EX POST FACTO LAWS

BAYOT V SANDIGANBAYAN Facts: Bayot is one of the several persons who was accused in more than 100 counts of estafa thru falsification of Public documents before the Sandiganbayan. The said charges started from his alleged involvement as a government auditor of the commission on audit assigned to the Ministry of education and culture, with some other employees from the said ministry. The bureau of treasury and the teacher’s camp in Baguio City for the preparation and encashment of fictitious TCAA checks for the nom-existent obligations of the teacher’s camp resulting in damage to the government of several millions. The 1st 32 cases were filed on july 25, 1987, while Bayot ran for municipal mayor of Amadeo Cavite and was elected on January 1980. but on May 1980 Sandiganbayan promulgated a decision convicting the accused together with his other co-accused in all but one of the thirty two cases filed against them. On Mach 16, 1982 Batas Pambansa Blg 195 was passed amending RA 3019. Issue: Whether or Not it would be violative of the constitutional guarantee against an ex post facto law. Held: The court finds no merit in the petitioner’s contention that RA 3019 as amended by Batas Pambansa Blg 195, which includes the crime of estafa through falsification of Public Documents as among crimes subjecting the public officer charged therewith with suspension from public office pending action in court, is a penal provision which violates the constitutional prohibition against the enactment of ex post facto law. Accdg to the RPC suspension from employment and public office during trial shall not be considered as a penalty. It is not a penalty because it is not a result of a judicial proceeding. In fact, if acquitted the official who is suspended shall be

entitled to reinstatement and the salaries and benefits which he failed to receive during suspension. And does not violate the constitutional provision against ex post facto law. The claim of the petitioner that he cannot be suspended because he is currently occupying a position diffren tfrom that under which he is charged is untenable. The amendatory provision clearly states that any incumbent public officer against whom any criminal prosecution under a valid information under RA 3019 for any offense involving fraud upon the government or public funds or property or whatever stage of execution and mode of participation shall be suspended from office. The use of the word “office” applies to any office which the officer charged may be holding and not only the particular office under which he was charged.

PEOPLE V FERRER

Facts: Hon. Judge Simeon Ferrer is the Tarlac trial court judge that declared RA1700 or the Anti-Subversive Act of 1957 as a bill of attainder. Thus, dismissing the information of subversion against the following: 1.) Feliciano Co for being an officer/leader of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) aggravated by circumstances of contempt and insult to public officers, subversion by a band and aid of armed men to afford impunity. 2.) Nilo Tayag and 5 others, for being members/leaders of the NPA, inciting, instigating people to unite and overthrow the Philippine Government. Attended by Aggravating Circumstances of Aid or Armed Men, Craft, and Fraud. The trial court is of opinion that 1.) The Congress usurped the powers of the judge 2.) Assumed judicial magistracy by pronouncing the guilt of the CPP without any forms of safeguard of a judicial trial. 3.) It created a presumption of organizational guilt by being members of the CPP regardless of voluntariness.

The Anti-Subversive Act of 1957 was approved 20June1957. It is an act to outlaw the CPP and similar associations penalizing membership therein, and for other purposes. It defined the Communist Party being although a political party is in fact an organized conspiracy to overthrow the Government, not only by force and violence but also by deceit, subversion and other illegal means. It declares that the CPP is a clear and present danger to the security of the Philippines. Section 4 provided that affiliation with full knowledge of the illegal acts of the CPP is punishable. Section 5 states that due investigation by a designated prosecutor by the Secretary of Justice be made prior to filing of information in court. Section 6 provides for penalty for furnishing false evidence. Section 7 provides for 2 witnesses in open court for acts penalized by prision mayor to death. Section 8 allows the renunciation of membership to the CCP through writing under oath. Section 9 declares the constitutionality of the statute and its valid exercise under freedom if thought, assembly and association. Issues: (1) Whether or not RA1700 is a bill of attainder/ ex post facto law. For penalizing membership of CPP (2) Whether or Not RA1700 violates freedom of expression. Held: The court holds the VALIDITY Of the Anti-Subversion Act of 1957. A bill of attainder is solely a legislative act. It punishes without the benefit of the trial. It is the substitution of judicial determination to a legislative determination of guilt. In order for a statute be measured as a bill of attainder, the following requisites must be present: 1.) The statute specifies persons, groups. 2.) the statute is applied retroactively and reach past conduct. (A bill of attainder relatively is also an ex post facto law.) In the case at bar, the statute simply declares the CPP as an organized conspiracy for

the overthrow of the Government for purposes of example of SECTION 4 of the Act. The Act applies not only to the CPP but also to other organizations having the same purpose and their successors. The Act’s focus is on the conduct not person. Membership to this organizations, to be UNLAWFUL, it must be shown that membership was acquired with the intent to further the

goals of the organization by overt acts. This is

thE element of MEMBERSHIP with KNOWLEDGE

that is punishable. This is the required proof of

a member’s direct participation. Why is membership punished. Membership renders aid and encouragement to the organization. Membership makes himself party to its unlawful acts. Furthermore, the statute is PROSPECTIVE in nature. Section 4 prohibits acts committed after approval of the act. The members of the subversive organizations before the passing of this Act is given an opportunity to escape liability by renouncing membership in accordance with Section 8. The statute applies the principle of mutatis mutandis or that the necessary changes having been made. The declaration of that the CPP is an organized conspiracy to overthrow the Philippine Government should not be the basis of guilt. This declaration is only a basis of Section 4 of the Act. The EXISTENCE OF SUBSTANTIVE EVIL justifies the limitation to the exercise of “Freedom of Expression and Association” in this matter. Before the enactment of the statute and statements in the preamble, careful investigations by the Congress were done. The court further stresses that whatever interest in freedom of speech and association is excluded

in the prohibition of membership in the CPP are weak considering NATIONAL SECURITY and PRESERVATION of DEMOCRACY. The court set basic guidelines to be observed in the prosecution under RA1700. In addition to proving circumstances/ evidences of subversion, the following elements must also be established: 1. Subversive Organizations besides the CPP, it must be proven that the organization purpose is to overthrow the present Government of the Philippines and establish a domination of a FOREIGN POWER. Membership is willfully and knowingly done by overt acts. 2. In case of CPP, the continued pursuance of its subversive purpose. Membership is willfully and knowingly done by overt acts. The court did not make any judgment on the crimes of the accused under the Act. The Supreme Court set aside the resolution of the TRIAL COURT

NON-IMPROSONMENT FOR DEBT

Lozano v. MARTINEZ Facts: Batas Pambansa 22 (BP22; Bouncing Check Law) was approved on 3 April 1979. The petitions arose from cases involving prosecution of offenses under BP22. (Florentina A. Lozano vs. RTC Judge Antonio M.Martinez [Manila, Branch XX] in GR L-63419, Luzviminda F. Lobaton vs. RTC Executive Judge Glicerio L.Cruz [Lemery Batangas, Branch V] in GR L-66839-42, Antonio and Susan Datuin vs. RTC Judge Ernani C. Pano [Quezon City, Branch LXXVIII] in GR 71654, Oscar Violago vs. RTC Judge Ernani C. Pano [Quezon City, Branch LXXVIII] in GR 74524-25, Elinor Abad vs. RTC Judge Nicolad A. Gerochi Jr. [Makati, Branch 139] in GR 75122-49, Amable and Sylvia Aguiluz vs. Presiding Judge of Branch 154 of Pasig in GR 75812- 13, Luis M. Hojas vs. RTC Judge Senen Penaranda [Cagayan de Oro, Branch XX] in GR 72565-67, and People vs. RTC Judge David Nitafan [Manila, Branch 52] and Thelma Sarmiento in GR 75789]. Lozano, Lobaton, Datuin, Violago, Abad, Aguiluz, Hojas and Sarmiento moved seasonably to quash the informationson the ground that the acts charged did not constitute an offense, thestatute being unconstitutional. Themotions were denied by the trial courts, except in one case, which is the subject of GR 75789 (People vs.Nitafan), wherein the trial court declared thelaw unconstitutional and dismissed the case. The partiesadversely affected have come to the Supreme Court for relief. Issue: Whether BP 22 is contrary to the constitutional prohibition against imprisonment for debt. Held: The constitutional prohibition against imprisonment for debt is a safeguard that evolved graduallyduring the early part of the nineteenth century in the various states of the American Union as a result of thepeople's revulsion at the cruel and inhumane practice, sanctioned by common law, which permitted creditorsto cause the incarceration of debtors

who could not pay their debts. At common law, money judgments arisingfrom actions for the recovery of a debt or for damages from breach of a contract could be enforced against theperson or body of the debtor by writ of capias ad satisfaciendum. By means of this writ, a debtor could be seized and imprisoned at the instance of the creditor until he makes the satisfaction awarded. As aconsequence of the popular ground swell against such a barbarous practice, provisions forbiddingimprisonment for debt came to be generally enshrined in the constitutions of various states of the Union. Thishumanitarian provision was transported to our shores by the Americans at the turn of the century andembodied in Philippine organic laws. Later, the Philippine fundamental law outlawed not only imprisonmentfor debt, but also the infamous practice, native to our shore, of throwing people in jail for non-payment of thecedula or poll tax. It may be constitutionally impermissible to penalize a person for non-payment of a debt ex contractu. Organic provisions relieving from imprisonment for debt were intended to prevent commitment ofdebtors to prison for liabilities arising from actions ex contractu. The inhibition was never meant to includedamages arising in actions ex delicto, for the reason that damages recoverable therein do not arise from anycontract entered into between the parties but are imposed upon the defendant for the wrong he has done andare considered as punishment, nor to fines and penalties imposed by the courts in criminal proceedings as punishments for crime. Herein, the thrust of the law (BP 22) is to prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, themaking of worthless checks and putting them in circulation. The law punishes the act not as an offense againstproperty, but an offense against public order. It is not the non-payment of an obligation which the lawpunishes, nor is it intended or designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt. Although the effect of the law maybe to coerce payment of an obligation, it is intended to banish a practice (i.e. the issuance of worthlesschecks) considered harmful to public welfare

Sura vs. Martin Facts: In Civil Case 5580 of the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Negros Occidental, through JudgeEduardoD. Enriquez, judgment was rendered on 20 June 1961, amended on 15 July1961, ordering the Vicente MartinSr. to recognize Vicente Martin Jr. as his natural son; toprovideVicente Martin Jr. support in the monthly rateof P100 from 10 December 1959 until thelatter reaches the age of majority, and to pay the attorney's fees inthe amount of P1,000 plus the costs. From the judgment, Vicente Martin Sr. appealed to the Court of Appeals,and the latter Court, in CA-GR 30388-R, affirmed said decision on 30 January 1964. On 9 May 1964, the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Negros Occidental, through Judge Jose R. Querubin issued the order, orderingthe Clerk of Court to issue writ of execution, same being forwarded to theProvincial Sheriff of NegrosOriental. Pursuant to said order, a writ of execution was issuedon 9 May 1964 by the Clerk of Court, and theProvincial Sheriff of Negros Oriental served the sameupon the defendant in Tanjay, Negros Oriental butreturned the writ unsatisfied. Thesecond paragraph of the Sheriff's return of service, dated 21 September1964, stated that "the judgment debtor is jobless, and is residing in the dwelling house and in the company of his widowed mother, at Tanjay, this province. Debtor has no leviable property; he is even supported by hismother. Hereto attached is the certificate of insolvency issued by the MunicipalTreasurer of Tanjay NegrosOriental, where debtor legally resides." On 6 October 1964, Nilda Sura's counsel (in behalf of here minorchild Vicente Martin Jr.) prayed that Vicente Martin Sr., for failure to satisfy the writ of execution, beadjudged guilty of contempt of court. On 28 November 1964, the Court issued the order granting VicenteMartin Sr. to fulfill the decisionof the court within the period of 30 days or he shall be held in contempt.Vicente

