consti cases intro

7/27/2019 Consti Cases Intro

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Consti cases intro

The Constitution of the Philippines

1. De leon v esguerra

De Leon v. Esguerra

G.R. No. 78059 August 31, 1987

Melencio-Herrera, J.

Facts:

In the Barangay elections held on May 17, 1982, petitioner Alfredo M. De Leon

was elected Barangay Captain and the other petitioners Angel S. Salamat, Mario C.

Sta. Ana, Jose C. Tolentino, Rogelio J. de la Rosa and Jose M. Resurreccion, as

Barangay Councilmen of Barangay Dolores, Taytay, Rizal under Batas Pambansa Blg.

222, otherwise known as the Barangay Election Act of 1982.

On February 9, 1987, petitioner Alfredo M, de Leon received a Memorandum

antedated December 1, 1986 but signed by respondent OIC Governor Benjamin

Esguerra on February 8, 1987 designating respondent Florentino G. Magno as

Barangay Captain of Barangay Dolores, Taytay, Rizal. The designation made by the

OIC Governor was by authority of the Minister of Local Government.

Also on February 8, 1987, respondent OIC Governor signed a Memorandum,

antedated December 1, 1986 designating respondents Remigio M. Tigas, Ricardo Z.

Lacanienta Teodoro V. Medina, Roberto S. Paz and Teresita L. Tolentino as membersof the Barangay Council of the same Barangay and Municipality.

Petitioners pray that the subject Memoranda be declared null and void and that

respondents be prohibited from taking over their positions of Barangay Captain and

Barangay Councilmen, respectively. Petitioners maintain that pursuant to Section 3 of

the Barangay Election Act of 1982 (BP Blg. 222), their terms of office shall be six (6)

years which shall commence on June 7, 1982 and shall continue until their successors

shall have elected and shall have qualified, or up to June 7, 1988. It is also their

position that with the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, respondent OIC Governor no

longer has the authority to replace them and to designate their successors.

On the other hand, respondents rely on Section 2, Article III of the Provisional

Constitution, promulgated on March 25, 1986, which provided:

SECTION 2. All elective and appointive officials and employees under the 1973

Constitution shall continue in office until otherwise provided by proclamation or


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executive order or upon the designation or appointment and qualification of their

successors, if such appointment is made within a period of one year from February

25,1986.

By reason of the foregoing provision, respondents contend that the terms of

office of elective and appointive officials were abolished and that petitioners continuedin office by virtue of the aforequoted provision and not because their term of six years

had not yet expired; and that the provision in the Barangay Election Act fixing the term

of office of Barangay officials to six (6) years must be deemed to have been repealed

for being inconsistent with the aforequoted provision of the Provisional Constitution.

Issue:

whether or not the designation of respondents to replace petitioners was

validly made during the one-year period which ended on February 25, 1987

Held:

February 8, 1977, should be considered as the effective date of replacement

and not December 1,1986 to which it was ante dated, in keeping with the dictates of

justice. But while February 8, 1987 is ostensibly still within the one-year deadline, the

aforequoted provision in the Provisional Constitution must be deemed to have been

overtaken by Section 27, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution reading.

SECTION 27. This Constitution shall take effect immediately upon its ratification by a

majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite held for the purpose and shall supersede allprevious Constitutions.

The 1987 Constitution was ratified in a plebiscite on February 2, 1987. By that

date, therefore, the Provisional Constitution must be deemed to have been superseded.

Having become inoperative, respondent OIC Governor could no longer rely on Section

2, Article III, thereof to designate respondents to the elective positions occupied by

petitioners.

Petitioners must now be held to have acquired security of tenure specially

considering that the Barangay Election Act of 1982 declares it a policy of the State toguarantee and promote the autonomy of the barangays to ensure their fullest

development as self-reliant communities.Similarly, the 1987 Constitution ensures the

autonomy of local governments and of political subdivisions of which the barangays

form a part, and limits the Presidents power to general supervision over local

governments. Relevantly, Section 8, Article X of the same 1987 Constitution further

provides in part:


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Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall

be determined by law, shall be three years ...

Until the term of office of barangay officials has been determined by law,

therefore, the term of office of six (6) years provided for in the Barangay Election Act of

1982 should still govern.

There is nothing inconsistent between the term of six (6) years for elective

Barangay officials and the 1987 Constitution, and the same should, therefore, be

considered as still operative, pursuant to Section 3, Article XVIII of the 1987

Constitution, reading:

Sec. 3. All existing laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations letters of instructions,

and other executive issuances not inconsistent, with this Constitution shall remain

operative until amended, repealed or revoked.

Gonzales Vs. Comelec

27 SCRA 835

G.R. L-27833

April 18, 1969

Facts: RA 4880 which took effect on June 17, 1967, prohibiting the too early nomination

of candidates and limiting the period of election campaign or partisan political activity

was challenged on constitutional grounds. More precisely, the basic liberties of free

speech and free press, freedom of assembly and freedom of association are invoked tonullify the act. Petitioner Cabigao was, at the time of the filing the petition, an incumbent

councilor in the 4th District of Manila and the Nacionalista Party official candidate for

Vice-Mayor of Manila to which he was subsequently elected on November 11, 1967;

petitioner Gonzales, on the other hand, is a private individual, a registered voter in the

City of Manila and a political leader of his co-petitioner. There was the further allegation

that the nomination of a candidate and the fixing of period of election campaign are

matters of political expediency and convenience which only political parties can regulate

or curtail by and among themselves through self-restraint or mutual understanding or

agreement and that the regulation and limitation of these political matters invoking the

police power, in the absence of clear and present danger to the state, would render the

constitutional rights of petitioners meaningless and without effect. Senator Lorenzo M.

Taada was asked to appear as amicus curiae, and elucidated that Act No. 4880 could

indeed be looked upon as a limitation on the preferred rights of speech and press, of

assembly and of association. He did justify its enactment however under the clear and

present danger doctrine, there being the substantive evil of elections, whether for


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national or local officials, being debased and degraded by unrestricted campaigning,

excess of partisanship and undue concentration in politics with the loss not only of

efficiency in government but of lives as well. The Philippine Bar Association, the Civil

Liberties Union, the U.P. Law Center and the U.P. Women Lawyers' Circle were

requested to give their opinions. Respondents contend that the act was based on the

police power of the state.

Issue: Whether or Not RA 4880 unconstitutional.

Held: Yes. As held in Cabansag v. Fernandez there are two tests that may supply an

acceptable criterion for permissible restriction on freedom of speech. These are the

clear and present danger rule and the 'dangerous tendency' rule. The first, means that

the evil consequence of the comment or utterance must be extremely serious and the

degree of imminence extremely high before the utterance can be punished. The danger

to be guarded against is the 'substantive evil' sought to be prevented. It has theadvantage of establishing according to the above decision a definite rule in

constitutional law. It provides the criterion as to what words may be publicly established.

The "dangerous tendency rule" is such that If the words uttered create a dangerous

tendency which the state has a right to prevent, then such words are punishable. It is

not necessary that some definite or immediate acts of force, violence, or unlawfulness

be advocated. It is sufficient that such acts be advocated in general terms. Nor is it

necessary that the language used be reasonably calculated to incite persons to acts of

force, violence, or unlawfulness. It is sufficient if the natural tendency and probable

effect of the utterance be to bring about the substantive evil which the legislative body

seeks to prevent.

The challenged statute could have been more narrowly drawn and the practices

prohibited more precisely delineated to satisfy the constitutional requirements as to a

valid limitation under the clear and present danger doctrine. As the author Taada

clearly explained, such provisions were deemed by the legislative body to be part and

parcel of the necessary and appropriate response not merely to a clear and present

danger but to the actual existence of a grave and substantive evil of excessive

partisanship, dishonesty and corruption as well as violence that of late has invariably

marred election campaigns and partisan political activities in this country.

The very idea of a government, republican in form, implies a right on the part of its

citizens to meet peaceably for consultation in respect to public affairs and to petition for

redress of grievances. As in the case of freedom of expression, this right is not to be

limited, much less denied, except on a showing of a clear and present danger of a

substantive evil that Congress has a right to prevent.


