1987 consti cases

8/8/2019 1987 Consti Cases

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Francisco vs. House of Representatives(GR 160261, 10 November 2003)En Banc, Carpio Morales (J): 1 concurs, 3 wrote separate concurring opinions to which 4 concur, 2 wrote concurring anddissenting separate opinions to which 2 concur.Facts: On 28 November 2001, the 12th Congress of the House of Representatives adopted and approved the Rules ofProcedure in Impeachment Porceedings, superceding the previous House Impeachment Rules approved by the 11thCongress. On 22 July 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution, which directed the Committee on Justice"to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice ofthe Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF). On 2 June 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed animpeachment complaint (first impeachment complaint) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven AssociateJustices of the Supreme Court for "culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and other high crimes."The complaint was endorsed by House Representatives, and was referred to the House Committee on Justice on 5 August2003 in accordance with Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution. The House Committee on Justice ruled on 13 October2003 that the first impeachment complaint was "sufficient in form," but voted to dismiss the same on 22 October 2003 forbeing insufficient in substance. Four months and three weeks since the filing of the first complaint or on 23 October 2003, aday after the House Committee on Justice voted to dismiss it, the second impeachment complaint was filed with theSecretary General of the House by House Representatives against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on thealleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House Resolution. The second impeachment complaintwas accompanied by a "Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by at least 1/3 of all the Members of the House ofRepresentatives. Various petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus were filed with the Supreme Court against theHouse of Representatives, et. al., most of which petitions contend that the filing of the second impeachment complaint isunconstitutional as it violates the provision of Section 5 of Article XI of the Constitution that "[n]o impeachment proceedingsshall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year."

Issue: Whether the power of judicial review extends to those arising from impeachment proceedings.Held: The Court's power of judicial review is conferred on the judicial branch of the government in Section 1, Article VIII ofour present 1987 Constitution. The "moderating power" to "determine the proper allocation of powers" of the differentbranches of government and "to direct the course of government along constitutional channels" is inherent in all courts as anecessary consequence of the judicial power itself, which is "the power of the court to settle actual controversies involvingrights which are legally demandable and enforceable." As indicated in Angara v. Electoral Commission, judicial review isindeed an integral component of the delicate system of checks and balances which, together with the corollary principle ofseparation of powers, forms the bedrock of our republican form of government and insures that its vast powers are utilizedonly for the benefit of the people for which it serves. The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system ofgovernment. It obtains not through express provision but by actual division in our Constitution. Each department of thegovernment has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere. But it does notfollow from the fact that the three powers are to be kept separate and distinct that the Constitution intended them to beabsolutely unrestrained and independent of each other. The Constitution has provided for an elaborate system of checksand balances to secure coordination in the workings of the various departments of the government. And the judiciary in turn,with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter, effectively checks the other departments in the exercise of its power to determine

the law, and hence to declare executive and legislative acts void if violative of the Constitution.The major difference between the judicial power of the Philippine Supreme Court and that of the U.S. Supreme Court is thatwhile the power of judicial review is only impliedly granted to the U.S. Supreme Court and is discretionary in nature, thatgranted to the Philippine Supreme Court and lower courts, as expressly provided for in the Constitution, is not just a powerbut also a duty, and it was given an expanded definition to include the power to correct any grave abuse of discretion on thepart of any government branch or instrumentality. There are also glaring distinctions between the U.S. Constitution and thePhilippine Constitution with respect to the power of the House of Representatives over impeachment proceedings. While theU.S. Constitution bestows sole power of impeachment to the House of Representatives without limitation, our Constitution,though vesting in the House of Representatives the exclusive power to initiate impeachment cases, provides for severallimitations to the exercise of such power as embodied in Section 3(2), (3), (4) and (5), Article XI thereof. These limitationsinclude the manner of filing, required vote to impeach, and the one year bar on the impeachment of one and the sameofficial. The people expressed their will when they instituted the above-mentioned safeguards in the Constitution. This showsthat the Constitution did not intend to leave the matter of impeachment to the sole discretion of Congress. Instead, itprovided for certain well-defined limits, or "judicially discoverable standards" for determining the validity of the exercise ofsuch discretion, through the power of judicial review. There is indeed a plethora of cases in which this Court exercised the

power of judicial review over congressional action. Finally, there exists no constitutional basis for the contention that theexercise of judicial review over impeachment proceedings would upset the system of checks and balances. Verily, theConstitution is to be interpreted as a whole and "one section is not to be allowed to defeat another." Both are integralcomponents of the calibrated system of independence and interdependence that insures that no branch of government actbeyond the powers assigned to it by the Constitution.Commission on Human Rights Employees' Association (CHREA) vs. Commission on Human Rights[GR 155336, 25 November 2004]Second Division, Chico-Nazario (J): 4 concurFacts: On 14 February 1998, Congress passed Republic Act 8522, otherwise known as the General Appropriations Act of1998. It provided for Special Provisions Applicable to All Constitutional Offices Enjoying Fiscal Autonomy. The last portion ofArticle XXXIII covers the appropriations of the Commission on Human Rights (CHR). These special provisions tacklesOrganizational Structure and the Use of Savings. On the strength of these special provisions, the CHR, through its then


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Chairperson Aurora P. Navarette-Recia and Commissioners Nasser A. Marohomsalic, Mercedes V. Contreras, Vicente P.Sibulo, and Jorge R. Coquia, promulgated Resolution A98-047 n 04 September 1998, adopting an upgrading andreclassification scheme among selected positions in the Commission. Annexed to said resolution is the proposed creation often additional plantilla positions, namely: one Director IV position, with Salary Grade 28 for the Caraga Regional Office, fourSecurity Officer II with Salary Grade 15, and five Process Servers, with Salary Grade 5 under the Office of theCommissioners. On 19 October 1998, CHR issued Resolution No. A98-055 providing for the upgrading or raising of salarygrades of certain positions in the Commission. It, likewise, provided for the creation and upgrading of other positions. Tosupport the implementation of such scheme, the CHR, in the same resolution, authorized the augmentation of acommensurate amount generated from savings under Personnel Services. By virtue of Resolution A98-062 dated 17November 1998, the CHR collapsed the vacant positions in the body to provide additional source of funding for saidstaffing modification. Among the positions collapsed were: one Attorney III, four Attorney IV, one Chemist III, three SpecialInvestigator I, one Clerk III, and one Accounting Clerk II. The CHR forwarded said staffing modification and upgradingscheme to the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) with a request for its approval, but the then DBM secretaryBenjamin Diokno denied the request. In light of the DBMs disapproval of the proposed personnel modification scheme, theCivil Service Commission (CSC)-National Capital Region Office, through a memorandum dated 29 March 1999,recommended to the CSC-Central Office that the subject appointments be rejected owing to the DBMs disapproval of theplantilla reclassification. Meanwhile, the officers of the Commission on Human Rights Employees Association (CHREA), inrepresentation of the rank and file employees of the CHR, requested the CSC-Central Office to affirm the recommendation ofthe CSC-Regional Office. CHREA stood its ground in saying that the DBM is the only agency with appropriate authoritymandated by law to evaluate and approve matters of reclassification and upgrading, as well as creation of positions. TheCSC-Central Office denied CHREAs request in a Resolution dated 16 December 1999, and reversed the recommendationof the CSC-Regional Office that the upgrading scheme be censured. CHREA filed a motion for reconsideration, but the CSC-Central Office denied the same on 9 June 2000. Given the cacophony of judgments between the DBM and the CSC,

CHREA elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals affirmed the pronouncement of the CSC-CentralOffice and upheld the validity of the upgrading, retitling, and reclassification scheme in the CHR on the justification that suchaction is within the ambit of CHRs fiscal autonomy. The CHREA filed the petition for review.Issue: Whether CHREA is a proper party to bring the suit in Court.Held: It has been held in a multitude of cases that a proper party is one who has sustained or is in immediate danger ofsustaining an injury as a result of the act complained of. Here, CHREA, which consists of rank and file employees of CHR,protests that the upgrading and collapsing of positions benefited only a select few in the upper level positions in theCommission resulting to the demoralization of the rank and file employees. This sufficiently meets the injury test. Indeed, theCHRs upgrading scheme, if found to be valid, potentially entails eating up the Commissions savings or that portion of itsbudgetary pie otherwise allocated for Personnel Services, from which the benefits of the employees, including those in therank and file, are derived. Further, the personality of the CHREA to file this case was recognized by the CSC when it tookcognizance of the CHREAs request to affirm the recommendation of the CSC-National Capital Region Office. CHREAspersonality to bring the suit was a non-issue in the Court of Appeals when it passed upon the merits of this case. Thus,neither should our hands be tied by this technical concern. Indeed, it is settled jurisprudence that an issue that was neitherraised in the complaint nor in the court below cannot be raised for the first time on appeal, as to do so would be offensive to

the basic rules of fair play, justice, and due process.CIVIL LIBERTIES UNIONvs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARYG.R. No. 83896 February 22, 1991FERNAN,C.J.:THE CASE:

Seek a declaration of the unconstitutionality of Executive Order No. 284 issued by President Corazon C. Aquinoand issuance of the extraordinary writs of prohibition andm andam us, as well as a temporary restraining order directingpublic respondents therein to cease and desist from holding, in addition to their primary positions, dual or multiple positionsother than those authorized by the 1987 Constitution and from receiving any salaries, allowances, per diems and other formsof privileges and the like appurtenant to their questioned positions, and compelling public respondents to return, reimburseor refund any and all amounts or benefits that they may have received from such positions.THE FACTS:

Petitioner Anti-Graft League of the Philippines charges that then DOJ Secretary Sedfrey Ordoez, construingSection 13, Article VII in relation to Section 7, par. (2), Article IX-B, rendered an opinion declaring that Cabinet members,their deputies (undersecretaries) and assistant secretaries may hold other public office, including membership in the boards

of government corporations:(a) when directly provided for in the Constitution as in the case of the Secretary of Justice whois made anex- offi cio member of the Judicial and Bar Council under Section 8, paragraph 1,Article VIII; or(b) if allowed by law; or(c) if allowed by the primary functions of their respective positions.On the basis of this opinion, the President Aquino promulgated Executive Order No. 284.