Martin Sr. havingfailed to satisfy said order, the Court on 9 January 1965 issued the order orderingthe arrest of Martin Sr. On 26 January 1964, Martin Sr.'s counsel filed a notice of appeal, and at thesame timeprayed for the fixing of a bond for the temporary release of the defendant. On 1February 1965, the Courtissued the order directing the confinement of Martin Sr. to theprovincial jail, adn fixed bail at P7,000 ifMartin Sr. desired to appeal the case. Martin Sr. appealed. Issue: Whether the imprisonment of Martin Sr. for failure to satisfy the decision requiring him to supporthisnatural son at the monthly rate of P100, due to insolvency, violative of the constitutional right againstimprisonment for debt Held: The orders for the arrest and imprisonment of Vicente Martin, Sr., for contempt of court forfailure tosatisfy the judgment were illegal, in view of the following considerations: (1) The judgmentordering MartinSr. to pay past and future support at P100 per month was a finaldisposition of the case and was declaratory ofthe obligation of Martin Sr.. The writ ofexecution issued on the judgment with respect to past support in theamount of about P6,000 Required "the sheriff or other proper officer" to whom it was directed to satisfy the amount out of all property, real and personal, of the judgment debtor in the manner specified inRule 39,Section 15, of the Rules of Court. The writ of execution was, therefore, a direct order to the sheriff or otherproper officer to whom it was directed, and not an order to the judgment debtor. In view thereof, the judgmentdebtor could not, in the very nature of things, havecommitted disobedience to the writ. (2) The sheriff's returnshows that the judgment debtorwas insolvent. Hence the Orders of January 9 and February 1, 1965, in effect,authorized his imprisonment for debt in violation of the Constitution. (3) The disobedience to a judgmentconsidered as indirect contempt does not refer to a judgment which is a finaldisposition of the case andwhich

is declaratory of the rights of the parties, but to a special judgment, ajudgment "which requires theperformance of any other act than the payment of money, or thesale or delivery of real or personal property."According to Moran, generally, any order orjudgment of a court finally disposing of an action should beenforced by ordinary executionproceedings, except special judgments which should be executed by contemptproceedings. The Court reversed the orders of the lower court.

INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE

CUANCA V SALAZAR

Facts: This is an action for habeas corpus

brought by Bartolome Caunca in behalf of his

cousin Estelita Flores who was employed by the

Far Eastern Employment Bureau, owned by Julia

Salazar, respondent herein. An advanced

payment has already been given to Estelita by

the employment agency, for her to work as a

maid. However, Estelita wanted to transfer to

another residence, which was disallowed by the

employment agency. Further she was detained

and her liberty was restrained. The employment

agency wanted that the advance payment,

which was applied to her transportation

expense from the province should be paid by

Estelita before she could be allowed to leave.

Issue: Whether or Not an employment agency

has the right to restrain and detain a maid

without returning the advance payment it gave?

Held: An employment agency, regardless of the

amount it may advance to a prospective

employee or maid, has absolutely no power to

curtail her freedom of movement. The fact that

no physical force has been exerted to keep her

in the house of the respondent does not make

less real the deprivation of her personal

freedom of movement, freedom to transfer

from one place to another, freedom to choose

one’s residence. Freedom may be lost due to

external moral compulsion, to founded or

groundless fear, to erroneous belief in the

existence of an imaginary power of an impostor

to cause harm if not blindly obeyed, to any

other psychological element that may curtail

the mental faculty of choice or the unhampered

exercise of the will. If the actual effect of such

psychological spell is to place a person at the

mercy of another, the victim is entitled to the

protection of courts of justice as much as the

individual who is illegally deprived of liberty by

duress or physical coercion.

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS,AMPARO,HABEAS

DATA AND KALIKASAN

VINGSON V CABCABAN

MANGILA V PANGILINAN

Anita Mangila was charged with seven criminalcomplaints with syndicated estafa in violation of Migrant #or$ers Act of 1""5. %he complaints arose from therecr&iting and promising of employment 'yMangila and the others to the privatecomplainants as overseas contract wor$ers in%oronto, Canada, and from the collection of visaprocessing fees, mem'ership fees and on(lineapplication witho&t a&thority from P)*A.+ollowing the preliminary

-Pangilinan of M%CC inP&erto Princesa, a warrant of arrest was iss&edagainst Mangila and her cohorts witho&t 'ail. 0yvirt&e of the arrest warrant, Mangila wasarrested in Manila

-.Mangila filed a petition for ha'eas corp&s 'eforethe CA to o'tain her release. 2he arg&ed that/&dge Pangilinan had no a&thority to cond&ctthe P- - was not yet completed whenthe arrest warrant was

therewas no finding of pro'a'le ca&se prior to theiss&ance of arrest warrant.%he CA denied Mangila4s petition. ISSUE:

remedy to o'tain the release of Mangilafrom detention. HELD:

habeas corpus is a special proceeding governed'y R&le 176 of the R&les of Co&rt, as amended.-n Ex Parte Billings , it was held that habeascorpus is that of a civil proceeding in character.-t see$s the enforcement of civil rights. Resortingto the

writ is not to in8&ire into the criminal act of which the complaint is made, '&t into the right of li'erty, notwithstanding the act and theimmediate p&rpose to 'e served is relief fromillegal restraint. %he r&le applies even wheninstit&ted to arrest a criminal prosec&tion andsec&re freedom. #hen a prisoner petitions for awrit of habeas corpus , he there'y commences as&it and prosec&tes a case in that co&rt.%he in8&iry in a habeas corpus proceeding isaddressed to the 8&estion of whether theproceedings and the assailed order are, for anyreason, n&ll and void. %he writ is not ordinarilygranted where the law provides for other remedies in the reg&lar co&rse, and in thea'sence of e9ceptional circ&mstances.Moreover, habeas corpus sho&ld not 'e grantedin advance of trial. %he orderly co&rse of trialm&st 'e p&rs&ed and the &s&al remediese9ha&sted 'efore resorting to the writ wheree9ceptional circ&mstances are e9tant. -n another case, it was held that habeas corpus cannot 'eiss&ed as a writ of error or as a means of reviewing errors of law and irreg&larities notinvolving the 8&estions of :&risdiction occ&rringd&ring the co&rse of the trial, s&':ect to thecaveat that constit&tional safeg&ards of h&manlife and li'erty m&st 'e preserved, and notdestroyed. -t has also 'een held that whererestraint is &nder legal process, mere errors andirreg&larities, which do not render theproceedings void, are not gro&nds for relief 'y habeas corpus 'eca&se in s&ch cases, therestraint is not

-t was clear that &nder 2ection

Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure , the resol&tion of the investigating :&dge was not final '&t was still s&':ect to thereview 'y the p&'lic prosec&tor who had thepower to order the release of the detainee if nopro'a'le ca&se sho&ld 'e&ltimately fo&ndagainst her. -n the

conte9t of the r&le, Mangilahad no need to see$ the iss&ance of the writ of habeas corpus to sec&re her release fromdetention. ;er proper reco&rse was to 'ring thes&pposed irreg&larities attending the cond&ct of the preliminary investigation and the iss&ance of the warrant for her arrest to the attention of theCity Prosec&tor, who had 'een meanwhile giventhe most direct access to the entire records of the case, incl&ding the warrant of arrest,following /&dge Pangilinan4s transmittal of themto the City Prosec&tor for appropriate action. %hewrit of habeas corpus co&ld not 'e &sed asas&'stit&te for another availa'le remedy

ARIGO V SWIFT

PONENTE: Villarama

TOPIC: Writ of kalikasan, UNCLOS, Immunity from suit

FACTS:

The USS Guardian is an Avenger-class mine countermeasures ship of the US Navy. In December 2012, the US Embassy in the Philippines requested diplomatic clearance for the said vessel “to enter and exit the territorial waters of the Philippines and to arrive at the port of Subic Bay for the purpose of routine ship replenishment, maintenance, and crew liberty.” On January 6, 2013, the ship left Sasebo, Japan for Subic Bay, arriving on January 13, 2013 after a brief stop for fuel in Okinawa, Japan.

On January 15, 2013, the USS Guardian departed Subic Bay for its next port of call in Makassar, Indonesia. On January 17, 2013 at

2:20 a.m. while transiting the Sulu Sea, the ship ran aground on the northwest side of South Shoal of the Tubbataha Reefs, about 80 miles east-southeast of Palawan. No one was injured in the incident, and there have been no reports of leaking fuel or oil.

Petitioners claim that the grounding, salvaging and post-salvaging operations of the USS Guardian cause and continue to cause environmental damage of such magnitude as to affect the provinces of Palawan, Antique, Aklan, Guimaras, Iloilo, Negros Occidental, Negros Oriental, Zamboanga del Norte, Basilan, Sulu, and Tawi-Tawi, which events violate their constitutional rights to a balanced and healthful ecology.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not petitioners have legal standing.

2. Whether or not US respondents may be held liable for damages caused by USS Guardian.

3. Whether or not the waiver of immunity from suit under VFA applies in this case.

HELD:

First issue: YES.

Petitioners have legal standing

Locus standi is “a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question.” Specifically, it is “a party’s personal and substantial interest in a case where he has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result” of the act being challenged, and “calls for more than just a generalized grievance.” However, the rule on standing is a procedural matter which this Court has relaxed for non-

traditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens, taxpayers and legislators when the public interest so requires, such as when the subject matter of the controversy is of transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to society, or of paramount public interest.

In the landmark case of Oposa v. Factoran, Jr., we recognized the “public right” of citizens to “a balanced and healthful ecology which, for the first time in our constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the fundamental law.” We declared that the right to a balanced and healthful ecology need not be written in the Constitution for it is assumed, like other civil and polittcal rights guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, to exist from the inception of mankind and it is an issue of transcendental importance with intergenerational implications.1âwphi1 Such right carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment.

On the novel element in the class suit filed by the petitioners minors in Oposa, this Court ruled that not only do ordinary citizens have legal standing to sue for the enforcement of environmental rights, they can do so in representation of their own and future generations.

Second issue: YES.

The US respondents were sued in their official capacity as commanding officers of the US Navy who had control and supervision over the USS Guardian and its crew. The alleged act or omission resulting in the unfortunate grounding of the USS Guardian on the TRNP was committed while they were performing official military duties. Considering that the satisfaction of a judgment against said officials will require remedial actions and appropriation of funds by the US government, the suit is deemed to be one against the US itself. The principle of State immunity therefore bars the

exercise of jurisdiction by this Court over the persons of respondents Swift, Rice and Robling.

During the deliberations, Senior Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio took the position that the conduct of the US in this case, when its warship entered a restricted area in violation of R.A. No. 10067 and caused damage to the TRNP reef system, brings the matter within the ambit of Article 31 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). He explained that while historically, warships enjoy sovereign immunity from suit as extensions of their flag State, Art. 31 of the UNCLOS creates an exception to this rule in cases where they fail to comply with the rules and regulations of the coastal State regarding passage through the latter’s internal waters and the territorial sea.

In the case of warships, as pointed out by Justice Carpio, they continue to enjoy sovereign immunity subject to the following exceptions:

Article 30: Non-compliance by warships with the laws and regulations of the coastal State

If any warship does not comply with the laws and regulations of the coastal State concerning passage through the territorial sea and disregards any request for compliance therewith which is made to it, the coastal State may require it to leave the territorial sea immediately.

Article 31: Responsibility of the flag State for damage caused by a warship or other government ship operated for non-commercial purposes

The flag State shall bear international responsibility for any loss or damage to the coastal State resulting from the non-compliance by a warship or other government ship

operated for non-commercial purposes with the laws and regulations of the coastal State concerning passage through the territorial sea or with the provisions of this Convention or other rules of international law.

