CONSTI II – Atty. Rovynne Jumao-as 1-Manresa-SanchezRoman Team Digest ©2011-2012

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MANILA PRINCE HOTEL VS GSIS

on July 19, 2011 – Ag‘z

Supremacy of the Constitution – Filipino First Policy – National

Patrimony – Qualified Filipinos

FACTS :

Pursuant to the privatization program of the government, GSIS

decided to sell 30-51% of the Manila Hotel Corporation. Two bidders

participated, MPH and Malaysian Firm Renong Berhad. MPH‘s bid

was at P41.58/per share while RB‘s bid was at P44.00/share. RB was

the highest bidder hence it was logically considered as the winning

bidder but is yet to be declared so. Pending declaration, MPH

matches RB‘s bid and invoked the Filipino First policy enshrined under

par. 2, Sec. 10, Art. 12 of the 1987 Constitution**, but GSIS refused to

accept. In turn MPH filed a TRO to avoid the

perfection/consummation of the sale to RB.

RB then assailed the TRO issued in favor of MPH arguing among

others that:

Par. 2, Sec. 10, Art. 12 of the 1987 Constitution needs an

implementing law because it is merely a statement of principle and

policy (not self-executing);

Even if said passage is self-executing, Manila Hotel does not fall

under national patrimony.

ISSUE: Whether or not RB should be admitted as the highest bidder

and hence be proclaimed as the legit buyer of shares.

HELD: No. MPH should be awarded the sale pursuant to Art 12 of the

1987 Const. This is in light of the Filipino First Policy.

Par. 2, Sec. 10, Art. 12 of the 1987 Constitution is self-executing. The

Constitution is the fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the

nation, it is deemed written in every statute and contract.

Manila Hotel falls under national patrimony. Patrimony in its plain and

ordinary meaning pertains to heritage. When the Constitution speaks

of national patrimony, it refers not only to the natural resources of the

Philippines, as the Constitution could have very well used the term

natural resources, but also to the cultural heritage of the Filipinos. It

also refers to our intelligence in arts, sciences and letters. Therefore,

we should develop not only our lands, forests, mines and other

natural resources but also the mental ability or faculty of our people.

Note that, for more than 8 decades (9 now) Manila Hotel has bore

mute witness to the triumphs and failures, loves and frustrations of the

Filipinos; its existence is impressed with public interest; its own

historicity associated with our struggle for sovereignty, independence

and nationhood.

Herein resolved as well is the term Qualified Filipinos which not only

pertains to individuals but to corporations as well and other juridical

entities/personalities. The term ―qualified Filipinos‖ simply means that

preference shall be given to those citizens who can make a viable

contribution to the common good, because of credible

competence and efficiency. It certainly does NOT mandate the

pampering and preferential treatment to Filipino citizens or

organizations that are incompetent or inefficient, since such an

indiscriminate preference would be counter-productive and inimical

to the common good.

In the granting of economic rights, privileges, and concessions, when

a choice has to be made between a ―qualified foreigner‖ and a

―qualified Filipino,‖ the latter shall be chosen over the former.‖

**Section 10. The Congress shall, upon recommendation of the

economic and planning agency, when the national interest dictates,

reserve to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or associations

at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens,

or such higher percentage as Congress may prescribe, certain areas

of investments. The Congress shall enact measures that will

encourage the formation and operation of enterprises whose capital

is wholly owned by Filipinos.

In the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the

national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to

qualified Filipinos.

The State shall regulate and exercise authority over foreign

investments within its national jurisdiction and in accordance with its

national goals and priorities.

(nag kabuang ko pangita og net cafe) paita.

CASE 2

3. PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS EMPLOYMENT ORGANIZATION

(PBMEO) vs.PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS CO., INC. (PBMCI) -Ces

June 5, 1973

FACTS:

Petitioner Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization (PBMEO)

is a legitimate labor union composed of the employees of the

Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc. (respondent). Petitioner decided to

stage a mass demonstration in front of Malacañang on on March 4,

1969 to express grievances against the alleged abuses of the Pasig

Police. Those participating in the demonstration were workers in the

1st shift, regular 2nd and 3rd shifts.

After learning about the planned mass demonstration, respondent

called for a meeting with the leaders of the PBMEO. During the

meeting, the planned demonstration was confirmed by the union.

But it was stressed that the demonstration was not a strike against the

company but was in fact an exercise of the laborers' inalienable

constitutional rights to freedom of expression, speech and petition for

redress of grievances.

The company asked them to cancel the demonstration for it would

interrupt the normal course of their business, which may result to loss

of revenue. This was backed up with the threat of the possibility that

the workers would lose their jobs if they continue with the rally.

A second meeting took place where the company reiterated its

appeal that while the workers may be allowed to participate, those

from the 1st and regular shifts should not participate in the

demonstration, otherwise, they would be dismissed. Since it was too

late to withdraw, the rally took place and the officers of the PBMEO

were eventually dismissed for violation of the ‗No strike and No

lockout‘ clause of their Collective Bargaining Agreement.

The lower court decided in favor of the company and the officers of

the PBMEO were found guilty of bargaining in bad faith. Their motion

for reconsideration was subsequently denied by the Court of

Industrial relations for being filed two days late.

Issues:

1. Whether or not the petitioner's constitutional rights to freedom of

expression, freedom of assembly and freedom to petition for redress

of grievances should be upheld over the company’s right to property.

- Yes. Human rights are supreme over property rights since property

rights can be lost through prescription while human rights do not

prescribe. The company‘s right to property should yield to the

workers Constitutional right to freedom of speech, freedom of

expression and freedom to petition for redress of grievances which

are not only civil rights but also political rights essential to man‘s

enjoyment of his life, to his happiness and to his full and complete

fulfillment. The company‘s loss of unrealized profits for the day of the

strike is not as important as the workers' fight for their rights. In fact,

they were even able to save money on the operational expenses for

that day.

2. Whether or not the mass demonstration of the PBMEO was a

violation of the company’s “No strike and No lockout” rule.

- NO. The demonstration was not a violation of the ‗No strike and No

lockout‘ clause but was in fact a valid exercise of the workers

constitutional rights to express their grievances against the Pasig

police, not against the company.

3. WON there was a justified cause for the dismissal of the petitioners

by the respondent and the CIR.

- NO. The Court of Industrial Relations should not be confined by

technical and procedural rules in its quest for justice. Since the CIR is

a creature of the Legislature and even the rules of the legislature

itself must be liberally applied if strict adherence to it would result in

the denial of a person‘s constitutional right, the CIR should not have

denied the petitioner's motion for reconsideration. In doing so, the

court divested itself of its jurisdiction, which rendered its decision in

favor of the company null and void.

A constitutional or valid infringement of human rights requires a more

stringent criterion, namely EXISTENCE OF A GRAVE AND

IMMEDIATE DANGER OF A SUBSTANTIVE EVIL WHICH THE STATE HAS THE

RIGHT TO PREVENT. When a Court acts against the Constitution, its

judgments and orders become null and void. A court may suspend

its own rules whenever the purpose of justice requires it.

4 People v. Marti –JM -

Facts: Andres Marti (appellant) and his common-law wife, Shirley

Reyes, went to the booth of the "Manila Packing and Export

Forwarders" carrying with them 4 gift wrapped packages. Anita

Reyes attended to them. Andres informed Anita Reyes that he was

sending the packages to a friend in Zurich, Switzerland. Appellant

filled up the contract necessary for the transaction, namely, "WALTER

FIERZ, Mattacketr II, 8052 Zurich, Switzerland".

Anita Reyes then asked the appellant if she could examine and

inspect the packages. However, he refused, assuring that the

packages simply contained books, cigars, and gloves and were gifts

to his friend in Zurich. Anita Reyes no longer insisted on inspecting the

packages. The 4 packages were then placed inside a brown

corrugated box one by two feet in size. Styro-foam was placed at

the bottom and on top of the packages before the box was sealed

with masking tape, thus making the box ready for shipment

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Before delivery of appellant's box to the Bureau of Customs and/or

Bureau of Posts, Mr. Job Reyes (proprietor) following standard

operating procedure, opened the boxes for final inspection. When

he opened appellant's box, a peculiar odor emitted therefrom, he

squeezed one of the bundles allegedly containing gloves and felt

dried leaves inside. Opening one of the bundles, he pulled out a

cellophane wrapper protruding from the opening of one of the

gloves. He made an opening on one of the cellophane wrappers

and took several grams of the contents.

He brought the letter and a sample of appellant's shipment to the

Narcotics Section of the National Bureau of Investigation. Job Reyes

brought out the box in which appellant's packages were placed

and, in the presence of the NBI agents, opened the top flaps,

removed the styro-foam and took out the cellophane wrappers from

inside the gloves. Dried marijuana leaves were found to have been

contained inside the cellophane wrappers. The package which

allegedly contained books was likewise opened by Job Reyes. He

discovered that the package contained bricks or cake-like dried

marijuana leaves. The package which allegedly contained

tabacalera cigars was also opened. It turned out that dried

marijuana leaves were neatly stocked underneath the cigars.

Thereafter, Information was filed against appellant for violation of RA

6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act and was

convicted.

Issue: Whether or not the evidence had been obtained in violation of

appellants constitutional rights against unreasonable search and

seizure and privacy of communication (Sec. 2 and 3, Art. III,

Constitution) and the same should be held inadmissible in evidence .

May an act of a private individual, allegedly in violation of

appellant''s constitutional rights, be invoked against the state?

Held: We hold in the negative! The Bill of Rights embodied in the

Constitution is not meant to be invoked against acts of private

individuals finds support in the deliberations of the Constitutional

Commission. True, the liberties guaranteed by the fundamental law

of the land must always be subject to protection. But protection

against whom? Commissioner Bernas in his sponsorship speech in the

Bill of Rights answers the query which he himself posed, as follows:

1.) the general reflections. The protection of fundamental liberties in

the essence of constitutional democracy. Protection against

whom? Protection against the state. The Bill of Rights governs the

relationship between the individual and the state. Its concern is not

the relation between individuals, between a private individual and

other individuals. What the Bill of Rights does is to declare some

forbidden zones in the private sphere inaccessible to any power

holder.

The constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and seizures

therefore applies as a restraint directed only against the government

and its agencies tasked with the enforcement of the law. Thus, it

could only be invoked against the State to whom the restraint

against arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power is imposed.

If the search is made upon the request of law enforcers, a warrant

must generally be first secured if it is to pass the test of

constitutionality. However, if the search is made at the behest or

initiative of the proprietor of a private establishment for its own and

private purposes, as in the case at bar, and without the intervention

of police authorities, the right against unreasonable search and

seizure cannot be invoked for only the act of private individual, not

the law enforcers, is involved. In sum, the protection against

unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be extended to acts

committed by private individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of

alleged unlawful intrusion by the government.

Appellant argues, however, that since the provisions of the 1935

Constitution has been modified by the present phraseology found in

the 1987 Charter, expressly declaring as inadmissible any evidence

obtained in violation of the constitutional prohibition against illegal

search and seizure, it matters not whether the evidence was

procured by police authorities or private individuals.

The argument is untenable. For one thing, the constitution, in laying

down the principles of the government and fundamental liberties of

the people, does not govern relationships between individuals.

Moreover, it must be emphasized that the modifications introduced

in the 1987 Constitution (re: Sec. 2, Art. III) relate to the issuance of

either a search warrant or warrant of arrest vis-a-vis the responsibility

of the judge in the issuance thereof. The modifications introduced

deviate in no manner as to whom the restriction or inhibition against

unreasonable search and seizure is directed against. The restraint

stayed with the State and did not shift to anyone else.

Corolarilly, alleged violations against unreasonable search and

seizure may only be invoked against the State by an individual

unjustly traduced by the exercise of sovereign authority. To agree

with appellant that an act of a private individual in violation of the Bill

of Rights should also be construed as an act of the State would result

in serious legal complications and an absurd interpretation of the

constitution.

Similarly, the admissibility of the evidence procured by an individual

effected through private seizure equally applies, in pari passu, to the

alleged violation, non-governmental as it is, of appellant's

constitutional rights to privacy and communication.

WATEROUS DRUG CORPORATION and MS. EMMA CO, petitioners,

vs.

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and ANTONIA MELODIA

CATOLICO, respondents.

FACTS:

Catolico was hired as a pharmacist by petitioner Waterous Drug

Corporation on 15 August 1988.

31 July 1989 - Catolico received a memo from WATEROUS VP-GM

Emma Co warning her not to dispense medicine to employees

chargeable to the latter's accounts because the same was a

prohibited practice and warned her not to negotiate with suppliers

of medicine without consulting the Purchasing Department.

In another memo - a WATEROUS Supervisor warned Catolico against

the "rush delivery of medicines without the proper documents."

29 January 1990 – a WATEROUS Control Clerk informed Co that he

noticed an irregularity involving Catolico and Yung Shin

Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (YSP):

Catolico overpriced the 10 bottles of Voren Tablets (from P320 to

P384) she purchased from YSP and pocketed the P640.00 overprice.

Ms. Saldana, EDRC Espana Pharmacy Clerk, confirmed that the

check amounting to P640.00 was actually received by Ms. Catolico. .

As a matter of fact, Ms. Catolico even asked Ms. Saldana if she

opened the envelope containing the check but Ms. Saldana

answered her "talagang ganyan, bukas."

Co asked Catolico to explain, within twenty-four hours, her side of the

reported irregularity. Catolico asked for additional time to give her

explanation, and she was granted a 48-hour extension from 1 to 3

February 1990. However, on 2 February 1990, she was informed that

effective 6 February 1990 to 7 March 1990, she would be placed on

preventive suspension.

Catolico requested access to the file for her to be able to make a

satisfactory explanation. In said letter she protested Saldaña's

invasion of her privacy when Saldaña opened an envelope

addressed to Catolico.

Catolico explained that the check she received from YSP was a

Christmas gift and not a "refund of overprice." She also averred that

the preventive suspension was ill-motivated, as it sprang from an

earlier incident between her and Co's secretary, Irene Soliven.

March 5, 1990 - WATEROUS Supervisor Luzviminda Bautro, issued a

memo notifying Catolico of her termination.

May 5, 1990 - Catolico filed before the Office of the Labor Arbiter a

complaint for unfair labor practice, illegal dismissal, and illegal

suspension.

In his decision, the Labor Arbiter found no proof of unfair labor

practice against petitioners. Nevertheless, he decided in favor of

Catolico because petitioners failed to "prove what [they] alleged as

complainant's dishonesty," and to show that any investigation was

conducted. Hence, the dismissal was without just cause and due

process. He thus declared the dismissal and suspension illegal but

disallowed reinstatement, as it would not be to the best interest of

the parties. Accordingly, he awarded separation pay; back wages

for one year; and the additional sum of P2,000.00 for illegal

suspension "representing 30 days work."

Petitioners appealed from the decision and urged the NLRC to set it

aside.

In its decision, the NLRC affirmed the findings of the Labor Arbiter on

the ground that petitioners were not able to prove a just cause for

Catolico's dismissal from her employment. It found that petitioner's

evidence consisted only of the check of P640.00 drawn by YSP in

favor of complainant, which her co-employee saw when the latter

opened the envelope. But, it declared that the check was

inadmissible in evidence pursuant to Sections 2 and 3(1 and 2) of

Article III of the Constitution.

ISSUE: Whether or Not the dismissal of the private respondent is in

violation of the Constitution, under the Bill of Rights.

HELD: NO.

Catolico was denied due process. Procedural due process requires

that an employee be apprised of the charge against him, given

reasonable time to answer the charge, allowed ample opportunity

to be heard and defend himself, and assisted by a representative if

the employee so desires. Ample opportunity connotes every kind of

assistance that management must accord the employee to enable

him to prepare adequately for his defense, including legal

representation. In the case at bar, although Catolico was given an

opportunity to explain her side, she was dismissed from the service in

the memorandum of 5 March 1990 issued by her Supervisor after

receipt of her letter and that of her counsel. No hearing was ever

conducted. The Supervisor's memorandum spoke of "evidences [sic]

in [WATEROUS] possession," which were not, however, submitted.

Catolico was also unjustly dismissed. It is settled that the burden is on

the employer to prove just and valid cause for dismissing an

employee, and its failure to discharge that burden would result in a

finding that the dismissal is unjustified. Catolico was dismissed

because of an alleged anomalous transaction with YSP.

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Unfortunately for petitioners, their evidence does not establish that

there was an overcharge. It clearly appears then that Catolico's

dismissal was based on hearsay information. The difference in price

may be attributed to the different packaging used in each purchase

order. Assuming that there was an overcharge, the purchase orders

were recommended, verified and approved by the WATEROUS

management. If the price increase was objectionable to petitioners,

they should have disapproved the transaction. Consequently,

petitioners had no one to blame for their predicament but

themselves.

Catolico's dismissal then was obviously grounded on mere suspicion,

which in no case can justify an employee's dismissal. Suspicion is not

among the valid causes provided by the Labor Code for the

termination of employment; and even the dismissal of an employee

for loss of trust and confidence must rest on substantial grounds and

not on the employer's arbitrariness, whims, caprices, or suspicion.

Besides, Catolico was not shown to be a managerial employee, to

which class of employees the term "trust and confidence" is

restricted.

As regards the constitutional violation upon which the NLRC

anchored its decision, we find no reason to revise the doctrine laid

down in People vs. Marti that the Bill of Rights does not protect

citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures perpetrated by

private individuals. It is not true, that the citizens have no recourse

against such assaults. On the contrary, such an invasion gives rise to

both criminal and civil liabilities.

Finally, since it has been determined by the Labor Arbiter that

Catolico's reinstatement would not be to the best interest of the

parties, he correctly awarded separation pay to Catolico.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

ARMANDO G. YRASUEGUI VS. PAL

This is a case of an international flight steward who was dismissed

because of his failure to adhere to the weight standards of the airline

company.

Petitioner claimed that he was illegally dismissed. He argues that (1)

his dismissal does not fall under 282 of the Labor Code; (2) continuing

adherence to the weight standards of the company is not a bona

fide occupational qualification; and (3) he was discriminated

against because other overweight employees were promoted

instead of being disciplined.

Facts:

- Petitioner Armando G. Yrasuegui was a former international flight

steward of Philippine Airlines, Inc. (PAL). He stands 5'8" with a large

body frame. The proper weight for a man of his height and body

structure is from 147 to 166 pounds, the ideal weight being 166

pounds.

- The weight problem dates back to 1984. Back then, PAL advised

him to go on an extended vacation leave (Dec. 29, 1984 to Mar 4,

1985) to address his weight concerns. Apparently, petitioner failed to

meet the standards, prompting another leave without pay (Mar 5,

1985 to Nov 1985).

- Petitioner met the required weight, and was allowed to return to

work. But his weight problem recurred. He again went on leave

without pay from (Oct 17, 1988 to Feb 1989).

- April 26, 1989, petitioner weighed 209 pounds, he was removed

from flight duty effective May 6, 1989 to July 3, 1989. He was formally

requested to trim down to his ideal weight and report for weight

checks on several dates

- February 25, 1989, petitioner underwent weight check. Instead of

losing, weight, he was overweight at 215 pounds. Consequently, his

off-duty status was retained.

- October 17, 1989, PAL Line Administrator personally visited petitioner

to check on the progress of his effort to lose weight. Petitioner gained

2 pounds from his previous weight. After the visit, petitioner made a

commitment to reduce weight in a letter addressed to Cabin Crew

Group Manager.

- Despite the lapse of a ninety-day period given to him to reach his

ideal weight, petitioner remained overweight. On January 3, 1990, he

was informed of the PAL decision for him to remain grounded until

such time that he satisfactorily complies with the weight standards.

- Petitioner failed to report for weight checks. Despite that, he was

given one more month to comply with the weight requirement. As

usual, he was asked to report for weight check on different dates.

Again, petitioner failed to report for weight checks

- April 17, 1990, petitioner was formally warned that a repeated

refusal to report for weight check would be dealt with accordingly.

He was given another set of weight check dates. Again, petitioner

ignored the directive and did not report for weight checks. On June

26, 1990, petitioner was required to explain his refusal to undergo

weight checks.

- When petitioner tipped the scale on July 30, 1990, he weighed

at 212 pounds. Still, way over the ideal weight. On November 13,

1992, PAL finally served petitioner a Notice of Administrative Charge

for violation of company standards on weight requirements. He was

given ten (10) days from receipt of the charge within which to file his

answer and submit controverting evidence

- June 15, 1993, petitioner was formally informed by PAL that due to

his inability to attain his ideal weight, "and considering the utmost

leniency" extended to him "which spanned a period covering a total

of almost five (5) years," his services were considered terminated

"effective immediately‖.

Issues:

I.

WHETHER THE CA GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER'S

OBESITY CAN BE A GROUND FOR DISMISSAL UNDER PARAGRAPH (e)

OF ARTICLE 282 OF THE LABOR CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES;

II.

WHETHER THE CA GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER'S

DISMISSAL FOR OBESITY CAN BE PREDICATED ON THE "BONA FIDE

OCCUPATIONAL QUALIFICATION (BFOQ) DEFENSE";

III.

WHETHER THE CA GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER WAS

NOT UNDULY DISCRIMINATED AGAINST WHEN HE WAS DISMISSED

WHILE OTHER OVERWEIGHT CABIN ATTENDANTS WERE EITHER GIVEN

FLYING DUTIES OR PROMOTED.

IV.

WHETHER PETITIONER IS ENTITLED TO A SPEARATION PAY

Ruling:

I. The obesity of petitioner is a ground for dismissal under Article

282(e) of the Labor Code.

An employee may be dismissed the moment he is unable to comply

with his ideal weight as prescribed by the weight standards. The

dismissal of the employee would thus fall under Article 282(e) of the

Labor Code. As explained by the CA:

The standards violated in this case were not mere "orders" of the

employer; they were the "prescribed weights" that a cabin crew must maintain in order to qualify for and keep his or her position in the

company. In other words, they were standards that establish

continuing qualifications for an employee's position. In this sense, the

failure to maintain these standards does not fall under Article 282(a)

whose express terms require the element of willfulness in order to be a ground for dismissal. The failure to meet the employer's qualifying

standards is in fact a ground that does not squarely fall under

grounds (a) to (d) and is therefore one that falls under Article 282(e) -

the "other causes analogous to the foregoing."

By its nature, these "qualifying standards" are norms that

apply prior to and after an employee is hired. They apply prior to

employment because these are the standards a job applicant must

initially meet in order to be hired. They apply after hiring because an

employee must continue to meet these standards while on the job in

order to keep his job. Under this perspective, a violation is not one of

the faults for which an employee can be dismissed; the employee

can be dismissed simply because he no longer "qualifies" for his job

irrespective of whether or not the failure to qualify was willful or

intentional.

Petitioner invoked the Nadura v. Benguet case, he says his dismissal is

illegal:

The reliance on Nadura is off-tangent. The factual milieu in Nadura is

substantially different from the case at bar. First, Nadura was not

decided under the Labor Code. The law applied in that case was

Republic Act (RA) No. 1787. Second, the issue of flight safety is absent

in Nadura, thus, the rationale there cannot apply here. Third,

in Nadura, the employee who was a miner, was laid off from work

because of illness, i.e., asthma. Here, petitioner was dismissed for his

failure to meet the weight standards of PAL. He was not dismissed

due to illness. Fourth, the issue in Nadura is whether or not the

dismissed employee is entitled to separation pay and damages.

Here, the issue centers on the propriety of the dismissal of petitioner

for his failure to meet the weight standards of PAL. Fifth, in Nadura,

the employee was not accorded due process. Here, petitioner was

accorded utmost leniency. He was given more than four (4) years to

comply with the weight standards of PAL.

In the case at bar, the evidence on record militates against

petitioner's claims that obesity is a disease. That he was able to

reduce his weight from 1984 to 1992 clearly shows that it is possible for

him to lose weight given the proper attitude, determination, and self-

discipline.

II. The dismissal of petitioner can be predicated on the bona fide

occupational qualification defense.

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Bona Fide Occupational Qualification (BFOQ) - Employment in

particular jobs may not be limited to persons of a particular sex,

religion, or national origin unless the employer can show that sex,

religion, or national origin is an actual qualification for performing the

job

- Petitioner contends that BFOQ is a statutory defense. It does not

exist if there is no statute providing for it. Further, there is no existing

BFOQ statute that could justify his dismissal.

Both arguments must fail.

First, the Constitution, the Labor Code,and RA No. 7277 or the Magna

Carta for Disabled Persons contain provisions similar to BFOQ.

Second, in British Columbia Public Service Employee Commission

(BSPSERC) v. The British Columbia Government and Service

Employee's Union (BCGSEU), the Supreme Court of Canada adopted

the so-called "Meiorin Test" in determining whether an employment

policy is justified. Under this test, (1) the employer must show that it

adopted the standard for a purpose rationally connected to the

performance of the job; (2) the employer must establish that the

standard is reasonably necessary to the accomplishment of that

work-related purpose; and (3) the employer must establish that the

standard is reasonably necessary in order to accomplish the

legitimate work-related purpose. Similarly, in Star Paper Corporation v.

Simbol, this Court held that in order to justify a BFOQ, the employer

must prove that(1) the employment qualification is reasonably

related to the essential operation of the job involved; and(2) that

there is factual basis for believing that all or substantially all persons

meeting the qualification would be unable to properly perform the

duties of the job.

In short, the test of reasonableness of the company policy is used

because it is parallel to BFOQ. BFOQ is valid "provided it reflects an

inherent quality reasonably necessary for satisfactory job

performance."

Verily, there is no merit to the argument that BFOQ cannot be applied

if it has no supporting statute. Too, the Labor Arbiter, NLRC, and

CA are one in holding that the weight standards of PAL are

reasonable. A common carrier, from the nature of its business and for

reasons of public policy, is bound to observe extraordinary diligence

for the safety of the passengers it transports. It is bound to carry its

passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide,

using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with due regard

for all the circumstances.

The law leaves no room for mistake or oversight on the part of a

common carrier. Thus, it is only logical to hold that the weight

standards of PAL show its effort to comply with the exacting

obligations imposed upon it by law by virtue of being a common

carrier.

The business of PAL is air transportation. As such, it has committed

itself to safely transport its passengers. In order to achieve this, it must

necessarily rely on its employees, most particularly the cabin flight

deck crew who are on board the aircraft. The weight standards of

PAL should be viewed as imposing strict norms of discipline upon its

employees.

III. Petitioner failed to substantiate his claim that he was discriminated

against by PAL.

Petitioner next claims that PAL is using passenger safety as a

convenient excuse to discriminate against him. We are constrained,

however, to hold otherwise. We agree with the CA that "the element

of discrimination came into play in this case as a secondary position

for the private respondent in order to escape the consequence of

dismissal that being overweight entailed. It is a confession-and-

avoidance position that impliedly admitted the cause of dismissal,

including the reasonableness of the applicable standard and the

private respondent's failure to comply." It is a basic rule in evidence

that each party must prove his affirmative allegation.

Since the burden of evidence lies with the party who asserts an

affirmative allegation, petitioner has to prove his allegation with

particularity. There is nothing on the records which could support the

finding of discriminatory treatment. Petitioner cannot establish

discrimination by simply naming the supposed cabin attendants who

are allegedly similarly situated with him. Substantial proof must be

shown as to how and why they are similarly situated and the

differential treatment petitioner got from PAL despite the similarity of

his situation with other employees.

Indeed, except for pointing out the names of the supposed

overweight cabin attendants, petitioner miserably failed to indicate

their respective ideal weights; weights over their ideal weights; the

periods they were allowed to fly despite their being overweight; the

particular flights assigned to them; the discriminating treatment they

got from PAL; and other relevant data that could have adequately

established a case of discriminatory treatment by PAL. In the words of

the CA, "PAL really had no substantial case of discrimination to

meet."

We are not unmindful that findings of facts of administrative

agencies, like the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC, are accorded

respect, even finality. The reason is simple: administrative agencies

are experts in matters within their specific and specialized

jurisdiction. But the principle is not a hard and fast rule. It only applies

if the findings of facts are duly supported by substantial evidence. If it

can be shown that administrative bodies grossly misappreciated

evidence of such nature so as to compel a conclusion to the

contrary, their findings of facts must necessarily be reversed. Factual

findings of administrative agencies do not have infallibility and must

be set aside when they fail the test of arbitrariness.

Here, the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC inexplicably misappreciated

evidence. We thus annul their findings.

IV. Petitioner is entitled to separation pay.

Normally, a legally dismissed employee is not entitled to separation

pay. This may be deduced from the language of Article 279 of the

Labor Code that "[a]n employee who is unjustly dismissed from work

shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and

other privileges and to his full backwages, inclusive of allowances,

and to his other benefits or their monetary equivalent computed

from the time his compensation was withheld from him up to the time

of his actual reinstatement." Luckily for petitioner, this is not an

ironclad rule.

Exceptionally, separation pay is granted to a legally dismissed

employee as an act "social justice," or based on "equity." In both

instances, it is required that the dismissal (1) was not for serious

misconduct; and (2) does not reflect on the moral character of the

employee.

Here, We grant petitioner separation pay equivalent to one-half (1/2)

month's pay for every year of service. It should include regular

allowances which he might have been receiving. We are not blind to

the fact that he was not dismissed for any serious misconduct or to

any act which would reflect on his moral character. We also

recognize that his employment with PAL lasted for more or less a

decade.

7. FILOTEO v. SANDIGANBAYAN (1996) - Construction of the

Constitution and Bill of Rights

By Bai Monisa Gampong in 1st yr 2nd Sem CASE DIGEST POOL · Edit

Doc · Delete JOSE D. FILOTEO, JR. vs. SANDIGANBAYAN and THE PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES

Facts:

A person under investigation for the commission of an offense is

constitutionally guaranteed certain rights. One of the most cherished

of these is the right ―to have competent and independent counsel

preferably of his choice‖. The 1987 Constitution, unlike its

predecessors, expressly covenants that such guarantee ―cannot be

waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel‖. In the

present case, petitioner claims that such proscription against an

uncounselled waiver of the right to counsel is applicable to him

retroactively, even though his custodial investigation took place in

1983 -- long before the effectivity of the new Constitution. He also

alleges that his arrest was illegal, that his extrajudicial confession was

extracted through torture, and that the prosecution‘s evidence was

insufficient to convict him. Finally, though not raised by petitioner,

the question of what crime -- brigandage or robbery -- was

committed is likewise motu propio addressed by the Court in this

Decision.