Petitioners maintain that this EO which allows members of the Cabinet, their undersecretaries and assistantsecretaries to hold other government offices or positions in addition to their primary positions runs counter to Section 13,Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. That by virtue of the phrase "unless otherwise provided in this Constitution," the onlyexceptions against holding any other office or employment in Government are those provided in the Constitution, namely:(1) The Vice-President may be appointed as a Member of the Cabinet under Section 3, par. (2),


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Article VII thereof; and(2) (2) the Secretary of Justice is anex- offi cio member of the Judicial and Bar Council by virtue ofSection 8 (1), Article VIII.

Petitioners further argue that the exception to the prohibition in Section 7, par. (2), Article I-XB on the Civil ServiceCommission applies to officers and employees of the Civil Service in general and that said exceptions do not apply andcannot be extended to Section 13, Article VII which applies specifically to the President, Vice-President, Members of theCabinet and their deputies or assistants.

The Solicitor General counters that DOJ Opinion No. 73 being the first official construction and interpretation by theSecretary of Justice of Section 13, Article VII and par. (2) of Section 7, Article I- XB of the Constitution, involving the samesubject of appointments or designations of an appointive executive official to positions other than his primary position, is"reasonably valid and constitutionally firm," and that Executive Order No. 284, promulgated pursuant to DOJ Opinion No. 73,series of 1987 is consequently constitutional. It is worth noting that DOJ Opinion No. 129 and DOJ Opinion No. 155,(subsequent opinions aftern Opinion No. 73) construed the limitation imposed by E.O. No. 284 as not applying toex-off iciopositions or to positions which, although not so designated asex- offi cio are allowed by the primary functions of the publicofficial, but only to the holding of multiple positions which are not related to or necessarily included in the position of thepublic official concerned.THE ISSUE:Whether or not EO 284 is constitutional?THE RULING:

Being head of an executive department is no mean job. It is more than a full-time job, requiring full attention,specialized knowledge, skills and expertise. If maximum benefits are to be derived from a department head's ability andexpertise, he should be allowed to attend to his duties and responsibilities without the distraction of other governmentaloffices or employment. He should be precluded from dissipating his efforts, attention and energy among too many positions

of responsibility, which may result in haphazardness and inefficiency. Surely the advantages to be derived from thisconcentration of attention, knowledge and expertise, particularly at this stage of our national and economic development, faroutweigh the benefits, if any, that may be gained from a department head spreading himself too thin and taking in more thanwhat he can handle.

While all other appointive officials in the civil service are allowed to hold other office or employment in thegovernment during their tenure when such is allowed by law or by the primary functions of their positions, members of theCabinet, their deputies and assistants may do so only when expressly authorized by the Constitution itself. In other words,Section 7, Article I-XB is meant to lay down the general rule applicable to all elective and appointive public officials andemployees, while Section 13, Article VII is meant to be the exception applicable only to the President, the Vice- President,Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants.

In the light of the construction given to Section 13, Article VII in relation to Section 7, par. (2), Article IX-B of the1987 Constitution, Executive Order No. 284 dated July 23, 1987 is unconstitutional. Ostensibly restricting the number ofpositions that Cabinet members, undersecretaries or assistant secretaries may hold in addition to their primary position tonot more than two (2) positions in the government and government corporations, Executive Order No. 284 actually allowsthem to hold multiple offices or employment in direct contravention of the express mandate of Section 13, Article VII of the

1987 Constitution prohibiting them from doing so, unless otherwise provided in the 1987 Constitution itself.Executive Order No. 284 is hereby declared null and void and is accordingly set aside.Manila Prince Hotel v. GSISGR 122156, 3 February 1997En banc, Bellosillo (p): 6 concur, others dissentFacts: The Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), pursuant to the privatization program of the PhilippineGovernment under Proclamation 50 dated 8 December 1986, decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of theissued and outstanding shares of the Manila Hotel (MHC). In a close bidding held on 18 September 1995 only two biddersparticipated: Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000shares at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for thesame number of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner. Pending the declaration of RenongBerhard as the winning bidder/strategic partner and the execution of the necessary contracts, the Manila Prince Hotelmatched the bid price of P44.00 per share tendered by Renong Berhad in a letter to GSIS dated 28 September 1995. ManilaPrince Hotel sent a managers check to the GSIS in a subsequent letter, but which GSIS refused to accept. On 17 October1995, perhaps apprehensive that GSIS has disregarded the tender of the matching bid and that the sale of 51% of the MHC

may be hastened by GSIS and consummated with Renong Berhad, Manila Prince Hotel came to the Court on prohibitionand mandamus.Issue(s):

Whether the provisions of the Constitution, particularly Article XII Section 10, are self-executing.

Whether the 51% share is part of the national patrimony.Held: A provision which lays down a general principle, such as those found in Article II of the 1987 Constitution, is usuallynot self-executing. But a provision which is complete in itself and becomes operative without the aid of supplementary orenabling legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule by means of which the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected,is self-executing. Thus a constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of the right conferred and theliability imposed are fixed by the constitution itself, so that they can be determined by an examination and construction of itsterms, and there is no language indicating that the subject is referred to the legislature for action. In self-executingconstitutional provisions, the legislature may still enact legislation to facilitate the exercise of powers directly granted by the


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constitution, further the operation of such a provision, prescribe a practice to be used for its enforcement, provide aconvenient remedy for the protection of the rights secured or the determination thereof, or place reasonable safeguardsaround the exercise of the right. The mere fact that legislation may supplement and add to or prescribe a penalty for theviolation of a self-executing constitutional provision does not render such a provision ineffective in the absence of suchlegislation. The omission from a constitution of any express provision for a remedy for enforcing a right or liability is notnecessarily an indication that it was not intended to be self-executing. The rule is that a self-executing provision of theconstitution does not necessarily exhaust legislative power on the subject, but any legislation must be in harmony with theconstitution, further the exercise of constitutional right and make it more available. Subsequent legislation however does notnecessarily mean that the subject constitutional provision is not, by itself, fully enforceable. As against constitutions of thepast, modern constitutions have been generally drafted upon a different principle and have often become in effect extensivecodes of laws intended to operate directly upon the people in a manner similar to that of statutory enactments, and thefunction of constitutional conventions has evolved into one more like that of a legislative body. Hence, unless it is expresslyprovided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions ofthe constitution are self-executing. If the constitutional provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead of self-executing, the legislature would have the power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law. In fine,Section 10, second paragraph, Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive command which is complete in itselfand which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. From its very words the provisiondoes not require any legislation to put it in operation.In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony pertains to heritage. When the Constitution speaks of nationalpatrimony, it refers not only to the natural resources of the Philippines, as the Constitution could have very well used theterm natural resources, but also to the cultural heritage of the Filipinos. It also refers to Filipinos intelligence in arts, sciencesand letters. In the present case, Manila Hotel has become a landmark, a living testimonial of Philippine heritage. While it wasrestrictively an American hotel when it first opened in 1912, a concourse for the elite, it has since then become the venue of

various significant events which have shaped Philippine history. In the granting of economic rights, privileges, andconcessions, especially on matters involving national patrimony, when a choice has to be made between a qualifiedforeigner and a qualified Filipino, the latter shall be chosen over the former.The Supreme Court directed the GSIS, the Manila Hotel Corporation, the Committee on Privatization and the Office of theGovernment Corporate Counsel to cease and desist from selling 51% of the Share of the MHC to Renong Berhad, and toaccept the matching bid of Manila Prince Hotel at P44 per shere and thereafter execute the necessary agreements anddocument to effect the sale, to issue the necessary clearances and to do such other acts and deeds as may be necessaryfor the purpose.Mabanag vs Lopez VitoFACTSThis is a petition for prohibition to prevent the enforcement of a congressional resolution designated "Resolution of bothhouses proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the Philippines to be appended as an ordinance thereto."The petitioners contend that their vote were not taken into consideration in requiring that in amending the constitution, thelaw requires 3/4 of the votes of the member of the Congress thus arriving in the question of constitutionality of the saidresolution.