Article 32: Immunities of warships and other government ships operated for non-commercial purposes

With such exceptions as are contained in subsection A and in articles 30 and 31, nothing in this Convention affects the immunities of warships and other government ships operated for non-commercial purposes. A foreign warship’s unauthorized entry into our internal waters with resulting damage to marine resources is one situation in which the above provisions may apply.

But what if the offending warship is a non-party to the UNCLOS, as in this case, the US?

According to Justice Carpio, although the US to date has not ratified the UNCLOS, as a matter of long-standing policy the US considers itself bound by customary international rules on the “traditional uses of the oceans” as codified in UNCLOS.

Moreover, Justice Carpio emphasizes that “the US refusal to join the UNCLOS was centered on its disagreement with UNCLOS” regime of deep seabed mining (Part XI) which considers the oceans and deep seabed commonly owned by mankind,” pointing out that such “has nothing to do with its the US’ acceptance of customary international rules on navigation.”

The Court also fully concurred with Justice Carpio’s view that non-membership in the UNCLOS does not mean that the US will disregard the rights of the Philippines as a Coastal State over its internal waters and territorial sea. We thus expect the US to bear “international responsibility” under Art. 31 in connection with the USS Guardian grounding which adversely affected the Tubbataha reefs.

Indeed, it is difficult to imagine that our long-time ally and trading partner, which has been actively supporting the country’s efforts to preserve our vital marine resources, would shirk from its obligation to compensate the damage caused by its warship while transiting our internal waters. Much less can we comprehend a Government exercising leadership in international affairs, unwilling to comply with the UNCLOS directive for all nations to cooperate in the global task to protect and preserve the marine environment as provided in Article 197 of UNCLOS

Article 197: Cooperation on a global or regional basis

States shall cooperate on a global basis and, as appropriate, on a regional basis, directly or through competent international organizations, in formulating and elaborating international rules, standards and recommended practices and procedures consistent with this Convention, for the protection and preservation of the marine environment, taking into account characteristic regional features.

In fine, the relevance of UNCLOS provisions to the present controversy is beyond dispute. Although the said treaty upholds the immunity of warships from the jurisdiction of Coastal States while navigating the latter’s territorial sea, the flag States shall be required to leave the territorial sea immediately if they flout the laws and regulations of the Coastal State, and they will be liable for damages caused by their warships or any other government vessel operated for non-commercial purposes under Article 31.

Third issue: NO.

The waiver of State immunity under the VF A pertains only to criminal jurisdiction and not to special civil actions such as the present petition for issuance of a writ of

Kalikasan. In fact, it can be inferred from Section 17, Rule 7 of the Rules that a criminal case against a person charged with a violation of an environmental law is to be filed separately.

The Court considered a view that a ruling on the application or non-application of criminal jurisdiction provisions of the VFA to US personnel who may be found responsible for the grounding of the USS Guardian, would be premature and beyond the province of a petition for a writ of Kalikasan.

The Court also found unnecessary at this point to determine whether such waiver of State immunity is indeed absolute. In the same vein, we cannot grant damages which have resulted from the violation of environmental laws. The Rules allows the recovery of damages, including the collection of administrative fines under R.A. No. 10067, in a separate civil suit or that deemed instituted with the criminal action charging the same violation of an environmental law.

AMPATUAN V MACARAIG

FACTS: Atty. Alioden D. Dalaig, Head of the COMELEC Legal Department, was killed at the corner of M. H. Del Pilar and Pedro Gil Streets, Ermita, Manila. Investigation conducted by the Manila Police District Homicide Section yielded the identity of the male perpetrator as PO1 Ampatuan. Consequently, PO1 Ampatuan was commanded to the MPD District Director for proper disposition. Likewise, inquest proceedings were conducted by the Manila Prosecutor’s Office. On 18 April 2008, Police Senior Superintendent Guinto, rendered his Pre-Charge Evaluation Report against PO1 Ampatuan, finding probable cause to charge PO1 Ampatuan with Grave Misconduct (Murder) and recommending that said PO1 Ampatuan be subjected to summary hearing.

Meanwhile, on 21 April 2008, the City Prosecutor of Manila recommended that the case against PO1 Ampatuan be set for further investigation and that the latter be released from custody unless he is being held for other charges/legal grounds. Armed with the 21 April 2008 recommendation of the Manila City’s Prosecution Office, petitioner, who is the wife of PO1 Ampatuan, filed a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Habeas Corpus before the RTC of Manila on 22 April 2008. On 24 April 2008, RTC ordered the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus commanding therein respondents to produce the body of PO1 Ampatuan and directing said respondents to show cause why they are withholding or restraining the liberty of PO1 Ampatuan. Seeking the reversal of RTC, the respondents averred that the filing of the administrative case against PO1 Ampatuan is a process done by the PNP and this Court has no authority to order the release of the subject police officer. The petitioner countered that the letter resignation of PO1 Ampatuan has rendered the administrative case moot and academic. Respondent however stressed that the resignation has not been acted by the appropriate police officials of the PNP, and that the administrative case was filed while PO1 Ampatuan is still in the active status of the PNP. The RTC reversed and dismissed the petition. ISSUE: THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT FAILED TO CONSIDER THAT THE ARREST AND DETENTION OF PO1 BASSER B. AMPATUAN WAS MADE WITHOUT ANY WARRANT AND THEREFORE, ILLEGAL. HELD: The objective of the writ is to determine whether the confinement or detention is valid or lawful. If it is, the writ cannot be issued. What is to be inquired into is the legality of a person's detention as of, at the earliest, the

filing of the application for the writ of habeas corpus, for even if the detention is at its inception illegal, it may, by reason of some supervening events, such as the instances mentioned in Section 4 of Rule 102, be no longer illegal at the time of the filing of the application In this case, PO1 Ampatuan has been placed under Restrictive Custody. Republic Act No. 6975 (also known as the Department of Interior and Local Government Act of 1990), as amended by Republic Act No. 8551 (also known as the Philippine National Police Reform and Reorganization Act of 1998), clearly provides that members of the police force are subject to the administrative disciplinary machinery of the PNP. Given that PO1 Ampatuan has been placed under restrictive custody, such constitutes a valid argument for his continued detention. This Court has held that a restrictive custody and monitoring of movements or whereabouts of police officers under investigation by their superiors is not a form of illegal detention or restraint of liberty. Restrictive custody is, at best, nominal restraint which is beyond the ambit of habeas corpus. It is neither actual nor effective restraint that would call for the grant of the remedy prayed for. It is a permissible precautionary measure to assure the PNP authorities that the police officers concerned are always accounted for. In sum, petitioner is unable to discharge the burden of showing that she is entitled to the issuance of the writ prayed for in behalf of her husband, PO1 Ampatuan. The petition fails to show on its face that the latter is unlawfully deprived of his liberty guaranteed and enshrined in the Constitution.

LANSANG V GARCIA

Facts: In the evening of August 21, 1971, at

about 9 p.m., while the Liberal Party of the

Philippines was holding a public meeting at

Plaza Miranda, Manila, for the presentation of

its candidates in the general elections

scheduled for November 8, 1971, two hand

grenades were thrown at the platform where

said candidates and other persons were. Eight

persons were killed and many more injured.

Proclamation 889 was issued by the President

suspending privilege of writ of habeas corpus

stating that there is a conspiracy of rebellion

and insurrection in order to forcibly seize

political power. Petitions for writ of habeas

corpus were filed by persons (13) who have

been arrested without a warrant.

It was stated that one of the safeguards of the

proclamation was that it is to be applied to

persons caught in flagrante delicto. Incidentally,

Proc. 889-A was issued as an amendment,

inserting the word “actually staging”. Proc. 889-

B was also issued lifting the suspension of

privilege in 27 provinces, 3 sub-provinces and

26 cities. Proc. 889-C was issued restoring the

suspension in 13 provinces and cities(mostly in

Mindanao). Proc. 889-D further lifted the

suspension in 7 provinces and 4 cities. Only 18

provinces and sub-provinces and 2 cities whose

privilege was suspended. Petitioners

maintained that Proclamation No. 889 did not

declare the existence of actual "invasion

insurrection or rebellion or imminent danger

thereof, however it became moot and academic

since it was amended. Petitioners further

contend that public safety did not require the

issuance of proclamations stating: (a) that there

is no rebellion; (b) that, prior to and at the time

of the suspension of the privilege, the

Government was functioning normally, as were

the courts; (c) that no untoward incident,

confirmatory of an alleged July-August Plan, has

actually taken place after August 21, 1971; (d)

that the President's alleged apprehension,

because of said plan, is non-existent and

unjustified; and (e) that the Communist forces

in the Philippines are too small and weak to

jeopardize public safety to such extent as to

require the suspension of the privilege of the

writ of habeas corpus.

A resolution was issued by majority of the Court

having tentatively arrived at a consensus that it

may inquire in order to satisfy itself of the

existence of the factual bases for the

proclamations. Now the Court resolves after

conclusive decision reached by majority.

Issues:

(1) Whether or Not the authority to decide

whether the exigency has arisen requiring

suspension (of the privilege of the writ of

habeas corpus) belongs to the President and his

decision is final and conclusive upon the courts

and upon all other persons.

(2) Whether or Not public safety require the

suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas

corpus decreed in Proclamation No. 889-A.

Held: The President has authority however it is

subject to judicial review. Two conditions must

concur for the valid exercise of the authority to

suspend the privilege to the writ (a) there must

be "invasion, insurrection, or rebellion" or

"imminent danger thereof," and (b) "public

safety" must require the suspension of the

privilege. President has three (3) courses of

action: (a) to call out the armed forces; (b) to

suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas

corpus; and (c) to place the Philippines or any

part thereof under martial law. He had, already,

called out the armed forces, proved inadequate.

Of the two other alternatives, the suspension of

the privilege is the least harsh.

Petitioners contention that CPP-NPA has no

ability, is negatived by the killing of 5 mayors,

20 barrio captains and 3 chiefs of police; that

there were fourteen (14) meaningful bombing

incidents in the Greater Manila Area in 1970.

CPP has managed to infiltrate or establish and

control nine major labor organizations; has

exploited the (11) major student or youth

organizations; about thirty (30) mass

organizations actively advancing the CPP.