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The prohibition of any speeches, announcements or commentaries, or the holding of

interviews for or against the election of any party or candidate for public office and the

prohibition of the publication or distribution of campaign literature or materials, against

the solicitation of votes whether directly or indirectly, or the undertaking of any

campaign literature or propaganda for or against any candidate or party is repugnant to

a constitutional command

Imbong v Comelec September 11, 1970

RA 6132: delegates in Constitutional Convention

Petitioner: Imbong

Respondents: Ferrer (Comelec Chair), Patajo, Miraflor (Comelec Members)

Petitioner: GonzalesRespondent: Comelec

Ponente: Makasiar

RELATED LAWS:

Resolution No 2 (1967) -Calls for Constitutional Convention to be composed of 2

delegates from each representative district who shall be elected in November, 1970.

RA 4919 -implementation of Resolution No 2

Resolution 4 (1969)-amended Resolution 2: Constitutional Convention shall be

composed of 320delegates a proportioned among existing representative districts

according to the population. Provided that each district shall be entitled to 2 delegates.RA 6132-Concon Act 1970, repealed RA 4919, implemented Res No. 2 & 4.

Sec 4: considers all public officers/employees as resigned when they file their

candidacy

Sec 2: apportionment of delegates

Sec 5: Disqualifies any elected delegate from running for any public office in the

election or from assuming any appointive office/position until the final adournment of the

ConCon.

Par 1 Sec 8: ban against all political parties/organized groups from giving

support/representing a delegate to the convention.

FACTS:

This is a petition for declaratory judgment. These are 2 separate but related petitions of

running candidates for delegates to the Constitutional Convention assailing the validity

of RA 6132.Gonzales: Sec, 2, 4, 5 and Par 1 Sec 8, and validity of entire law Imbong:

Par 1 Sec 8


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ISSUE:

Whether the Congress has a right to call for Constitutional Convention and whether the

parameters set by such a call is constitutional.

HOLDING:

The Congress has the authority to call for a Constitutional Convention as a Constituent

Assembly. Furthermore, specific provisions assailed by the petitioners are deemed as

constitutional.

RATIO:

- Sec 4 RA 6132: it is simply an application of Sec 2 Art 12 of Constitution

-Constitutionality of enactment of RA 6132:

Congress acting as Constituent Assembly, has full authority to propose amendments, or

call for convention for the purpose by votes and these votes were attained by

Resolution 2 and 4

- Sec 2 RA 6132: it is a mere implementation of Resolution 4 and is enough that the

basis employed for such apportions is reasonable. Macias case relied by Gonzales is

not reasonable for that case granted more representatives to provinces with less

population and vice versa. In this case, Batanes is equal to the number of delegates I

other provinces with more population.- Sec 5: State has right to create office and parameters to qualify/disqualify members

thereof. Furthermore, this disqualification is only temporary. This is a safety mechanism

to prevent political figures from controlling elections and to allow them to devote more

time to the Constituional Convention.

- Par 1 Sec 8: this is to avoid debasement of electoral process and also to assure

candidates equal opportunity since candidates must now depend on their individual

merits, and not the support of political parties. This provision does not create

discrimination towards any particular party/group, it applies to all organizations.

Occena v. COMELEC

G.R. No. L-56350 April 2, 1981

Fernando, C.J.

Facts:


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Petitioners Samuel Occena and Ramon A. Gonzales, both members of the

Philippine Bar and former delegates to the 1971 Constitutional Convention that framed

the present Constitution, are suing as taxpayers. The rather unorthodox aspect of these

petitions is the assertion that the 1973 Constitution is not the fundamental law, the

Javellana ruling to the contrary notwithstanding.

Issue:

What is the power of the Interim Batasang Pambansa to propose

amendments and how may it be exercised? More specifically as to the latter, what is the

extent of the changes that may be introduced, the number of votes necessary for the

validity of a proposal, and the standard required for a proper submission?

Held:

The applicable provision in the 1976 Amendments is quite explicit. Insofar aspertinent it reads thus: TheInterim Batasang Pambansa shall have the same powers

and its Members shall have the same functions, responsibilities, rights, privileges, and

disqualifications as the interim National Assembly and the regular National Assembly

and the Members thereof. One of such powers is precisely that of proposing

amendments. The 1973 Constitution in its Transitory Provisions vested

the Interim National Assembly with the power to propose amendments upon special call

by the Prime Minister by a vote of the majority of its members to be ratified in

accordance with the Article on Amendments. When, therefore, the Interim Batasang

Pambansa, upon the call of the President and Prime Minister Ferdinand E. Marcos, met

as a constituent body its authority to do so is clearly beyond doubt. It could and didpropose the amendments embodied in the resolutions now being assailed. It may be

observed parenthetically that as far as petitioner Occena is concerned, the question of

the authority of the Interim Batasang Pambansa to propose amendments is not new.

Considering that the proposed amendment of Section 7 of Article X of the Constitution

extending the retirement of members of the Supreme Court and judges of inferior courts

from sixty-five (65) to seventy (70) years is but a restoration of the age of retirement

provided in the 1935 Constitution and has been intensively and extensively discussed at

the Interim Batasang Pambansa, as well as through the mass media, it cannot,

therefore, be said that our people are unaware of the advantages and disadvantages of

the proposed amendment.

Issue:

Were the amendments proposed are so extensive in character that they go

far beyond the limits of the authority conferred on the Interim Batasang Pambansa as

Successor of the Interim National Assembly? Was there revision rather than

amendment?


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Held:

Whether the Constitutional Convention will only propose amendments to the

Constitution or entirely overhaul the present Constitution and propose an entirely new

Constitution based on an Ideology foreign to the democratic system, is of no moment;because the same will be submitted to the people for ratification. Once ratified by the

sovereign people, there can be no debate about the validity of the new Constitution. The

fact that the present Constitution may be revised and replaced with a new one is no

argument against the validity of the law because amendment includes the revision or

total overhaul of the entire Constitution. At any rate, whether the Constitution is merely

amended in part or revised or totally changed would become immaterial the moment the

same is ratified by the sovereign people.

Issue:

What is the vote necessary to propose amendments as well as the standard

for proper submission?

Held:

The Interim Batasang Pambansa, sitting as a constituent body, can propose

amendments. In that capacity, only a majority vote is needed. It would be an

indefensible proposition to assert that the three-fourth votes required when it sits as a

legislative body applies as well when it has been convened as the agency through

which amendments could be proposed. That is not a requirement as far as aconstitutional convention is concerned. It is not a requirement either when, as in this

case, the Interim Batasang Pambansa exercises its constituent power to propose

amendments. Moreover, even on the assumption that the requirement of three- fourth

votes applies, such extraordinary majority was obtained. It is not disputed that

Resolution No. 1 proposing an amendment allowing a natural-born citizen of the

Philippines naturalized in a foreign country to own a limited area of land for residential

purposes was approved by the vote of 122 to 5; Resolution No. 2 dealing with the

Presidency, the Prime Minister and the Cabinet, and the National Assembly by a vote of

147 to 5 with 1 abstention; and Resolution No. 3 on the amendment to the Article on the

Commission on Elections by a vote of 148 to 2 with 1 abstention. Where then is the

alleged infirmity? As to the requisite standard for a proper submission, the question may

be viewed not only from the standpoint of the period that must elapse before the holding

of the plebiscite but also from the standpoint of such amendments having been called to

the attention of the people so that it could not plausibly be maintained that they were

properly informed as to the proposed changes. As to the period, the Constitution

indicates the way the matter should be resolved. There is no ambiguity to the applicable


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provision: Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution shall be valid when

ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not later than

three months after the approval of such amendment or revision. The three resolutions

were approved by the Interim Batasang Pambansa sitting as a constituent assembly on

February 5 and 27, 1981. In the Batasang Pambansa Blg. 22, the date of the plebiscite

is set for April 7, 1981. It is thus within the 90-day period provided by the Constitution.

Tolentino v. COMELEC

G.R. No. 148334 January 21, 2004

Barredo, J.