Jose D. Filoteo, Jr. was a police investigator of the Western Police

District in Metro Manila, an old hand at dealing with suspected

criminals. A recipient of various awards and commendations

attesting to his competence and performance as a police officer, he

could not therefore imagine that one day he would be sitting on the

other side of the investigation table as the suspected mastermind of

the armed hijacking of a postal delivery van.

Along with his co-accused Martin Mateo, Jr. y Mijares, PC/Sgt.

Bernardo Relator, Jr. y Retino, CIC Ed Saguindel y Pabinguit, Ex-

PC/Sgt. Danilo Miravalles y Marcelo and civilians Ricardo Perez,

Reynaldo Frias, Raul Mendoza, Angel Liwanag, Severino Castro and

Gerardo Escalada.

On May 3, 1982, in Meycauyan, Bulacan, the said accused, two of

whom were armed with guns, stop the Postal Delivery Truck of the

Bureau of Postal while it was travelling along the MacArthur Highway

of said municipality, at the point of their guns, and then take, rob

and carry away with them the following:

1) Postal Delivery Truck

2) Social Security System Medicare Checks and Vouchers

3) Social Security System Pension Checks and Vouchers

4) Treasury Warrants

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5) Several Mail Matters from abroad

in the total amount of P253,728.29 more or less, belonging to US

Government Pensionados, SSS Pensionados, SSS Medicare

Beneficiaries and Private Individuals from Bulacan,

Pampanga, Bataan, Zambales and Olongapo City, to the damage

and prejudice of the owners in the aforementioned amount.

On separate dates, Filoteo, Mateo, Saguindel, Relator and Miravalles

pleaded not guilty. Their co-accused Perez, Frias, Mendoza,

Liwanag, Castro and Escalada were never arrested and remained at

large. Mateo escaped from police custody and was

tried in absentia in accordance with Article IV, Section 19 of the 1973

Constitution. Saguindel and Relator failed to appear during the trial

on February 21, 1985 and on March 31, 1986, respectively, and were

thus ordered arrested but remained at large since then. Like in the

case of Mateo, proceedings against them were held in

absentia. Only Filoteo filed this petition, after the respondent Court

rendered its assailed Decision and Resolution.

Issue

1. Are the written statements, particularly the extra-judicial confession

executed by the accused without the presence of his lawyer,

admissible in evidence against him? YES

2. Were said statements obtained through torture, duress, maltreatment

and intimidation and therefore illegal and inadmissible? NO

3. Was petitioner‘s warrantless arrest valid and proper? Any irregularity

attendant to his arrest, if any, was cured when he voluntarily

submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the trial court by entering a

plea of not guilty and by participating in the trial.

4. Is the evidence of the prosecution sufficient to find the petitioner

guilty beyond reasonable doubt?YES

5. What crime -- brigandage or robbery -- was committed? ROBBERY

Ruling: Uncounselled Waiver

SC finds that the pivotal issue here is the admissibility of petitioner‘s

extrajudicial confession which lays out in detail his complicity in the

crime. Petitioner contends that SC erred in admitting his extrajudicial

confession notwithstanding uncontradicted testimony and

documentary proof that he was made to sign the same through

torture, maltreatment, physical compulsion, threats and intimidation

and without the presence and assistance of counsel. He also claims

that in executing the extrajudicial confession, he was denied the

right to counsel in the same way that his waiver of the said right was

likewise without the benefit of counsel. Petitioner therefore questions

the respondent Court‘s admission in evidence of his extrajudicial

confession on the strength of cases upholding the admissibility of

extrajudicial confessions notwithstanding the absence of counsel

―especially where the statements are replete with details and

circumstances which are indicative of voluntariness.‖ We shall first

tackle the issue of his uncounselled waiver of his right to counsel.

The pertinent provision of Article IV, Section 20 of the 1973

Constitution reads as follows:

―No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. Any

person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall

have the right to remain silent and to counsel and to be informed of

such rights. No force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other

means which vitiates the free will shall be used against him. Any

confession obtained in violation of this section shall be inadmissible in

evidence.‖

In comparison, the relevant rights of an accused under Article III,

Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution are, inter alia, as follows:

―(1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense

shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to

have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own

choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must

be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in

writing and in the presence of counsel.

(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other

means which vitiate the free will shall be used against him. Secret

detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms of

detention are prohibited.

(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or

Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.

(4) The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for violations of

this section as well as compensation to and rehabilitation of victims

of torture or similar practices and their families.‖ (underscoring

supplied. Obviously, the 1973 Constitution did not contain the right

against an uncounselled waiver of the right to counsel which is

provided under paragraph 1, Section 12, Article III of the 1987

Constitution)

In the landmark case of Magtoto vs. Manguera, the Court

categorically held that the aforequoted provisions of the 1973

Constitution (which were not included in the 1935 Charter) must be

prospectively applied. This Court said:

―We hold that this specific portion of this constitutional mandate has

and should be given a prospective and not a retrospective

effect. Consequently, a confession obtained from a person under

investigation for the commission of an offense, who has not been

informed of his right (to silence and) to counsel, is inadmissible in

evidence if the same had been obtained after the effectivity of the

New Constitution on January 17, 1973. Conversely, such confession

is admissible in evidence against the accused, if the same had been

obtained before the effectivity of the New Constitution, even if

presented after January 17, 1973, and even if he had not been

informed of his right to counsel, since no law gave the accused the

right to be so informed before that date.”

By parity of reasoning, the specific provision of the 1987 Constitution

requiring that a waiver by an accused of his right to counsel during

custodial investigation must be made with the assistance of counsel

may not be applied retroactively or in cases where the extrajudicial

confession was made prior to the effectivity of said

Constitution. Accordingly, waivers of the right to counsel during

custodial investigation without the benefit of counsel during the

effectivity of the 1973 Constitution should, by such argumentation, be

admissible. Although a number of cases held that extrajudicial

confessions made while the 1973 Constitution was in force and effect,

should have been made with the assistance of counsel, the definitive

ruling was enunciated only on April 26, 1983 when this Court,

through Morales, Jr., vs. Enrile, issued the guidelines to be observed

by law enforcers during custodial investigation. The court specifically

ruled that ―(t)he right to counsel may be waived but the waiver shall

not be valid unless made with the assistance of counsel.‖ Thereafter,

in People vs. Luvendino, the Court through Mr. Justice Florentino P.

Feliciano vigorously taught:

The doctrine that an uncounseled waiver of the right to counsel is not

to be given legal effect was initially a judge-made one and was first

announced on 26 April 1983 in Morales vs. Enrile and reiterated on 20

March 1985 in People vs. Galit.

While the Morales-Galit doctrine eventually became part of Section

12(1) of the 1987 Constitution, that doctrine affords no comfort to

appellant Luvendino for the requirements and restrictions outlined

inMorales and Galit have no retroactive effect and do not reach

waivers made prior to 26 April 1983 the date of promulgation

of Morales.‖

Pursuant to the above doctrine, petitioner may not claim the benefits

of the Morales and Galit rulings because he executed his

extrajudicial confession and his waiver to the right to counsel on May

30, 1982, or before April 26, 1983. The prospective application of

―judge-made‖ laws was underscored in Co vs. Court of

Appeals where the Court ruled thru Chief Justice Andres R. Narvasa

that in accordance with Article 8 of the Civil Code which provides

that “(j)udicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the

Constitution shall form part of the legal system of the Philippines,‖

and Article 4 of the same Code which states that “(l)aws shall have

no retroactive effect unless the contrary is provided,‖ the principle of

prospectivity of statutes, original or amendatory, shall apply to

judicial decisions, which, although in themselves are not laws, are

nevertheless evidence of what the law means.

Petitioner‘s contention that Article III, Section 12 of the 1987

Constitution should be given retroactive effect for being favorable to

him as an accused, cannot be sustained. While Article 22 of the RPC

provides that “(p)enal laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as

they favor the person guilty of a felony who is not a habitual

criminal,” what is being construed here is a constitutional provision

specifically contained in the Bill of Rights which is obviously not a

penal statute. A bill of rights is a declaration and enumeration of the

individual rights and privileges which the Constitution is designed to

protect against violations by the government, or by individuals or

groups of individual. It is a charter of liberties for the individual and a

limitation upon the power of the state. Penal laws, on the other hand,

strictly and properly are those imposing punishment for an offense

committed against the state which the executive of the state has the

power to pardon. In other words, a penal law denotes punishment

imposed and enforced by the state for a crime or offense against its

law

Hence, petitioner‘s vigorous reliance on People vs. Sison to make his

extrajudicial confession inadmissible is misplaced. In that case, the

extrajudicial confession was executed on May 19, 1983, clearly after

the promulgation of Morales on April 26, 1983.

The admissibility of petitioner‘s uncounselled waiver of the right to

counsel notwithstanding, the Court has still to determine whether

such waiver was made voluntarily and intelligently. The waiver must

also be categorical and definitive, and must rest on clear evidence.

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Sgt. Arsenio Carlos, investigating officer, testified that he apprised

petitioner of his right to counsel even in waiving the same right but

petitioner did not even inform him that his father-in-law was a

lawyer. Although allowed to talk for thirty minutes with Jimmy

Victorino, who was his comrade at the WPD General Assignment

Section, still, petitioner did not invoke his right to counsel.

It should be emphasized that petitioner could not have been

ignorant of his rights as an accused. He was a fourth year

criminology student and a topnotch student in the police basic

course. Having been in the police force since 1978, with stints at the

investigation division or the detective bureau, he knew the tactics

used by investigators to incriminate criminal suspects. in other words,

he was knowledgeable on the matter of extrajudicial confessions.

9 Taxicab Operators v. BOT 1982

By Monica Katherine Juezan in 1st yr 2nd Sem CASE DIGEST

POOL · Edit Doc · Delete

TAXICAB OPERATORS OF METRO MANILA, INC., FELICISIMO CABIGAO

and ACE TRANSPORTATION CORPORATION vs.

THE BOARD OF TRANSPORTATION and THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU

OF LAND TRANSPORTATION

FACTS:

Petitioner Taxicab Operators of Metro Manila, Inc. (TOMMI) is a

domestic corporation composed of taxicab operators, who are

grantees of Certificates of Public Convenience to operate taxicabs

within the City of Manila and to any other place in Luzon accessible

to vehicular traffic. Petitioners Ace Transportation Corporation and

Felicisimo Cabigao are two of the members of TOMMI, each being

an operator and grantee of such certificate of public convenience.

SUBJECT: Phasing out and Replacement of Old and Dilapidated Taxis

WHEREAS, it is the policy of the government to insure that only safe

and comfortable units are used as public conveyances;

WHEREAS, the riding public, particularly in Metro-Manila, has, time

and again, complained against, and condemned, the continued

operation of old and dilapidated taxis;

WHEREAS, in order that the commuting public may be assured of

comfort, convenience, and safety, a program of phasing out of old

and dilapidated taxis should be adopted;

WHEREAS, after studies and inquiries made by the Board of

Transportation, the latter believes that in six years of operation, a taxi

operator has not only covered the cost of his taxis, but has made

reasonable profit for his investments;

NOW, THEREFORE, pursuant to this policy, the Board hereby declares

that no car beyond six years shall be operated as taxi, and in

implementation of the same hereby promulgates the following rules

and regulations:

1. As of December 31, 1977, all taxis of Model 1971 and earlier are

ordered withdrawn from public service and thereafter may no longer

be registered and operated as taxis. In the registration of cards for

1978, only taxis of Model 1972 and later shall be accepted for

registration and allowed for operation;

2. As of December 31, 1978, all taxis of Model 1972 are ordered

withdrawn from public service and thereafter may no longer be

registered and operated as taxis. In the registration of cars for 1979,

only taxis of Model 1973 and later shall be accepted for registration

and allowed for operation; and every year thereafter, there shall be

a six-year lifetime of taxi, to wit:

1980 — Model 1974

1981 — Model 1975, etc.

All taxis of earlier models than those provided above are hereby

ordered withdrawn from public service as of the last day of

registration of each particular year and their respective plates shall

be surrendered directly to the Board of Transportation for subsequent

turnover to the Land Transportation Commission.

For an orderly implementation of this Memorandum Circular, the rules

herein shall immediately be effective in Metro-Manila. Its

implementation outside Metro- Manila shall be carried out only after

the project has been implemented in Metro-Manila and only after

the date has been determined by the Board.

Pursuant to the above BOT circular, respondent Director of the

Bureau of Land Transportation (BLT) issued Implementing Circular No.

52, dated August 15, 1980, instructing the Regional Director, the MV

Registrars and other personnel of BLT, all within the National Capitol

Region, to implement said Circular, and formulating a schedule of

phase-out of vehicles to be allowed and accepted for registration as

public conveyances.

In accordance therewith, cabs of model 1971 were phase-out in

registration year 1978; those of model 1972, in 1979; those of model

1973, in 1980; and those of model 1974, in 1981.

On January 27, 1981, petitioners filed a Petition with the BOT,

docketed as Case No. 80-7553, seeking to nullify MC No. 77-42 or to

stop its implementation; to allow the registration and operation in

1981 and subsequent years of taxicabs of model 1974, as well as

those of earlier models which were phased-out, provided that, at the

time of registration, they are roadworthy and fit for operation.

On February 16, 1981, petitioners filed before the BOT a

"Manifestation and Urgent Motion", praying for an early hearing of

their petition. The case was heard on February 20, 1981. Petitioners

presented testimonial and documentary evidence, offered the

same, and manifested that they would submit additional

documentary proofs. Said proofs were submitted on March 27, 1981

attached to petitioners' pleading.

On November 28, 1981, petitioners filed before the same Board a

"Manifestation and Urgent Motion to Resolve or Decide Main Petition"

praying that the case be resolved or decided not later than

December 10, 1981 to enable them, in case of denial, to avail of

whatever remedy they may have under the law for the protection of

their interests before their 1975 model cabs are phased-out on

January 1, 1982.

Petitioners, through its President, allegedly made personal follow-ups

of the case, but was later informed that the records of the case

could not be located.

ISSUES:

A. Did BOT and BLT promulgate the questioned memorandum

circulars in accord with the manner required by Presidential Decree

No. 101, thereby safeguarding the petitioners‘ constitutional right to

procedural due process?

B. Granting arguendo, that respondents did comply with the

procedural requirements imposed by Presidential Decree No. 101,

would the implementation and enforcement of the assailed

memorandum circulars violate the petitioners‘ constitutional rights to.

(1) Equal protection of the law;

(2) Substantive due process; and

(3) Protection against arbitrary and unreasonable classification and

standard?

HELD:

On Procedural and Substantive Due Process:

Presidential Decree No. 101 grants to the Board of Transportation the

power to fix just and reasonable standards, classification, regulations,

practices, measurements, or service to be furnished, imposed,

observed, and followed by operators of public utility motor vehicles.

In support of their submission that they were denied procedural due

process, petitioners contend that they were not caged upon to

submit their position papers, nor were they ever summoned to attend

any conference prior to the issuance of the questioned BOT Circular.

It is clear from the provision aforequoted, however, that the leeway

accorded the Board gives it a wide range of choice in gathering

necessary information or data in the formulation of any policy, plan

or program. It is not mandatory that it should first call a conference or

require the submission of position papers or other documents from

operators or persons who may be affected, this being only one of the

options open to the Board, which is given wide discretionary

authority. Petitioners cannot justifiably claim, therefore, that they

were deprived of procedural due process. Neither can they state

with certainty that public respondents had not availed of other

sources of inquiry prior to issuing the challenged Circulars. operators

of public conveyances are not the only primary sources of the data

aand information that may be desired by the BOT.

On Equal Protection of the Law

As enunciated in the preambular clauses of the challenged BOT

Circular, the overriding consideration is the safety and comfort of the

riding public from the dangers posed by old and dilapidated taxis.

The State, in the exercise, of its police power, can prescribe

regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, good order, safety

and general welfare of the people. It can prohibit all things hurtful to

comfort, safety and welfare of society. It may also regulate property

rights. In the language of Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando "the

necessities imposed by public welfare may justify the exercise of

governmental authority to regulate even if thereby certain groups

may plausibly assert that their interests are disregarded".

In so far as the non-application of the assailed Circulars to other

transportation services is concerned, it need only be recalled that

the equal protection clause does not imply that the same treatment

be accorded all and sundry. It applies to things or persons identically

or similarly situated. It permits of classification of the object or subject

of the law provided classification is reasonable or based on

substantial distinction, which make for real differences, and that it

must apply equally to each member of the class. What is required

under the equal protection clause is the uniform operation by legal

means so that all persons under Identical or similar circumstance

would be accorded the same treatment both in privilege conferred

and the liabilities imposed. The challenged Circulars satisfy the

foregoing criteria.

Evident then is the conclusion that the questioned Circulars do not

suffer from any constitutional infirmity. To declare a law

unconstitutional, the infringement of constitutional right must be

clear, categorical and undeniable.

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The Writs prayed for are denied and this Petition is hereby dismissed

11 DECS v San Diego - Lobaton

Department of Education, Culture, and Sports (DECS) and Director of

Center for Educational Measurement, petitioners, vs. Roberto Rey

San Diego and Judge Teresita Dizon-Capulong, in her capacity as

Presiding Judge of the RTC of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Branch 172,

respondents

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

-----------

We cannot have a society of square pegs in round holes, of dentists

who should

never have left the farm and engineers who should have studied

banking and

teachers who could be better as merchants

-- and of lawyers who may prove better as plumbers.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

-----------

FACTS:

Private respondent is a graduate of the University of the East with a

degree in Bachelor of Science in Zoology.

A check with the Department of Education showed that he took and

flunked the National Medical Admission Test (NMAT) four times and

was applying to take a fifth examination.

DECS rejected his application following its rule that: A student shall be

allowed only three (3) chances to take the NMAT. After three (3)

successive failures, a student shall not be allowed to take the NMAT

for the fourth time.

To compel his admission to the test, private respondent went to the

RTC of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, invoking his constitutional rights to

freedom and quality education and challenging the constitutionality

of MECS Order No. 12, Series of 1972, containing the above-cited

rule.

Respondent judge rendered a decision on July 4, 1989, declaring the

challenged order invalid and granting the petition, holding that San

Diego had been deprived of his right to pursue a medical education

through an arbitrary exercise of the police power.

ISSUE: Whether a person who has thrice failed the National Medical

Admission Test (NMAT) is entitled to take it again.

HELD:

(On Police Power)

In Tablarin v. Gutierrez, the SC upheld the constitutionality of the

NMAT as a measure intended to limit the admission to medical

schools only to those who have initially proved their competence

and preparation for a medical education. (Said rationale should also

be applied to the case at bar.)

As to the contention that private respondent has been deprived of

his right to pursue a medical education through an arbitrary exercise

of the police power, the same holds no bearing. The police power of

the state is said to be validly exercised if (a) the interests of the public

generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require the

interference of the State, and (b) the means employed are

reasonably necessary to the attainment of the object sought to be

accomplished and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. In other

words, the proper exercise of the police power requires the

concurrence of a lawful subject and a lawful method.

Lawful subject: It is the right and responsibility of the State to insure

that the medical profession is not infiltrated by incompetents to

whom patients may unwarily entrust their lives and health.

Lawful method: The method employed by the challenged regulation

is not irrelevant to the purpose of the law nor is it arbitrary or

oppressive. The three-flunk rule is intended to insulate the medical

schools and ultimately the medical profession from the intrusion of

those not qualified to be doctors. While every person is entitled to

aspire to be a doctor, he does not have a constitutional right to be a

doctor -- one cannot insist on being a physician if he will be a

menace to his patients.

Hence, no arbitrary exercise of the police power in this light.

(Minor Issues)

1.) The right to quality education invoked by the private respondent

is not absolute. The constitution also provides that ―every person has

the right to choose a profession or course of study, subject to fair,

reasonable, and equitable admission and academic requirements.‖

2.) The contention that the challenged rule violates the equal

protection clause is not well-taken. A law does not have to operate

with equal force on all persons or things to be conformable to Art. III,

Sec. 1 of the Constitution. There would only be unequal protection if

some applicants who have passed the tests are admitted and others

who have also qualified are denied entrance. In other words, what

the equal protection requires is equality among equals.

Petition GRANTED, decision of respondent court REVERSED.

Carlos Superdrug v. DSWD (Police power)

By Joseph Madriaga in 1st yr 2nd Sem CASE DIGEST POOL · Edit

Doc · Delete

Facts: R.A. No. 9257, amending R.A. No. 7432 became effective on

March 21, 2004. Section 4(a) of the Act states: The senior citizens shall

be entitled to twenty percent (20%) discount from all establishments

relative to the utilization of services in hotels and similar lodging

establishments, restaurants and recreation centers, and purchase of

medicines in all establishments for the exclusive use or enjoyment of

senior citizens, including funeral and burial services for the death of

senior citizens. . .The establishment may claim the discounts as tax

deduction based on the net cost of the goods sold or services

rendered. Provided, that the cost of the discount shall be allowed as

deduction from gross income for the same taxable year that the

discount is granted. Provided, further, That the total amount of the

claimed tax deduction net of value added tax if applicable, shall be

included in their gross sales receipts for tax purposes and shall be

subject to proper documentation and to the provisions of the

National Internal Revenue Code, as amended.

On November 12, 2004, the DOH issued Administrative Order No 177

amending A.O. No. 171. Under A.O. No. 177, the twenty percent

discount shall not be limited to the purchase of unbranded generic

medicines only, but shall extend to both prescription and non-

prescription medicines whether branded or generic. Thus, it stated

that ―[t]he grant of twenty percent (20%) discount shall be provided

in the purchase of medicines from all establishments dispensing

medicines for the exclusive use of the senior citizens.‖

Issue: Whether or not the State, in promoting the health and welfare

of a special group of citizens, can impose upon private

establishments the burden of partly subsidizing a government

program.

Held:Yes, the law is a legitimate exercise of police power of the

State.

Reason: The Senior Citizens Act was enacted primarily to maximize

the contribution of senior citizens to nation-building, and to grant

benefits and privileges to them for their improvement and well-being

as the State considers them an integral part of our society. The

priority given to senior citizens finds its basis in the Constitution as set

forth in the law itself. Thus, the Act provides: Pursuant to Article XV,

Section 4 of the Constitution, it is the duty of the family to take care

of its elderly members while the State may design programs of social

security for them. In addition to this, Section 10 in the Declaration of

Principles and State Policies provides: ―The State shall provide social

justice in all phases of national development.‖ Further, Article XIII,

Section 11, provides: ―The State shall adopt an integrated and

comprehensive approach to health development which shall

endeavor to make essential goods, health and other social services

available to all the people at affordable cost. There shall be priority

for the needs of the underprivileged sick, elderly, disabled, women

and children.‖ Consonant with these constitutional principles the

following are the declared policies of this Act:

. . .

(f) To recognize the important role of the private sector in the

improvement of the welfare of senior citizens and to actively seek

their partnership.

To implement the above policy, the law grants a twenty

percent discount to senior citizens for medical and dental services,

and diagnostic and laboratory fees; admission fees charged by

theaters, concert halls, circuses, carnivals, and other similar places of

culture, leisure and amusement; fares for domestic land, air and sea

travel; utilization of services in hotels and similar lodging

establishments, restaurants and recreation centers; and purchases of

medicines for the exclusive use or enjoyment of senior citizens. As a

form of reimbursement, the law provides that business establishments

extending the twenty percent discount to senior citizens may claim

the discount as a tax deduction.

The law is a legitimate exercise of police power which, similar to the

power of eminent domain, has general welfare for its object. Police

power is not capable of an exact definition, but has been purposely

veiled in general terms to underscore its comprehensiveness to meet

all exigencies and provide enough room for an efficient and flexible

response to conditions and circumstances, thus assuring the greatest

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benefits. Accordingly, it has been described as ―the most essential,

insistent and the least limitable of powers, extending as it does to all

the great public needs.‖ It is ―[t]he power vested in the legislature by

the constitution to make, ordain, and establish all manner of

wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes, and ordinances, either

with penalties or without, not repugnant to the constitution, as they

shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the commonwealth,

and of the subjects of the same.‖

For this reason, when the conditions so demand as determined by

the legislature, property rights must bow to the primacy of police

power because property rights, though sheltered by due process,

must yield to general welfare.

Police power as an attribute to promote the common good would

be diluted considerably if on the mere plea of petitioners that they

will suffer loss of earnings and capital, the questioned provision is

invalidated. Moreover, in the absence of evidence demonstrating

the alleged confiscatory effect of the provision in question, there is

no basis for its nullification in view of the presumption of validity which

every law has in its favor.

Given these, it is incorrect for petitioners to insist that the grant of the

senior citizen discount is unduly oppressive to their business, because

petitioners have not taken time to calculate correctly and come up

with a financial report, so that they have not been able to show

properly whether or not the tax deduction scheme really works

greatly to their disadvantage.

In treating the discount as a tax deduction, petitioners insist that they

will incur losses because, referring to the DOF Opinion, for every P1.00

senior citizen discount that petitioners would give, P0.68 will be

shouldered by them as only P0.32 will be refunded by the

government by way of a tax deduction.

To illustrate this point, petitioner Carlos Super Drug cited the anti-

hypertensive maintenance drug Norvasc as an example. According

to the latter, it acquires Norvasc from the distributors at P37.57 per

tablet, and retails it at P39.60 (or at a margin of 5%). If it grants a 20%

discount to senior citizens or an amount equivalent to P7.92, then it

would have to sell Norvasc at P31.68 which translates to a loss from

capital of P5.89 per tablet. Even if the government will allow a tax

deduction, only P2.53 per tablet will be refunded and not the full

amount of the discount which is P7.92. In short, only 32% of the 20%

discount will be reimbursed to the drugstores.

Petitioners‘ computation is flawed. For purposes of reimbursement,

the law states that the cost of the discount shall be deducted from

gross income,the amount of income derived from all sources before

deducting allowable expenses, which will result in net income. Here,

petitioners tried to show a loss on a per transaction basis, which

should not be the case. An income statement, showing an

accounting of petitioners‘ sales, expenses, and net profit (or loss) for

a given period could have accurately reflected the effect of the

discount on their income. Absent any financial statement, petitioners

cannot substantiate their claim that they will be operating at a loss

should they give the discount. In addition, the computation was

erroneously based on the assumption that their customers consisted

wholly of senior citizens. Lastly, the 32% tax rate is to be imposed on

income, not on the amount of the discount.

Furthermore, it is unfair for petitioners to criticize the law because

they cannot raise the prices of their medicines given the cutthroat

nature of the players in the industry. It is a business decision on the

part of petitioners to peg the mark-up at 5%. Selling the medicines

below acquisition cost, as alleged by petitioners, is merely a result of

this decision. Inasmuch as pricing is a property right, petitioners

cannot reproach the law for being oppressive, simply because they

cannot afford to raise their prices for fear of losing their customers to

competition.

The Court is not oblivious of the retail side of the pharmaceutical

industry and the competitive pricing component of the business.

While the Constitution protects property rights, petitioners must

accept the realities of business and the State, in the exercise of

police power, can intervene in the operations of a business which

may result in an impairment of property rights in the process.

Moreover, the right to property has a social dimension. While Article

XIII of the Constitution provides the precept for the protection of

property, various laws and jurisprudence, particularly on agrarian

reform and the regulation of contracts and public utilities,

continuously serve as a reminder that the right to property can be

relinquished upon the command of the State for the promotion of

public good.

(13) MMDA v. Bel-Air Village Association, Inc. G.R. NO. 135962

(March 27, 2000) –kiji-

Petitioner: Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (Government

agency tasked with the delivery of basic services in Metro Manila)

Respondent: Bel Air Village Association Inc (Government agency

tasked with the delivery of basic services in Metro Manila and the

registered owner of Neptune Street, a road inside Bel-Air Village.)

Facts: Respondent received from petitioner, through its Chairman, a

notice requesting respondent to open Neptune Street to public

vehicular traffic and that the perimeter wall separating the

subdivision from the adjacent Kalayaan Avenue would be

demolished. BAVA then, filed a case for injunction enjoining the

opening of Neptune Street and prohibiting the demolition of the

perimeter wall. The trial court denied the issuance of a preliminary

injunction. On appeal, the appellate court ruled that the MMDA has

no authority to order the opening of Neptune Street, and cause the

demolition of its perimeter walls. It held that the authority is lodged in

the City Council of Makati by ordinance.

Issue: WON the MMDA has authority to open Neptune Road to the

public.

Held: No.The MMDA has no power to enact ordinances for the

welfare of the community. Hence, its proposed opening of Neptune

Street which was not mandated by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of

Makati City, is illegal.

It bears stressing that police power is lodged primarily in the

National Legislature. It cannot be

exercised by any group or body of individuals not possessing

legislative power. The National Legislature,

however, may delegate this power to the President and

administrative boards as well as the lawmaking

bodies of municipal corporations or local government units. Once

delegated, the agents can exercise only

such legislative powers as are conferred on them by the national

lawmaking body.

REVIEW CENTER ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs.

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA and COMMISSION ON

HIGHER EDUCATION represented by its Chairman ROMULO L. NERI,

Respondents.

Nature of Case

Petition for prohibition and mandamus assailing Executive

Order No. 566 (EO 566) and Commission on Higher Education (CHED)

Memorandum Order No. 30, series of 2007 (RIRR).

Facts:

June 11 and 12 2006 - the Professional Regulation Commission (PRC)

conducted the Nursing Board Examinations nationwide.

June 2006 - licensure applicants wrote the PRC to report that

handwritten copies of two sets of examinations were circulated

during the examination period among the examinees reviewing at

the R.A. Gapuz Review Center and Inress Review Center. The PRC

later admitted the leakage and traced it to two Board of Nursing

members.

June 19 2006 - the PRC released the results of the Nursing Board

Examinations.

August 18 2006 - the Court of Appeals restrained the PRC from

proceeding with the oath-taking of the successful examinees set on

August 22 2006.

Consequently, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (President Arroyo)

replaced all the members of the PRC's Board of Nursing. President

Arroyo also ordered the examinees to re-take the Nursing Board

Examinations.

September 8 2006 - President Arroyo issued EO 566 which authorized

the CHED to supervise the establishment and operation of all review

centers and similar entities in the Philippines.

November 3 2006 - the CHED, through its then Chairman Carlito S.

Puno (Chairman Puno), approved CHED Memorandum Order No. 49,

series of 2006 (IRR)

In a letter dated 24 November 2006, the Review Center Association

of the Philippines (petitioner), an organization of independent review

centers, asked the CHED to "amend, if not withdraw" the IRR arguing,

among other things, that giving permits to operate a review center

to Higher Education Institutions (HEIs) or consortia of HEIs and

professional organizations will effectively abolish independent review

centers.