KULAYAN V TAN

LOZADA V MACAPAGAL ARROYO

CARAM V SEGUI

GAMBOA V CHAN

Facts:Former President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo issued Admin No. 275 creating Zeñarosa Commissionwhich was formed to investigate the existence of private army groups in the country in view of eliminating and dismantling them permanently in the future. Upon conclusion of its investigation, theCommission submitted a confidential report to the office of the President.Marynette Gamboa was the Mayor of Dingras, Ilocos Norte. Gamboa alleged that the PhilippineNational Police Ilocos Norte conducted surveillance operation against her and her aides and classifiedher as PAG coddler. Purportedly without the benefit of data verification, PNP forwarded in the Report’s enumeration of individual maintaining PAGs. Gamboa’s association with PAG was published and released in the different forms of media, publicly tagging her as a PAG coddler. Alleging that her right to privacy was violated, Gamboa filed apetition before the RTC for the issuance of writ of habeas data to destroy the unverified reports fromthe PNP data base and restrain PNP from forwarding baseless

reports against her. The RTC ruled thatthe inclusion of Gamboa in the report violates her right to privacy. However, the RTC dismissed Gamboa’s petition for writ of habeas data saying that Gamboa failed to establish the source of the information.ISSUES:1. Whether or not the forwarding or information or intelligence report by the PNP to the Commission was an unlawful act that violated petitioner’s right to privacy 2. Whether or not resort to petition for writ of habeas data was proper HELD:Forwarding of information or intelligence report gathered by the PNP to the Commission is NOT an intrusion of petitioner’s right to privacy It is clear that the issuance of AO 275 articulates a legitimate aim which is to investigate theexistence of PAGs with the ultimate objective of dismantling them permanently. Pursuant to the stateinterest of dismantling PAGs, as well as the powers and functions accorded to the Commission and thePNP, the latter collected information on individuals suspected of maintaining PAGs, monitored them andcounteracted their activities. One of those individuals is herein petitioner Gamboa.This court holds that Gamboa was able to sufficiently establish that the data contained in thereport listing her as a PAG coddler came from the PNP contrary to the ruling of the trial court, however,the forwarding of information by the PNP to the Commission was not unlawful act that violated orthreatened her right to privacy in life, liberty or security. The PNP was rationally expected to forwardand share intelligence regarding PAGs with the body specifically created for the purpose of investigatingthe existence of these notorious group. Moreover, the Commission was explicitly authorized to deputize the police force in the fulfillment of the former’s mandate, and thus had the power to request as sistancefrom the latter. Petition for writ of habeas data is NOT PROPER

PAJE V CASINO

SPEEDY DISPOSITION OF CASES

GARCIA EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

In November 1990, President Corazon Aquino issued Executive Order No. 438 which imposed, in addition to any other duties, taxes and charges imposed by law on all articles imported into the Philippines, an additional duty of 5% ad valorem tax. This additional duty was imposed across the board on all imported articles, including crude oil and other oil products imported into the Philippines. In 1991, EO 443 increased the additional duty to 9%. In the same year, EO 475 was passed reinstating the previous 5% duty except that crude oil and other oil products continued to be taxed at 9%. Enrique Garcia, a representative from Bataan, avers that EO 475 and 478 are unconstitutional for they violate Section 24 of Article VI of the Constitution which provides:

All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments.

He contends that since the Constitution vests the authority to enact revenue bills in Congress, the President may not assume such power by issuing Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478 which are in the nature of revenue-generating measures.

ISSUE: Whether or not EO 475 and 478 are constitutional.

HELD: Under Section 24, Article VI of the Constitution, the enactment of appropriation, revenue and tariff bills, like all other bills is, of course, within the province of the Legislative rather than the Executive Department. It does not follow, however, that therefore Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478, assuming they may be characterized as revenue measures, are prohibited to be exercised by the President,

that they must be enacted instead by the Congress of the Philippines.

Section 28(2) of Article VI of the Constitution provides as follows:

(2) The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within specified limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the national development program of the Government.

There is thus explicit constitutional permission to Congress to authorize the President “subject to such limitations and restrictions as [Congress] may impose” to fix “within specific limits” “tariff rates . . . and other duties or imposts . . . .” In this case, it is the Tariff and Customs Code which authorized the President ot issue the said EOs.

GUERRERO V CA

CONDE V RIVERA

Facts: Aurelia Conde, formerly a municipal

midwife in Lucena, Tayabas, has been forced to

respond to no less the five information for

various crimes and misdemeanors, has

appeared with her witnesses and counsel at

hearings no less than on eight different

occasions only to see the cause postponed, has

twice been required to come to the Supreme

Court for protection, and now, after the

passage of more than one year from the time

when the first information was filed, seems as

far away from a definite resolution of her

troubles as she was when originally charged.

Issue: Whether or Not petitioner has been

denied her right to a speedy and impartial trial.

Held: Philippine organic and statutory law

expressly guarantee that in all criminal

prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right

to have a speedy trial. Aurelia Conde, like all

other accused persons, has a right to a speedy

trial in order that if innocent she may go free,

and she has been deprived of that right in

defiance of law. We lay down the legal

proposition that, where a prosecuting officer,

without good cause, secures postponements of

the trial of a defendant against his protest

beyond a reasonable period of time, as in this

instance for more than a year, the accused is

entitled to relief by a proceeding in mandamus

to compel a dismissal of the information, or if

he be restrained of his liberty, by habeas corpus

to obtain his freedom.

RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED

Galman v Sandiganbayan

144 SCRA 392 (1986)

Facts: An investigating committee was created

to determine the facts on the case involving the

assassination of Ninoy Aquino. It appears that

majority and minority reports showed that they

are unconvinced on the participation of Galman

as the assassin of late Sen. Aquino and branded

him instead as the fall guy as opposed to the

military reports. Majority reports

recommended the 26 military respondents as

indictable for the premeditated killing of Aquino

and Galman which the Sandiganbayan did not

give due consideration.

The office of the Tanod Bayan was originally

preparing a resolution charging the 26 military

accused as principal to the crime against Aquino

but was recalled upon the intervention of

President Marcos who insist on the innocence

of the accused. Marcos however recommended

the filing of murder charge and to implement

the acquittal as planned so that double

jeopardy may be invoked later on.

The petitioners filed an action for miscarriage of

justice against the Sandiganbayan and gross

violation of constitutional rights of the

petitioners for failure to exert genuine efforts in

allowing the prosecution to present vital

documentary evidence and prayed for nullifying

the bias proceedings before the Sandiganbayan

and ordering a re-trial before an impartial

tribunal.

Issue: Whether or not there was due process in

the acquittal of the accused from the charges

against them.

Held: The Supreme Court held that the

prosecution was deprived of due process and

fair opportunity to prosecute and prove their

case which grossly violates the due process

clause. There could be no double jeopardy since

legal jeopardy attaches only (a) upon a valid

indictment, (b) before a competent court, (c)

after arraignment, (d) a valid plea having been

entered; and (e) the case was dismissed or

otherwise terminated without the express

consent of the accused (People vs. Ylagan, 58

Phil. 851). The lower court that rendered the

judgment of acquittal was not competent as it

was ousted of its jurisdiction when it violated

the right of the prosecution to due process. In

effect the first jeopardy was never terminated,

and the remand of the criminal case for further

hearing and/or trial before the lower courts

amounts merely to a continuation of the first

jeopardy, and does not expose the accused to a

second jeopardy.

The court further contends that the previous

trial was a mock trial where the authoritarian

President ordered the Sandiganbayan and

Tanod Bayan to rig and closely monitor the trial

which was undertaken with due pressure to the

judiciary. The court’s decision of acquittal is one

void of jurisdiction owing to its failure in

observing due process during the trial therefore

the judgment was also deemed void and double

jeopardy cannot be invoked. More so the trial

was one vitiated with lack of due process on the

account of collusion between the lower court

and Sandiganbayan for the rendition of a pre-

determined verdict of the accused.

The denial on the motion for reconsideration of

the petitioners by the court was set aside and

rendered the decision of acquittal of the

accused null and void. An order for a re-trial

was granted.

VILLAFLOR VS. SUMMERS

Facts: Petitioner Villaflor was charged with the

crime of adultery. The trial judge ordered the

petitioner to subject herself into physical

examination to test whether or not she was

pregnant to prove the determine the crime of

adultery being charged to her. Herein petitioner

refused to such physical examination

interposing the defense that such examination

was a violation of her constitutional rights

against self-incrimination.

Issue: Whether or Not the physical examination

was a violation of the petitioner’s constitutional

rights against self-incrimination.

Held: No. It is not a violation of her

constitutional rights. The rule that the

constitutional guaranty, that no person shall be

compelled in any criminal case to be a witness

against himself, is limited to a prohibition

against compulsory testimonial self-

incrimination. The corollary to the proposition is

that, an ocular inspection of the body of the

accused is permissible.

BELTRAN V SAMSON

Facts: Beltran, as a defendant for the crime of Falsification, refused to write a sample of his handwriting as ordered by the respondent Judge. The petitioner in this case contended that such order would be a violation of his constitutional right against self-incrimination because such examination would give the prosecution evidence against him, which the latter should have gotten in the first place. He also argued that such an act will make him furnish evidence against himself.

Issue: Whether or not the writing from the fiscal's dictation by the petitioner for the purpose of comparing the latter's handwriting and determining whether he wrote certain documents supposed to be falsified, constitutes evidence against himself within the scope and meaning of the constitutional provision under examination. Held: The court ordered the respondents and those under their orders desist and abstain absolutely and forever from compelling the petitioner to take down dictation in his handwriting for the purpose of submitting the latter for comparison. Writing is something more than moving the body, or the hands, or the fingers; writing is not a purely mechanical act, because it requires the application of intelligence and attention; and in the case at bar writing means that the petitioner herein is to furnish a means to determine whether or not he is the falsifier, as the petition of the respondent fiscal clearly states. Except that it is more serious, we believe the present case is similar to that of producing documents or chattels in one's possession. We say that, for the purposes of the constitutional privilege, there is a similarity between one who is compelled to produce a document, and one

who is compelled to furnish a specimen of his handwriting, for in both cases, the witness is required to furnish evidence against himself. It cannot be contended in the present case that if permission to obtain a specimen of the petitioner's handwriting is not granted, the crime would go unpunished. Considering the circumstance that the petitioner is a municipal treasurer, it should not be a difficult matter for the fiscal to obtained genuine specimens of his handwriting. But even supposing it is impossible to obtain specimen or specimens without resorting to the means complained herein, that is no reason for trampling upon a personal right guaranteed by the constitution. It might be true that in some cases criminals may succeed in evading the hand of justice, but such cases are accidental and do not constitute the raison d' etre of the privilege. This constitutional privilege exists for the protection of innocent persons.

PEOPLE V GALIT

The prisoner was arrested for killing the victim oil the occasion of a robbery. He had beendetained and interrogated almost continuously for five days, to no avail. He consistentlymaintained his innocence. There was no evidence to link him to the crime. Obviously,something drastic had to be done. A confession was absolutely necessary. So the investigatingofficers began to maul him and to torture him physically. Still the prisoner insisted on hisinnocence. His will had to be broken. A confession must be obtained. So they continued tomaltreat and beat him. 'They covered his face with a rag and pushed his face into a toilet bowlfull of human waste. The prisoner could not take any more. His body could no longer endurethe pain inflicted on him and the indignities he had to suffer. His will had been broken. Headmitted what the investigating officers wanted him to admit and he signed the confessionthey prepared. Later, against his will, he posed for pictures as directed by his investigators,purporting it to be a reenactment.

ISSUE: Whether or not the accused was informed of his constitutional rights to remain silentand to counsel, and that any statement he might make could be used against him. RULING: Such a long question followed by a monosyllabic answer does not satisfy the requirements of the law that the accused be informed of his rights under the Constitution and our laws. Insteadthere should be several short and clear questions and every right explained in simple words in adialect or language known to the person under investigation. Accused is from Samar and thereis no showing that he understands Tagalog. Moreover, at the time of his arrest, accused wasnot permitted to communicate with his lawyer, a relative, or a friend. In fact, his sisters andother relatives did not know that he had been brought to the NBI for investigation and it wasonly about two weeks after he had executed the salaysay that his relatives were allowed to visithim. His statement does not even contain any waiver of right to counsel and yet during theinvestigation he was not assisted by one. At the supposed reenactment, again accused was notassisted by counsel of his choice. These constitute gross violations of his rights.

CHAVEZ V CA

Facts: Judgment of conviction was for qualified theft of a motor vehicle(thunderbird car together with accessories). An information was filed against the accused together with other accused,that they conspired, with intent to gain and abuse of confidence without theconsent of owner Dy Lim, took the vehicle.All the accused plead not guilty. During the trial, the fiscal grecia (prosecution) asked roger Chavez to be thefirst witness. Counsel of the accused opposed. Fiscal Grecia contends that the accused (Chavez) will only be an ordinary witness not an state witness. Counsel of

accused answer that it will only incriminate his client. But the jugde ruled in favor of the fiscal.