Facts:

Following the appointment of Senator Teofisto Guingona as Vice-President ofthe Philippines, the Senate on February 8, 2001 passed Resolution No. 84, calling on

COMELEC to fill the vacancy through a special election to be held simultaneously with

the regular elections on May 14, 2001. Twelve senators, with 6-year term each, were

due to be elected in that election. The resolution further provides that the Senatorial

candidate garnering the 13th highest number of votes shall serve only for the unexpired

term of former Senator Teofisto Guingona, Jr. which ends on June 30, 2004. On June 5,

2001, after canvassing the election results, the COMELEC proclaimed 13 candidates as

the elected Senators, with the first 12 Senators to serve the unexpired term of 6 years

and the 13th Senator to serve the full term of 3 years of Senator Teofisto Guingona, Jr.

Gregorio Honasan ranked 13th.

Petitioners Arturo Tolentino and Arturo Mojica, as voters and taxpayers, filed the

instant petition for prohibition, praying for the nullification of Resolution No. 01-005.

They contend that COMELEC issued Resolution 01-005 without jurisdiction because:

(1) it failed to notify the electorate of the position to be filled in the special election as

required under Section 2 of RA 6645; (2) it failed to require senatorial candidates to

indicate in their certificates of candidacy whether they seek election under the special or

regular elections as allegedly required under Section 73 of BP 881; and, consequently,

(3) it failed to specify in the Voters Information Sheet the candidates seeking election

under the special or regular senatorial elections as purportedly required under Section

4, paragraph 4 of RA 6646. Tolentino and Mojica add that because of these omissions,

COMELEC canvassed all the votes cast for the senatorial candidates in the 14 May

2001 elections without distinction such that there were no two separate Senate

elections held simultaneously but just a single election for thirteen seats, irrespective of

term. Tolentino and Mojica sought the issuance of a temporary restraining order during

the pendency of their petition. Without issuing any restraining order, the Supreme Court

required COMELEC to Comment on the petition. Honasan questioned Tolentinos and


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Mojicas standing to bring the instant petition as taxpayers and voters because they do

not claim that COMELEC illegally disbursed public funds; nor claim that they sustained

personal injury because of the issuance of Resolutions 01-005 and 01-006.

Issue:

whether or not the Special Election held on May 14, 2001 should be nullified:

(1) for failure to give notice by the body empowered to and

(2) for not following the procedure of filling up the vacancy pursuant to R.A. 6645

Held:

(1) Where the law does not fix the time and place for holding a special

election but empowers some authority to fix the time and place after the happening of a

condition precedent, the statutory provision on the giving of notice is considered

mandatory, and failure to do so will render the election a nullity.

The test in determining the validity of a special election in relation to the failure to

give notice of the special election is whether want of notice has resulted in misleading a

sufficient number of voters as would change the result of special election. If the lack of

official notice misled a substantial number of voters who wrongly believed that there

was no special election to fill vacancy, a choice by small percentage of voters would be

void.

(2) There is no basis in the petitioners claim that the manner by which the

COMELEC conducted the special Senatorial election on May 14, 2001 is a nullitybecause the COMELEC failed to document separately the candidates and to canvass

separately the votes cast for the special election. No such requirement exists in our

election laws. What is mandatory under Section 2 of R.A. 6645 is that the COMELEC fix

the date of election, if necessary, and state among others, the office/s to be voted for.

Significantly, the method adopted by the COMELEC in conducting the special election

on May 14, 2001 merely implemented the procedure specified by the Senate in

Resolution No. 84. Initially, the original draft of said resolution as introduced by Senator

Francisco Tatad made no mention of the manner by which the seat vacated by former

Senator Guingona would be filled. However, upon the suggestion of Senator Raul Roco,the Senate agreed to amend the resolution by providing as it now appears, that the

senatorial cabdidate garnering the 13th highest number of votes shall serve only for the

unexpired term of former Senator Teofisto Giongona, Jr.

Sanidad v. COMELEC


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G.R. No. 90878 January 29, 1990

Medialdea, J.

Facts:

Republic Act No. 6766, entitled AN ACT PROVIDING FOR AN ORGANICACT FOR THE CORDILLERA AUTONOMOUS REGION was enacted into law.

Pursuant to said law, the City of Baguio and the Cordilleras which consist of the

provinces of Benguet, Mountain Province, Ifugao, Abra and Kalinga-Apayao, all

comprising the Cordillera Autonomous Region, shall take part in a plebiscite for the

ratification of said Organic Act.

Petitioner Pablito V. Sanidad, who claims to be a newspaper columnist of the

OVERVIEW for the BAGUIO MIDLAND COURIER, a weekly newspaper circulated in

the City of Baguio and the Cordilleras, assailed the constitutionality of Section 19 of

Comelec Resolution No. 2167, which provides:

Section 19. Prohibition on columnists, commentators or announcers. During the

plebiscite campaign period, on the day before and on the plebiscite day, no mass media

columnist, commentator, announcer or personality shall use his column or radio or

television time to campaign for or against the plebiscite issues.

It is alleged by petitioner that said provision is void and unconstitutional because

it violates the constitutional guarantees of the freedom of expression and of the press

enshrined in the Constitution.

Unlike a regular news reporter or news correspondent who merely reports the

news, petitioner maintains that as a columnist, his column obviously and necessarily

contains and reflects his opinions, views and beliefs on any issue or subject about

which he writes. Petitioner believes that said provision of COMELEC Resolution No.

2167 constitutes a prior restraint on his constitutionally-guaranteed freedom of the press

and further imposes subsequent punishment for those who may violate it because it

contains a penal provision, as follows:

Article XIII, Section 122, Election Offenses and Banned Acts or Activities. Except to

the extent that the same may not be applicable plebiscite. the banned acts/activities andoffenses defined in and penalized by the Omnibus Election Code (Sections 261, 262,

263 and Article XXII, B.P. Blg. 881) and the pertinent provisions of R.A. No. 6646 shall

be aplicable to the plebiscite governed by this Resolution.

Issue:


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Is Section 19 of Comelec Resolution No. 2167 unconstitutional on the ground

that it violates the constitutional guarantees of the freedom of expression and of the

press?

Held:

It is clear from Art. IX-C of the 1987 Constitution that what was granted to the

Comelec was the power to supervise and regulate the use and enjoyment offranchises,

permits or other grants issued for the operation of transportation or other public utilities,

media of communication or information to the end that equal opportunity, time and

space, and the right to reply, including reasonable, equal rates therefor, for public

information campaigns and forums among candidates are ensured. The evil sought to

be prevented by this provision is the possibility that a franchise holder may favor or give

any undue advantage to a candidate in terms of advertising space or radio or television

time. This is also the reason why a columnist, commentator, announcer or

personality, who is acandidate for any elective office is required to take a leave ofabsence from his work during the campaign period (2nd par. Section 11(b) R.A. 6646).

It cannot be gainsaid that a columnist or commentator who is also a candidate would be

more exposed to the voters to the prejudice of other candidates unless required to take

a leave of absence.

However, neither Article IX-C of the Constitution nor Section 11 (b), 2nd par. of

R.A. 6646 can be construed to mean that the Comelec has also been granted the right

to supervise and regulate the exercise by media practitioners themselves of their right to

expression during plebiscite periods. Media practitioners exercising their freedom of

expression during plebiscite periods are neither the franchise holders nor thecandidates. In fact, there are no candidates involved in a plebiscite. Therefore, Section

19 of Comelec Resolution No. 2167 has no statutory basis.

Santiago v. COMELEC

G.R. No. 127325 March 19, 1997

Davide, Jr., J.

Facts:

Private respondent Atty. Jesus S. Delfin filed with public respondent

COMELEC a Petition to Amend the Constitution, to Lift Term Limits of Elective

Officials, by Peoples Initiative (hereafter, Delfin Petition) wherein Delfin asked the

COMELEC for an order

1. Fixing the time and dates for signature gathering all over the

country;


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2. Causing the necessary publications of said Order and the attached

Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution, in newspapers of general and

local circulation;

3. Instructing Municipal Election Registrars in all Regions of the

Philippines, to assist Petitioners and volunteers, in establishing signing stations

at the time and on the dates designated for the purpose.