ISSUESWhether or not the Court has jurisdiction and whether or not the journals can be investigated against the

conclusiveness of the enrolled bills.HELDPetition is dismissed without cost. The Court held that to go behind the enrolled bills which were already authenticated andto investigate the journals amounts to disregard of the respect due to the coequal and independent department of the state,and it would be an inquisition into the conduct of the members of the legislature, a very delicate power, the frequent exerciseof which must lead to confusion in the administration of the law.Duly certified copies shall be conclusive proof of the provisions of Acts and the due enactment thereof.Kilosbayan vs Guingona27.KILOSBAYAN v. GUINGONAFacts:

Petitioners filed a case for the prohibition / injunction with a prayer for a TRO & preliminary injunction againstthe implementation of the Contract of Lease between PCSO & PGMC in connection to an online lotto system. Petitioners aresuing in their capacity as members of Congress and as taxpayers. On DECEMBER 17, 1993 the Contract of Lease was

executed and approved by the president on DECEMBER 20, 1993. Petitioner claims that the respondents & the OFFICE OFTHE PRESIDENT gravely abused their discretion tantamount to a lack of authority by entering into the contract, because:

1. Section 1 of RA 1169 (PCSO Charter) prohibits the PCSO from conducting lotteries in cooperation with any entity2. RA 3846 & jurisprudence require Congresional franchise before a telecom system (public utility) can be established3. Article 12 of Section 11 of the Constitution prohibits companies with less than 60% Filipino Ownership from operating a public

system4. PGMG is not authorized by its charter or by RA 7042 (Foreign Investment Act) to install an online Lotto systema. The contract shows that PGMC is the actual operatior while it is a 75% foreign-owned company. RA 7042 puts all forms of

gambling on the negative listRespondents answered the allegations by contending:1. PGMC is only an independent contractor. There is noshared franchise
http://jrulawstudentcentral.blogspot.com/2009/07/mabanag-vs-lopez-vito.htmlhttp://jrulawstudentcentral.blogspot.com/2009/07/mabanag-vs-lopez-vito.html


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2. PCSO will not a operate a public system as a telecom system is an indispensable requirement of an online lottery system.Petitioner interpretation of Section 1 of RA 1169 too narrow.3. There are no violations of laws4. The issue of morality is a political one and should not beresolved in a legal forum5. Petitioners are without legal standing, as illustrated inValmonte vs. PCSO

a. The PCSO is a corporate entity and can enter into all kinds of contracts to achieve objectives. Arguing that PCSO will operate apublic utility, it is still exempted under Section of Act 3846, wherelegislativefranchiseesarenotnecessary for radio stationsIssues:1. Whether or not petitioners have standing2. Whether or not the contract is legal under Section 1 ofRA 1169Held:

1. Yes, petitioners have standing. Standing is only a procedural technicality that can be set aside depending on the importance ofan issue. As taxpayers and citizens to be affected by the reach of the lotto system, petitioners have standing.2. No, the contract is illegal. The Court rules in thenegative arguing that whatever is not unequivocally

granted is withheld. PCSO cannot share the franchise in any way. The contracts nature can be understood to form theintent of the parties as evident in the provisions of the contract. Article 1371 of the CC provides that the intent of contractingparties are determined in part through their acts. The only contribution PCSO will be giving is the authority to operate. Allrisks are to be taken by the lessor; operation will be taken by the PCSO only after 8 years. Further proof are:a. Payment of investment acts in the even ofcontract suspension / breachb. Rent not fixed at 4.9% and can be reducedgiven that all risks are borne by the lessor

c. Prohibition against PGMC involvement in competitor games; strange if gaming is PGMC; businessd. Public stock requirement of 25% in 2 years, which is unreasonable for a lease contract. It indicates that PGMC is the operator

and the condition an attempt to increase public benefit through public involvement.e. Escrow deposit may be used as performancebond.

f. PGMC operation evident in personnel management, procedural and coordinating rules set by the lessor.g. PCSO authority to terminate contact upon

PGMC insolvencyThe contract indicates that PCSO is the actual lessor of the authority to operate given the indivisible community betweenthem.Wherefore, Petition granted. Contract invalid and TRO madepermanentCruz, Concurring:

The respondent was not able to prove the allegations that the contract was intentionally crafted to appear to bea lease. PCSO cannot operate without the collaboration of PGMC. The rental fee underscores the PGMC interest in thesuccess of the venture, since their income depends on the degree of success. The transaction is immoral insofar as theactivity is fixed by the foreigners on us with government approval.Feliciano concurring:

Locus standi reflects an important constitutional principle: the separation of powers. The rules is that thoseassailing statute must show the adverse effect of its implementation has on them. But it is not a rigid rule. It is not enoughthat the court invoke public mistrust or national concern in brushing aside the requirement, as it would mean standing isdependent on a majority and is far from being intellectually satisfying. While no principle has been set for determining

standing, the guidelines are:1.character of funds involved (is it public in nature? inthis case, the funds are from the general populace);taxpayer with right to see taxes used properly.

2. clear disregard of a law prohibiting certain actions of a public agency the judicial conclusion on case merits interact with thenotion of locus standi

Tolentino vs. Commission on Elections[GR 148334, 21 January 2004]En Banc, Carpio (J): 8 concur, 1 dissents in separate opinion to which 3 joinFacts: Shortly after her succession to the Presidency in January 2001, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo nominated thenSenator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. (Senator Guingona) as Vice-President. Congress confirmed the nomination of Senator


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Guingona who took his oath as Vice-President on 9 February 2001. Following Senator Guingonas confirmation, the Senateon 8 February 2001 passed Resolution 84 certifying to the existence of a vacancy in the Senate. Resolution 84 called onCOMELEC to fill the vacancy through a special election to be held simultaneously with the regular elections on 14 May 2001.Twelve Senators, with a 6-year term each, were due to be elected in that election. Resolution 84 further provided that theSenatorial candidate garnering the 13th highest number of votes shall serve only for the unexpired term of former SenatorTeofisto T. Guingona, Jr., which ends on 30 June 2004. On 5 June 2001, after COMELEC had canvassed the electionresults from all the provinces but one (Lanao del Norte), COMELEC issued Resolution 01-005 provisionally proclaiming 13candidates as the elected Senators. Resolution 01-005 also provided that the first twelve (12) Senators shall serve for aterm of six (6) years and the thirteenth (13th) Senator shall serve the unexpired term of three (3) years of Senator Teofisto T.Guingona, Jr. who was appointed Vice-President. Ralph Recto (Recto) and Gregorio Honasan (Honasan) ranked 12thand 13th, respectively, in Resolution 01-005. On 20 June 2001, Arturo Tolentino and Arturo Mojica, as voters and taxpayers,filed the petition for prohibition, impleading only COMELEC as respondent. Tolentino and Mojica sought to enjoin COMELECfrom proclaiming with finality the candidate for Senator receiving the 13th highest number of votes as the winner in thespecial election for a single three-year term seat. Accordingly, Tolentino and Mojica prayed for the nullification of Resolution01-005 in so far as it makes a proclamation to such effect. Tolentino and Mojica contend that COMELEC issued Resolution01-005 without jurisdiction because: (1) it failed to notify the electorate of the position to be filled in the special election asrequired under Section 2 of RA 6645; (2) it failed to require senatorial candidates to indicate in their certificates of candidacywhether they seek election under the special or regular elections as allegedly required under Section 73 of BP 881; and,consequently, (3) it failed to specify in the Voters Information Sheet the candidates seeking election under the special orregular senatorial elections as purportedly required under Section 4, paragraph 4 of RA 6646. Tolentino and Mojica add thatbecause of these omissions, COMELEC canvassed all the votes cast for the senatorial candidates in the 14 May 2001elections without distinction such that there were no two separate Senate elections held simultaneously but just a singleelection for thirteen seats, irrespective of term. Tolentino and Mojica sought the issuance of a temporary restraining order

during the pendency of their petition. Without issuing any restraining order, the Supreme Court required COMELEC toComment on the petition. Honasan questioned Tolentinos and Mojica's standing to bring the instant petition as taxpayersand voters because they do not claim that COMELEC illegally disbursed public funds; nor claim that they sustained personalinjury because of the issuance of Resolutions 01-005 and 01-006.Issue: Whether Tolentino and Mojica have standing to litigate.Held: Legal standing or locus standi refers to a personal and substantial interest in a case such that the party hassustained or will sustain direct injury because of the challenged governmental act. The requirement of standing, whichnecessarily sharpens the presentation of issues, relates to the constitutional mandate that this Court settle only actualcases or controversies. Thus, generally, a party will be allowed to litigate only when (1) he can show that he has personallysuffered some actual or threatened injury because of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; (2) the injury is fairlytraceable to the challenged action; and (3) the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action. Applied strictly, thedoctrine of standing to litigate will indeed bar the present petition. In questioning, in their capacity as voters, the validity of thespecial election on 14 May 2001, Tolentino and Mojica assert a harm classified as a generalized grievance. Thisgeneralized grievance is shared in substantially equal measure by a large class of voters, if not all the voters, who voted inthat election. Neither have Tolentino and Mojica alleged, in their capacity as taxpayers, that the Court should give due

