consti finals cases
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EX POST FACTO LAWS
BAYOT V SANDIGANBAYAN Facts: Bayot is one of the several persons who was accused in more than 100 counts of estafa thru falsification of Public documents before the Sandiganbayan. The said charges started from his alleged involvement as a government auditor of the commission on audit assigned to the Ministry of education and culture, with some other employees from the said ministry. The bureau of treasury and the teacher’s camp in Baguio City for the preparation and encashment of fictitious TCAA checks for the nom-existent obligations of the teacher’s camp resulting in damage to the government of several millions. The 1st 32 cases were filed on july 25, 1987, while Bayot ran for municipal mayor of Amadeo Cavite and was elected on January 1980. but on May 1980 Sandiganbayan promulgated a decision convicting the accused together with his other co-accused in all but one of the thirty two cases filed against them. On Mach 16, 1982 Batas Pambansa Blg 195 was passed amending RA 3019. Issue: Whether or Not it would be violative of the constitutional guarantee against an ex post facto law. Held: The court finds no merit in the petitioner’s contention that RA 3019 as amended by Batas Pambansa Blg 195, which includes the crime of estafa through falsification of Public Documents as among crimes subjecting the public officer charged therewith with suspension from public office pending action in court, is a penal provision which violates the constitutional prohibition against the enactment of ex post facto law. Accdg to the RPC suspension from employment and public office during trial shall not be considered as a penalty. It is not a penalty because it is not a result of a judicial proceeding. In fact, if acquitted the official who is suspended shall be
entitled to reinstatement and the salaries and benefits which he failed to receive during suspension. And does not violate the constitutional provision against ex post facto law. The claim of the petitioner that he cannot be suspended because he is currently occupying a position diffren tfrom that under which he is charged is untenable. The amendatory provision clearly states that any incumbent public officer against whom any criminal prosecution under a valid information under RA 3019 for any offense involving fraud upon the government or public funds or property or whatever stage of execution and mode of participation shall be suspended from office. The use of the word “office” applies to any office which the officer charged may be holding and not only the particular office under which he was charged.
PEOPLE V FERRER
Facts: Hon. Judge Simeon Ferrer is the Tarlac trial court judge that declared RA1700 or the Anti-Subversive Act of 1957 as a bill of attainder. Thus, dismissing the information of subversion against the following: 1.) Feliciano Co for being an officer/leader of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) aggravated by circumstances of contempt and insult to public officers, subversion by a band and aid of armed men to afford impunity. 2.) Nilo Tayag and 5 others, for being members/leaders of the NPA, inciting, instigating people to unite and overthrow the Philippine Government. Attended by Aggravating Circumstances of Aid or Armed Men, Craft, and Fraud. The trial court is of opinion that 1.) The Congress usurped the powers of the judge 2.) Assumed judicial magistracy by pronouncing the guilt of the CPP without any forms of safeguard of a judicial trial. 3.) It created a presumption of organizational guilt by being members of the CPP regardless of voluntariness.
The Anti-Subversive Act of 1957 was approved 20June1957. It is an act to outlaw the CPP and similar associations penalizing membership therein, and for other purposes. It defined the Communist Party being although a political party is in fact an organized conspiracy to overthrow the Government, not only by force and violence but also by deceit, subversion and other illegal means. It declares that the CPP is a clear and present danger to the security of the Philippines. Section 4 provided that affiliation with full knowledge of the illegal acts of the CPP is punishable. Section 5 states that due investigation by a designated prosecutor by the Secretary of Justice be made prior to filing of information in court. Section 6 provides for penalty for furnishing false evidence. Section 7 provides for 2 witnesses in open court for acts penalized by prision mayor to death. Section 8 allows the renunciation of membership to the CCP through writing under oath. Section 9 declares the constitutionality of the statute and its valid exercise under freedom if thought, assembly and association. Issues: (1) Whether or not RA1700 is a bill of attainder/ ex post facto law. For penalizing membership of CPP (2) Whether or Not RA1700 violates freedom of expression. Held: The court holds the VALIDITY Of the Anti-Subversion Act of 1957. A bill of attainder is solely a legislative act. It punishes without the benefit of the trial. It is the substitution of judicial determination to a legislative determination of guilt. In order for a statute be measured as a bill of attainder, the following requisites must be present: 1.) The statute specifies persons, groups. 2.) the statute is applied retroactively and reach past conduct. (A bill of attainder relatively is also an ex post facto law.) In the case at bar, the statute simply declares the CPP as an organized conspiracy for
the overthrow of the Government for purposes of example of SECTION 4 of the Act. The Act applies not only to the CPP but also to other organizations having the same purpose and their successors. The Act’s focus is on the conduct not person. Membership to this organizations, to be UNLAWFUL, it must be shown that membership was acquired with the intent to further the
goals of the organization by overt acts. This is
thE element of MEMBERSHIP with KNOWLEDGE
that is punishable. This is the required proof of
a member’s direct participation. Why is membership punished. Membership renders aid and encouragement to the organization. Membership makes himself party to its unlawful acts. Furthermore, the statute is PROSPECTIVE in nature. Section 4 prohibits acts committed after approval of the act. The members of the subversive organizations before the passing of this Act is given an opportunity to escape liability by renouncing membership in accordance with Section 8. The statute applies the principle of mutatis mutandis or that the necessary changes having been made. The declaration of that the CPP is an organized conspiracy to overthrow the Philippine Government should not be the basis of guilt. This declaration is only a basis of Section 4 of the Act. The EXISTENCE OF SUBSTANTIVE EVIL justifies the limitation to the exercise of “Freedom of Expression and Association” in this matter. Before the enactment of the statute and statements in the preamble, careful investigations by the Congress were done. The court further stresses that whatever interest in freedom of speech and association is excluded
in the prohibition of membership in the CPP are weak considering NATIONAL SECURITY and PRESERVATION of DEMOCRACY. The court set basic guidelines to be observed in the prosecution under RA1700. In addition to proving circumstances/ evidences of subversion, the following elements must also be established: 1. Subversive Organizations besides the CPP, it must be proven that the organization purpose is to overthrow the present Government of the Philippines and establish a domination of a FOREIGN POWER. Membership is willfully and knowingly done by overt acts. 2. In case of CPP, the continued pursuance of its subversive purpose. Membership is willfully and knowingly done by overt acts. The court did not make any judgment on the crimes of the accused under the Act. The Supreme Court set aside the resolution of the TRIAL COURT
NON-IMPROSONMENT FOR DEBT
Lozano v. MARTINEZ Facts: Batas Pambansa 22 (BP22; Bouncing Check Law) was approved on 3 April 1979. The petitions arose from cases involving prosecution of offenses under BP22. (Florentina A. Lozano vs. RTC Judge Antonio M.Martinez [Manila, Branch XX] in GR L-63419, Luzviminda F. Lobaton vs. RTC Executive Judge Glicerio L.Cruz [Lemery Batangas, Branch V] in GR L-66839-42, Antonio and Susan Datuin vs. RTC Judge Ernani C. Pano [Quezon City, Branch LXXVIII] in GR 71654, Oscar Violago vs. RTC Judge Ernani C. Pano [Quezon City, Branch LXXVIII] in GR 74524-25, Elinor Abad vs. RTC Judge Nicolad A. Gerochi Jr. [Makati, Branch 139] in GR 75122-49, Amable and Sylvia Aguiluz vs. Presiding Judge of Branch 154 of Pasig in GR 75812- 13, Luis M. Hojas vs. RTC Judge Senen Penaranda [Cagayan de Oro, Branch XX] in GR 72565-67, and People vs. RTC Judge David Nitafan [Manila, Branch 52] and Thelma Sarmiento in GR 75789]. Lozano, Lobaton, Datuin, Violago, Abad, Aguiluz, Hojas and Sarmiento moved seasonably to quash the informationson the ground that the acts charged did not constitute an offense, thestatute being unconstitutional. Themotions were denied by the trial courts, except in one case, which is the subject of GR 75789 (People vs.Nitafan), wherein the trial court declared thelaw unconstitutional and dismissed the case. The partiesadversely affected have come to the Supreme Court for relief. Issue: Whether BP 22 is contrary to the constitutional prohibition against imprisonment for debt. Held: The constitutional prohibition against imprisonment for debt is a safeguard that evolved graduallyduring the early part of the nineteenth century in the various states of the American Union as a result of thepeople's revulsion at the cruel and inhumane practice, sanctioned by common law, which permitted creditorsto cause the incarceration of debtors
who could not pay their debts. At common law, money judgments arisingfrom actions for the recovery of a debt or for damages from breach of a contract could be enforced against theperson or body of the debtor by writ of capias ad satisfaciendum. By means of this writ, a debtor could be seized and imprisoned at the instance of the creditor until he makes the satisfaction awarded. As aconsequence of the popular ground swell against such a barbarous practice, provisions forbiddingimprisonment for debt came to be generally enshrined in the constitutions of various states of the Union. Thishumanitarian provision was transported to our shores by the Americans at the turn of the century andembodied in Philippine organic laws. Later, the Philippine fundamental law outlawed not only imprisonmentfor debt, but also the infamous practice, native to our shore, of throwing people in jail for non-payment of thecedula or poll tax. It may be constitutionally impermissible to penalize a person for non-payment of a debt ex contractu. Organic provisions relieving from imprisonment for debt were intended to prevent commitment ofdebtors to prison for liabilities arising from actions ex contractu. The inhibition was never meant to includedamages arising in actions ex delicto, for the reason that damages recoverable therein do not arise from anycontract entered into between the parties but are imposed upon the defendant for the wrong he has done andare considered as punishment, nor to fines and penalties imposed by the courts in criminal proceedings as punishments for crime. Herein, the thrust of the law (BP 22) is to prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, themaking of worthless checks and putting them in circulation. The law punishes the act not as an offense againstproperty, but an offense against public order. It is not the non-payment of an obligation which the lawpunishes, nor is it intended or designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt. Although the effect of the law maybe to coerce payment of an obligation, it is intended to banish a practice (i.e. the issuance of worthlesschecks) considered harmful to public welfare
Sura vs. Martin Facts: In Civil Case 5580 of the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Negros Occidental, through JudgeEduardoD. Enriquez, judgment was rendered on 20 June 1961, amended on 15 July1961, ordering the Vicente MartinSr. to recognize Vicente Martin Jr. as his natural son; toprovideVicente Martin Jr. support in the monthly rateof P100 from 10 December 1959 until thelatter reaches the age of majority, and to pay the attorney's fees inthe amount of P1,000 plus the costs. From the judgment, Vicente Martin Sr. appealed to the Court of Appeals,and the latter Court, in CA-GR 30388-R, affirmed said decision on 30 January 1964. On 9 May 1964, the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Negros Occidental, through Judge Jose R. Querubin issued the order, orderingthe Clerk of Court to issue writ of execution, same being forwarded to theProvincial Sheriff of NegrosOriental. Pursuant to said order, a writ of execution was issuedon 9 May 1964 by the Clerk of Court, and theProvincial Sheriff of Negros Oriental served the sameupon the defendant in Tanjay, Negros Oriental butreturned the writ unsatisfied. Thesecond paragraph of the Sheriff's return of service, dated 21 September1964, stated that "the judgment debtor is jobless, and is residing in the dwelling house and in the company of his widowed mother, at Tanjay, this province. Debtor has no leviable property; he is even supported by hismother. Hereto attached is the certificate of insolvency issued by the MunicipalTreasurer of Tanjay NegrosOriental, where debtor legally resides." On 6 October 1964, Nilda Sura's counsel (in behalf of here minorchild Vicente Martin Jr.) prayed that Vicente Martin Sr., for failure to satisfy the writ of execution, beadjudged guilty of contempt of court. On 28 November 1964, the Court issued the order granting VicenteMartin Sr. to fulfill the decisionof the court within the period of 30 days or he shall be held in contempt.Vicente
Martin Sr. havingfailed to satisfy said order, the Court on 9 January 1965 issued the order orderingthe arrest of Martin Sr. On 26 January 1964, Martin Sr.'s counsel filed a notice of appeal, and at thesame timeprayed for the fixing of a bond for the temporary release of the defendant. On 1February 1965, the Courtissued the order directing the confinement of Martin Sr. to theprovincial jail, adn fixed bail at P7,000 ifMartin Sr. desired to appeal the case. Martin Sr. appealed. Issue: Whether the imprisonment of Martin Sr. for failure to satisfy the decision requiring him to supporthisnatural son at the monthly rate of P100, due to insolvency, violative of the constitutional right againstimprisonment for debt Held: The orders for the arrest and imprisonment of Vicente Martin, Sr., for contempt of court forfailure tosatisfy the judgment were illegal, in view of the following considerations: (1) The judgmentordering MartinSr. to pay past and future support at P100 per month was a finaldisposition of the case and was declaratory ofthe obligation of Martin Sr.. The writ ofexecution issued on the judgment with respect to past support in theamount of about P6,000 Required "the sheriff or other proper officer" to whom it was directed to satisfy the amount out of all property, real and personal, of the judgment debtor in the manner specified inRule 39,Section 15, of the Rules of Court. The writ of execution was, therefore, a direct order to the sheriff or otherproper officer to whom it was directed, and not an order to the judgment debtor. In view thereof, the judgmentdebtor could not, in the very nature of things, havecommitted disobedience to the writ. (2) The sheriff's returnshows that the judgment debtorwas insolvent. Hence the Orders of January 9 and February 1, 1965, in effect,authorized his imprisonment for debt in violation of the Constitution. (3) The disobedience to a judgmentconsidered as indirect contempt does not refer to a judgment which is a finaldisposition of the case andwhich
is declaratory of the rights of the parties, but to a special judgment, ajudgment "which requires theperformance of any other act than the payment of money, or thesale or delivery of real or personal property."According to Moran, generally, any order orjudgment of a court finally disposing of an action should beenforced by ordinary executionproceedings, except special judgments which should be executed by contemptproceedings. The Court reversed the orders of the lower court.
INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE
CUANCA V SALAZAR
Facts: This is an action for habeas corpus
brought by Bartolome Caunca in behalf of his
cousin Estelita Flores who was employed by the
Far Eastern Employment Bureau, owned by Julia
Salazar, respondent herein. An advanced
payment has already been given to Estelita by
the employment agency, for her to work as a
maid. However, Estelita wanted to transfer to
another residence, which was disallowed by the
employment agency. Further she was detained
and her liberty was restrained. The employment
agency wanted that the advance payment,
which was applied to her transportation
expense from the province should be paid by
Estelita before she could be allowed to leave.
Issue: Whether or Not an employment agency
has the right to restrain and detain a maid
without returning the advance payment it gave?
Held: An employment agency, regardless of the
amount it may advance to a prospective
employee or maid, has absolutely no power to
curtail her freedom of movement. The fact that
no physical force has been exerted to keep her
in the house of the respondent does not make
less real the deprivation of her personal
freedom of movement, freedom to transfer
from one place to another, freedom to choose
one’s residence. Freedom may be lost due to
external moral compulsion, to founded or
groundless fear, to erroneous belief in the
existence of an imaginary power of an impostor
to cause harm if not blindly obeyed, to any
other psychological element that may curtail
the mental faculty of choice or the unhampered
exercise of the will. If the actual effect of such
psychological spell is to place a person at the
mercy of another, the victim is entitled to the
protection of courts of justice as much as the
individual who is illegally deprived of liberty by
duress or physical coercion.
WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS,AMPARO,HABEAS
DATA AND KALIKASAN
VINGSON V CABCABAN
MANGILA V PANGILINAN
Anita Mangila was charged with seven criminalcomplaints with syndicated estafa in violation of Migrant #or$ers Act of 1""5. %he complaints arose from therecr&iting and promising of employment 'yMangila and the others to the privatecomplainants as overseas contract wor$ers in%oronto, Canada, and from the collection of visaprocessing fees, mem'ership fees and on(lineapplication witho&t a&thority from P)*A.+ollowing the preliminary
-Pangilinan of M%CC inP&erto Princesa, a warrant of arrest was iss&edagainst Mangila and her cohorts witho&t 'ail. 0yvirt&e of the arrest warrant, Mangila wasarrested in Manila
-.Mangila filed a petition for ha'eas corp&s 'eforethe CA to o'tain her release. 2he arg&ed that/&dge Pangilinan had no a&thority to cond&ctthe P- - was not yet completed whenthe arrest warrant was
therewas no finding of pro'a'le ca&se prior to theiss&ance of arrest warrant.%he CA denied Mangila4s petition. ISSUE:
remedy to o'tain the release of Mangilafrom detention. HELD:
habeas corpus is a special proceeding governed'y R&le 176 of the R&les of Co&rt, as amended.-n Ex Parte Billings , it was held that habeascorpus is that of a civil proceeding in character.-t see$s the enforcement of civil rights. Resortingto the
writ is not to in8&ire into the criminal act of which the complaint is made, '&t into the right of li'erty, notwithstanding the act and theimmediate p&rpose to 'e served is relief fromillegal restraint. %he r&le applies even wheninstit&ted to arrest a criminal prosec&tion andsec&re freedom. #hen a prisoner petitions for awrit of habeas corpus , he there'y commences as&it and prosec&tes a case in that co&rt.%he in8&iry in a habeas corpus proceeding isaddressed to the 8&estion of whether theproceedings and the assailed order are, for anyreason, n&ll and void. %he writ is not ordinarilygranted where the law provides for other remedies in the reg&lar co&rse, and in thea'sence of e9ceptional circ&mstances.Moreover, habeas corpus sho&ld not 'e grantedin advance of trial. %he orderly co&rse of trialm&st 'e p&rs&ed and the &s&al remediese9ha&sted 'efore resorting to the writ wheree9ceptional circ&mstances are e9tant. -n another case, it was held that habeas corpus cannot 'eiss&ed as a writ of error or as a means of reviewing errors of law and irreg&larities notinvolving the 8&estions of :&risdiction occ&rringd&ring the co&rse of the trial, s&':ect to thecaveat that constit&tional safeg&ards of h&manlife and li'erty m&st 'e preserved, and notdestroyed. -t has also 'een held that whererestraint is &nder legal process, mere errors andirreg&larities, which do not render theproceedings void, are not gro&nds for relief 'y habeas corpus 'eca&se in s&ch cases, therestraint is not
-t was clear that &nder 2ection
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure , the resol&tion of the investigating :&dge was not final '&t was still s&':ect to thereview 'y the p&'lic prosec&tor who had thepower to order the release of the detainee if nopro'a'le ca&se sho&ld 'e<imately fo&ndagainst her. -n the
conte9t of the r&le, Mangilahad no need to see$ the iss&ance of the writ of habeas corpus to sec&re her release fromdetention. ;er proper reco&rse was to 'ring thes&pposed irreg&larities attending the cond&ct of the preliminary investigation and the iss&ance of the warrant for her arrest to the attention of theCity Prosec&tor, who had 'een meanwhile giventhe most direct access to the entire records of the case, incl&ding the warrant of arrest,following /&dge Pangilinan4s transmittal of themto the City Prosec&tor for appropriate action. %hewrit of habeas corpus co&ld not 'e &sed asas&'stit&te for another availa'le remedy
ARIGO V SWIFT
PONENTE: Villarama
TOPIC: Writ of kalikasan, UNCLOS, Immunity from suit
FACTS:
The USS Guardian is an Avenger-class mine countermeasures ship of the US Navy. In December 2012, the US Embassy in the Philippines requested diplomatic clearance for the said vessel “to enter and exit the territorial waters of the Philippines and to arrive at the port of Subic Bay for the purpose of routine ship replenishment, maintenance, and crew liberty.” On January 6, 2013, the ship left Sasebo, Japan for Subic Bay, arriving on January 13, 2013 after a brief stop for fuel in Okinawa, Japan.
On January 15, 2013, the USS Guardian departed Subic Bay for its next port of call in Makassar, Indonesia. On January 17, 2013 at
2:20 a.m. while transiting the Sulu Sea, the ship ran aground on the northwest side of South Shoal of the Tubbataha Reefs, about 80 miles east-southeast of Palawan. No one was injured in the incident, and there have been no reports of leaking fuel or oil.
Petitioners claim that the grounding, salvaging and post-salvaging operations of the USS Guardian cause and continue to cause environmental damage of such magnitude as to affect the provinces of Palawan, Antique, Aklan, Guimaras, Iloilo, Negros Occidental, Negros Oriental, Zamboanga del Norte, Basilan, Sulu, and Tawi-Tawi, which events violate their constitutional rights to a balanced and healthful ecology.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not petitioners have legal standing.
2. Whether or not US respondents may be held liable for damages caused by USS Guardian.
3. Whether or not the waiver of immunity from suit under VFA applies in this case.
HELD:
First issue: YES.
Petitioners have legal standing
Locus standi is “a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question.” Specifically, it is “a party’s personal and substantial interest in a case where he has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result” of the act being challenged, and “calls for more than just a generalized grievance.” However, the rule on standing is a procedural matter which this Court has relaxed for non-
traditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens, taxpayers and legislators when the public interest so requires, such as when the subject matter of the controversy is of transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to society, or of paramount public interest.
In the landmark case of Oposa v. Factoran, Jr., we recognized the “public right” of citizens to “a balanced and healthful ecology which, for the first time in our constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the fundamental law.” We declared that the right to a balanced and healthful ecology need not be written in the Constitution for it is assumed, like other civil and polittcal rights guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, to exist from the inception of mankind and it is an issue of transcendental importance with intergenerational implications.1âwphi1 Such right carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment.
On the novel element in the class suit filed by the petitioners minors in Oposa, this Court ruled that not only do ordinary citizens have legal standing to sue for the enforcement of environmental rights, they can do so in representation of their own and future generations.
Second issue: YES.
The US respondents were sued in their official capacity as commanding officers of the US Navy who had control and supervision over the USS Guardian and its crew. The alleged act or omission resulting in the unfortunate grounding of the USS Guardian on the TRNP was committed while they were performing official military duties. Considering that the satisfaction of a judgment against said officials will require remedial actions and appropriation of funds by the US government, the suit is deemed to be one against the US itself. The principle of State immunity therefore bars the
exercise of jurisdiction by this Court over the persons of respondents Swift, Rice and Robling.
During the deliberations, Senior Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio took the position that the conduct of the US in this case, when its warship entered a restricted area in violation of R.A. No. 10067 and caused damage to the TRNP reef system, brings the matter within the ambit of Article 31 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). He explained that while historically, warships enjoy sovereign immunity from suit as extensions of their flag State, Art. 31 of the UNCLOS creates an exception to this rule in cases where they fail to comply with the rules and regulations of the coastal State regarding passage through the latter’s internal waters and the territorial sea.
In the case of warships, as pointed out by Justice Carpio, they continue to enjoy sovereign immunity subject to the following exceptions:
Article 30: Non-compliance by warships with the laws and regulations of the coastal State
If any warship does not comply with the laws and regulations of the coastal State concerning passage through the territorial sea and disregards any request for compliance therewith which is made to it, the coastal State may require it to leave the territorial sea immediately.