Delfin alleged in his petition that he is a founding member of the Movement for

Peoples Initiative, a group of citizens desirous to avail of the system intended to

institutionalize people power; that he and the members of the Movement and other

volunteers intend to exercise the power to directly propose amendments to the

Constitution granted under Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution; that the exercise

of that power shall be conducted in proceedings under the control and supervision of

the COMELEC; that, as required in COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, signature stations

shall be established all over the country, with the assistance of municipal election

registrars, who shall verify the signatures affixed by individual signatories; that beforethe Movement and other volunteers can gather signatures, it is necessary that the time

and dates to be designated for the purpose be first fixed in an order to be issued by the

COMELEC; and that to adequately inform the people of the electoral process involved,

it is likewise necessary that the said order, as well as the Petition on which the

signatures shall be affixed, be published in newspapers of general and local circulation,

under the control and supervision of the COMELEC.

The Delfin Petition further alleged that the provisions sought to be amended are

Sections 4 and 7 of Article VI, 7Section 4 of Article VII, and Section 8 of Article X of the

Constitution. Attached to the petition is a copy of a Petition for Initiative on the 1987Constitution embodying the proposed amendments which consist in the deletion from

the aforecited sections of the provisions concerning term limit.

According to Delfin, the said Petition for Initiative will first be submitted to the

people, and after it is signed by at least twelve per cent of the total number of registered

voters in the country it will be formally filed with the COMELEC.

The petitioners herein Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago, Alexander Padilla,

and Maria Isabel Ongpin filed this special civil action for prohibition raising the

following arguments:

(1) The constitutional provision on peoples initiative to amend the Constitution can only

be implemented by law to be passed by Congress. No such law has been passed; in

fact, Senate Bill No. 1290 entitled An Act Prescribing and Regulating Constitution

Amendments by Peoples Initiative, which petitioner Senator Santiago filed on 24

November 1995, is still pending before the Senate Committee on Constitutional

Amendments.


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(2) It is true that R.A. No. 6735 provides for three systems of initiative, namely, initiative

on the Constitution, on statutes, and on local legislation. However, it failed to provide

any subtitle on initiative on the Constitution, unlike in the other modes of initiative, which

are specifically provided for in Subtitle II and Subtitle III. This deliberate omission

indicates that the matter of peoples initiative to amend the Constitution was left to somefuture law. Former Senator Arturo Tolentino stressed this deficiency in the law in his

privilege speech delivered before the Senate in 1994: There is not a single word in that

law which can be considered as implementing [the provision on constitutional initiative].

Such implementing provisions have been obviously left to a separate law.

(3) Republic Act No. 6735 provides for the effectivity of the law after publication in print

media. This indicates that the Act covers only laws and not constitutional amendments

because the latter take effect only upon ratification and not after publication.

(4) COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, adopted on 16 January 1991 to govern the conductof initiative on the Constitution and initiative and referendum on national and local laws,

is ultra vires insofar asinitiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned, since

the COMELEC has no power to provide rules and regulations for the exercise of the

right of initiative to amend the Constitution. Only Congress is authorized by the

Constitution to pass the implementing law.

(5) The peoples initiative is limited to amendments to the Constitution, not to revision

thereof. Extending or lifting of term limits constitutes a revision and is, therefore, outside

the power of the peoples initiative.

(6) Finally, Congress has not yet appropriated funds for peoples initiative; neither the

COMELEC nor any other government department, agency, or office has realigned funds

for the purpose.

Issue:

Is R.A. No. 6735adequate to cover the system on initiative on amendments to

the Constitution?

Held:

No. Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution provides:

Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the

people through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total

number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at

least three per centum of the registered voters therein. No amendment under this


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section shall be authorized within five years following the ratification of this Constitution

nor oftener than once every five years thereafter.

The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right.

This provision is not self-executory. Without implementing legislation Section 2cannot operate. Thus, although this mode of amending the Constitution is a mode of

amendment which bypasses congressional action, in the last analysis it still is

dependent on congressional action.

This system of initiative was originally included in Section 1 of the draft Article on

Amendment or Revision proposed by the Committee on Amendments and Transitory

Provisions of the 1986 Constitutional Commission in its Committee Report No. 7

(Proposed Resolution No. 332). That section reads as follows:

Sec. 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed:

(a) by the National Assembly upon a vote of three-fourths of all its members; or

(b) by a constitutional convention; or

(c) directly by the people themselves thru initiative as provided for in Article___ Section

___of the Constitution.

Indeed, the system of initiative on the Constitution under Section 2 of Article

XVII of the Constitution is not self-executory.

Has Congress provided for the implementation of the exercise of this right?

Those who answer the question in the affirmative point to R.A. No. 6735. But is R.A. No.

6735 a full compliance with the power and duty of Congress to provide for the

implementation of the exercise of the right? A careful scrutiny of the Act yields a

negative answer.

First. Contrary to the assertion of public respondent COMELEC, Section 2 of

the Act does not suggest an initiative on amendments to the Constitution. The said

section reads:

Sec. 2. Statement and Policy. The power of the people under a system of initiative

and referendum to directly propose, enact, approve or reject, in whole or in part, the

Constitution, laws, ordinances, or resolutions passed by any legislative body upon

compliance with the requirements of this Act is hereby affirmed, recognized and

guaranteed. (Emphasis supplied).


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The inclusion of the word Constitution therein was a delayed afterthought. That

word is neither germane nor relevant to said section, which exclusively relates to

initiative and referendum on national laws and local laws, ordinances, and resolutions.

That section is silent as to amendments on the Constitution. As pointed out earlier,

initiative on the Constitution is confined only to proposals to AMEND. The people are

not accorded the power to directly propose, enact, approve, or reject, in whole or inpart, the Constitution through the system ofinitiative. They can only do so with respect

to laws, ordinances, or resolutions.

Second. It is true that Section 3 (Definition of Terms) of the Actdefines initiative on amendments to the Constitution and mentions it as one of the three

systems ofinitiative, and that Section 5 (Requirements) restates the constitutional

requirements as to the percentage of the registered voters who must submit the

proposal. But unlike in the case of the other systems of initiative, the Act does not

provide for the contents of a petition for initiative on the Constitution. Section 5,

paragraph (c) requires, among other things, statement of theproposed law sought to beenacted, approved or rejected, amended or repealed, as the case may be . It does not

include, as among the contents of the petition, the provisions of the Constitution sought

to be amended, in the case of initiative on the Constitution. Said paragraph (c) reads in

full as follows:

(c) The petition shall state the following:c.1 contents or text of the proposed lawsought to be enacted, approved or rejected,

amended or repealed, as the case may be;

c.2 the proposition;

c.3 the reason or reasons therefor;c.4 that it is not one of the exceptions provided therein;

c.5 signatures of the petitioners or registered voters; and

c.6 an abstract or summary proposition is not more than one hundred (100) words

which shall be legibly written or printed at the top of every page of the petition.

(Emphasis supplied).

The use of the clause proposed laws sought to be enacted, approved or

rejected, amended or repealed only strengthens the conclusion that Section 2, quoted

earlier, excludes initiative on amendments to the Constitution.

Third. While the Act provides subtitles for National Initiative and Referendum

(Subtitle II) and for Local Initiative and Referendum (Subtitle III), no subtitle is provided

forinitiative on the Constitution. This conspicuous silence as to the latter simply means

that the main thrust of the Act is initiative and referendum on national and local laws. If

Congress intended R.A. No. 6735 to fully provide for the implementation of

the initiative on amendments to the Constitution, it could have provided for a subtitle

therefor, considering that in the order of things, the primacy of interest, or hierarchy of


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values, the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution is far

more important than the initiative on national and local laws.

Sec. 3. Definition of terms

xxx xxx xxx

There are three (3) systems of initiative, namely:

a.1 Initiative on the Constitution which refers to a petition proposing amendments to the

Constitution;

a.2 Initiative on Statutes which refers to a petition proposing to enact anational

legislation; and

a.3 Initiative on local legislation which refers to a petition proposing to enact a regional,

provincial, city, municipal, or barangay law, resolution or ordinance. (Emphasis

supplied).

Hence, to complete the classification under subtitles there should have been a

subtitle on initiative on amendments to the Constitution.