In a letter dated 3 January 2007, Chairman Puno wrote petitioner,

through its President Jose Antonio Fudolig (Fudolig), that to suspend

the implementation of the IRR would be inconsistent with the

mandate of EO 566. hairman Puno also wrote that petitioner's

comments and suggestions would be considered in the event of

revisions to the IRR.

In view of petitioner's continuing request to suspend and re-evaluate

the IRR, Chairman Puno, in a letter dated 9 February 2007, invited

petitioner's representatives to a dialogue on 14 March 2007. In

accordance with what was agreed upon during the dialogue,

petitioner submitted to the CHED its position paper on the IRR.

Petitioner also requested the CHED to confirm in writing Chairman

Puno's statements during the dialogue, particularly on lowering of the

registration fee from P400,000 to P20,000 and the requirement for

reviewers to have five years' teaching experience instead of five

years' administrative experience. Petitioner likewise requested for a

categorical answer to their request for the suspension of the IRR. The

CHED did not reply to the letter.

On 7 May 2007, the CHED approved the RIRR.

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On 22 August 2007, petitioner filed before the CHED a Petition to

Clarify/Amend Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations8 praying

for a ruling:

(1.) Amending the RIRR by excluding independent review centers

from the coverage of the CHED;

(2.) Clarifying the meaning of the requirement for existing review

centers to tie-up or be integrated with HEIs, consortium or HEIs and

PRC-recognized professional associations with recognized programs,

or in the alternative, to convert into schools; and

(3.) Revising the rules to make it conform with Republic Act No. 7722

(RA 7722) limiting the CHED's coverage to public and private

institutions of higher education as well as degree-granting programs

in post-secondary educational institutions.

October 8 2007 - the CHED issued Resolution No. 718-200710 referring

petitioner's request to exclude independent review centers from

CHED's supervision and regulation to the Office of the President as

the matter requires the amendment of EO 566. To exclude the

operation of independent review centers from the coverage of

CHED would clearly contradict the intention of the said Executive

Order No. 566.

October 26 2007 - petitioner filed a petition for Prohibition and

Mandamus before this Court praying for the annulment of the RIRR,

the declaration of EO 566 as invalid and unconstitutional, and the

prohibition against CHED from implementing the RIRR.

April 23 2008 - a Motion for Leave of Court for Intervention In Support

of the Petition and a Petition In Intervention were filed by CPA

Review School of the Philippines, Inc. (CPAR), Professional Review

and Training Center, Inc. (PRTC), ReSA Review School, Inc. (ReSA),

CRC-ACE Review School, Inc. (CRC-ACE), all independent CPA

review centers operating in Manila (collectively, petitioners-

intervenors). Petitioners-intervenors pray for the declaration of EO 566

and the RIRR as invalid on the ground that both constitute an

unconstitutional exercise of legislative power.

Issues:

1. Whether EO 566 is an unconstitutional exercise by the Executive of

legislative power as it expands the CHED's jurisdiction; and

2. Whether the RIRR is an invalid exercise of the Executive's rule-

making power.

** These are the main issues in the case. However, the focus

on our topic is on the issue ofPolice Power.

Held:

Police power to prescribe regulations to promote the

health, morals, education, good order or safety, and the general

welfare of the people flows from the recognition that salus populi est

suprema lex - the welfare of the people is the supreme law. Police

power primarily rests with the legislature although it may be exercised

by the President and administrative boards by virtue of a valid

delegation. Here, no delegation of police power exists under RA 7722

authorizing the President to regulate the operations of non-degree

granting review centers.

In case the other issues will be asked...

(1) The scopes of EO 566 and the RIRR clearly expand the CHED's

coverage under RA 7722. The CHED's coverage under RA 7722 is

limited to public and private institutions of higher education and

degree-granting programs in all public and private post-secondary

educational institutions. EO 566 directed the CHED to formulate a

framework for the regulation of review centers and similar entities.

Therefore, it is unconstitutional.

(2) The exercise of the President‘s residual powers under Section 20,

Title I of Book III of EO(invoked by the OSG to justify GMA‘s action)

requires legislation; as the provision clearly states that the exercise of

the President‘s other powers and functions has to be "provided for

under the law." There is no law granting the President the power to

amend the functions of the CHED. The President has no inherent or

delegated legislative power to amend the functions of the CHED

under RA 7722. Since EO 566 is an invalid exercise of legislative

power, the RIRR is also an invalid exercise of the CHED's quasi-

legislative power.

15. PPI v. COMELEC (Pasquin)

Facts:

On March 2, 1995, COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 2772,

Sections 2 and 8 of which read,

Sec. 2. Comelec Space. — The Commission shall procure free print

space of not less than one half (1/2) page in at least one newspaper

of general circulation in every province or city for use as "Comelec

Space" from March 6, 1995 in the case of candidates for senator and

from March 21, 1995 until May 12, 1995. In the absence of said

newspaper, "Comelec Space" shall be obtained from any magazine

or periodical of said province or city.

Sec. 8. Undue Reference to Candidates/Political Parties in

Newspapers. — No newspaper or publication shall allow to be

printed or published in the news, opinion, features, or other sections

of the newspaper or publication accounts or comments which

manifestly favor or oppose any candidate or political party by unduly

or repeatedly referring to or including therein said candidate or

political party. However, unless the facts and circumstances clearly

indicate otherwise, the Commission will respect the determination by

the publisher and/or editors of the newspapers or publications that

the accounts or views published are significant, newsworthy and of

public interest. (Emphasis supplied)

In implementation of this resolution, COMELEC sent identical letters to

various publishers of newspapers all members of the PPI, directing

them to provide free print space to the COMELEC to be used by

candidates for the senatorial field to make known their qualifications,

their stand on public issues and their platforms and programs of

government.

PPI now comes to the court seeking the declaration of

unconstitutionality of Resolution No. 2772 on the grounds that it

violates the prohibition imposed by the Constitution upon the

government, and any of its agencies, against the taking of private

property for public use without just compensation. It also sought to

declare the letter directives of the COMELEC void for requiring

publishers to give free "COMELEC Space" and at the same time

process raw data to make it camera-ready, constitute impositions of

involuntary servitude, contrary to the provisions of Section 18 (2),

Article III of the 1987 Constitution.

On April 20, 1995, the Court issued a TRO enjoining COMELEC from

implementing the assailed resolution.

The OSG in its comment representing the COMELEC alleged that the

resolution did not impose upon the publishers any obligation to

provide free print space in newspapers as it does not provide any

administrative of criminal sanction for noncompliance with the

resolution. According to the OSG, the resolution merely provided for

guidelines to be followed in connection with the procurement of

COMELEC space. The OSG further maintains that Section 8 of the

resolution is a permissible exercise of the power of supervision or

regulation of the COMELEC over the communication and

information operations of print media enterprises during the election

period to safeguard and ensure the fair, impartial and credible

election.

During the oral hearing, the COMELEC clarified that the resolution

and the letter directives were not intended to compel those

members to supply COMELEC with free print space, rather, they were

merely designed to solicit from the publishers the same free print

space which many publishers had voluntarily given to the COMELEC

during the 1992 elections.

On 5 May 1995, the Court received from the Office of the Solicitor

General a manifestation which attached a copy of COMELEC

Resolution No. 2772-A dated 4 May 1995 which clarified the

previously issued resolution.

Issue: Whether or not Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 constitutes a

valid exercise of power of eminent domain.

Held: No. Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 is unconstitutional.

Ruling:

The power of eminent domain is one of the fundamental and

eminent powers of the State. Power of eminent domain is usually

understood to be the ultimate right of the sovereign to appropriate,

not only public but private property of all citizens within the territorial

sovereignty, to public purpose. Eminent domain is the act in which

property can be seized from a citizen with due compensation. In

other words, the state can take over someone's land if they give a

monetary compensation, as long as there is a true reason for such an

action.

The threshold requisites for a lawful taking of private property for

public use need to be examined here: one is the necessity for the

taking; another is the legal authority to effect the taking. The element

of necessity for the taking has not been shown by respondent

Comelec. It has not been suggested that the members of PPI are

unwilling to sell print space at their normal rates to Comelec for

election purposes. Indeed, the unwillingness or reluctance of

Comelec to buy print space lies at the heart of the

problem. 3Similarly, it has not been suggested, let alone

demonstrated, that Comelec has been granted the power of

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eminent domain either by the Constitution or by the legislative

authority. A reasonable relationship between that power and the

enforcement and administration of election laws by Comelec must

be shown; it is not casually to be assumed.

The taking of a private property for public use is authorized by the

Constitution, but not without payment of just compensation. And

apparently the necessity of paying compensation for "Comelec

space" is precisely what is sought to be avoided by respondent

Commission, whether Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 is read as

petitioner PPI reads it, as an assertion of authority to require

newspaper publishers to "donate" free print space for Comelec

purposes, or as an exhortation, or perhaps an appeal, to publishers to

donate free print space, as Section 1 of Resolution No. 2772-A

attempts to suggest. There is nothing at all to prevent newspaper

and magazine publishers from voluntarily giving free print space to

Comelec for the purposes contemplated in Resolution No. 2772.

Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 does not, however, provide a

constitutional basis for compelling publishers, against their will, in the

kind of factual context here present, to provide free print space for

Comelec purposes. Section 2 does not constitute a valid exercise of

the power of eminent domain.

As for Section 8 of Resolution No. 2772, the Court ruled that the issue

on its constitutionality is not yet ripe for judicial review for lack of

actual case or controversy.

Telecom v. COMELEC

By BonChe Verana Quibo in 1st yr 2nd Sem CASE DIGEST POOL · Edit

Doc · Delete

TELECOM v. COMELEC

FACTS: Petitioners Telebab and GMA Network incorporated are

questioning the validity of Section 92, B.P No 881 the Omnibus

Election Code with respect to broadcast media.

SEC. 90. Comelec space. - The Commission shall procure space in at

least one newspaper of general circulation in every province or

city: Provided, however, That in the absence of said newspaper,

publication shall be done in any other magazine or periodical in said

province or city, which shall be known as “Comelec Space” wherein

candidates can announce their candidacy. Said space shall be

allocated, free of charge, equally and impartially by the Commission

among all candidates within the area in which the newspaper is

circulated. (print ads)

SEC. 92. Comelec time. - The Commission shall procure radio and

television time to be known as “Comelec Time” which shall be

allocated equally and impartially among the candidates within the

area of coverage of all radio and television stations. For this purpose,

the franchise of all radio broadcasting and television stations are

hereby amended so as to provide radio or television time, free of

charge, during the period of the campaign. (tv air time)

Petitioners claim that such provision of the Omnibus Election Code

takes property without due process of law; that it violates the

eminent domain clause of the Constitution which provides for the

payment of just compensation; that it denies broadcast media the

equal protection of the laws; and that, in any event, it violates the

terms of the franchise of petitioner GMA Network, Inc. Petitioners

contend that §92 of BP Blg. 881 violates the due process

clause[6] and the eminent domain provision[7] of the Constitution by

taking air time from radio and television broadcasting stations

without payment of just compensation. Petitioners claim that the

primary source of revenue of the radio and television stations is the

sale of air time to advertisers and that to require these stations to

provide free air time is to authorize a taking which is not ―a de

minimis temporary limitation or restraint upon the use of private

property.‖

Question on Standing: Telebab has no standing, GMA has. GMA as a

broadcasting network, directly suffers loss as part of the effects of

Section 92.

ISSUE: Whether there is property taken by the government in

implementing Section 92 of B.P 881

RULING: In truth, radio and television broadcasting companies, which

are given franchises, do not own the airwaves and frequencies

through which they transmit broadcast signals and images. They are

merely given the temporary privilege of using them. Since a

franchise is a mere privilege, the exercise of the privilege may

reasonably be burdened with the performance by the grantee of

some form of public service. In the granting of the privilege to

operate broadcast stations and thereafter supervising radio and

television stations, the state spends considerable public funds in

licensing and supervising such stations. It would be strange if it

cannot even require the licensees to render public service by giving

free air time.

The claim that petitioner would be losing P52,380,000 in

unrealized revenue from advertising is based on the assumption that

air time is ―finished product‖ which, it is said, become the property of

the company, like oil produced from refining or similar natural

resources after undergoing a process for their production. But air

time is not owned by broadcast companies. As held in Red Lion

Broadcasting Co. v. F.C.C.,[ which upheld the right of a party

personally attacked to reply, ―licenses to broadcast do not confer

ownership of designated frequencies, but only the temporary

privilege of using them.‖ Consequently, ―a license permits

broadcasting, but the licensee has no constitutional right to be the

one who holds the license or to monopolize a radio frequency to the

exclusion of his fellow citizens. There is nothing in the First

Amendment which prevents the Government from requiring a

licensee to share his frequency with others and to conduct himself as

a proxy or fiduciary with obligations to present those views and

voices which are representative of his community and which would

otherwise, by necessity, be barred from the airwaves.‖As radio and

television broadcast stations do not own the airwaves, no private

property is taken by the requirement that they provide air time to the

COMELEC.

It is noteworthy that §49 of R.A. No. 6388, from which §92 of B.P. Blg.

881 was taken, expressly provided that the COMELEC Time should

―be considered as part of the public service time said stations are

required to furnish the Government for the dissemination of public

information and education under their respective franchises or

permits.‖ There is no reason to suppose that §92 of B.P. Blg. 881

considers the COMELEC Time therein provided to be otherwise than

as a public service which petitioner is required to render under §4 of

its charter (R.A. No. 7252). In sum, B.P. Blg. 881, §92 is not an invalid

amendment of petitioner‘s franchise but the enforcement of a duty

voluntarily assumed by petitioner in accepting a public grant of

privilege.

Regulation of the broadcast industry requires spending of

public funds which it does not do in the case of print media. As radio

and television broadcast stations do not own the airwaves, no private

property is taken by the requirement that they provide airtime to the

COMELEC.

To affirm the validity of §92, therefore, is likewise to uphold the

people‘s right to information on matters of public concern. The use of

property bears a social function and is subject to the state‘s duty to

intervene for the common good. Broadcast media can find their just

and highest reward in the fact that whatever altruistic service they

may render in connection with the holding of elections is for that

common good.

For the foregoing reasons, the petition is dismissed.

17 Estate of Suguitan v City – Sagarino

SC 3rd DIVISION

G.R. No. 135087 March 14, 2000

HEIRS OF ALBERTO SUGUITAN, petitioner,

vs. CITY OF MANDALUYONG, respondent.

D E C I S I O N

GONZAGA-REYES, J.:

FACTS:

In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioners prayed for the

reversal of RTC Pasig‘s Order that (1) declared that the City of

Mandaluyong has a lawful right to take the subject parcel of land

together with existing improvements thereon (TCT No. 56264 Registry

of Deeds, Metro Manila District II) for the public use or purpose upon

payment of just compensation, and (2) directed the parties to submit

to the Court within fifteen (15) days from notice hereof, a list of

independent appraisers from which the Court will select three (3) to

be appointed as Commissioners.

· October 13, 1994 – the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Mandaluyong

City issued a RESOLUTIONauthorizing then Mayor Benjamin B. Abalos

to institute expropriation proceedings over the property of Alberto

Suguitan located at Boni Avenue and Sto. Rosario streets in

Mandaluyong City with an area of 414 square meters and more

particularly described under Transfer Certificate of Title No. 56264 of

the Registry of Deeds of Metro Manila District II. The intended purpose

of the expropriation was the expansion of the Mandaluyong Medical

Center.

· January 20, 1995 – Mayor Benjamin Abalos wrote Alberto Suguitan a

letter dated offering to buy his property, but Suguitan refused to sell.

· March 13, 1995 – the City of Mandaluyong filed a complaint for

expropriation with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig.

Suguitan filed a motion to dismiss the complaint based on the

following grounds —

(1) the power of eminent domain is not being exercised in

accordance with law;

(2) there is no public necessity to warrant expropriation of subject

property;

(3) the City of Mandaluyong seeks to expropriate the said property

without payment of just compensation;

(4) the City of Mandaluyong has no budget and appropriation for

the payment of the property being expropriated; and

(5) expropriation of Suguitan's property is but a ploy of Mayor

Benjamin Abalos to acquire the same for his personal use.

· October 24, 1995 – the trial court denied Suguitan's motion to

dismiss.

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· November 14, 1995 – the trial court issued an order allowing the City

of Mandaluyong to take immediate possession of Suguitan's property

upon the DEPOSIT of P621,000 representing 15% of the fair market

value of the subject property based upon the current tax declaration

of such property.

· December 15, 1995 – the City of Mandaluyong assumed possession

of the subject property by virtue of a writ of possession issued by the

trial court on December 14, 1995.

· July 28, 1998 – the court granted the assailed order

of EXPROPRIATION.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the City of Mandaluyong must exercise its delegated

power of eminent domain by means of an ORDINANCE as required

by §19 RA 7160, and not by means of a mere RESOLUTION.

HELD:

A. EMINENT DOMAIN

Eminent domain is the right or power of a sovereign state to

appropriate private property to particular uses to promote public

welfare. It is an indispensable attribute of sovereignty; a power

grounded in the primary duty of government to serve the common

need and advance the general welfare. Thus, the right of eminent

domain appertains to every independent government without the

necessity for constitutional recognition. The provisions found in

modern constitutions of civilized countries relating to the taking of

property for the public use do not by implication grant the power to

the government, but limit a power which would otherwise be without

limit. Thus, our own Constitution provides that "private property shall

not be taken for public use without just compensation." Furthermore,

the due process and equal protection clauses act as additional

safeguards against the arbitrary exercise of this governmental power.

The power of eminent domain is essentially legislative in nature. It is

firmly settled, however, that such power may be validly delegated to

local government units, other public entities and public utilities,

although the scope of this delegated legislative power is necessarily

narrower than that of the delegating authority and may only be

exercised in strict compliance with the terms of the delegating law.

The basis for the exercise of the power of eminent domain by local

government units is §19 of RA 7160 which provides that:

A local government unit may, through its chief executive and acting

pursuant to an ORDINANCE, exercise the power of eminent domain

for public use, purpose, or welfare for the benefits of the poor and

the landless, upon payment of just compensation, pursuant to the

provisions of the Constitution and pertinent laws; Provided, however,

That the power of eminent domain may not be exercised unless a

valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner, and

such offer was not accepted; Provided,further, That the local

government unit may immediately take possession of the

property upon the filing of the expropriation proceedings and upon

making a deposit with the proper court of at least fifteen percent

(15%) of the fair market value of the property based on the current

tax declaration of the property to be expropriated; Provided, finally,

That the amount to be paid for the expropriated property shall be

determined by the proper court, based on the fair market value at

the time of the taking of the property.

B. ORDINANCE vs RESOLUTION

Despite the existence of this legislative grant in favor of local

governments, it is still the duty of the courts to determine whether the

power of eminent domain is being exercised in accordance with the

delegating law. The courts have the obligation to determine whether

the following requisites have been complied with by the LGU

concerned:

1. An ORDINANCE is enacted by the local legislative council

authorizing the local chief executive, in behalf of the LGU, to exercise

the power of eminent domain or pursue expropriation proceedings

over a particular private property.

2. The power of eminent domain is exercised for public use, purpose

or welfare, or for the benefit of the poor and the landless.

3. There is payment of just compensation, as required under Section

9, Article III of the Constitution, and other pertinent laws.

4. A valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner

of the property sought to be expropriated, but said offer was not

accepted.

An ordinance is a law, but a resolution is merely a declaration of the

sentiment or opinion of a lawmaking body on a specific matter. An

ordinance possesses a general and permanent character, but a

resolution is temporary in nature. Additionally, the two are enacted

differently — a third reading is necessary for an ordinance, but not for

a resolution, unless decided otherwise by a majority of all the

Sanggunian members.

An examination of the applicable law will show that

an ORDINANCE is necessary to authorize the filing of a complaint with

the proper court since, beginning at this point, the power of eminent

domain is already being exercised.

C. EXPROPRIATION PROCEEDING

Rule 67 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court reveals that expropriation

proceedings are comprised of two stages:

(1) the first is concerned with the determination of the authority of the

plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain and the propriety

of its exercise in the context of the facts involved in the suit; it ends

with an order, if not in a dismissal of the action, of condemnation

declaring that the plaintiff has a lawful right to take the property

sought to be condemned, for the public use or purpose described in

the complaint, upon the payment of just compensation to be

determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint;

(2) the second phase is concerned with the determination by the

court of the just compensationfor the property sought to be taken;

this is done by the court with the assistance of not more than three

(3) commissioners.

D. IRR (Implementing Rules and Regulations) OF EMINENT DOMAIN

Article 36 (a), Rule VI of the IRR (of Eminent Domain) which provides

that:

If the LGU fails to acquire a private property for public use, purpose,

or welfare through purchase, LGU may expropriate said property

through a resolution of the Sanggunian authorizing its (local) chief

executive to initiate expropriation proceedings.

§19 of RA 7160 prevails over IRR which merely seeks to implement it. It

is axiomatic that the clear letter of the law is controlling and cannot

be amended by a mere administrative rule issued for its

implementation. Besides, what the discrepancy seems to indicate is

a mere oversight in the wording of the implementing rules, since

Article 32, Rule VI of IRR, also requires that, in exercising the power of

eminent domain, the chief executive of the LGU must act pursuant to

an ordinance. SC cannot grant judicial sanction to a local

government unit's exercise of its delegated power of eminent

domain in contravention of the very law giving it such power.

However, SC ruling in this case does not preclude the City of

Mandaluyong from enacting the necessary ordinance and

thereafter reinstituting expropriation proceedings, for so long as it has

complied with all other legal requirements.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The July 28, 1998

decision of Branch 155 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig in SCA No.

875 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

18 ESTATE vs. CITY OF MANILA

By Bembem Sarno in 1st yr 2nd Sem CASE DIGEST POOL · Edit

Doc · Delete

FACTS:Jose B. L. Reyes and petitioners Heirs of Edmundo Reyes are

the pro-indiviso co-owners in equal proportion of 11 parcels of land

situated at Sta. Cruz District, Manila. These parcels of land are being

occupied and leased by different tenants, among whom are

respondents Abiog, Maglonso and members of respondent

Sampaguita Bisig ng Magkakapitbahay, Incorporated (SBMI). On

November 9, 1993 and May 26, 1994, respectively, they filed

ejectment complaints against respondents Rosario Abiog and

Angelina Maglonso, among others. Upon his death, Jose B.L. Reyes

was substituted by his heirs. Petitioners obtained favorable judgments

against said respondents. Respondents Abiog and Maglonso

appealed to the RTC and to the CA but both appeals were denied.

As no appeals were further taken, the judgments of eviction against

respondents Abiog and Maglonso became final and executory in

1998.

Meanwhile, during the pendency of the two ejectment cases

against respondents Abiog and Maglonso,respondent City filed a

complaint for eminent domain (expropriation)]of the properties of

petitioners. The properties sought to be acquired by the City

included parcels of land occupied by respondents Abiog, Maglonso

and members of respondent SBMI. The complaint was based

on Ordinance No. 7818 enacted on November 29, 1993 authorizing

the City Mayor of Manila to expropriate certain parcels of land.

According to the ordinance, the said properties were to be

distributed to the intended beneficiaries, who were ―the occupants

of the said parcels of land who (had) been occupying the said lands

as lessees or any term thereof for a period of at least 10 years.‖

Thus, respondent City thru City Legal Officer Angel Aguirre, Jr. sent

the petitioners a written offer to purchase the subject properties

forP10,285,293.38 but the same was rejected. Respondent City

prayed that an order be issued fixing the provisional value of the

property in the amount of P9,684,380 based on the current tax

declaration of the real properties and that it be authorized to enter

and take possession thereof upon the deposit with the trial court of

the amount of P1,452,657 or 15% of the aforesaid value.

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On May 15, 1995, respondent SBMI, a registered non-stock

corporation composed of the residents of the subject properties

(including as well as representing herein respondents Abiog and

Maglonso), filed a motion for intervention and admission of their

attached complaint with prayer for injunction. Respondent SBMI

alleged that it had a legal interest over the subject matter of the

litigation as its members were the lawful beneficiaries of the subject

matter of the case. It prayed for the issuance of a temporary

restraining order to enjoin the petitioners from ousting the occupants

of the subject properties. The trial court denied the motion for

intervention in an order on the ground that ―the movants’ interest

(was) indirect, contingent, remote, conjectual (sic), consequential

(sic) and collateral. At the very least, it (was), if it (existed) at all,

purely inchoate, or in sheer expectancy of a right that may or may

not be granted.”

On the day SBMI‘s motion for intervention was denied, petitioners

filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for eminent domain for lack of

merit.

On June 6, 1995, the trial court allowed respondent City to take

possession of the subject property upon deposit of the amount

of P1,542,793, based on the P10,285,293.38 offer by respondent City

to petitioners which the trial court fixed as the provisional amount of the subject properties. On October 3, 1995, the City’s complaint for

eminent domain was dismissed.[15] The trial court held that

expropriation was inappropriate because herein petitioners were in

fact willing to sell the subject properties under terms acceptable to the purchaser. Moreover, respondent City failed to show that its offer

was rejected by petitioners. Respondent City’s motion for

reconsideration was denied.

However, on January 27, 1998, the Court of Appeals rendered the

assailed decision reversing the trial court judgment and upholding as

valid respondent City‘s exercise of its power of eminent domain over

petitioners‘ properties.

There can be no interpretation of the letter of the defendant-

appellee other than that the valid and definite offer of the plaintiff-

appellant to purchase the subject property was not accepted or

turned down. The lower court held that the defendants-appellees

were actually willing to sell, in fact, some of the tenants have already

purchased the land that they occupy. However, we agree with the

plaintiff-appellant that the contracts entered into by the defendants-

appellees with some of the tenants do not affect the offer it made.

The plaintiff-appellant was not a party in those transactions and as

pointed out, its concern is the majority of those who have no means

to provide themselves with decent homes to live on.

What followed were incidents leading to the filing of the petition

for certiorari against the resolution of the Court of Appeals which

essentially sought to enjoin the petitioners from enforcing the final

judgments against respondents Abiog, Maglonso and SBMI

(hereinafter, respondent occupants) in the ejectment cases.

Maglonso filed for a protective order but was not granted.

Thgereafter, SBMI sought for the same o stop the execution of the

final and executory judgments in the ejectment cases against them.

On September 4, 1998, petitioners filed a motion to set aside as

ineffective and/or null and void the said August 19, 1998 resolution.

But the Court of Appeals denied the same enjoining JBL and herein

petitioners from disturbing the physical possession of all the properties

subject of the expropriation proceedings. On 27 January 1998, we held that the plaintiff-appellant validly

exercised its power of eminent domain and consequently may

expropriate the subject property upon payment of just

compensation. The record before us shows that on 6 June 1995, the

lower court allowed the plaintiff-appellant to take possession of the

subject property upon filing of P1,542,793.00 deposit. The property to

be expropriated includes the same properties subject of the

ejectment cases against the intervenors. There is nothing in the

record that would show that the order of possession was ever set

aside or the deposit returned to the plaintiff-appellant. in insisting

that its offer was valid and that the amount it deposited was

sufficient, respondent City reiterates the reasons cited by the Court of

Appeals. According to respondent City, there is nothing in the Local

Government Code of 1991 which requires the offer to be made

before enacting an enabling ordinance. The actual exercise of the

power of eminent domain begins only upon the filing of the

complaint for eminent domain with the RTC by the Chief Executive

and not when an ordinance pursuant thereto has been enacted. It is

therefore safe to say that the offer to purchase can be made before

the actual filing of the complaint, whether that is before or after the

ordinance is enacted.

ISSUE: WON the respondent cuty may legally expropriate the subject

properties

HELD: Whether respondent City deprived petitioners of their property

without due process of law depends on whether the City complied

with the legal requirements for expropriation. Before respondent City

can exercise its power of eminent domain, the same must be

sanctioned and must not violate any law. Being a mere creation of

the legislature, a local government unit can only exercise powers

granted to it by the legislature. Such is the nature of the constitutional

power of control of Congress over local government units, the latter

being mere creations of the former.

When it expropriated the subject properties, respondent City relied

on its powers granted by Section 19 of the Local Government Code

of 1991]and RA 409 (The Revised Charter of the City of Manila). The

latter specifically gives respondent City the power to expropriate

private property in the pursuit of its urban land reform and housing

program.]Respondent City, however, is also mandated to follow the

conditions and standards prescribed by RA 7279 (the Urban

Development and Housing Act of 1992), the law governing the

expropriation of property for urban land reform and housing. Sections

9 and 10 of RA 7279 specifically provide that:

Sec. 9. Priorities in the acquisition of Land – Lands for socialized

housing shall be acquired in the following order:

(a) Those owned by the Government or any of its sub-divisions,

instrumentalities, or agencies, including government-owned or –

controlled corporations and their subsidiaries; (b) Alienable lands

of the public domain; (c) Unregistered or abandoned and idle

lands; (d) Those within the declared Areas of Priority Development,

Zonal Improvement sites, and Slum Improvement and Resettlement

Program sites which have not yet been acquired; (e) Bagong

Lipunan Improvement sites and Services or BLISS sites which have not

yet been acquired; and (f) Privately-owned lands.

Where on-site development is found more practicable and

advantageous to the beneficiaries, the priorities mentioned in this

section shall not apply. The local government units shall give

budgetary priority to on-site development of government lands.

Sec. 10. Modes of Land Acquisition. – The modes of acquiring lands

for purposes of this Act shall include, among others, community

mortgage, land swapping, land assembly or consolidation, land

banking, donation to the Government, joint venture agreement,

negotiated purchase, and expropriation: Provided, however, That

expropriation shall be resorted to only when other modes of

acquisition have been exhausted: Provided further, That where

expropriation is resorted to, parcels of land owned by small property

owners shall be exempted for purposes of this Act: Provided, finally,

that abandoned property, as herein defined, shall be reverted and

escheated to the State in a proceeding analogous to the procedure

laid down in Rule 91 of the Rules of Court. [italics supplied]

In Filstream vs. Court of Appeals,]we held that the above-quoted

provisions are limitations to the exercise of the power of eminent

domain, specially with respect to the order of priority in acquiring

private lands and in resorting to expropriation proceedings as a

means to acquire the same. Private lands rank last in the order of

priority for purposes of socialized housing. In the same vein,

expropriation proceedings are to be resorted to only after the other

modes of acquisition have been exhausted. Compliance with these

conditions is mandatory because these are the only safeguards of

oftentimes helpless owners of private property against violation of

due process when their property is forcibly taken from them for public

use.