Article 31: Responsibility of the flag State for damage caused by a warship or other government ship operated for non-commercial purposes
The flag State shall bear international responsibility for any loss or damage to the coastal State resulting from the non-compliance by a warship or other government ship
operated for non-commercial purposes with the laws and regulations of the coastal State concerning passage through the territorial sea or with the provisions of this Convention or other rules of international law.
Article 32: Immunities of warships and other government ships operated for non-commercial purposes
With such exceptions as are contained in subsection A and in articles 30 and 31, nothing in this Convention affects the immunities of warships and other government ships operated for non-commercial purposes. A foreign warship’s unauthorized entry into our internal waters with resulting damage to marine resources is one situation in which the above provisions may apply.
But what if the offending warship is a non-party to the UNCLOS, as in this case, the US?
According to Justice Carpio, although the US to date has not ratified the UNCLOS, as a matter of long-standing policy the US considers itself bound by customary international rules on the “traditional uses of the oceans” as codified in UNCLOS.
Moreover, Justice Carpio emphasizes that “the US refusal to join the UNCLOS was centered on its disagreement with UNCLOS” regime of deep seabed mining (Part XI) which considers the oceans and deep seabed commonly owned by mankind,” pointing out that such “has nothing to do with its the US’ acceptance of customary international rules on navigation.”
The Court also fully concurred with Justice Carpio’s view that non-membership in the UNCLOS does not mean that the US will disregard the rights of the Philippines as a Coastal State over its internal waters and territorial sea. We thus expect the US to bear “international responsibility” under Art. 31 in connection with the USS Guardian grounding which adversely affected the Tubbataha reefs.
Indeed, it is difficult to imagine that our long-time ally and trading partner, which has been actively supporting the country’s efforts to preserve our vital marine resources, would shirk from its obligation to compensate the damage caused by its warship while transiting our internal waters. Much less can we comprehend a Government exercising leadership in international affairs, unwilling to comply with the UNCLOS directive for all nations to cooperate in the global task to protect and preserve the marine environment as provided in Article 197 of UNCLOS
Article 197: Cooperation on a global or regional basis
States shall cooperate on a global basis and, as appropriate, on a regional basis, directly or through competent international organizations, in formulating and elaborating international rules, standards and recommended practices and procedures consistent with this Convention, for the protection and preservation of the marine environment, taking into account characteristic regional features.
In fine, the relevance of UNCLOS provisions to the present controversy is beyond dispute. Although the said treaty upholds the immunity of warships from the jurisdiction of Coastal States while navigating the latter’s territorial sea, the flag States shall be required to leave the territorial sea immediately if they flout the laws and regulations of the Coastal State, and they will be liable for damages caused by their warships or any other government vessel operated for non-commercial purposes under Article 31.
Third issue: NO.
The waiver of State immunity under the VF A pertains only to criminal jurisdiction and not to special civil actions such as the present petition for issuance of a writ of
Kalikasan. In fact, it can be inferred from Section 17, Rule 7 of the Rules that a criminal case against a person charged with a violation of an environmental law is to be filed separately.
The Court considered a view that a ruling on the application or non-application of criminal jurisdiction provisions of the VFA to US personnel who may be found responsible for the grounding of the USS Guardian, would be premature and beyond the province of a petition for a writ of Kalikasan.
The Court also found unnecessary at this point to determine whether such waiver of State immunity is indeed absolute. In the same vein, we cannot grant damages which have resulted from the violation of environmental laws. The Rules allows the recovery of damages, including the collection of administrative fines under R.A. No. 10067, in a separate civil suit or that deemed instituted with the criminal action charging the same violation of an environmental law.
AMPATUAN V MACARAIG
FACTS: Atty. Alioden D. Dalaig, Head of the COMELEC Legal Department, was killed at the corner of M. H. Del Pilar and Pedro Gil Streets, Ermita, Manila. Investigation conducted by the Manila Police District Homicide Section yielded the identity of the male perpetrator as PO1 Ampatuan. Consequently, PO1 Ampatuan was commanded to the MPD District Director for proper disposition. Likewise, inquest proceedings were conducted by the Manila Prosecutor’s Office. On 18 April 2008, Police Senior Superintendent Guinto, rendered his Pre-Charge Evaluation Report against PO1 Ampatuan, finding probable cause to charge PO1 Ampatuan with Grave Misconduct (Murder) and recommending that said PO1 Ampatuan be subjected to summary hearing.
Meanwhile, on 21 April 2008, the City Prosecutor of Manila recommended that the case against PO1 Ampatuan be set for further investigation and that the latter be released from custody unless he is being held for other charges/legal grounds. Armed with the 21 April 2008 recommendation of the Manila City’s Prosecution Office, petitioner, who is the wife of PO1 Ampatuan, filed a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Habeas Corpus before the RTC of Manila on 22 April 2008. On 24 April 2008, RTC ordered the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus commanding therein respondents to produce the body of PO1 Ampatuan and directing said respondents to show cause why they are withholding or restraining the liberty of PO1 Ampatuan. Seeking the reversal of RTC, the respondents averred that the filing of the administrative case against PO1 Ampatuan is a process done by the PNP and this Court has no authority to order the release of the subject police officer. The petitioner countered that the letter resignation of PO1 Ampatuan has rendered the administrative case moot and academic. Respondent however stressed that the resignation has not been acted by the appropriate police officials of the PNP, and that the administrative case was filed while PO1 Ampatuan is still in the active status of the PNP. The RTC reversed and dismissed the petition. ISSUE: THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT FAILED TO CONSIDER THAT THE ARREST AND DETENTION OF PO1 BASSER B. AMPATUAN WAS MADE WITHOUT ANY WARRANT AND THEREFORE, ILLEGAL. HELD: The objective of the writ is to determine whether the confinement or detention is valid or lawful. If it is, the writ cannot be issued. What is to be inquired into is the legality of a person's detention as of, at the earliest, the
filing of the application for the writ of habeas corpus, for even if the detention is at its inception illegal, it may, by reason of some supervening events, such as the instances mentioned in Section 4 of Rule 102, be no longer illegal at the time of the filing of the application In this case, PO1 Ampatuan has been placed under Restrictive Custody. Republic Act No. 6975 (also known as the Department of Interior and Local Government Act of 1990), as amended by Republic Act No. 8551 (also known as the Philippine National Police Reform and Reorganization Act of 1998), clearly provides that members of the police force are subject to the administrative disciplinary machinery of the PNP. Given that PO1 Ampatuan has been placed under restrictive custody, such constitutes a valid argument for his continued detention. This Court has held that a restrictive custody and monitoring of movements or whereabouts of police officers under investigation by their superiors is not a form of illegal detention or restraint of liberty. Restrictive custody is, at best, nominal restraint which is beyond the ambit of habeas corpus. It is neither actual nor effective restraint that would call for the grant of the remedy prayed for. It is a permissible precautionary measure to assure the PNP authorities that the police officers concerned are always accounted for. In sum, petitioner is unable to discharge the burden of showing that she is entitled to the issuance of the writ prayed for in behalf of her husband, PO1 Ampatuan. The petition fails to show on its face that the latter is unlawfully deprived of his liberty guaranteed and enshrined in the Constitution.
LANSANG V GARCIA
Facts: In the evening of August 21, 1971, at
about 9 p.m., while the Liberal Party of the
Philippines was holding a public meeting at
Plaza Miranda, Manila, for the presentation of
its candidates in the general elections
scheduled for November 8, 1971, two hand
grenades were thrown at the platform where
said candidates and other persons were. Eight
persons were killed and many more injured.
Proclamation 889 was issued by the President
suspending privilege of writ of habeas corpus
stating that there is a conspiracy of rebellion
and insurrection in order to forcibly seize
political power. Petitions for writ of habeas
corpus were filed by persons (13) who have
been arrested without a warrant.
It was stated that one of the safeguards of the
proclamation was that it is to be applied to
persons caught in flagrante delicto. Incidentally,
Proc. 889-A was issued as an amendment,
inserting the word “actually staging”. Proc. 889-
B was also issued lifting the suspension of
privilege in 27 provinces, 3 sub-provinces and
26 cities. Proc. 889-C was issued restoring the
suspension in 13 provinces and cities(mostly in
Mindanao). Proc. 889-D further lifted the
suspension in 7 provinces and 4 cities. Only 18
provinces and sub-provinces and 2 cities whose
privilege was suspended. Petitioners
maintained that Proclamation No. 889 did not
declare the existence of actual "invasion
insurrection or rebellion or imminent danger
thereof, however it became moot and academic
since it was amended. Petitioners further
contend that public safety did not require the
issuance of proclamations stating: (a) that there
is no rebellion; (b) that, prior to and at the time
of the suspension of the privilege, the
Government was functioning normally, as were
the courts; (c) that no untoward incident,
confirmatory of an alleged July-August Plan, has
actually taken place after August 21, 1971; (d)
that the President's alleged apprehension,
because of said plan, is non-existent and
unjustified; and (e) that the Communist forces
in the Philippines are too small and weak to
jeopardize public safety to such extent as to
require the suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus.
A resolution was issued by majority of the Court
having tentatively arrived at a consensus that it
may inquire in order to satisfy itself of the
existence of the factual bases for the
proclamations. Now the Court resolves after
conclusive decision reached by majority.
Issues:
(1) Whether or Not the authority to decide
whether the exigency has arisen requiring
suspension (of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus) belongs to the President and his
decision is final and conclusive upon the courts
and upon all other persons.
(2) Whether or Not public safety require the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus decreed in Proclamation No. 889-A.
Held: The President has authority however it is
subject to judicial review. Two conditions must
concur for the valid exercise of the authority to
suspend the privilege to the writ (a) there must
be "invasion, insurrection, or rebellion" or
"imminent danger thereof," and (b) "public
safety" must require the suspension of the
privilege. President has three (3) courses of
action: (a) to call out the armed forces; (b) to
suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus; and (c) to place the Philippines or any
part thereof under martial law. He had, already,
called out the armed forces, proved inadequate.
Of the two other alternatives, the suspension of
the privilege is the least harsh.
Petitioners contention that CPP-NPA has no
ability, is negatived by the killing of 5 mayors,
20 barrio captains and 3 chiefs of police; that
there were fourteen (14) meaningful bombing
incidents in the Greater Manila Area in 1970.
CPP has managed to infiltrate or establish and
control nine major labor organizations; has
exploited the (11) major student or youth
organizations; about thirty (30) mass
organizations actively advancing the CPP.