While R.A. No. 6735 exerted utmost diligence and care in providing for the

details in the implementation of initiative and referendum on national and local

legislation thereby giving them special attention, it failed, rather intentionally, to do so on

the system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution. Anent the initiative on

national legislation, the Act provides for the following:

(a) The required percentage of registered voters to sign the petition and the contents of

the petition;

(b) The conduct and date of the initiative;

(c) The submission to the electorate of the proposition and the required number of votes

for its approval;

(d) The certification by the COMELEC of the approval of the proposition;

(e) The publication of the approved proposition in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper

of general circulation in the Philippines; and

(f) The effects of the approval or rejection of the proposition.

As regards local initiative, the Act provides for the following:


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(a) The preliminary requirement as to the number of signatures of registered voters for

the petition;

(b) The submission of the petition to the local legislative body concerned;

(c) The effect of the legislative bodys failure to favorably act thereon, and the invocationof the power of initiative as a consequence thereof;

(d) The formulation of the proposition;

(e) The period within which to gather the signatures;

(f) The persons before whom the petition shall be signed;

(g) The issuance of a certification by the COMELEC through its official in the local

government unit concerned as to whether the required number of signatures have beenobtained;

(h) The setting of a date by the COMELEC for the submission of the proposition to the

registered voters for their approval, which must be within the period specified therein;

(i) The issuance of a certification of the result;

(j) The date of effectivity of the approved proposition;

(k) The limitations on local initiative; and

(l) The limitations upon local legislative bodies.

Upon the other hand, as to initiative on amendments to the Constitution, R.A. No.

6735, in all of its twenty-three sections, merely (a) mentions, the word Constitution in

Section 2; (b) defines initiative on the Constitution and includes it in the enumeration of

the three systems of initiative in Section 3; (c) speaks of plebiscite as the process by

which the proposition in an initiative on the Constitution may be approved or rejected by

the people; (d) reiterates the constitutional requirements as to the number of voters who

should sign the petition; and (e) provides for the date of effectivity of the approvedproposition.

There was, therefore, an obvious downgrading of the more important or the

paramount system of initiative. RA. No. 6735 thus delivered a humiliating blow to the

system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution by merely paying it a reluctant lip

service.


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The foregoing brings us to the conclusion that R.A. No. 6735 is incomplete,

inadequate, or wanting in essential terms and conditions insofar as initiative on

amendments to the Constitution is concerned. Its lacunae on this substantive matter are

fatal and cannot be cured by empowering the COMELEC to promulgate such rules

and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of the Act.

The rule is that what has been delegated, cannot be delegated or as expressed

in a Latin maxim: potestas delegata non delegari potest. The recognized exceptions to

the rule are as follows:

(1) Delegation of tariff powers to the President under Section 28(2) of Article VI of

the Constitution;

(2) Delegation of emergency powers to the President under Section 23(2) of Article

VI of the Constitution;

(3) Delegation to the people at large;

(4) Delegation to local governments; and(5) Delegation to administrative bodies.

Empowering the COMELEC, an administrative body exercising quasi-judicial

functions, to promulgate rules and regulations is a form of delegation of legislative

authority under no. 5 above. However, in every case of permissible delegation, there

must be a showing that the delegation itself is valid. It is valid only if the law (a) is

complete in itself, setting forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out, or

implemented by the delegate; and (b) fixes a standard the limits of which are

sufficiently determinate and determinable to which the delegate must conform in the

performance of his functions. A sufficient standard is one which defines legislativepolicy, marks its limits, maps out its boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply

it. It indicates the circumstances under which the legislative command is to be effected.

Insofar as initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution is concerned,

R.A. No. 6735 miserably failed to satisfy both requirements in subordinate legislation.

The delegation of the power to the COMELEC is then invalid.

Issue:

Is COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, insofar as it prescribes rules andregulations on theconduct of initiative on amendments to the Constitution, void?

Held:

Yes. The COMELEC cannot validly promulgate rules and regulations to

implement the exercise of the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the

Constitution through the system of initiative. It does not have that power under R.A. No.


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6735. Reliance on the COMELECs power under Section 2(1) of Article IX-C of the

Constitution is misplaced, for the laws and regulations referred to therein are those

promulgated by the COMELEC under (a) Section 3 of Article IX-C of the Constitution, or

(b) a law where subordinate legislation is authorized and which satisfies the

completeness and the sufficient standard tests.

Issue:

Did the COMELEC act without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in

entertaining the Delfin petition

Held:

Yes. Under Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution and Section 5(b) of

R.A. No. 6735, a petition for initiative on the Constitution must be signed by at least

12% of the total number of registered voters of which every legislative district isrepresented by at least 3% of the registered voters therein. The Delfin Petition does not

contain signatures of the required number of voters. Delfin himself admits that he has

not yet gathered signatures and that the purpose of his petition is primarily to obtain

assistance in his drive to gather signatures. Without the required signatures, the petition

cannot be deemed validly initiated.

Since the Delfin Petition is not the initiatory petition under R.A. No. 6735 and

COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, it cannot be entertained or given cognizance of by the

COMELEC. The respondent Commission must have known that the petition does not

fall under any of the actions or proceedings under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure orunder Resolution No. 2300, for which reason it did not assign to the petition a docket

number. Hence, the said petition was merely entered as UND, meaning, undocketed.

That petition was nothing more than a mere scrap of paper, which should not have been

dignified by the Order of 6 December 1996, the hearing on 12 December 1996, and the

order directing Delfin and the oppositors to file their memoranda or oppositions. In so

dignifying it, the COMELEC acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.

Bacani v. NACOCO Digest

G.R. No. L-9657 Nov. 29, 1956

Two-fold Function of the Government

FACTS:

1. Bacani and Matoto are court stenographers both assigned in the CFI of Manila. During thependency of another civil case (Civil Case No. 2293 entitled 'Francisco Sycip vs. NACOCO'),

Alikpala, counsel for NACOCO(Natl Coconut Corporation) , requested the said stenographers

for copies of the transcript of the stenographic notes taken by them during the hearing.

Plaintiffs complied with the request by delivering to Counsel Alikpala the needed transcript
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containing 714 pages and thereafter submitted to him their bills for the payment of their

fees. The NACOCO paid the amount of P564 to Bacani and P150 to Matoto for said transcript at

the rate of P1 per page.

3. Subsequently, the Auditor General required the plaintiffs to reimburse said amounts by virtueof a DOJ circular which stated that NACOCO, being a government entity, was exempt from thepayment of the fees in question.

4. Petitioners countered that NACOCO is not a government entity within the purview of section16, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court while the defendants set up as a defense that the NACOCO is

a government entity within the purview of section 2 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917

hence, exempt from paying the stenographers fees under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not NACOCO is a government entity.

No, it is not.

1. GOCCs do not acquire that status for the simple reason that they do not come under theclassification of municipal or public corporation. While NACOCO was organized for the purpose

of adjusting the coconut industry to a position independent of trade preferences in the United

States and of providing Facilities for the better curing of copra products and the proper

utilization of coconut by-products, a function which our government has chosen to exercise to

promote the coconut industry. It was given a corporate power separate and distinct from the

government, as it was made subject to the provisions of the Corporation Law in so far as its

corporate existence and the powers that it may exercise are concerned (sections 2 and 4,

Commonwealth Act No. 518). It may sue and be sued in the same manner as any other private

corporations, and in this sense it is an entity different from our government.

2. There are functions which our government is required to exercise to promote its objectives asexpressed in our Constitution and which are exercised by it as an attribute of sovereignty, and

those which it may exercise to promote merely the welfare, progress and prosperity of the

people.3. President Wilson enumerates the constituent functions as follows:

(1) The keeping of order and providing for the protection of persons and property from violence

and robbery.(2) The fixing of the legal relations between man and wife and between parents and children.

(3) The regulation of the holding, transmission, and interchange of property, and the

determination of its liabilities for debt or for crime.(4) The determination of contract rights between individuals.(5) The definition and punishment of crime.(6) The administration of justice in civil cases.(7) The determination of the political duties, privileges, and relations of citizens.