course to the petition because in the special election held on 14 May 2001 tax money [was] x x x extracted and spent inviolation of specific constitutional protections against abuses of legislative power or that there [was] misapplication of suchfunds by COMELEC or that public money [was] deflected to any improper purpose. On the other hand, the Court hasrelaxed the requirement on standing and exercised our discretion to give due course to voters suits involving the right ofsuffrage. The Court has the discretion to take cognizance of a suit which does not satisfy the requirement of legal standingwhen paramount interest is involved. In not a few cases, the court has adopted a liberal attitude on the locus standi of apetitioner where the petitioner is able to craft an issue of transcendental significance to the people. Thus, when the issuesraised are of paramount importance to the public, the Court may brush aside technicalities of procedure. The Court accordsthe same treatment to Tolentino and Mojica in the present case in their capacity as voters since they raise important issuesinvolving their right of suffrage, considering that the issue raised in the petition is likely to arise again.Javellana vs. The Executive Secretary

The Facts:Sequence of events that lead to the filing of the Plebiscite then Ratification Cases.

The Plebiscite CaseOn March 16, 1967, Congress of the Philippines passed Resolution No. 2, which was amended by Resolution No. 4 of saidbody, adopted on June 17, 1969, calling a Convention to propose amendments to the Constitution of the Philippines.

Said Resolution No. 2, as amended, was implemented by Republic Act No. 6132, approved on August 24, 1970, pursuant tothe provisions of which the election of delegates to the said Convention was held on November 10, 1970, and the 1971Constitutional Convention began to perform its functions on June 1, 1971.

While the Convention was in session on September 21, 1972, the President issued Proclamation No. 1081 placing the entirePhilippines under Martial Law.

On November 29, 1972, the Convention approved its Proposed Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines. The next day,


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November 30, 1972, the President of the Philippines issued Presidential Decree No. 73, "submitting to the Filipino people forratification or rejection the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention,and appropriating funds therefor," as well as setting the plebiscite for said ratification or rejection of the ProposedConstitution on January 15, 1973.

On December 7, 1972, Charito Planas filed a case against the Commission on Elections, the Treasurer of the Philippinesand the Auditor General, to enjoin said "respondents or their agents from implementing Presidential Decree No. 73, in anymanner, until further orders of the Court," upon the grounds, inter alia, that said Presidential Decree "has no force and effectas law because the calling ... of such plebiscite, the setting of guidelines for the conduct of the same, the prescription of theballots to be used and the question to be answered by the voters, and the appropriation of public funds for the purpose, are,by the Constitution, lodged exclusively in Congress ...," and "there is no proper submission to the people of said ProposedConstitution set for January 15, 1973, there being no freedom of speech, press and assembly, and there being no sufficienttime to inform the people of the contents thereof."

On December 17, 1972, the President had issued an order temporarily suspending the effects of Proclamation No. 1081, forthe purpose of free and open debate on the Proposed Constitution.On December 23, the President announced the postponement of the plebiscite for the ratification or rejection of theProposed Constitution. No formal action to this effect was taken until January 7, 1973, when General Order No. 20 wasissued, directing "that the plebiscite scheduled to be held on January 15, 1978, be postponed until further notice." SaidGeneral Order No. 20, moreover, "suspended in the meantime" the "order of December 17, 1972, temporarily suspendingthe effects of Proclamation No. 1081 for purposes of free and open debate on the proposed Constitution."

Because of these events relative to the postponement of the aforementioned plebiscite, the Court deemed it fit to refrain, for

the time being, from deciding the aforementioned cases, for neither the date nor the conditions under which said plebiscitewould be held were known or announced officially. Then, again, Congress was, pursuant to the 1935 Constitution, scheduledto meet in regular session on January 22, 1973, and since the main objection to Presidential Decree No. 73 was that thePresident does not have the legislative authority to call a plebiscite and appropriate funds therefor, which Congressunquestionably could do, particularly in view of the formal postponement of the plebiscite by the President reportedly afterconsultation with, among others, the leaders of Congress and the Commission on Elections the Court deemed it moreimperative to defer its final action on these cases.

"In the afternoon of January 12, 1973, the petitioners in Case G.R. No. L-35948 filed an "urgent motion," praying that saidcase be decided "as soon as possible, preferably not later than January 15, 1973."

The next day, January 13, 1973, which was a Saturday, the Court issued a resolution requiring the respondents in said three(3) cases to comment on said "urgent motion" and "manifestation," "not later than Tuesday noon, January 16, 1973." Priorthereto, or on January 15, 1973, shortly before noon, the petitioners in said Case G.R. No. L-35948 riled a "supplementalmotion for issuance of restraining order and inclusion of additional respondents," praying:

"... that a restraining order be issued enjoining and restraining respondent Commission on Elections, as well as theDepartment of Local Governments and its head, Secretary Jose Roo; the Department of Agrarian Reforms and its head,Secretary Conrado Estrella; the National Ratification Coordinating Committee and its Chairman, Guillermo de Vega; theirdeputies, subordinates and substitutes, and all other officials and persons who may be assigned such task, from collecting,certifying, and announcing and reporting to the President or other officials concerned, the so-called Citizens' Assembliesreferendum results allegedly obtained when they were supposed to have met during the period comprised between January10 and January 15, 1973, on the two questions quoted in paragraph 1 of this Supplemental Urgent Motion."

On the same date January 15, 1973 the Court passed a resolution requiring the respondents in said case G.R. No. L-35948to file "file an answer to the said motion not later than 4 P.M., Tuesday, January 16, 1973," and setting the motion for hearing"on January 17, 1973, at 9:30 a.m." While the case was being heard, on the date last mentioned, at noontime, the Secretaryof Justice called on the writer of this opinion and said that, upon instructions of the President, he (the Secretary of Justice)was delivering to him (the writer) a copy of Proclamation No. 1102, which had just been signed by the President. Thereupon,the writer returned to the Session Hall and announced to the Court, the parties in G.R. No. L-35948 inasmuch as the hearingin connection therewith was still going on and the public there present that the President had, according to information

conveyed by the Secretary of Justice, signed said Proclamation No. 1102, earlier that morning.

Thereupon, the writer read Proclamation No. 1102 which is of the following tenor:____________________________"BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES"PROCLAMATION NO. 1102"ANNOUNCING THE RATIFICATION BY THE FILIPINO PEOPLE OF THE CONSTITUTION PROPOSED BY THE 1971CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION."WHEREAS, the Constitution proposed by the nineteen hundred seventy-one Constitutional Convention is subject toratification by the Filipino people;"WHEREAS, Citizens Assemblies were created in barrios, in municipalities and in districts/wards in chartered cities pursuantto Presidential Decree No. 86, dated December 31, 1972, composed of all persons who are residents of the barrio, district or


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ward for at least six months, fifteen years of age or over, citizens of the Philippines and who are registered in the list ofCitizen Assembly members kept by the barrio, district or ward secretary;"WHEREAS, the said Citizens Assemblies were established precisely to broaden the base of citizen participation in thedemocratic process and to afford ample opportunity for the citizenry to express their views on important national issues;"WHEREAS, responding to the clamor of the people and pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 86-A, dated January 5, 1973,the following questions were posed before the Citizens Assemblies or Barangays: Do you approve of the New Constitution?Do you still want a plebiscite to be called to ratify the new Constitution?"WHEREAS, fourteen million nine hundred seventy-six thousand five hundred sixty-one (14,976,561) members of all theBarangays (Citizens Assemblies) voted for the adoption of the proposed Constitution, as against seven hundred forty-threethousand eight hundred sixty-nine (743,869) who voted for its rejection; while on the question as to whether or not thepeople would still like a plebiscite to be called to ratify the new Constitution, fourteen million two hundred ninety-eightthousand eight hundred fourteen (14,298,814) answered that there was no need for a plebiscite and that the vote of theBarangays (Citizens Assemblies) should be considered as a vote in a plebiscite;"WHEREAS, since the referendum results show that more than ninety-five (95) per cent of the members of the Barangays(Citizens Assemblies) are in favor of the new Constitution, the Katipunan ng Mga Barangay has strongly recommended thatthe new Constitution should already be deemed ratified by the Filipino people;"NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers in me vested by theConstitution, do hereby certify and proclaim that the Constitution proposed by the nineteen hundred and seventy-one (1971)Constitutional Convention has been ratified by an overwhelming majority of all of the votes cast by the members of all theBarangays (Citizens Assemblies) throughout the Philippines, and has thereby come into effect."IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the Republic of the Philippines to be affixed."Done in the City of Manila, this 17th day of January, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and seventy-three.(Sgd.) FERDINAND E. MARCOS"President of the Philippines

"By the President:"ALEJANDRO MELCHOR"Executive Secretary"_________________________________

The Ratification Case

On January 20, 1973, Josue Javellana filed Case G.R. No. L-36142 against the Executive Secretary and the Secretaries ofNational Defense, Justice and Finance, to restrain said respondents "and their subordinates or agents from implementingany of the provisions of the propose Constitution not found in the present Constitution" referring to that of 1935. The petitiontherein, filed by Josue Javellana, as a "Filipino citizen, and a qualified and registered voter" and as "a class suit, for himself,and in behalf of all citizens and voters similarly situated," was amended on or about January 24, 1973. After reciting insubstance the facts set forth in the decision in the plebiscite cases, Javellana alleged that the President had announced "theimmediate implementation of the New Constitution, thru his Cabinet, respondents including," and that the latter "are actingwithout, or in excess of jurisdiction in implementing the said proposed Constitution" upon the ground: "that the President, asCommander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, is without authority to create the Citizens Assemblies"; that the

same "are without power to approve the proposed Constitution ..."; "that the President is without power to proclaim theratification by the Filipino people of the proposed Constitution"; and "that the election held to ratify the proposed Constitutionwas not a free election, hence null and void."