KULAYAN V TAN
LOZADA V MACAPAGAL ARROYO
CARAM V SEGUI
GAMBOA V CHAN
Facts:Former President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo issued Admin No. 275 creating Zeñarosa Commissionwhich was formed to investigate the existence of private army groups in the country in view of eliminating and dismantling them permanently in the future. Upon conclusion of its investigation, theCommission submitted a confidential report to the office of the President.Marynette Gamboa was the Mayor of Dingras, Ilocos Norte. Gamboa alleged that the PhilippineNational Police Ilocos Norte conducted surveillance operation against her and her aides and classifiedher as PAG coddler. Purportedly without the benefit of data verification, PNP forwarded in the Report’s enumeration of individual maintaining PAGs. Gamboa’s association with PAG was published and released in the different forms of media, publicly tagging her as a PAG coddler. Alleging that her right to privacy was violated, Gamboa filed apetition before the RTC for the issuance of writ of habeas data to destroy the unverified reports fromthe PNP data base and restrain PNP from forwarding baseless
reports against her. The RTC ruled thatthe inclusion of Gamboa in the report violates her right to privacy. However, the RTC dismissed Gamboa’s petition for writ of habeas data saying that Gamboa failed to establish the source of the information.ISSUES:1. Whether or not the forwarding or information or intelligence report by the PNP to the Commission was an unlawful act that violated petitioner’s right to privacy 2. Whether or not resort to petition for writ of habeas data was proper HELD:Forwarding of information or intelligence report gathered by the PNP to the Commission is NOT an intrusion of petitioner’s right to privacy It is clear that the issuance of AO 275 articulates a legitimate aim which is to investigate theexistence of PAGs with the ultimate objective of dismantling them permanently. Pursuant to the stateinterest of dismantling PAGs, as well as the powers and functions accorded to the Commission and thePNP, the latter collected information on individuals suspected of maintaining PAGs, monitored them andcounteracted their activities. One of those individuals is herein petitioner Gamboa.This court holds that Gamboa was able to sufficiently establish that the data contained in thereport listing her as a PAG coddler came from the PNP contrary to the ruling of the trial court, however,the forwarding of information by the PNP to the Commission was not unlawful act that violated orthreatened her right to privacy in life, liberty or security. The PNP was rationally expected to forwardand share intelligence regarding PAGs with the body specifically created for the purpose of investigatingthe existence of these notorious group. Moreover, the Commission was explicitly authorized to deputize the police force in the fulfillment of the former’s mandate, and thus had the power to request as sistancefrom the latter. Petition for writ of habeas data is NOT PROPER
PAJE V CASINO
SPEEDY DISPOSITION OF CASES
GARCIA EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
In November 1990, President Corazon Aquino issued Executive Order No. 438 which imposed, in addition to any other duties, taxes and charges imposed by law on all articles imported into the Philippines, an additional duty of 5% ad valorem tax. This additional duty was imposed across the board on all imported articles, including crude oil and other oil products imported into the Philippines. In 1991, EO 443 increased the additional duty to 9%. In the same year, EO 475 was passed reinstating the previous 5% duty except that crude oil and other oil products continued to be taxed at 9%. Enrique Garcia, a representative from Bataan, avers that EO 475 and 478 are unconstitutional for they violate Section 24 of Article VI of the Constitution which provides:
All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments.
He contends that since the Constitution vests the authority to enact revenue bills in Congress, the President may not assume such power by issuing Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478 which are in the nature of revenue-generating measures.
ISSUE: Whether or not EO 475 and 478 are constitutional.
HELD: Under Section 24, Article VI of the Constitution, the enactment of appropriation, revenue and tariff bills, like all other bills is, of course, within the province of the Legislative rather than the Executive Department. It does not follow, however, that therefore Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478, assuming they may be characterized as revenue measures, are prohibited to be exercised by the President,
that they must be enacted instead by the Congress of the Philippines.
Section 28(2) of Article VI of the Constitution provides as follows:
(2) The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within specified limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the national development program of the Government.
There is thus explicit constitutional permission to Congress to authorize the President “subject to such limitations and restrictions as [Congress] may impose” to fix “within specific limits” “tariff rates . . . and other duties or imposts . . . .” In this case, it is the Tariff and Customs Code which authorized the President ot issue the said EOs.
GUERRERO V CA
CONDE V RIVERA
Facts: Aurelia Conde, formerly a municipal
midwife in Lucena, Tayabas, has been forced to
respond to no less the five information for
various crimes and misdemeanors, has
appeared with her witnesses and counsel at
hearings no less than on eight different
occasions only to see the cause postponed, has
twice been required to come to the Supreme
Court for protection, and now, after the
passage of more than one year from the time
when the first information was filed, seems as
far away from a definite resolution of her
troubles as she was when originally charged.
Issue: Whether or Not petitioner has been
denied her right to a speedy and impartial trial.
Held: Philippine organic and statutory law
expressly guarantee that in all criminal
prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right
to have a speedy trial. Aurelia Conde, like all
other accused persons, has a right to a speedy
trial in order that if innocent she may go free,
and she has been deprived of that right in
defiance of law. We lay down the legal
proposition that, where a prosecuting officer,
without good cause, secures postponements of
the trial of a defendant against his protest
beyond a reasonable period of time, as in this
instance for more than a year, the accused is
entitled to relief by a proceeding in mandamus
to compel a dismissal of the information, or if
he be restrained of his liberty, by habeas corpus
to obtain his freedom.
RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED
Galman v Sandiganbayan
144 SCRA 392 (1986)
Facts: An investigating committee was created
to determine the facts on the case involving the
assassination of Ninoy Aquino. It appears that
majority and minority reports showed that they
are unconvinced on the participation of Galman
as the assassin of late Sen. Aquino and branded
him instead as the fall guy as opposed to the
military reports. Majority reports
recommended the 26 military respondents as
indictable for the premeditated killing of Aquino
and Galman which the Sandiganbayan did not
give due consideration.
The office of the Tanod Bayan was originally
preparing a resolution charging the 26 military
accused as principal to the crime against Aquino
but was recalled upon the intervention of
President Marcos who insist on the innocence
of the accused. Marcos however recommended
the filing of murder charge and to implement
the acquittal as planned so that double
jeopardy may be invoked later on.
The petitioners filed an action for miscarriage of
justice against the Sandiganbayan and gross
violation of constitutional rights of the
petitioners for failure to exert genuine efforts in
allowing the prosecution to present vital
documentary evidence and prayed for nullifying
the bias proceedings before the Sandiganbayan
and ordering a re-trial before an impartial
tribunal.
Issue: Whether or not there was due process in
the acquittal of the accused from the charges
against them.
Held: The Supreme Court held that the
prosecution was deprived of due process and
fair opportunity to prosecute and prove their
case which grossly violates the due process
clause. There could be no double jeopardy since
legal jeopardy attaches only (a) upon a valid
indictment, (b) before a competent court, (c)
after arraignment, (d) a valid plea having been
entered; and (e) the case was dismissed or
otherwise terminated without the express
consent of the accused (People vs. Ylagan, 58
Phil. 851). The lower court that rendered the
judgment of acquittal was not competent as it
was ousted of its jurisdiction when it violated
the right of the prosecution to due process. In
effect the first jeopardy was never terminated,
and the remand of the criminal case for further
hearing and/or trial before the lower courts
amounts merely to a continuation of the first
jeopardy, and does not expose the accused to a
second jeopardy.
The court further contends that the previous
trial was a mock trial where the authoritarian
President ordered the Sandiganbayan and
Tanod Bayan to rig and closely monitor the trial
which was undertaken with due pressure to the
judiciary. The court’s decision of acquittal is one
void of jurisdiction owing to its failure in
observing due process during the trial therefore
the judgment was also deemed void and double
jeopardy cannot be invoked. More so the trial
was one vitiated with lack of due process on the
account of collusion between the lower court
and Sandiganbayan for the rendition of a pre-
determined verdict of the accused.
The denial on the motion for reconsideration of
the petitioners by the court was set aside and
rendered the decision of acquittal of the
accused null and void. An order for a re-trial
was granted.
VILLAFLOR VS. SUMMERS
Facts: Petitioner Villaflor was charged with the
crime of adultery. The trial judge ordered the
petitioner to subject herself into physical
examination to test whether or not she was
pregnant to prove the determine the crime of
adultery being charged to her. Herein petitioner
refused to such physical examination
interposing the defense that such examination
was a violation of her constitutional rights
against self-incrimination.
Issue: Whether or Not the physical examination
was a violation of the petitioner’s constitutional
rights against self-incrimination.
Held: No. It is not a violation of her
constitutional rights. The rule that the
constitutional guaranty, that no person shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself, is limited to a prohibition
against compulsory testimonial self-
incrimination. The corollary to the proposition is
that, an ocular inspection of the body of the
accused is permissible.
BELTRAN V SAMSON
Facts: Beltran, as a defendant for the crime of Falsification, refused to write a sample of his handwriting as ordered by the respondent Judge. The petitioner in this case contended that such order would be a violation of his constitutional right against self-incrimination because such examination would give the prosecution evidence against him, which the latter should have gotten in the first place. He also argued that such an act will make him furnish evidence against himself.
Issue: Whether or not the writing from the fiscal's dictation by the petitioner for the purpose of comparing the latter's handwriting and determining whether he wrote certain documents supposed to be falsified, constitutes evidence against himself within the scope and meaning of the constitutional provision under examination. Held: The court ordered the respondents and those under their orders desist and abstain absolutely and forever from compelling the petitioner to take down dictation in his handwriting for the purpose of submitting the latter for comparison. Writing is something more than moving the body, or the hands, or the fingers; writing is not a purely mechanical act, because it requires the application of intelligence and attention; and in the case at bar writing means that the petitioner herein is to furnish a means to determine whether or not he is the falsifier, as the petition of the respondent fiscal clearly states. Except that it is more serious, we believe the present case is similar to that of producing documents or chattels in one's possession. We say that, for the purposes of the constitutional privilege, there is a similarity between one who is compelled to produce a document, and one
who is compelled to furnish a specimen of his handwriting, for in both cases, the witness is required to furnish evidence against himself. It cannot be contended in the present case that if permission to obtain a specimen of the petitioner's handwriting is not granted, the crime would go unpunished. Considering the circumstance that the petitioner is a municipal treasurer, it should not be a difficult matter for the fiscal to obtained genuine specimens of his handwriting. But even supposing it is impossible to obtain specimen or specimens without resorting to the means complained herein, that is no reason for trampling upon a personal right guaranteed by the constitution. It might be true that in some cases criminals may succeed in evading the hand of justice, but such cases are accidental and do not constitute the raison d' etre of the privilege. This constitutional privilege exists for the protection of innocent persons.
PEOPLE V GALIT
The prisoner was arrested for killing the victim oil the occasion of a robbery. He had beendetained and interrogated almost continuously for five days, to no avail. He consistentlymaintained his innocence. There was no evidence to link him to the crime. Obviously,something drastic had to be done. A confession was absolutely necessary. So the investigatingofficers began to maul him and to torture him physically. Still the prisoner insisted on hisinnocence. His will had to be broken. A confession must be obtained. So they continued tomaltreat and beat him. 'They covered his face with a rag and pushed his face into a toilet bowlfull of human waste. The prisoner could not take any more. His body could no longer endurethe pain inflicted on him and the indignities he had to suffer. His will had been broken. Headmitted what the investigating officers wanted him to admit and he signed the confessionthey prepared. Later, against his will, he posed for pictures as directed by his investigators,purporting it to be a reenactment.
ISSUE: Whether or not the accused was informed of his constitutional rights to remain silentand to counsel, and that any statement he might make could be used against him. RULING: Such a long question followed by a monosyllabic answer does not satisfy the requirements of the law that the accused be informed of his rights under the Constitution and our laws. Insteadthere should be several short and clear questions and every right explained in simple words in adialect or language known to the person under investigation. Accused is from Samar and thereis no showing that he understands Tagalog. Moreover, at the time of his arrest, accused wasnot permitted to communicate with his lawyer, a relative, or a friend. In fact, his sisters andother relatives did not know that he had been brought to the NBI for investigation and it wasonly about two weeks after he had executed the salaysay that his relatives were allowed to visithim. His statement does not even contain any waiver of right to counsel and yet during theinvestigation he was not assisted by one. At the supposed reenactment, again accused was notassisted by counsel of his choice. These constitute gross violations of his rights.
CHAVEZ V CA
Facts: Judgment of conviction was for qualified theft of a motor vehicle(thunderbird car together with accessories). An information was filed against the accused together with other accused,that they conspired, with intent to gain and abuse of confidence without theconsent of owner Dy Lim, took the vehicle.All the accused plead not guilty. During the trial, the fiscal grecia (prosecution) asked roger Chavez to be thefirst witness. Counsel of the accused opposed. Fiscal Grecia contends that the accused (Chavez) will only be an ordinary witness not an state witness. Counsel of
accused answer that it will only incriminate his client. But the jugde ruled in favor of the fiscal.
Petitioner was convicted.