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(8) Dealings of the state with foreign powers: the preservation of the state from external

danger or encroachment and the advancement of its international interests.4. The most important of the ministrant functions are: public works, public education, public

charity, health and safety regulations, and regulations of trade and industry. The principles

deter mining whether or not a government shall exercise certain of these optional functions

are: (1) that a government should do for the public welfare those things which private capitalwould not naturally undertake and (2) that a government should do these things which by its

very nature it is better equipped to administer for the public welfare than is any private

individual or group of individuals.

PVTA v. CIR

G.R. No. L-32052 July 25, 1975

Fernando, J.

Facts:

Private respondents filed a petition wherein they alleged their employment relationship,

the overtime services in excess of the regular eight hours a day rendered by them, and

the failure to pay them overtime compensation in accordance with Commonwealth Act

No. 444. Their prayer was for the differential between the amount actually paid to them

and the amount allegedly due them. Petitioner Philippine Virginia Tobacco

Administration would predicate its plea for the reversal of the order complained of on the

basic proposition that it is beyond the jurisdiction of respondent Court as it is exercising

governmental functions and that it is exempt from the operation of Commonwealth Act

No. 444.

Issue:

whether PVTA discharges governmental and not proprietary functions

Held:

No. A reference to the enactments creating petitioner corporation suffices todemonstrate the merit of petitioners plea that it performs governmental and not proprietaryfunctions. As originally established by Republic Act No. 2265, its purposes and objectives were

set forth thus: (a) To promote the effective merchandising of Virginia tobacco in the domesticand foreign markets so that those engaged in the industry will be placed on a basis of economic

security; (b) To establish and maintain balanced production and consumption of Virginiatobacco and its manufactured products, and such marketing conditions as will insure andstabilize the price of a level sufficient to cover the cost of production plus reasonable profit bothin the local as well as in the foreign market; (c) To create, establish, maintain, and operateprocessing, warehousing and marketing facilities in suitable centers and supervise the selling
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and buying of Virginia tobacco so that the farmers will enjoy reasonable prices that secure a fairreturn of their investments; (d) To prescribe rules and regulations governing the grading,classifying, and inspecting of Virginia tobacco; and (e) To improve the living and economicconditions of the people engaged in the tobacco industry. The amendatory statute, RepublicAct No. 4155, renders even more evident its nature as a governmental agency. Its first section on

the declaration of policy reads: It is declared to be the national policy, with respect to the localVirginia tobacco industry, to encourage the production of local Virginia tobacco of the qualitiesneeded and in quantities marketable in both domestic and foreign markets, to establish thisindustry on an efficient and economic basis, and, to create a climate conducive to local cigarettemanufacture of the qualities desired by the consuming public, blending imported and nativeVirginia leaf tobacco to improve the quality of locally manufactured cigarettes. The objectivesare set forth thus: To attain this national policy the following objectives are hereby adopted: 1.Financing; 2. Marketing; 3. The disposal of stocks of the Agricultural Credit Administration(ACA) and the Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration (PVTA) at the best obtainableprices and conditions in order that a reinvigorated Virginia tobacco industry may be established

on a sound basis; and 4. Improving the quality of locally manufactured cigarettes throughblending of imported and native Virginia leaf tobacco; such importation with correspondingexportation at a ratio of one kilo of imported to four kilos of exported Virginia tobacco,purchased by the importer-exporter from the Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration.

Functions relating to the maintenance of peace and the prevention of crime,

those regulating property and property rights, those relating to the administration of

justice and the determination of political duties of citizens, and those relating to national

defense and foreign relations may not be strictly considered constituent. Under the

traditional constituent-ministrant classification, such constituent functions are exercised

by the State as attributes of sovereignty, and not merely to promote the welfare,progress and prosperity of the people these latter functions being ministrant, the

exercise of which is optional on the part of the government. Nonetheless, the growing

complexities of modern society, however, have rendered this traditional classification of

the functions of government quite unrealistic, not to say obsolete. The areas which used

to be left to private enterprise and initiative and which the government was called upon

to enter optionally, and only because it was better equipped to administer for the public

welfare than is any private individual or group of individuals, continue to lose their well-

defined boundaries and to be absorbed within activities that the government must

undertake in its sovereign capacity if it is to meet the increasing social challenges of the

times. Here as almost everywhere else the tendency is undoubtedly towards a greatersocialization of economic forces. Here of course this development was envisioned,

indeed adopted as a national policy, by the Constitution itself in its declaration of

principle concerning the promotion of social justice.

Government v. Monte De Piedad Digest
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Facts:

1. Spain paid $400,000 into the treasury of the Philippine Islands for the relief of thosedamaged by an earthquake.

2. Upon the petition of Monte de Piedad, an institution under the control of the church, the

Philippine Government directed its treasurer to give $80,000 of the relief fund in Four(4)4 installments. As a result, various petitions were filed, includingthe heirs of those entitled to the allotments. All prayed for the State to bring suit againstMonte de Piedad, and for it to pay with interest.

3. The Defendant appealed since all its funds have been exhausted already on variousjewelry loans.

Issue: Whether the government is the proper authority to the cause of action

YES.

The Philippine government, as a trustee towards the funds could maintain the actionsince there has been no change of sovereignty. The state, as a sovereign, is theparenspatriae of the people. These principles are based upon public policy. The PhilippineGovernment is not a mere nominal party because it was exercising its sovereignfunctions or powers and was merely seeking to carry out a trust developed upon it whenthe Philippine Islands was ceded to the United States. Finally, if said loan was forecclesiastical pious work, then Spain would not exercise its civil capacities.

Co Kim Chan vs. Valdez Tan Keh

75 PHIL 131

FACTS: Petitioner filed a motion for mandamus which prays that the respondent judge be

ordered to continue the proceeding which was initiated under the regime of the so-called

Republic of the Philippines established during the Japanese military occupation. It is based on

the proclamation issued by Gen. Douglas McArthur which had the effect of invalidating and

nullifying all judicial proceedings and judgments of the courts of the Philippines. Furthermore, it

was contended that the lower courts have no jurisdiction to take cognizance of and continue

judicial proceedings pending the court of the defunct republic in the absence of enabling law.

ISSUES: Whether the government established in the said Japanese occupation is in fact a defacto government.

Whether the judicial acts and proceedings of the courts existing in the Philippines under the

Philippine Executive Commission were good and valid even after the liberation or reoccupation

of the Philippines by the US Forces.


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HELD: In political and international law, all acts and proceedings of the legislative, executive and

judicial department of a de facto government is valid. Being a de facto government, judicial acts

done under its control, when they are not political in nature, to the extent that they effect

during the continuance and control of said government remain good.

All judgment and judicial proceedings which are not of political complexion were good and valid

before and remained as such even after the occupied territory had come again into the power

of true and original sovereign.

Wherefore, the respondent judge is directed to take cognizance of the civil case (3012) and

continue the proceedings.

People of the Philippines vs Gozo

on November 9, 2011

Political LawSovereignty

Gozo bought a house and lot which was located inside the US Naval Reservation which

is within the territorial jurisdiction of Olongapo City. Upon the advice of an assistant in

the Mayors Office and some neighbors, she demolished the house without acquiring

the necessary permits and then later on erected another house. She was then charged

by the City Engineers Office for violating Mun. Ord No. 14 Series of 1964 which

requires her to secure permits for any demolition and/or construction within the City.

She was convicted in violation thereof by the lower court. She appealed and countered

that the City of Olongapo has no administrative jurisdiction over the said lot because it

is within a Naval Base of a foreign country.

ISSUE: Is the Municipal Ordinance enforceable within the US Naval Base?

HELD: Yes. The Philippine Government has not abdicated its sovereignty over the

bases as part of the Philippine territory or divested itself completely of jurisdiction over

offenses committed therein. Under the terms of the treaty, the United States

Government has prior or preferential but not exclusive jurisdiction of such offenses. The

Philippine Government retains not only jurisdictional rights not granted, but also all such

ceded rights as the United States Military authorities for reasons of their own decline to

make use of (Military Bases Agreement). Hence, in the exercise of its sovereignty, the

State through the City of Olongapo does have administrative jurisdiction over the lot

located within the US Naval Base.


