 of the Omnibus Election Code requires that a voter must have resided in the Philipp inesfor at least one year and in the city or municipality wherein he proposes to vote for at least six months immediately preceding theelection. As held in Nuval v. Guray,35 however, registration as a voter does not bar the filing of a subsequent case questioning acandidates lack of residency.

Petitioners invocation of the liberal interpretation of election laws cannot avail him any. As held in Aquino v. Commission onElections:36

A democratic government is necessarily a government of laws. In a republican government those laws are themselves ordained bythe people. Through their representatives, they dictate the qualifications necessary for service in government positions. And aspetitioner clearly lacks one of the essential qualifications for running for membership in the House of Representatives, not even thewill of a majority or plurality of the voters of the Second District of Makati City would substitute for a requirement mandated by thefundamental law itself.

Fourth, petitioner was not denied due process because the COMELEC failed to act on his motion to be allowed to present evidence.Under 5(d), in relation to 7, of R.A. No. 6646 (Electoral Reforms Law of 1987), proceedings for denial or cancellation of acertificate of candidacy are summary in nature. The holding of a formal hearing is thus not de rigeur. In any event, petitioner cannotclaim denial of the right to be heard since he filed a Verified Answer, a Memorandum and a Manifestation, all dated March 19, 2001,before the COMELEC in which he submitted documents relied by him in this petition, which, contrary to petitioners claim, arecomplete and intact in the records.

III.

The statement in petitioners certificate of candidacy that he had been a resident of Oras, Eastern Samar for "two years" at the timehe filed such certificate is not true. The question is whether the COMELEC was justified in ordering the cancellation of his certificateof candidacy for this reason. We hold that it was. Petitioner made a false representation of a material fact in his certificate ofcandidacy, thus rendering such certificate liable to cancellation. The Omnibus Election Code provides:

SEC. 74. Contents of certificate of candidacy.The certificate of candidacy shall state that the person filing it is announcing hiscandidacy for the office stated therein and that he is eligible for said office; if for Member of the Batasang Pambansa, the province,including its component cities, highly urbanized city or district or sector which he seeks to represent; the political party to which hebelongs; civil status; his date of birth; residence; his post office address for all election purposes; his profession or occupation; thathe will support and defend the Constitution of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; that he will obey thelaws, legal orders, and decrees promulgated by the duly constituted authorities; that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant toa foreign country; that the obligation imposed by his oath is assumed voluntarily, without mental reservation or purpose of evasion;and that the facts stated in the certificate of candidacy are true to the best of his knowledge.

SEC. 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy.A verified petition seeking to deny due course or tocancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained

therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from thetime of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after due notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days beforethe election.

Indeed, it has been held that a candidates statement in her certificate of candidacy for the position of governor of Leyte that shewas a resident of Kananga, Leyte when this was not so37 or that the candidate was a "natural-born" Filipino when in fact he hadbecome an Australian citizen38 constitutes a ground for the cancellation of a certificate of candidacy. On the other hand, we heldin Salcedo II v. COMELEC39 that a candidate who used her husbands family name even though their marriage was void was notguilty of misrepresentation concerning a material fact. In the case at bar, what is involved is a false statement concerning acandidates qualification for an office for which he filed the certificate of candidacy. This is a misrepresentation of a material fact

justifying the cancellation of petitioners certificate of candidacy. The cancellation of petitioners certificate of candidacy in this caseis thus fully justified.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and the resolution of the Second Division of the Commission on Elections, dated July 19,2001, and the order, dated January 30, 2002 of the Commission on Elections en bancare AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 120295 June 28, 1996

JUAN G. FRIVALDO, petitioner,vs.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and RAUL R. LEE, respondents.

G.R. No. 123755 June 28, 1996


14/45


PANGANIBAN, J.:p

The ultimate question posed before this Court in these twin cases is: Who should be declared the rightful governor of Sorsogon -(i) Juan G. Frivaldo, who unquestionably obtained the highest number of votes in three successive elections but who was twicedeclared by this Court to be disqualified to hold such office due to his alien citizenship, and who now claims to have re-assumed hislost Philippine citizenship thru repatriation;

(ii) Raul R. Lee, who was the second placer in the canvass, but who claims that the votes cast in favor of Frivaldo should beconsidered void; that the electorate should be deemed to have intentionally thrown away their ballots; and that legally, he securedthe most number of valid votes; or

(iii) The incumbent Vice-Governor, Oscar G. Deri, who obviously was not voted directly to the position of governor, but whoaccording to prevailing jurisprudence should take over the said post inasmuch as, by the ineligibility of F rivaldo, a "permanentvacancy in the contested office has occurred"?