The Issue:

1. Is the issue of the validity of Proclamation No. 1102 a justiciable, or political and therefore non-justiciable, question?

2. Has the Constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention been ratified validly (with substantial, if not strict,compliance) conformably to the applicable constitutional and statutory provisions?

3. Has the aforementioned proposed Constitution acquiesced in (with or without valid ratification) by the people?(acquiesced - "permission" given by silence or passiveness. Acceptance or agreement by keeping quiet or by not makingobjections.)

4. Are petitioners entitled to relief?

5. Is the aforementioned proposed Constitution in force?

The Resolution:

Summary:The court was severely divided on the following issues raised in the petition: but when the crucial question of whether thepetitioners are entitled to relief, six members of the court (Justices Makalintal, Castro, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio andEsguerra) voted to dismiss the petition. Concepcion, together Justices Zaldivar, Fernando and Teehankee, voted to grantthe relief being sought, thus upholding the 1973 Constitution.


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Details:1. Is the issue of the validity of Proclamation No. 1102 a justiciable, or political and therefore non-justiciable,question?

On the first issue involving the political-question doctrine Justices Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee andmyself, or six (6) members of the Court, hold that the issue of the validity of Proclamation No. 1102 presents a justiciableand non-political question. Justices Makalintal and Castro did not vote squarely on this question, but, only inferentially, intheir discussion of the second question. Justice Barredo qualified his vote, stating that "inasmuch as it is claimed there hasbeen approval by the people, the Court may inquire into the question of whether or not there has actually been such anapproval, and, in the affirmative, the Court should keep hands-off out of respect to the people's will, but, in negative, theCourt may determine from both factual and legal angles whether or not Article XV of the 1935 Constitution been compliedwith." Justices Makasiar, Antonio, Esguerra, or three (3) members of the Court hold that the issue is political and "beyond theambit of judicial inquiry."

2. Has the Constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention been ratified validly (with substantial, if notstrict, compliance) conformably to the applicable constitutional and statutory provisions?

On the second question of validity of the ratification, Justices Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee and myself,or six (6) members of the Court also hold that the Constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention was notvalidly ratified in accordance with Article XV, section 1 of the 1935 Constitution, which provides only one way for ratification,i.e., "in an election or plebiscite held in accordance with law and participated in only by qualified and duly registered voters.

Justice Barredo qualified his vote, stating that "(A)s to whether or not the 1973 Constitution has been validly ratified pursuant

to Article XV, I still maintain that in the light of traditional concepts regarding the meaning and intent of said Article, thereferendum in the Citizens' Assemblies, specially in the manner the votes therein were cast, reported and canvassed, fallsshort of the requirements thereof. In view, however, of the fact that I have no means of refusing to recognize as a judge thatfactually there was voting and that the majority of the votes were for considering as approved the 1973 Constitution withoutthe necessity of the usual form of plebiscite followed in past ratifications, I am constrained to hold that, in the political sense,if not in the orthodox legal sense, the people may be deemed to have cast their favorable votes in the belief that in doing sothey did the part required of them by Article XV, hence, it may be said that in its political aspect, which is what counts most,after all, said Article has been substantially complied with, and, in effect, the 1973 Constitution has been constitutionallyratified."Justices Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra, or three (3) members of the Court hold that under their view there has been ineffect substantial compliance with the constitutional requirements for valid ratification.

3. Has the aforementioned proposed Constitution acquiesced in (with or without valid ratification) by the people?

On the third question of acquiescence by the Filipino people in the aforementioned proposed Constitution, no majority vote

has been reached by the Court.Four (4) of its members, namely, Justices Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra hold that "the people have alreadyaccepted the 1973 Constitution."Two (2) members of the Court, namely, Justice Zaldivar and myself hold that there can be no free expression, and there haseven been no expression, by the people qualified to vote all over the Philippines, of their acceptance or repudiation of theproposed Constitution under Martial Law. Justice Fernando states that "(I)f it is conceded that the doctrine stated in someAmerican decisions to the effect that independently of the validity of the ratification, a new Constitution once acceptedacquiesced in by the people must be accorded recognition by the Court, I am not at this stage prepared to state that suchdoctrine calls for application in view of the shortness of time that has elapsed and the difficulty of ascertaining what is themind of the people in the absence of the freedom of debate that is a concomitant feature of martial law." 88Three (3) members of the Court express their lack of knowledge and/or competence to rule on the question. JusticesMakalintal and Castro are joined by Justice Teehankee in their statement that "Under a regime of martial law, with the freeexpression of opinions through the usual media vehicle restricted, (they) have no means of knowing, to the point of judicialcertainty, whether the people have accepted the Constitution."

4. Are petitioners entitled to relief?

On the fourth question of relief, six (6) members of the Court, namely, Justices Makalintal, Castro, Barredo, Makasiar,Antonio and Esguerra voted to DISMISS the petition. Justice Makalintal and Castro so voted on the strength of their viewthat "(T)he effectivity of the said Constitution, in the final analysis, is the basic and ultimate question posed by these cases toresolve which considerations other than judicial, an therefore beyond the competence of this Court, 90 are relevant andunavoidable." 91Four (4) members of the Court, namely, Justices Zaldivar, Fernando, Teehankee and myself voted to deny respondents'motion to dismiss and to give due course to the petitions.

5. Is the aforementioned proposed Constitution in force?


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On the fifth question of whether the new Constitution of 1973 is in force:Four (4) members of the Court, namely, Justices Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra hold that it is in force by virtue ofthe people's acceptance thereof;Four (4) members of the Court, namely, Justices Makalintal, Castro, Fernando and Teehankee cast no vote thereon on thepremise stated in their votes on the third question that they could not state with judicial certainty whether the people haveaccepted or not accepted the Constitution; andTwo (2) members of the Court, namely, Justice Zaldivar and myself voted that the Constitution proposed by the 1971Constitutional Convention is not in force; with the result that there are not enough votes to declare that the new Constitutionis not in force.ACCORDINGLY, by virtue of the majority of six (6) votes of Justices Makalintal, Castro, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio andEsguerra with the four (4) dissenting votes of the Chief Justice and Justices Zaldivar, Fernando and Teehankee, all theaforementioned cases are hereby dismissed. This being the vote of the majority, there is no further judicial obstacle to thenew Constitution being considered in force and effect.

It is so ordered.Sanidad vs. Commission on Elections[GR L-44640, 12 October 1976]; also Guzman vs. Comelec [GR L-44684], and Gonzales vs. Commission on Elections [GRL-44714]En Banc, Martin (J): 1 concurs in result, 4 concur in separate opinions, 2 dissent in separate opinions, 2 filed separateopinionsFacts: On 2 September 1976, President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree 991 calling for a nationalreferendum on 16 October 1976 for the Citizens Assemblies ("barangays") to resolve, among other things, the issues ofmartial law, the interim assembly, its replacement, the powers of such replacement, the period of its existence, the length of

the period for the exercise by the President of his present powers. 20 days after or on 22 September 1976, the Presidentissued another related decree, Presidential Decree 1031, amending the previous Presidential Decree 991, by declaring theprovisions of Presidential Decree 229 providing for the manner of voting and canvass of votes in "barangays" (CitizensAssemblies) applicable to the national referendum-plebiscite of 16 October 1976. Quite relevantly, Presidential Decree 1031repealed inter alia, Section 4, of Presidential Decree 991. On the same date of 22 September 1976, the President issuedPresidential Decree 1033, stating the questions to he submitted to the people in the referendum-plebiscite on 16 October1976. The Decree recites in its "whereas" clauses that the people's continued opposition to the convening of the interimNational Assembly evinces their desire to have such body abolished and replaced thru a constitutional amendment,providing for a new interim legislative body, which will be submitted directly to the people in the referendum-plebiscite ofOctober 16. The Commission on Elections was vested with the exclusive supervision and control of the October 1976National Referendum-Plebiscite. On 27 September 1976, Pablo C. Sanidad and Pablito V. Sanidad, father and son,commenced L-44640 for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction seeking to enjoin the Commission on Elections from holdingand conducting the Referendum Plebiscite on October 16; to declare without force and effect Presidential Decree Nos. 991and 1033, insofar as they propose amendments to the Constitution, as well as Presidential Decree 1031, insofar as it directsthe Commission on Elections to supervise, control, hold, and conduct the Referendum-Plebiscite scheduled on 16 October