ISSUE: Whether or not constitutional right of Chavez against self – incrimination had been violated – to warrant writ of HC?
HELD: YES. Petitioner was forced to testify to incriminate himself, in full breach of his constitutional right to remain silent. It cannot be said now that he has waived his right. He did not volunteer to take the stand and in his own defense; he did not offer himself as a witness;
Juxtaposed with the circumstances of the case heretofore adverted to, make waiver a shaky defense. It cannot stand. If, by his own admission, defendant proved his guilt, still, his original claim remains valid. For the privilege, we say again, is a rampart that gives protection – even to the guilty
Habeas corpus is a high prerogative writ. It is traditionally considered as an exceptional remedy to release a person whose liberty is illegally restrained such as when the accused’s constitutional rights are disregarded. Such defect results in the absence or loss of jurisdiction and therefore invalidates the trial and the consequent conviction of the accused whose fundamental right was violated. That void judgment of conviction may be challenged by collateral attack, which precisely is the function of habeas corpus. This writ may issue even if another remedy which is less effective may be availed of by the defendant. Thus, failure by the accused to perfect his appeal before the Court of Appeals does not preclude a recourse to the writ. The writ may be granted upon a judgment already final. For, as explained in Johnson vs. Zerbst, the writ of habeas corpus as an extraordinary remedy must be liberally given effect so as to protect well a person whose liberty is at stake. The propriety of the writ was given the nod in that case,
involving a violation of another constitutional right, in this wise:
A court’s jurisdiction at the beginning of trial may be lost “in the course of the proceedings” due to failure to complete the court — as the Sixth Amendment requires — by providing Counsel for an accused who is unable to obtain Counsel, who has not intelligently waived this constitutional guaranty, and whose life or liberty is at stake. If this requirement of the Sixth Amendment is not complied with, the court no longer has jurisdiction to proceed. The judgment of conviction pronounced by a court without jurisdiction is void, and one imprisoned thereunder may obtain release of habeas corpus.
Under our own Rules of Court, to grant the remedy to the accused Roger Chavez whose case presents a clear picture of disregard of a constitutional right is absolutely proper. Section 1 of Rule 102 extends the writ, unless otherwise expressly provided by law, “to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto.
PEOPLE V SUAREZ
FACTS: On or about the 8th day of December,
1987 in the Municipality of Pasig, Estrelita
Guzman was robbed and was killed in her own
house.
Suarez wanted his aunt killed so that he and his
wife, Marivic Suarez, also the victim’s adopted
daughter, could get at once any property that
Marivic might inherit from Estrellita upon the
latter's death. In exchange for the job, Suarez
would allow the other accused to steal what
they wanted from the house, in addition to
giving them P100,000.00 after one month from
the killing of Estrellita.
Two of the accused, Reyes and Lara, gave their
sworn statement detailing what transpired from
the planning until the execution of the crime.
Relying on the extrajudicial confessions of the
accused and on the circumstantial evidence
adduced by the prosecution, the trial court
found Suarez, Reyes and Lara guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of robbery with homicide.
While Suarez and Reyes have already accepted
the trial court's verdict, Lara now questions the
lower court's decision by challenging the
admissibility of their extrajudicial declarations.
He claims that their extrajudicial confessions
were obtained through force and intimidation
and without the benefit of an effective counsel.
ISSUES: WON accused Lara’s extrajudicial
confessions were freely and voluntary given and
without the benefit of an effective counsel.
HELD: After a thorough review of the records of
the case, we agree with the lower court's
factual finding and conclusion that the
extrajudicial confessions of accused Reyes and
appellant Lara were freely and voluntarily given
and that their retraction and claims of violence
and coercion were merely belated contrivances
and efforts at exculpation. Their claim that they
were forced to sign their respective statements
was sufficiently refuted by the witnesses for the
prosecution who were present on the day and
time the duo gave and signed their sworn
statements.
We find no merit in herein appellant's
contention that Atty. Saunar was not Reyes'
own choice as counsel for the interrogation.
While the initial choice of the lawyer in cases
where a person under custodial investigation
cannot afford the services of a lawyer is
naturally lodged in the police investigators, the
accused really has the final choice as he may
reject the counsel chosen for him and ask for
another one. A lawyer provided by the
investigators is deemed engaged by the accused
where he never raised any objection against the
former's appointment during the course of the
investigation and the accused thereafter
subscribes to the veracity of his statement
before the swearing officer. 37
Here, while the lawyers of the accused were
provided by the NBI, the accused never signified
their desire to have a lawyer of their own
choice. Thus, we also disagree with appellant's
claim that the lawyer who assisted him in his
waiver came in only after he had executed his
waiver. His own statements show that he
waived his rights in the presence and with the
advice of Atty. Rodolfo Dahiroc.
PEOPLE V MALMSTED
Facts: Captain Alen Vasco, the commanding officer of the first regional command (NARCOM) stationed at camp Dangwa, ordered his men to set up a temporary checkpoint for the purpose of checking all vehicles coming from the Cordillera Region. The order to establish a checkpoint was prompted by persistent reports that vehicles coming from Sagada were transporting marijuana and other prohibited drugs. And an information also was received about a Caucasian coming from Sagada had in his possession prohibited drugs. In the afternoon the bus where accused was riding stopped. Sgt. Fider and CIC Galutan boarded the bus and announced that they were members of the NARCOM and that they would conduct an inspection. During the inspection CIC Galutan noticed a bulge on accused waist.
Suspecting the bulge on accused waist to be a gun, the officer asked for accused’s passport and other identification papers. When accused failed to comply, the officer required him to bring out whatever it was that was bulging o his waist. And it turned out to be a pouched bag and when accused opened the same bag the officer noticed four suspicious looking objects wrapped in brown packing tape. It contained hashish, a derivative of marijuana. Thereafter, the accused was invited outside the bus for questioning. But before he alighted from the bus accused stopped to get two travelling bags. The officer inspects the bag. It was only after the officers had opened the bags that the accused finally presented his passport. The two bags contained a stuffed toy each, upon inspection the stuff toy contained also hashish. Issue: Whether or not there is a violation of the constitutional right against unreasonable search and seizure Ruling: The Supreme Court held that under Section 5 Rule 113 of the Rules of Court provides: “Arrest without warrant; when lawful – a peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
a) When, in the presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporary confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another”
Accused was searched and arrested while transporting prohibited drugs. A crime was actually being committed by the accused
and he was caught in flagrante delicto, thus the search made upon his personal effects falls squarely under paragraph 1 of the foregoing provision of law, which allows a warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest.
Probable cause has been defined as such facts and circumstances which could lead a reasonable, discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed, and that the object sought in connection with the offense are in the placed sought to be searched.
When NARCOM received the information that a Caucasian travelling from Sagada to Baguio City was carrying with him a prohibited drug, there was no time to obtain a search warrant.
MORALES V ENRILE
GAMBOA V CRUZ
Facts: Petitioner was arrested for vagrancy
without a warrant. During a line-up of 5
detainees including petitioner, he was identified
by a complainant to be a companion in a
robbery, thereafter he was charged. Petitioner
filed a Motion to Acquit on the ground that the
conduct of the line-up, without notice and in
the absence of his counsel violated his
constitutional rights to counsel and to due
process. The court denied said motion. Hearing
was set, hence the petition.
Issue: Whether or Not petitioner’s right to
counsel and due process violated.
Held: No. The police line-up was not part of the
custodial inquest, hence, petitioner was not yet
entitled, at such stage, to counsel. He had not
been held yet to answer for a criminal offense.
The moment there is a move or even an urge of
said investigators to elicit admissions or
confessions or even plain information which
may appear innocent or innocuous at the time,
from said suspect, he should then and there be
assisted by counsel, unless he waives the right,
but the waiver shall be made in writing and in
the presence of counsel.
On the right to due process, petitioner was not,
in any way, deprived of this substantive and
constitutional right, as he was duly represented
by a counsel. He was accorded all the
opportunities to be heard and to present
evidence to substantiate his defense; only that
he chose not to, and instead opted to file a
Motion to Acquit after the prosecution had
rested its case. What due process abhors is the
absolute lack of opportunity to be heard.
PEOPLE V BARROS
PEOPLE V COMPIL
PEOPLE V SALAS
Facts: At about 6:00 o'clock in the morning of
March 6, 1992, a 60 year old woman, identified
as Virginia Talens was found lying dead in a
canal at Bo. San Nicolas, Mexico, Pampanga;
she was last seen alive at about 3:00 o'clock
early morning of March 6, 1992 by Orlando
Pangan and Richard Pangan who were with her
going home coming from the wake of one
Leonardo Flores; both Orlando and Richard
Pangan testified that accused was with them in
going home at about 3:00 o'clock in the
morning of March 6, 1992; Orlando and Richard
Pangan reached first their house and left the
two on the way and that was the last time
Virginia was seen alive; just a few minutes after
reaching his house and while inside his house,
Orlando Pangan heard a shout; another woman,
one Serafia Gutierrez, testified that she likewise
was awakened by a shout at about 3:00 in the
morning; Dr. Aguda who autopsied the victim
found hematoma on the head and chest, an
abrasion on the left chin and stabwound on the
neck which stabwound, the doctor claims, was
the cause of death of the victim; Police
Investigator Gonzales who immediately
responded upon report, recovered at the scene
a pin, the victim's wristwatch, earring, a ring
and P135.00 money; he likewise found on
March 9, 1992 when he continued his
investigation bloodstain on the front door of
the house of the accused which bloodstain
when submitted for examination was found to
be of human blood; one Resultay was with
Virginia Talens at about 5:00 afternoon of
March 5, 1992 in going to the wake, who claims
that Virginia had money on a purse as while
they were on the way Virginia bet on a jueteng
she saw Virginia got money from her purse a
P500.00 bill but as she had no change she
instead took P8.00 from her other pocket; one
Ramil Talens, a son of the victim corroborated
the claim of Resultay that Virginia had with her
at that time money worth P2,000.00 as in the
morning of March 5, 1992 he gave her mother
for safekeeping the sum of P1,500.00 which he
claims his mother placed in her purse and
claims further that at the wake, he asked and
was given P50.00 by his mother as he also
participated in the gambling thereat, however,
the purse of Virginia containing about P2,000.00
was no longer to be found when she was found
dead; Orlando Pangan saw the accused
gambled in the wake; Virginia likewise gambled
at the wake; accused had been working for
three days before March 6 at Sta. Ana,
Pampanga and up to March 5, 1992, but the
following day, he did not anymore report for
work at Sta. Ana, Pampanga, was no longer to
be found and was last seen at about 3:00
morning together with Virginia Talens on their
way home coming from the wake; the parents
of [the] accused were informed by Investigator
Gonzales that their son was the suspect and
adviced them to surrender him, but since March
6, 1992 when accused left Mexico, Pampanga,
he returned only on September 19, 1992 at
Arayat, Pampanga, not at Mexico, Pampanga
where he was ultimately apprehended by the
Mexico Police on September 22, 1992 after
chancing on a radio message by the police of
Arayat to their Provincial commander that a
vehicular incident occurred at Arayat,
Pampanga where one Elmer Salas was the
victim and was hospitalized at the district
hospital at Arayat, Pampanga where he used
the name of Rommel Salas and not Elmer Salas.
The trial court rendered convicting Salas for
Robbery with Homicide
Issues:
(1) Whether or Not there is evidence sufficient
to sustain a conviction of the appellant of the
crime of Robbery with Homicide.
(2) Whether or Not the appellant’s crime
homicide or robbery with homicide.