We find that herein respondent City failed to prove strict compliance

with the requirements of Sections 9 and 10 of RA 7279. Respondent

City neither alleged in its complaint nor proved during the

proceedings before the trial court that it complied with said

requirements. Even in the Court of Appeals, respondent City in its

pleadings failed to show its compliance with the law. The Court of

Appeals was likewise silent on this specific jurisdictional issue. This is a

clear violation of the right to due process of the petitioners.

We also take note of the fact that Filstream is substantially similar in

facts and issues to the case at bar.

In that case, Filstream acquired a favorable judgment of eviction

against the occupants of its properties in Tondo, Manila. But prior

thereto, on the strength of Ordinance 7818 (the same ordinance

used by herein respondent City as basis to file the complaint for

eminent domain), respondent City initiated a complaint for

expropriation of Filstream‘s properties in Tondo, Manila, for the

benefit of the residents thereof. Filstream filed a motion to dismiss and

the City opposed the same. The trial court denied the motion. When

the judgment in the ejectment case became final, Filstream was

able to obtain a writ of execution and demolition. It thereafter filed a

motion to dismiss the expropriation complaint but the trial court

denied the same and ordered the condemnation of the subject

properties. On appeal, the Court of Appeals denied Filstream‘s

petition on a technical ground. Thus, the case was elevated to this

Court for review of the power of the City to expropriate the

Filstream‘s properties.

Meanwhile, the occupants and respondent City filed in separate

branches of the RTC of Manila several petitions for certiorari with

prayer for injunction to prevent the execution of the judgments in the

ejectment cases. After the consolidation of the petitions for certiorari,

the designated branch of RTC Manila dismissed the cases on the

ground of forum-shopping. The dismissal was appealed to the Court

of Appeals which reversed the trial court‘s dismissal and granted

respondent‘s prayer for injunction. Filstream appealed the same to

this Court, which appeal was consolidated with the earlier petition for

review of the decision of the Court of Appeals in the main

expropriation case.

Due to the substantial resemblance of the facts and issues of the

case at bar to those in Filstream, we find no reason to depart from

our ruling in said case. To quote:

The propriety of the issuance of the restraining order and the writ of

preliminary injunction is but a mere incident to the actual controversy

which is rooted in the assertion of the conflicting rights of the parties

in this case over the disputed premises. In order to determine

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whether private respondents are entitled to the injunctive reliefs

granted by respondent CA, we deemed it proper to extract the

source of discord.

Due to the fatal infirmity in the City‘s exercise of the power of

eminent domain, its complaint for expropriation must necessarily fail.

Considering that the consolidated cases before us can be

completely resolved by the application of our Filstream ruling, it is

needless to discuss the constitutionality of Ordinance 7818. We herein

apply the general precept that constitutional issues will not be

passed upon if the case can be decided on other grounds.

In view of the dismissal of the complaint for expropriation and the

favorable adjudication of petitioners‘ appeal from the decision of

the Court of Appeals on the expropriation of the subject properties,

the petition for certiorari questioning the validity of the Court of

Appeals resolutions (allowing respondent occupants to intervene

and granting their motion to enjoin the execution of the executory

judgments in the ejectment cases) becomes moot and academic.

19 MCWD v J. Kings & Sons

By Mac-mac Sinsona in 1st yr 2nd Sem CASE DIGEST POOL · Edit

Doc · Delete

19 MCWD v J. Kings & Sons

Facts: - Petitioner Metropolitan Cebu Water District is a government-

owned and controlled corporation created pursuant to Presidential

Decree No. 198, as amended. Among its purposes are to acquire,

install, improve, maintain and operate water supply and distribution

systems within the boundaries of the District.

- Petitioner wanted to acquire a five square meter lot occupied by its

production well. The lot is part of respondent‘s property covered by

TCT No. 168605 and located in Banilad, Cebu City.

- Petitioner initiated negotiations with respondent J. King and Sons

Company, Inc. for the voluntary sale of the latter‘s property.

Respondent did not acquiesce to petitioner‘s proposal.

- After the negotiations had failed, petitioner pursuant to its charter

initiated

expropriation proceedings through Board Resolution No. 015-20049

which was duly approved by the Local Water Utilities Administration

(LWUA).

- November 10, 2004, petitioner filed a complaint to expropriate the

five square meter portion of respondent‘s property.

- February 7, 2005, petitioner filed a motion for the issuance of a writ

of possession. Petitioner deposited with the Clerk of Court the

amount of P17,500.00 equivalent to one hundred percent of the

current zonal value of the property which the Bureau of Internal

Revenue had pegged at P3,500.00 per square meter. The trial court

granted the motion and issued the writ of possession. Respondent

moved for reconsideration but the motion was denied.

- Respondent filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with the

Court of Appeals. It sought the issuance of a temporary restraining

order (TRO) which the Court of Appeals granted. Thus, petitioner was

not able to gain entry to the lot.

- July 26, 2006, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed decision

granting respondent‘s petition. It ruled that the board resolution

which authorized the filing of the expropriation complaint lacked

exactitude and particularity which made it invalid; that there was no

genuine necessity for the expropriation of the five square meter lot

and; that the reliance on Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8974 in fixing the

value of the property contravenes the judicial determination of just

compensation. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but the motion

was rejected.

Issue(topic - eminent domain): Whether or not petitioner may

exercise the power of eminent domain.

Held: Yes!

- Eminent domain is the right of the state to acquire private property

for public use upon payment of just compensation. The power of

eminent domain is inseparable in sovereignty being essential to the

existence of the State and inherent in government. Its exercise is

proscribed by only two Constitutional requirements: first, that there

must be just compensation, and second, that no person shall be

deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law.

- As an inherent sovereign prerogative, the power to expropriate

pertains to the legislature. However, Congress may, as in fact it often

does, delegate the exercise of the power to government agencies,

public officials and quasi-public entities. Petitioner is one of the

numerous government offices so empowered. Under its charter, P.D.

No. 198, as amended, petitioner is explicitly granted the power of

eminent domain.

- A corporation does not have powers beyond those expressly

conferred upon it by its enabling law. Petitioner‘s charter provides

that it has the powers, rights and privileges given to private

corporations under existing laws, in addition to the powers granted in

it. All the powers, privileges, and duties of the district shall be

exercised and performed by and through the board and that any

executive, administrative or ministerial power may be delegated and

redelegated by the board to any of its officers or agents for such

purpose. Being a corporation, petitioner can exercise its powers only

through its board of directors.

- For petitioner to exercise its power of eminent domain, two

requirements should be met, namely:first, its board of directors

passed a resolution authorizing the expropriation, and; second, the

exercise of the power of eminent domain was subjected to review by

the LWUA. In this case, petitioner‘s board of directors approved on

February 27, 2004, Board Resolution No. 015-200432 authorizing its

general manager to file expropriation and other cases. Moreover,

the LWUA did review and gave its stamp of approval to the filing of a

complaint for the expropriation of respondent‘s lot. Specifically, the

LWUA through its Administrator, Lorenzo H. Jamora, wrote petitioner‘s

manager, Armando H. Paredes, a letter dated February 28, 2005

authorizing petitioner to file the expropriation case "against the

owner of the five square meter portion of Lot No. 921-A covered by

TCT No. 168805, pursuant to Section 25 of P.D. No. 198, as amended."

- The letter not only explicitly debunks respondent‘s claim that there

was no authorization from LWUA but it also identifies the lot sought to

be expropriated with sufficient particularity.

It is settled that the validity of a complaint may be questioned

immediately upon its filing through a motion to dismiss or raised

thereafter as an affirmative defense. However, there is no need to

further belabor the issue since it is established that petitioner has the

legal capacity to institute the expropriation complaint.

- Anent the second issue involving the issuance of a writ of

possession, a discussion on the various stages in an expropriation

proceeding is necessary.

The general rule is that upon filing of the expropriation complaint, the

plaintiff has the right to take or enter into possession of the real

property involved if he deposits with the authorized government

depositary an amount equivalent to the assessed value of the

property for purposes of taxation. An exception to this procedure is

provided by R.A. No. 897434 . It requires the payment of one hundred

percent (100%) of the zonal value of the property to be expropriated

to entitle the plaintiff to a writ of possession.

- In an expropriation proceeding there are two stages, first, is the

determination of the validity of the expropriation, and second is the

determination of just compensation.

- Petitioner was supposed to tender the provisional payment directly

to respondent during a hearing which it had failed to attend.

Petitioner, then, deposited the provisional payment with the court.

The trial court did not commit an error in accepting the deposit and

in issuing the writ of possession. The deposit of the provisional amount

with the court is equivalent to payment.

- Section 4 of R.A. No. 8974 is emphatic to the effect that "upon

compliance with the guidelines…the court shall immediately issue to

the implementing agency an order to take possession of the

property and start the implementation of the project." Upon

compliance with the requirements, a petitioner in an expropriation

case…is entitled to a writ of possession as a matter of right and it

becomes the ministerial duty of the trial court to forthwith issue the

writ of possession. No hearing is required and the court neither

exercises its discretion or judgment in determining the amount of the

provisional value of the properties to be expropriated as the

legislature has fixed the amount under Section 4 of R.A. No. 8974.

- It is mandatory on the trial court‘s part to issue the writ of possession

and on the sheriff‘s part to deliver possession of respondent‘s

property to petitioner pursuant to the writ.

WHEREFORE, the Court of Appeals‘ Decision dated 26 July 2006 and

Resolution dated 28 September 2006 are REVERSED. The ORDERS of

the Regional Trial Court dated 01 April 2005 and 9 May 2005 are

hereby REINSTATED. The Regional Trial Court is further DIRECTED to

immediately REMIT the amount of P17,500.00 to respondent and to

REQUIRE the sheriff to implement the writ of possession. The case is

REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings.

20 Republic v de Castellvi - Solis

By Revelen Radam Solis in 1st yr 2nd Sem CASE DIGEST POOL · Edit

Doc · Delete

20 Republic v de Castellvi – Solis

G.R. No. L-20620 August 15, 1974

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant, vs.CARMEN M. VDA.

DE CASTELLVI, ET AL., defendants-appellees.

FACTS:

This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of

Pampanga in its Civil Case No. 1623, an expropriation proceeding.

The land owned by defendant-appellee, Carmen M. Vda. de

Castellvi, judicial administratrix of the estate of the late Alfonso de

Castellvi, was occupied by the Republic from July 1947 under a

contract of lease, which was renewed yearly. In 1956, before the

contract expires on June 30, plaintiff sought to renew it but

defendant refused. When the AFP, particularly the Philippine Air

Force, refused to vacate the lot owned by Castellvi after the

termination of the contract, the defendant informed the AFP,

through a letter to the Chief of Staff, that the heirs of the property

had decided not to renew the contract of lease of the property in

question because they have decided to subdivide the land to be

sold to the general public. Furthermore, she demanded that the

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property be vacated within 30 days from receipt of the letter and

that the property be returned in the same condition prior to the

occupancy of the AFP. The Chief of Staff refused alleging that it was

difficult for the Air Force to vacate the property since there are

permanent installations and other facilities erected and established

therein amounting to almost P500,000.00. It was also alleged that the

acquisition of property by means of expropriation proceedings is

subject to recommendation to the President.

The defendant brought the suit to the Court of First Instance of

Pampanga for the ejectment of the Philippine Air Force from their

land. While the ejectment case was pending, the Republic filed, on

June on June 26, 1959, a complaint for eminent domain against

Carmen vda, de Castellvi, and Maria Nieves Toledo Gozun, over two

parcels of land.

The Republic, among other things, alleged:

that the fair market value of the above-mentioned lands, according

to the Committee on Appraisal for the Province of Pampanga, was

not more than P2,000 per hectare, or a total market value of

P259,669.10;

and prayed (1) that the provisional value of the lands be fixed at

P259.669.10, that the court authorizes plaintiff to take immediate

possession of the lands upon deposit of that amount with the

Provincial Treasurer of Pampanga;

(2) that the court appoints three commissioners to ascertain and

report to the court the just compensation for the property sought to

be expropriated,

(3) and that the court issues thereafter a final order of

condemnation.

On June 29, 1959 the trial court issued an order fixing the provisional

value of the lands at P259,669.10.

After the Republic had deposited with the Provincial Treasurer of

Pampanga the amount of P259,669.10, the trial court ordered that

the Republic be placed in possession of the lands. The Republic was

actually placed in possession of the lands on August 10, 1959.

On November 4, 1959, the trial court authorized the Provincial

Treasurer of Pampanga to pay defendant Toledo-Gozun the sum of

P107,609.00 as provisional value of her lands. On May 16, 1960 the

trial Court authorized the Provincial Treasurer of Pampanga to pay

defendant Castellvi the amount of P151,859.80 as provisional value of

the land under her administration, and ordered said defendant to

deposit the amount with the Philippine National Bank under the

supervision of the Deputy Clerk of Court. In another order of May 16,

1960 the trial Court entered an order of condemnation.

After the parties-defendants and intervenors had filed their

respective memoranda, and the Republic, after several extensions of

time, had adopted as its memorandum its objections to the report of

the Commissioners, the trial court, on May 26, 1961, rendered its

decision, finding that the unanimous recommendation of the

commissioners of P10.00 per square meter for the 3 lots is fair and just;

and required the Republic to pay interests.

On June 21, 1961 the Republic filed a motion for a new trial and/or

reconsideration, upon the grounds of newly-discovered evidence,

that the decision was not supported by the evidence, and that the

decision was against the law, against which motion defendants

Castellvi and Toledo-Gozun filed their respective oppositions. On July

8, 1961 when the motion of the Republic for new trial and/or

reconsideration was called for hearing, the Republic filed a

supplemental motion for new trial upon the ground of additional

newly-discovered evidence. This motion for new trial and/or

reconsideration was denied by the court on July 12, 1961.

The Republic filed various ex-parte motions for extension of time

within which to file its record on appeal. The Republic's record on

appeal was finally submitted on December 6, 1961.

In December 1961, the trial court dismissed both appeals for having

been filed out of time. On January 11, 1962 the Republic filed a

"motion to strike out the order of December 27, 1961 and for

reconsideration", and subsequently an amended record on appeal,

against which motion the defendants Castellvi and Toledo-Gozun

filed their opposition. On July 26, 1962 the trial court issued an order,

stating that "in the interest of expediency, the questions raised may

be properly and finally determined by the Supreme Court," and at

the same time it ordered the Solicitor General to submit a record on

appeal containing copies of orders and pleadings specified therein.

In an order dated November 19, 1962, the trial court approved the

Republic's record on appeal as amended. Both Castellvi and

Toledo-Guzon did not insit on appeal.

ISSUE: Whether the ―taking‖ be reckoned from the year 1947 or 1959.

HELD: ―Taking‖ under the power of eminent domain may be defined

generally as entering upon private property for more than a

momentary period, and, under the warrant or color of legal

authority, devoting it to a public use, or otherwise informally

appropriating or injuriously affecting it in such a way as substantially

to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment

thereof.

A number of circumstances must be present in the "taking" of

property for purposes of eminent domain.

(1) The expropriator must enter a private property. This circumstance

is present in the instant case, when by virtue of the lease agreement

the Republic, through the AFP, took possession of the property of

Castellvi.

(2) the entrance into private property must be for more than a

momentary period. "Momentary" means, "lasting but a moment; of

but a moment's duration. The aforecited lease contract was for a

period of one year, renewable from year to year. The entry on the

property, under the lease, is temporary, and considered transitory.

The fact that the Republic, through the AFP, constructed some

installations of a permanent nature does not alter the fact that the

entry into the land was transitory, or intended to last a year, although

renewable from year to year by consent of 'The owner of the land‘.

(3) The entry into the property should be under warrant or color of

legal authority. This circumstance in the "taking" may be considered

as present in the instant case, because the Republic entered the

Castellvi property as lessee.

(4) The property must be devoted to a public use or otherwise

informally appropriated or injuriously affected. It may be conceded

that the circumstance of the property being devoted to public use is

present because the property was used by the air force of the AFP.

(5) The utilization of the property for public use must be in such a way

as to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment of

the property. In the instant case, the entry of the Republic into the

property and its utilization of the same for public use did not oust

Castellvi and deprive her of all beneficial enjoyment of the property.

Castellvi remained as owner, and was continuously recognized as

owner by the Republic, as shown by the renewal of the lease

contract from year to year, and by the provision in the lease

contract whereby the Republic undertook to return the property to

Castellvi when the lease was terminated. Neither was Castellvi

deprived of all the beneficial enjoyment of the property, because

the Republic was bound to pay, and had been paying, Castellvi the

agreed monthly rentals until the time when it filed the complaint for

eminent domain on June 26, 1959.

It is clear, therefore, that the "taking" of Catellvi's property for

purposes of eminent domain cannot be considered to have taken

place in 1947 when the Republic commenced to occupy the

property as lessee thereof. We find merit in the contention of Castellvi

that two essential elements in the "taking" of property under the

power of eminent domain, namely: (1) that the entrance and

occupation by the condemnor must be for a permanent, or

indefinite period, and (2) that in devoting the property to public use

the owner was ousted from the property and deprived of its

beneficial use, were not present when the Republic entered and

occupied the Castellvi property in 1947.

Under Section 4 of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, the ―just

compensation‖ is to be determined as of the date of the filing of the

complaint. This Court has ruled that when the taking of the property

sought to be expropriated coincides with the commencement of the

expropriation proceedings, or takes place subsequent to the filing of

the complaint for eminent domain, the just compensation should be

determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint. Herein, it is

undisputed that the Republic was placed in possession of the

Castellvi property, by authority of the court, on 10 August 1959.

The ―taking‖ of the Castellvi property for the purposes of determining

the just compensation to be paid must, therefore, be reckoned as of

26 June 1959 when the complaint for eminent domain was filed.

21 NPC v CA - Soriano

By Renie Jay Soriano in 1st yr 2nd Sem CASE DIGEST POOL · Edit

Doc · Delete

G.R. No. 113194 March 11, 1996

NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, petitioner,

vs.

COURT OF APPEALS and MACAPANTON

MANGONDATO, respondents.

Facts:

In 1978, National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR), took possession of

a 21, 995 sq.m land, a portion of Lot 1 of the subdivision plan situated

in Marawi City, owned by Mangondato, under the mistaken belief

that it forms part of the public land reserved for use of the NAPOCOR

for hydroelectric power purposes under Proclamation No. 1354 of the

President of the Philippines dated Dec. 3, 1974.

NAPOCOR alleged that the subject land was until then possessed

and administered by Marawi City so that in exchange for the city‘s

waiver and quitclaim of any right over the property, NAPOCOR had

paid the city a ―financial assistance‖ of P40.00 per sq.m.

Mangondato claimed that the subject land is his duly registered

private property and that he is not privy to any agreement between

NAPOCOR and Marawi City and that any payment to the city

cannot be considered as payment to him.

Later NAPOCOR acceded to the fact that the subject property

belongs to Mangondato.

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On July 13, 1990, NAPOCOR‘s National Power Board (NAPOCOR‘s

board) passed Resolution No. 90-225 resolving to pay Mangondato

P100.00 per sq.m for only a 12, 132 sq.m portion of the property plus

12% interest per annum from 1978. However, said resolution was

deferred to allow the NAPOCOR‘s regional legal counsel to

determine whether P100.00 per sq.m is the fair market value.

On August 14, 1990, NAPOCOR‘s board passed Resolution No. 90-316

resolving that Mangondato be paid the base price of P40.00 per

sq.m plus 12% from 1978 pending the determination whether P100.00

per sq.m is the fair market value.

NAPOCOR‘s regional legal counsel‘s findings state that

Mandondato‘s property is classified as industrial which has a fair

market value of P300.00 for those along the national highway and on

the basis of recent Supreme Court decisions, NAPOCOR has to pay

not less than P300.00 per sq.m. NAPOCOR‘s board on May 17, 1991

passed Resolution No. 91-247 resolving to pay Mangondato P100.00

per sq.m for the property excluding 12% interest per annum.

In a letter dated December 17, 1991 and February 4, 1992,

Mandondato disagreed with Resolution No. 91-247. At the same

time, to get partial payment, he asked that he be paid in the

meantime, P100.00 per sq.m without prejudice to pursuing his claim

for the proper and just compensation plus interest thereon.

On February 12, 1992, NAPOCOR‘s general counsel filed a

memorandum for its president finding no legal impediment if they, in

the meantime were to pay Mangondato P100.00 per sq.m without

prejudice to the final determination of the proper and just

compensation.

On March, 1991, the parties executed a Deed of Sale where

NAPOCOR paid Mangondato P100.00 per sq.m excluding interest

and without prejudice to Mandondato‘s pursuance of claims for just

compensation and interest.

In a letter dated April 20, 1992, Mangondato asked for the payment

of P300.00 per sq.m plus 12% interest per annum from 1978. However,

NAPOCOR‘s board passed Resolution No. 92-121 granting its

president the authority to negotiate for the payment of P100.00 per

sq.m for the land plus 12% interest per annum from 1978 less

payments already made.

On July 7, 1992, Mangondato filed before the lower court Civil case

against NAPOCOR seeking to recover the possession of the property

described in the complaint as Lots 1 and 3 of the subdivision plan,

the payment of a monthly rent of P15,000.00 from 1978 until the

surrender of the property, and other related costs.

On the other hand, NAPOCOR filed before the lower court a Civil

Case which is a Complaint for eminent domain against Mangondato

over the subject property.

Upon agreement of the parties, the two cases were ordered

consolidated and appointed Atty. Saipal Alawi representing the

lower court, Atty. Connie Doromal for NAPOCOR and Atty. Alimbsar

Ali from City Assessor‘s Office to ascertain and report to the court the

just compensation.

On July 28, 1992, Commissioner Doromal filed his report

recommending a fair market value of P300.00 per sq.m as of

November 23, 1978. On August 6, 1992, Commissioners Alawi and Ali

filed their joint report recommending a fair market value of P1000.00

per sq.m as of 1992.

After receiving the reports and comments from the parties, the court

denied Mangondato‘s request for recovery of possession of the

property but ordering NAPOCOR to pay monthly rent of P15,000.00

from 1978 up to July 1992 with 12% interest per annum and

condemning the property in favor of NAPOCOR effective July, 1992

upon payment of P1000.00 per sq.m as a just compensation.

Two issued raised by the petitioner:

1) THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN AFFIRMING THAT THE JUST

COMPENSATION FOR THE PROPERTY IS ITS VALUE IN 1992, WHEN THE

COMPLAINT WAS FILED, AND NOT ITS VALUE IN 1978, WHEN THE

PROPERTY WAS TAKEN BY PETITION.

2) THE COURT ERRED IN FIXING THE VALUE OF JUST COMPENSATION AT

P1,000.00 PER SQUARE METER INSTEAD OF P40.00 PER SQUARE METER.

Issues:

1) At what point in time should the value of the land subject of

expropriation be computed: at the date of ―taking‖ or the date of

filing of the complaint for eminent domain?

Side issue: When is there ―Taking‖ of Property?

2) What is the fair market value of the property?

Rulings:

1) The general rule in determining "just compensation" in eminent

domain is the value of the property as of the date of the filing of

complaint, as follows:

Sec. 4. Order of Condemnation. When such a motion is overruled or

when any party fails to defend as required by this rule, the court may

enter an order of condemnation declaring that the plaintiff has a

lawful right to take the property sought to be condemned, for the

public use or purpose described in the complaint, upon the payment

of just compensation to, be determined as of the date of the filing of

the complaint…

The general rule however, admits of an exception where this Court

fixed the value of the property as of the date it was taken and not at

the date of the commencement of the expropriation proceedings.

In Provincial Government of Rizal vs. Caro de Araullo, the Court ruled

that ". . . the owners of the land have no right to recover damages

for this unearned increment resulting from the construction of the

public improvement (lengthening of Taft Avenue from Manila to

Pasay) for which the land was taken. To permit them to do so would

be to allow them to recover more than the value of the land at the

time when it was taken, which is the true measure of the damages,

or just compensation, and would discourage the construction of

important public improvements."

Following the above doctrine, in the case of Municipality of La

Carlota vs. The Spouses Felicidad Baltazar and Vicente Gan, said, ". .

. the owner as is the constitutional intent, is paid what he is entitled to

according to the value of the property so devoted to public use as

of the date of the taking. From that time, he had been deprived

thereof. He had no choice but to submit. He is not, however, to be

despoiled of such a right. No less than the fundamental law

guarantee's just compensation. It would be an injustice to him

certainly if from such a period, he could not recover the value of

what was lost. There could be on the other hand, injustice to the

expropriator if by a delay in the collection; the increment in price

would accrue to the owner. The doctrine to which this Court has

been committed is intended precisely to avoid either contingency

fraught with unfairness."

Simply stated, the exception finds application where the owner

would be given undue incremental advantages arising from the use

to which the government devotes the property expropriated — as for

instance, the extension of a main thoroughfare as was the case in

Caro de Araullo. In the instant case, however, it is difficult to

conceive of how there could have been an extra-ordinary increase

in the value of the owner's land arising from the expropriation, as

indeed the records do not show any evidence that the valuation of

P1,000.00 reached in 1992 was due to increments directly caused by

petitioner's use of the land. Since the petitioner is claiming an

exception to Rule 67, Section 4, 17 it has the burden of proving its

claim that its occupancy and use — not ordinary inflation and

increase in land values — was the direct cause of the increase in

valuation from 1978 to 1992.

Side issue: This Court has defined the elements of ―taking‖ as the

main ingredient in the exercise of power of eminent domain, in the

following words:

A number of circumstances must be present in the "taking"

of property for purposes of eminent domain: (1) the expropriator

must enter a private property; (2) the entrance into private property

must be for more than a momentary period; (3) the entry into the

property should be under warrant or color of legal authority; (4) the

property must be devoted to a public use or otherwise informally

appropriated or injuriously affected; and (5) the utilization of the

property for public use must be in such a way to oust the owner and

deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment of the property.

In this case, the petitioner‘s entrance in 1978 was without intent to

expropriate or was not made under warrant or color of legal

authority, for it believed the property was public land covered by

Proclamation No. 1354.

2) The fair market value as held by the respondent court is the

amount of P1000.00 per sq.m. In an expropriation case where the

principal issue is the determination of just compensation, a trial

before the Commissioners is indispensable to allow the parties to

present the evidence on the issue of just compensation. Inasmuch as

determination of just compensation in eminent domain cases is a

judicial function and factual findings of the Court of Appeals are

conclusive on the parties and reviewable only when the case falls

within the recognized exceptions, which is not the situation in this

petition, we see no reason to disturb the factual findings as to

valuation of the subject property.

In sum, we agree with the Court of Appeals that petitioner has failed

to show why it should be granted an exemption from the general rule

in determining just compensation provided under Section 4 of Rule

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67. On the contrary, private respondent has convinced us that,

indeed, such general rule should in fact be observed in this case.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED and the judgment

appealed from AFFIRMED, except as to the interest on the monthly

rentals. which is hereby reduced from twelve percent to the legal

rate of six percent (6%)per annum. Costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

22- NPC v. Gutierrez 193 SCRA 1 (1991)

By Janina Marie Sto.Domingo in 1st yr 2nd Sem CASE DIGEST

POOL · Edit Doc · Delete

FACTS:

Plaintiff National Power Corporation, a government owned and

controlled entity, in accordance with Commonwealth Act No. 120, is

invested with the power of eminent domain for the purpose of

pursuing its objectives, which among others is the construction,

operation, and maintenance of electric transmission lines for

distribution throughout the Philippines. For the construction of its 230

KV Mexico-Limay transmission lines, plaintiff's lines have to pass the

lands belonging to defendants Matias Cruz, Heirs of Natalia Paule

and spouses Misericordia Gutierrez and Ricardo Malit covered by tax

declarations Nos. 907, 4281 and 7582, respectively.

Plaintiff initiated negotiations for the acquisition of right of way

easements over the aforementioned lots for the construction of its

transmission lines but unsuccessful in this regard, said corporation was

constrained to file eminent domain proceedings against the herein

defendants on January 20, 1965.

The only controversy existing between the parties litigants is the

reasonableness and adequacy of the disturbance or compensation

fee of the expropriated properties.

Meanwhile, for the purpose of determining the fair and just

compensation due the defendants, the court appointed three

commissioners, comprised of one representative of the plaintiff, one

for the defendants and the other from the court, who then were

empowered to receive evidence, conduct ocular inspection of the

premises, and thereafter, prepare their appraisals as to the fair and

just compensation to be paid to the owners of the lots.

ISSUE: WHETHER PETITIONER SHOULD BE MADE TO PAY SIMPLE

EASEMENT FEE OR FULL COMPENSATION FOR THE LAND TRAVERSED BY

ITS TRANSMISSION LINES.

RULING:

The Supreme Court, in Republic of the Philippines vs. PLDT, thus held

that:

Normally, of course, the power of eminent domain results in the

taking or appropriation of title to, and possession of, the expropriated

property; but no cogent reason appears why said power may not be

availed of to impose only a burden upon the owner of condemned

property, without loss of title and possession. It is unquestionable that

real property may, through expropriation, be subjected to an

easement of right-of-way.

In the case at bar, the easement of right-of-way is definitely a taking

under the power of eminent domain. Considering the nature and

effect of the installation of the 230 KV Mexico-Limay transmission

lines, the limitation imposed by NPC against the use of the land for an

indefinite period deprives private respondents of its ordinary use.

For these reasons, the owner of the property expropriated is entitled

to a just compensation, which should be neither more nor less,

whenever it is possible to make the assessment, than the money

equivalent of said property. Just compensation has always been

understood to be the just and complete equivalent of the loss which

the owner of the thing expropriated has to suffer by reason of the

expropriation. The price or value of the land and its character at the

time it was taken by the Government are the criteria for determining

just compensation.

Private respondents recognize the inherent power of eminent

domain being exercised by NPC when it finally consented to the

expropriation of the said portion of their land, subject however to

payment of just compensation. No matter how laudable NPC's

purpose is, for which expropriation was sought, it is just and equitable

that they be compensated the fair and full equivalent for the loss

sustained, which is the measure of the indemnity, not whatever gain

would accrue to the expropriating entity.

It appearing that the trial court did not act capriciously and

arbitrarily in setting the price of P5.00 per square meter of the

affected property, the said award is proper and not unreasonable.