Petitioner was convicted.

ISSUE: Whether or not constitutional right of Chavez against self – incrimination had been violated – to warrant writ of HC?

HELD: YES. Petitioner was forced to testify to incriminate himself, in full breach of his constitutional right to remain silent. It cannot be said now that he has waived his right. He did not volunteer to take the stand and in his own defense; he did not offer himself as a witness;

Juxtaposed with the circumstances of the case heretofore adverted to, make waiver a shaky defense. It cannot stand. If, by his own admission, defendant proved his guilt, still, his original claim remains valid. For the privilege, we say again, is a rampart that gives protection – even to the guilty

Habeas corpus is a high prerogative writ. It is traditionally considered as an exceptional remedy to release a person whose liberty is illegally restrained such as when the accused’s constitutional rights are disregarded. Such defect results in the absence or loss of jurisdiction and therefore invalidates the trial and the consequent conviction of the accused whose fundamental right was violated. That void judgment of conviction may be challenged by collateral attack, which precisely is the function of habeas corpus. This writ may issue even if another remedy which is less effective may be availed of by the defendant. Thus, failure by the accused to perfect his appeal before the Court of Appeals does not preclude a recourse to the writ. The writ may be granted upon a judgment already final. For, as explained in Johnson vs. Zerbst, the writ of habeas corpus as an extraordinary remedy must be liberally given effect so as to protect well a person whose liberty is at stake. The propriety of the writ was given the nod in that case,

involving a violation of another constitutional right, in this wise:

A court’s jurisdiction at the beginning of trial may be lost “in the course of the proceedings” due to failure to complete the court — as the Sixth Amendment requires — by providing Counsel for an accused who is unable to obtain Counsel, who has not intelligently waived this constitutional guaranty, and whose life or liberty is at stake. If this requirement of the Sixth Amendment is not complied with, the court no longer has jurisdiction to proceed. The judgment of conviction pronounced by a court without jurisdiction is void, and one imprisoned thereunder may obtain release of habeas corpus.

Under our own Rules of Court, to grant the remedy to the accused Roger Chavez whose case presents a clear picture of disregard of a constitutional right is absolutely proper. Section 1 of Rule 102 extends the writ, unless otherwise expressly provided by law, “to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto.

PEOPLE V SUAREZ

FACTS: On or about the 8th day of December,

1987 in the Municipality of Pasig, Estrelita

Guzman was robbed and was killed in her own

house.

Suarez wanted his aunt killed so that he and his

wife, Marivic Suarez, also the victim’s adopted

daughter, could get at once any property that

Marivic might inherit from Estrellita upon the

latter's death. In exchange for the job, Suarez

would allow the other accused to steal what

they wanted from the house, in addition to

giving them P100,000.00 after one month from

the killing of Estrellita.

Two of the accused, Reyes and Lara, gave their

sworn statement detailing what transpired from

the planning until the execution of the crime.

Relying on the extrajudicial confessions of the

accused and on the circumstantial evidence

adduced by the prosecution, the trial court

found Suarez, Reyes and Lara guilty beyond

reasonable doubt of robbery with homicide.

While Suarez and Reyes have already accepted

the trial court's verdict, Lara now questions the

lower court's decision by challenging the

admissibility of their extrajudicial declarations.

He claims that their extrajudicial confessions

were obtained through force and intimidation

and without the benefit of an effective counsel.

ISSUES: WON accused Lara’s extrajudicial

confessions were freely and voluntary given and

without the benefit of an effective counsel.

HELD: After a thorough review of the records of

the case, we agree with the lower court's

factual finding and conclusion that the

extrajudicial confessions of accused Reyes and

appellant Lara were freely and voluntarily given

and that their retraction and claims of violence

and coercion were merely belated contrivances

and efforts at exculpation. Their claim that they

were forced to sign their respective statements

was sufficiently refuted by the witnesses for the

prosecution who were present on the day and

time the duo gave and signed their sworn

statements.

We find no merit in herein appellant's

contention that Atty. Saunar was not Reyes'

own choice as counsel for the interrogation.

While the initial choice of the lawyer in cases

where a person under custodial investigation

cannot afford the services of a lawyer is

naturally lodged in the police investigators, the

accused really has the final choice as he may

reject the counsel chosen for him and ask for

another one. A lawyer provided by the

investigators is deemed engaged by the accused

where he never raised any objection against the

former's appointment during the course of the

investigation and the accused thereafter

subscribes to the veracity of his statement

before the swearing officer. 37

Here, while the lawyers of the accused were

provided by the NBI, the accused never signified

their desire to have a lawyer of their own

choice. Thus, we also disagree with appellant's

claim that the lawyer who assisted him in his

waiver came in only after he had executed his

waiver. His own statements show that he

waived his rights in the presence and with the

advice of Atty. Rodolfo Dahiroc.

PEOPLE V MALMSTED

Facts: Captain Alen Vasco, the commanding officer of the first regional command (NARCOM) stationed at camp Dangwa, ordered his men to set up a temporary checkpoint for the purpose of checking all vehicles coming from the Cordillera Region. The order to establish a checkpoint was prompted by persistent reports that vehicles coming from Sagada were transporting marijuana and other prohibited drugs. And an information also was received about a Caucasian coming from Sagada had in his possession prohibited drugs. In the afternoon the bus where accused was riding stopped. Sgt. Fider and CIC Galutan boarded the bus and announced that they were members of the NARCOM and that they would conduct an inspection. During the inspection CIC Galutan noticed a bulge on accused waist.

Suspecting the bulge on accused waist to be a gun, the officer asked for accused’s passport and other identification papers. When accused failed to comply, the officer required him to bring out whatever it was that was bulging o his waist. And it turned out to be a pouched bag and when accused opened the same bag the officer noticed four suspicious looking objects wrapped in brown packing tape. It contained hashish, a derivative of marijuana. Thereafter, the accused was invited outside the bus for questioning. But before he alighted from the bus accused stopped to get two travelling bags. The officer inspects the bag. It was only after the officers had opened the bags that the accused finally presented his passport. The two bags contained a stuffed toy each, upon inspection the stuff toy contained also hashish. Issue: Whether or not there is a violation of the constitutional right against unreasonable search and seizure Ruling: The Supreme Court held that under Section 5 Rule 113 of the Rules of Court provides: “Arrest without warrant; when lawful – a peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:

a) When, in the presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;

b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and

c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporary confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another”

Accused was searched and arrested while transporting prohibited drugs. A crime was actually being committed by the accused

and he was caught in flagrante delicto, thus the search made upon his personal effects falls squarely under paragraph 1 of the foregoing provision of law, which allows a warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest.

Probable cause has been defined as such facts and circumstances which could lead a reasonable, discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed, and that the object sought in connection with the offense are in the placed sought to be searched.

When NARCOM received the information that a Caucasian travelling from Sagada to Baguio City was carrying with him a prohibited drug, there was no time to obtain a search warrant.

MORALES V ENRILE

GAMBOA V CRUZ

Facts: Petitioner was arrested for vagrancy

without a warrant. During a line-up of 5

detainees including petitioner, he was identified

by a complainant to be a companion in a

robbery, thereafter he was charged. Petitioner

filed a Motion to Acquit on the ground that the

conduct of the line-up, without notice and in

the absence of his counsel violated his

constitutional rights to counsel and to due

process. The court denied said motion. Hearing

was set, hence the petition.

Issue: Whether or Not petitioner’s right to

counsel and due process violated.

Held: No. The police line-up was not part of the

custodial inquest, hence, petitioner was not yet

entitled, at such stage, to counsel. He had not

been held yet to answer for a criminal offense.

The moment there is a move or even an urge of

said investigators to elicit admissions or

confessions or even plain information which

may appear innocent or innocuous at the time,

from said suspect, he should then and there be

assisted by counsel, unless he waives the right,

but the waiver shall be made in writing and in

the presence of counsel.

On the right to due process, petitioner was not,

in any way, deprived of this substantive and

constitutional right, as he was duly represented

by a counsel. He was accorded all the

opportunities to be heard and to present

evidence to substantiate his defense; only that

he chose not to, and instead opted to file a

Motion to Acquit after the prosecution had

rested its case. What due process abhors is the

absolute lack of opportunity to be heard.

PEOPLE V BARROS

PEOPLE V COMPIL

PEOPLE V SALAS

Facts: At about 6:00 o'clock in the morning of

March 6, 1992, a 60 year old woman, identified

as Virginia Talens was found lying dead in a

canal at Bo. San Nicolas, Mexico, Pampanga;

she was last seen alive at about 3:00 o'clock

early morning of March 6, 1992 by Orlando

Pangan and Richard Pangan who were with her

going home coming from the wake of one

Leonardo Flores; both Orlando and Richard

Pangan testified that accused was with them in

going home at about 3:00 o'clock in the

morning of March 6, 1992; Orlando and Richard

Pangan reached first their house and left the

two on the way and that was the last time

Virginia was seen alive; just a few minutes after

reaching his house and while inside his house,

Orlando Pangan heard a shout; another woman,

one Serafia Gutierrez, testified that she likewise

was awakened by a shout at about 3:00 in the

morning; Dr. Aguda who autopsied the victim

found hematoma on the head and chest, an

abrasion on the left chin and stabwound on the

neck which stabwound, the doctor claims, was

the cause of death of the victim; Police

Investigator Gonzales who immediately

responded upon report, recovered at the scene

a pin, the victim's wristwatch, earring, a ring

and P135.00 money; he likewise found on

March 9, 1992 when he continued his

investigation bloodstain on the front door of

the house of the accused which bloodstain

when submitted for examination was found to

be of human blood; one Resultay was with

Virginia Talens at about 5:00 afternoon of

March 5, 1992 in going to the wake, who claims

that Virginia had money on a purse as while

they were on the way Virginia bet on a jueteng

she saw Virginia got money from her purse a

P500.00 bill but as she had no change she

instead took P8.00 from her other pocket; one

Ramil Talens, a son of the victim corroborated

the claim of Resultay that Virginia had with her

at that time money worth P2,000.00 as in the

morning of March 5, 1992 he gave her mother

for safekeeping the sum of P1,500.00 which he

claims his mother placed in her purse and

claims further that at the wake, he asked and

was given P50.00 by his mother as he also

participated in the gambling thereat, however,

the purse of Virginia containing about P2,000.00

was no longer to be found when she was found

dead; Orlando Pangan saw the accused

gambled in the wake; Virginia likewise gambled

at the wake; accused had been working for

three days before March 6 at Sta. Ana,

Pampanga and up to March 5, 1992, but the

following day, he did not anymore report for

work at Sta. Ana, Pampanga, was no longer to

be found and was last seen at about 3:00

morning together with Virginia Talens on their

way home coming from the wake; the parents

of [the] accused were informed by Investigator

Gonzales that their son was the suspect and

adviced them to surrender him, but since March

6, 1992 when accused left Mexico, Pampanga,

he returned only on September 19, 1992 at

Arayat, Pampanga, not at Mexico, Pampanga

where he was ultimately apprehended by the

Mexico Police on September 22, 1992 after

chancing on a radio message by the police of

Arayat to their Provincial commander that a

vehicular incident occurred at Arayat,

Pampanga where one Elmer Salas was the

victim and was hospitalized at the district

hospital at Arayat, Pampanga where he used

the name of Rommel Salas and not Elmer Salas.

The trial court rendered convicting Salas for

Robbery with Homicide

Issues:

(1) Whether or Not there is evidence sufficient

to sustain a conviction of the appellant of the

crime of Robbery with Homicide.

(2) Whether or Not the appellant’s crime

homicide or robbery with homicide.

