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Chapter XXThe Right against Double Jeopardy

34.P. vs Inting, 70 SCRA 289

Considering that this petition for review on certiorari of the order dated October 21, 1975,

of the City Court of Davao, Branch II, in its Criminal Case No. 8053-B, entitled "The People of

the Philippines vs. Jose Alvarado, for Estafa" which order dismissed the case "on the ground

that. the p prosecution has failed to prove the crime charged", is an actual attempt by the

petitioner to appeal from a judgment of acquittal in a criminal case that became final and

executory upon its promulgation, an appeal that would, as correctly contended by the Solicitor

General, place the accused in double jeopardy because there was a trial on the merits and the trial

court in the full exercise of its jurisdiction found the evidence of the prosecution insufficient to

support conviction of the accused, this Court resolved to deny the petition for review.

Charged with estafa under Article 315, 3rd case, paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal

Code, the accused, Jose Alvarado, was acquitted by the trial court on its reasoning that his failure

to return a typewriter he bought from complainant Business Machines Corporation "with

reservation of title, right of repossession and forfeiture of all partial payments upon default",

after the postdated check for P854.25 issued as payment had been dishonored, could be simply

considered as a breach of civil obligation and not a violation of Article 315, paragraph l(b) of the

Revised Penal Code.

The Solicitor General in his comment dated January 5, 1976, contends that a contract to

sell as the one involved herein must be distinguished from a contract of sale, and that in the

former case the failure of the purchaser to pay as agreed would prevent the contract of sale from

taking place and the purchaser would be duty bound to return the very same thing received or

become liable for estafa under par. (b), sub. no. 1 of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code.

Although he believes that the trial court committed an error in the interpretation of the law and in

acquitting the accused, nevertheless he concedes that a correction by appeal of such an error in

the guise of a petition for certiorari, an error which is non-jurisdictional in character, would

result in a violation of the constitutional inhibition against double jeopardy (Article IV, Section

22, 1973 Constitution).


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Since the Solicitor General who has control of all appeals by the State in criminal cases

and the private respondent (accused) are in accord that the present petition (by way of appeal

from an acquittal on the merits) would place the accused in double jeopardy, the petition must be

denied outright without need of going into the correctness of respondent judge's ruling. Since no

appeal by the State lies from an acquittal verdict, the petition must be as it is hereby denied.

Teehankee (Chairman), Makasiar, Muoz Palma and Martin, JJ., concur.

35.De Guzman vs. Escalona, 97 SCRA 619

In this original Petition for Certiorari, which was given due course in our Resolution of February

6, 1980, the sole question to be resolved is whether or not respondent Municipal Circuit Court

Judge, in Criminal Case No. 2450-D, had jurisdiction to try the offense charged and render

judgment although the criminal Complaint which was filed before him was only for preliminary

investigation.

The Complaint charged the accused Florentino Rodrigo and Mariano Dayday with "Illegal

Possession of Explosive locally known as 'dinamita' (P.D. No. 1058)" before the Third Municipal

Circuit Court at Daanbantayan Medellin, Cebu (Crim. Case No. 2450-D), and reads as follows:

That on the 20th day of July, 1979 at around 9:00 o'clock in the morning, more or less, at Sitio

Suba, Bgy. Maya, Municipality of Daanbantayan, Province of Cebu, Philippines, and within the

Preliminary Jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused while in the

seawaters of the above-mentioned place, confederating and mutually helping with one another,

without authority of the law and without proper permit from authorities, did then and there

willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously possess, keep an explosive, locally known as 'DINAMITA'

in their banca purposely for use of illegal fishing in which case, three (3) bottles of explosives,

two (2) paddles, two (2) fishnets locally known as "SIBOT" and one (1) banca were recovered

from their possession and control, which acts of the above-named accused is a gross violation ofPD No. 1058.

All contrary to law.

The Complaint was precipitated by the fact, as disclosed by the Sworn Statements of CIC Carlos

Dosdos and Sgt. Jose Andales 2 that when they conducted a seaborne patrol along Daanbantayan


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Cebu, in the morning of July 20, 1979, they spotted the accused Florentino Rodrigo and Mariano

Dayday aboard a banca. As they approached the banca Rodrigo attempted to light a bottle of

dynamite but which the succeeded ill slopping. Both accused were arrested and three bottles of

dynamite and two fishnets were confiscated from them.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles

virtual law library

Instead of conducting a preliminary investigation, respondent Judge motu proprio treated the

Complaint as one for Violation of Act 3023 3 and, therefore, within its jurisdiction, since the

offense charged did not warrant prosecution under Presidential Decree No. 9 relating to crimes

against national security. He then proceeded to arraign the accused both of whom pleaded guilty,

and rendered judgment on August 6, 1979, quoted in full hereunder:

DECISION

This case was originally filed in violation of Section 2 of PD No. 9, but is prosecuted under Act

3023 upon suggestion of the Court, for under the facts and circumstances of this case the

interests of justice require that this offense be prosecuted under Act 3023 inasmuch as the

possession is not in connection with subversion or insurrection and that the quantity and quality

of the homemade explosive do not come to the level of destructiveness contemplated under PD

No. 9.

Upon arraignment, both accused entered a plea of guilty. in view thereof, the Court hereby

renders a decision finding and declaring above two accused GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt

of the offense of Illegal Possession of Explosive at the time and place stated in the complaint, in

violation of Act 3023, and they are thereby sentenced to suffer a penalty consisting of

imprisonment for four (4) months and fine of P 1,000.00 each, in accordance with the penal

provisions of said Act, and to pay the costs.

Apprehended explosives contained in two (2) beer bottles are confiscated and ordered turnedover to the 342nd PC Company, Bogo, Cebu, for proper disposal.