On the issue of ownership being claimed by petitioner in the event

that the price of P5.00 per square meter be sustained, it is well settled

that an issue which has not been raised in the Court a quo cannot

be raised for the first time on appeal as it would be offensive to the

basic rules of fair play, justice and due process. Petitioner only sought

an easement of right-of-way, and as earlier discussed, the power of

eminent domain may be exercised although title was not transferred

to the expropriator.

23. NPC v. Ibrahim (2009) -Jennidy-

FACTS:

Lucman G. Ibrahim and his co-heirs Omar G. Maruhom, Elias G.

Maruhom, Bucay G. Maruhom, Mamod G. Maruhom, Farouk G.

Maruhom, Hidjara G. Maruhom, Rocania G. Maruhom, Potrisam G.

Maruhom, Lumba G. Maruhom, Sinab G. Maruhom, Acmad G.

Maruhom, Solayman G. Maruhom, Mohamad M. Ibrahim and

Cairoronesa M. Ibrahim (respondents) are owners of a 70,000-square

meter lot in Saduc, Marawi City. Sometime in 1978, NPC, without

respondents‘ knowledge and consent, took possession of the

subterranean area of the land and constructed therein underground

tunnels. The tunnels were used by NPC in siphoning the water of Lake

Lanao and in the operation of NPC‘s Agus II, III, IV, V, VI, and VII

projects located in Saguiran, Lanao del Sur; Nangca and Balo-i in

Lanao del Norte; and Ditucalan and Fuentes in Iligan City.

Respondents only discovered the existence of the tunnels sometime

in July 1992. Thus, on October 7, 1992, respondents demanded that

NPC pay damages and vacate the subterranean portion of the

land, but the demand was not heeded. Hence, on November 23,

1994, respondents instituted an action for recovery of possession of

land and damages against NPC with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of

Lanao del Sur, docketed as Civil Case No. 1298-94.

RTC

After trial, the RTC rendered a decision,2 the decretal portion of

which reads:

1. Denying [respondents‘] prayer for [NPC] to dismantle the

underground tunnels constructed beneath the lands of

[respondents] in Lots 1, 2, and 3 of Survey Plan FP (VII-5) 2278;

2. Ordering [NPC] to pay to [respondents] the fair market value of

said 70,000 square meters of land covering Lots 1, 2, and 3 as

described in Survey Plan FP (VII-5) 2278 less the area of 21,995 square

meters atP1,000.00 per square meter or a total of P48,005,000.00 for

the remaining unpaid portion of 48,005 square meters; with 6%

interest per annum from the filing of this case until paid;

3. Ordering [NPC] to pay [respondents] a reasonable monthly rental

of P0.68 per square meter of the total area of 48,005 square meters

effective from its occupancy of the foregoing area in 1978 or a total

of P7,050,974.40.

4. Ordering [NPC] to pay [respondents] the sum of P200,000.00 as

moral damages; and

5. Ordering [NPC] to pay the further sum of P200,000.00 as

attorney‘s fees and the costs

RTC modified its judgment hereby rendered:

1. Reducing the judgment award of [respondents] for the fair market

value of P48,005,000.00 by [P]9,526,000.00 or for a difference

[of] P38,479,000.00 and by the further sum of P33,603,500.00 subject

of the execution pending appeal leaving a difference of

[P]4,878,500.00 which may be the subject of execution upon the

finality of this modified judgment with 6% interest per annum from the

filing of the case until paid.

2. Awarding the sum of P1,476,911.00 to herein [respondents] Omar

G. Maruhom, Elias G. Maruhom, Bucay G. Maruhom, Mahmod G.

Maruhom, Farouk G. Maruhom, Hidjara G. Maruhom, Portrisam G.

Maruhom and Lumba G. Maruhom as reasonable rental deductible

from the awarded sum of P7,050,974.40 pertaining to [respondents].

3. Ordering [NPC] embodied in the August 7, 1996 decision to pay

[respondents] the sum of P200,000.00 as moral damages; and further

sum of P200,000.00 as attorney‘s fees and costs.

CA

Lucman Ibrahim and NPC then filed their separate appeals with the

CA, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 57792. On June 8, 2005, the CA

rendered a Decision,7 setting aside the modified judgment and

reinstating the original Decision, amending it further by deleting the

award of moral damages and reducing the amount of rentals and

attorney‘s fees.

To satisfy the judgment, respondents filed with the RTC a motion for

execution of its August 7, 1996 decision, as modified by the CA. On

November 13, 2007, the RTC granted the motion, and issued the

corresponding writ of execution. Subsequently, a notice of

garnishment was issued upon NPC‘s depositary bank.

On May 30, 2008, the CA rendered the now assailed

Decision,10 dismissing NPC‘s petition for certiorari. Rejecting NPC‘s

argument, the CA declared that this Court‘s Decision in G.R. No.

168732 intended NPC to pay the full value of the property as

compensation without ordering the transfer of respondents‘ title to

the land. According to the CA, in a plethora of cases involving lands

traversed by NPC’s transmission lines, it had been consistently ruled

that an easement is compensable by the full value of the property

despite the fact that NPC was only after a right-of-way easement, if

by such easement it perpetually or indefinitely deprives the land

owner of his proprietary rights by imposing restrictions on the use of

the property. The CA, therefore, ordered NPC to pay its admitted

obligation to respondents amounting to P36,219,887.20.11

SC

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NPC is now before us faulting the CA for dismissing the former‘s

petition for certiorari. It also prayed for a TRO to enjoin respondents

and all persons acting under their authority from implementing the

May 30, 2008 Decision of the CA. In its July 9, 2008 Resolution,12 this

Court granted NPC‘s prayer, and issued a TRO enjoining the

execution of the assailed CA Decision. In the main, NPC insists that

the payment of just compensation for the land carries with it the

correlative right to obtain title or ownership of the land taken. It

stresses that this Court’s Decision in G.R. No. 168732 is replete with

pronouncements that the just compensation awarded to respondents

corresponds to compensation for the entire land and not just for an

easement or a burden on the property, thereby necessitating a

transfer of title and ownership to NPC upon satisfaction of

judgment.NPC added that by granting respondents‘ motion for

execution, and consequently issuing the writ of execution and notice

of garnishment, the RTC and the CA allowed respondents to retain

title to the property even after the payment of full compensation.

This, according to NPC, was a clear case of unjust enrichment.

ISSUE: W/N the payment of just compensation for the land carries

with it the correlative right to obtain title or ownership of the land

taken.

HELD: NO!

[NPC], by its selective quotations from the Decision in G.R. No.

168732, would have Us suppose that the High Court, in decreeing

that [NPC] pay the full value of the property as just compensation,

implied that [NPC] was entitled to the entire land, including the

surface area and not just the subterranean portion. No such

inference can be drawn from [the] reading of the entirety of the High

Court‘s Decision. On the contrary, a perusal of the subject Decision

yields to this Court the unmistakable sense that the High Court

intended [NPC] to pay the full value of the subject property as just

compensation without ordering the transfer o[f] respondents’ title to

the land. This is patent from the following language of the High Court

as quoted by [NPC] itself:

In disregarding this procedure and failing to recognize respondents’

ownership of the sub-terrain portion, petitioner took a risk and

exposed itself to greater liability with the passage of time. It must be

emphasized that the acquisition of the easement is not without

expense. The underground tunnels impose limitations on

respondents’ use of the property for an indefinite period and deprive

them of its ordinary use. Based upon the foregoing, respondents are

clearly entitled to the payment of just compensation.

Notwithstanding the fact that [NPC] only occupies the sub-terrain

portion, it is liable to pay not merely an easement but rather the full

compensation for land. This is so because in this case, the nature of

the easement practically deprives the owners of its normal beneficial

use. Respondents, as the owners of the property thus expropriated,

are entitled to a just compensation which should be neither more nor

less, whenever it is possible to make the assessment, than the money

equivalent of said property.14

As we explained in Camarines Norte Electric Cooperative, Inc. v.

Court of Appeals:16

The acquisition of an easement of a right-of-way falls within the

purview of the power of eminent domain. Such conclusion finds

support in easements of right-of-way where the Supreme Court

sustained the award of just compensation for private property

condemned for public use.

The Supreme Court, in Republic v. PLDT thus held that:

"Normally, of course, the power of eminent domain results in the

taking or appropriation of title to, and possession of, the expropriated

property; but no cogent reason appears why said power may not be

availed of to impose only a burden upon the owner of condemned

property, without loss of title and possession. It is unquestionable that

real property may, through expropriation, be subjected to an easement of right-of-way." However, a simple right-of-way easement

transmits no rights, except the easement. Vines Realty retains full

ownership and it is not totally deprived of the use of the land. It can

continue doing what it wants to do with the land, except those that

would result in contact with the wires.1avvphi1

In Camarines Norte Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. Court of

Appeals19 and National Power Corporation v. Manubay Agro-

Industrial Development Corporation,20 this Court sustained the

award of just compensation equivalent to the fair and full value of

the property even if petitioners only sought the continuation of the

exercise of their right-of-way easement and not the ownership over

the land. There is simply no basis for NPC to claim that the payment

of fair market value without the concomitant transfer of title

constitutes an unjust enrichment.

24 NPC v IBRAHIM 2007 – Faizah Tejero Topic: What may be taken

This case is about plaintiffs Mr. Ibrahim and his co-heirs complaint

against NAPOCOR or the National Power Corporation. NAPOCOR

built underground tunnels under the parcels of land owned by the

plaintiffs without their knowledge and consent. One of the plaintiffs

was denied a permit to build a well because it is dangerous.

NAPOCOR argued that the subsoil is not part of the property of the

plaintiffs.

FACTS:

o On November 23, 1994, respondent Lucman G. Ibrahim, in his

personal capacity and in behalf of his co-heirs Omar G. Maruhom,

Elias G. Maruhom, and other Maruhoms, instituted an action against

petitioner National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR) for recovery of

possession of land and damages before the Regional Trial Court

(RTC) of Lanao del Sur.

o In their complaint, Ibrahim and his co-heirs claimed that they were

owners of several parcels of land described in Survey PlanFP (VII-5)

2278 consisting of 70,000 square meters, divided into three (3)

lots, i.e. Lots 1, 2, and 3 consisting of 31,894, 14,915, and 23,191 square

meters each respectively. Sometime in 1978, NAPOCOR, through

alleged stealth and without respondents’ knowledge and prior

consent, took possession of the sub-terrain area of their lands and

constructed therein underground tunnels. The existence of the tunnels

was only discovered sometime in July 1992 by respondents and then

later confirmed on November 13, 1992 by NAPOCOR itself through a

memorandum issued by the latter‘s Acting Assistant Project

Manager. The tunnels were apparently being used by NAPOCOR in

siphoning the water of Lake Lanao and in the operation of

NAPOCOR‘s Agus II, III, IV, V, VI, VII projects located in Saguiran,

Lanao del Sur; Nangca and Balo-i in Lanao del Norte; and Ditucalan

and Fuentes in Iligan City.

o On September 19, 1992, respondent Omar G. Maruhom requested

the Marawi City Water District for a permit to construct and/or install a

motorized deep well in Lot 3 located in Saduc, Marawi City but his

request was turned down because the construction of the deep well

would cause danger to lives and property. On October 7, 1992,

respondents demanded that NAPOCOR pay damages and vacate

the sub-terrain portion of their lands but the latter refused to vacate

much less pay damages. Respondents further averred that the

construction of the underground tunnels has endangered their lives

and properties as MarawiCity lies in an area of local volcanic and

tectonic activity. Further, these illegally constructed tunnels caused

them sleepless nights, serious anxiety and shock thereby entitling

them to recover moral damages and that by way of example for the

public good, NAPOCOR must be held liable for exemplary damages.

o The RTC ruled that the plaintiffs be given just compensation.

However, this first judgment of the RTC was modified as it gave

NAPOCOR the right to the parcels of land which the plaintiffs strongly

averred.

o The CA modified the RTC‘s ruling by deleting the moral damages

and reducing the attorney‘s fees.

1) Reducing the judgment award of plaintiffs for the fair market value

of P48,005,000.00 by 9,526,000.00 or for a difference byP38,479,000.00

and by the further sum of P33,603,500.00 subject of the execution

pending appeal leaving a difference of 4,878,500.00 which may be

the subject of execution upon the finality of this modified judgment

with 6% interest per annum from the filing of the case until paid.

2) Awarding the sum of P1,476,911.00 to herein petitioners Omar G.

Maruhom, Elias G. Maruhom, Bucay G. Maruhom, Mahmod G.

Maruhom, Farouk G. Maruhom, Hidjara G. Maruhom, Portrisam G.

Maruhom and Lumba G. Maruhom as reasonable rental deductible

from the awarded sum of P7,050,974.40 pertaining to plaintiffs.

o The case was elevated to the SC.

Ruling of Supreme Court:

This case revolves around the propriety of paying just compensation

to respondents, and, by extension, the basis for computing the same.

The threshold issue of whether respondents are entitled to just

compensation hinges upon who owns the sub-terrain area occupied

by petitioner.

o Petitioner maintains that the sub-terrain portion where the

underground tunnels were constructed does not belong to

respondents because, even conceding the fact that respondents

owned the property, their right to the subsoil of the same does not

extend beyond what is necessary to enable them to obtain all the

utility and convenience that such property can normally give. In any

case, petitioner asserts that respondents were still able to use the

subject property even with the existence of the tunnels, citing as an

example the fact that one of the respondents, Omar G. Maruhom,

had established his residence on a part of the property. Petitioner

concludes that the underground tunnels 115 meters below

respondents’ property could not have caused damage or prejudice

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to respondents and their claim to this effect was, therefore, purely

conjectural and speculative. The contention lacks merit.

o The jurisdiction of the Court in cases brought to it from the CA is

limited to reviewing and revising the errors of law imputed to it, its

findings of fact being as a rule conclusive and binding on the Court.

In the present case, petitioner failed to point to any evidence

demonstrating grave abuse of discretion on the part of the CA or to

any other circumstances which would call for the application of the

exceptions to the above rule.

o Consequently, the CA‘s findings which upheld those of the trial

court that respondents owned and possessed the property and that

its substrata was possessed by petitioner since 1978 for the

underground tunnels, cannot be disturbed. Moreover, the Court

sustains the finding of the lower courts that the sub-terrain portion of

the property similarly belongs to respondents. This conclusion is

drawn from Article 437 of the Civil Code which provides:

ART. 437. The owner of a parcel of land is the owner of its surface

and of everything under it, and he can construct thereon any works

or make any plantations and excavations which he may deem

proper, without detriment to servitudes and subject to special laws

and ordinances. He cannot complain of the reasonable

requirements of aerial navigation.

Thus, the ownership of land extends to the surface as well as to the

subsoil under it. In Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, the

Court of Appeals justified this by saying there is ―no conflict of

interest‖ between the owners of the surface rights and the owners of

the sub-surface rights. This is rather strange doctrine, for it is a well-

known principle that the owner of a piece of land has rights not only

to its surface but also to everything underneath and the airspace

above it up to a reasonable height.

In this regard, the trial court found that respondents could have dug

upon their property motorized deep wells but were prevented from

doing so by the authorities precisely because of the construction and

existence of the tunnels underneath the surface of their

property. Respondents, therefore, still had a legal interest in the sub-

terrain portion insofar as they could have excavated the same for

the construction of the deep well. The fact that they could not was

appreciated by the RTC as proof that the tunnels interfered with

respondents‘ enjoyment of their property and deprived them of its

full use and enjoyment, thus:

Has it deprived the plaintiffs of the use of their lands when from the

evidence they have already existing residential houses over said

tunnels and it was not shown that the tunnels either destroyed said

houses or disturb[ed] the possession thereof by plaintiffs? From the

evidence, an affirmative answer seems to be in order. The plaintiffs

and [their] co-heirs discovered [these] big underground tunnels in

1992. This was confirmed by the defendant on November 13, 1992 by

the Acting Assistant Project Manager, Agus 1 Hydro Electric Project

(Exh. K). On September 16, 1992, Atty. Omar Maruhom (co-heir)

requested the Marawi City Water District for permit to construct a

motorized deep well over Lot 3 for his residential house (Exh. Q). He

was refused the permit ―because the construction of the deep well

as (sic) the parcels of land will cause danger to lives and property.‖

He was informed that ―beneath your lands are constructed the

Napocor underground tunnel in connection with Agua Hydroelectric

plant‖ (Exh. Q-2). There in fact exists ample evidence that this

construction of the tunnel without the prior consent of plaintiffs

beneath the latter‘s property endangered the lives and properties of

said plaintiffs. It has been proved indubitably that Marawi City lies in

an area of local volcanic and tectonic activity. Lake Lanao has

been formed by extensive earth movements and is considered to be

a drowned basin of volcano/tectonic origin. InMarawi City, there

are a number of former volcanoes and an extensive amount of

faulting. Some of these faults are still moving. (Feasibility Report on

Marawi City Water District by Kampsa-Kruger, Consulting Engineers,

Architects and Economists, Exh. R). Moreover, it has been shown that

the underground tunnels [have] deprived the plaintiffs of the lawful

use of the land and considerably reduced its value. On March 6,

1995, plaintiffs applied for a two-million peso loan with the Amanah

Islamic Bank for the expansion of the operation of the Ameer

Construction and Integrated Services to be secured by said land

(Exh. N), but the application was disapproved by the bank in its letter

of April 25, 1995 (Exh. O) stating that:

―Apropos to this, we regret to inform you that we cannot

consider your loan application due to the following reasons, to wit:

That per my actual ocular inspection and verification,

subject property offered as collateral has an existing underground

tunnel by the NPC for the Agus I Project, which tunnel is traversing

underneath your property, hence, an encumbrance. As a matter of

bank policy, property with an existing encumbrance cannot be

considered neither accepted as collateral for a loan.‖

All the foregoing evidence and findings convince this Court that

preponderantly plaintiffs have established the condemnation of their

land covering an area of 48,005 sq. meters located at

Saduc, Marawi City by the defendant National Power Corporation

without even the benefit of expropriation proceedings or the

payment of any just compensation and/or reasonable monthly rental

since 1978.[12]

In the past, the Court has held that if the government takes property

without expropriation and devotes the property to public use, after

many years, the property owner may demand payment of just

compensation in the event restoration of possession is neither

convenient nor feasible.[13] This is in accordance with the principle

that persons shall not be deprived of their property except by

competent authority and for public use and always upon payment

of just compensation.[14]

Petitioner contends that the underground tunnels in this case

constitute an easement upon the property of respondents which

does not involve any loss of title or possession. The manner in which

the easement was created by petitioner, however, violates the due

process rights of respondents as it was without notice and indemnity

to them and did not go through proper expropriation

proceedings. Petitioner could have, at any time, validly exercised

the power of eminent domain to acquire the easement over

respondents’ property as this power encompasses not only the taking

or appropriation of title to and possession of the expropriated

property but likewise covers even the imposition of a mere burden

upon the owner of the condemned property.[15] Significantly,

though, landowners cannot be deprived of their right over their land

until expropriation proceedings are instituted in court. The court must

then see to it that the taking is for public use, that there is payment of

just compensation and that there is due process of law.[16]

In disregarding this procedure and failing to recognize respondents‘

ownership of the sub-terrain portion, petitioner took a risk and

exposed itself to greater liability with the passage of time. It must be

emphasized that the acquisition of the easement is not without

expense. The underground tunnels impose limitations on

respondents‘ use of the property for an indefinite period and deprive

them of its ordinary use. Based upon the foregoing, respondents are

clearly entitled to the payment of just

compensation.[17] Notwithstanding the fact that petitioner only

occupies the sub-terrain portion, it is liable to pay not merely an

easement fee but rather the full compensation for land. This is so

because in this case, the nature of the easement practically deprives

the owners of its normal beneficial use. Respondents, as the owners

of the property thus expropriated, are entitled to a just compensation

which should be neither more nor less, whenever it is possible to

make the assessment, than the money equivalent of said

property.[18]

Petition DENIED. Decision of the CA affirmed.

25- REPUBLIC v. PLDT

By Aeje S. Timosan in 1st yr 2nd Sem CASE DIGEST POOL · Edit

Doc · Delete

G.R. No. L-18841 January 27, 1969

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.

PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE COMPANY, defendant-

appellant.

Facts:

The plaintiff, Republic of the Philippines, is a political entity exercising

governmental powers through its branches and instrumentalities, one

of which is the Bureau of Telecommunications. That office was

created on 1 July 1947, under Executive Order No. 94, with the

following powers and duties, in addition to certain powers and duties

formerly vested in the Director of Posts:

SEC. 79. The Bureau of Telecommunications shall exercise the

following powers and duties:

(a) To operate and maintain existing wire-telegraph and radio-

telegraph offices, stations, and facilities, and those to be established

to restore the pre-war telecommunication service under the Bureau

of Posts, as well as such additional offices or stations as may hereafter

be established to provide telecommunication service in places

requiring such service;

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(b) To investigate, consolidate, negotiate for, operate and maintain

wire-telephone or radio telephone communication service

throughout the Philippines by utilizing such existing facilities in cities,

towns, and provinces as may be found feasible and under such

terms and conditions or arrangements with the present owners or

operators thereof as may be agreed upon to the satisfaction of all

concerned;

(c) To prescribe, subject to approval by the Department Head,

equitable rates of charges for messages handled by the system

and/or for time calls and other services that may be rendered by

said system;

(d) To establish and maintain coastal stations to serve ships at sea or

aircrafts and, when public interest so requires, to engage in the

international telecommunication service in agreement with other

countries desiring to establish such service with the Republic of the

Philippines; and

(e) To abide by all existing rules and regulations prescribed by the

International Telecommunication Convention relative to the

accounting, disposition and exchange of messages handled in the

international service, and those that may hereafter be promulgated

by said convention and adhered to by the Government of the

Republic of the Philippines.

The defendant, Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company

(PLDT), is a public service corporation holding a legislative franchise,

Act 3426, as amended by Commonwealth Act 407, to install,

operate and maintain a telephone system throughout the Philippines

and to carry on the business of electrical transmission of messages

within the Philippines and between the Philippines and the telephone

systems of other countries. The RCA Communications, Inc., (which is

not a party to the present case but has contractual relations with the

parties) is an American corporation authorized to transact business in

the Philippines and is the grantee, by assignment, of a legislative

franchise to operate a domestic station for the reception and

transmission of long distance wireless messages (Act 2178) and to

operate broadcasting and radio-telephone and radio-telegraphic

communications services (Act 3180).

After its creation, in 1947, the Bureau of Telecommunications set up

its own Government Telephone System by utilizing its own

appropriation and equipment and by renting trunk lines of the PLDT

to enable government offices to call private parties. Its application

for the use of these trunk lines was in the usual form of applications

for telephone service, containing a statement, above the signature

of the applicant, that the latter will abide by the rules and regulations

of the PLDT which are on file with the Public Service Commission

On 5 March 1958, the plaintiff, through the Director of

Telecommunications, entered into an agreement with RCA

Communications, Inc., for a joint overseas telephone service

whereby the Bureau would convey radio-telephone overseas calls

received by RCA's station to and from local residents. Actually, they

inaugurated this joint operation on 2 February 1958, under a

"provisional" agreement.

On 7 April 1958, the defendant Philippine Long Distance Telephone

Company, complained to the Bureau of Telecommunications that

said bureau was violating the conditions under which their Private

Branch Exchange (PBX) is inter-connected with the PLDT's facilities,

referring to the rented trunk lines, for the Bureau had used the trunk

lines not only for the use of government offices but even to serve

private persons or the general public, in competition with the

business of the PLDT; and gave notice that if said violations were not

stopped by midnight of 12 April 1958, the PLDT would sever the

telephone connections. When the PLDT received no reply, it

disconnected the trunk lines being rented by the Bureau at midnight

on 12 April 1958. The result was the isolation of the Philippines, on

telephone services, from the rest of the world, except the United

States.

On 12 April 1958, plaintiff Republic commenced suit against the

defendant, Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company, in the

Court of First Instance of Manila (Civil Case No. 35805), praying in its

complaint for judgment commanding the PLDT to execute a

contract with plaintiff, through the Bureau, for the use of the facilities

of defendant's telephone system throughout the Philippines under

such terms and conditions as the court might consider reasonable,

and for a writ of preliminary injunction against the defendant

company to restrain the severance of the existing telephone

connections and/or restore those severed.

Acting on the application of the plaintiff, and on the ground that the

severance of telephone connections by the defendant company

would isolate the Philippines from other countries, the court a quo, on

14 April 1958, issued an order for the defendant:

(1) to forthwith reconnect and restore the seventy-eight (78) trunk

lines that it has disconnected between the facilities of the

Government Telephone System, including its overseas telephone

services, and the facilities of defendant; (2) to refrain from carrying

into effect its threat to sever the existing telephone communication

between the Bureau of Telecommunications and defendant, and

not to make connection over its telephone system of telephone calls

coming to the Philippines from foreign countries through the said

Bureau's telephone facilities and the radio facilities of RCA

Communications, Inc.; and (3) to accept and connect through its

telephone system all such telephone calls coming to the Philippines

from foreign countries — until further order of this Court.

It is said that after trial, the lower court rendered judgment that it

could not compel the PLDT to enter into an agreement with the

Bureau because the parties were not in agreement; that under

Executive Order 94, establishing the Bureau of Telecommunications,

said Bureau was not limited to servicing government offices alone,

nor was there any in the contract of lease of the trunk lines, since the

PLDT knew, or ought to have known, at the time that their use by the

Bureau was to be public throughout the Islands, hence the Bureau

was neither guilty of fraud, abuse, or misuse of the poles of the PLDT;

and, in view of serious public prejudice that would result from the

disconnection of the trunk lines, declared the preliminary injunction

permanent, although it dismissed both the complaint and the

counterclaims.

Issue:

Whether or not Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT)

may be compelled to enter into such agreement.

Held:

The Republic may not compel the PLDT to celebrate a contract with

it, but the Republic may, in the exercise of the sovereign power of

eminent domain, require the telephone company to permit

interconnection of the government telephone system and that of the

PLDT, as the needs of the government service may require, subject to

the payment of just compensation to be determined by the

court. Nominally, of course, the power of eminent domain results in

the taking or appropriation of title to, and possession of, the

expropriated property; but no cogent reason appears why the said

power may not be availed of to impose only a burden upon the

owner of condemned property, without loss of title and possession. It

is unquestionable that real property may, through expropriation, be

subjected to an easement of right of way (Guys, this is the case

doctrine jud kunuhay nalibog pud ko sa iyang gi-yawit. Basta mao

na).

Reasoning:

The use of the PLDT's lines and services to allow inter-service

connection between both telephone systems is not much different.

In either case private property is subjected to a burden for public use

and benefit. If, under section 6, Article XIII, of the Constitution, the

State may, in the interest of national welfare, transfer utilities to public

ownership upon payment of just compensation---Then, there is no

reason why the State may not require a public utility to render

services in the general interest, provided just compensation is paid

therefore. Ultimately, the beneficiary of the interconnecting service

would be the users of both telephone systems, so that the

condemnation would be for public use.

The Bureau of Telecommunications, under section 78 (b) of Executive

Order No. 94, may operate and maintain wire telephone or radio

telephone communications throughout the Philippines by utilizing

existing facilities in cities, towns, and provinces under such terms and

conditions or arrangement with present owners or operators as may

be agreed upon to the satisfaction of all concerned; but there is

nothing in this section that would exclude resort to condemnation

proceedings where unreasonable or unjust terms and conditions are

exacted, to the extent of crippling or seriously hampering the

operations of said Bureau.

Executive Order No. 94, Series of 1947, reorganizing the Bureau of

Telecommunications, expressly empowered the latter in its Section

79, subsection (b), to "negotiate for, operate and maintain wire

telephone or radio telephone communication service throughout

the Philippines", and, in subsection (c), "to prescribe, subject to

approval by the Department Head, equitable rates of charges for

messages handled by the system and/or for time calls and other

services that may be rendered by the system". Nothing in these

provisions limits the Bureau to non-commercial activities or prevents it

from serving the general public. It may be that in its original

prospectuses the Bureau officials had stated that the service would

be limited to government offices: but such limitations could not block

future expansion of the system, as authorized by the terms of the

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Executive Order, nor could the officials of the Bureau bind the

Government not to engage in services that are authorized by law.

It is a well-known rule that erroneous application and enforcement of

the law by public officers do not block subsequent correct

application of the statute (PLDT vs. Collector of Internal Revenue, 90

Phil. 676), and that the Government is never estopped by mistake or

error on the part of its agents (Pineda vs. Court of First Instance of

Tayabas, 52 Phil. 803, 807; Benguet Consolidated Mining Co. vs.

Pineda, 98 Phil. 711, 724).

The theses that the Bureau's commercial services constituted unfair

competition, and that the Bureau was guilty of fraud and abuse

under its contract are likewise untenable for the following reasons:

1. First, the competition is merely hypothetical, the demand for

telephone service being very much more than the supposed

competitors can supply. The PLDT had 20,000 pending applications

at the time, and the Bureau had another 5,000. The telephone

company's inabilities to meet the demands for service are notorious

even now.

2. Second, the charter of the defendant expressly provides:

SEC. 14. The rights herein granted shall not be exclusive, and

the rights and power to grant to any corporation, association or

person other than the grantee franchise for the telephone or

electrical transmission of message or signals shall not be impaired or

affected by the granting of this franchise: — (Act 3436)

3. Third, as the trial court correctly stated, "when the Bureau of

Telecommunications subscribed to the trunk lines, defendant knew or

should have known that their use by the subscriber was more or less

public and all embracing in nature, that is, throughout the

Philippines, if not abroad" (Decision, Record on Appeal, page 216).

The acceptance by the defendant of the payment of rentals,

despite its knowledge that the plaintiff had extended the use of the

trunk lines to commercial purposes, continuously since 1948, implies

assent by the defendant to such extended use. Since this relationship

has been maintained for a long time and the public has patronized

both telephone systems, and their interconnection is to the public

convenience, it is too late for the defendant to claim misuse of its

facilities, and it is not now at liberty to unilaterally sever the physical

connection of the trunk lines.

Note: It is clear that the main reason for the objection of the PLDT lies

in the fact that said appellant did not expect that the Bureau's

telephone system would expand with such rapidity as it has done.

But this expansion is no ground for the discontinuance of the service

agreed upon.