1976. They contend that under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions there is no grant to the incumbent President to exercise theconstituent power to propose amendments to the new Constitution. As a consequence, the Referendum-Plebiscite onOctober 16 has no constitutional or legal basis. On 30 September 1976, another action for Prohibition with PreliminaryInjunction, docketed as L-44684, was instituted by Vicente M. Guzman, a delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention,asserting that the power to propose amendments to, or revision of the Constitution during the transition period is expresslyconferred on the interim National Assembly under action 16, Article XVII of the Constitution. Still another petition forProhibition with Preliminary Injunction was filed on 5 October 1976 by Raul M. Gonzales, his son Raul Jr., and AlfredoSalapantan, docketed as L-44714, to restrain the implementation of Presidential Decrees relative to the forthcomingReferendum-Plebiscite of October 16.Issue: Whether the President may call upon a referendum for the amendment of the Constitution.Held: Section 1 of Article XVI of the 1973 Constitution on Amendments ordains that "(1) Any amendment to, or revision of,this Constitution may be proposed by the National Assembly upon a vote of three-fourths of all its Members, or by aconstitutional convention. (2) The National Assembly may, by a vote of two-thirds of all its Members, call a constitutionalconvention or, by a majority vote of all its Members, submit the question of calling such a convention to the electorate in anelection." Section 2 thereof provides that "Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution shall be valid when ratified by a

majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not later than three months a after the approval of suchamendment or revision." In the present period of transition, the interim National Assembly instituted in the TransitoryProvisions is conferred with that amending power. Section 15 of the Transitory Provisions reads "The interim NationalAssembly, upon special call by the interim Prime Minister, may, by a majority vote of all its Members, propose amendmentsto this Constitution. Such amendments shall take effect when ratified in accordance with Article Sixteen hereof." There are,therefore, two periods contemplated in the constitutional life of the nation, i.e., period of normalcy and period of transition. Intimes of normalcy, the amending process may be initiated by the proposals of the (1) regular National Assembly upon a voteof three-fourths of all its members; or (2) by a Constitutional Convention called by a vote of two-thirds of all the Members ofthe National Assembly. However the calling of a Constitutional Convention may be submitted to the electorate in an electionvoted upon by a majority vote of all the members of the National Assembly. In times of transition, amendments may beproposed by a majority vote of all the Members of the interim National Assembly upon special call by the interim PrimeMinister. The Court in Aquino v. COMELEC, had already settled that the incumbent President is vested with that prerogative


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of discretion as to when he shall initially convene the interim National Assembly. The Constitutional Convention intended toleave to the President the determination of the time when he shall initially convene the interim National Assembly, consistentwith the prevailing conditions of peace and order in the country. When the Delegates to the Constitutional Convention votedon the Transitory Provisions, they were aware of the fact that under the same, the incumbent President was given thediscretion as to when he could convene the interim National Assembly. The President's decision to defer the convening ofthe interim National Assembly soon found support from the people themselves. In the plebiscite of January 10-15, 1973, atwhich the ratification of the 1973 Constitution was submitted, the people voted against the convening of the interim NationalAssembly. In the referendum of 24 July 1973, the Citizens Assemblies ("bagangays") reiterated their sovereign will towithhold the convening of the interim National Assembly. Again, in the referendum of 27 February 1975, the proposedquestion of whether the interim National Assembly shall be initially convened was eliminated, because some of the membersof Congress and delegates of the Constitutional Convention, who were deemed automatically members of the interimNational Assembly, were against its inclusion since in that referendum of January, 1973 the people had already resolvedagainst it. In sensu striciore, when the legislative arm of the state undertakes the proposals of amendment to a Constitution,that body is not in the usual function of lawmaking. It is not legislating when engaged in the amending process. Rather, it isexercising a peculiar power bestowed upon it by the fundamental charter itself. In the Philippines, that power is provided forin Article XVI of the 1973 Constitution (for the regular National Assembly) or in Section 15 of the Transitory Provisions (forthe interim National Assembly). While ordinarily it is the business of the legislating body to legislate for the nation by virtue ofconstitutional conferment, amending of the Constitution is not legislative in character. In political science a distinction ismade between constitutional content of an organic character and that of a legislative character. The distinction, however, isone of policy, not of law. Such being the case, approval of the President of any proposed amendment is a misnomer. Theprerogative of the President to approve or disapprove applies only to the ordinary cases of legislation. The President hasnothing to do with proposition or adoption of amendments to the Constitution.Philippine Bar Association vs. COMELEC

140 SCRA 455January 7, 1986

FACTS:

11 petitions were filed for prohibition against the enforcement of BP 883 which calls for special national elections onFebruary 7, 1986 (Snap elections) for the offices of President and Vice President of the Philippines. BP 883 in conflict withthe constitution in that it allows the President to continue holding office after the calling of the special election.

Senator Pelaez submits that President Marcos letter of conditional resignation did not create the actual vacancy requiredin Section 9, Article 7 of the Constitution which could be the basis of the holding of a special election for President and VicePresident earlier than the regular elections for such positions in 1987. The letter states that the President is: irrevocablyvacat(ing) the position of President effective only when the election is held and after the winner is proclaimed and qualifiedas President by taking his oath office ten (10) days after his proclamation.

The unified opposition, rather than insist on strict compliance with the cited constitutional provision that the incumbentPresident actually resign, vacate his office and turn it over to the Speaker of the Batasang Pambansa as acting President,their standard bearers have not filed any suit or petition in intervention for the purpose nor repudiated the scheduled election.They have not insisted that President Marcos vacate his office, so long as the election is clean, fair and honest.

ISSUE:

Is BP 883 unconstitutional, and should the Supreme Court therefore stop and prohibit the holding of the elections

HELD:

The petitions in these cases are dismissed and the prayer for the issuance of an injunction restraining respondents fromholding the election on February 7, 1986, in as much as there are less than the required 10 votes to declare BP 883unconstitutional.

The events that have transpired since December 3,as the Court did not issue any restraining order, have turned the issueinto a political question (from the purely justiciable issue of the questioned constitutionality of the act due to the lack of theactual vacancy of the Presidents office) which can be truly decided only by the people in their sovereign capacity at thescheduled election, since there is no issue more political than the election. The Court cannot stand in the way of letting thepeople decide through their ballot, either to give the incumbent president a new mandate or to elect a new president.Lawyers League for a Better Philippines vs Pres. AquinoG.R. No. 73748May 22, 1986

FACTS:1. On February 25, 1986, President Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation No. 1 announcing that she and Vice PresidentLaurel


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were taking power.2. On March 25, 1986, proclamation No.3 was issued providing the basis of the Aquino government assumption of power bystating that the "new government was installed through a direct exercise of the power of the Filipino people assisted by unitsof the New Armed Forces of the Philippines."

ISSUE:WON the government of Corazon Aquino is legitimate?

HELD:Yes

RATIO:The legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter but belongs to the realm of politics where only the peopleare the judge.The Court further held that:1. the people have accepted the Aquino government which is in effective control of the entire country;2. it is not merely a de facto government but in fact and law a de jure government; and3. the community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of the new governmentSantiago vs COMELECFACTS:

On December 6, 1996, Atty. Jesus S. Delfin, founding member of the Movement for People's Initiative, filed with theCOMELEC a "Petition to Amend the Constitution, to Lift Term Limits of Elective Officials, by People's Initiative" citing Section

2, Article XVII of the Constitution. Acting on the petition, the COMELEC set the case for hearing and directed Delfin to havethe petition published. After the hearing the arguments between petitioners and opposing parties, the COMELEC directedDelfin and the oppositors to file their "memoranda and/or oppositions/memoranda" within five days. On December 18, 1996,Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago, Alexander Padilla, and Maria Isabel Ongpin filed a special civil action for prohibitionunder Rule 65 raising the following arguments, among others:

1.) That the Constitution can only be amended by peoples initiative if there is an enabling law passed by Congress, to whichno such law has yet been passed; and

2.) That R.A. 6735 does not suffice as an enabling law on peoples initiative on the Constitution, unlike in the other modes ofinitiative.

ISSUE:

Is R.A. No. 6735 sufficient to enable amendment of the Constitution by peoples initiative?

HELD:

NO. R.A. 6735 is inadequate to cover the system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution.

