new consti cases

8/8/2019 New Consti Cases

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Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-68635 May 14, 1987

IN THE MATTER OF PROCEEDINGS FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION AGAINST ATTY.WENCESLAO LAURETA, AND OF CONTEMPT PROCEEDINGS AGAINST EVA

MARAVILLA-ILUSTRE in G.R. No. 68635, entitled "EVA MARAVILLA-ILUSTRE, vs.HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, ET AL."

R E S O L U T I O N

PER CURIAM:

Before us are 1) Atty. Wenceslao Laureta's Motion for Reconsideration of the PerCuriam Resolution of this Court promulgated on March 12, 1987, finding him guilty ofgrave professional misconduct and suspending him indefinitely from the practice of law;and 2) Eva Maravilla-Ilustre's Motion for Reconsideration of the same Resolutionholding her in contempt and ordering her to pay a fine of P1,000.00.

Essentially, Atty. Laureta maintains that the Order of suspension without hearingviolated his right to life and due process of law and by reason thereof the Order is null

and void; that the acts of misconduct imputed to him are without basis; that the chargeagainst him that it was he who had circulated to the press copies of the Complaint filedbefore the Tanodbayan is unfounded such that, even in this Court's Resolution, hishaving distributed copies to the press is not stated positively; that the banner headlinewhich appeared In the Daily Express is regrettable but that he was not responsible forsuch "misleading headline;" that he "did nothing of the sort" being fully conscious of hisresponsibilities as a law practitioner and officer of the Court; that as a formernewspaperman, he would not have been satisfied with merely circulating copies of theComplaint to the press in envelopes where his name appears; "he himself would havewritten stories about the case in a manner that sells newspapers; even a series of juicyarticles perhaps, something that would have further subjected the respondent justices to

far worse publicity;" that, on the contrary, the press conference scheduled by Ilustre wascancelled through his efforts in order to prevent any further adverse publicity resultingfrom the filing of the complaint before the Tanodbayan; that, as a matter of fact, it wasthis Court's Resolution that was serialized in the Bulletin Today, which newspaper alsomade him the subject of a scathing editorial but that he "understands the cooperationbecause after all, the Court rendered a favorable judgment in the Bulletin union caselast year;" that he considered it "below his dignity to plead for the chance to present hisside" with the Editor, Mr. Ben Rodriguez, "a long-time personal friend" since he "can


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afford to be the sacrificial lamb if only to help the Honorable Court uphold its integrity;"that he was called by a reporter of DZRH and was asked to comment on the case filedbefore the Tanodbayan but that his remarks were confined to the filing of the case byIlustre herself, and that the judgment of the trial Court had attained its finality long ago;that he is not Ilustre's counsel before the Tanodbayan and did not prepare the complaint

filed before it, his professional services having been terminated upon the final dismissalof Ilustre's case before this Court; that similarities in the language and phraseology usedin the Ilustre letters, in pleadings before this Court and before the Tanodbayan do notprove his authorship since other lawyers "even of a mediocre caliber" could very easilyhave reproduced them; that the discussions on the merits in the Per Curiam Resolutionare "more properly addressed to the Tanodbayan, Justice Raul M. Gonzales beingcompetent to deal with the case before him;" that he takes exception to the accusationthat he has manifested lack of respect for and exposed to public ridicule the two highestCourts of the land, all he did having been to call attention to errors or injusticecommitted in the promulgation of judgments or orders; that he has "not authorized orassisted and/or abetted and could not have prevented the contemptuous statements,

conduct, acts and malicious charges of Eva Maravilla Ilustre who was no longer hisclient when these alleged acts were done; that "he is grateful to this Court for thereminder on the first duty of a lawyer which is to the Court and not to his client, a dutythat he has always impressed upon his law students;" and finally, that "for the record, heis sorry for the adverse publicity generated by the filing of the complaint against theJustices before the Tanodbayan."

In her own Motion for Reconsideration, Eva Maravilla-Ilustre also raises as her mainground the alleged deprivation of her constitutional right to due process. She maintainsthat as contempt proceedings are commonly treated as criminal in nature, the mode ofprocedure and rules of evidence in criminal prosecution should be assimilated, as far aspracticable, in this proceeding, and that she should be given every opportunity topresent her side. Additionally, she states that, with some sympathetic lawyers, theymade an "investigation" and learned that the Resolution of the First Division was arrivedat without any deliberation by its members; that Court personnel were "tight-lippedabout the matter, which is shrouded mystery" thereby prompting her to pursue a coursewhich she thought was legal and peaceful; that there is nothing wrong in making publicthe manner of voting by the Justices, and it was for that reason that she addressedIdentical letters to Associate Justices Andres Narvasa, Ameurfina M. Herrera, IsaganiCruz and Florentino Feliciano; that "if the lawyers of my opponents were not a SolicitorGeneral, and member of the Supreme Court and a Division Chairman, respectively, theresolution of May 14, 1986 would not have aroused my suspicion;" that instead of takingthe law into her own hands or joining any violent movement, she took the legitimate stepof making a peaceful investigation into how her case was decided, and brought hergrievance to the Tanodbayan "in exasperation" against those whom she felt hadcommitted injustice against her "in an underhanded manner."

We deny reconsideration in both instances.


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The argument premised on lack of hearing and due process, is not impressed withmerit. What due process abhors is absolute lack of opportunity to be heard (Tajoneravs. Lamaroza, et al., 110 SCRA 438 [1981]). The word "hearing" does not necessarilyconnote a "trial-type" proceeding. In the show-cause Resolution of this Court, datedJanuary 29, 1987, Atty. Laureta was given sufficient opportunity to inform this Court of

the reasons why he should not be subjected to dispose action. His Answer, wherein heprayed that the action against him be dismissed, contained twenty-two (22) pages,double spaced. Eva Maravilla-Ilustre was also given a like opportunity to explain herstatements, conduct, acts and charges against the Court and/or the official actions ofthe Justices concerned. Her Compliance Answer, wherein she prayed that the contemptproceeding against her be dismissed, contained nineteen (19) pages, double spaced.Both were afforded ample latitude to explain matters fully. Atty. Laureta denied havingauthored the letters written by Ilustre, his being her counsel before the Tanodbayan, hishaving circularized to the press copies of the complaint filed before said body, and hishaving committed acts unworthy of his profession. But the Court believed otherwise andfound that those letters and the charges levelled against the Justices concerned, of

themselves and by themselves, betray not only their malicious and contemptuouscharacter, but also the lack of respect for the two highest Courts of the land, a completeobliviousness to the fundamental principle of separation of powers, and a wantondisregard of the cardinal doctrine of independence of the Judiciary. Res ipsaloquitur. Nothing more needed to have been said or proven. The necessity to conductany further evidentially hearing was obviated (See People vs. Hon. Valenzuela, G.R.Nos. 63950-60, April 19, 1985, 135 SCRA 712). Atty. Laureta and Ilustre were givenample opportunity to be heard, and were, in fact, heard.