4. The last issue urged by the PLDT as appellant is its right to

compensation for the use of its poles for bearing telephone wires of

the Bureau of Telecommunications. Admitting that section 19 of the

PLDT charter reserves to the Government:

― the privilege without compensation of using the poles of the

grantee to attach one ten-pin cross-arm, and to install, maintain and

operate wires of its telegraph system thereon; Provided, however,

That the Bureau of Posts shall have the right to place additional cross-

arms and wires on the poles of the grantee by paying a

compensation, the rate of which is to be agreed upon by the

Director of Posts and the grantee; —

the defendant counterclaimed for P8,772.00 for the use of its poles

by the plaintiff, contending that what was allowed free use, under

the aforequoted provision, was one ten-pin cross-arm attachment

and only for plaintiff's telegraph system, not for its telephone system;

that said section could not refer to the plaintiff's telephone system,

because it did not have such telephone system when defendant

acquired its franchise. The implication of the argument is that plaintiff

has to pay for the use of defendant's poles if such use is for plaintiff's

telephone system and has to pay also if it attaches more than one

(1) ten-pin cross-arm for telegraphic purposes.‖

The implication of the argument is that plaintiff has to pay for the use

of defendant's poles if such use is for plaintiff's telephone system and

has to pay also if it attaches more than one (1) ten-pin cross-arm for

telegraphic purposes. However, there is no proof that the telephone

wires strain the poles of the PLDT more than the telegraph wires, nor

that they cause more damage than the wires of the telegraph

system, or that the Government has attached to the poles more than

one ten-pin cross-arm as permitted by the PLDT charter. Hence, so

long as the burden to be borne by the PLDT poles is not increased,

there is no reason why the reservation in favor of the telegraph wires

of the government should not be extended to its telephone lines, any

time that the government decided to engage also in this kind of

communication.

Conclusion:

In the ultimate analysis, the true objection of the PLDT to continue

the link between its network and that of the Government is that the

latter competes "parasitically‖ with its own telephone services.

Considering, however, that the PLDT franchise is non-exclusive; that it

is well-known that defendant PLDT is unable to adequately cope with

the current demands for telephone service, as shown by the number

of pending applications therefor; and that the PLDT's right to just

compensation for the services rendered to the Government

telephone system and its users is herein recognized and preserved,

the objections of defendant-appellant are without merit. To uphold

the PLDT's contention is to subordinate the needs of the general

public to the right of the PLDT to derive profit from the future

expansion of its services under its non-exclusive franchise.

The decision of the Court of First Instance, now under appeal, is

affirmed, except in so far as it dismisses the petition of the Republic of

the Philippines to compel the Philippine Long Distance Telephone

Company to continue servicing the Government telephone system

upon such terms, and for a compensation, that the trial court may

determine to be just, including the period elapsed from the filing of

the original complaint or petition.

26 Carlos Superdrug v DSWD (2007)

By Jamel Macacua in 1st yr 2nd Sem CASE DIGEST POOL · Edit

Doc · Delete

Carlos Superdrug v Department of Social Welfare and

Development(2007)

This is a petition for Prohibition with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction

assailing the constitutionality of Section 4(a) of Republic Act (R.A.)

No. 9257, otherwise known as the "Expanded Senior Citizens Act of

2003.

FACTS:

Petitioners are domestic corporations and proprietors operating

drugstores in the Philippines. Public respondents, on the other hand,

include the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD),

the Department of Health (DOH), the Department of Finance (DOF),

the Department of Justice (DOJ), and the Department of Interior and

Local Government (DILG) which have been specifically tasked to

monitor the drugstores‘ compliance with the law; promulgate the

implementing rules and regulations for the effective implementation

of the law; and prosecute and revoke the licenses of erring drugstore

establishments.

On February 26, 2004, R.A. No. 9257 (Expanded Senior Citizens Act of

2003), amending R.A. No. 7432 (the Old Senior Citizens Act), was

signed into law by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo which

became effective on March 21, 2004. Section 4(a) provides that:

The senior citizens shall be entitled to the following:

1. the grant of twenty percent (20%) discount from all establishments

relative to the utilization of services in hotels and similar lodging

establishments, restaurants and recreation centers, and purchase of

medicines in all establishments for the exclusive use or enjoyment of

senior citizens, including funeral and burial services for the death of

senior citizens;

The establishments may claim the discounts granted under (a), (f),

(g) and (h) as tax deduction based on the net cost of the goods sold

or services rendered: Provided, That the cost of the discount shall be

allowed as deduction from gross income for the same taxable year

that the discount is granted. Provided, further, That the total amount

of the claimed tax deduction net of value added tax if applicable,

shall be included in their gross sales receipts for tax purposes and

shall be subject to proper documentation and to the provisions of

the National Internal Revenue Code, as amended.

On November 12, 2004, the Department of Health issued

Administrative Order No 177 amending A.O. No. 171. Under A.O. No.

177, the twenty percent discount shall not be limited to the purchase

of unbranded generic medicines only, but shall extend to both

prescription and non-prescription medicines whether branded or

generic. Thus, it stated that the grant of twenty percent (20%)

discount shall be provided in the purchase of medicines from all

establishments dispensing medicines for the exclusive use of the

senior citizens.‖

Among other issues, petitioners assert that Section 4(a) of the law is

unconstitutional because it constitutes deprivation of private

property. Compelling drugstore owners and establishments to grant

the discount will result in a loss of profit and capital because 1)

drugstores impose a mark-up of only 5% to 10% on branded

medicines; and 2) the law failed to provide a scheme whereby

drugstores will be justly compensated for the discount.

Issue:

Whether or not petitioners are entitled to just compensation.

RULING

No. petitioners are not entitled to just compensation. The permanent

reduction in their total revenues is a forced subsidy corresponding to

the taking of private property for public use or benefit. This constitutes

compensable taking for which petitioners would ordinarily become

entitled to a just compensation.

Just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the

property taken from its owner by the expropriator. The measure is not

the taker‘s gain but the owner‘s loss. The word just is used to intensify

the meaning of the word compensation, and to convey the idea

that the equivalent to be rendered for the property to be taken shall

be real, substantial, full and ample. A tax deduction does not offer

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full reimbursement of the senior citizen discount. As such, it would not

meet the definition of just compensation.

Having said that, this raises the question of whether the State, in

promoting the health and welfare of a special group of citizens, can

impose upon private establishments the burden of partly subsidizing

a government program.

The Court believes so.

The law grants a twenty percent discount to senior citizens for

medical and dental services, and diagnostic and laboratory fees;

admission fees charged by theaters, concert halls, circuses, carnivals,

and other similar places of culture, leisure and amusement; fares for

domestic land, air and sea travel; utilization of services in hotels and

similar lodging establishments, restaurants and recreation centers;

and purchases of medicines for the exclusive use or enjoyment of

senior citizens. As a form of reimbursement, the law provides that

business establishments extending the twenty percent discount to

senior citizens may claim the discount as a tax deduction.

The law is a legitimate exercise of police power which, similar to the

power of eminent domain, has general welfare for its object. Police

power is not capable of an exact definition, but has been purposely

veiled in general terms to underscore its comprehensiveness to meet

all exigencies and provide enough room for an efficient and flexible

response to conditions and circumstances, thus assuring the greatest

benefits. Accordingly, it has been described as ―the most essential,

insistent and the least limitable of powers, extending as it does to all

the great public needs.‖ It is the power vested in the legislature by

the constitution to make, ordain, and establish all manner of

wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes, and ordinances, either

with penalties or without, not repugnant to the constitution, as they

shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the commonwealth,

and of the subjects of the same.‖

For this reason, when the conditions so demand as determined by

the legislature, property rights must bow to the primacy of police

power because property rights, though sheltered by due process,

must yield to general welfare.

Police power as an attribute to promote the common good would

be diluted considerably if on the mere plea of petitioners that they

will suffer loss of earnings and capital, the questioned provision is

invalidated. Moreover, in the absence of evidence demonstrating

the alleged confiscatory effect of the provision in question, there is

no basis for its nullification in view of the presumption of validity which

every law has in its favor.

Given these, it is incorrect for petitioners to insist that the grant of the

senior citizen discount is unduly oppressive to their business, because

petitioners have not taken time to calculate correctly and come up

with a financial report, so that they have not been able to show

properly whether or not the tax deduction scheme really works

greatly to their disadvantage.

The Court is not oblivious of the retail side of the pharmaceutical

industry and the competitive pricing component of the business.

While the Constitution protects property rights, petitioners must

accept the realities of business and the State, in the exercise of

police power, can intervene in the operations of a business which

may result in an impairment of property rights in the process.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

Other issue:

Whether or not section 4(a) of R.A. 9257 has constitutional basis.

Yes. RA 9257 is in accord with the states policy to provide social

justice in all phases of national development and to adopt an

integrated and comprehensive approach to health development

which shall endeavor to make essential goods, health and other

social services available to all people at affordable cost. There shall

be priority for the needs of the underprivileged sick, elderly, disabled,

women and children.

28. LORENZO SUMULONG and EMILIA VIDANES-

BALAOING, petitioners,

vs.

HON. BUENAVENTURA GUERRERO and NATIONAL HOUSING

AUTHORITY, respondents.

FACTS: On December 5, 1977 the National Housing Authority (NIIA)

filed a complaint for expropriation of parcels of land covering

approximately twenty five (25) hectares, (in Antipolo, Rizal) including

the lots of petitioners Lorenzo Sumulong and Emilia Vidanes-Balaoing

with an area of 6,667 square meters and 3,333 square meters

respectively.

Together with the complaint was a motion for immediate possession

of the properties. The NHA deposited the amount of P158,980.00 with

the Philippine National Bank, representing the "total market value" of

the subject twenty five hectares of land, pursuant to Presidential

Decree No. 1224 which defines "the policy on the expropriation of

private property for socialized housing upon payment of just

compensation." This was granted by thecourt.

After denial of petitioners, motion for reconsideration on the ground

that they had been deprived of the possession of their property

without due process of law, thus they challenged the constitutionality

of Pres. Decree No. 1224.

Issue: WON the "Socialized housing" for the purpose of condemnation

proceeding, as defined in said Decree, is for a public purpose.

HOLDING: Yes.

Petitioners contend that "socialized housing" as defined in Pres.

Decree No. 1224, as amended, for the purpose of condemnation

proceedings is not of "public use" since it will benefit only "a handful

of people, bereft of public character."

"Socialized housing" is defined as, "the construction of dwelling units

for the middle and lower class members of our society, including the

construction of the supporting infrastructure and other facilities" (Pres.

Decree No. 1224, par. 1)

Citing the case of Heirs of Juancho Ardona v. Reyes, the term "public

use" has acquired a more comprehensive coverage. To the literal

import of the term signifying strict use or employment by the public

has been added the broader notion of indirect public benefit or

advantage. It is accurate to state then that at present whatever may

be beneficially employed for the general welfare satisfies the

requirement of public use.

Specifically, urban renewal or redevelopment and the construction

of low-cost housing is recognized as a public purpose, not only

because of the expanded concept of public use but also because

of specific provisions in the Constitution. The 1973 Constitution made

it incumbent upon the State to establish, maintain and ensure

adequate social services including housing [Art. 11, sec. 7].

Housing is a basic human need. Shortage in housing is a matter of

state concern since it directly and significantly affects public health,

safety, the environment and in sum, the general welfare.

In the light of the foregoing, this Court is satisfied that "socialized

housing" fans within the confines of "public use".

Petitioners claim that there are vast areas of lands in Rizal hundreds

of hectares of which are owned by a few landowners only. Why

should the NHA pick their small lots? Expropriation is not confined to

landed estates. The test to be applied for a valid expropriation of

private lands was the area of the land and not the number of people

who stood to be benefitted. The State acting through the NHA is

vested with broad discretion to designate the property. The property

owner may not interpose objections merely because in their

judgment some other property would have been more suitable.

The Court stated that, "[i]t is unfortunate that the petitioner would be

deprived of his landholdings, but his interest and that of his family

should not stand in the way of progress and the benefit of the

greater may only of the inhabitants of the country."

29 ESTATE V PHIL. EXPO

By El Dinamita in 1st yr 2nd Sem CASE DIGEST POOL · Edit

Doc · Delete

ESTATE OF SALUD JIMENEZ VS PHILIPPINE EXPORT PROCESSING ZONE

jan 16, 2011. -Deither

-petition for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of:

+CA dated March 25, 1998 and January 14, 1999.

+which ordered the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of

Cavite City, Branch 17, to proceed with the hearing of the

expropriation proceedings regarding the determination of just

compensation for Lot 1406-B while setting aside the Orders dated

August 4, 1997 and November 3, 1997 of the said Regional Trial Court

which ordered the peaceful turnover to petitioner Estate of Salud

Jimenez of said Lot 1406-B.

FACTA:

xxxMay 15, 1981, private respondent Philippine Export

Processing Zone (PEZA), then called as the Export Processing Zone

Authority (EPZA), initiated before the RTC of Cavite expropriation proceedings on three parcels of irrigated rice land in Rosario,

Cavite. One of the lots, Lot 1406 (A and B) of the San Francisco de

Malabon Estate, (29,008 sq ms), is registered in the name of Salud

Jimenez under TCT No. T-113498 of the Registry of Deeds of Cavite.

xxxJuly 11, 1991 the trial court upheld the right of private respondent

PEZA to expropriate, among others, Lot 1406 (A and

B). Reconsideration of the said order was sought by petitioner

contending that said lot would only be transferred to a private

corporation, Philippine Vinyl Corp., and hence would not be utilized

for a public purpose.

xxxOctober 25, 1991, the trial court reconsidered the Order dated

July 11, 1991 and released Lot 1406-A from expropriation while the

expropriation of Lot 1406-B was maintained.

xxxPEZA appeals to CA

Meanwhile petitioner wrote two letters offering two proposals,

namely:

+ Withdrawal of private respondent‘s appeal with respect to Lot

1406-A in consideration of the waiver of claim for damages and loss

of income for the possession of said lot by private respondent.

+ The swap of Lot 1406-B with Lot 434 covered by TCT No. T-14772

since private respondent has no money yet to pay for the lot.

January 4, 1993,Private respondent‘s Board approved the

“proposal” and the compromise agreement was signed by private

respondent through its then administrator Tagumpay

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Jardiniano assisted by Government Corporate Counsel Oscar I.

Garcia.

xxxThe Court of Appeals remanded the case to the trial court for

the approval of the said compromise agreement entered into

between the parties, consequent with the withdrawal of the appeal

with the Court of Appeals.

xxxAugust 23, 1993, the trial court approved the compromise

agreement.

xxxHowever, private respondent failed to transfer the title of Lot 434

to petitioner inasmuch as it was not the registered owner of the

covering TCT No. T-14772 but Progressive Realty Estate, Inc. Thus, on March 13, 1997, petitioner Estate filed a “Motion to Partially Annul the

Order dated August 23, 1993.

xxxAugust 4, 1997, the trial court annulled the said compromise

agreement entered into between the parties and directed private

respondent to peacefully turn over Lot 1406-A to the petitioner. PEZA

moved for its reconsideration.

xxxDecember 4, 1997, the trial court, at the instance of petitioner,

corrected the Orders dated August 4, 1997 and November 3, 1997 by

declaring that it is Lot 1406-B and not Lot 1406-A that should be

surrendered and returned to petitioner.

xxxNovember 27, 1997, respondent interposed before the Court of

Appeals a petition for certiorari and prohibition seeking to nullify the

Orders dated August 4, 1997 and November 3, 1997 of the trial

court. Petitioner filed its Comment on January 16, 1998.

xxxMarch 25, 1998Acting on the petition, the Court of Appeals

upheld the rescission of the compromise agreement, ratiocinating

thus:

A judicial compromise may be enforced by a writ of execution, and

if a party fails or refuses to abide by the compromise, the other party

may regard it as rescinded and insist upon his original demand. This is

in accordance with Article 2041 of the Civil Code which provides:

If one of the parties fails or refuses to abide by the compromise, the

other party may either enforce the compromise or regard it as

rescinded and insist upon his original demand.”

Petitioner sought reconsideration of the Decision dated March 25,

1998. However, public respondent in a Resolution dated January 14,

1999 denied petitioner‘s motion for reconsideration.

Hence, this petition anchored on the following assignment of errors,

to wit:

ERAT:

WON THE CA ERRED IN ENTERTAINING PETITION FOR CERTIORARI

UNDER RULE 65 OF RC.

WON THE CA ERRED IN INTERPRETING “ORIGINAL DEMAND” TO MEAN

FIXING OF JUST COMPENSATION.

WON ART 2041 WILL APPLY IN THE CASE AT BAR

WON THE RESPONDENT HAS THE LEGAL AUTHORITY TO EXPROPRIATE

THE SUBJECT LOT 1406-B AND THE SAME WAS FOR VALID PUBLIC

PURPOSE (-topic)

RULING:

The supreme court ruled in favor of the respondent

ON APPEAL FORCERTIORARI

It appeared that on August 11, 1997, respondent received the Order

of the trial court dated August 4, 1997 annulling the compromise

agreement. On August 26, 1997, the last day for the filing of a notice

of appeal, respondent filed instead a motion for

reconsideration. The Order of the trial court denying the motion for

reconsideration was received by respondent on November 23,

1997. The reglementary period to appeal therefore lapsed on

November 24, 1997. On November 27, 1997, however, respondent

filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari. Petitioner

claims that appeal is the proper remedy inasmuch as the Order

dated August 4, 1997 of the Regional Trial Court is a final order that

completely disposes of the case. Besides, according to petitioner,

respondent is estopped in asserting that certiorari is the proper

remedy inasmuch as it invoked the fifteen (15) day reglementary

period for appeal when it filed a motion for reconsideration on

August 26, 1997 and not the sixty (60) day period for filing a petition

forcertiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

The Court of Appeals did not err in entertaining the petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of The Rules of Court. A petition

for certiorari is the proper remedy when any tribunal, board, or officer

exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in

excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting

to lack or excess of jurisdiction and there is no appeal, nor any plain,

speedy, and adequate remedy at law. Grave abuse of discretion is

defined as the capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is

equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. An error of judgment committed in

the exercise of its legitimate jurisdiction is not the same as ―grave abuse of discretion.‖ An abuse of discretion is not sufficient by itself to

justify the issuance of a writ of certiorari. The abuse must be grave

and patent, and it must be shown that the discretion was exercised

arbitrarily and despotically.

As a general rule, a petition for certiorari will not lie if an appeal is the

proper remedy thereto such as when an error of judgment as well as

of procedure are involved However, in certain exceptional cases,

where the rigid application of such rule will result in a manifest failure

or miscarriage of justice, the provisions of the Rules of Court which

are technical rules may be relaxed.

ON EXPROPRIATION PROCEEDINGS

Expropriation proceedings involve two (2) phases. The first phase

ends either with an order of expropriation (where the right of plaintiff

to take the land and the public purpose to which they are to be

devoted are upheld) or an order of dismissal. Either order would be a

final one since it finally disposes of the case. The second phase

concerns the determination of just compensation to be ascertained

by three (3) commissioners. It ends with an order fixing the amount to

be paid to the defendant. Inasmuch as it leaves nothing more to be

done, this order finally disposes of the second stage. To both orders

the remedy therefrom is an appeal.

In the case at bar, the first phase was terminated when the July 11,

1991 order of expropriation became final and the parties

subsequently entered into a compromise agreement regarding the

mode of payment of just compensation. When respondent failed to

abide by the terms of the compromise agreement, petitioner filed an

action to partially rescind the same. Obviously, the trial could only

validly order the rescission of the compromise agreement anent the

payment of just compensation inasmuch as that was the subject of

the compromise. However, on August 4, 1991, the trial court gravely

abused its discretion when it ordered the return of Lot 1406-B. It, in

effect, annulled the Order of Expropriation dated July 11, 1991 which

was already final and executory.

ON ARTICLE 2041 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE

petitioner assails the interpretation by the Court of Appeals of the

phrase ―original demand‖ in Article 2041 of the New Civil CoDE.

Article 2041 provides that, ―If one of the parties fails or refuses to

abide by the compromise, the other party may either enforce the

compromise or regard it as rescinded and insist upon his original

demand

The incorporation of the expropriation order in the compromise

agreement did not subject said order to rescission but instead

constituted an admission by petitioner of respondent’s authority to

expropriate the subject parcel of land and the public purpose for

which it was expropriated. This is evident from paragraph three (3) of

the compromise agreement which states that the ―swap

arrangement recognizes the fact that Lot 1406-B covered by TCT No.

T-113498 of the estate of defendant Salud Jimenez is

considered expropriated in favor of the government based on the

Order of the Honorable Court dated July 11, 1991.” It is crystal clear

from the contents of the agreement that the parties limited the

compromise agreement to the matter of just compensation to

petitioner. Said expropriation order is not closely intertwined with the

issue of payment such that failure to pay by respondent will also

nullify the right of respondent to expropriate. No statement to this

effect was mentioned in the agreement. The Order was mentioned

in the agreement only to clarify what was subject to payment.

This Court therefore finds that the Court of Appeals did not err in

interpreting “original demand” to mean the fixing of just

compensation. The authority of respondent and the nature of the

purpose thereof have been put to rest when the Expropriation Order

dated July 11, 1991 became final and was duly admitted by

petitioner in the compromise agreement. The only issue for

consideration is the manner and amount of payment due to

petitioner. . Under the compromise agreement, petitioner was

supposed to receive respondent‘s Lot No. 434 in exchange for Lot

1406-B. When respondent failed to fulfill its obligation to deliver Lot

434, petitioner can again demand for the payment but not the return

of the expropriated Lot 1406-B.

-After having invoked the provisions of Article 2041, petitioner

inconsistently contends that said article does not apply to the case

at bar inasmuch as it is only applicable to cases where a

compromise has not been approved by a court. In the case at bar,

the trial court approved the compromise agreement. Petitioner insists

that Articles 2038, 2039 and 1330 of the New Civil Code should

apply.

- The applicability of art 2039 and 1330 will not change the outcome

of the subject of the rescission. Since the compromise agreement

was only about the mode of payment by swapping of lots and not

about the right and purpose to expropriate the subject Lot 1406-B,

only the originally agreed form of compensation that is by cash

payment, was rescinded.

ON PUBLIC PURPOSE

-This Court holds that respondent has the legal authority to

expropriate the subject Lot 1406-B and that the same was for a valid

public purpose.

the ―public use‖ requirement for a valid exercise of the power of

eminent domain is a flexible and evolving concept influenced by

changing conditions. In this jurisdiction, the statutory and judicial

trend has been summarized as follows:

xxxxxx- the court has ruled that the taking to be valid must be for

public use. There was a time when it was felt that a literal meaning

should be attached to such a requirement. Whatever project is

undertaken must be for the public to enjoy, as in the case of streets

or parks. Otherwise expropriation is not allowable. It is not

anymore. As long as the purpose of the taking is public, then the

power of eminent domain comes into play… It is accurate to state

then that at present whatever may be beneficially employed for the

general welfare satisfies the requirement of public use.

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xxxxxx- In Manosca v. Court of Appeals, this Court has also held that

what ultimately emerged is a concept of public use which is just as

broad as “public welfare.”

THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN

Respondent PEZA expropriated the subject parcel of land pursuant

to Proclamation No. 1980 dated May 30, 1980 issued by former

President Ferdinand Marcos.

The power of eminent domain of respondent is contained in its

original charter,

EXERCISING OF POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN

In the absence of some constitutional or statutory provision to the

contrary, the necessity and expediency of exercising the right of

eminent domain are questions essentially political and not judicial in

their character.

xxxxx

In the case at bar, the expropriation order was issued by the trial

court in 1991. The compromise agreement between the parties was

approved by the trial court in 1993. However, from 1993 up to the

present, respondent has failed in its obligation to pay petitioner to

the prejudice of the latter. Respondent caused damage to

petitioner in making the latter to expect that it had a good title to

the property to be swapped with Lot 1406-B; and meanwhile,

respondent has been reaping benefits from the lease or rental

income of the said expropriated lot. We cannot tolerate this

oppressive exercise of the power of eminent domain by respondent.

----->Though the respondent has committed a misdeed to petitioner,

we cannot, however, grant the petitioner’s prayer for the return of the

expropriated Lot No. 1406-B. The Order of expropriation dated July

11, 1991, has long become final and executory. Petitioner

cited Provincial Government of Sorsogon v. Rosa E. Vda. De

Villaroya to support its contention that it is entitled to a return of the

lot where this Court ruled that “under ordinary circumstances,

immediate return to the owners of the unpaid property is the obvious

remedy.” However, the said statement was not the ruling in that

case. As in other cases where there was no prompt payment by the

government, this Court declared in Sorsogon that “the Provincial

Government of Sorsogon is expected to immediately pay as

directed. Should any further delay be encountered, the trial court is

directed to seize any patrimonial property or cash savings of the

province in the amount necessary to implement this decision.”

However, this Court also stressed and declared in that case that “In

cases where land is taken for PUBLIC USE, PUBLIC INTEREST, however,

must be considered.”

In view of all the foregoing, justice and equity dictate that this case

be remanded to the trial court for hearing of the expropriation

proceedings on the determination of just compensation for Lot 1406-B

and for its prompt payment to the petitioner.

importante diri anf PUBLIC PURPOSE. Gi pose lang nako ang uban

topic bcg ma chambahan og question.

love,

diet.

31 Heirs of Moreno vs. Mactan Cebu

By Adam Dandro Chua Jambangan and Faizah Tejero in 1st yr 2nd

Sem CASE DIGEST POOL · Edit Doc ·Delete

Heirs of Moreno vs. Mactan Cebu

413 SCRA 502 (2003)

Facts:

National Airport Corporation as the predecessor agency of

respondent Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority (MCIAA)

wanted to acquire Lots Nos. 916 and 920 situated in Lahug, Cebu

City for the proposed expansion of Lahug Airport.

To entice the landowners to cede their properties, the government

assured them that they could repurchase their lands once Lahug

Airport was closed or its operations transferred to Mactan Airport.

In 1991, Lahug Airport ceased operations as the Mactan Airport was

opened for incoming and outgoing flights. Hence, petitioners wrote

then President Fidel V. Ramos and the airport manager begging

them for the exercise of their alleged right to repurchase Lots Nos.

916 and 920, but they were not heeded. Hence, this petition for

review.

Issue: W/N petitioners can exercise the right of repurchase over the

said land.

Held: Of course!

In the case of Reyes vs. CA, Supreme Court ruled that if the land is

expropriated for a particular purpose, with the condition that when

that purpose is ended or abandoned the property shall return to its

former owner, then, of course, when the purpose is terminated or

abandoned the former owner reacquires the property so

expropriated. If it is expropriated for a public street and the

expropriation is granted upon condition that the city can only use it

for a public street, then, of course, when the city abandons its use as

a public street, it returns to the former owner, unless there is some

statutory provision to the contrary. If, upon the contrary, however, the

decree of expropriation gives to the entity a fee simple title, then, of

course, the land becomes the absolute property of the expropriator,

whether it be the State, a province, or municipality, and in that case

the non-user does not have the effect of defeating the title acquired

by the expropriation proceedings. When land has been acquired for

public use in fee simple, unconditionally, either by the exercise of

eminent domain or by purchase, the former owner retains no rights in

the land, and the public use may be abandoned, or the land may

be devoted to a different use, without any impairment of the estate

or title acquired, or any reversion to the former owner (The above

stated are principles. Murag mao ni ang point sa PUBLIC USE nga

topic)

Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority36 is correct in stating

that one would not find an express statement in the Decision in Civil

Case No. R-1881 to the effect that "the [condemned] lot would

return to [the landowner] or that [the landowner] had a right to

repurchase the same if the purpose for which it was expropriated is

ended or abandoned or if the property was to be used other than as

the Lahug Airport." This omission notwithstanding, and while the

inclusion of this pronouncement in the judgment of condemnation

would have been ideal, such precision is not absolutely necessary

nor is it fatal to the cause of petitioners herein. No doubt, the return or

repurchase of the condemned properties of petitioners could be

readily justified as the manifest legal effect or consequence of the trial court’s underlying presumption that "Lahug Airport will continue

to be in operation" when it granted the complaint for eminent

domain and the airport discontinued its activities.

The predicament of petitioners involves a constructive trust, one that

is akin37 to the implied trust referred to in Art. 1454 of the Civil Code,

"If an absolute conveyance of property is made in order to secure

the performance of an obligation of the grantor toward the grantee,

a trust by virtue of law is established. If the fulfillment of the obligation

is offered by the grantor when it becomes due, he may demand the

reconveyance of the property to him."

In the case at bar, petitioners conveyed Lots Nos. 916 and 920 to the

government with the latter obliging itself to use the realties for the

expansion of Lahug Airport; failing to keep its bargain, the

government can be compelled by petitioners to reconvey the

parcels of land to them, otherwise, petitioners would be denied the

use of their properties upon a state of affairs that was not conceived

nor contemplated when the expropriation was authorized.

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition for Review is GRANTED.

32 Reyes vs. NHA

By Jade Canada and Faizah Tejero in 1st yr 2nd Sem CASE DIGEST

POOL · Edit Doc · Delete

Page 2 – Public Use

Reyes vs. National Housing Authority (NHA)

365 SCRA 494; GR No. 147577

Facts:

Respondent National Housing Authority (NHA) filed complaints for the

expropriation of sugarcane lands belonging to the petitioners.

The stated public purpose of the expropriation was the expansion of

the Dasmariñas Resettlement Project to accommodate the squatters

who were relocated from the Metropolitan Manila area.

The trial court rendered judgment ordering the expropriation of these

lots and the payment of just compensation.

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the lower court.

A few years later, petitioners alleged that respondent NHA had not

relocated squatters from the Metropolitan Manila area on the

expropriated lands in violation of the stated public purpose for

expropriation and had not paid the just compensation fixed by the

court.

Petitioners likewise question the public nature of the use by

respondent NHA when it entered into a contract for the

construction of low cost housing units, which is allegedly different

from the stated public purpose in the expropriation proceedings.

Hence, it is claimed that respondent NHA has forfeited its rights and

interests by virtue of the expropriation judgment and the

expropriated properties should now be returned to herein

petitioners.

Issue: Whether or not the judgment of expropriation was forfeited in

the light of the failure of respondent NHA to use the expropriated

property for the intended purpose but for a totally different purpose.

Held:

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The Supreme Court held in favor of the respondent NHA.

Accordingly, petitioners cannot insist on a restrictive view of the

eminent domain provision of the Constitution by contending that the

contract for low cost housing is a deviation from the stated public

use.

It is now settled doctrine that the concept of public use is no longer

limited to traditional purposes. The term "public use" has now been

held to be synonymous with "public interest," "public benefit," "public

welfare," and "public convenience." Thus, whatever may be

beneficially employed for the general welfare satisfies the

requirement of public use."