SO ORDERED.

Both the accused have served their sentence.


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Contesting the course of action taken and the judgment rendered by respondent Judge, herein

petitioner Lt. Col. Rodrigo S. De Guzman, PC Provincial Commander Integrated National Police

Superintendent at Camp Sotero Cabahug, Cebu City, instituted these certiorari proceedings

alleging mainly that the offense charged was one for possession of explosives intended for illegal

fishing under Presidential Decree No. 704, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1058, and not

for violation of Act 3023 which had long been repealed by several laws and decrees; that the

penalty provided for by current legislation is one which falls within the exclusive original

jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance; and that respondent Judge's Decision has no legal

basis.

For his part, respondent Judge submits that only possession of explosives in connection with

subversion is covered by Presidential Decree No. 9, thus, the old law on illegal possession of

explosives, Act 3023, has not been completely repealed; that having found that the possession by

the two accused of two bottles of home-made explosives was solely for fishing purposes and had

no connection with subversion, the illegal act should fall not under Presidential Decree No. 9 but

under Act 3023; that having arrived at said conclusion there was nothing irregular in his

assuming original jurisdiction and not merely conducting the second stage of the preliminary

investigation, for under Section 87 (c) of the Judiciary Act the Municipal Court has jurisdiction

over illegal possession of explosives. Respondent Judge further justifies his course of action as

being in the interest of the speedy and inexpensive administration of justice.

The accused, Florentino Rodrigo and Mariano Dayday, whom we ordered impleaded as party

respondents, filed their Comment on the Petition, stating that they freely and voluntarily entered

a plea of guilty with the able assistance of counsel; that before handing down the Decision,

respondent Judge made them understand the nature and gravity of their crime; that even the state

prosecutors showed their conformity and appreciation for the wisdom and practicality of the

judgment of respondent Judge; and that they appreciated the sentence imposed on them because

they did not contemplate to commit so grave an offense, the two bottles of confiscated explosives

being adulterated and not of genuine quality, and considering that they are illiterates and ignorant

of the destructive use of these explosives.


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Significantly, the Solicitor General representing the People of the Philippines and whom we

likewise ordered impleaded as party petitioner, has joined petitioner De Guzman in assailing the

validity of the action taken by respondent Judge in the criminal case before him.

We find this Petition, indeed, impressed with merit and that respondent Judge exceeded his

jurisdiction when he rendered the questioned Decision of August 6, 1979.

The complaint filed against the two accused specifically alleged that they wilfully and

unlawfully possessed in their banca explosives locally known as "dinamita" purposely intended

for use in illegal fishing in violation of Presidential Decree No. 1058.

Presidential Decree No. 1058 is an amendatory decree, which increased the penalties for certain

forms of illegal fishing and for other acts made punishable under Presidential Decree No. 704 or

the "Fisheries Decree of 1975". The pertinent portion of Section 33 of Presidential Decree No.

704, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1058 reads:

Sec. 33. Illegal fishing; illegal possession of explosives intended for illegal fishing;

dealing in illegally caught fish or fishery/aquatic products. - It shall be unlawful for any person

to catch, take or gather or cause to be caught, taken gathered fish or fisheries/aquatic products in

Philippine waters with the use of explosives, obnoxious or poisonous substance, or by the use of

electricity as defined in paragraphs (1), (m) and (d), respectively, of Section 3 hereof: Provided,

that possession of such explosives with intent to use the same for illegal fishing as herein defined

shall be punishable as hereinafter provided. ...

Section 38, subsection a (1) of Presidential Decree No. 704, as amended by Presidential Decree

No. 1058, correspondingly provides

(1) By the penalty of imprisonment ranging from twelve (12) years to twenty-five (25) years

in the case of mere possession of explosives intended for illegal fishing. ...

As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General in the Comment he filed for petitioner People

of the Philippines, respondent Judge's reference to Presidential Decree No. 9 is misplaced for,

indeed, there is no mention at all of, nor any reference to, Presidential Decree No. 9 in the

Complaint.


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General that no jeopardy may be deemed to have attached by virtue of the erroneous and void

judgment of conviction rendered by respondent Judge as to bar a subsequent indictment and trial

of the case in the proper Court with jurisdiction over the offense.

WHEREFORE, we hereby set aside the Decision of August 6, 1979 rendered by respondent

Judge Marcelino M. Escalona of the Municipal Circuit Court of Medellin, Cebu, and remand this

case to him for preliminary investigation in accordance with law and the Rules.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee (Chairman), Makasiar, Fernandez, Guerrero, and De Castro, JJ., concur.

36.P. vs. Pablo, 98 SCRA 289

Before the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, Branch XIII, Alaminos, Pangasinan, Rogelio

Carace, Godofredo Carace, Gil Castrence, Rogelio Caranza and Damian Senit were charged with

Homicide in an information filed on February 6, 1973, for the killing of Benjamin Atcha

(Criminal Case No. 254-A).

Arraigned on March 29, 1973 before Hon. Magno B. Pablo, all the aforenamed accused pleaded

not guilty. Hearing started on April 23, 1973 and was reset on May 3, 1973 after the presentation

of state witness Pepito Ordonio, there being another case also scheduled for hearing.

Because of the absence of Dr. Duque as witness, the prosecution prayed for a postponement to

judge Pablo. The prosecution was denied twice by the court but they were permitted to appeal on

the denial of the motion for the postponement to the appellate court. Despite the granting of the

request for ten (10) days within which to elevate the incident of the denial of the motion for

postponement, Judge Pablo granted a "Motion to Consider Prosecution's Case Rested and

Motion to Dismiss" filed by the defense in the afternoon of the same day, July 17, 1973, in an

order also dated July 17, 1973, acquitting all the accused for failure on the part of the prosecution

to prove beyond reasonable doubt their guilt, with cost de oficio, without giving the prosecution

time to file its opposition to the aforesaid motion, which the prosecution in fact filed promptly on

July 18, 1973 after receipt of a copy of the defense motion of July 17, 1973.