(1)

In his Motion for Reconsideration, Atty. Laureta reiterates his allegations in his Answerto the show-cause Resolution that his professional services were terminated by Ilustreafter the dismissal of the main petition by this Court; that he had nothing to do with thecontemptuous letters to the individual Justices; and that he is not Ilustre's counselbefore the Tanodbayan.

Significantly enough, however, copy of the Tanodbayan Resolution dismissing Ilustre'sComplaint was furnished Atty. Laureta as "counsel for the complainant" at his addressof record. Of note, too, is the fact that it was he who was following up the Complaintbefore the Tanodbayan and, after its dismissal, the Motion for Reconsideration of theOrder of dismissal.

Of import, as well, is the report of Lorenzo C. Bardel, a process server of this Court, thatafter having failed to serve copy of the Per Curiam Resolution of March 12, 1987 of thisCourt on Ilustre personally at her address of record, "101 F. Manalo St., Cubao, QuezonCity," having been informed that she is 6 not a resident of the place," he proceeded tothe residence of Atty. Laureta where the latter's wife "voluntarily received the two copiesof decision for her husband and for Ms. Maravina-Ilustre" (p. 670, Rollo, Vol. 11).


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That Ilustre subsequently received copy of this Court's Resolution delivered to Mrs.Laureta is shown by the fact that she filed, as of March 27, 1987, a "Petition forExtension of Time to file Motion for Reconsideration" and subsequently the Motion forReconsideration. In that Petition Ilustre acknowledged receipt of the Resolution onMarch 12, 1987, the very same date Mrs. Laureta received copy thereof. If, indeed, the

lawyer-client relationship between her husband and Ilustre had been allegedlycompletely severed, all Mrs. Laureta had to do was to return to the Sheriff the copyintended for Ilustre. As it was, however, service on Atty. Laureta proved to be service onIlustre as well. The close tie- up between the corespondents is heightened by the factthat three process servers of this Court failed to serve copy of this Court's Per CuriamResolution on Ilustre personally.

Noteworthy, as well, is that by Atty. Laureta's own admission, he was the one called bya "reporter" of DZRH to comment on the Ilustre charges before the Tanodbayan. If, infact, he had nothing to do with the complaint, he would not have been pinpointed at all.

And if his disclaimer were the truth, the logical step for him to have taken was to refer

the caller to the lawyer/s allegedly assisting Ilustre, at the very least, out of elementarycourtesy and propriety. But he did nothing of the sort. " He gave his comment withalacrity.

The impudence and lack of respect of Atty. Laureta for this Court again surfaces whenhe asserts in his Motion for Reconsideration that he "understands the cooperation" ofthe Bulletin Today as manifested in the serialized publication of the Per CuriamResolution of this Court and his being subjected to a scathing editorial by the samenewspaper "because after all, the Court rendered a favorable judgment in the Bulletinunion case last year." The malice lurking in that statement is most unbecoming of anofficer of the Court and is an added reason for denying reconsideration.

Further, Atty. Laureta stubbornly contends that discussions on the merits in the Court'sPer Curiam Resolution are more properly addressed to the Tanodbayan, forgetting,however, his own discourse on the merits in his Answer to this Court's Resolution datedJanuary 29, 1987. He thus incorrigibly insists on subordinating the Judiciary to theexecutive notwithstanding the categorical pronouncement in the Per Curiam Resolutionof March 12, 1987, that Article 204 of the Revised Penal Code has no application to themembers of a collegiate Court; that a charge of violation of the Anti-Graft and CorruptPractices Act on the ground that a collective decision is "unjust" cannot prosper; plusthe clear and extended dissertation in the same Per Curiam Resolution on thefundamental principle of separation of powers and of checks and balances, pursuant towhich it is this Court "entrusted exclusively with the judicial power to adjudicate withfinality all justifiable disputes, public and private. No other department or agency maypass upon its judgments or declare them 'unjust' upon controlling and irresistiblereasons of public policy and of sound practice."

Atty. Laureta's protestations that he has done his best to protect and uphold the dignityof this Court are belied by environmental facts and circumstances. His apologeticstance for the "adverse publicity" generated by the filing of the charges against the


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Justices concerned before the Tanodbayan rings with insincerity. The complaint wascalculated precisely to serve that very purpose. The threat to bring the case to "anotherforum of justice" was implemented to the fun. Besides, he misses the heart of thematter. Exposure to the glare of publicity is an occupational hazard. If he has beenvisited with disciplinary sanctions it is because by his conduct, acts and statements, he

has, overall, deliberately sought to destroy the "authenticity, integrity, andconclusiveness of collegiate acts," to "undermine the role of the Supreme Court as thefinal arbiter of all justifiable disputes," and to subvert public confidence in the integrity ofthe Courts and the Justices concerned, and in the orderly administration of justice.

In fine, we discern nothing in Atty. Laureta's Motion for Reconsideration that would callfor a modification, much less a reversal, of our finding that he is guilty of graveprofessional misconduct that renders him unfit to continue to be entrusted with theduties and responsibilities pertaining to an attorney and officer of the Court.

(2)

Neither do we find merit in Ilustre's Motion for Reconsideration. She has turned deafears to any reason or clarification. She and her counsel have refused to accept theuntenability of their case and the inevitability of losing in Court. They have allowedsuspicion alone to blind their actions and in so doing degraded the administration of

justice. "Investigation" was utterly uncalled for. All conclusions and judgments of theCourt, be they en bancor by Division, are arrived at only after deliberation. The fact thatno dissent was indicated in the Minutes of the proceedings held on May 14, 1986showed that the members of the Division voted unanimously. Court personnel are not ina position to know the voting in any case because all deliberations are held behindclosed doors without any one of them being present. No malicious inferences should

have been drawn from their inability to furnish the information Ilustre and Atty. Lauretadesired The personality of the Solicitor General never came into the picture. It wasJustice Abad Santos, and not Justice Yap, who was Chairman of the First Division whenthe Resolution of May 14, 1986 denying the Petition was rendered. Thereafter JusticeYap inhibited himself from any participation. The fact that the Court en bancupheld thechallenged Resolutions of the First Division emphasizes the irrespective of Ilustre's caseirrespective of the personalities involved.

Additionally, Ilustre has been trifling with this Court. She has given our process serversthe run-around. Three of them failed to serve on her personally her copy of this Court'sPer Curiam Resolution of March 12, 1987 at her address of record. Mrs. Lauretainformed process server Lorenzo C. Bardel that Ilustre was residing at 17-D, QuezonSt., Tondo, Manila. Romeo C. Regala, another process server, went to that address toserve copy of the Resolution but he reported:

4. That inspite of diligent efforts to locate the address of ms.Eva Maravilla-Ilustre, said address could not be located;


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5. That I even asked the occupants (Cerdan Family) of No. 17 QuezonStreet, Tondo, Manila, and they informed that there is no such Ms. EvaMaravilla-Ilustre in the neighborhood and/or in the vicinity; ... (p. 672,Rollo, Vol. 11).