Held: There was no eyewitness or direct
evidence; either to the robbery or to the
homicide and none of the things allegedly
stolen were ever recovered. However, direct
evidence is not the only matrix from which the
trial court may draw its findings and conclusion
of culpability. Resort to circumstantial evidence
is essential when to insist on direct testimony
would result in setting felons free.
For circumstantial evidence to be sufficient to
support a conviction, all the circumstances must
be consistent with each other, consistent with
the theory that the accused is guilty of the
offense charged, and at the same time
inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is
innocent and with every other possible, rational
hypothesis excepting that of guilt. All the
circumstances established must constitute an
unbroken chain which leads to one and fair and
reasonable conclusion pointing solely to the
accused, to the exclusion of all other persons,
as the author of the crime. The facts and
circumstances consistent with the guilt of the
accused and inconsistent with his innocence
can constitute evidence which, in weight and
probative value, may be deemed to surpass
even direct evidence in its effect on the court.
The fatal stabbing of Virginia Talens occurred at
around 3:00 a.m. of March 6, 1992. Appellant
hastily abandoned his house in Barrio San
Nicolas, Mexico, Pampanga, his residence since
childhood, on that very date. Appellant was
nowhere when his co-worker and barrio mate,
Eduardo Bagtas, came to appellant's house to
fetch him for work at around 6:30 to 7:00 a.m.
of March 6, 1992. Appellant also abandoned his
job as a painter in Sta. Ana, Pampanga, on
March 6, 1992, the date of the crime, leaving
behind an unfinished painting project. He was
not seen again from said date. Police
investigators found human bloodstains on the
front door of appellant's house, on his clothing,
and on his yellow slippers after the victim was
killed. Despite efforts of the police to find
appellant as the principal suspect, a fact known
to appellant's family and neighbors, appellant
did not present himself to the authorities.
Appellant was apprehended only a full six
months after the date of the crime, following
his confinement in a hospital in Arayat,
Pampanga because he was sideswiped by a
Victory Liner bus in Arayat. When hospitalized,
appellant used the alias Rommel Salas, instead
of his true name Elmer Salas. These
circumstances denote flight, which when
unexplained, has always been considered by the
courts as indicative of guilt.
Both appellant and victim gambled at the wake
they attended. The victim was, in fact, enjoying
a winning streak when her son, Ramil Talens,
came to fetch her but which he failed to do
because his mother was winning, and she
refused to leave. The purse of Talens containing
cash was gone when her corpse was found in
the canal with a stab wound and bruises. What
was left was a safety pin which victim used to
fasten the missing purse to her clothes.
Denial is an inherently weak defense which
must be buttressed by strong evidence of non-
culpability to merit credibility. Denial is negative
and self-serving and cannot be given greater
evidentiary weight over the testimonies of
credible witnesses who positively testified that
appellant was at the locus criminis and was the
last person seen with the victim alive.
The absence of evidence showing any improper
motive on the part of the principal witness for
the prosecution to falsely testify against the
appellant strongly tends to buttress the
conclusion that no such improper motive exists
and that the testimony of said witnesses
deserve full faith and credit.
The essence of voluntary surrender is
spontaneity and the intent of the accused to
give himself up and submit himself
unconditionally to the authorities either
because he acknowledges his guilt or he wants
to save the State the trouble of having to effect
his arrest. Spontaneity and intent to give one's
self up are absent where the accused went into
hiding for six months after the incident and had
to resort to an alias when he was involved in an
accident being investigated by the police
authorities.
Robbery with Homicide is a special complex
crime against property. Homicide is incidental
to the robbery which is the main purpose of the
criminal. In charging Robbery with Homicide,
the onus probandi is to establish: "(a) the taking
of personal property with the use of violence or
intimidation against a person; (b) the property
belongs to another; (c) the taking is
characterized with animus lucrandi; and (d) on
the occasion of the robbery or by reason
thereof, the crime of homicide, which is used in
the generic sense, was committed." Although
there was no witness as to the actual robbing of
the victim, there is testimony that the victim
had more or less P2,000.00; and wore gold
earrings valued at P750.00. These were never
recovered.
While there is indeed no direct proof that
Virginia Talens was robbed at the time she was
killed, we may conclude from four
circumstances that the robbery occasioned her
killing: (1) Both appellant and victim gambled at
the wake. (2) The appellant knew that victim
was winning. (3) The victim was last seen alive
with appellant. (4) The victim's purse containing
her money and earrings were missing from her
body when found.
The decision of the regional trial court is
affirmed. Costs against appellant. So ordered.
PEOPLE V OBSANIA
Facts: The accused was charged with Robbery
with Rape before the Municipal Court of
Balungao, Pangasinan. He pleaded not guilty.
His counsel moved for the dismissal of the
charge for failure to allege vivid designs in the
info. Said motion was granted. From this order
of dismissal the prosecution appealed.
Issue: Whether or Not the present appeal
places the accused in Double Jeopardy.
Held: In order that the accused may invoke
double jeopardy, the following requisites must
have obtained in the original prosecution, a)
valid complaint, b) competent court, c) the
defendant had pleaded to the charge, d)
defendant was acquitted or convicted or the
case against him was dismissed or otherwise
terminated without his express consent.
In the case at bar, the converted dismissal was
ordered by the Trial Judge upon the defendant's
motion to dismiss. The “doctrine of double
jeopardy” as enunciated in P.vs. Salico applies
to wit when the case is dismissed with the
express consent of the defendant, the dismissal
will not be a bar to another prosecution for the
same offense because his action in having the
case is dismissed constitutes a waiver of his
constitutional right/privilege for the reason that
he thereby prevents the Court from proceeding
to the trial on the merits and rendering a
judgment of conviction against him.
In essence, where a criminal case is dismissed
provisionally not only with the express consent
of the accused but even upon the urging of his
counsel there can be no double jeopardy under
Sect. 9 Rule 113, if the indictment against him is
revived by the fiscal.
PEOPLE V FERRER
The Government is appealing from an order of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, dismissing the case against the Defendant Cornelio Ferrer for acts of lasciviousness, on a motion to quash filed by him.
Cornelio Ferrer was charged with acts of lasciviousness in the Justice of the Peace Court of Asia, Negros Occidental on the basis of a written complaint, later amended filed by the offended party, Perla Engcoy. After the corresponding preliminary investigation, the Justice of the Peace Court finding “probable cause that the offense charged has been committed and that the Defendant is probably guilty,” elevated the case to the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, where the case was tried on February 15, 1955. After the prosecution had rested its case, the hearing was adjourned to March 1, 1955. In the meantime, on February 24 of the same year, the accused filed a motion to quash on the ground that the jurisdiction of the trial court to try the case had not been established for the reason that the evidence for the prosecution merely tended to prove that the acts of lasciviousness were committed in the house of the offended party, without showing where that house is situated. The prosecution filed a written opposition to the motion to quash, and the defense filed a reply to said opposition, after which the trial court by order of March 23, 1955, granted the motion to quash and dismissed the case with costs de oficio.
We have examined the record of the case, particularly, the testimony of the offended party and that of the Chief of Police and we are fully convinced that the prosecution had established the jurisdiction of the trial court, that is to say, that the offense charged was committed in the town of Asia, Province of
Negros Occidental. In the first place, the complaint and amended complaint both under oath, filed by the offended party in the Justice of the Peace Court allege that the acts of lasciviousness were committed against her in her house in the poblacion of the Municipality of Asia, Province of Negros Occidental. In the second place, testifying as a witness at the trial, she gave as her residence the town of Asia, Negros Occidental. Then she testified that the acts of lasciviousness were committed on her person in her house. (pp. 6, 7, 11, t.s.n.) As the Solicitor General says, in the absence of proof that she had more than one house, it is presumed that the crime was committed in her house in Asia, Negros Occidental, within the jurisdiction of the trial court. Then we have the testimony of Celestino Regala, Chief of Police of Asia, wherein he declared that he received the complaint filed by Perla Engcoy against Cornelio Ferrer; chan roblesvirtualawlibrarythat he made the corresponding investigation, specially since the accused was one of his policemen, charged with having committed acts of lasciviousness against the offended party, Perla, in her own house, and he asserted that the distance of said house from the Municipal building of Asia is around 200 yards. (pp. 72-83, t s. n.) With all this evidence, we cannot understand how the trial court could say that the prosecution had not established its jurisdiction to try the case.
Unfortunately, however, we believe that the Government however meritorious its case cannot appeal the order of dismissal without violating the right of the Defendant not to be placed in double jeopardy. The accused herein has not filed a brief on appeal raising this question of double jeopardy. Nevertheless, Rule 118, Section 2 the Rule of Court provides:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary “The People of the Philippines cannot appeal if the Defendant would be placed thereby in double jeopardy,” and we have to give force and effect to said rule. Here, the Defendant had already been arraigned and he entered his plea, and the trial had begun, and the prosecution had rested its case. We hold that the appeal of the
Government from the order of dismissal would place the accused in double jeopardy.
We find the present case to be one of miscarriage of justice because the accused was practically acquitted with out considering the merits of the case, all due, unfortunately, to the error of the trial court. However, this Tribunal finds itself helpless to correct the error and must respect and enforce the right of the accused granted by law and guaranteed by the Constitution.
Without anticipating or advancing any opinion as to the innocence or guilt of the accused, since he is a municipal policeman, it is suggested that he be subjected to an administrative investigation. Let copies of this decision be furnished the office of the President and the Municipal Council of Asia, Negros Occidental.
In view of the foregoing, the appeal filed on behalf of the Government is hereby dismissed with costs de oficio.
ESMANA V POGOY
Facts: Petitioners Esmeña and Alba were
charged with grave coercion in the Court of
Cebu City for allegedly forcing Fr. Thomas
Tibudan to withdraw a sum of money worth
P5000 from the bank to be given to them
because the priest lost in a game of chance.
During arraignment, petitioners pleaded “Not
Guilty”. No trial came in after the arraignment
due to the priest’s request to move it on
another date. Sometime later Judge Pogoy
issued an order setting the trial Aug.16,1979
but the fiscal informed the court that it received
a telegram stating that the complainant was
sick. The accused invoked their right to speedy
trial. Respondent judge dismissed the case
because the trial was already dragging the
accused and that the priest’s telegram did not
have a medical certificate attached to it in order
for the court to recognize the complainant’s
reason to be valid in order to reschedule again
another hearing. After 27 days the fiscal filed a
motion to revive the case and attached the
medical certificate of the priest proving the fact
that the priest was indeed sick of influenza. On
Oct.24,1979, accused Esmeña and Alba filed a
motion to dismiss the case on the ground of
double jeopardy.
Issue: Whether or Not the revival of grave
coercion case, which was dismissed earlier due
to complainant’s failure to appear at the trial,
would place the accused in double jeopardy
Held: Yes, revival of the case will put the
accused in double jeopardy for the very reason
that the case has been dismissed already
without the consent of the accused which
would have an effect of an acquittal on the case
filed. The dismissal was due to complainant’s
incapability to present its evidence due to non
appearance of the witnesses and complainant
himself which would bar further prosecution of
the defendant for the same offense. For double
jeopardy to exist these three requisites should
be present, that one, there is a valid complaint
or information filed second, that it is done
before a court of competent jurisdiction and
third, that the accused has been arraigned and
has pleaded to the complaint or information. In
the case at bar, all three conditions were
present, as the case filed was grave coercion,
filed in a court of competent jurisdiction as to
where the coercion took place and last the
accused were arraigned and has pleaded to the
complaint or the information. When these three
conditions are present then the acquittal,
conviction of the accused, and the dismissal or
termination of the case without his express
consent constitutes res judicata and is a bar to
another prosecution for the offense charged. In
the case, it was evidently shown that the
accused invoked their right to a speedy trial and
asked for the trial of the case and not its
termination which would mean that
respondents had no expressed consent to the
dismissal of the case which would make the
case filed res judicata and has been dismissed
by the competent court in order to protect the
respondents as well for their right to speedy
trial which will be equivalent to acquittal of the
respondents which would be a bar to further
prosecution.