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While the respondent judge never raised the issue of double jeopardy, the private respondents

may have in mind invoking the principle of double jeopardy, although not expressly, when they

contend that the dismissal of this case amounts to an acquittal (p. 5, Memorandum for Private

Respondents). The principle, however, may not be successfully invoked because the action of the

respondent judge complained of in this petition being clearly one constituting grave abuse of

discretion, same amounts to lack of jurisdiction which would prevent double jeopardy from

attaching (People v. Cabero, 61 Phil. 121; People v. Surtida, 43 SCRA 29; and People v.

Navarro, 63 SCRA 264).

37.Cruz vs. Enrile, 160 SCRA 700

Facts: On 19 October 1973, Capt. Rodolfo Magpantay alias "Honorato D. Castro", alias

"Rolando Moreno", alias "Norberto de Ramos"; Corazon R. Serrano, and Atty/ Domingo V.

Flores, Jr., and two other "John Does" were charged before the Military Commission No. 13 with

estafa through falsification of commercial documents, and falsification of commercial documents

(Criminal Case MC 13-2). Flores and his co-accused were arraigned on 25 October 1973 and all

pleaded not guilty. The case was thereafter set for trial. The presentation of evidence for the

prosecution which started on 25 October 1973 was concluded on 24 January 1974, and the

reception of the evidence for the defendants was set for March 26 and 27, 1974. On 25 March

1974, however, the Secretary of National Defense, in a memorandum to the Judge Advocate

General of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, directed the withdrawal of the charges against

Capt. Rodolfo V. Magpantay, et al., from Military Commission No. 13. The next day, the day

scheduled for the reception of the evidence for the defendants, counsel for Magpantay handed to

the Commission the memorandum of the Secretary of National Defense and the letter of the

Judge Advocate General, directing the withdrawal of the case from the Commission. The

prosecution deplored the withdrawal of the case, claiming that they have proved the guilt of the

accused beyond reasonable doubt, but the Military Commission held itself to be without

discretion on the matter. On 28 March 1974, however, the Secretary of National Defense, after a

full consideration of all the aspects of the case, withdrew his previous order and directed the

Commission forthwith to proceed with the trial of the accused. Pursuant thereto, the Military

Commission scheduled the continuation of the trial and reception of the evidence for the

defendants to 1 April 1974. Pleading double jeopardy, in that the "Withdrawal Order of the


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Honorable Secretary of the Department of National Defense dated 25 March 1974 operates as an

acquittal of the accused Flores and a revocation and reinstatement of the case against the

Domingo V. Flores, Jr. constitutes 'double jeopardy", Flores moved to quash the case against

him, but the Military Commission denied his petition to quash. Flores filed the petition for

certiorari with the Supreme Court. The other accused, Capt. Rodolfo Magpantay, upon the other

hand, started presenting his evidence on 2 April 1974. But, the proceedings were suspended upon

the filing of the instant petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether the constitutional mandate against putting a person twice in jeopardy of

punishment for the same offense was violated when the Secretary of National Defense withdrew

his previous memorandum and directed that further proceedings be had in the case.

Held: The rule on double jeopardy is contained in Article IV, Section 22 of the 1973 Constitution

which provides that "no person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same

offense." It is restated in Article 39 of the Articles of War (Commonwealth Act No. 408), as "No

person shall, without his consent, be tried a second time for the same offense; but no proceeding

in which an accused has been found guilty by a court-martial upon any charge or specification

shall be held to be a trial in the sense of this article until the reviewing and, if there be one, the

confirming authority shall have taken final action upon the case"; and in Section 70-C of the

Manual on Courts Martial which reads "One who in a competent court has been convicted,

acquitted or put in jeopardy in respect to a real or supposed crime, cannot be further or again

pursued for it, unless he waives his right to rely on this immunity." For double jeopardy to exist,

it is essential that the first judgment of conviction or acquittal or dismissal is final; otherwise,

there is no judgment of conviction or acquittal to speak of, and, therefore, the accused can not

claim double jeopardy. Herein, Flores cannot invoke double jeopardy because the order of the

Military Commission 13, terminating the hearing on 26 March 1974 pursuant to the

Memorandum of the Secretary of National Defense to the Judge Advocate General and of the

letter of the latter to the Commission, is not a final order of acquittal or dismissal. Under military

law, a decision of a military tribunal, be it of acquittal or conviction, or dismissal, is merely

recommendatory and subject to review by the convening authority, the review boards, and the

reviewing authority. It is apparent that in the administration of justice by the military, a military

commission acts merely as a commissioner who takes the evidence and reports thereon to the


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convening and reviewing authorities with his recommendation. While the Military Commission

13 may have ordered the termination of the hearing of Criminal Case MC 13-2, pursuant to the

Memorandum of the Secretary of National Defense to the Judge Advocate General, and the letter

of the latter to the Military Commission 13, directing the withdrawal of the charges against Capt.

Rodolfo Magpantay and his co-accused, the order has none of the attributes of a final judgment

since it was not passed upon by the convening and reviewing authorities and confirmed by the

President. Although jeopardy had attached, it has not yet terminated. Being so, the constitutional

mandate against putting a person twice in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense was not

violated when the Secretary of National Defense withdrew his previous memorandum and

directed that further proceedings be had in the case, as the action of the Secretary of National

Defense is but a continuation of the proceedings. The constitutional mandate against putting a

person twice in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense is to protect the accused from going

through a trial a second time. But, since the first proceedings has not yet been terminated, there is

no second proceeding to speak of, and, therefore, no double jeopardy.