In ruling for Frivaldo, the Court lays down new doctrines on repatriation, clarifies/reiterates/amplifies existing jurisprudence oncitizenship and elections, and upholds the superiority of substantial justice over pure legalisms.

G.R. No. 123755

This is a special civil action under Rules 65 and 58 of the Rules of Court for certiorari and preliminary injunction to review and annula Resolution of the respondent Commission on Elections (Comelec), First Division, 1 promulgated on December 19, 1995 2 andanother Resolution of the Comelec en banc promulgated February 23, 1996 3 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.

The Facts

On March 20, 1995, private respondent Juan G. Frivaldo filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the office of Governor of Sorsogon inthe May 8, 1995 elections. On March 23, 1995, petitioner Raul R. Lee, another candidate, filed a petition 4 with the Comelecdocketed as SPA No. 95-028 praying that Frivaldo "be disqualified from seeking or holding any public office or position by reason ofnot yet being a citizen of the Philippines", and that his Certificate of Candidacy be canceled. On May 1, 1995, the Second Division ofthe Comelec promulgated a Resolution 5 granting the petition with the following disposition 6:

WHEREFORE, this Division resolves to GRANT the petition and declares that respondent is DISQUALIFIED to run for the Office ofGovernor of Sorsogon on the ground that he is NOT a citizen of the Philippines. Accordingly, respondent's certificate of candidacy is

canceled.

The Motion for Reconsideration filed by Frivaldo remained unacted upon until after the May 8, 1995 elections. So, his candidacycontinued and he was voted for during the elections held on said date. On May 11, 1995, the Comelec en banc 7 affirmed theaforementioned Resolution of the Second Division.

The Provincial Board of Canvassers completed the canvass of the election returns and a Certificate of Votes 8dated May 27, 1995was issued showing the following votes obtained by the candidates for the position of Governor of Sorsogon:

Antonio H. Escudero, Jr. 51,060

Juan G. Frivaldo 73,440

Raul R. Lee 53,304

Isagani P. Ocampo 1,925

On June 9, 1995, Lee filed in said SPA No. 95-028, a (supplemental) petition 9 praying for his proclamation as the duly-electedGovernor of Sorsogon.

In an order 10 dated June 21, 1995, but promulgated according to the petition "only on June 29, 1995," the Comelec enbanc directed "the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Sorsogon to reconvene for the purpose of proclaiming candidate Raul Lee asthe winning gubernatorial candidate in the province of Sorsogon on June 29, 1995 . . ." Accordingly, at 8:30 in the evening of June30, 1995, Lee was proclaimed governor of Sorsogon.

On July 6, 1995, Frivaldo filed with the Comelec a new petition, 11 docketed as SPC No. 95-317, praying for the annulment of theJune 30, 1995 proclamation of Lee and for his own proclamation. He alleged that on June 30, 1995, at 2:00 in the afternoon, he tookhis oath of allegiance as a citizen of the Philippines after "his petition for repatriation under P.D. 725 which he filed with the Special


15/45

Committee on Naturalization in September 1994 had been granted". As such, when "the said order (dated June 21, 1995) (of theComelec) . . . was released and received by Frivaldo on June 30, 1995 at 5:30 o'clock in the evening, there was no more legalimpediment to the proclamation (of Frivaldo) as governor . . ." In the alternative, he averred that pursuant to the two cases of Labovs. Comelec, 12 the Vice-Governor - not Lee - should occupy said position of governor.

On December 19, 1995, the Comelec First Division promulgated the herein assailed Resolution 13 holding that Lee, "not havinggarnered the highest number of votes," was not legally entitled to be proclaimed as duly-elected governor; and that Frivaldo, "havinggarnered the highest number of votes,

and . . . having reacquired his Filipino citizenship by repatriation on June 30, 1995 under the provisions of Presidential Decree No.725 . . . (is) qualified to hold the office of governor of Sorsogon"; thus:

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Commission (First Division), therefore RESOLVES to GRANT the Petition.