The third process server, Nelson C. Cabesuela, was also unable to serve copy of thisCourt's Resolution on Ilustre. He reported:

2. On March 17, 1987, at about 9:30 A.M., I arrived at the house in theaddress furnished at; the notice of judgment (101 Felix Manalo St., Cubao,Quezon City), and was received by an elderly woman who admitted to bethe owner of the house but vehemently refused to be Identified, and toldme that she does not know the addressee Maravilla, and told me furtherthat she always meets different persons looking for Miss Maravillabecause the latter always gives the address of her house;

3. That, I was reminded of an incident that I also experienced in the sameplace trying to serve a resolution to Miss Maravilla which was returnedunserved because she is not known in the place; ... (p. 674, Rollo, Vol. II).

And yet, in her Petition for Extension of Time and in her Motion for Reconsideration shepersists in giving that address at 101 Felix Manalo St., Cubao, Quezon City, where ourprocess servers were told that she was not a resident of and that she was unknownthereat. If for her contumacious elusiveness and lack of candor alone, Ilustre deservesno further standing before this Court.

ACCORDINGLY, the respective Motions for reconsideration of Atty. Wenceslao G.

Laureta for the setting aside of the order suspending him from the practice of law, andof Eva Maravilla Ilustre for the lifting of the penalty for contempt are DENIED, and thisdenial is FINAL. Eva Maravilla Ilustre shall pay the fine of P1,000.00 imposed on herwithin ten (10) days from notice, or, suffer imprisonment for ten (10) days upon failure topay said fine within the stipulated period.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, C.J., Fernan, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras,Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento and Cortes, JJ., concur.

Yap, J.,*

took no part.


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Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 71782 April 14, 1988

HADJI IBRAHIM SOLAY PANGANDAMAN, MAGAMBAAN

PANGANDAMAN, MACARIAN PANGANDAMAN, MAMINTAL

PANGANDAMAN, PACALUNDO PANGANDAMAN, MANGORAMAS

PANGANDAMAN, MACADAOB P. PANGORANGAN KILATUN

PANGANDAMAN, MARIO PANGANDAMAN, MACABIDAR

PANGANDAMAN, PUYAT P. ROMAMPAT, SANTORANI P.DIMAPENGEN, NASSER P. DIMAPENGEN and DIAMA OPAO petitioners,

vs. DIMAPORO T. CASAR, AS MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL JUDGE OF

POONABAYABAO, TAMPARAN AND MASIU, LANAO DEL SUR and THE

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,Respondents.

NARVASA, J.:

The petitioners ask this Court: chanrobles virtual law library

1) to annul the warrant for their arrest issued by respondent Judge

Dimaporo T. Casar of the Municipal Circuit Court of Masiu, Lanao del Sur, inCriminal Case No. 1748 entitled People vs. Hadji Ibrahim SolayPangandaman et al.; chanrobles virtual law library

2) to prohibit the Judge from taking further cognizance of said Criminal Case

No. 1748; and chanrobles virtual law library

3) to compel the Judge to forward the entire record of Criminal Case No.

1748 to the Provincial Fiscal of Lanao del Sur for proper

disposition. 1 chanrobles virtual law library

Their plea is essentially grounded on the claim that the warrant for theirarrest was issued by the respondent Judge without a proper preliminary

investigation. 2 The Solicitor General agrees and recommends that theirpetition be granted and the warrant of arrest voided. 3 chanrobles virtual law

library


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On July 27, 1985, a shooting incident occurred in Pantao, Masiu, Lanao del

Sur, which left at least five persons dead and two others wounded. What in

fact transpired is still unclear. According to one version, armed men hadattacked a residence in Pantao, Masiu, with both attackers and defenders

suffering casualties. 4 Another version has it that a group that was on its

way to another place, Lalabuan, also in Masiu, had beenambushed. 5 chanrobles virtual law library

On the following day, Atty. Mangurun Batuampar, claiming to represent thewidow of one of the victims, filed a letter-complaint with the Provincial Fiscal

at Marawi City, asking for a "full blast preliminary investigation" of the

incident. 6 The letter adverted to the possibility of innocent persons being

implicated by the parties involved on both sides - none of whom was,

however, identified - and promised that supporting affidavits would shortlybe filed. Immediately the Provincial Fiscal addressed a "1st indorsement" to

the respondent Judge, transmitting Atty. Batuampar's letter and requestingthat "all cases that may be filed relative .. (to the incident) that happened in

the afternoon of July 27, 1985," be forwarded to his office, which "has first

taken cognizance of said cases." 7 chanrobles virtual law library

No case relative to the incident was, however, presented to the respondent

Judge until Saturday, August 10, 1985, when a criminal complaint for

multiple murder was filed before him by P.C. Sgt. Jose L. Laruan, which was

docketed as Case No. 1748. 8On that same day, the respondent Judge"examined personally all (three) witnesses (brought by the sergeant) underoath thru .. (his) closed and direct supervision," reducing to writing the

questions to the witnesses and the latter's answers.9

Thereafter the Judge"approved the complaint and issued the corresponding warrant of arrest"

against the fourteen (14) petitioners (who were named by the witnesses)

and fifty (50) "John Does." 10 chanrobles virtual law library

An "ex-parte" motion for reconsideration was filed on August 14, 1985 by

Atty. Batuampar (joined by Atty. Pama L. Muti), seeking recall of the

warrant of arrest and subsequent holding of a "thorough investigation" onthe ground that the Judge's initial investigation had been "hasty and

manifestly haphazard" with "no searching questions" having beenpropounded. 11 The respondent Judge denied the motion for "lack of

basis;" 12 hence the present petition.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles

virtual law library

While they concede the authority of the respondent Judge to conduct a

preliminary investigation of the offenses involved, which are cognizable byRegional Trial Courts, the petitioners and the Solicitor General argue that the

Judge in the case at bar failed to conduct the investigation in accordance


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with the procedure prescribed in Section 3, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court

; 13 and that that failure constituted a denial to petitioners of due process

which nullified the proceedings leading to the issuance of the warrant for thepetitioners' arrest. 14 It is further contended that August 10, 1985 was a