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Laurel v. Misa

G.R. No. L-409 March 28, 1946

Bengzon, J.

Held:

A citizen or subject owes, not a qualified and temporary, but an absolute and

permanent allegiance, which consists in the obligation of fidelity and obedience to his

government or sovereign; and that this absolute and permanent allegiance should not

be confused with the qualified and temporary allegiance which a foreigner owes to the

government or sovereign of the territory wherein he resides, so long as he remains

there, in return for the protection he receives, and which consists in the obedience to

the laws of the government or sovereign.

The absolute and permanent allegiance of the inhabitants of a territory

occupied by the enemy of their legitimate government or sovereign is not abrogated or

severed by the enemy occupation, because the sovereignty of the government or

sovereignde jure is not transferred thereby to the occupier, and if it is not transferred to

the occupant it must necessarily remain vested in the legitimate government; that the

sovereignty vested in the titular government (which is the supreme power which

governs a body politic or society which constitute the state) must be distinguished from

the exercise of the rights inherent thereto, and may be destroyed, or severed and

transferred to another, but it cannot be suspended because the existence of sovereignty

cannot be suspended without putting it out of existence or divesting the possessorthereof at least during the so-called period of suspension; that what may be suspended

is the exercise of the rights of sovereignty with the control and government of the

territory occupied by the enemy passes temporarily to the occupant; that the

subsistence of the sovereignty of the legitimate government in a territory occupied by

the military forces of the enemy during the war, although the former is in fact prevented

from exercising the supremacy over them is one of the rules of international law of our

times; recognized, by necessary implication, in articles 23, 44, 45, and 52 of Hague

Regulation; and that, as a corollary of the conclusion that the sovereignty itself is not

suspended and subsists during the enemy occupation, the allegiance of the inhabitants

to their legitimate government or sovereign subsists, and therefore there is no such

thing as suspended allegiance, the basic theory on which the whole fabric of the

petitioners contention rests.

A foreign country, in the same way an inhabitant of a territory occupied by the

military forces of the enemy may commit treason against his own legitimate government

or sovereign if he adheres to the enemies of the latter by giving them aid and comfort;

and that if the allegiance of a citizen or subject to his government or sovereign is
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nothing more than obedience to its laws in return for the protection he receives, it would

necessarily follow that a citizen who resides in a foreign country or state would, on one

hand, ipso facto acquire the citizenship thereof since he has enforce public order and

regulate the social and commercial life, in return for the protection he receives, and

would, on the other hand, lose his original citizenship, because he would not be bound

to obey most of the laws of his own government or sovereign, and would not receive,while in a foreign country, the protection he is entitled to in his own.

As a corollary of the suspension of the exercise of the rights of sovereignty by

the legitimate government in the territory occupied by the enemy military forces,

because the authority of the legitimate power to govern has passed into the hands of

the occupant (Article 43, Hague Regulations), the political laws which prescribe the

reciprocal rights, duties and obligation of government and citizens, are suspended or in

abeyance during military occupation, for the only reason that as they exclusively bear

relation to the ousted legitimate government, they are inoperative or not applicable to

the government established by the occupant; that the crimes against national security,such as treason and espionage; inciting to war, correspondence with hostile country,

flight to enemys country, as well as those against public order, such as rebellion,

sedition, and disloyalty, illegal possession of firearms, which are of political complexion

because they bear relation to, and are penalized by our Revised Penal Code as crimes

against the legitimate government, are also suspended or become inapplicable as

against the occupant, because they cannot be committed against the latter; and that,

while the offenses against public order to be preserved by the legitimate government

were inapplicable as offenses against the invader for the reason above stated, unless

adopted by him, were also inoperative as against the ousted government for the latter

was not responsible for the preservation of the public order in the occupied territory, yetarticle 114 of the said Revised Penal Code, was applicable to treason committed

against the national security of the legitimate government, because the inhabitants of

the occupied territory were still bound by their allegiance to the latter during the enemy

occupation.

Although the military occupant is enjoined to respect or continue in force,

unless absolutely prevented by the circumstances, those laws that enforce public order

and regulate the social and commercial life of the country, he has, nevertheless, all the

powers of de facto government and may, at his pleasure, either change the existing

laws or make new ones when the exigencies of the military service demand such action,that is, when it is necessary for the occupier to do so for the control of the country and

the protection of his army, subject to the restrictions or limitations imposed by the

Hague Regulations, the usages established by civilized nations, the laws of humanity

and the requirements of public conscience; and that, consequently, all acts of the

military occupant dictated within these limitations are obligatory upon the inhabitants of

the territory, who are bound to obey them, and the laws of the legitimate government

which have not been adopted, as well and those which, though continued in force, are


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in conflict with such laws and orders of the occupier, shall be considered as suspended

or not in force and binding upon said inhabitants.

Since the preservation of the allegiance or the obligation of fidelity and obedience

of a citizen or subject to his government or sovereign does not demand from him a

positive action, but only passive attitude or forbearance from adhering to the enemy bygiving the latter aid and comfort, the occupant has no power, as a corollary of the

preceding consideration, to repeal or suspend the operation of the law of treason,

essential for the preservation of the allegiance owed by the inhabitants to their

legitimate government, or compel them to adhere and give aid and comfort to him;

because it is evident that such action is not demanded by the exigencies of the military

service or not necessary for the control of the inhabitants and the safety and protection

of his army, and because it is tantamount to practically transfer temporarily to the

occupant their allegiance to the titular government or sovereign; and that, therefore, if

an inhabitant of the occupied territory were compelled illegally by the military occupant,

through force, threat or intimidation, to give him aid and comfort, the former may lawfullyresist and die if necessary as a hero, or submit thereto without becoming a traitor.

The crime of treason against the government of the Philippines defined and

penalized in article 114 of the Penal Code, though originally intended to be a crime

against said government as then organized by authority of the sovereign people of the

United States, exercised through their authorized representative, the Congress and the

President of the United States, was made, upon the establishment of the

Commonwealth Government in 1935, a crime against the Government of the Philippines

established by authority of the people of the Philippines, in whom the sovereignty

resides according to section 1, Article II, of the Constitution of the Philippines, by virtueof the provision of section 2, Article XVI thereof, which provides that All laws of the

Philippine Islands . . . shall remain operative, unless inconsistent with this Constitution .

. . and all references in such laws to the Government or officials of the Philippine

Islands, shall be construed, in so far as applicable, to refer to the Government and

corresponding officials under this constitution.

Ruffy v. Chief of Staff

G.R. No. L-45081 July 15, 1936

Tuason, J.

Facts:

This was a petition for prohibition, praying that the respondents, the Chief of

Staff and the General Court Martial of the Philippine Army, be commanded to desist

from further proceedings in the trial of petitioners before that body. Preliminary

injunction having been denied by us and the General Court Martial having gone ahead


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with the trial, which eventually resulted in the acquittal of one of the defendants, Ramon

Ruffy, the dismissal of the case as to another, Victoriano Dinglasan, and the conviction

of Jose L. Garcia, Prudente M. Francisco, Dominador Adeva and Andres Fortus, the

last-named four petitioners now seek in their memorandum to convert the petition into

one for certiorari, with the prayer that the records of the proceedings before the General

Court Martial be ordered certified to the Supreme Court for review.

The ground of the petition was that the petitioners were not subject to military law

at the time the offense for which they had been placed on trial was committed. In their

memorandum they have raised an additional question of law that the 93d Article of

War is unconstitutional.

Issue:

whether petitioners were not subject to military law at the time the offense for

which they had been placed on trial was committed

Held:

No. The 2d Article of War defines and enumerates the persons subject to

military law as follows:

Art. 2. Persons Subject to Military Law. The following persons are subject to these

articles and shall be understood as included in the term any person subject to military

law or persons subject to militarylaw, whenever used in these articles:

(a) All officers, members of the Nurse Corps and soldiers belonging to the Regular

Force of the Philippine Army; all reservists, from the dates of their call to active duty and

while on such active duty; all trainees undergoing military instructions; and all other

persons lawfully called, drafted, or order to obey the same;

(b) Cadets, flying cadets, and probationary third lieutenants;

(c) All retainers to the camp and all persons accompanying or serving with the Army

of the Philippines in the field in time of war or when martial law is declared though not

otherwise subject to these articles;(d) All persons under sentences adjudged by courts-martial.