Consistent with the decisions of the Supreme Court, the proclamation of Raul R. Lee as Governor of Sorsogon is hereby orderedannulled, being contrary to law, he not having garnered the highest number of votes to warrant his proclamation.

Upon the finality of the annulment of the proclamation of Raul R. Lee, the Provincial Board of Canvassers is directed to immediatelyreconvene and, on the basis of the completed canvass, proclaim petitioner Juan G. Frivaldo as the duly elected Governor ofSorsogon having garnered the highest number of votes, and he having reacquired his Filipino citizenship by repatriation on June 30,1995 under the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 725 and, thus, qualified to hold the office of Governor of Sorsogon.

Conformably with Section 260 of the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881), the Clerk of the Commission is directed to notify HisExcellency the President of the Philippines, and the Secretary of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Sorsogon of thisresolution immediately upon the due implementation thereof.

On December 26, 1995, Lee filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the Comelec en banc in itsResolution 14 promulgated on February 23, 1996. On February 26, 1996, the present petition was filed. Acting on the prayer for atemporary restraining order, this Court issued on February 27, 1996 a Resolution which inter alia directed the parties "to maintainthe status quo prevailing prior to the filing of this petition."

The Issues in G.R. No. 123755

Petitioner Lee's "position on the matter at hand may briefly be capsulized in the following propositions" 15:

First -- The initiatory petition below was so far insufficient in form and substance to warrant the exercise by the COMELEC of itsjurisdiction with the result that, in effect, the COMELEC acted without jurisdiction in taking cognizance of and deciding said petition;

Second -- The judicially declared disqualification of respondent was a continuing condition and rendered him ineligible to run for, tobe elected to and to hold the Office of Governor;

Third -- The alleged repatriation of respondent was neither valid nor is the effect thereof retroactive as to cure his ineligibility andqualify him to hold the Office of Governor; and

Fourth -- Correctly read and applied, the Labo Doctrine fully supports the validity of petitioner's proclamation as duly electedGovernor of Sorsogon.

G.R. No. 120295

This is a petition to annul three Resolutions of the respondent Comelec, the first two of which are also at issue in G.R. No. 123755,as follows:

1. Resolution 16 of the Second Division, promulgated on May 1, 1995, disqualifying Frivaldo from running for governor of Sorsogonin the May 8, 1995 elections "on the ground that he is not a citizen of the Philippines";

2. Resolution 17 of the Comelec en banc, promulgated on May 11, 1995; and

3. Resolution 18 of the Comelec en banc, promulgated also on May 11, 1995 suspending the proclamation of, among others,

Frivaldo.

The Facts and the Issue

The facts of this case are essentially the same as those in G.R. No. 123755. However, Frivaldo assails the above-mentionedresolutions on a different ground: that under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, which is reproduced hereinunder:

Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy. -- A verified petition seeking to deny due course or tocancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that any material representation containedtherein as required under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from thetime of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before theelection. (Emphasis supplied.)


16/45

the Comelec had no jurisdiction to issue said Resolutions because they were not rendered "within the period allowed by law" i.e.,"not later than fifteen days before the election."

Otherwise stated, Frivaldo contends that the failure of the Comelec to act on the petition for disqualification within the period offifteen days prior to the election as provided by law is a jurisdictional defect which renders the said Resolutions null and void.

By Resolution on March 12, 1996, the Court consolidated G.R. Nos. 120295 and 123755 since they are intimately related in theirfactual environment and are identical in the ultimate question raised, viz., who should occupy the position of governor of the

province of Sorsogon.

On March 19, 1995, the Court heard oral argument from the parties and required them thereafter to file simultaneously theirrespective memoranda.

The Consolidated Issues

From the foregoing submissions, the consolidated issues may be restated as follows:

1. Was the repatriation of Frivaldo valid and legal? If so, did it seasonably cure his lack of citizenship as to qualify him to beproclaimed and to hold the Office of Governor? If not, may it be given retroactive effect? If so, from when?

2. Is Frivaldo's "judicially declared" disqualification for lack of Filipino citizenship a continuing bar to his eligibility to run for, beelected to or hold the governorship of Sorsogon?

3. Did the respondent Comelec have jurisdiction over the initiatory petition in SPC No. 95-317 considering that said petition is not "apre-proclamation case, an election protest or a quo warranto case"?