38.

Tangan vs. P., 155 SCRA 435

Petitioner has been charged on July 1, 1985 before the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch

136 in an information that described the commission of the crime of murder with the use of an

unlicensed firearm and docketed as Criminal Case No. 17587. Subsequently, the offense

charged was changed to homicide with the use of a licensed firearm, with the information

amended on August 16, 1985.

On September 18, 1985 a resolution was issued by the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal

finding probable cause to hold petitioner for illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions used

in the commission of homicide as defined and punished under Section 1 of Presidential Decree

1866 (Rollo, p. 97) and on the same date, information was filed in the same court indicting

petitioner for the offense (Rollo, p. 20) docketed as Criminal Case No. 19350

On October 30, 1985 petitioner filed a motion to quash the information in Criminal Case No.

19360 on the grounds that: (1) the information charges more than one offense which are

separately punishable under existing laws; (2) the criminal action or liability of the accused has


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been extinguished; and (3) the accused is in jeopardy of being convicted, or acquitted, of the

offense charged (Rollo, p. 3).

Legal jeopardy attaches only: (a) upon a valid indictment; (b) before a competent court; (c) after

arraignment; (d) a valid plea having been entered; and (e) the case was dismissed or otherwise

terminated without the express consent of the accused. (People v. Bocar, supra; Buscayno v.

Military Commission Nos. 1, 2, 6 and 25, 109 SCRA 273 [1981]).chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

There is no double jeopardy in the filing of the information for homicide in Criminal Case No.

17587 and in the filing of the information for illegal possession of firearms and ammunition used

in the commission of homicide in Criminal Case No. 19350 for the simple reason that the first

jeopardy had not yet attached. It is well-settled that the mere filing of two information or

complaints charging the same offense does not yet afford the accused in those cases the occasion

to complain that he is being placed in jeopardy twice for the same offense, for the simple reason

that the primary basis of the defense of double jeopardy is that the accused has already been

convicted or acquitted in the first case or that the same has been terminated without his express

consent. It is the conviction or jeopardy of being convicted or the acquittal of the accused or

termination of the case that bars further prosecution of the same offense or any attempt to

commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is

necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information. (Bulaong v.

People, 17 SCRA 746 [1966]; Silvestre v. Military Commission No. 21, 82 SCRA 10 [1978];

Buscayno v. Military Commission Nos. 1, 2, 6 and 25, supra; People v. Milfores, 115 SCRA 570

[1982]). (Rule 117, Sec. 2(h), Rules of Court).

39.P. vs. Quizada, 160 SCRA 516

Upon arraignment on February 18, 1982, the accused pleaded not guilty to all the three

information regarding defamation. Thereafter, she moved to quash the same on the ground that

the charges should have been initiated not by the fiscal but upon complaint of the offended party

herself.

The argument of the accused was that the remarks allegedly made by her imputed to the

complaining witness the crime of adultery, a private crime. Under Rule 110, Section 4 (now

Section 5), of the Rules of Court and Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, no criminal action


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for defamation imputing such offense "shall be brought except at the instance of and upon

complaint filed by the offended party."

The trial judge agreed and granted the motion. The charges were dismissed and the motion for

reconsideration filed by the prosecution was denied.

The prosecution then came to this Court to challenge the dismissal, and that is how double

jeopardy entered the picture. The private respondent now claims that reversal of the dismissal

and reinstatement of the cases would violate her rights under Article IV, Section 22 (now Article

III, Section 21) of the Constitution.

Required to comment, the Solicitor General argued that the crime imputed by the alleged

remarks was prostitution, a public offense. As such, it could be the basis of a prosecution for

defamation through an information filed by the fiscal.

That is doubtless true. However, the Court notes that in addition to allegedly calling the

complainant a whore, the private respondent is also charged in one information with having

described the former as "a paramour of my husband," which is a clear imputation of adultery. A

paramour is "one who loves or is loved illicitly. One taking the place without the legal rights of a

husband or wife. A mistress; called also lover." Accordingly, that imputation was covered by the

aforecited Rule 110.

It is not denied that the charges were made through the information filed by the assistant

provincial fiscal and not formally commenced in court by the offended party. Nevertheless, it is

also clear that these information were based on the three criminal complaints earlier filed by

Tranquilan with the fiscals office, which conducted the corresponding preliminary investigation

thereon.

Conformably to the procedural rules then in force, the complaints and the records of the

preliminary investigation were transmitted to the trial court upon the filing of the corresponding

information. Hence, although the charges were not initiated through complaint of the offended

party and the information did not state that they were based on her complaint, such

circumstances did not deprive the respondent court of jurisdiction.


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theProvincial Fiscal addressed a "1st endorsement" to the respondent Judge, transmitting

Atty.Batuampar's letter and requesting that "all cases that may be filed relative (to the

incident)that happened in the afternoon of July 27, 1985," be forwarded to his office, which "has

first taken cognizance of said cases."

-No case relative to the incident was, however, presented to the respondent Judge untilSaturday,

August 10, 1985, when a criminal complaint for multiple murder was filed before himby P.C.

Sgt. Jose L. Laruan, which was docketed as Case No. 1748. On that same day, therespondent

Judge "examined personally all (three) witnesses (brought by the sergeant) under oath thru

(his) closed and direct supervision," reducing to writing the questions to the witnesses and the

latter's answers. Thereafter the Judge "approved the complaint and issued the corresponding

warrant of arrest" against the fourteen (14) petitioners (who were named by the witnesses) and

fifty (50) John Does.