Saturday during which "Municipal Trial Courts are open from 8:00 a.m. to

1:00 p.m. only, ..." and "... it would hardly have been possible forrespondent Judge to determine the existence of probable cause againstsixty- four (64) persons whose participations were of varying nature anddegree in a matter of hours and issue the warrant of arrest in the same

day;" 15and that there was undue haste and an omission to ask searching

questions by the Judge who relied "mainly on the supporting affidavits whichwere obviously prepared already when presented to him by an enlisted PC

personnel as investigator." 16 chanrobles virtual law library

The petitioners further assert that the respondent Judge conducted the

preliminary investigation of the charges "... in total disregard of theProvincial Fiscal ..." who, as said respondent well knew, had already taken

cognizance of the matter twelve (12) days earlier and was poised to conducthis own investigation of the same; 17 and that issuance of a warrant of

arrest against fifty (50) "John Does" transgressed the Constitutional

provision requiring that such warrants should particularly describe the

persons or things to be seized. 18 chanrobles virtual law library

There can be no debate about the proposition that in conducting a preinvestigation of any crime cognizable by the Regional Trial Courts, a judge ofan inferior court (other than in Metro-Manila or the chartered cities, where

no authority to conduct preliminary investigation is vested in such officials)must observe the procedure prescribed in Section 3 of Rule 112, 1985 Rules

on Criminal Procedure. And although not specifically so declared, theprocedure mandated by the Rule actually consists of two phases or

stages.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The first phase consists of an ex-parte inquiry into the sufficiency of thecomplaint and the affidavits and other documents offered in support thereof.And it ends with the determination by the Judge either: (1) that there is no

ground to continue with the inquiry, in which case he dismisses thecomplaint and transmits the order of dismissal, together with the records of

the case, to the provincial fiscal; or (2) that the complaint and the

supporting documents show sufficient cause to continue with the inquiry and

this ushers in the second phase.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual

law library

This second phase is designed to give the respondent notice of the

complaint, access to the complainant's evidence and an opportunity to


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submit counter-affidavits and supporting documents. At this stage also, the

Judge may conduct a hearing and propound to the parties and their

witnesses questions on matters that, in his view, need to be clarified. Thesecond phase concludes with the Judge rendering his resolution, either for

dismissal of the complaint or holding the respondent for trial, which shall be

transmitted, together with the record, to the provincial fiscal for appropriateaction.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The procedure above described must be followed before the complaint orinformation is filed in the Regional Trial Court. Failure to do so will result in a

denial of due process. 19 chanrobles virtual law library

Here, no information has as yet been filed with the Regional Trial Court.

There is no pretense that the preliminary investigation has been completed,

insofar as the respondent Judge is concerned, and that he does not intend to

undertake the second phase. In this situation, it cannot be said that he hasfailed to observe the prescribed procedure. What has happened is simply

that after receiving the complaint and examining the complainant's

witnesses, and having come to believe, on the basis thereof, that the

offenses charged had been committed, the respondent Judge issued thewarrant now complained of against the fourteen (14) respondents (now

petitioners) named and Identified by the witnesses as the perpetrators of the

killings and injuries, as well as against 50 "John Does." chanrobles virtual

law library

The real question, therefore, is whether or not the respondent Judge had the

power to issue the warrant of arrest without completing the entire prescribedprocedure for preliminary investigation. Stated otherwise, is completion of

the procedure laid down in Section 3 of Rule 112 a condition sine quanon for the issuance of a warrant of arrest? chanrobles virtual law library

There is no requirement that the entire procedure for preliminary

investigation must be completed before a warrant of arrest may be issued.

What the Rule 20 provides is that no complaint or information for an offensecognizable by the Regional Trial Court may be filed without completing that

procedure. But nowhere is it provided that the procedure must be completed

before a warrant of arrest may issue. Indeed, it is the contrary that is true.

The present Section 6 of the same Rule 112 clearly authorizes the municipaltrial court to order the respondent's arrest even before opening the second

phase of the investigation if said court is satisfied that a probable cause

exists and there is a necessity to place the respondent under immediate

custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice.


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Sec. 6. When warrant of arrest may issue.- chanrobles virtual

law library

xxx xxx xxx chanrobles virtual law library

(b) By the Municipal Trial Court. If the municipal trial judgeconducting the preliminary investigation is satisfied after anexamination in writing and under oath of the complainant and

his witnesses in the form of searching question and answers,that a probable cause exists and that there is a necessity of

placing the respondent under immediate custody in order not to

frustrate the ends of justice, he shag issue a warrant of

arrest. 21

This was equally true under the former rules, where the first phase of the

investigation was expressly denominated "preliminary examination" to

distinguish it from the second phase, or preliminary investigation proper.

Thus, the former Section 6 of Rule 112 provided:

SEC. 6. Warrant of arrest, when issued. - If the judge besatisfied from the preliminary e petition conducted by him or bythe investigating officer that the offense complained of has been

committed and that there is reasonable ground to believe that

the accused has committed it, he must issue a warrant or order

for his arrest.

In Mayuga vs. Maravilla,22

this Court found occasion to dwell in some detailon the process of preliminary investigation and, incidentally, to affirm thepower of a justice of the peace or municipal judge conducting a preliminary

investigation to order the arrest of the accused after the first stage

(preliminary examination), saying:

Appellant should bear in mind that apreliminaryinvestigationsuch as was conducted by the Justice of the Peace has for itspurpose only the determination of whether a crime has been

committed and whether there is probable cause to believe the

accused guilty thereof, and if so, the issuance of a warrant of

arrest. And it should not be forgotten that a preliminaryinvestigation has two stages: First, a preliminary examination ofthe complainant and his witnesses prior to the arrest of the

accused; and, second, the reading to the accused after his arrest

of the complaint or information filed against him, and his being

informed of the substance of the evidence against him, afterwhich he is allowed to present evidence in his favor, if he so


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desires. Probable cause, in regard to the first stage of

preliminary investigation, depends on the discretion of the judge

or magistrate empowered to issue the warrant of arrest. Itsuffices that facts are presented to him to convince him, not that

a person has committed the crime, but that there is probable

cause to believe that such person committed the crime charged.The proceeding is generally ex parte unless the defendantdesires to be present and while under the old Rules the Justice ofthe Peace or investigating officer must take the testimony of the

complainant and the latter's witnesses under oath, only the

testimony of the complainant shall be in writing and only anabstract of the testimony of the other is required. Regarding

preliminary investigation, it has thus been ruled that 'the

occasion is not for the full and exhaustive display of the parties'

evidence; it is for the presentation of such evidence only as mayengender well-grounded belief that an offense has been

committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof.