4. Was the proclamation of Lee, a runner-up in the election, valid and legal in light of existing jurisprudence?

5. Did the respondent Commission on Elections exceed its jurisdiction in promulgating the assailed Resolutions, all of whichprevented Frivaldo from assuming the governorship of Sorsogon, considering that they were not rendered within the period referredto in Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, viz., "not later than fifteen days before the elections"?

The First Issue: Frivaldo's Repatriation

The validity and effectivity of Frivaldo's repatriation is the lis mota, the threshold legal issue in this case. All the other matters raisedare secondary to this.

The Local Government Code of 1991 19 expressly requires Philippine citizenship as a qualification for elective local officials,including that of provincial governor, thus:

Sec. 39. Qualifications. -- (a) An elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines; a registered voter in the barangay,

municipality, city, or province or, in the case of a member of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, orsangguniang bayan, the district where he intends to be elected; a resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately precedingthe day of the election; and able to read and write Filipino or any other local language or dialect.

(b) Candidates for the position of governor, vice governor or member of the sangguniang panlalawigan, or mayor, vice mayor ormember of the sangguniang panlungsod of highly urbanized cities must be at least twenty-three (23) years of age on election day.

xxx xxx xxx

Inasmuch as Frivaldo had been declared by this Court 20 as a non-citizen, it is therefore incumbent upon him to show that he hasreacquired citizenship; in fine, that he possesses the qualifications prescribed under the said statute (R.A. 7160).

Under Philippine law, 21 citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by naturalization or by repatriation. Frivaldo toldthis Court in G.R. No. 104654 22 and during the oral argument in this case that he tried to resume his citizenship by direct act ofCongress, but that the bill allowing him to do so "failed to materialize, notwithstanding the endorsement of several members of theHouse of Representatives" due, according to him, to the "maneuvers of his political rivals." In the same case, his attempt

at naturalization was rejected by this Court because of jurisdictional, substantial and procedural defects.Despite his lack of Philippine citizenship, Frivaldo was overwhelmingly elected governor by the electorate of Sorsogon, with amargin of 27,000 votes in the 1988 elections, 57,000 in 1992, and 20,000 in 1995 over the same opponent Raul Lee. Twice, he was

judicially declared a non-Filipino and thus twice disqualified from holding and discharging his popular mandate. Now, he comes to usa third time, with a fresh vote from the people of Sorsogon and a favorable decision from the Commission on Elections to boot.Moreover, he now boasts of having successfully passed through the third and last mode of reacquiring citizenship: by repatriationunder P.D. No. 725, with no less than the Solicitor General himself, who was the prime opposing counsel in the previous cases helost, this time, as counsel for co-respondent Comelec, arguing the validity of his cause (in addition to his able private counsel SixtoS. Brillantes, Jr.). That he took his oath of allegiance under the provisions of said Decree at 2:00 p.m. on June 30, 1995 is notdisputed. Hence, he insists that he -- not Lee -- should have been proclaimed as the duly-elected governor of Sorsogon when the


17/45

Provincial Board of Canvassers met at 8:30 p.m. on the said date since, clearly and unquestionably, he garnered the highestnumber of votes in the elections and since at that time, he already reacquired his citizenship.

En contrario, Lee argues that Frivaldo's repatriation is tainted with serious defects, which we shall now discuss in seriatim.

First, Lee tells us that P.D. No. 725 had "been effectively repealed", asserting that "then President Corazon Aquino exercisinglegislative powers under the Transitory Provisions of the 1987 Constitution, forbade the grant of citizenship by Presidential Decreeor Executive Issuances as the same poses a serious and contentious issue of policy which the present government, in the exercise

of prudence and sound discretion, should best leave to the judgment of the first Congress under the 1987 Constitution", adding thatin her memorandum dated March 27, 1987 to the members of the Special Committee on Naturalization constituted for purposes ofPresidential Decree No. 725, President Aquino directed them "to cease and desist from undertaking any and all proceedings withinyour functional area of responsibility as defined under Letter of Instructions (LOI) No. 270 dated April 11, 1975, as amended." 23