Under the said law, initiative on the Constitution is confined only to proposals to AMEND. The people are not accorded thepower to "directly propose, enact, approve, or reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution" through the system of initiative.They can only do so with respect to "laws, ordinances, or resolutions." The use of the clause "proposed laws sought to beenacted, approved or rejected, amended or repealed" denotes that R.A. No. 6735 excludes initiative on amendments to theConstitution.

Also, while the law provides subtitles for National Initiative and Referendum and for Local Initiative and Referendum, nosubtitle is provided for initiative on the Constitution. This means that the main thrust of the law is initiative and referendum onnational and local laws. If R.A. No. 6735 were intended to fully provide for the implementation of the initiative on

amendments to the Constitution, it could have provided for a subtitle therefor, considering that in the order of things, theprimacy of interest, or hierarchy of values, the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution is farmore important than the initiative on national and local laws.

While R.A. No. 6735 specially detailed the process in implementing initiative and referendum on national and local laws, itintentionally did not do so on the system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution.

WHEREFORE, petition is GRANTED.MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, ALEXANDER PADILLA, and MARIA ISABEL ONGPIN, petitioners,vs.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, JESUS DELFIN, ALBERTO PEDROSA & CARMEN PEDROSA, in their capacities asfounding members of the People's Initiative for Reforms, Modernization and Action (PIRMA), respondents.


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SENATOR RAUL S. ROCO, DEMOKRASYA-IPAGTANGGOL ANG KONSTITUSYON (DIK), MOVEMENT OFATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC. (MABINI), INTEGRATED BAR OF THEPHILIPPINES (IBP), and LABAN NG DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO (LABAN), petitioners-intervenors.DAVIDE, JR., J.:The heart of this controversy brought to us by way of a petition for prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is the rightof the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution through the system ofinitiative under Section 2 of ArticleXVII of the 1987 Constitution. Undoubtedly, this demands special attention, as this system of initiative was unknown to thepeople of this country, except perhaps to a few scholars, before the drafting of the 1987 Constitution. The 1986Constitutional Commission itself, through the original proponent 1and the main sponsor2of the proposed Article onAmendments or Revision of the Constitution, characterized this system as "innovative".3Indeed it is, for both under the 1935and 1973 Constitutions, only two methods of proposing amendments to, or revision of, the Constitution were recognized,viz., (1) by Congress upon a vote of three-fourths of all its members and (2) by a constitutional convention. 4For this and theother reasons hereafter discussed, we resolved to give due course to this petition.On 6 December 1996, private respondent Atty. Jesus S. Delfin filed with public respondent Commission on Elections(hereafter, COMELEC) a "Petition to Amend the Constitution, to Lift Term Limits of Elective Officials, by People's Initiative"(hereafter, Delfin Petition) 5wherein Delfin asked the COMELEC for an order

1. Fixing the time and dates for signature gathering all over the country;2. Causing the necessary publications of said Order and the attached "Petition for Initiative on the 1987Constitution, in newspapers of general and local circulation;3. Instructing Municipal Election Registrars in all Regions of the Philippines, to assist Petitioners andvolunteers, in establishing signing stations at the time and on the dates designated for the purpose.

Delfin alleged in his petition that he is a founding member of the Movement for People's Initiative,6 a group of citizens

desirous to avail of the system intended to institutionalize people power; that he and the members of the Movement andother volunteers intend to exercise the power to directly propose amendments to the Constitution granted under Section 2,Article XVII of the Constitution; that the exercise of that power shall be conducted in proceedings under the control andsupervision of the COMELEC; that, as required in COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, signature stations shall be establishedall over the country, with the assistance of municipal election registrars, who shall verify the signatures affixed by individualsignatories; that before the Movement and other volunteers can gather signatures, it is necessary that the time and dates tobe designated for the purpose be first fixed in an order to be issued by the COMELEC; and that to adequately inform thepeople of the electoral process involved, it is likewise necessary that the said order, as well as the Petition on which thesignatures shall be affixed, be published in newspapers of general and local circulation, under the control and supervision ofthe COMELEC.The Delfin Petition further alleged that the provisions sought to be amended are Sections 4 and 7 of Article VI, 7Section 4 ofArticle VII, 8and Section 8 of Article X 9of the Constitution. Attached to the petition is a copy of a "Petition for Initiative on the1987 Constitution" 10embodying the proposed amendments which consist in the deletion from the aforecited sections of theprovisions concerning term limits, and with the following proposition:

DO YOU APPROVE OF LIFTING THE TERM LIMITS OF ALL ELECTIVE GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS,

AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE SECTIONS 4 AND 7 OF ARTICLE VI, SECTION 4 OF ARTICLE VII,AND SECTION 8 OF ARTICLE X OF THE 1987 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION?

According to Delfin, the said Petition for Initiative will first be submitted to the people, and after it is signed by at least twelveper cent of the total number of registered voters in the country it will be formally filed with the COMELEC.Upon the filing of the Delfin Petition, which was forthwith given the numberUND 96-037 (INITIATIVE), the COMELEC,through its Chairman, issued an Order11(a) directing Delfin "to cause the publication of the petition, together with theattached Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution (including the proposal, proposed constitutional amendment, and thesignature form), and the notice of hearing in three (3) daily newspapers of general circulation at his own expense" not laterthan 9 December 1996; and (b) setting the case for hearing on 12 December 1996 at 10:00 a.m.At the hearing of the Delfin Petition on 12 December 1996, the following appeared: Delfin and Atty. Pete Q. Quadra;representatives of the People's Initiative for Reforms, Modernization and Action (PIRMA); intervenor-oppositor Senator RaulS. Roco, together with his two other lawyers, and representatives of, or counsel for, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines(IBP), Demokrasya-Ipagtanggol ang Konstitusyon (DIK), Public Interest Law Center, and Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino(LABAN). 12Senator Roco, on that same day, filed a Motion to Dismiss the Delfin Petition on the ground that it is not theinitiatory petition properly cognizable by the COMELEC.

After hearing their arguments, the COMELEC directed Delfin and the oppositors to file their "memoranda and/oroppositions/memoranda" within five days. 13

On 18 December 1996, the petitioners herein Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago, Alexander Padilla, and Maria IsabelOngpin filed this special civil action for prohibition raising the following arguments:

(1) The constitutional provision on people's initiative to amend the Constitution can only be implementedby law to be passed by Congress. No such law has been passed; in fact, Senate Bill No. 1290 entitledAn

Act Prescribing and Regulating Constitution Amendments by People's Initiative, which petitioner SenatorSantiago filed on 24 November 1995, is still pending before the Senate Committee on ConstitutionalAmendments.(2) It is true that R.A. No. 6735 provides for three systems of initiative, namely, initiative on theConstitution, on statutes, and on local legislation. However, it failed to provide any subtitle on initiative onthe Constitution, unlike in the other modes of initiative, which are specifically provided for in Subtitle II and


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Subtitle III. This deliberate omission indicates that the matter of people's initiative to amend theConstitution was left to some future law. Former Senator Arturo Tolentino stressed this deficiency in thelaw in his privilege speech delivered before the Senate in 1994: "There is not a single word in that lawwhich can be considered as implementing [the provision on constitutional initiative]. Such implementingprovisions have been obviously left to a separate law.(3) Republic Act No. 6735 provides for the effectivity of the law after publication in print media. Thisindicates that the Act covers only laws and not constitutional amendments because the latter take effectonly upon ratification and not after publication.(4) COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, adopted on 16 January 1991 to govern "the conduct of initiative onthe Constitution and initiative and referendum on national and local laws, is ultra vires insofar as initiativeon amendments to the Constitution is concerned, since the COMELEC has no power to provide rules andregulations for the exercise of the right of initiative to amend the Constitution. Only Congress is authorizedby the Constitution to pass the implementing law.(5) The people's initiative is limited to amendments to the Constitution, not to revision thereof. Extending orlifting of term limits constitutes a revision and is, therefore, outside the power of the people's initiative.(6) Finally, Congress has not yet appropriated funds for people's initiative; neither the COMELEC nor anyother government department, agency, or office has realigned funds for the purpose.