... 23 chanrobles virtual law library

The rule on arrest after preliminary examination has, of course, been

modified somewhat since the occurrence of the facts upon

which Mayuga was decided, but not to abrogate the authority of theinvestigating judge to order such arrest, and only to prescribe the

requirement that before he may do so, he must examine the witnesses to

the complaint, the examination to be under oath and reduced to writing in

the form of searching questions and answers. This modification was

introduced by Republic Act 3838, approved June 22, 1963, amendingSection 87 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, and the "searching questions and

answers" requirement is incorporated in the present Section 6 of Rule 112

already quoted.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The argument, therefore, must be rejected that the respondent Judge acted

with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the warrant of arrest againstpetitioners without first completing the preliminary investigation in

accordance with the prescribed procedure. The rule is and has always been

that such issuance need only await a finding of probable cause, not the

completion of the entire procedure of preliminary investigation

.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Also without appreciable merit is petitioners' other argument that there wasscarcely time to determine probable cause against sixty-four persons (the

fourteen petitioners and fifty "Does") within a matter of hours on a Saturday

when municipal trial courts are open only from 8:00 a.m. to 1:00 p.m. That

argument founders upon the respondent Judge's positive affirmations that


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he had personally and closely examined under oath the three witnesses to

the complaint 24 and that he had issued the warrant of arrest "believing that

the offense thus filed had been committed." 25 Nothing in the record beforethis Court belies or discredits those affirmations which have, besides, the

benefit of the legal presumption that official duty has been regularly

performed. 26The contention that the witnesses to the complaint had merelysworn before the respondent Judge to statements prepared beforehand andsubmitted by a military investigator 27 must, in view of the foregoingconsiderations and for lack of any support in the record, be dismissed as

mere speculation.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The same argument also unwarrantedly assumes that the respondent Judge

limited the proceedings on preliminary examination to the usual Saturday

office hours of 8:00 a.m. to 1:00 p.m., in addition to not making anypersuasive showing that such proceedings could not have been completed

within that time-frame. For all that appears, said respondent could have putoff the 1:00 p.m. adjournment until he had finished interrogating the

witnesses to his satisfaction. And there is really nothing unusual incompleting within a three-hour period the questioning of three witnesses in a

preliminary examination to determine the existence of probable

cause.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The record which, lacking proof to the contrary, must be accepted as an

accurate chronicle of the questioned proceedings, showsprima facie that therespondent Judge had personally examined the witnesses to the complaint,and a consideration of the latter's sworn answers to his questions satisfies

this Court that the finding of probable cause against the petitioners wasneither arbitrary nor unfounded.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual

law library

The three witnesses to the complaint, Misandoning Monasprang, a student,Lawandato Ripors, an engineering graduate, and Sanny Monib a farmer gave

mutually corroborative accounts of the incident. Under separate questioning,

they declared that they were members of a party that was passing byPantao on its way to Lalabuan from Talaguian, all in Masiu, Lanao del Sur, at

about 10:00 a.m. on July 27, 1985, when they were ambushed and firedupon by an armed group which included the petitioners and about fifty other

unidentified persons; that five of the party had been killed and two (the

witnesses Lawandato Ripors and Sanny Monib) wounded; that even after

they had killed their victims, the ambushers had continued to fire at thedead bodies; that the witnesses managed to escape their attackers and

return to Talaguian, where they informed their relatives about what had

happened, and thence went to the municipal hall in Masiu to report to the

authorities; that the dead victims were recovered only late in the afternoon


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of that day because the authorities could not "penetrate" the area and the

ambushers refused to release the bodies; and that the ambush was an

offshoot of a grudge between the families of the ambushers and those of the

victims. 28 chanrobles virtual law library

The witnesses named and Identified the dead victims as Cadar Monasprang,Macacrao Guiling Macrang Hadji Alawi, Alicman Ripors and Malabato Diator.

All of them also Identified by name each of the fourteen petitioners as

members of the ambush group. The respondent Judge can hardly be faultedfor finding enough cause to hold the petitioners named in the statements of

three eyewitnesses to killings perpetrated in broad

daylight.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

In Luna vs. Plaza, 29 this Court ruled that the term "searching questions andanswers" means -

...only, taking into consideration the purpose of the preliminaryexamination which is to determine "whether there is areasonable ground to believe that an offense has beencommitted and the accused is probably guilty thereof so that a

warrant of arrest may be issued and the accused held for trial,"

such questions as have tendency to show the commission of a

crime and the perpetuator thereof. What would be searchingquestions would depend on what is sought to be inquired into,

such as: the nature of the offense, the date, time, and place of

its commission, the possible motives for its commission; the

subject, his age, education, status, financial and socialcircumstances, his attitude toward the investigation, social

attitudes, opportunities to commit the offense; the victim, his

age, status, family responsibilities, financial and social

circumstances, characteristics, etc. The points that are thesubject of inquiry may differ from case to case. The questions,

therefore must to a great degree depend upon the Judge making

the investigation. ...

Upon this authority, and considering what has already been stated above,

this Court is not prepared to question the propriety of the respondent

Judge's finding of probable cause or substitute its judgment for his in thematter of what questions to put to the witnesses during the preliminary

examination.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Upon the facts and the law, therefore, the warrant of arrest in question

validly issued against the petitioners, such issuance having been ordered

after proceedings, to which no irregularity has been shown to attach, in


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which the respondent Judge found sufficient cause to commit the petitioners

to answer for the crime complained of.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles

virtual law library

Insofar, however, as said warrant is issued against fifty (50) "John Does" not

one of whom the witnesses to the complaint could or would Identify, it is ofthe nature of a general warrant, one of a class of writs long proscribed as

unconstitutional and once anathematized as "totally subversive of the liberty

of the subject." 30 Clearly violative of the constitutional injunction thatwarrants of arrest should particularly describe the person or persons to be

seized, 31 the warrant must, as regards its unidentified subjects, be

voided.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The fact that the Provincial Fiscal may have announced his intention of

investigating the incident himself did not, in the view of the Court, legally

inhibit the respondent Judge from conducting his own inquiry into the matterif, as is made to appear here, it was regularly brought before him and no

formal complaint was filed before the Fiscal. Courtesy may have dictated

that in those circumstances he leave the investigation to the Fiscal and

simply endorse to the latter the complaint filed with him; duty did not, and ifhe nonetheless chose to conduct his own investigation, nothing in the rules

states or implies that he could not do

so.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Be that as it may, since the action and final resolution of the respondent

Judge after completing the second stage of the preliminary investigation are

subject to review by the Provincial Fiscal, practical considerations ofexpediency and the avoidance of duplication of work dictate that the latter

official be permitted to take over the investigation even in its present

stage.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

WHEREFORE, the warrant complained of is upheld and declared valid insofar

as it orders the arrest of the petitioners. Said warrant is voided to the extent

that it is issued against fifty (50) "John Does." The respondent Judge isdirected to forward to the Provincial Fiscal of Lanao del Sur the record of the

preliminary investigation of the complaint in Criminal Case No. 1728 of his

court for further appropriate action. Without pronouncement as to

costs.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, C.J., Cruz, Gancayco and Grio-Aquino, JJ., concur.