Held: There was no eyewitness or direct

evidence; either to the robbery or to the

homicide and none of the things allegedly

stolen were ever recovered. However, direct

evidence is not the only matrix from which the

trial court may draw its findings and conclusion

of culpability. Resort to circumstantial evidence

is essential when to insist on direct testimony

would result in setting felons free.

For circumstantial evidence to be sufficient to

support a conviction, all the circumstances must

be consistent with each other, consistent with

the theory that the accused is guilty of the

offense charged, and at the same time

inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is

innocent and with every other possible, rational

hypothesis excepting that of guilt. All the

circumstances established must constitute an

unbroken chain which leads to one and fair and

reasonable conclusion pointing solely to the

accused, to the exclusion of all other persons,

as the author of the crime. The facts and

circumstances consistent with the guilt of the

accused and inconsistent with his innocence

can constitute evidence which, in weight and

probative value, may be deemed to surpass

even direct evidence in its effect on the court.

The fatal stabbing of Virginia Talens occurred at

around 3:00 a.m. of March 6, 1992. Appellant

hastily abandoned his house in Barrio San

Nicolas, Mexico, Pampanga, his residence since

childhood, on that very date. Appellant was

nowhere when his co-worker and barrio mate,

Eduardo Bagtas, came to appellant's house to

fetch him for work at around 6:30 to 7:00 a.m.

of March 6, 1992. Appellant also abandoned his

job as a painter in Sta. Ana, Pampanga, on

March 6, 1992, the date of the crime, leaving

behind an unfinished painting project. He was

not seen again from said date. Police

investigators found human bloodstains on the

front door of appellant's house, on his clothing,

and on his yellow slippers after the victim was

killed. Despite efforts of the police to find

appellant as the principal suspect, a fact known

to appellant's family and neighbors, appellant

did not present himself to the authorities.

Appellant was apprehended only a full six

months after the date of the crime, following

his confinement in a hospital in Arayat,

Pampanga because he was sideswiped by a

Victory Liner bus in Arayat. When hospitalized,

appellant used the alias Rommel Salas, instead

of his true name Elmer Salas. These

circumstances denote flight, which when

unexplained, has always been considered by the

courts as indicative of guilt.

Both appellant and victim gambled at the wake

they attended. The victim was, in fact, enjoying

a winning streak when her son, Ramil Talens,

came to fetch her but which he failed to do

because his mother was winning, and she

refused to leave. The purse of Talens containing

cash was gone when her corpse was found in

the canal with a stab wound and bruises. What

was left was a safety pin which victim used to

fasten the missing purse to her clothes.

Denial is an inherently weak defense which

must be buttressed by strong evidence of non-

culpability to merit credibility. Denial is negative

and self-serving and cannot be given greater

evidentiary weight over the testimonies of

credible witnesses who positively testified that

appellant was at the locus criminis and was the

last person seen with the victim alive.

The absence of evidence showing any improper

motive on the part of the principal witness for

the prosecution to falsely testify against the

appellant strongly tends to buttress the

conclusion that no such improper motive exists

and that the testimony of said witnesses

deserve full faith and credit.

The essence of voluntary surrender is

spontaneity and the intent of the accused to

give himself up and submit himself

unconditionally to the authorities either

because he acknowledges his guilt or he wants

to save the State the trouble of having to effect

his arrest. Spontaneity and intent to give one's

self up are absent where the accused went into

hiding for six months after the incident and had

to resort to an alias when he was involved in an

accident being investigated by the police

authorities.

Robbery with Homicide is a special complex

crime against property. Homicide is incidental

to the robbery which is the main purpose of the

criminal. In charging Robbery with Homicide,

the onus probandi is to establish: "(a) the taking

of personal property with the use of violence or

intimidation against a person; (b) the property

belongs to another; (c) the taking is

characterized with animus lucrandi; and (d) on

the occasion of the robbery or by reason

thereof, the crime of homicide, which is used in

the generic sense, was committed." Although

there was no witness as to the actual robbing of

the victim, there is testimony that the victim

had more or less P2,000.00; and wore gold

earrings valued at P750.00. These were never

recovered.

While there is indeed no direct proof that

Virginia Talens was robbed at the time she was

killed, we may conclude from four

circumstances that the robbery occasioned her

killing: (1) Both appellant and victim gambled at

the wake. (2) The appellant knew that victim

was winning. (3) The victim was last seen alive

with appellant. (4) The victim's purse containing

her money and earrings were missing from her

body when found.

The decision of the regional trial court is

affirmed. Costs against appellant. So ordered.

PEOPLE V OBSANIA

Facts: The accused was charged with Robbery

with Rape before the Municipal Court of

Balungao, Pangasinan. He pleaded not guilty.

His counsel moved for the dismissal of the

charge for failure to allege vivid designs in the

info. Said motion was granted. From this order

of dismissal the prosecution appealed.

Issue: Whether or Not the present appeal

places the accused in Double Jeopardy.

Held: In order that the accused may invoke

double jeopardy, the following requisites must

have obtained in the original prosecution, a)

valid complaint, b) competent court, c) the

defendant had pleaded to the charge, d)

defendant was acquitted or convicted or the

case against him was dismissed or otherwise

terminated without his express consent.

In the case at bar, the converted dismissal was

ordered by the Trial Judge upon the defendant's

motion to dismiss. The “doctrine of double

jeopardy” as enunciated in P.vs. Salico applies

to wit when the case is dismissed with the

express consent of the defendant, the dismissal

will not be a bar to another prosecution for the

same offense because his action in having the

case is dismissed constitutes a waiver of his

constitutional right/privilege for the reason that

he thereby prevents the Court from proceeding

to the trial on the merits and rendering a

judgment of conviction against him.

In essence, where a criminal case is dismissed

provisionally not only with the express consent

of the accused but even upon the urging of his

counsel there can be no double jeopardy under

Sect. 9 Rule 113, if the indictment against him is

revived by the fiscal.

PEOPLE V FERRER

The Government is appealing from an order of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, dismissing the case against the Defendant Cornelio Ferrer for acts of lasciviousness, on a motion to quash filed by him.

Cornelio Ferrer was charged with acts of lasciviousness in the Justice of the Peace Court of Asia, Negros Occidental on the basis of a written complaint, later amended filed by the offended party, Perla Engcoy. After the corresponding preliminary investigation, the Justice of the Peace Court finding “probable cause that the offense charged has been committed and that the Defendant is probably guilty,” elevated the case to the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, where the case was tried on February 15, 1955. After the prosecution had rested its case, the hearing was adjourned to March 1, 1955. In the meantime, on February 24 of the same year, the accused filed a motion to quash on the ground that the jurisdiction of the trial court to try the case had not been established for the reason that the evidence for the prosecution merely tended to prove that the acts of lasciviousness were committed in the house of the offended party, without showing where that house is situated. The prosecution filed a written opposition to the motion to quash, and the defense filed a reply to said opposition, after which the trial court by order of March 23, 1955, granted the motion to quash and dismissed the case with costs de oficio.

We have examined the record of the case, particularly, the testimony of the offended party and that of the Chief of Police and we are fully convinced that the prosecution had established the jurisdiction of the trial court, that is to say, that the offense charged was committed in the town of Asia, Province of

Negros Occidental. In the first place, the complaint and amended complaint both under oath, filed by the offended party in the Justice of the Peace Court allege that the acts of lasciviousness were committed against her in her house in the poblacion of the Municipality of Asia, Province of Negros Occidental. In the second place, testifying as a witness at the trial, she gave as her residence the town of Asia, Negros Occidental. Then she testified that the acts of lasciviousness were committed on her person in her house. (pp. 6, 7, 11, t.s.n.) As the Solicitor General says, in the absence of proof that she had more than one house, it is presumed that the crime was committed in her house in Asia, Negros Occidental, within the jurisdiction of the trial court. Then we have the testimony of Celestino Regala, Chief of Police of Asia, wherein he declared that he received the complaint filed by Perla Engcoy against Cornelio Ferrer; chan roblesvirtualawlibrarythat he made the corresponding investigation, specially since the accused was one of his policemen, charged with having committed acts of lasciviousness against the offended party, Perla, in her own house, and he asserted that the distance of said house from the Municipal building of Asia is around 200 yards. (pp. 72-83, t s. n.) With all this evidence, we cannot understand how the trial court could say that the prosecution had not established its jurisdiction to try the case.

Unfortunately, however, we believe that the Government however meritorious its case cannot appeal the order of dismissal without violating the right of the Defendant not to be placed in double jeopardy. The accused herein has not filed a brief on appeal raising this question of double jeopardy. Nevertheless, Rule 118, Section 2 the Rule of Court provides:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary “The People of the Philippines cannot appeal if the Defendant would be placed thereby in double jeopardy,” and we have to give force and effect to said rule. Here, the Defendant had already been arraigned and he entered his plea, and the trial had begun, and the prosecution had rested its case. We hold that the appeal of the

Government from the order of dismissal would place the accused in double jeopardy.

We find the present case to be one of miscarriage of justice because the accused was practically acquitted with out considering the merits of the case, all due, unfortunately, to the error of the trial court. However, this Tribunal finds itself helpless to correct the error and must respect and enforce the right of the accused granted by law and guaranteed by the Constitution.

Without anticipating or advancing any opinion as to the innocence or guilt of the accused, since he is a municipal policeman, it is suggested that he be subjected to an administrative investigation. Let copies of this decision be furnished the office of the President and the Municipal Council of Asia, Negros Occidental.

In view of the foregoing, the appeal filed on behalf of the Government is hereby dismissed with costs de oficio.

ESMANA V POGOY

Facts: Petitioners Esmeña and Alba were

charged with grave coercion in the Court of

Cebu City for allegedly forcing Fr. Thomas

Tibudan to withdraw a sum of money worth

P5000 from the bank to be given to them

because the priest lost in a game of chance.

During arraignment, petitioners pleaded “Not

Guilty”. No trial came in after the arraignment

due to the priest’s request to move it on

another date. Sometime later Judge Pogoy

issued an order setting the trial Aug.16,1979

but the fiscal informed the court that it received

a telegram stating that the complainant was

sick. The accused invoked their right to speedy

trial. Respondent judge dismissed the case

because the trial was already dragging the

accused and that the priest’s telegram did not

have a medical certificate attached to it in order

for the court to recognize the complainant’s

reason to be valid in order to reschedule again

another hearing. After 27 days the fiscal filed a

motion to revive the case and attached the

medical certificate of the priest proving the fact

that the priest was indeed sick of influenza. On

Oct.24,1979, accused Esmeña and Alba filed a

motion to dismiss the case on the ground of

double jeopardy.

Issue: Whether or Not the revival of grave

coercion case, which was dismissed earlier due

to complainant’s failure to appear at the trial,

would place the accused in double jeopardy

Held: Yes, revival of the case will put the

accused in double jeopardy for the very reason

that the case has been dismissed already

without the consent of the accused which

would have an effect of an acquittal on the case

filed. The dismissal was due to complainant’s

incapability to present its evidence due to non

appearance of the witnesses and complainant

himself which would bar further prosecution of

the defendant for the same offense. For double

jeopardy to exist these three requisites should

be present, that one, there is a valid complaint

or information filed second, that it is done

before a court of competent jurisdiction and

third, that the accused has been arraigned and

has pleaded to the complaint or information. In

the case at bar, all three conditions were

present, as the case filed was grave coercion,

filed in a court of competent jurisdiction as to

where the coercion took place and last the

accused were arraigned and has pleaded to the

complaint or the information. When these three

conditions are present then the acquittal,

conviction of the accused, and the dismissal or

termination of the case without his express

consent constitutes res judicata and is a bar to

another prosecution for the offense charged. In

the case, it was evidently shown that the

accused invoked their right to a speedy trial and

asked for the trial of the case and not its

termination which would mean that

respondents had no expressed consent to the

dismissal of the case which would make the

case filed res judicata and has been dismissed

by the competent court in order to protect the

respondents as well for their right to speedy

trial which will be equivalent to acquittal of the

respondents which would be a bar to further

prosecution.