-An "ex-parte" motion for reconsideration was filed on August 14, 1985 by Atty.

Batuampar(joined by Atty. Pama L. Muti), seeking recall of the warrant of arrest and subsequent

holding of a "thorough investigation" on the ground that the Judge's initial investigation had been

"hasty and manifestly haphazard" with "no searching questions" having been propounded. The

respondent Judge denied the motion for lack of basis.-The petitioners contend:

- that the Judge in the case at bar failed to conduct the investigation in accordance with the

procedure prescribed in Section 3, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court;- that failure constituted a

denial to petitioners of due process which nullified the proceedings leading to the issuance of the

warrant for the petitioners' arrest;

- that August 10, 1985 was a Saturday during which "Municipal Trial Courts are open from8:00

a.m. to 1:00 p.m. only ..." and "... it would hardly have been possible for respondent Judge to

determine the existence of probable cause against sixty- four (64) persons whose participations

were of varying nature and degree in a matter of hours and issue the warrant of arrest in the same

day";

- that there was undue haste and an omission to ask searching questions by the Judge whorelied

"mainly on the supporting affidavits which were obviously prepared already when presented to

him by an enlisted PC personnel as investigator.";


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- that the respondent Judge conducted the preliminary investigation of the charges"... in total

disregard of the Provincial Fiscal ..."who, as said respondent well knew, had already taken

cognizance of the matter twelve (12) days earlier and was poised to conduct hisown investigation

of the same; and- that issuance of a warrant of arrest against fifty (50) "John Does" transgressed

the Constitutional provision requiring that such warrants should particularly describe the persons

or things to be seized.

Issue: Whether or not the warrant of arrest was null and void. More specifically stated, WON

completion of the procedure laid down in Section 3 of Rule 112 a condition sine qua non for the

issuance of a warrant of arrest.

Ruling: The warrant complained of is upheld and declared valid insofar as it orders the arrest of

the petitioners. Said warrant is voided to the extent that it is issued against fifty (50) "JohnDoes."

The respondent Judge is directed to forward to the Provincial Fiscal of Lanao del Sur the record

of the preliminary investigation of the complaint in Criminal Case No. 1728 of his court for

further appropriate action.

41.Bustamante vs. Maceren, 48 SCRA 144

MAIN POINT:

No re-opening of a case may be ordered of a criminal case after accused has started serving his

sentence; a judgment in a criminal case becomes final after the lapse of the period for perfecting

an appeal or when the sentence has been partially or totally satisfied or served or the defendant

has waived in writing his appeal; withdrawal of plea of guilty does not constitute waiver of

defense of double jeopardy timely invoked

***

5. May the government appeal a judgment of acquittal or for the increase of the penalty

imposed?

No, since double jeopardy has set in. (PEOPLE VS. HON. VELASCO, G.R. NO. 127444, 340

SCRA 207, SEPT. 13, 2000). As mandated by the Constitution, statutes and cognate

jurisprudence, an acquittal is final and unappealable on the ground of double jeopardy, whether it


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happens at the trial court of a judgment of acquittal brought before the Supreme Court on

certiorari cannot be had unless there is a finding of mistrial, as in Galman vs. Sandiganbayan.

However, if the accused was the one who appealed the decision of the CFI convicting him of

homicide (though he was charged of murder), the appellate court may convict him of murder if

the evidence warrants and that the lower court mis-appreciated the evidence. This is so because if

the accused appeals the decision, the same will be subject to a complete re-examination of the

evidence on record.

Read:

1. PEOPLE VS. DOMINGO, March 2, 2009

FACTS: The Court of Appeals found appellant Jesus Domingo guilty beyond reasonable doubt

of murder, attempted murder, frustrated murder, and frustrated homicide.

On or about the 29th day of March 2000, complainant and her children were sleeping inside their

house when Domingo when she was awakened when the accused entered their kitchen armed

with a screwdriver and a kitchen knife. He stabbed the complainant and her children. Raquel

Indon, complainant, pleaded the appellant to spare her daughter but teh appellant answered

Ngayon pa, nagawa ko na. Two of her children died.

Five years passed, the defense counsel said that nine days prior the commission of the crime,

appellant suffered sleeplessness, lack of appetite, and nervousness. Occasionally, a voice would

tell him to kill. Appellant averred that when he regained his memory, one week had already

passed since the incidents, and he was already detained. They submitted a psychiatric evaluation,

and psychological examination as evidence that appellant suffered from Schizophrenia, a mental

disorder characterized by the presence of delusions and or hallucinations, disorganized speech

and behavior, poor impulse control and low frustration tolerance. The doctor could not find out

when the appellant started to suffer this illness, but the symptoms of Schizophrenia which were

manifested by the patient indicated that he suffered from the illness six months before the Center

examined the appellant. The counsel of the appellant raised the defense of insanity of the

appellant.

ISSUE: Whether or not the appellant is exempt from criminal liability on the ground of insanity.


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HELD: No, the defense of insanity is unmeritorious. Insanity exempts the accused only when the

finding of mental disorder refers to appellants state of mind immediately before or at the very

moment of the commission of the crime. This was not the case in the issue at bar, what was

presented was proof of appellants mental disorder that existed five years after the incident, but

not at the time the crimes were committed. The RTC also considered it crucial that appellant had

the presence of mind to respond to Raquel Indons pleas that her daughters be spared by saying,

Ngayon pa, nagawa ko na.

Even assuming that nine days prior the crime the appellant was hearing voices ordering him to

kill people, while suggestive of an abnormal mental condition, cannot be equated with a total

deprivation of will or an absence of the power to discern. Mere abnormality of mental faculties

will not exclude imputability.