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Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-23051 October 20, 1925

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES ISLANDS,Plaintiff-Appellant, vs. JOSE MA.VELOSO,Defendant-Appellant.

MALCOLM, J.:chanrobles virtual law library

This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila finding the accused,

Jose Ma. Veloso, guilty of the crime of resistance of the agents of the authority, in violation ofarticle 252 of the Penal Code, and sentencing him to four months and one dayimprisonment, arresto mayor, with the accessory penalties, to pay a fine of P200, with thecorresponding subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs. The errorsassigned by counsel for the accused as appellant, go to the proposition that the resistance of

the police was justifiable on account of the illegality of the John Doe searchwarrant.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

In May, 1923, the building located at No. 124 Calle Arzobispo, City of Manila, was used by anorganization known as the Parliamentary Club. Jose Ma. Veloso was at that time a member of

the House of Representative of the Philippine Legislature. He was also the manager of theclub.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The police of Manila had reliable information that the so-called Parliamentary Club was nothingmore than a gambling house. Indeed, on May 19, 1923, J. F. Townsend, the chief of thegambling squad, had been to the club and verified this fact. As a result, on May 25, 1923,

Detective Andres Geronimo of the secret service of the City of Manila, applied for, and obtaineda search warrant from Judge Garduo of the municipal court. Thus provided, the policeattempted to raid the Parliamentary Club a little after three in the afternoon of the date above-mentioned. They found the doors to the premises closed and barred. Accordingly, one band ofpolice including policeman Rosacker, ascended a telephone pole, so as to enter a window of the

house. Other policemen, headed by Townsend, broke in the outerdoor.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Once inside the Parliamentary Club, nearly fifty persons were apprehended by the police. Oneof them was the defendant Veloso. Veloso asked Townsend what he wanted, and the lattershowed him the search warrant. Veloso read it and told Townsend that he was RepresentativeVeloso and not John Doe, and that the police had no right to search the house. Townsend


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answered that Veloso was considered as John Doe. As Veloso's pocket was bulging, as if itcontained gambling utensils, Townsend required Veloso to show him the evidence of the game.About five minutes was consumed in conversation between the policemen and the accused thepolicemen insisting on searching Veloso, and Veloso insisting in his refusal to submit to thesearch.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

At last the patience of the officers was exhausted. So policeman Rosacker took hold of Velosoonly to meet with his resistance. Veloso bit Rosacker in the right forearm, and gave him a blowin another part of the body, which injured the policeman quite severely. Through the combinedefforts of Townsend and Rosacker, Veloso was finally laid down on the floor, and long sheets ofpaper, ofreglas de monte, cards, cardboards, and chips were taken from hispockets.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

All of the persons arrested were searched and then conducted to the patrol wagons. Velosoagain refused to obey and shouted offensive epithets against the police department. It wasnecessary for the policemen to conduct him downstairs. At the door, Veloso resisted sotenaciously that three policemen were needed to place him in the patrolwagon.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

In the municipal court of the City of Manila, the persons arrest in the raid were accused ofgambling. All of them were eventually acquitted in the Court of First Instance for lack of proof,with the sole exception of Veloso, who was found guilty of maintaining a gambling house. Thiscase reached the appellate court where the accused was finally sentenced to pay a fine of P500.(No. 22163. 1 ) chanrobles virtual law library

The foregoing are the principal facts taken mainly from the findings of the trial judge, the

Honorable Vicente Nepomuceno. Counsel for the appellant makes no effort to impugn thesefindings, except that he stresses certain points as more favorable to the case of his client. Thedefense, as previously indicated, is planted squarely on the contention that since the name ofVeloso did not appear in the search warrant, but instead the pseudonym John Doe was used,Veloso had a legal right to resist the police by force. The nature of this defense makes itadvisable to set forth further facts, relating particularly to the search warrant, before passing tothe law.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

There are found in the record the application for search warrant, the affidavit for searchwarrant, and the search warrant. The application reads:

UNITED STATES OF AMERICAPHILIPPINE ISLANDSchanrobles virtual law library

IN THE MUNICIPAL COURT OF THE CITY OF MANILA chanrobles virtual law library

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff, vs. JOHN DOE, Defendant. chanroblesvirtual law library


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APPLICATION FOR (G)SEARCH WARRANT chanrobles virtual law library

Testimony taken before Hon. L. Garduo, Judge, Municipal Court,Manila.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Andres Geronimo, being duly sworn, testifies as follows:

Q. What is your name, residence and occupation? - A. Andres Geronimo, No. 47Revellin, detective.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Q. Are you the applicant of this search warrant? - A. Yes,sir.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Q. Do you know the premises situated at No. 124 Calle Arzobispo, District of W.C., City of Manila? - A. Yes. sir.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law

library

Q. Do you know who occupies said premises? - A. I do not know. According tothe best of my information the house is occupied by JohnDoe.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Q . What are your reasons for applying for this search warrant? - A. It has beenreported to me by a person whom I consider to be reliable that in said premisesthere are instruments and devices used in gambling games, such as cards, dice,chips, lottery tickets, lists of drawing and lists used in prohibited games kept. It

has been reported to me by a person whom I consider to be reliable that thereare or there will be gambling conducted in said premises. The aforesaid premisesare known as gambling house. I have watched the foregoing premises andbelieved it to be a gambling house and a place where instruments and devicesused in gambling games, such as cards, dice, chips, lottery tickets, lists ofdrawing and lists used in prohibited games are kept.

I, Andres Geronimo, being duly sworn, depose and say that I have read the foregoingquestions and answers and that I find the same to correct and true to the best of myknowledge and belief.

(Sgd.) ANDRES GERONIMO chanrobles virtual law library

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 25th day of May, 1923.

(Sgd.) L. GARDUO Judge, Municipal Court


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The affidavit and the search warrant are so nearly alike that it will suffice to copy the searchwarrant alone. This document reads:

UNITED STATES OF AMERICAPHILIPPINE ISLANDS chanrobles virtual law library

IN THE MUNICIPAL COURT OF THE CITY OF MANILA chanrobles virtual law library

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, Plaintiff, chanrobles virtual law library

vs.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

JOHN DOE, Defendant.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

SEARCH WARRANT (G) chanrobles virtual law library

The People of the Philippine Islands, to any member of the chanrobles virtual law library

Police Force of the City of Manila.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

GREETING: chanrobles virtual law library

Proof by affidavit having this day been made before me by Andres Geronimo that he hasgood reason to believe and does believe that John Doe has illegally in his possession inthe building occupied by him and which is under his control, namely in the building

numbered 124 Calle Arzobispo, City of Manila, Philippines Islands, certain devices andeffects used in violation of the Gambling Law, to wit: money, cards, chips, reglas, pintas,tables and chairs and other utensils used in connection with the game commonly knownas monte and that the said John Doe keeps and conceals said devices and effects withthe illegal and criminal intention of using them in violation of the GamblingLaw.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Now therefore, you are hereby commanded that at any time in the day or night withinten (10) days on or after this date to make a search on the person of said John Doe and

in the house situated at No. 124 Calle Arzobispo, City of Manila, Philippine Islands, inquest of the above described devices and effects and if you find the same or any part

thereof, you are commanded to bring it forthwith before me as provided for bylaw.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Given under my hand, this 25th day of May, 1923.