PEOPLE V CITY COURT OF SILAY

Facts: That sometime on January 4,1974,

accused Pacifico Sensio, Romeo Millan and

Wilfredo Jochico who were then scalers at the

Hawaiian-Philippine Company, weighed cane

cars No.1743,1686 and 1022 loaded with sugar

canes which were placed in tarjetas (weight

report cards), Apparently, it was proven and

shown that there was padding of the weight of

the sugar canes and that the information on the

tarjetas were to be false making it appear to be

heavier than its actual weight. The three

accused then were charged with “Falsification

by private individuals and use of falsified

document”. After the prosecution had

presented, the respondent moved to dismiss

the charge against them on the ground that the

evidences presented were not sufficient to

establish their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

Acting on the motion, respondent court issued

its order dismissing the case on the ground that

the acts committed by the accused do not

constituted the crime of falsification as strictly

enumerated in the revised penal code defining

the crime of falsification which was charged

earlier and that their case be dismissed. People

asserts that the plea of double jeopardy is not

tenable even if the case at bar was dismissed

because according to them, it was done with

the consent of the accused therefore waiving

there defense of double jeopardy. The accused

on the other hand, reiterated the fact that the

dismissal was due to lack of merits of the

prosecution which would have the same effect

as an acquittal which will bar the prosecution

from prosecuting the accused for it will be

unjust and unconstitutional for the accused due

to double jeopardy rule thus the appeal of the

plaintiff.

Issue: Whether or Not the grant of petition by

the court would place the accused Sensio,

Millan and Jochico in double jeopardy

Held: Yes the revival of the case will put the

accused in double jeopardy for the very reason

that the case has been dismissed earlier due to

lack of merits. It is true that the criminal case of

falsification was dismissed on a motion of the

accused however this was a motion filed after

the prosecution had rested its case, calling for

the evidence beyond reasonable ground which

the prosecution had not been able to do which

would be tantamount to acquittal therefore will

bar the prosecution of another case. As it was

stated on the requirements of a valid defense of

double jeopardy it says: That there should be a

valid complaint, second would be that such

complaint be filed before a competent court

and to which the accused has pleaded and that

defendant was previously acquitted, convicted

or dismissed or otherwise terminated without

express consent of the accused in which were

all present in the case at bar. There was indeed

a valid, legitimate complaint and concern

against the accused Sensio, Millan and Jochico

which was filed at a competent court with

jurisdiction on the said case. It was also

mentioned that the accused pleaded not guilty

and during the time of trial, it was proven that

the case used against the accused were not

sufficient to prove them guilty beyond

reasonable doubt therefore dismissing the case

which translates to acquittal. It explained

further that there are two instances when we

can conclude that there is jeopardy when first is

that the ground for the dismissal of the case

was due to insufficiency of evidence and

second, when the proceedings have been

reasonably prolonged as to violate the right of

the accused to a speedy trial. In the 2 requisites

given, it was the first on that is very much

applicable to our case at bar where there was

dismissal of the case due to insufficiency of

evidence which will bar the approval of the

petition in the case at bar for it will constitute

double jeopardy on the part of the accused

which the law despises.

SALCEDO V MENDOZA

DE LA TORRE V CA

ALBERTO V CA

CITIZENSHIP

LABO V COMELEC

FACTS: Herein petitioner, claiming for recognition as a Philippine citizen is a mayor-elect who, through his marriage with an Australian national, was naturalized and took an oath of allegiance as an Australian citizen. Said marriage was found to be bigamous and therefore was annulled. Petitioner claims that his naturalization made him only a dual national and did not divest him of his Philippine citizenship.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner was divested of his Philippine citizenship.

HELD: Yes, because Commonwealth Act No. 63 clearly stated that Philippine citizenship may be lost through naturalization in a foreign country; express renunciation of citizenship; and by oath of allegiance to a foreign country, all of which are applicable to the petitioner.

FRIVALDO V COMELEC

FACTS: Juan G. Frivaldo was proclaimed governor of the province of Sorsogon and assumed office in due time. The League of Municipalities filed with the COMELEC a petition for the annulment of Frivaldo on the ground that he was not a Filipino citizen, having been naturalized in the United States. Frivaldo admitted the allegations but pleaded the special and affirmative defenses that he was naturalized as American citizen only to protect himself against President Marcos during the Martial Law era. ISSUE: Whether or not Frivaldo is a Filipino citizen. RULING:

No. Section 117 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that a qualified voter must be, among other qualifications, a citizen of the Philippines, this being an indispensable requirement for suffrage under Article V, Section 1, of the Constitution. He claims that he has reacquired Philippine citizenship by virtue of valid repatriation. He claims that by actively participating in the local elections, he automatically forfeited American citizenship under the laws of the United States of America. The Court stated that that the alleged forfeiture was between him and the US. If he really wanted to drop his American citizenship, he could do so in accordance with CA No. 63 as amended by CA No. 473 and PD 725. Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by naturalization, or by repatriation.

MERCADO V MANZANO

Facts:Petitioners filed for respondent’s disqualification for election alleging that respondent is a dual citizen, and under the Local Government Code, dual citizens cannot run for public office.

Respondent is a son of both Filipinos but was born in the U.S which follows the principle of jus soli, hence, considered an American citizen as well.

COMELEC allowed Manzano to run because he was considered natural-born because of the vrtue that he is a son of both Filipino citizens but petitioners assail this.

Issue: Is respondent Manzano a dual citizen and cannot run for public office?

Ruling: The Court first defined dual citizenship and compared it to dual allegiance.

Dual citizenship arises when a person whose parents are citizens of a state that follows jus saguinis and was born in a state that follows jus soli, hence, resulting to a concurrent application of different two laws or more.

On the other hand, dual allegiance is a situation whre a person simultaneously owes loyalty to two or more states.

In this case, Respondent, though dual citizen, his act of filing a certificate of candidacy tantamount to his election of Phil. citizenship – meaning he forswears allegiance to the other country and thereby terminating their status as dual.

The Court stressed that participating in the election is an express renunciation of American citizenship.

BANGZON V HRET

FACTS: The citizenship of respondent Cruz is at issue in this case, in view of the constitutional requirement that “no person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen.”

Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was born in Tarlac in 1960 of Filipino parents. In 1985, however, Cruz enlisted in the US Marine Corps and without the consent of the Republic of the Philippines, took an oath of allegiance to the USA. As a Consequence, he lost his Filipino citizenship for under CA No. 63 [(An Act Providing for the Ways in Which Philippine Citizenship May Be Lost or Reacquired (1936)] section 1(4), a Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship by, among other, “rendering service to or accepting commission in the armed forces of a foreign country.”

Whatever doubt that remained regarding his loss of Philippine citizenship was erased by his naturalization as a U.S. citizen in 1990, in connection with his service in the U.S. Marine Corps.

In 1994, Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship through repatriation under RA 2630 [(An Act Providing for Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship by Persons Who Lost Such Citizenship by Rendering Service To, or Accepting Commission In, the Armed Forces of the United States (1960)]. He ran for and was elected as the Representative of the 2nd District of Pangasinan in the 1998 elections. He won over petitioner Bengson who was then running for reelection.

Subsequently, petitioner filed a case for Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam with respondent HRET claiming that Cruz was not qualified to become a member of the HOR since he is not a natural-born citizen as required under Article VI, section 6 of the Constitution. HRET rendered its decision dismissing the petition for quo warranto and declaring Cruz the duly elected Representative in the said election.

ISSUE: WON Cruz, a natural-born Filipino who became an American citizen, can still be considered a natural-born Filipino upon his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.

HELD: petition dismissed

YES

Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however reacquire the same in the manner provided by law. C.A. No. 63 enumerates the 3 modes by which Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by a former citizen: 1. by naturalization, 2. by repatriation, and 3. by direct act of Congress. **

Repatriation may be had under various statutes by those who lost their citizenship due to: 1. desertion of the armed forces; 2. services in the armed forces of the allied forces in World War II; 3. service in the Armed Forces of the United States at any other time, 4. marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien; and 5. political economic necessity

Repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality This means that a naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino.

R.A. No. 2630 provides: Sec 1. Any person who had lost his Philippine citizenship by rendering service to, or accepting commission in, the Armed Forces of the United States, or after separation from the Armed Forces of the United States, acquired United States citizenship, may reacquire Philippine citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registering the same with Local Civil Registry in the place where he resides or last resided in the Philippines. The said oath of allegiance shall contain a renunciation of any other citizenship.

Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the Republic and having registered the same in the Civil Registry of Magantarem, Pangasinan in accordance with the aforecited provision, Cruz is deemed to have recovered his original status as a natural-born citizen, a status which he acquired at birth as the son of a Filipino father. It bears stressing that the act of repatriation allows him to recover, or return to, his original status before he lost his Philippine citizenship.

MACALINTAL V COMELEC

Romulo Macalintal, as a lawyer and a taxpayer, questions the validity of the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003 (R.A. 9189). He questions the validity of the said act on the following grounds, among others:

1. That the provision that a Filipino already considered an immigrant abroad can be allowed to participate in absentee voting provided he executes an affidavit stating his intent to return to the Philippines is void because it dispenses of the requirement that a voter must be a resident of the Philippines for at least one year and in the place where he intends to vote for at least 6 months immediately preceding the election;

2. That the provision allowing the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to proclaim winning candidates insofar as it affects the canvass of votes and proclamation of winning candidates for president and vice-president, is unconstitutional because it violates the Constitution for it is Congress which is empowered to do so.

ISSUE: Whether or not Macalintal’s arguments are correct.

HELD: No.

1. There can be no absentee voting if the absentee voters are required to physically reside in the Philippines within the period required for non-absentee voters. Further, as understood in election laws, domicile and resident are interchangeably used. Hence, one is a resident of his domicile (insofar as election laws is concerned). The domicile is the place where one has the intention to return to. Thus, an immigrant who executes an affidavit stating his intent to return to the Philippines is considered a resident of the Philippines for purposes of being

qualified as a voter (absentee voter to be exact). If the immigrant does not execute the affidavit then he is not qualified as an absentee voter.

2. The said provision should be harmonized. It could not be the intention of Congress to allow COMELEC to include the proclamation of the winners in the vice-presidential and presidential race. To interpret it that way would mean that Congress allowed COMELEC to usurp its power. The canvassing and proclamation of the presidential and vice presidential elections is still lodged in Congress and was in no way transferred to the COMELEC by virtue of RA 9189.

NICOLAS-LEWIS V COMELEC

Facts: Petitioners were dual citizens by virtue of RA 9225. Petitioners sought to avail their right of suffrage under RA 9189 or the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003. Comelec, however, did not allow petitioners to vote in the 2004 election, reasoning the petitioners faield to comply with the requirement of 1-year residency prior the elections as provided for under Article 5, Sec 1 of the Constitution. Issue: Whether or not petitioners may participate in the election sans the compliance of the 1 year residency. Ruling: The Court held that those who retained or reacquired their citizenship under RA 9225 may exercise their right to vote under the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003, RA 9189. Article 5, Section 2 of the Constitution provides for the exception to the residency requirement in Section 1 of the same article. The voting mechanism in RA 9189 was practically set forth

to provide a system wherein Filipinos of dual citizenship and are, at the same time, not residing in the Philippines are empowered to vote. The Court held that present day duals may now exercise their right of suffrage provided they meet the requirements under Section 1, Article V of the Constitution in relation to R.A. 9189

CALILUNG V DATUMANONG

FACTS:

Petitioner prays for a writ of prohibition be

issued to stop respondent from implementing

RA 9225, or Act Making the Citizenship of the

Philippine Citizens Who Acquire Foreign

Citizenship Permanent, Amending for the

Purpose Commonwealth Act No. 63, as

Amended, and for Other Purposes. Petitioner

avers that said Act is unconstitutional as it

violates Section 5, Article IV of the 1987

Constitution: "Dual allegiance of citizens is

inimical to the national interest and shall be

dealt with by law."