The act of respondent NHA in entering into a contract with a real

estate developer for the construction of low cost housing on the

expropriated lots to be sold to qualified low income beneficiaries

cannot be taken to mean as a deviation from the stated public

purpose of their taking. Jurisprudence has it that the expropriation of

private land for slum clearance and urban development is for a

public purpose even if the developed area is later sold to private

homeowners, commercials firms, entertainment and service

companies, and other private concerns.

Moreover, the Constitution itself allows the State to undertake, for the

common good and in cooperation with the private sector, a

continuing program of urban land reform and housing which will

make at affordable cost decent housing and basic services to

underprivileged and homeless citizens in urban centers and

resettlement areas. The expropriation of private property for the

purpose of socialized housing for the marginalized sector is in

furtherance of social justice.

33 Republic vs. CA

By Adam Dandro Chua Jambangan and Faizah Tejero in 1st yr 2nd

Sem CASE DIGEST POOL · Edit Doc ·Delete

Republic vs. CA

383 SCRA 611 (2002)

Facts:

The bone of contention in the instant controversy is the 76,589-square

meter property previously owned by Luis Santos, predecessor-in-

interest of herein respondents, which forms part of the expropriated

land situated along MacArthur Highway, Malolos, Bulacan, utilized for

the continued broadcast operation and use of radio transmitter

facilities for the ―Voice of the Philippines‖ project. Petitioner, through

the Philippine Information Agency (―PIA‖), took over the premises

after the previous lessee, the ―Voice of America,‖ had ceased its

operations thereat.

Petitioner made a deposit of P517,558.80, the sum provisionally fixed

as being the reasonable value of the property. On 26 February 1979,

or more than nine years after the institution of the expropriation

proceedings, the trial court issued this order where the plaintiff has to

pay the defendants the just compensation for said property which is

the fair market value of the land condemned, computed at the rate

of six pesos (P6.00) per square meter, with legal rate of interest from

September 19, 1969, until fully paid;

However, the national government failed to pay to herein

respondents the compensation pursuant to the foregoing decision,

such that a little over five years later, or on 09 May 1984, respondents

filed a manifestation with a motion seeking payment for the

expropriated property.

In the meantime, President Joseph Ejercito Estrada issued

Proclamation No. 22, transferring 20 hectares of the expropriated

property to the Bulacan State University for the expansion of its

facilities and another 5 hectares to be used exclusively for the

propagation of the Philippine carabao. The remaining portion was

retained by the PIA.

This fact notwithstanding, and despite the 1984 court order, the

Santos heirs remained unpaid, and no action was taken on their

case until 16 September 1999 when petitioner filed its manifestation

and motion to permit the deposit in court of the amount of

P4,664,000.00 by way of just compensation for the expropriated

property of the late Luis Santos subject to such final computation as

might be approved by the court.

This time, the Santos heirs, opposing the manifestation and motion,

submitted a counter-motion to adjust the compensation from P6.00

per square meter previously fixed in the 1979 decision to its current

zonal valuation pegged at P5,000.00 per square meter or, in the

alternative, to cause the return to them of the expropriated

property.

Issue: Whether the state has validly exercised its power of eminent

domain.

Held:

The right of eminent domain is usually understood to be an ultimate

right of the sovereign power to appropriate any property within its

territorial sovereignty for a public purpose.[7]Fundamental to the

independent existence of a State, it requires no recognition by the

Constitution, whose provisions are taken as being merely

confirmatory of its presence and as being regulatory, at most, in the

due exercise of the power. In the hands of the legislature, the power

is inherent, its scope matching that of taxation, even that of police

power itself, in many respects. It reaches to every form of property

the State needs for public use and, as an old case so puts it, all

separate interests of individuals in property are held under a tacit

agreement or implied reservation vesting upon the sovereign the

right to resume the possession of the property whenever the public

interest so requires it.

The ubiquitous character of eminent domain is manifest in the nature

of the expropriation proceedings. Expropriation proceedings are not

adversarial in the conventional sense, for the condemning authority

is not required to assert any conflicting interest in the property. Thus,

by filing the action, the condemnor in effect merely serves notice

that it is taking title and possession of the property, and the

defendant asserts title or interest in the property, not to prove a right

to possession, but to prove a right to compensation for the taking.

However, the power is not without its limits:

first, the taking must be for public use, and

second, that just compensation must be given to the private owner

of the property.[10]

These twin proscriptions have their origin in the recognition of the

necessity for achieving balance between the State interests, on the

one hand, and private rights, upon the other hand, by effectively

restraining the former and affording protection to the latter.[11]

In determining ―public use,‖ two approaches are utilized –

the first is public employment or the actual use by the public, and

thesecond is public advantage or benefit.[12]

It is also useful to view the matter as being subject to constant

growth, which is to say that as society advances, its demands upon

the individual so increases, and each demand is a new use to which

the resources of the individual may be devoted.

The expropriated property has been shown to be for the continued

utilization by the PIA, a significant portion thereof being ceded for

the expansion of the facilities of the Bulacan State University and for

the propagation of the Philippine carabao, themselves in line with

the requirements of public purpose. Respondents question the public

nature of the utilization by petitioner of the condemned property,

pointing out that its present use differs from the purpose originally

contemplated in the 1969 expropriation proceedings. The argument

is of no moment. The property has assumed a public character upon

its expropriation. Surely, petitioner, as the condemnor and as the

owner of the property, is well within its rights to alter and decide the

use of that property, the only limitation being that it be for public use,

which, decidedly, it is.

In insisting on the return of the expropriated property, respondents

would exhort on the pronouncement in Provincial Government of

Sorsogon vs. Vda. de Villaroya[14] where the unpaid landowners

were allowed the alternative remedy of recovery of the property

there in question. It might be borne in mind that the case involved

the municipal government of Sorsogon, to which the power of

eminent domain is not inherent, but merely delegated and of limited

application. However, the points in dispute are whether such

payment can still be made and, if so, in what amount. Said lots have

been the subject of expropriation proceedings. It follows that both by

virtue of the judgment, long final, in the expropriation suit, as well as

the annotations upon their title certificates, plaintiffs are not entitled

to recover possession of their expropriated lots - which are still

devoted to the public use for which they were expropriated - but

only to demand the fair market value of the same.

Verily, private respondents, although not entitled to the return of the

expropriated property, deserve to be paid promptly on the yet

unpaid award of just compensation already fixed by final judgment

of the Bulacan RTC on 26 February 1979 at P6.00 per square meter,

with legal interest thereon at 12% per annum computed from the

date of "taking" of the property, i.e., 19 September 1969, until the due

amount shall have been fully paid.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.

34 Mactan-Cebu Intl Airport v. Lozada -jeff

By Jefferson Pond Victoriano and Faizah Tejero in 1st yr 2nd Sem

CASE DIGEST POOL · Edit Doc · Delete

Mactan-Cebu Intl Airport v. Lozada

Facts:

Subject of this case is Lot No. 88, with an area of 1,017 square meters,

located in Lahug, Cebu City. Its original owner was Anastacio

Deiparine when the same was subject to expropriation proceedings,

initiated by the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), represented by

the then Civil Aeronautics Administration (CAA), for the expansion

and improvement of the Lahug Airport.

During the pendency of the expropriation proceedings, respondent

Bernardo L. Lozada, Sr. acquired Lot No. 88 from Deiparine.

On December 29, 1961, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of

the Republic and ordered the latter to pay Lozada the fair market

value of Lot No. 88, adjudged at P3.00 per square meter.

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The affected landowners appealed. Pending appeal, the Air

Transportation Office (ATO), formerly CAA, proposed a compromise

settlement whereby the owners of the lots affected by the

expropriation proceedings would either not appeal or withdraw their

respective appeals in consideration of a commitment that the

expropriated lots would be resold at the price they were

expropriated in the event that the ATO would abandon the Lahug

Airport.

Because of this promise, Lozada did not pursue his appeal.

Thereafter, Lot No. 88 was transferred and registered in the name of

the Republic.

The projected improvement and expansion plan of the old Lahug

Airport, however, was not pursued.

On November 29, 1989, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued a

Memorandum to the Department of Transportation, directing the

transfer of general aviation operations of the Lahug Airport to the

Mactan International Airport before the end of 1990 and, upon such

transfer, the closure of the Lahug Airport.

From the date of the institution of the expropriation proceedings up

to the present, the public purpose of the said expropriation

(expansion of the airport) was never actually initiated, realized, or

implemented. Instead, the old airport was converted into a

commercial complex. Lot No. 88 became the site of a jail known as

Bagong Buhay Rehabilitation Complex , while a portion thereof was

occupied by squatters.

Thus, on June 4, 1996, petitioners initiated a complaint for the

recovery of possession and reconveyance of ownership of Lot No. 88.

In their Answer, petitioners asked for the immediate dismissal of the

complaint. The specifically denied that the Government had made

assurances to reconvey Lot No. 88 to respondents in the event that

the property would no longer be needed for airport operations.

Petitioners instead asserted that the judgment of condemnation was

unconditional, and respondents were, therefore, not entitled to

recover the expropriated property notwithstanding non-use or

abandonment thereof.

Aggrieved, petitioners (MCIAA) interposed an appeal to the CA.

After the filing of the necessary appellate briefs, the CA rendered its

assailed Decision dated February 28, 2006, denying petitioners

appeal and affirming in toto the Decision of the RTC, Branch 57,

Cebu City. Petitioners motion for reconsideration was, likewise,

denied in the questioned CA Resolution dated February 7, 2007.

Issue:

Hence, this petition arguing that: (1) the respondents utterly failed to

prove that there was a repurchase agreement or compromise

settlement between them and the Government

Holding:

The petition is DENIED. Respondents are ORDERED to return to

petitioners the just compensation they received for the expropriation

of Lot No. 88, plus legal interest, in the case of default, to be

computed from the time petitioners comply with their obligation to

reconvey Lot No. 88 to them.

Reasoning:

It is well settled that the taking of private property by the

Governments power of eminent domain is subject to two mandatory

requirements: (1) that it is for a particular public purpose; and (2) that

just compensation be paid to the property owner. These

requirements partake of the nature of implied conditions that should

be complied with to enable the condemnor to keep the property

expropriated.

More particularly, with respect to the element of public use, the

expropriator should commit to use the property pursuant to the

purpose stated in the petition for expropriation filed, failing which, it

should file another petition for the new purpose. If not, it is then

incumbent upon the expropriator to return the said property to its

private owner, if the latter desires to reacquire the same. Otherwise,

the judgment of expropriation suffers an intrinsic flaw, as it would lack

one indispensable element for the proper exercise of the power of

eminent domain, namely, the particular public purpose for which the

property will be devoted. Accordingly, the private property owner

would be denied due process of law, and the judgment would

violate the property owners right to justice, fairness, and equity.

In light of these premises, we now expressly hold that the taking of

private property, consequent to the Governments exercise of its

power of eminent domain, is always subject to the condition that the

property be devoted to the specific public purpose for which it was

taken. Corollarily, if this particular purpose or intent is not initiated or

not at all pursued, and is peremptorily abandoned, then the former

owners, if they so desire, may seek the reversion of the property,

subject to the return of the amount of just compensation received. In

such a case, the exercise of the power of eminent domain has

become improper for lack of the required factual justification.

Even without the foregoing declaration, in the instant case, on the

question of whether respondents were able to establish the existence

of an oral compromise agreement that entitled them to repurchase

Lot No. 88 should the operations of the Lahug Airport be abandoned,

we rule in the affirmative.

35 EPZA vs Dulay

By Kyrie Dea Maia and Faizah Tejero in 1st yr 2nd Sem CASE DIGEST

POOL · Edit Doc · Delete

EPZA vs Dulay

April 29, 1987

FACTS In 1979, the President issued a proclamation for the

establishment of an export processing zone by petitioner Export

Processing Zone Authority (EPZA) in Lapulapu, Mactan City, Cebu.

The area included four (4) parcels of land owned and registered in

the name of the private respondent. EPZA offered to purchase the

land but they failed to reach an agreement regarding the sale of the

property.

EPZA filed with the trial court of Cebu a complaint for expropriation

pursuant to P.D. 66 which empowers the petitioner to acquire by

condemnation proceedings any property for the establishment of

export processing zones for the purpose of establishing the Mactan

Export Processing Zone.

The trial court issued a writ of possession authorizing EPZA to take

immediate possession of the premises, issued the order of

condemnation declaring the petitioner as having the lawful right to

take the properties sought to be condemned, upon the payment of

just compensation. The respondent judge also issued a second order,

subject of this petition, appointing certain persons as commissioners

to ascertain and report to the court the just compensation for the

properties sought to be expropriated. Three commissioners submitted

their consolidated report recommending the amount of P15.00 per

square meter as the fair and reasonable value of just compensation

for the properties.

EZRA filed MFR on the grounds that P.D. No. 1533 has superseded

Sections 5 to 8 of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court on the ascertainment

of just compensation through commissioners; and that the

compensation must not exceed the maximum amount set by P.D.

No. 1533. Trial court denied the MFR.

ISSUE * Whether or not Sections 5 to 8, Rule 67 of the Revised Rules of

Court had been repealed or deemed amended by P.D. No. 1533

insofar as the appointment of commissioners to determine the just

compensation is concerned.

Whether or not the exclusive and mandatory mode of determining

just compensation in P.D. No. 1533(**fair and current market value

declared by the owner of the property sought to be expropriated or

the market value as determined by the assessor, whichever is

lower) valid and constitutional?

RULING P.D. No. 1533, which eliminates the court's discretion to

appoint commissioners pursuant to Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, is

unconstitutional and void. To hold otherwise would be to undermine

the very purpose why this Court exists in the first place. The prior P.Ds

Nos. 76, 464, 794 having the same method of determining just

compensation are also unconstitutional.

SC: The method of ascertaining just compensation under the

mentioned decrees constitutes impermissible encroachment on

judicial prerogatives. It tends to render this Court inutile in a matter

which under the Constitution is reserved to it for final determination.

The doctrine enunciated in National Housing Authority v. Reyes,

supra, therefore, must necessarily be abandoned if we are to uphold

this Court's role as the guardian of the fundamental rights

guaranteed by the due process and equal protection clauses and

as the final arbiter over transgressions committed against

constitutional rights.

Just compensation means the value of the property at the time of

the taking. It means a fair and full equivalent for the loss sustained. All

the facts as to the condition of the property and its surroundings, its

improvements and capabilities, should be considered.

In this particular case, the tax declarations presented by the

petitioner as basis for just compensation were made by the Lapu-

Lapu municipal, later city assessor long before martial law, when land

was not only much cheaper but when assessed values of properties

were stated in figures constituting only a fraction of their true market

value. The private respondent was not even the owner of the

properties at the time. It purchased the lots for development

purposes. To peg the value of the lots on the basis of documents

which are out of date and at prices below the acquisition cost of

present owners would be arbitrary and confiscatory.

36.) Eslaban vs. vda de Onorio

By Marxzxz Yap in 1st yr 2nd Sem CASE DIGEST POOL · Edit

Doc · Delete

36.) Eslaban vs. vda de Onorio

360 scra 230 (2001)

(Page 2, When should just compensation be fixed?)

Facts:

• Clarita Vda. De Onorio is the owner of the land in Barangay M.

Roxas, Sto. Nino, South Cotabato

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.

• Such land is the subject for the construction of an irrigation canal of

the National Irrigation Administration (NIA). Mr. Santiago Eslaban Jr. is

the project manager of NIA.

• The parties agreed to the construction of the canal provided that

the government will pay for the area that has been taken.

• A right-of-way agreement was entered into by the parties in which

respondent was paid the amount of P4, 180.00 as right of way

damages.

• Subsequently, respondent executed an Affidavit of Waiver of Rights

and Fees which waives her rights for the damage to the crops due to

construction of the right of way.

• After which, respondent demands that petitioner pay P111, 299.55

for taking her property but the petitioner refused.

• Petitioner states that the government had not consented to be sued

and that the respondent is not entitled for compensation by virtue of

the homestead patent under CA no. 141.

• The RTC held that the NIA should pay respondent the amount of

P107, 517.60 as just compensation for the 24,660 sq meters that have

been used for the construction of the canal.

• The Court of Appeals also affirmed the decision of the RTC.

Issue: Whether or not the value of just compensation shall be

determined from the time of the taking or from the time of the finality

of the decision.

Held: With respect to the compensation which the owner of the

condemned property is entitled to receive, it is likewise settled that it

is the market value which should be paid or “that sum of money

which a person, desirous but not compelled to buy, and an owner,

willing but not compelled to sell, would agree on as a price to be

given and received therefor.” Further, just compensation means not

only the correct amount to be paid to the owner of the land but also

the payment of the land within a reasonable time from its taking.

Without prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered “just”

for then the property owner is made to suffer the consequence of

being immediately deprived of his land while being made to wait for

a decade or more before actually receiving the amount necessary

to cope with his loss. Nevertheless, as noted in Ansaldo v. Tantuico,

Jr., there are instances where the expropriating agency takes over

the property prior to the expropriation suit, in which case just

compensation shall be determined as of the time of taking, not as of

the time of filing of the action of eminent domain.

A final order sustaining the right to expropriate the property may be

appealed by any party aggrieved thereby. Such appeal, however,

shall not prevent the court from determining the just compensation to

be paid.

After the rendition of such an order, the plaintiff shall not be permitted

to dismiss or discontinue the proceeding except on such terms as the

court deems just and equitable.

Thus, the value of the property must be determined either as of the

date of the taking of the property or the filing of the complaint,

“whichever came first.” Even before the new rule, however, it was

already held in Commissioner of Public Highways v. Burgos that the

price of the land at the time of taking, not its value after the passage

of time, represents the true value to be paid as just compensation. It

was, therefore, error for the Court of Appeals to rule that the just

compensation to be paid to respondent should be determined as of

the filing of the complaint in 1990, and not the time of its taking by the

NIA in 1981, because petitioner was allegedly remiss in its obligation

to pay respondent, and it was respondent who filed the complaint. In

the case of Burgos

, it was also the property owner who brought the action for

compensation against the government after 25 years since the

taking of his property for the construction of a road.

Indeed, the value of the land may be affected by many factors. It

may be enhanced on account of its taking for public use, just as it

may depreciate. As observed in Republic v. Lara: [W]here property is

taken ahead of the filing of the condemnation proceedings, the

value thereof may be enhanced by the public purpose for which it is

taken; the entry by the plaintiff upon the property may have

depreciated its value thereby; or there may have been a natural

increase in the value of the property from the time it is taken to the

time the complaint is filed, due to general economic conditions. The

owner of private property should be compensated only for what he

actually loses; it is not intended that his compensation shall extend

beyond his loss or injury. And what he loses is only the actual value of

his property at the time it is taken. This is the only way that

compensation to be paid can be truly just, i.e., “just” not only to the

individual whose property is taken, “but to the public, which is to pay

for it”.

37 NPC vs. Ibrahim- Silos

By Mitchai Silos in 1st yr 2nd Sem CASE DIGEST POOL · Edit

Doc · Delete

NPC VS. IBRAHIM

G.R. No. 168732, June 29, 2007

FACTS: Sometime in 1978, NAPOCOR, through alleged stealth and

without respondents' (Ibrahim and his co-heirs) knowledge and prior

consent, took possession of the sub-terrain area of the latter‘s lands

and constructed therein underground tunnels. Ibrahim thus instituted

an action against petitioner NAPOCOR for recovery of possession of

land and damages before the RTC of Lanao del Sur. NAPOCOR

contended that the tunnels are a government project for the benefit

of all and all private lands are subject to such easement as may be

necessary for the same. It further contended that such easement did

not involve any loss of title or possession. Another of the errors

assigned by petitioner NAPOCOR is that assuming that it is liable to

pay just compensation, it should be made to pay the value of the

land from the time it constructed the tunnels.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not respondents are entitled to just compensation for

the acquisition of the easement over their land.

2. When should just compensation be fixed?

RULING:

1. Yes. The manner in which the easement was created by

NAPOCOR violated the due process rights of respondents as it was

without notice and indemnity to them and did not go through proper

expropriation proceedings. Landowners cannot be deprived of their

right over their land until expropriation proceedings are instituted in

court.

2. In the present case, to allow NAPOCOR to use the date it

constructed the tunnels as the date of valuation would be grossly

unfair. First, it did not enter the land under warrant or color of legal

authority or with intent to expropriate the same. In fact, it did not

bother to notify the owners and wrongly assumed it had the right to

dig those tunnels under their property. Secondly, the

―improvements‖ introduced by petitioner, namely, the tunnels, in no

way contributed to an increase in the value of the land. The trial

court, therefore, as affirmed by the CA, rightly computed the

valuation of the property as of 1992, when respondents discovered

the construction of the huge underground tunnels beneath their

lands and petitioner confirmed the same and started negotiations for

their purchase but no agreement could be reached.

Policy:

The general rule in determining “just compensation” in eminent

domain is the value of the property as of the date of the filing of the

complaint. The general rule, however, admits of an exception: where

the Court fixed the value of the property as of the date it was taken

and not the date of the commencement of the expropriation

proceeding.Such as in the case of:

Provincial Government of Rizal vs. Caro de Araullo, the Court ruled

that “the owners of the land have no right to recover damages for

this unearned increment resulting from the construction of the public

improvement (lengthening of Taft Avenue from Manila to Pasay)

from which the land was taken. To permit them to do so would be to

allow them to recover more than the value of the land at the time it

was taken, which is the true measure of the damages, or just

compensation, and would discourage the construction of important

public improvements.

Simply stated, the exception finds the application where the owner

would be given undue incremental advantages arising from the use

to which the government devotes the property expropriated.

38 Tan v. Rep 523 S 203 2007

By Ran Datukon in 1st yr 2nd Sem CASE DIGEST POOL · Edit

Doc · Delete

E. Just Compensation – 1. When should just compensation be fixed?

Tan vs. Republic

523 S 203 (2007)

Facts: Julita P. Tan, petitioner herein, is the registered owner of a

parcel of land consisting of 7,161 square meters located at the

southern bank of the Zapote River in Sitio Wawa, Pulang Lupa,

Las Piñas City. Her ownership is evidenced by Transfer Certificate of

Title (TCT) No. 78188 of the Registry of Deeds, same city. She

acquired this property from the San Antonio Development

Corporation (SADC) as shown by a document denominated

―Irrevocable and Exclusive Special Power of Attorney‖ dated April 6,

2001, whereby she assumed SADC‘s ―obligation of paying all

imposable taxes due said land.‖ In consideration of such assumption

and ―for value‖ she ―stepped into the shoes‖ of SADC ―free to

exercise such rights and prerogatives as owner of the subject

property, including the right to collect and demand payment for the

sale and/or use of the subject land or any portion thereof, by and

from any person or entity.‖

The Public Estates Authority (PEA) is a government-owned and

controlled corporation, organized and existing pursuant to

Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1084 representing in this case the

Republic of the Philippines, herein respondent. Among the properties

PEA manages is the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road (Coastal Road),

also known as the R-1 Expressway.

Prior to the transfer of the property to petitioner by SADC, or

on March 29, 1985, PEA wrote SADC requesting permission to enter

the latter‘s property, then covered by TCT No. 439101, for the

purpose of constructing thereon the southern abutment of the

Zapote Bridge at the Coastal Road. PEA also proposed to SADC to

CONSTI II – Atty. Rovynne Jumao-as 1-Manresa-SanchezRoman Team Digest ©2011-2012

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start their negotiation for its acquisition of the latter‘s property. SADC

replied authorizing PEA to enter the property, subject to the condition

that the latter should pay a monthly rental of P10,000.00. PEA then

directed its contractor, the Philippine National Construction

Corporation, to enter the property and begin the necessary

engineering works on the Coastal Road. PEA requested SADC either

to donate or sell the property to the government. SADC replied by

offering to sell the property to PEA. SADC‘s asking price

was P1,288,980.00 plus P400,000.00 as compensation for the house

and other improvements thereon that were destroyed during the

construction of the Coastal Road.

PEA informed SADC it has no plan to buy the whole lot, but

only the 1,131 square meter portion above sea level. PEA then asked

SADC to submit proofs of ownership and costs of the improvements

which were demolished. Negotiations then ensued between the

parties. However, for the past twenty (20) years, they failed to reach

an agreement. On April 6, 2001, petitioner Julita Tan acquired the

property from SADC. PEA has been collecting toll fees from the road

users in the average amount of P1,039,404.85 per day, as shown by a

document denominated ―Traffic Count of the Year 2002. Despite its

collection of huge toll fees, PEA continuously refuses to pay petitioner

any compensation.

On October 20, 2003, petitioner filed with the RTC a motion to order

PEA to immediately pay her just compensation based on the zonal

valuation of the BIR. This was opposed by PEA. The trial court

decided in favor of the petitioner. PEA timely filed a motion for

reconsideration but it was denied by the trial court in its Order. PEA

then elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals by way of a

petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus. The CA decided in

favor of PEA. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration; the CA

denied the same. Hence, this petition.

Issue: Whether the CA erred in holding that the just compensation

for petitioner‘s property should be based on the BIR zonal valuation in

1985 when petitioner entered the subject property.

Held: The SC ruled that the CA erred in ruling that PEA‘s taking of

the property occurred in 1985 and that the compensation should be

based on the BIR zonal valuation in that year. Section 9, Article III of

the Constitution specifically mandates that ―Private property shall not

be taken for public use without just compensation.‖

In City of Manila v. Estrada, we held that ―compensation‖

means ―an equivalent for the value of land (property) taken.‖ The

use of the word ―just‖ is ―to convey the idea that the equivalent to

be rendered for the property taken shall be real, substantial, full,

ample.‖ Thus, Estrada defined just compensation as ―a fair and full

equivalent for the loss sustained.‖ Then in Manila Railroad Co.

v.Caligsahan, we held that ―to be exactly just, the compensation

should be estimated at the time of the taking.‖ Subsequently,

in Republic v. Vda. de Castellvi, we ruled that just compensation is

determined as of the date of the taking of the property or the filing of

the complaint, whichever came first.

PEA‘s entry into the property with the permission of SADC, its previous

owner, was not for the purpose of expropriating the

property. Records show and as stressed by Mr. Justice Renato

C. Dacudao of the CA in his Dissenting Opinion, SADC allowed PEA

to enter the land on condition that it should pay a monthly rental of

P10,000.00. Thereafter, PEA, in a letter dated May 28, 1985,

requested SADC to donate or sell the land to the government. On

October 22, 1985, SADC responded, offering to sell the land to PEA

for P1,288,980.00, plus P400,000.00 representing the value of the

improvements destroyed by PEA when it entered the

property. However, since 1985 up to the present, no agreement has

been reached between PEA and SADC or herein petitioner who

acquired the property from the latter. While PEA has been earning

huge toll fees, it has refused to pay petitioner any compensation for

the use of her property in violation of her right as an owner. The

above circumstances clearly show that when PEA

entered petitioner‘s land in 1985, it was not for the purpose of

expropriating it. We stress that after its entry, PEA wrote SADC

requesting to donate or sell the land to the government. Indeed,

there was no intention on the part of PEA to expropriate the subject

property. It could have simply exercised its power of eminent

domain.

Section 2, Rule 67 (on Expropriation) of the same Rules provides,

among others, that upon the filing of the complaint or at any time

thereafter and after due notice to the defendant, the plaintiff shall

have the right to take or enter upon the possession of the real

property involved if he deposits with the authorized government

depositary an amount equivalent to the assessed value of the

property. It bears reiterating that in Republic v. Vda. de Castellvi, we

ruled that just compensation is determined as of the date of the

taking of the property or the filing of the complaint, whichever came

first. The trial court, therefore, was correct in ordering respondent,

through PEA, upon the filing of its complaint for expropriation, to pay

petitioner just compensation on the basis of the BIR zonal valuation of

the subject property at P20,000.00 per square meter.

39 HEIRS OF MATEO PIDACAN et. al v. ATO

By Sigrid G. Mier in 1st yr 2nd Sem CASE DIGEST POOL · Edit

Doc · Delete 1. When should just compensation be fixed?

HEIRS OF MATEO PIDACAN et. al v. ATO (Air Transportation Office)

G.R. No. 162779 June 15, 2007

This is a petition for review on certiorari are the Decision dated

August 20, 2003 and the Resolution dated March 17, 2004 of the

Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 72404, which reversed the

Decision dated February 1, 2001 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of

San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, Branch 46 in Civil Case No. R-800.

FACTS:

Sometime in 1935, spouses

Mateo Pidacan and Romana Eigo acquired under the homestead

provision of Act No. 2874[3] a parcel of land consisting of about 22

hectares situated in San Jose, Occidental Mindoro. Patent No. 33883

and Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 2204 were issued on the

land, in the names of the Pidacanspouses.

In 1948, the Civil Aeronautics Administration (now Air Transportation

Office or ―ATO‖) used a portion of the said property as an airport.

Upon the death of the Pidacanspouses in 1974, the ATO constructed

a perimeter fence and a new terminal building on the property. The

ATO also lengthened, widened, and cemented the airport‘s runway.

The spouses‘ heirs

namely, Pacita Pidacan Vda. de Zubiri and Adela Pidacan Vda. de

Robles demanded from ATO the payment of the value of the

property as well as rentals for the use of the occupied premises.

However, they were told that payment could not be made because

the property was still in their parents‘ name.

With the loss of the owner‘s copy of OCT

No.2204, Pacita Pidacan Vda. de Zubiri filed a petition for the

issuance of another owner‘s duplicate. On February 23, 1988, OCT

No. 2204 was cancelled and Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-

7160 was issued in favor of the heirs. The heirs presented TCT No. T-

7160 and the death certificates of their parents to the ATO, but the

latter still refused to pay them.

The heirs claimed that they were entitled to payment of rentals plus

the value of the property. The ATO countered that the heirs were not

entitled to any payment, either of the value of the land or of the

rentals because the property had been sold to its predecessor, the

defunct Civil Aeronautics Administration for P0.70 per square meter.

The ATO claimed that even if it failed to obtain title in its name, it had

been declaring the property for taxation purposes.

The heirs subsequently filed with the RTC a complaint against the ATO

for payment of the value of the property as well as rentals for its use

and occupation. The ATO, in turn, filed a complaint for expropriation,

which was dismissed on the ground that it would be absurd for the

ATO to expropriate a parcel of land it considered its own.

On September 12, 1994, the trial court promulgated a Decision

ordering the ATO to pay rentals and the value of the land at P89 per

square meter. The ATO appealed to the Court of Appeals on the

ground that the trial court erred in fixing the value of the property on

the basis of its present value.