(Sgd.) L. GARDUOJudge, Municipal Court


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Coming now to the legal aspects of the case it is first worthy of mention that by reason of theFourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and the eleventh and eighteenthparagraphs of the Philippine Bill of Rights, as found in the present Organic Act, the security ofthe dwelling and the person is guaranteed. The organic act provides "that the right to besecured against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated." It further provides

"that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation andparticularly describing the place to be searched and the person or things to beseized." chanrobles virtual law library

In the Philippine Code of Criminal Procedure are found provisions of the same import althoughnaturally entering more into detail. It is therein provided, among other things, that "a searchwarrant shall not issue except for probable cause and upon application supported by oathparticularly describing the place to be searched and the person of thing to be seized." (Section97.) After the judge or justice shall have examined on oath the complainant and any witnesseshe may produce, and shall have taken their depositions in writing (section 98), and after thejudge or justice is satisfied of the existence of facts upon which the application is based, or thatthere is probable cause to believe that they exist, he must issue the warrant which must besubstantially in the following form:

. . . You are, therefore, commanded, . . . to make immediate search on the person of

............................, or in the house situated ...................................... (describing it or anyother place to be searched with reasonable particularity, as the case may be) for thefollowing property: . . . ." (Section 99.) It is finally provided that "a person charged with acrime may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proofof the commission of the crime. (Section 105).

A search warrant must conform strictly to the requirements of the constitutional and statutoryprovisions under which it is issued. Otherwise it has rightly been held, must be absolutely legal,"for there is not a description of process known to the law, the execution of which is moredistressing to the citizen. Perhaps there is none which excites such intense feeling inconsequence of its humiliating and degrading effect." The warrant will always be construedstrictly without, however, going the full length of requiring technical accuracy. No presumptionsof regularity are to be invoked in aid of the process when an officer undertakes to justify underit. (24 R. C. L., pp. 711, et seq.; Reed vs. Rice [1829], 2 J. J. Marshall [Ky.] 44; 19 Am. Dec., 122;Smith vs. McDuffee [1914], 72 Ore., 276; Ann. Cas. 1916 D, 947.) chanrobles virtual law library

The search warrant has been likened to a warrant of arrest. Although apprehending that thereare material differences between the two, in view of the paucity of authority pertaining to John

Doe search warrants we propose to take into consideration the authorities relied upon by theappellant, thus following the precedent of Uy Kheytin vs. Villareal ([1920], 42 Phil., 886), wherethe regularity of the issuance of the search warrant was alsoquestioned.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library


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In the lower court, and again in this court, the attorneys for the defense quoted fromWharton's Criminal Procedure. In that text at pages 51, 52, 54, 55, and 56 of volume 1 of theTenth Edition, is found the following:

Form and Sufficiency of Warrant. Technical accuracy is not required. . . .

x x x x x x x x xchanrobles virtual law library

Name and description of the accusedshould be inserted in the body of the warrant andwhere the name is unknown there must be such a description of the person accused aswill enable the officer to identify him when found.


Warrant for apprehension of unnamed party, or containing a wrong name for the partyto be apprehended is void, except in those cases where it contains a descriptio personae

such as will enable the officer to identify the accused.


John Doe' Warrants. It follows, on principle, from what has already been said regardingthe essential requirements of warrants for the apprehension of persons accused, andabout blank warrants, that a warrant for the apprehension of a person whose true nameis unknown, by the name of "John Doe" or "Richard Roe," "whose other or true name inunknown," is void, without other and further descriptions of the person to beapprehended, and such warrant will not justify the officer in acting under it. Such a

warrant must, in addition, contain the best descriptio personaepossible to be obtainedof the person or persons to be apprehended, and this description must be sufficient toindicate clearly the proper person or persons upon whom the warrant is to be served;and should state his personal appearance and peculiarities, give his occupation andplace of residence, and any other circumstances by means of which he can beidentified.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Person apprehended in actof committing a crime, under a "John Doe" warrant, on theother hand, the apprehension will not be illegal, or the officer liable, because undersuch circumstances it is not necessary that a warrant should have been issued.

The authority most often cited to sustain the text, and quoted with approval by the UnitedStates Supreme Court, is the case of Commonwealth vs. Crotty ([1865], 10 Allen [Mass.], 403). Itthere appeared that one Peaslee had made a complaint to the police court Lee, charging that"John Doe or Richard Roe, whose other or true name is to your complainant unknown," hadcommitted an assault and battery upon him; upon which complaint a warrant was issuedagainst "John Doe or Richard Roe, whose other or true name is to your complainant unknown,named in the foregoing complaint." Neither the complaint nor the warrant contained any


22/25

further description or means of identification of the person to be arrested. Crotty resisted thearrest upon the ground that the warrant was invalid. Mr. Chief Justice Bigelow, as the organ ofthe Supreme Court of Massachusetts, said:

We cannot entertain a doubt that the warrant on which the officer attempted to arrest

one of the defendant at the time of the alleged riot was insufficient, illegal and void. Itdid not contain the name of the defendant, nor any description or designation by whichhe could be known and identified as the person against whom it was issued. It was ineffect a general warrant, upon which any other individual might as well have beenarrested, as being included in the description, as the defendant himself. Such a warrantwas contrary to elementary principles, and in direct violation of the constitutional rightof the citizen, as set forth in the Declaration of Rights, article 14, which declares thatevery subject has a right to be secure from all unreasonable searches and seizures of hisperson, and that all warrants, therefore, are contrary to this right, if the order in thewarrant to a civil officer to arrest one or more suspected persons or to seize theirproperty be not accompanied with a special designation of the persons or objects ofsearch, arrest or seizure. This is in fact only a declaration of an ancient common lawright. It was always necessary to express the name or give some description of a party tobe arrested on a warrant; and if one was granted with the name in blank, and withoutother designation of the person to be arrested, it was void. (1 Hale P. C. 577. 2 Ib. 119.Foster, 312. 7 Dane Ab. 248. 1 Chit. Crim. Law, 39. Mead vs. Haws, 7 Cow., 332, andcases cited.) chanrobles virtual law library

This rule or principle does not prevent the issue and service of a warrant against a partywhose name is unknown. In such case the best description possible of the person to bearrested is to be given in the warrant; but it must be sufficient to indicate clearly on

whom it is to be served, by stating his occupation, his personal appearance andpeculiarities, the place of his residence, or other circumstances by which he can beidentified. (1 Chit. Crim. Law, 39, 40.) chanrobles virtual law library

The warrant being defective and void on its face, the officer had no right to arrest theperson on whom he attempted to serve it. He acted without warrant and was atrespasser. The defendant whom he sought to arrest had a right to resist by force, usingno more than was necessary to resist the unlawful acts of the officer . ..chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The defendants, therefore, in resisting the officer in making an arrest under the warrantin question, if they were guilty of no improper or excessive force or violence, did not do

an unlawful act by lawful means, or a lawful act by unlawful means, and so could not beconvicted of the misdemeanor of a riot, with which they are charged in the indictment.