The law presumes every man to be of sound mind. Otherwise stated, the law presumes that all

acts are voluntary, and that it is improper to presume that acts are done unconsciously. Thus, a

person accused of a crime who pleads the exempting circumstance of insanity has the burden of

proving beyond reasonable doubt that he or she was insane immediately before or at the moment

the crime was committed.

1-a. Central Bank of the Philippines vs. CA, GR. No. 41859, March 8, 1989

On July 2, 1968, an information was filed before the Court of First Instance of Manila, 6th

Judicial Region, Branch V, charging herein private respondents Felipe Plaza Chua and Melchor

Avila Chua with the crime of estafa, as follows:

That in or about and during the period comprised between April 1961 to December 31, 1961,

inclusive, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, being then the President and

treasurer, respectively, of the Surigao Development Bank, located at Surigao, Surigao del Norte,

which is a private development bank organized under the provisions of Republic Act 2081,conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping each other, did then and there

wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud the Central Bank of the Philippines and the

Development Bank of the Philippines, banking institutions duly organized and existing under

and by virtue of the laws of the Republic of the Philippines, as follows, to wit: The said Surigao

Development Bank, as such private development bank, began operations on April 19, 1961, in


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1. WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEAL HAS

JURISDICTION TO RENDER A DECISION ENTIRELY DISREGARDING THE FINDINGS

OF FACTS MADE BY THE TRIAL COURT WHICH ARE DULY SUPPORTED BY THE

EVIDENCE CONSISTING MAINLY OF DOCUMENTS AND INSTEAD, ADOPT ITS OWN

FINDINGS OF FACT BASED (a) ON SPECULATION AND CONJECTURES, (b.) ON

MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS AND (c) CONTRARY TO THE DOCUMENTS AND

EXHIBITS OF THE CASE, THUS, LEADING IT TO NO OTHER ALTERNATIVE BUT TO

FORMULATE INFERENCES AND CONCLUSIONS WHICH ARE ABSURD AND

POSITIVELY IMPOSSIBLE.

2. WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEAL HAS

JURISDICTION TO RENDER A DECISION BY RELYING ON AN EXHIBIT WHICH WAS

NOT FORMALLY OFFERED, MUCH LESS ADMITTED IN EVIDENCE DURING THE

TRIAL; and,

3. WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS HAS

JURISDICTION TO RENDER A DECISION BY RELYING ON A DOCUMENT AND

GIVING THE SAME A MEANING COMPLETELY CONTRARY TO ITS CONTENTS THUS

DISTORTING THE CORRECT CONTEXT OF THE SAME.

We rule in the affirmative.

Section 11 of Rule 124 of the Rules of Court defines the power of the appellate court on appeals

taken to it, thus:

Section 11. Power of Appellate Court on AppealUpon appeal from a judgment of the Court

of First Instance, the appellate court may reverse, affirm or modify the judgment and increase or

reduce the penalty imposed by the trial, remand the case to the Court of First Instance for new

trial or retrial, or dismiss the case.

The reason behind this rule is that an appeal of a criminal case opens its entire records for review

in order to resolve not only questions of law but also questions of facts. The Court of Appeals

may thus re-examine and re- weigh all the evidence on record and affirm, modify or reverse the

findings of facts and conclusions of the lower court. 11 That its findings of facts or conclusions


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Ordinarily, errors of judgment may be corrected in a timely appeal from the judgment on the

merits. Such remedy, however, is not available in the case at bar, the decision involved being one

of acquittal. An appeal therefrom by the People would run counter to the accused's constitutional

guarantee against double jeopardy.

We discern in this petition for certiorari a subtle attempt to have us review the judgment of the

appellate court on the merits. While the petition at bar is denominated a special civil action for

certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court and the issues raised therein ostensibly dealt with

the jurisdiction of the appellate court, petitioners' attack on the appellate court's jurisdiction is

premised on the conclusions that (a) the findings of facts of the appellate court were based on

conjectures and speculations, or on misapprehension of facts and contrary to the documents and

exhibits; (b) the exhibit relied upon by the appellate court has not been offered nor admitted in

evidence during the trial; and (c) the appellate court gave to a document a meaning contrary to its

contents. But how valid and tenable these premises are remains a question. To determine their

validity would entail a review and re- evaluation of the evidence on record as well as the

procedure taken vis-a-vis the conclusions arrived at by the appellate court; in effect, a review of

the judgment of acquittal, which we cannot do in a petition for certiorari and without violating

the private respondents' constitutional right against double jeopardy.

Section 2 of Rule 122 of the Rules of Court provides that "the People of the Philippines cannot

appeal if the defendant would be placed thereby in double jeopardy." The argument that the

judgment is tainted with grave abuse of discretion and therefore, null and void, is flawed because

whatever error may have been committed by the lower court was merely an error of judgment

and not of jurisdiction. It did not affect the intrinsic validity of the decision. This is the kind of

error that can no longer be rectified on appeal by the prosecution no matter how obvious the

error may be. 20 The rule therefore, in this jurisdiction is that a judgment of acquittal is not

reviewable by a higher court, for an appeal by the government from the judgment would put the

accused in second jeopardy for the same offense.

Moreover, the case of People vs. Ang Cho Kio tells us:


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No error, however flagrant committed by the Court against the State can be reserved by it for

decision by the Supreme Court when the defendant has once been in jeopardy and discharged,

even though the discharge was the result of the error committed.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs. This

decision is immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.