The Court of Appeals rendered a Decision setting aside the RTC

Decision and remanded the case to the court a quo for further

proceedings. The appellate court also ruled that just compensation

should be determined as of the time the property was taken for

public use.

After trial upon remand of the case to the court of origin, judgment

was rendered anew as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby

rendered:

1. Expropriating the actual area occupied by the defendant Air

Transportation Office of the plaintiff’s property covered by Transfer

Certificate of Title No. T-7160, totaling Two Hundred Fifteen Thousand

Seven Hundred Thirty Seven (215,737) square meters, in favor of

defendant;

2. Ordering defendant Air Transportation Office to pay plaintiffs

the amount of Three Hundred Four ((P304.00) Pesos per square meter

for the area herein expropriated which totals to Sixty Five Million Five

Hundred Eight (sic) Four Thousand Forty Eight (P65,584,048.00) Pesos

with interest thereon at the rate of 12% per annum from February 1,

2001, until the same is fully paid.

3. Ordering defendant Air Transportation Office to pay plaintiffs

monthly rentals for the use and occupation of the subject property

cited in item No. 1 above, computed as follows:

Three Thousand Fifty Eight Pesos and Forty Centavos (P3,058.40) from

1957 to 1977;

Four Thousand Twenty Two Pesos and Sixty five Centavos (P4,022.60)

from 1978 to 1979;

Six Thousand Thirty Four Pesos and Fifty Centavos (P6,034.50) from

1980 to 1984;

Nine Thousand Six Hundred Ninety Nine Pesos and Sixty Centavos

(P9,699.60) from 1985 to 1991;

Seventeen Thousand Nine Hundred thirteen Pesos and Sixty

Centavos (P17,913.60) from 1992 to 1994;

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Thirty Seven Thousand One Hundred Eighty One Pesos and Eighty

Centavos (P37,181.80) from 1995 to 1997;

Fifty Four Thousand Six Hundred Fifty Eight Pesos and Sixty Centavos

(P54,658.60) from 1998 to January 31, 2001;

or a total monthly rentals, from January 1, 1957 to January 31, 2001,

of Six Million Two hundred Forty Nine Thousand Six Hundred Forty Five

Pesos and Forty Centavos (P6,249,645.40) with interest thereon at the

rate of 12% per annum, until the same is fully paid;

4. Ordering defendant Air Transportation Office to pay plaintiffs

ten (10%) per cent of the amount involved as and for attorney’s fees

and expenses of litigation; and

5. Ordering defendant Air Transportation Office to pay the costs

of suit.

The ATO once again appealed to the Court of Appeals, which in its

assailed Decision reversed the trial court’s ruling. The heirs moved for

reconsideration but it was denied. Aggrieved, the heirs filed the

instant petition.

ISSUE: When should just compensation be fixed?

HELD: In the instant case, it is necessary to resolve the issues

concerning the taking of the subject property, the time when the

taking took place and the appropriate value of just compensation.

In this case, it is undisputed that petitioners‘ private property was

converted into an airport by respondent ATO. As a consequence,

petitioners were completely deprived of beneficial use and

enjoyment of their property. Clearly, there was taking in the concept

of expropriation as early as 1948 when the airport was constructed

on petitioners‘ private land.

As a rule, the determination of just compensation in eminent domain

cases is reckoned from the time of taking. In this case, however,

application of the said rule would lead to grave injustice. Note that

the ATO had been using petitioners‘ property as airport since 1948

without having instituted the proper expropriation proceedings. To

peg the value of the property at the time of taking in 1948, despite

the exponential increase in its value considering the lapse of over

half a century, would be iniquitous. We cannot allow the ATO to

conveniently invoke the right of eminent domain to take advantage

of the ridiculously low value of the property at the time of taking that

it arbitrarily chooses to the prejudice of petitioners.

In this particular case, justice and fairness dictate that the

appropriate reckoning point for the valuation of petitioners‘ property

is when the trial court made its order of expropriation in 2001. As for

the fair value of the subject property, we believe that the amount

arrived at by the commissioners appointed by the trial court, P304.39

per square meter, constitutes just compensation to petitioners.

However, the trial court‘s award of rental payments to petitioners is

not supported by evidence on record and must be deleted. To justify

such award, the purported contract of lease must first be proven by

competent evidence.

Lastly, the interest accruing fixed by the trial court at the rate of 12%

per annum is not consistent with law and should be reduced to the

legal interest rate of 6% per annum.

PETITION IS GRANTED. The Decision dated February 1, 2001 of the

Regional Trial Court of San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, Branch 46 in

Civil Case No. R-800 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION, as follows:

1. The actual area occupied by respondent ATO covered by

Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-7160, totaling 215,737 square meters

is declared expropriated in favor of the ATO.

2. The ATO is ordered to pay petitioners the amount of P304.39 per

square meter for the area expropriated, or a total

of P65,668,185.43 with interest at the rate of 6% per annum

from February 1, 2001, until the same is fully paid.

40-Santos vs. Land Bank of the Philippines

By Mae Bungabong in 1st yr 2nd Sem CASE DIGEST POOL · Edit

Doc · Delete

Santos vs. Land Bank of the Philippines

September 7, 2000

Facts:

Edgardo Santos who is the plaintiff Trial Court, sitting as an Agrarian

Court rendered judgment, the dispositive portion of in Agrarian Case

No. RTC 94-3206 for the determination of just compensation

regarding properties which were taken by DAR under P.D. No. 27 in

1972.

The Court rendered its decision for such case fixing the amount of

P49,241,876.00 to be the just compensation for the irrigated and

unirrigated ricelands with areas of 36.4152 and 40.7874 hectares,

respectively, and situated at Pinit, Ocampo, Camarines Sur which

are portions of the agricultural lands. And ordering the Land Bank of

the Philippines to pay the plaintiff the amount of FORTY-FIVE MILLION

SIX HUNDRED NINE-EIGHT THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED FIVE AND

34/100 (P45,698,805.34) PESOS, Philippine currency, in the manner

provided by R.A. 6657, by way of full payment of the said just

compensation.

Land Bank released a preliminary valuation in the amount of

P3,543,070.66 in cash and bond. Leaving the balance of to

P45,698,805.34 which was ordered by the Regional Trial Court to be

paid in accordance with RA 6657.

The Land Bank elevated the matter to the Supreme Court, which

eventually dismissed the appeal in its Resolution dated December 17,

1997. Accordingly, a writ of execution was issued by the Regional Trial

Court on December 4, 1997 and a notice of garnishment was served

on the Land Bank on December 17, 1997.

On December 22, 1997, the Regional Trial Court issued an Order

declaring that the Land Bank had complied with the writ of

execution and ordered the same to release the amount of

P44,749,947.82 to petitioner and the amount of P948,857.52 to the

Clerk of Court as commission fees for execution of judgment.

The Land Bank remitted the amount of P948,857.52 to the Clerk of

Court on December 24, 1997 and released the amount of

P3,621,023.01 in cash and Land Bank Bond No. AR-0002206 in the

amount of P41,128,024.81 to the petitioner.

Petitioner filed a motion for the issuance of an alias writ of execution

before the Regional Trial Court, praying that the payment of the

compensation be in proportion of P8,629,179.36 in bonds and

P32,499,745 in cash, alleging that the cash portion should include the

amounts in the Decision representing the interest payments.

Before the motion could be resolved by the Regional Trial Court,

petitioner moved to withdraw the same and instead filed a motion

for release of the balance of the garnished amount. He claimed that

the payment of P41,128,024.81 in Land Bank Bonds was not

acceptable to him and that the said amount should be paid in cash

or certified check.

The respondent Land Bank, on the other hand, opposed the motion,

contending that the judgment amount had already been satisfied

on December 24, 1997.

The Regional Trial Court issued an Order on March 20, 1998 for the

Land Bank to release the balance of P41,128,024.81 from the

garnished amount in cash or certified check.

The Land Bank moved for a reconsideration of the said Order,

maintaining that the payment was properly made in Land Bank

Bonds.

On March 25, 1998, petitioner filed a motion to hold the Land Bank in

contempt for its refusal to release the balance of the garnished

amount in cash or certified check.

Respondent Regional Trial Court presided over by a new judge,

resolved the two motions on April 24, 1998. It held that the payment

of just compensation must be computed in the manner provided for

in Section 18, Republic Act No. 6657. Thus, it ruled that: To summarize,

the very issue to be resolved in the instant case is to determine how

much should be paid in cash and how much also should be paid in

bonds, to fully satisfy the judgment herein rendered in the amount of

P49,241,876.00.

The Order of March 20, 1997 as well as that of December 22, 1997

should be reconsidered. It goes without saying that the payment of

just compensation must be made in accordance with Sec. 18,

Republic Act No. 6657 in relation to Section 9, Rule 39 of the 1997

Rules of Civil Procedure

The Court finds no merit in the motion to cite in contempt of court the

Land Bank of the Philippines. WHEREFORE, Defendant Land Bank of

the Philippines is hereby ordered to pay the [p]laintiff the [c]ash

[b]alance of FIVE MILLION SEVEN HUNDRED NINETY TWO THOUSAND

EIGHTY-FOUR and 37/100 (P5,792,084.37), Philippine [c]urrency and

the amount of THIRTY FIVE MILLION, THREE HUNDRED THIRTY SIX

THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED FORTY and 16/100 (P35,336,840.16)

PESOS in government instruments or bonds to fully satisfy the

Judgment herein in the amount of forty-nine million two hundred

forty one thousand eight hundred seventy six (P49,241,876.00) pesos,

Philippine currency as just compensation due the plaintiff.

Petitioner appealed to CA: The CA upheld the questioned April 24,

1998 Order of the trial court. The appellate court opined that the

Order merely ascertained the mode of compensation for petitioner's

expropriated properties, as decreed in the final judgment, and was

issued pursuant to the court a quo's general supervisory control over

the process of execution.

Thus, the petitioner filed this Petition for Review of Certiorari.

Issue: Whether or not the April 24, 1998 Order of Judge Llaguno was

proper.

Held/Ruling: It is proper thus; there is no merit for this petition. All told,

we hold that the appellate court was correct in sustaining the

propriety and the efficacy of the April 24, 1998 Order of Judge

Llaguno. In the exercise of her supervisory powers over the execution

of a final and executory judgment,[i][14] such as her August 12, 1997

Decision, special circumstances attending its execution impelled her

to issue the Order clarifying the terms thereof.

Reasoning: The argument is not persuasive. The April 24, 1998 Order

was not an illegal amendment of the August 12, 1997 judgment

which had become final and executory. The reason is that the Order

did not revise, correct, or alter the Decision. Rather, the Order

iterated and made clear the essence of the final judgment.

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The August 12, 1997 judgment mandated compensation to the

petitioner "in the manner provided by R.A. 6657."[ii][9] There is

certitude with regard to this assertion. The confusion in the present

case, which required the issuance of the assailed Order, arose from

petitioner's belief that the Land Bank had obligated itself to pay in

cash the compensation due him. This fact can allegedly be gleaned

from its compliance with the December 4, 1997 Writ of Execution and

December 19, 1997 Notice of Garnishment.

Respondent bank was obliged to follow the mandate of the August

12, 1997 judgment. Hence, its compliance with the Writ of Execution

and the Notice of Garnishment[iii][11] ought to have been construed

as an agreement to pay petitioner in the manner set forth in Republic

Act No. 6657. Its compliance was not an undertaking to pay in cash

because such act would have been a deviation from the dictum of

the final judgment, to which execution must conform.[iv][12] Paying

in cash, as petitioner demands, is not compatible with such

judgment.

Misplaced is petitioner's reliance on Section 9, Rule 39 of the Rules of

Court, because the final judgment decrees payment in cash and

bonds. Indeed, this provision must be taken in conjunction with RA

6657.

Since respondent bank had already given petitioner the entire

adjudged amount in the requiredproportion of cash and bonds, it

must be deemed to have complied with its duty under Rule 39.

We understand petitioner's desire to be paid in cash; after all, his

compensation was long overdue. However, we cannot grant his

Petition because it is not sustained by the law. In this regard, we

recall the Court's explanation in Association of Small Landowners in

the Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform:"It cannot be

denied from these cases that the traditional method for the payment

of just compensation is money and no other. And so, conformably,

has just compensation been paid in the past solely in that medium.

However, we do not deal here with the traditional exercise of the

power of eminent domain. This is not an ordinary expropriation where

only a specific property of relatively limited area is sought to be

taken by the State from its owner for a specific and perhaps local

purpose. What we deal with here is a revolutionary kind of

expropriation.compensation provided for in the afore-quoted

Section 18 of the CARP Law is not violative of the Constitution. We do

not mind admitting that a certain degree of pragmatism has

influenced our decision on this issue, but after all this Court is not a

cloistered institution removed from the realities and demands of

society or oblivious to the need for its enhancement. The Court is as

acutely anxious as the rest our people to see the goal of agrarian

reform achieved at last after the frustrations and deprivations of our

peasant masses during all these disappointing decades. We are

aware that invalidation of the said section will result in the nullification

of the entire program, killing the farmer's hopes even as they

approach realization and resurrecting the specter of discontent and

dissent in the restless countryside. That is not in our view the intention

of the Constitution, and that is not what we shall decree today."

Accepting the theory that payment of the just compensation is not

always required to be made fully in money, we find further that the

proportion of cash payment to the other things of value constituting

the total payment, as determined on the basis of the areas of the

lands expropriated, is not unduly oppressive upon the landowner. It is

noted that the smaller the land, the bigger the payment in money,

primarily because the small landowner will be needing it more than

the big landowners, who can afford a bigger balance in bonds and

other things of value. No less importantly, the government financial

instruments making up the balance of the payment are 'negotiable

at any time.' The other modes, which are likewise available to be

landowner at his option, are also not unreasonable because

payment is made in shares of stock, LBP bonds, other properties or

assets, tax credits, and other things of value equivalent to the

amount of just compensation.

41. Reyes vs. NHA

By Alexand Rhea Villahermosa in 1st yr 2nd Sem CASE DIGEST

POOL · Edit Doc · Delete

41. Reyes vs. National Housing Authority ( NHA ), Villahermosa

Facts: Respondent National Housing Authority (NHA)

filedcomplaints for the expropriation of sugarcane lands belonging

to the petitioners. The stated public purpose of the expropriation was

the expansion of the Dasmariñas Resettlement Project to

accommodate the squatters who were relocated from

the Metropolitan Manila area. The trial court rendered judgment

ordering the expropriation of these lots and the payment of

just compensation. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the

lower court.

A few years later, petitioners contended that respondent NHA

violated the stated public purpose for the expansion of the

Dasmariñas Resettlement Project when it failed to relocate the

squatters from the Metro Manila area, as borne out by the ocular

inspection conducted by the trial court which showed that most of

the expropriated properties remain unoccupied. Petitioners likewise

question the public nature of the use by respondent NHA when it

entered into a contract for the construction of low cost housing units,

which is allegedly different from the stated public purpose in the

expropriation proceedings. Hence, it is claimed that respondent NHA

has forfeited its rights and interests by virtue of the expropriation

judgment and the expropriated properties should now be returned

to herein petitioners.

Issue: Whether or not the judgment of expropriation was forfeited in

the light of the failure of respondent NHA to use the expropriated

property for the intended purpose but for a totally different purpose.

Held: The Supreme Court held in favor of the respondent NHA.

Accordingly, petitioners cannot insist on a restrictive view of the

eminent domain provision of the Constitution by contending that the

contract for low cost housing is a deviation from the stated public

use. It is now settled doctrine that the concept of public use is no

longer limited to traditional purposes. The term "public use" has now

been held to be synonymous with "public interest," "public benefit,"

"public welfare," and "public convenience." Thus, whatever may be

beneficially employed for the general welfare satisfies the

requirement of public use."

In addition, the expropriation of private land for slum clearance and

urban development is for a public purpose even if the developed

area is later sold to private homeowners, commercials firms,

entertainment and service companies, and other private concerns.

Moreover, the Constitution itself allows the State to undertake, for the

common good and in cooperation with the private sector, a

continuing program of urban land reform and housing which will

make at affordable cost decent housing and basic services to

underprivileged and homeless citizens in urban centers and

resettlement areas. The expropriation of private property for the

purpose of socialized housing for the marginalized sector is in

furtherance of social justice.

42 Republic vs CA

By Shiela Basadre in 1st yr 2nd Sem CASE DIGEST POOL · Edit

Doc · Delete

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the General Manager

of the PHILIPPINE INFORMATION AGENCY (PIA), petitioner, vs. THE

HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and the HEIRS OF LUIS SANTOS as

herein represented by DR. SABINO SANTOS and PURIFICACION

SANTOS IMPERIAL, respondents.

FACTS: Petitioner instituted expropriation proceedings on 19

September 1969 before the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan, covering

a total of 544,980 square meters of contiguous land in Bulacan, to be

utilized for the continued broadcast operation and use of radio

transmitter facilities for the ―Voice of the Philippines‖ project.

This property was previously occupied by lessee, "Voice of America"

and now occupied by Petitioner, through the Philippine Information

Agency (―PIA‖). Petitioner made a deposit of P517,558.80, the sum

provisionally fixed as being the reasonable value of the property.

Out of the total area of 544,980 square meters, 76,589 square meters

are owned by Luis Santos, the predecessor-in-interest of the

respondents.

On 26 February 1979, or more than nine years after the institution of

the expropriation proceedings,an order was issued by the court:

for the condemnation of the whole property consisting of 544,980

square meters;

for the payment to defendants just compensation for said property

which is the fair market value of the land condemned, computed at

the rate of six pesos (P6.00) per square meter, with legal rate of

interest from September 19, 1969, until fully paid;

In 1984, or more than five years after the decision of the court, the

respondents did not receive payment for just compensation which

lead them to file a motion seeking payment for the expropriated

property. The Bulacan RTC ordered for the payment of the said

property amounting to P1,058,655.05 but this was not complied with

and so the respondents filed an action directed to the provincial

treasurer of Bulacan for release P72,683.55, representing the share of

the deposit made by petitioner in 1969. This was granted by the trial

court.

Despite the 1984 court order, no payment was received by the

Santos heirs and no action was taken on their case. On 16

September 1999 the petitioner filed its manifestation and motion to

permit the deposit in court of the amount of P4,664,000.00 by way of

just compensation for the expropriated property of the late Luis

Santos subject to such final computation as might be approved by

the court but the Santos heirs, opposed the manifestation and

motion. They submitted a counter-motion:

to adjust the compensation from P6.00 per square meter previously

fixed in the 1979 decision to its current zonal valuation pegged at

P5,000.00 per square meter

or, in the alternative

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to cause the return to them of the expropriated property.

On 01 March 2000, the Bulacan RTC ruled in favor of respondents

and issued the assailed order, The decision of 26 February 1979 was

declared to be unenforceable on the ground of prescription. The

RTC ordered the return of the expropriated property of the late

defendant Luis Santos to his heirs.

ISSUE: W/N the unpaid landowners are allowed the alternative

remedy of recovery of the expropriated property.

RULING: No. Unpaid landowners are not allowed to recover the

expropriated property as an alternative remedy.

In the case of Provincial Government of Sorsogon vs. Vda. de

Villaroya[14] where the unpaid landowners were allowed the

alternative remedy of recovery of the property there in question. It

might be borne in mind that the case involved the municipal

government of Sorsogon, to which the power of eminent domain is

not inherent, but merely delegated and of limited application. The

grant of the power of eminent domain to local governments under

Republic Act No. 7160[15] cannot be understood as being the

pervasive and all-encompassing power vested in the legislative

branch of government. For local governments to be able to wield

the power, it must, by enabling law, be delegated to it by the

national legislature, but even then, this delegated power of eminent

domain is not, strictly speaking, a power of eminent, but only of

inferior, domain or only as broad or confined as the real authority

would want it to be

In the case of Alfonso vs. Pasay City, the recovery of possession of

property taken for public use prayed for by the unpaid landowner

was denied even while no requisite expropriation proceedings were

first instituted. The landowner was merely given the relief of

recovering compensation for his property computed at its market

value at the time it was taken and appropriated by the State.

Respondents can only claim just compensation.

The constitutional limitation of ―just compensation‖ is considered to

be the sum equivalent to the market value of the property, broadly

described to be the price fixed by the seller in open market in the

usual and ordinary course of legal action and competition or the fair

value of the property as between one who receives, and one who

desires to sell, it fixed at the time of the actual taking by the

government.[25] Thus, if property is taken for public use before

compensation is deposited with the court having jurisdiction over the

case, the final compensation must include interests on its just value to

be computed from the time the property is taken to the time when

compensation is actually paid or deposited with the court.[26] In fine,

between the taking of the property and the actual payment, legal

interests accrue in order to place the owner in a position as good as

(but not better than) the position he was in before the taking

occurred.

The Bulacan trial court, in its 1979 decision, was correct in imposing

interests on the zonal value of the property to be computed from the

time petitioner instituted condemnation proceedings and ―took‖ the

property in September 1969. This allowance of interest on the amount

found to be the value of the property as of the time of the taking

computed, being an effective forbearance, at 12% per

annum[28] should help eliminate the issue of the constant fluctuation

and inflation of the value of the currency over time.[29] Article 1250

of the Civil Code, providing that, in case of extraordinary inflation or

deflation, the value of the currency at the time of the establishment

of the obligation shall be the basis for the payment when no

agreement to the contrary is stipulated, has strict application only to

contractual obligations.[30] In other words, a contractual agreement

is needed for the effects of extraordinary inflation to be taken into

account to alter the value of the currency.

Private respondents, although not entitled to the return of the

expropriated property, deserve to be paid promptly on the yet

unpaid award of just compensation already fixed by final judgment

of the Bulacan RTC on 26 February 1979 at P6.00 per square meter,

with legal interest thereon at 12% per annum computed from the

date of "taking" of the property, i.e., 19 September 1969, until the due

amount shall have been fully paid.

43. Republic v. Lim

By Aziraphale Zheng in 1st yr 2nd Sem CASE DIGEST POOL · Edit

Doc · Delete

From Philamie Soria

September 5, 1938- the Republic of the Philippines (Republic)

instituted a special civil action for expropriation with the CFI of Cebu

involving Lots 932 and 939 of the Banilad Friar Land Estate, Lahug,

Cebu City, for the purpose of establishing a military reservation for

the Philippine Army.

The said lots were registered under Gervasia Denzon and Eulalia

Denzon respectively.

October 19, 1938- Republic took possession of the lots after

depositing P9,500.00 with the Philippine National Bank.

May 14, 1940- the CFI rendered its Decision ordering the Republic to

pay the Denzons the sum of P4,062.10 as just compensation.

April 5, 1948- An entry of judgment was made

In 1950- Jose Galeos, one of the heirs of the Denzons, filed with the

National Airports Corporation a claim for rentals for the two lots, but it

―denied knowledge of the matter.‖ The claim on the said lot by

another heir, Nestor Belocura was likewise denied

September 20, 1961- the Denzons‘ successors-in-interest, Francisca

Galeos-Valdehueza and Josefina Galeos-Panerio filed with the same

CFI an action for recovery of possession with damages against the

Republic and officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines in

possession of the property.

Valdehueza and Panerio were issued the titles with the annotation

―subject to the priority of the National Airports Corporation to acquire

said parcels of land, Lots 932 and 939 upon previous payment of a

reasonable market value.‖

July 31, 1962- The successors in interests‘ claim were favored by the

court declaring them as the owners because of the Republic‘s failure

to pay the amount of P4,062.10 as just compensation. The records do

not show that the Government paid the owners or their successors-in-

interest according to the 1940 CFI decision although, as

stated, P9,500.00 was deposited by it, and said deposit had been

disbursed. With the records lost, however, it cannot be known who

received the money. ‗It is further certified that the corresponding

Vouchers and pertinent Journal and Cash Book were destroyed

during the last World War, and therefore the names of the payees

concerned cannot be ascertained.‘ However, because of the

annotation on their land titles, they were ordered to execute a deed

of sale in favor of the Republic.

Valdehueza and Panerio appealed the decision but the Supreme

Court held that the properties could no longer be recovered.

Although they remained the registered owners because of the

Republic‘s failure to pay the compensation, the remedy left is to

demand payment of the fair market value.

Can such payment still be made and, if so, in what amount?

The payment of just compensation is no longer proper at this point.

By final and executory judgment in said proceedings, they were

condemned for public use, as part of an airport, and ordered sold to

the Government. In fact the annotations contained the right of the

National Airports Corporation (now CAA) to pay for and acquire

them. It follows that both by virtue of the judgment, long final, in the

expropriation suit, as well as the annotations upon their title

certificates, plaintiffs are not entitled to recover possession of their

expropriated lots – which are still devoted to the public use for which

they were expropriated – but only to demand the fair market value

of the same.‖

1964- Valdehueza and Panerio mortgaged Lot 932 to Vicente

Lim, herein respondent, as security for their loans. For their failure to

pay Lim despite demand, he had the mortgage foreclosed in 1976.

A new TCT was issued in Lim‘s name.

August 20, 1992- respondent Lim filed a complaint for quieting of title

against General Romeo Zulueta, as Commander of the Armed

Forces of the Philippines, Commodore Edgardo Galeos, as

Commander of Naval District V of the Philippine Navy, Antonio

Cabaluna, Doroteo Mantos and Florencio Belotindos, herein

petitioners. Subsequently, he amended the complaint to implead

the Republic.

RTC- declared plaintiff Vicente Lim the absolute and exclusive owner

of Lot No. 932 with all the rights of an absolute owner including the

right to possession.

CA- sustained the decision of the RTC

ISSUE:

Whether the Republic has retained ownership of Lot 932 despite its

failure to pay respondent‘s predecessors-in-interest the just

compensation therefore pursuant to the judgment of the CFI

rendered as early asMay 14, 1940

HELD:

One of the basic principles enshrined in our Constitution is that no

person shall be deprived of hisprivate property without due process

of law; and in expropriation cases, an essential element of due

process is that there must be just compensation whenever private

property is taken for public use.

Accordingly, Section 9, Article III,of our Constitution mandates: "

Private property shall not be taken for public use without just

compensation. The Republic disregarded the foregoing provision

when it failed and refused to pay respondent‘s predecessors-in-

interest the just compensation.

The final judgment in the expropriation proceedings was entered

on April 5, 1948. More than half of a century has passed, yet, to this

day, the landowner, now respondent, has remained empty-handed.

Undoubtedly, over 50 years of delayed payment cannot, in any way,

be viewed as fair.

Just compensation embraces not only the correct determination of

the amount to be paid to the owners of the land, but also the

payment for the land within a reasonable time from its taking.

Without prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered

‗just.’” In jurisdictions similar to ours, where an entry to the

expropriated property precedes the payment of compensation, it

has been held that if the compensation is not paid in a reasonable

time, the party may be treated as a trespasser ab initio.

CONSTI II – Atty. Rovynne Jumao-as 1-Manresa-SanchezRoman Team Digest ©2011-2012

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It is the obstinacy of the Republic that prompted us to dismiss its

petition outright. As early as May 19, 1966, in Valdehueza, this Court

mandated the Republic to pay respondent‘s predecessors-in-interest

the sum of P16,248.40 as ―reasonable market value of the two lots in

question.‖ Unfortunately, it did not comply and allowed several

decades to pass without obeying this Court‘s mandate.

Such prolonged obstinacy bespeaks of lack of respect to private

rights and to the rule of law, which we cannot countenance. It is

tantamount to confiscation of private property. While it is true that all

private properties are subject to the need of government, and the

government may take them whenever the necessity or the exigency

of the occasion demands, however, the Constitution guarantees

that when this governmental right of expropriation is exercised, it shall

be attended by compensation.

Significantly, the above-mentioned provision of Section 9, Article III of

the Constitution is not a grant but a limitation of power. This limiting

function is in keeping with the philosophy of the Bill of Rights against

the arbitrary exercise of governmental powers to the detriment of the

individual‘s rights. Given this function, the provision should therefore

be strictly interpreted against the expropriator, the government,

and liberally in favor of the property owner.

Significantly, in Municipality of Biñan v. Garcia[15] this Court ruled

that the expropriation of lands consists of two stages, to wit:

―x x x The first is concerned with the determination of the authority of

the plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain and the

propriety of its exercise in the context of the facts involved in the suit.

It ends with an order, if not of dismissal of the action, ―of

condemnation declaring that the plaintiff has a lawful right to take

the property sought to be condemned, for the public use or purpose

described in the complaint, upon the payment of just compensation

to be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint‖ x x x. The second phase of the eminent domain action is concerned with

the determination by the court of ―the just compensation for the

property sought to be taken.‖ This is done by the court with the

assistance of not more than three (3) commissioners. x x x.

It is only upon the completion of these two stages that expropriation

is said to have been completed.

The Republic‘s assertion that the defense of the State will be in grave

danger if we shall order the reversion of Lot 932 to respondent is an

overstatement. First, Lot 932 had ceased to operate as an airport.

What remains in the site is just the National Historical Institute‘s.

And second, there are only thirteen (13) structures located on Lot

932, eight (8) of which are residence apartments of military

personnel.

Respondent is entitled to recover possession of the expropriated lot

from the Republic. Unless this form of swift and effective relief is

granted to him, the grave injustice committed against his

predecessors-in-interest, though no fault or negligence on their part,

will be perpetuated.

The issue of whether or not respondent acted in bad faith is

immaterial considering that the Republic did not complete the

expropriation process. In short, it failed to perfect its title over Lot 932

by its failure to pay just compensation. The issue of bad faith would

have assumed relevance if the Republic actually acquired title over

Lot 932.

It bears emphasis that when Valdehueza and Panerio mortgaged Lot

932 to respondent in 1964, they were still the owners thereof and their

title had not yet passed to the petitioner Republic. In fact, it never

did. Such title or ownership was rendered conclusive when we

categorically ruled in Valdehueza that: ―It is true that plaintiffs are still

the registered owners of the land, there not having been a transfer of

said lots in favor of the Government.‖

In summation, while the prevailing doctrine is that ―the non-payment

of just compensation does not entitle the private landowner to

recover possession of the expropriated lots, however, in cases where

the government failed to pay just compensation within five (5) years

from the finality of the judgment in the expropriation proceedings,

the owners concerned shall have the right to recover possession of

their property. This is in consonance with the principle that ―the

government cannot keep the property and dishonor the

judgment.‖ To be sure, the five-year period limitation will encourage

the government to pay just compensation punctually. This is in

keeping with justice and equity. After all, it is the duty of the

government, whenever it takes property from private persons against

their will, to facilitate the payment of just compensation.