To justify their recourse to us via the special civil action for prohibition, the petitioners allege that in the event the COMELECgrants the Delfin Petition, the people's initiative spearheaded by PIRMA would entail expenses to the national treasury forgeneral re-registration of voters amounting to at least P180 million, not to mention the millions of additional pesos inexpenses which would be incurred in the conduct of the initiative itself. Hence, the transcendental importance to the publicand the nation of the issues raised demands that this petition for prohibition be settled promptly and definitely, brushingaside technicalities of procedure and calling for the admission of a taxpayer's and legislator's suit. 14Besides, there is no

other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.On 19 December 1996, this Court (a) required the respondents to comment on the petition within a non-extendible period often days from notice; and (b) issued a temporary restraining order, effective immediately and continuing until further orders,enjoining public respondent COMELEC from proceeding with the Delfin Petition, and private respondents Alberto andCarmen Pedrosa from conducting a signature drive for people's initiative to amend the Constitution.On 2 January 1997, private respondents, through Atty Quadra, filed their Comment 15on the petition. They argue thereinthat:

1. IT IS NOT TRUE THAT "IT WOULD ENTAIL EXPENSES TO THE NATIONAL TREASURY FORGENERAL REGISTRATION OF VOTERS AMOUNTING TO AT LEAST PESOS: ONE HUNDREDEIGHTY MILLION (P180,000,000.00)" IF THE "COMELEC GRANTS THE PETITION FILED BYRESPONDENT DELFIN BEFORE THE COMELEC.2. NOT A SINGLE CENTAVO WOULD BE SPENT BY THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT IF THECOMELEC GRANTS THE PETITION OF RESPONDENT DELFIN. ALL EXPENSES IN THE SIGNATUREGATHERING ARE ALL FOR THE ACCOUNT OF RESPONDENT DELFIN AND HIS VOLUNTEERS PERTHEIR PROGRAM OF ACTIVITIES AND EXPENDITURES SUBMITTED TO THE COMELEC. THE

ESTIMATED COST OF THE DAILY PER DIEM OF THE SUPERVISING SCHOOL TEACHERS IN THESIGNATURE GATHERING TO BE DEPOSITED and TO BE PAID BY DELFIN AND HIS VOLUNTEERSIS P2,571,200.00;3. THE PENDING PETITION BEFORE THE COMELEC IS ONLY ON THE SIGNATURE GATHERINGWHICH BY LAW COMELEC IS DUTY BOUND "TO SUPERVISE CLOSELY" PURSUANT TO ITS"INITIATORY JURISDICTION" UPHELD BY THE HONORABLE COURT IN ITS RECENT SEPTEMBER26, 1996 DECISION IN THE CASE OF SUBIC BAY METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY VS. COMELEC, ET

AL. G.R. NO. 125416;4. REP. ACT NO. 6735 APPROVED ON AUGUST 4, 1989 IS THE ENABLING LAW IMPLEMENTINGTHE POWER OF PEOPLE INITIATIVE TO PROPOSE AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION.SENATOR DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO'S SENATE BILL NO. 1290 IS A DUPLICATION OF WHAT AREALREADY PROVIDED FOR IN REP. ACT NO. 6735;5. COMELEC RESOLUTION NO. 2300 PROMULGATED ON JANUARY 16, 1991 PURSUANT TO REP.ACT 6735 WAS UPHELD BY THE HONORABLE COURT IN THE RECENT SEPTEMBER 26, 1996DECISION IN THE CASE OF SUBIC BAY METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY VS. COMELEC, ET AL. G.R.

NO. 125416 WHERE THE HONORABLE COURT SAID: "THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS CAN DONO LESS BY SEASONABLY AND JUDICIOUSLY PROMULGATING GUIDELINES AND RULES FORBOTH NATIONAL AND LOCAL USE, IN IMPLEMENTING OF THESE LAWS."6. EVEN SENATOR DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO'S SENATE BILL NO. 1290 CONTAINS A PROVISIONDELEGATING TO THE COMELEC THE POWER TO "PROMULGATE SUCH RULES ANDREGULATIONS AS MAY BE NECESSARY TO CARRY OUT THE PURPOSES OF THIS ACT." (SEC. 12,S.B. NO. 1290, ENCLOSED AS ANNEX E, PETITION);7. THE LIFTING OF THE LIMITATION ON THE TERM OF OFFICE OF ELECTIVE OFFICIALSPROVIDED UNDER THE 1987 CONSTITUTION IS NOT A "REVISION" OF THE CONSTITUTION. IT ISONLY AN AMENDMENT. "AMENDMENT ENVISAGES AN ALTERATION OF ONE OR A FEW SPECIFICPROVISIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION. REVISION CONTEMPLATES A RE-EXAMINATION OF THE


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ENTIRE DOCUMENT TO DETERMINE HOW AND TO WHAT EXTENT IT SHOULD BE ALTERED." (PP.412-413, 2ND. ED. 1992, 1097 PHIL. CONSTITUTION, BY JOAQUIN G. BERNAS, S.J.).

Also on 2 January 1997, private respondent Delfin filed in his own behalf a Comment 16 which starts off with an assertion thatthe instant petition is a "knee-jerk reaction to a draft 'Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution'. . . which is not formallyfiled yet." What he filed on 6 December 1996 was an "Initiatory Pleading" or "Initiatory Petition," which was legally necessaryto start the signature campaign to amend the Constitution or to put the movement to gather signatures under COMELECpower and function. On the substantive allegations of the petitioners, Delfin maintains as follows:

(1) Contrary to the claim of the petitioners, there is a law, R.A. No. 6735, which governs the conduct ofinitiative to amend the Constitution. The absence therein of a subtitle for such initiative is not fatal, sincesubtitles are not requirements for the validity or sufficiency of laws.(2) Section 9(b) of R.A. No. 6735 specifically provides that the proposition in an initiative to amend theConstitution approved by the majority of the votes cast in the plebiscite shall become effective as of theday of the plebiscite.(3) The claim that COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is ultra vires is contradicted by (a) Section 2, Article IX-C of the Constitution, which grants the COMELEC the power to enforce and administer all laws andregulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall; and (b)Section 20 of R.A. 6735, which empowers the COMELEC to promulgate such rules and regulations asmay be necessary to carry out the purposes of the Act.(4) The proposed initiative does not involve a revision of, but mere amendmentto, the Constitutionbecause it seeks to alter only a few specific provisions of the Constitution, or more specifically, only thosewhich lay term limits. It does not seek to reexamine or overhaul the entire document.

As to the public expenditures for registration of voters, Delfin considers petitioners' estimate of P180 million as unreliable, foronly the COMELEC can give the exact figure. Besides, if there will be a plebiscite it will be simultaneous with the 1997

Barangay Elections. In any event, fund requirements forinitiative will be a priority government expense because it will be forthe exercise of the sovereign power of the people.In the Comment 17for the public respondent COMELEC, filed also on 2 January 1997, the Office of the Solicitor Generalcontends that:

(1) R.A. No. 6735 deals with, inter alia, people's initiative to amend the Constitution. Its Section 2 onStatement of Policy explicitly affirms, recognizes, and guarantees that power; and its Section 3, whichenumerates the three systems ofinitiative, includes initiative on the Constitution and defines the same asthe power to propose amendments to the Constitution. Likewise, its Section 5 repeatedly mentionsinitiative on the Constitution.(2) A separate subtitle on initiative on the Constitution is not necessary in R.A. No. 6735 because, beingnational in scope, that system ofinitiative is deemed included in the subtitle on National Initiative andReferendum; and Senator Tolentino simply overlooked pertinent provisions of the law when he claimedthat nothing therein was provided forinitiative on the Constitution.(3) Senate Bill No. 1290 is neither a competent nor a material proof that R.A. No. 6735 does not deal withinitiative on the Constitution.

(4) Extension of term limits of elected officials constitutes a mere amendment to the Constitution, not arevision thereof.(5) COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 was validly issued under Section 20 of R.A. No. 6735 and under theOmnibus Election Code. The rule-making power of the COMELEC to implement the provisions of R.A. No.6735 was in fact upheld by this Court in Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority vs. COMELEC.

On 14 January 1997, this Court (a) confirmed nunc pro tuncthe temporary restraining order; (b) noted the aforementionedComments and the Motion to Lift Temporary Restraining Order filed by private respondents through Atty. Quadra, as well asthe latter's Manifestation stating that he is the counsel for private respondents Alberto and Carmen Pedrosa only and theComment he filed was for the Pedrosas; and (c) granted the Motion for Intervention filed on 6 January 1997 by Senator RaulRoco and allowed him to file his Petition in Intervention not later than 20 January 1997; and (d) set the case for hearing on23 January 1997 at 9:30 a.m.On 17 January 1997, the Demokrasya-Ipagtanggol ang Konstitusyon (DIK) and the Movement of Attorneys for BrotherhoodIntegrity and Nationalism, Inc. (MABINI), filed a Motion for Intervention. Attached to the motion was their Petition inIntervention, which was later replaced by an Amended Petition in Intervention wherein they contend that:

(1) The Delfin proposal does not involve a mere amendmentto, but a revision of, the Constitution

because, in the words of Fr. Joaquin Bernas, S.J., 18it would involve a change from a political philosophythat rejects unlimited tenure to one that accepts unlimited tenure; and although the change might appearto be an isolated one, it can affect other provisions, such as, on synchronization of elections and on theState policy of guaranteeing equal access to opportunities for public service and prohibiting politicaldynasties. 19A revision cannot be done by initiative which, by express provision of Section 2 of Article XVIIof the Constitution, is limited to amendments.(2) The prohibition against reelection of the President and the limits provided for all other national and localelective officials are based on the philosophy of governance, "to open up the political arena to as many asthere are Filipinos qualified to handle the demands of leadership, to break the concentration of politicaland economic powers in the ha

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