This memorandum dated March 27, 1987 24 cannot by any stretch of legal hermeneutics be construed as a law sanctioning orauthorizing a repeal of P.D. No. 725. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones 25 and a repeal may be express or implied. It isobvious that no express repeal was made because then President Aquino in her memorandum -- based on the copy furnished us byLee -- did not categorically and/or impliedly state that P.D. 725 was being repealed or was being rendered without any legal effect.In fact, she did not even mention it specifically by its number or text. On the other hand, it is a basic rule of statutory constructionthat repeals by implication are not favored. An implied repeal will not be allowed "unless it is convincingly and unambiguouslydemonstrated that the two laws are clearly repugnant and patently inconsistent that they cannot co-exist". 26

The memorandum of then President Aquino cannot even be regarded as a legislative enactment, for not every pronouncement ofthe Chief Executive even under the Transitory Provisions of the 1987 Constitution can nor should be regarded as an exercise of herlaw-making powers. At best, it could be treated as an executive policy addressed to the Special Committee to halt the acceptance

and processing of applications for repatriation pending whatever "judgment the first Congress under the 1987 Constitution" mightmake. In other words, the former President did not repeal P.D. 725 but left it to the first Congress -- once created -- to deal with thematter. If she had intended to repeal such law, she should have unequivocally said so instead of referring the matter to Congress.The fact is she carefully couched her presidential issuance in terms that clearly indicated the intention of "the present government, inthe exercise of prudence and sound discretion" to leave the matter of repeal to the new Congress. Any other interpretation of thesaid Presidential Memorandum, such as is now being proffered to the Court by Lee, would visit unmitigated violence not only uponstatutory construction but on common sense as well.

Second, Lee also argues that "serious congenital irregularities flawed the repatriation proceedings," asserting that Frivaldo'sapplication therefor was "filed on June 29, 1995 . . . (and) was approved in just one day or on June 30, 1995 . . .", which "preventeda judicious review and evaluation of the merits thereof." Frivaldo counters that he filed his application for repatriation with the Officeof the President in Malacaang Palace on August 17, 1994. This is confirmed by the Solicitor General. However, the SpecialCommittee was reactivated only on June 8, 1995, when presumably the said Committee started processing his application. On June29, 1995, he filled up and re-submitted the FORM that the Committee required. Under these circumstances, it could not be said thatthere was "indecent haste" in the processing of his application.

Anent Lee's charge that the "sudden reconstitution of the Special Committee on Naturalization was intended solely for the personalinterest of respondent," 27 the Solicitor General explained during the oral argument on March 19, 1996 that such allegation is simplybaseless as there were many others who applied and were considered for repatriation, a list of whom was submitted by him to thisCourt, through a Manifestation 28 filed on April 3, 1996.

On the basis of the parties' submissions, we are convinced that the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty andthe presumption of legality in the repatriation of Frivaldo have not been successfully rebutted by Lee. The mere fact that theproceedings were speeded up is by itself not a ground to conclude that such proceedings were necessarily tainted. After all, therequirements of repatriation under P.D. No. 725 are not difficult to comply with, nor are they tedious and cumbersome. In fact, P.D.725 29 itself requires very little of an applicant, and even the rules and regulations to implement the said decree were left to theSpecial Committee to promulgate. This is not unusual since, unlike in naturalization where an alien covets a first-timeentry intoPhilippine political life, in repatriation the applicant is a former natural-born Filipino who is merely seeking to reacquire his previouscitizenship. In the case of Frivaldo, he was undoubtedly a natural-born citizen who openly and faithfully served his country and hisprovince prior to his naturalization in the United States -- a naturalization he insists was made necessary only to escape the ironclutches of a dictatorship he abhorred and could not in conscience embrace -- and who, after the fall of the dictator and the re-

establishment of democratic space, wasted no time in returning to his country of birth to offer once more his talent and services tohis people.

So too, the fact that ten other persons, as certified to by the Solicitor General, were granted repatriation argues convincingly andconclusively against the existence of favoritism vehemently posited by Raul Lee. At any rate, any contest on the legality of Frivaldo'srepatriation should have been pursued before the Committee itself, and, failing there, in the Office of the President, pursuant to thedoctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies.

Third, Lee further contends that assuming the assailed repatriation to be valid, nevertheless it could only be effective as at 2:00 p.m.of June 30, 1995 whereas the citizenship qualification prescribed

consti cases set 2, last 9 cases

Documents