1-b. P. vs. Montemayor, January 30, 1969, 26 SCRA 687

To state the question raised in this mandamus proceeding is to render evident why the Comment

of Solicitor General Mendoza was quite emphatic as to its being devoid of support in law. The

prosecution in a criminal case for homicide, apparently dissatisfied with the decision of

respondent Judge Jesus B. Ruiz of the Court of First Instance of the First Judicial District

stationed in Tuguegarao, Cagayan convicting private respondent Rodrigo Mamanao of homicide

but finding him entitled to the benefits of incomplete self-defense, there being unlawful

aggression from the victim and no provocation on his part, filed a notice of appeal. More

specifically, the objection was to the penalty imposed of six months and one day and the

indemnity to the heirs of the deceased fixed at P4,000.00. Respondent Judge having failed to

honor such notice of appeal, he was sought to be compelled by this petition to comply with what

the prosecution considered "a purely ministerial act."

The petition must fail.

1. It is indeed surprising that Assistant Fiscal Teodoro L. Hernando, who prepared and

signed the petition, 5 could so confidently assert that he could rely on Rule 122 of the Revised

Rules of Court. He completely ignored Section 2 which reads thus: "The People of the

Philippines cannot appeal if the defendant would be placed thereby in double jeopardy. In all

other cases either party may appeal from a final judgment or ruling or from an order made after

judgment affecting the substantial rights of the appellant." 6 He likewise ignored the explicit

ruling in Ang Cho Kio. In People v. Paet, decided two years later, Justice Montemayor, speaking

for the Court reaffirmed such a doctrine: "With the view we take of the propriety and legality of

the appeal, we find it unnecessary to go into the merits of the contention of the parties, although


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it may not be out of place to state that according to the decision of June 10, 1955, as well as the

appealed resolution, the penalty imposed which did not include the confiscation of the amount of

$3,140, was upon the recommendation of the prosecution itself. In the first place, the

confiscation or forfeiture of the above mentioned sum would be an additional penalty and would

amount to an increase of the penalty already imposed upon the accused. To reopen the case for

the purpose of increasing the penalty as is sought in the Governments appeal, would be placing

the accused in double jeopardy, and under Rule 118, section 2 of the Rules of Court, the

Government cannot appeal in a criminal case if the defendant would be placed thereby in double

jeopardy."

2. There ought to have been awareness on the part of Assistant Provincial Fiscal Hernando

that on at least two occasions the Ang Cho Kio ruling was sought to be reconsidered, but in each

time it failed. In People v. Pomeroy, the then Justice, later Chief Justice, Concepcion, explained

why: "The prosecution in the case at bar urges a reexamination of the question decided in the

Ang Cho Kio cases and a reconsideration of the view therein expressed by this Court. To our

mind, however, the reasons advanced by the Solicitor General in support of his pretense are not

sufficiently weighty to warrant a reversal of said view which is a mere corollary of the practice

established in the Philippines and in the United States, for so long a time as to form part and

parcel, not merely of the settled jurisprudence, but, also, of the constitutional law, in both

jurisdictions." In People v. Arinso, it was the same fate that attended such a move.

3. The tone of confidence quite marked in the petition was most certainly unwarranted.

Assistant Provincial Fiscal Hernando and Provincial Fiscal Bello would have been well-advised

had they exerted greater efforts to acquaint themselves with the state of the law. They must ever

keep in mind that decisions of this Court are authoritative and therefore call for deference and

respect. Moreover, as appealed criminal cases, when allowable under existing legal norms, are

handled by the Office of the Solicitor General, it certainly would have been dictated by

prudence, to say the least, if that dignitary were consulted. Then blunders of this kind would

have been avoided. The prosecutors, responsible for this petition would have been spared the

mild reproof implicit in the comment of Solicitor-General Mendoza, arising from their

inadequate grasp of controlling doctrines, especially those of constitutional dimension.

WHEREFORE, the petition for mandamus is dismissed. No costs.


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2. P. vs. Ruiz, 81 SCRA 455

- Missing -

3. US vs. Yam Tung Way, 21 Phil. 67

The defendant in this case was charged in the Court of First Instance of Manila with the crime of

fraud or infringement of literary rights or property. The information charges substantially that the

defendant, with intent to defraud, and to the prejudice of the complaining witness, the owner of a

certain literary work, a "Reduction Table," feloniously, fraudulently and without authority

copied, printed and reproduced this "Reduction Table" and sold and distributed fraudulent copies

thereof to the damage and prejudice of the complaining witness in the sum of P3,000.

The trial court based its judgment dismissing the information and discharging the defendant on

the ground that no copyright law exists in the Philippine Islands and that the complaining witness

could have no exclusive rights in the pamphlet in question which were subject to violation or

infringement, so as to sustain a conviction. No finding was made as to the alleged facts touching

the reproduction by the defendant of the pamphlet of which ownership is claimed by the

complaining witness.

The allowance of an appeal by the Government would undoubtedly place the defendant twice in

jeopardy in violation of the provisions of the Philippine Bill of Rights, set out in the Act of

Congress of July 1, 1902, as those provisions have been construed by the Supreme Court of the

United States in the case of Kepner v. United States (195 U. S., 100; 11 Phil. Rep., 669).

As indicated in the opinion in that case, the protection afforded by the prohibition against the

putting of any person twice in jeopardy for the same offense, is a protection not merely against

the peril of second punishment, but against being tried a second time for the same offense. In that

case the court expressly held that:

"It follows that Military Order No. 58, as amended by Act of the Philippine Commission, No.194, in so far as it undertakes to permit an appeal by the Government after acquittal, was

repealed by the Act of Congress of July, 1902, providing immunity from second jeopardy for the

same criminal offense."


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But the reasoning of the opinion goes further and denies the right to the Government to procure

the reversal of erroneous proceedings and commence anew, save only in those cases in which the

first proceeding did not create legal jeopardy. So that, without his own consent, a defendant who

has once been brought to trial in a court of competent jurisdiction cannot be again put on trial for

the same offense after the first trial has terminated by a judgment directing his discharge,

whether his discharge be the result of a formal acquittal, or of a ruling of the court upon some

question of law arising at the trial.