The petitioners come within the general application of the clause in sub-

paragraph (a); and all other persons lawfully called, drafted, or ordered into, or to duty

for training in, the said service, from the dates they are required by the terms of the call,

draft, or order to obey the same. By their acceptance of appointments as officers in the

Bolo Area from the General Headquarters of the 6th Military District, they became

members of the Philippine Army amendable to the Articles of War. The Bolo Area, as

has been seen, was a contingent of the 6th Military District which, as has also been


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pointed out, had been recognized by and placed under the operational control of the

United States Army in the Southwest Pacific. The Bolo Area received supplies and

funds for the salaries of its officers and men from the Southwest Pacific Command. As

officers in the Bolo Area and the 6th Military District, the petitioners operated under the

orders of duly established and duly appointed commanders of the United States Army.

Issue:

whether the 93d Article of War is unconstitutional as it deprives the Supreme

Court of its jurisdiction over offenses punishable by death or imprisonment for life

Held:

No. Courts martial are agencies of executive character, and one of the

authorities for the ordering of courts martial has been held to be attached to the

constitutional functions of the President as Commander in Chief, independently oflegislation. Unlike courts of law, they are not a portion of the judiciary. Congress has the

power to provide for the trial and punishment of military and naval offenses in the

manner then and now practiced by civilized nations.

Not belonging to the judicial branch of the government, it follows that courts-

martial must pertain to the executive department; and they are in fact simply

instrumentalities of the executive power, provided by Congress for the President as

Commander in Chief, to aid him in properly commanding the army and navy and

enforcing discipline therein, and utilized under his orders or those of his authorized

military representatives.

Mo Ya Lim Yao vs. Commissioner of Immigration,GR L-21289, 4 October 1971

Facts:

On 8 February 1961, Lau Yuen Yeung applied for a passport visa to enter the Philippinesas a non-immigrant, for a temporary visitor's visa to enter the Philippines. She waspermitted to come into the Philippines on 13 March 1961. On the date of her arrival,

Asher Y, Cheng filed a bond in the amount of P1,000.00 to undertake, among others,that said Lau Yuen Yeung would actually depart from the Philippines on or before theexpiration of her authorized period of stay in this country or within the period as in hisdiscretion the Commissioner of Immigration. After repeated extensions, she wasallowed to stay in the Philippines up to 13 February 1962. On 25 January 1962, shecontracted marriage with Moy Ya Lim Yao alias Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim an allegedFilipino citizen. Because of the contemplated action of the Commissioner ofImmigration to confiscate her bond and order her arrest and immediate deportation,


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after the expiration of her authorized stay, she brought an action for injunction withpreliminary injunction. The Court of First Instance of Manila (Civil Case 49705) deniedthe prayer for preliminary injunction. Moya Lim Yao and Lau Yuen Yeung appealed.

Issue:

Whether Lau Yuen Yeung ipso facto became a Filipino citizen upon her marriageto a Filipino citizen.

Held:

Under Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473, an alien woman marrying a Filipino, native

born or naturalized, becomes ipso facto a Filipina provided she is not disqualified to be a

citizen of the Philippines under Section 4 of the same law. Likewise, an alien woman

married to an alien who is subsequently naturalized here follows the Philippine

citizenship of her husband the moment he takes his oath as Filipino citizen, provided

that she does not suffer from any of the disqualifications under said Section 4. Whether

the alien woman requires to undergo the naturalization proceedings, Section 15 is aparallel provision to Section 16. Thus, if the widow of an applicant for naturalization as

Filipino, who dies during the proceedings, is not required to go through a naturalization

proceedings, in order to be considered as a Filipino citizen hereof, it should follow that

the wife of a living Filipino cannot be denied the same privilege. Everytime the

citizenship of a person is material or indispensible in a judicial or administrative case,

Whatever the corresponding court or administrative authority decides therein as to such

citizenship is generally not considered as res adjudicata, hence it has to be threshed out

again and again as the occasion may demand. Lau Yuen Yeung, was declared to have

become a Filipino citizen from and by virtue of her marriage to Moy Ya Lim Yao al as

Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim, a Filipino citizen of 25 January 1962.

LAWYERS LEAGUE FOR A BETTER PHILIPPINES vs. AQUINO

(G.R. No. 73748 - May 22, 1986)

FACTS:

On February 25, 1986, President Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation No. 1 announcing that

she and Vice President Laurel were taking power.

On March 25, 1986, proclamation No.3 was issued providing the basis of the Aquino

government assumption of power by stating that the "new government was installed through a

direct exercise of the power of the Filipino people assisted by units of the New Armed Forces of

the Philippines."

ISSUE:


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Whether or not the government of Corazon Aquino is legitimate.

HELD:

Yes. The legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter but belongs to the

realm of politics where only the people are the judge.

The Court further held that:

The people have accepted the Aquino government which is in effective control of the entire

country;

It is not merely a de facto government but in fact and law a de jure government; and

The community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of the new government.

Villavicencio vs Lukban L-14639Facts:

Justo Lukban as Manila Mayor together with the police officer, took custody of 170

women at the night of October 25 beyond the latter's consent and knowledge and

thereafter were shipped to Davao City where they were signed as laborers.

A writ of habeas corpus was filed against the mayor on behalf of those women. The

court granted the writ, but the mayor was not able to bring any of the women before

the court on the stipulated date.

Issue:

Whether or not the act of mayor has a legal basis.

Held:

The supreme court said that the mayor's acts were not legal. His intent of exterminating

vice was commendable, but there was no law saying that he could force filipino women

to change their domicile from manila to nother place. The women, said the court,

although in a sense "lepers of society" were still filipino citizens and such they were

entitled to the constitutional enjoyed by all other filipino citizens. The right to freedom

of domicile was such a fundamental right that its suppression could considered

tantamount to slavery.

The supreme court upheld the right of filipino citizens to freedom of domicile or the

Liberty of abode. "Ours is a government of laws and not of men."


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LAUREL V. MISA

FACTS:

A petition for habeas corpus was filed by Anastacio Laurel. He claims that a Filipino

citizen who adhered to the enemy giving the latter aid and comfort during theJapanese occupation cannot be prosecuted for the crime of treason for the reasonsthat the sovereignty of the legitimate government in the Philippines and consequentlythe correlative allegiance of Filipino citizen thereto were then suspended; and thatthere was a change of sovereignty over these Islands upon the proclamation of thePhilippine Republic.

ISSUE: WHETHER THE ABSOLUTE ALLEGIANCE OF A FILIPINO CITIZEN TO THE

GOVERNMENT BECOMES SUSPENDED DURING OCCUPATION

Held:

A citizen or subject owes, not a qualified and temporary, but an absolute and

permanent allegiance, which consists in the obligation of fidelity and obedience to his

government or sovereign; and that this absolute and permanent allegiance should not

be confused with the qualified and temporary allegiance which a foreigner owes to the

government or sovereign of the territory wherein he resides, so long as he remains

there, in return for the protection he receives, and which consists in the obedience to

the laws of the government or sovereign.

The absolute and permanent allegiance of the inhabitants of a territory

occupied by the enemy of their legitimate government or sovereign is not abrogated orsevered by the enemy occupation, because the sovereignty of the government or

sovereignde jure is not transferred thereby to the occupier, and if it is not transferred to

the occupant it must necessarily remain vested in the legitimate government; that the

sovereignty vested in the titular government (which is the supreme power which

governs a body politic or society which constitute the state) must be distinguished from

the exercise of the rights inherent thereto, and may be destroyed, or severed and

transferred to another, but it cannot be suspended because the existence of sovereignty

cannot be suspended without putting it out of existence or divesting the possessor

thereof at least during the so-called period of suspension; that what may be suspended

is the exercise of the rights of sovereignty with the control and government of theterritory occupied by the enemy passes temporarily to the occupant; that the

subsistence of the sovereignty of the legitimate government in a territory occupied by

the military forces of the enemy during the war, although the former is in fact p

consti cases intro

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