ISSUE:

Whether or not RA 9225 is unconstitutional by

recognizing and allowing dual allegiance.

RULING:

No. Section 5, Article IV of the Constitution is a

declaration of policy and is not self-executing

provision.

What RA 9225 does is to allow dual citizenship

to natural-born Filipino citizens who have lost

their Philippine citizenship, by reason of

naturalization as citizens of a foreign country. In

its face, it does not recognize dual allegiance.

VALLES V COMELEC

FACTS: Petitioner filed a petition and prays that a writ of prohibition be issued to stop respondent from implementing Republic Act No. 9225, entitled "An Act Making the Citizenship of Philippine Citizens Who Acquire Foreign Citizenship Permanent, Amending for the Purpose Commonwealth Act No. 63, As Amended, and for Other Purposes" which he avers that Rep. Act No. 9225 is unconstitutional as it violates Section 5, Article IV of the 1987 Constitution that states, "Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law." R.A. 9225: SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy.-It is hereby declared the policy of the State that all Philippine citizens who become citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship under the conditions of this Act. SEC. 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship.-Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, natural-born citizens of the Philippines who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are hereby deemed to have reacquired Philippine citizenship upon taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic. ISSUES: (1) Is Rep. Act No. 9225 unconstitutional? (2) Does this Court have jurisdiction to pass upon the issue of dual allegiance? RULING: No. Section 5, Article IV of the Constitution is a declaration of a policy and it is not a self-executing provision. What Rep. Act No. 9225 does is allow dual citizenship to natural-born Filipino citizens who have lost Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country. On its face, it does not recognize dual allegiance. By swearing to the supreme authority of the Republic, the person implicitly renounces his foreign citizenship. Plainly, from Section 3, Rep. Act No. 9225 stayed clear out of the problem of dual allegiance and shifted the burden of confronting the issue of whether or not there is

dual allegiance to the concerned foreign country. What happens to the other citizenship was not made a concern of Rep. Act No. 9225. On the other hand, Congress was given a mandate to draft a law that would set specific parameters of what really constitutes dual allegiance. Until this is done, it would be premature for the judicial department, including this Court, to rule on issues pertaining to dual allegiance. PETITION is DISMISSED For lack of merit.

JAPZON V COMELEC

Facts: Ø Both petitioner Manuel B. Japzon (Japzon) and

private respondent Jaime S. Ty (Ty) were candidates for the Office of Mayor of the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, in the local elections held on 14 May 2007.

Ø Japzon instituted SPA No. 07-568 by filing before the COMELEC a Petition[5] to disqualify and/or cancel Ty's Certificate of Candidacy on the ground of material misrepresentation. Japzon averred in his Petition that Ty was a former natural-born Filipino, having been born on 9 October 1943 in what was then Pambujan Sur, Hernani Eastern Samar (now the Municipality of General Macarthur, Easter Samar) to spouses Ang Chim Ty (a Chinese) and Crisanta Aranas Sumiguin (a Filipino).

Ø Ty eventually migrated to the United States of America (USA) and became a citizen thereof. Ty had been residing in the USA for the last 25 years. When Ty filed his Certificate of Candidacy on 28 March 2007, he falsely represented therein that he was a resident of Barangay6, Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, for one year before 14 May 2007, and was not a permanent resident or immigrant of any foreign country.

Ø While Ty may have applied for the reacquisition of his Philippine citizenship, he never actually resided in Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, for a period of one year immediately preceding the date of election

as required under Section 39 of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991

Ø Inspite of having reacquisition in his Philippine citizenship, Ty continued to make trips to the USA, the most recent of which was on 31 October 2006 lasting until 20 January 2007.

Ø Ty already took his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, he continued to comport himself as an American citizen as proven by his travel records. He had also failed to renounce his foreign citizenship as required by Republic Act No. 9225, otherwise known as the Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003, or related laws.

Ø Japzon prayed for in his Petition that the COMELEC order the disqualification of Ty from running for public office and the cancellation of the latter's Certificate of Candidacy.

Ø Ty admitted that he was a natural-born Filipino who went to the USA to work and subsequently became a naturalized American citizen. Ty claimed, however, that prior to filing his Certificate of Candidacy for the Office of Mayor of the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, on 28 March 2007, he already performed the following acts: (1) with the enactment of Republic Act No. 9225, granting dual citizenship to natural-born Filipinos, Ty filed with the Philippine Consulate General in Los Angeles, California, USA, an application for the reacquisition of his Philippine citizenship; (2) on 2 October 2005, Ty executed an Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines before Noemi T. Diaz, Vice Consul of the Philippine Consulate General in Los Angeles, California, USA; (3) Ty applied for a Philippine passport indicating in his application that his residence in the Philippines was at A. Mabini St., Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar. Ty's application was approved and he was issued on 26 October 2005 a Philippine passport; (4) on 8 March 2006, Ty personally secured and signed his Community Tax Certificate (CTC) from the Municipality of General Macarthur, in which he stated that his address was at Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar; (5) thereafter, on 17

July 2006, Ty was registered as a voter in Precinct 0013A, Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar; (6) Ty secured another CTC dated 4 January 2007 again stating therein his address as Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar; and (7) finally, Ty executed on 19 March 2007 a duly notarized Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship.

Ø He had reacquired his Philippine citizenship and renounced his American citizenship, and he had been a resident of the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, for more than one year prior to the 14 May 2007 elections. Therefore, Ty sought the dismissal of Japzon's Petition in SPA No. 07-568. Ty acquired the highest number of votes and was declared Mayor of the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, by the Municipal Board of Canvassers on 15 May 2007.[7]

Ø The COMELEC First Division found that Ty complied with the requirements of Sections 3 and 5 of Republic Act No. 9225 and reacquired his Philippine citizenship, to wit: Philippine citizenship is an indispensable requirement for holding an elective public office, and the purpose of the citizenship qualification is none other than to ensure that no alien, i.e., no person owing allegiance to another nation, shall govern our people and our country or a unit of territory thereof.

Ø Evidences revealed that Ty executed an Oath of Allegiance before Noemi T. Diaz, Vice Consul of the Philippine Consulate General, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A. on October 2, 2005 and executed a Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship on March 19, 2007 in compliance with R.A. [No.] 9225. Moreover, neither is Ty a candidate for or occupying public office nor is in active service as commissioned or non-commissioned officer in the armed forces in the country of which he was naturalized citizen

Ø Ty did not commit material misrepresentation in stating in his Certificate of Candidacy that he was a resident of Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, for at least one year before the elections on 14 May 2007. It reasoned that: Although Ty has lost

his domicile in [the] Philippines when he was naturalized as U.S. citizen in 1969, the reacquisition of his Philippine citizenship and subsequent acts thereof proved that he has been a resident of Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar for at least one (1) year before the elections held on 14 May 2007 as he represented in his certificate of candidacy.

Ø The petition was denied and COMELEC was in favor of the defendant failing to obtain a favorable resolution from the COMELEC, Japzon proceeded to file the instant Petition for Certiorari, that the COMELEC had committed grave abuse of discretion and lack of discretion for dismissing the petition.

Ø Japzon prays for the Court to annul and set aside the Resolutions dated 31 July 2007 and 28 September 2007 of the COMELEC First Division and en banc, respectively; to issue a new resolution denying due course to or canceling Ty's Certificate of Candidacy; and to declare Japzon as the duly elected Mayor of the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar.

Ø Ty sought the dismissal of the present Petition. According to Ty, the COMELEC already found sufficient evidence to prove that Ty was a resident of the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, one year prior to the 14 May 2007 local elections. The Court cannot evaluate again the very same pieces of evidence without violating the well-entrenched rule that findings of fact of the COMELEC are binding on the Court.

Ø The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), meanwhile, is of the position that Ty failed to meet the one-year residency requirement set by law to qualify him to run as a mayoralty candidate in the 14 May 2007 local elections.The Court finds no merit in the Petition at bar.

Ø . On 19 March 2007, he personally executed a Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship before a notary public. By the time he filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the Office of Mayor of the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, on 28 March 2007, he had already

effectively renounced his American citizenship, keeping solely his Philippine citizenship.

Ø The Court of Appeals set aside the appealed orders of the COMELEC and the Court of Appeals and annulled the election of the respondent as Municipal Mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan on the ground that respondent's immigration to the United States in 1984 constituted an abandonment of his domicile and residence in the Philippines. Being a green card holder, which was proof that he was a permanent resident or immigrant of the United States, and in the absence of any waiver of his status as such before he ran for election on January 18, 1988, respondent was held to be disqualified under §68 of the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines (Batas Pambansa Blg. 881). ISSUE: Whether or not the defedant has complied with the residency requirement for elective positions. RULING: Yes, the defendant solely complied the residency requirements for elective position.

Ø It bears to point out that Republic Act No. 9225 governs the manner in which a natural-born Filipino may reacquire or retain[17] his Philippine citizenship despite acquiring a foreign citizenship, and provides for his rights and liabilities under such circumstances. A close scrutiny of said statute would reveal that it does not at all touch on the matter of residence of the natural-born Filipino taking advantage of its provisions. Republic Act No. 9225 imposes no residency requirement for the reacquisition or retention of Philippine citizenship; nor does it mention any effect of such reacquisition or retention of Philippine citizenship on the current residence of the concerned natural-born Filipino. Clearly, Republic Act No. 9225 treats citizenship independently of residence.

This is only logical and consistent with the general intent of the law to allow for dual citizenship.

Ø There is no basis for this Court to require Ty to stay in and never leave at all the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, for the full one-year period prior to the 14 May 2007 local elections so that he could be considered a resident thereof. To the contrary, the Court has previously ruled that absence from residence to pursue studies or practice a profession or registration as a voter other than in the place where one is elected, does not constitute loss of residence.[24] The Court also notes, that even with his trips to other countries, Ty was actually present in the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, Philippines, for at least nine of the 12 months preceding the 14 May 2007 local elections. Even if length of actual stay in a place is not necessarily determinative of the fact of residence therein, it does strongly support and is only consistent with Ty's avowed intent in the instant case to establish residence/domicile in the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar.

Ø Japzon repeatedly brings to the attention of this Court that Ty arrived in the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, on 4 May 2006 only to comply with the one-year residency requirement, so Ty could run as a mayoralty candidate in the 14 May 2007 elections. In Aquino v. COMELEC,[25] the Court did not find anything wrong in an individual changing residences so he could run for an elective post, for as long as he is able to prove with reasonable certainty that he has effected a change of residence for election law purposes for the period required by law. As this Court already found in the present case, Ty has proven by substantial evidence that he had established residence/domicile in the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, by 4 May 2006, a little over a year prior to the 14 May 2007 local elections, in which he ran as a candidate for the Office of the Mayor and in which he garnered the most number of votes.

Ø To successfully challenge Ty's disqualification, Japzon must clearly demonstrate that Ty's ineligibility is so patently antagonistic to constitutional and legal principles that overriding such ineligibility and thereby giving effect to the apparent will of the people would ultimately create greater prejudice to the very democratic institutions and juristic traditions that our Constitution and laws so zealously protect and promote. In this case, Japzon failed to substantiate his claim that Ty is ineligible to be Mayor of the Municipality, the instant Petition for Certiorari is dismiss.