PEOPLE V CITY COURT OF SILAY
Facts: That sometime on January 4,1974,
accused Pacifico Sensio, Romeo Millan and
Wilfredo Jochico who were then scalers at the
Hawaiian-Philippine Company, weighed cane
cars No.1743,1686 and 1022 loaded with sugar
canes which were placed in tarjetas (weight
report cards), Apparently, it was proven and
shown that there was padding of the weight of
the sugar canes and that the information on the
tarjetas were to be false making it appear to be
heavier than its actual weight. The three
accused then were charged with “Falsification
by private individuals and use of falsified
document”. After the prosecution had
presented, the respondent moved to dismiss
the charge against them on the ground that the
evidences presented were not sufficient to
establish their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Acting on the motion, respondent court issued
its order dismissing the case on the ground that
the acts committed by the accused do not
constituted the crime of falsification as strictly
enumerated in the revised penal code defining
the crime of falsification which was charged
earlier and that their case be dismissed. People
asserts that the plea of double jeopardy is not
tenable even if the case at bar was dismissed
because according to them, it was done with
the consent of the accused therefore waiving
there defense of double jeopardy. The accused
on the other hand, reiterated the fact that the
dismissal was due to lack of merits of the
prosecution which would have the same effect
as an acquittal which will bar the prosecution
from prosecuting the accused for it will be
unjust and unconstitutional for the accused due
to double jeopardy rule thus the appeal of the
plaintiff.
Issue: Whether or Not the grant of petition by
the court would place the accused Sensio,
Millan and Jochico in double jeopardy
Held: Yes the revival of the case will put the
accused in double jeopardy for the very reason
that the case has been dismissed earlier due to
lack of merits. It is true that the criminal case of
falsification was dismissed on a motion of the
accused however this was a motion filed after
the prosecution had rested its case, calling for
the evidence beyond reasonable ground which
the prosecution had not been able to do which
would be tantamount to acquittal therefore will
bar the prosecution of another case. As it was
stated on the requirements of a valid defense of
double jeopardy it says: That there should be a
valid complaint, second would be that such
complaint be filed before a competent court
and to which the accused has pleaded and that
defendant was previously acquitted, convicted
or dismissed or otherwise terminated without
express consent of the accused in which were
all present in the case at bar. There was indeed
a valid, legitimate complaint and concern
against the accused Sensio, Millan and Jochico
which was filed at a competent court with
jurisdiction on the said case. It was also
mentioned that the accused pleaded not guilty
and during the time of trial, it was proven that
the case used against the accused were not
sufficient to prove them guilty beyond
reasonable doubt therefore dismissing the case
which translates to acquittal. It explained
further that there are two instances when we
can conclude that there is jeopardy when first is
that the ground for the dismissal of the case
was due to insufficiency of evidence and
second, when the proceedings have been
reasonably prolonged as to violate the right of
the accused to a speedy trial. In the 2 requisites
given, it was the first on that is very much
applicable to our case at bar where there was
dismissal of the case due to insufficiency of
evidence which will bar the approval of the
petition in the case at bar for it will constitute
double jeopardy on the part of the accused
which the law despises.
SALCEDO V MENDOZA
DE LA TORRE V CA
ALBERTO V CA
CITIZENSHIP
LABO V COMELEC
FACTS: Herein petitioner, claiming for recognition as a Philippine citizen is a mayor-elect who, through his marriage with an Australian national, was naturalized and took an oath of allegiance as an Australian citizen. Said marriage was found to be bigamous and therefore was annulled. Petitioner claims that his naturalization made him only a dual national and did not divest him of his Philippine citizenship.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner was divested of his Philippine citizenship.
HELD: Yes, because Commonwealth Act No. 63 clearly stated that Philippine citizenship may be lost through naturalization in a foreign country; express renunciation of citizenship; and by oath of allegiance to a foreign country, all of which are applicable to the petitioner.
FRIVALDO V COMELEC
FACTS: Juan G. Frivaldo was proclaimed governor of the province of Sorsogon and assumed office in due time. The League of Municipalities filed with the COMELEC a petition for the annulment of Frivaldo on the ground that he was not a Filipino citizen, having been naturalized in the United States. Frivaldo admitted the allegations but pleaded the special and affirmative defenses that he was naturalized as American citizen only to protect himself against President Marcos during the Martial Law era. ISSUE: Whether or not Frivaldo is a Filipino citizen. RULING:
No. Section 117 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that a qualified voter must be, among other qualifications, a citizen of the Philippines, this being an indispensable requirement for suffrage under Article V, Section 1, of the Constitution. He claims that he has reacquired Philippine citizenship by virtue of valid repatriation. He claims that by actively participating in the local elections, he automatically forfeited American citizenship under the laws of the United States of America. The Court stated that that the alleged forfeiture was between him and the US. If he really wanted to drop his American citizenship, he could do so in accordance with CA No. 63 as amended by CA No. 473 and PD 725. Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by naturalization, or by repatriation.
MERCADO V MANZANO
Facts:Petitioners filed for respondent’s disqualification for election alleging that respondent is a dual citizen, and under the Local Government Code, dual citizens cannot run for public office.
Respondent is a son of both Filipinos but was born in the U.S which follows the principle of jus soli, hence, considered an American citizen as well.
COMELEC allowed Manzano to run because he was considered natural-born because of the vrtue that he is a son of both Filipino citizens but petitioners assail this.
Issue: Is respondent Manzano a dual citizen and cannot run for public office?
Ruling: The Court first defined dual citizenship and compared it to dual allegiance.
Dual citizenship arises when a person whose parents are citizens of a state that follows jus saguinis and was born in a state that follows jus soli, hence, resulting to a concurrent application of different two laws or more.
On the other hand, dual allegiance is a situation whre a person simultaneously owes loyalty to two or more states.
In this case, Respondent, though dual citizen, his act of filing a certificate of candidacy tantamount to his election of Phil. citizenship – meaning he forswears allegiance to the other country and thereby terminating their status as dual.
The Court stressed that participating in the election is an express renunciation of American citizenship.
BANGZON V HRET
FACTS: The citizenship of respondent Cruz is at issue in this case, in view of the constitutional requirement that “no person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen.”
Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was born in Tarlac in 1960 of Filipino parents. In 1985, however, Cruz enlisted in the US Marine Corps and without the consent of the Republic of the Philippines, took an oath of allegiance to the USA. As a Consequence, he lost his Filipino citizenship for under CA No. 63 [(An Act Providing for the Ways in Which Philippine Citizenship May Be Lost or Reacquired (1936)] section 1(4), a Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship by, among other, “rendering service to or accepting commission in the armed forces of a foreign country.”
Whatever doubt that remained regarding his loss of Philippine citizenship was erased by his naturalization as a U.S. citizen in 1990, in connection with his service in the U.S. Marine Corps.
In 1994, Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship through repatriation under RA 2630 [(An Act Providing for Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship by Persons Who Lost Such Citizenship by Rendering Service To, or Accepting Commission In, the Armed Forces of the United States (1960)]. He ran for and was elected as the Representative of the 2nd District of Pangasinan in the 1998 elections. He won over petitioner Bengson who was then running for reelection.
Subsequently, petitioner filed a case for Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam with respondent HRET claiming that Cruz was not qualified to become a member of the HOR since he is not a natural-born citizen as required under Article VI, section 6 of the Constitution. HRET rendered its decision dismissing the petition for quo warranto and declaring Cruz the duly elected Representative in the said election.
ISSUE: WON Cruz, a natural-born Filipino who became an American citizen, can still be considered a natural-born Filipino upon his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.
HELD: petition dismissed
YES
Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however reacquire the same in the manner provided by law. C.A. No. 63 enumerates the 3 modes by which Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by a former citizen: 1. by naturalization, 2. by repatriation, and 3. by direct act of Congress. **
Repatriation may be had under various statutes by those who lost their citizenship due to: 1. desertion of the armed forces; 2. services in the armed forces of the allied forces in World War II; 3. service in the Armed Forces of the United States at any other time, 4. marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien; and 5. political economic necessity
Repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality This means that a naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino.
R.A. No. 2630 provides: Sec 1. Any person who had lost his Philippine citizenship by rendering service to, or accepting commission in, the Armed Forces of the United States, or after separation from the Armed Forces of the United States, acquired United States citizenship, may reacquire Philippine citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registering the same with Local Civil Registry in the place where he resides or last resided in the Philippines. The said oath of allegiance shall contain a renunciation of any other citizenship.
Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the Republic and having registered the same in the Civil Registry of Magantarem, Pangasinan in accordance with the aforecited provision, Cruz is deemed to have recovered his original status as a natural-born citizen, a status which he acquired at birth as the son of a Filipino father. It bears stressing that the act of repatriation allows him to recover, or return to, his original status before he lost his Philippine citizenship.
MACALINTAL V COMELEC
Romulo Macalintal, as a lawyer and a taxpayer, questions the validity of the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003 (R.A. 9189). He questions the validity of the said act on the following grounds, among others:
1. That the provision that a Filipino already considered an immigrant abroad can be allowed to participate in absentee voting provided he executes an affidavit stating his intent to return to the Philippines is void because it dispenses of the requirement that a voter must be a resident of the Philippines for at least one year and in the place where he intends to vote for at least 6 months immediately preceding the election;
2. That the provision allowing the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to proclaim winning candidates insofar as it affects the canvass of votes and proclamation of winning candidates for president and vice-president, is unconstitutional because it violates the Constitution for it is Congress which is empowered to do so.
ISSUE: Whether or not Macalintal’s arguments are correct.
HELD: No.
1. There can be no absentee voting if the absentee voters are required to physically reside in the Philippines within the period required for non-absentee voters. Further, as understood in election laws, domicile and resident are interchangeably used. Hence, one is a resident of his domicile (insofar as election laws is concerned). The domicile is the place where one has the intention to return to. Thus, an immigrant who executes an affidavit stating his intent to return to the Philippines is considered a resident of the Philippines for purposes of being
qualified as a voter (absentee voter to be exact). If the immigrant does not execute the affidavit then he is not qualified as an absentee voter.
2. The said provision should be harmonized. It could not be the intention of Congress to allow COMELEC to include the proclamation of the winners in the vice-presidential and presidential race. To interpret it that way would mean that Congress allowed COMELEC to usurp its power. The canvassing and proclamation of the presidential and vice presidential elections is still lodged in Congress and was in no way transferred to the COMELEC by virtue of RA 9189.
NICOLAS-LEWIS V COMELEC
Facts: Petitioners were dual citizens by virtue of RA 9225. Petitioners sought to avail their right of suffrage under RA 9189 or the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003. Comelec, however, did not allow petitioners to vote in the 2004 election, reasoning the petitioners faield to comply with the requirement of 1-year residency prior the elections as provided for under Article 5, Sec 1 of the Constitution. Issue: Whether or not petitioners may participate in the election sans the compliance of the 1 year residency. Ruling: The Court held that those who retained or reacquired their citizenship under RA 9225 may exercise their right to vote under the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003, RA 9189. Article 5, Section 2 of the Constitution provides for the exception to the residency requirement in Section 1 of the same article. The voting mechanism in RA 9189 was practically set forth
to provide a system wherein Filipinos of dual citizenship and are, at the same time, not residing in the Philippines are empowered to vote. The Court held that present day duals may now exercise their right of suffrage provided they meet the requirements under Section 1, Article V of the Constitution in relation to R.A. 9189
CALILUNG V DATUMANONG
FACTS:
Petitioner prays for a writ of prohibition be
issued to stop respondent from implementing
RA 9225, or Act Making the Citizenship of the
Philippine Citizens Who Acquire Foreign
Citizenship Permanent, Amending for the
Purpose Commonwealth Act No. 63, as
Amended, and for Other Purposes. Petitioner
avers that said Act is unconstitutional as it
violates Section 5, Article IV of the 1987
Constitution: "Dual allegiance of citizens is
inimical to the national interest and shall be
dealt with by law."