Appellant's argument, as based on these authorities, runs something like this. The law,constitutional and statutory, requires that the search warrant shall not issue unless theapplication "particularly" describe the person to be seized. A failure thus to name the person is


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fatal to the validity of the search warrant. To justify search and arrest, the process must belegal. Illegal official action may be forcibly resisted.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanroblesvirtual law library

For the prosecution, however, as the arguments are advanced by the Attorney-General, and as

the law was summarized by the trial judge, there is much to be said. Careful and logicalreflection brings forth certain points of paramount force and exercising a decisive influence. Wewill now make mention of them by correlating the facts and thelaw.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

In the first place, the affidavit for the search warrant and the search warrant itself described thebuilding to be searched as "the building No. 124 Calle Arzobispo, City of Manila, PhilippineIslands." This, without doubt, was a sufficient designation of the premises to be searched. It isthe prevailing rule that a description of a place to be searched is sufficient if the officer with thewarrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place intended. (Steele vs. U. S.[1925], U. S. Supreme Court Advance Opinions 1924-1925; 69 Law. ed., 757). The police officerswere accordingly authorized to break down the door and enter the premises of the buildingoccupied by the so-called Parliamentary Club. When inside, they then had the right to arrest thepersons presumably engaged in a prohibited game, and to confiscate the evidence of thecommission of the crime. It has been held that an officer making an arrest may take from theperson arrested any money or property found upon his person, which was used in thecommission of the crime or was the fruit of the crime, or which may furnish the person arrestedwith the means of committing violence or of escaping, or which may be used as evidence on thetrial of the cause, but not otherwise. (Moreno vs. Ago Chi [1909], 12 Phil., 439.) chanroblesvirtual law library

Proceeding along a different line of approach, it is undeniable that the application for thesearch warrant, the affidavit, and the search warrant failed to name Jose Ma. Veloso as theperson to be seized. But the affidavit and the search warrant did state that "John Doe hasillegally in his possession in the building occupied by him, and which is under his control,namely, in the building numbered 124 Calle Arzobispo, City of Manila, Philippine Islands, certaindevices and effects used in violation of the Gambling Law." Now, in this connection, it must notbe forgotten that the Organic Act requires a particular description of the place to be searched,and the person or things to be seized, and that the warrant in this case sufficiently describedthe place and the gambling apparatus, and, in addition, contained a description of the person tobe seized. Under the authorities cited by the appellant, it is invariably recognized that thewarrant for the apprehension of an unnamed party is void, "except in those cases where itcontains a description personae such as will enable the officer to identify the accused." Thedescription must be sufficient to indicate clearly the proper person upon whom the warrant isto be served. As the search warrant stated that John Doe had gambling apparatus in hispossession in the building occupied by him at No. 124 Calle Arzobispo, City of Manila, and asthis John Doe was Jose Ma. Veloso, the manager of the club, the police could identify John Doeas Jose Ma. Veloso without difficulty.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library


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Again, it must be remembered that No. 124 Calle Arzobispo was supposed to be used for clubpurposes. It was not the home of Veloso; not the place of abode of the family, which the lawcarefully protects in all of its sanctity. It was a club partially public in nature. It was, moreover, acamouflaged club with a high sounding name calculated to mislead the police, but intended fornefarious practices. In a club of such a character, unlike in the home, there would commonly be

varying occupancy, a number of John Does and Richard Roes whose names would be unknownto the police.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

It is also borne out by the authorities that, in defense of himself, any member of his family orhis dwelling, a man has a right to employ all necessary violence. But even in the home, andmuch less so in a club or public place, the person sought to be arrested or to be searchedshould use no more force than is necessary to repel the unlawful act of the officers. Toauthorize resistance to the agents of the authority, the illegality of the invasion must be clearlymanifest. Here, there was possibly a proper case for protest. There was no case for excessiveviolence to enforce the defendant's idea of a debatable legal question. (Commonwealth vs.Crotty, supra; People vs. Chan Fook [1921], 42 Phil., 230; 3 Groizard, Codigo Penal, pp. 456,457.) chanrobles virtual law library

The trial judge deduced from the searched warrant that the accused Veloso was sufficientlyidentified therein. Mention was made by his Honor of the code provision relating to acomplaint or information, permitting a fictitious name to be inserted in the complaint orinformation, in lieu of the true name. The Attorney-General adds to this the argument that thepolice were authorized to arrest without a warrant since a crime was being committed. We findit unnecessary to comment on this contention.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtuallaw library

John Doe search warrants should be the exception and not the rule. The police shouldparticularly describe the place to be searched and the person or things to be seized, whereverand whenever it is feasible. The police should not be hindered in the performance of theirduties, which are difficult enough of performance under the best of conditions, by superficialadherence to technicality or far fetched judicialinterference.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

We agree with the trial judge and with the Attorney-General in their conclusions to the effectthat the search warrant was valid, and that the defendant has been proved guilty beyond areasonable doubt, of the crime of resistance of the agents of theauthority.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The information alleges that at the time of the commission of the crime, the accused was amember of the House of Representatives. The trial court was led to consider this allegation inrelation with the facts as an aggravating circumstance, and to sentence the accusedaccordingly. We doubt, however, that advantage was taken by the offender of his publicposition when he resisted the officers of the law. The offender did not necessarily make use ofthe prestige of his office as a means to commit a crime. Undoubtedly, Jose Ma. Veloso, as Juan


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de la Cruz, would have resisted the police just as stoutly, as the Honorable Jose Ma. Veloso did.The penalty, accordingly, falls within the medium of that provided by the PenalCode.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Finding present no reversible error, agreeing in all respects with the findings of facts as made by

the trial judge, and concurring with the trial judge in his legal conclusion, with one exception, itresults that the judgment appealed from must be, as it is hereby, affirmed, with the solemodification that the defendant and appellant shall be sentenced to two months and one dayimprisonment, arresto mayor, with the costs of this instance against him. Let the correspondingorder to carry this judgment into effect issue.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

Avancea, C.J., Street, Villamor, Ostrand, Johns, and Romualdez, JJ., concur.

Villa-Real, JJ., took no part.

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