This court has frequently held that legal jeopardy attaches in criminal proceedings in this

jurisdiction after arraignment and plea in a court of competent jurisdiction, at the moment when

the first witness is called to the stand and interrogated, and it is quite clear that the defendant in

this case having been brought to trial after arraignment and plea and all the governments

witnesses having testified on his trial, is entitled to protection against the peril of being again

brought to trial for the offense with which he was charged at that trial and this whether the

rulings of the trial judge on which he based his order discharging the defendant and dismissing

the information were or were not erroneous. (U. S. v. Ballentine, 4 Phil. Rep., 672; U. S. v.

Montiel, 7 Phil. Rep., 272; U. S. v. Gemora, 8 Phil. Rep., 19.)

The appeal entered in this case on behalf of the Government should be dismissed with costs

against the Appellant. So ordered.

4.

P. vs. Ang cho Kio, 95 Phil. 475

That on or about the 30th day of December, 1952, in Mountain Province, Philippines and within

the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, then a passenger of

Philippine Air Line Plane PI-C-38 enroute from Laoag to Aparri while the said plane was flying

over Mountain Province, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, and without

authority of law, compel Pedro Perlas, pilot of the aforesaid plane, against the latters will and

consent, to change the route of the plane and take him (Accused) to Amoy, and when Pedro

Perlas failed to comply immediately with said order, said accused who was than armed with .45

and .38 caliber pistols, with treachery and known premeditation, did then and there willfully,

unlawfully and feloniously, shot said Pedro Perlas, thus inflicting gunshot wounds on the

different parts of his (Pedro Perlas) body and as a result thereof said Pedro Perles died instantly.


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Appeal was dismissed on account of double jeopardy.

6. The Supervening Fact Doctrine.

It simply provides that an accuseds conviction shall not be a bar to another prosecution for

an offense which necessarily includes the offense charged in the former complaint or information

when the graver offense developed due to supervening facts arising from the same act or

omission constituting the former charge or that the facts constituting the graver charge became

known only or were discovered after a plea was entered in the former complaint or information.

(Section 7, Rule 117, 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure; P vs. Tarok, 73 Phil. 260; P vs. Villasis,

46 O.G. 268; Melo vs. People, 85 Phil. 766; P vs. Buling, 107 Phil. 712; P vs. Adil, 76 SCRA

462; P. vs. Tac-an, 182 SCRA 601; and P vs. City Court of Manila, 121 SCRA 637

Read:

1. 76 SCRA 469

- Missing -

2. P. vs. Tarok, 73 Phil. 260

On October 16, 1938, the appellant and his wife (the deceased Inocencia Itok) went to the house

of one Sotera Baroro for the purpose of asking the latter permission to extract oil from some of

her coconuts. Having been granted permission, Inocencia Itok borrowed a bolo with which to

husk the coconuts. When the deceased saw that her husband was not doing anything to help her,

she asked Segundino Itok, son of Sotera Baroro, to assist her in husking the coconuts; whereupon

the appellant told the deceased to give him the bolo as he would do the husking himself. On

receiving the bolo, the appellant turned on his wife and started hacking her, as a result of which

she was wounded in several parts of her body. The appellant was consequently indicted for the

crime of serious physical injuries, to which he pleaded guilty, and was sentenced to suffer a

penalty of seven months and one day. While appellant was serving this sentence, Inocencia Itok

died of meningitis which was caused by the infection of the wound on her forehead inflicted by

the appellant; whereupon he was indicted in the Court of First Instance of Oriental Negros for the

crime of parricide. To this charge the appellant interposed the plea of double jeopardy, but the

lower court found him guilty of the crime as charged and sentenced him to an indeterminate

sentence of six years and one day of prision mayor to twelve years and one day of reclusion


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The judgment of the lower court, herein appealed from, is accordingly reversed, and the

information for parricide against the defendant-appellant, Ponciano Tarok, hereby dismissed,

with cost de oficio. So ordered.

3.

P. vs. Villasis, 46 O.G. 268

- Missing

We would have no alternative to dismiss the present appeal. However, this Court in its recent

decision in the case of Melo vs. People et al. (85 Phil., 974), has already repealed the doctrine

laid down in the Tarok case as contrary to the real meaning of double jeopardy as intended by the

Constitution and the Rules of Court and "obnoxious to the administration of justice," and has

reverted to the rule that "where after the first prosecution a new fact supervenes for which the

defendant is responsible, which changes the character of the offenses and together with the facts

existing at the time, constitutes a new and distinct offense." That rule applies to the present case

where, after the first prosecution for a lesser crime, new facts have supervened which, together

with those already in existence at the time of the first prosecution, have made the offense graver

and the penalty first imposed legally inadequate.

4. Melo vs. People, 85 Phil. 766

FACTS: Carmelo was charged with frustrated homicide. On arraignment, Carmelo pleaded not

guilty, on the same day the victim died. The information was amended charging Carmelo with

homicide. Carmelo filed a motion to quash the amended information alleging double jeopardy.

ISSUE: Whether or not the filing of the amended information constitutes double jeopardy

RULING: No, the second offense was not in existence at the time of the first prosecution. After

the first prosecution, when new facts supervened, changing the character of the offense which the

accused is responsible for, he cannot be said to have been in double jeopardy.

5. P. vs. Buling, 107 Phil. 712

FACTS: Accused was charged with less serious physical injury, wherein he pleaded guilty. After

serving sentence, the wounds inflicted upon the victim did not heal. A complaint was filed

against him for serious physical injury.


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consti cases unfinished

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