ISSUE:
Whether or not RA 9225 is unconstitutional by
recognizing and allowing dual allegiance.
RULING:
No. Section 5, Article IV of the Constitution is a
declaration of policy and is not self-executing
provision.
What RA 9225 does is to allow dual citizenship
to natural-born Filipino citizens who have lost
their Philippine citizenship, by reason of
naturalization as citizens of a foreign country. In
its face, it does not recognize dual allegiance.
VALLES V COMELEC
FACTS: Petitioner filed a petition and prays that a writ of prohibition be issued to stop respondent from implementing Republic Act No. 9225, entitled "An Act Making the Citizenship of Philippine Citizens Who Acquire Foreign Citizenship Permanent, Amending for the Purpose Commonwealth Act No. 63, As Amended, and for Other Purposes" which he avers that Rep. Act No. 9225 is unconstitutional as it violates Section 5, Article IV of the 1987 Constitution that states, "Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law." R.A. 9225: SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy.-It is hereby declared the policy of the State that all Philippine citizens who become citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship under the conditions of this Act. SEC. 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship.-Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, natural-born citizens of the Philippines who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are hereby deemed to have reacquired Philippine citizenship upon taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic. ISSUES: (1) Is Rep. Act No. 9225 unconstitutional? (2) Does this Court have jurisdiction to pass upon the issue of dual allegiance? RULING: No. Section 5, Article IV of the Constitution is a declaration of a policy and it is not a self-executing provision. What Rep. Act No. 9225 does is allow dual citizenship to natural-born Filipino citizens who have lost Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country. On its face, it does not recognize dual allegiance. By swearing to the supreme authority of the Republic, the person implicitly renounces his foreign citizenship. Plainly, from Section 3, Rep. Act No. 9225 stayed clear out of the problem of dual allegiance and shifted the burden of confronting the issue of whether or not there is
dual allegiance to the concerned foreign country. What happens to the other citizenship was not made a concern of Rep. Act No. 9225. On the other hand, Congress was given a mandate to draft a law that would set specific parameters of what really constitutes dual allegiance. Until this is done, it would be premature for the judicial department, including this Court, to rule on issues pertaining to dual allegiance. PETITION is DISMISSED For lack of merit.
JAPZON V COMELEC
Facts: Ø Both petitioner Manuel B. Japzon (Japzon) and
private respondent Jaime S. Ty (Ty) were candidates for the Office of Mayor of the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, in the local elections held on 14 May 2007.
Ø Japzon instituted SPA No. 07-568 by filing before the COMELEC a Petition[5] to disqualify and/or cancel Ty's Certificate of Candidacy on the ground of material misrepresentation. Japzon averred in his Petition that Ty was a former natural-born Filipino, having been born on 9 October 1943 in what was then Pambujan Sur, Hernani Eastern Samar (now the Municipality of General Macarthur, Easter Samar) to spouses Ang Chim Ty (a Chinese) and Crisanta Aranas Sumiguin (a Filipino).
Ø Ty eventually migrated to the United States of America (USA) and became a citizen thereof. Ty had been residing in the USA for the last 25 years. When Ty filed his Certificate of Candidacy on 28 March 2007, he falsely represented therein that he was a resident of Barangay6, Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, for one year before 14 May 2007, and was not a permanent resident or immigrant of any foreign country.
Ø While Ty may have applied for the reacquisition of his Philippine citizenship, he never actually resided in Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, for a period of one year immediately preceding the date of election
as required under Section 39 of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991
Ø Inspite of having reacquisition in his Philippine citizenship, Ty continued to make trips to the USA, the most recent of which was on 31 October 2006 lasting until 20 January 2007.
Ø Ty already took his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, he continued to comport himself as an American citizen as proven by his travel records. He had also failed to renounce his foreign citizenship as required by Republic Act No. 9225, otherwise known as the Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003, or related laws.
Ø Japzon prayed for in his Petition that the COMELEC order the disqualification of Ty from running for public office and the cancellation of the latter's Certificate of Candidacy.
Ø Ty admitted that he was a natural-born Filipino who went to the USA to work and subsequently became a naturalized American citizen. Ty claimed, however, that prior to filing his Certificate of Candidacy for the Office of Mayor of the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, on 28 March 2007, he already performed the following acts: (1) with the enactment of Republic Act No. 9225, granting dual citizenship to natural-born Filipinos, Ty filed with the Philippine Consulate General in Los Angeles, California, USA, an application for the reacquisition of his Philippine citizenship; (2) on 2 October 2005, Ty executed an Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines before Noemi T. Diaz, Vice Consul of the Philippine Consulate General in Los Angeles, California, USA; (3) Ty applied for a Philippine passport indicating in his application that his residence in the Philippines was at A. Mabini St., Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar. Ty's application was approved and he was issued on 26 October 2005 a Philippine passport; (4) on 8 March 2006, Ty personally secured and signed his Community Tax Certificate (CTC) from the Municipality of General Macarthur, in which he stated that his address was at Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar; (5) thereafter, on 17
July 2006, Ty was registered as a voter in Precinct 0013A, Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar; (6) Ty secured another CTC dated 4 January 2007 again stating therein his address as Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar; and (7) finally, Ty executed on 19 March 2007 a duly notarized Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship.
Ø He had reacquired his Philippine citizenship and renounced his American citizenship, and he had been a resident of the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, for more than one year prior to the 14 May 2007 elections. Therefore, Ty sought the dismissal of Japzon's Petition in SPA No. 07-568. Ty acquired the highest number of votes and was declared Mayor of the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, by the Municipal Board of Canvassers on 15 May 2007.[7]
Ø The COMELEC First Division found that Ty complied with the requirements of Sections 3 and 5 of Republic Act No. 9225 and reacquired his Philippine citizenship, to wit: Philippine citizenship is an indispensable requirement for holding an elective public office, and the purpose of the citizenship qualification is none other than to ensure that no alien, i.e., no person owing allegiance to another nation, shall govern our people and our country or a unit of territory thereof.
Ø Evidences revealed that Ty executed an Oath of Allegiance before Noemi T. Diaz, Vice Consul of the Philippine Consulate General, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A. on October 2, 2005 and executed a Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship on March 19, 2007 in compliance with R.A. [No.] 9225. Moreover, neither is Ty a candidate for or occupying public office nor is in active service as commissioned or non-commissioned officer in the armed forces in the country of which he was naturalized citizen
Ø Ty did not commit material misrepresentation in stating in his Certificate of Candidacy that he was a resident of Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, for at least one year before the elections on 14 May 2007. It reasoned that: Although Ty has lost
his domicile in [the] Philippines when he was naturalized as U.S. citizen in 1969, the reacquisition of his Philippine citizenship and subsequent acts thereof proved that he has been a resident of Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar for at least one (1) year before the elections held on 14 May 2007 as he represented in his certificate of candidacy.
Ø The petition was denied and COMELEC was in favor of the defendant failing to obtain a favorable resolution from the COMELEC, Japzon proceeded to file the instant Petition for Certiorari, that the COMELEC had committed grave abuse of discretion and lack of discretion for dismissing the petition.
Ø Japzon prays for the Court to annul and set aside the Resolutions dated 31 July 2007 and 28 September 2007 of the COMELEC First Division and en banc, respectively; to issue a new resolution denying due course to or canceling Ty's Certificate of Candidacy; and to declare Japzon as the duly elected Mayor of the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar.
Ø Ty sought the dismissal of the present Petition. According to Ty, the COMELEC already found sufficient evidence to prove that Ty was a resident of the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, one year prior to the 14 May 2007 local elections. The Court cannot evaluate again the very same pieces of evidence without violating the well-entrenched rule that findings of fact of the COMELEC are binding on the Court.
Ø The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), meanwhile, is of the position that Ty failed to meet the one-year residency requirement set by law to qualify him to run as a mayoralty candidate in the 14 May 2007 local elections.The Court finds no merit in the Petition at bar.
Ø . On 19 March 2007, he personally executed a Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship before a notary public. By the time he filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the Office of Mayor of the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, on 28 March 2007, he had already
effectively renounced his American citizenship, keeping solely his Philippine citizenship.
Ø The Court of Appeals set aside the appealed orders of the COMELEC and the Court of Appeals and annulled the election of the respondent as Municipal Mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan on the ground that respondent's immigration to the United States in 1984 constituted an abandonment of his domicile and residence in the Philippines. Being a green card holder, which was proof that he was a permanent resident or immigrant of the United States, and in the absence of any waiver of his status as such before he ran for election on January 18, 1988, respondent was held to be disqualified under §68 of the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines (Batas Pambansa Blg. 881). ISSUE: Whether or not the defedant has complied with the residency requirement for elective positions. RULING: Yes, the defendant solely complied the residency requirements for elective position.
Ø It bears to point out that Republic Act No. 9225 governs the manner in which a natural-born Filipino may reacquire or retain[17] his Philippine citizenship despite acquiring a foreign citizenship, and provides for his rights and liabilities under such circumstances. A close scrutiny of said statute would reveal that it does not at all touch on the matter of residence of the natural-born Filipino taking advantage of its provisions. Republic Act No. 9225 imposes no residency requirement for the reacquisition or retention of Philippine citizenship; nor does it mention any effect of such reacquisition or retention of Philippine citizenship on the current residence of the concerned natural-born Filipino. Clearly, Republic Act No. 9225 treats citizenship independently of residence.
This is only logical and consistent with the general intent of the law to allow for dual citizenship.
Ø There is no basis for this Court to require Ty to stay in and never leave at all the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, for the full one-year period prior to the 14 May 2007 local elections so that he could be considered a resident thereof. To the contrary, the Court has previously ruled that absence from residence to pursue studies or practice a profession or registration as a voter other than in the place where one is elected, does not constitute loss of residence.[24] The Court also notes, that even with his trips to other countries, Ty was actually present in the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, Philippines, for at least nine of the 12 months preceding the 14 May 2007 local elections. Even if length of actual stay in a place is not necessarily determinative of the fact of residence therein, it does strongly support and is only consistent with Ty's avowed intent in the instant case to establish residence/domicile in the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar.
Ø Japzon repeatedly brings to the attention of this Court that Ty arrived in the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, on 4 May 2006 only to comply with the one-year residency requirement, so Ty could run as a mayoralty candidate in the 14 May 2007 elections. In Aquino v. COMELEC,[25] the Court did not find anything wrong in an individual changing residences so he could run for an elective post, for as long as he is able to prove with reasonable certainty that he has effected a change of residence for election law purposes for the period required by law. As this Court already found in the present case, Ty has proven by substantial evidence that he had established residence/domicile in the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, by 4 May 2006, a little over a year prior to the 14 May 2007 local elections, in which he ran as a candidate for the Office of the Mayor and in which he garnered the most number of votes.
Ø To successfully challenge Ty's disqualification, Japzon must clearly demonstrate that Ty's ineligibility is so patently antagonistic to constitutional and legal principles that overriding such ineligibility and thereby giving effect to the apparent will of the people would ultimately create greater prejudice to the very democratic institutions and juristic traditions that our Constitution and laws so zealously protect and promote. In this case, Japzon failed to substantiate his claim that Ty is ineligible to be Mayor of the Municipality, the instant Petition for Certiorari is dismiss.