armor magazine, july-august 1990

8/6/2019 Armor Magazine, July-August 1990

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We tend to love heroes. Tina Turner even nor were they gifted with moral s1puts to song her need for one. And it doesn'tmatter if reality fails to provide a bountiful crop When they entered combat in Norlfrom which to choose, because we'll make they were members of a new organizithem up in a heartbeat. We'll even impart mys- combined arms armored division, attical super powers to their personas to help ment, untried in battle. Their organizati

above that of the common man.

. .them overcome the forcesof evil, while they provideexamples of the right thingto do through their effortsto triumph in the end. Andtriumph they do, becausetheir morality requires it.

As General Patton said,"Americans love a winnerand will not tolerate aloser." The truth of thatstatement runs so deepthat we are willing to avertour eyes to moral lapses,and in some cases, likeBonnie and Clyde, ButchCassidy, and Jesse James,we are willing to go the o p

ne.-posite direction and ignore total moralbankruptcy to portray them as heroes whohave merely taken on the system and lost.World War 11 furnished us a spate of heroesthe likes of Audie Murphy, Pappy Boyington,and Leon Johnson. Their individual heroismhas been well documented. But we do nothave to look far to find our own breed ofheroes, though most of them remain un-adorned by history's effort to make famoustheir individual faces and deeds. They werethe soldiers of the 1st and 2nd ArmoredDivisions - they possessed no super powers,

By Order of the Secretary of the Army:CARL E. WON0General, United States ArmyChief of Staff

tics, and equiprmuch of it not asthe Germans' -been tested on thcof Tennessee iCarolinas. This wajob-training at itsThey paid dearlyfor the lessonsthat would result irganizations, tactiequipment emplcsubsequentdivisions. Throu!severence in theharsh odds, bloaand not a few teovercame initialand triumphed inOne of their leaders, a hero's hero,I.D. White has stood the last roll call a'actly 50 years after he helped form t t(see p. 50).We don't have to invent our herimbue them with special powers. \only look to historical records to findblood heroes like I . D. White and thcof "Old Ironsides" and "Hell on Wheels

Dick Tracy was a neat guy. But Itank with the best of

Official:WILLIAM J. MEEHAN IIBrigadier General, United States ArmyThe Adjutant General


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The Professional Development Bulletin of the Armor Branch PB-17-90-4Editor-in-ChiefMAJOR PATRICK J. COONEYManaging EditorJON T. CLEMENSCommandantMG THOMAS C. FOLEYARMOR (ISSN 0004-2420) is published

bimonthly by the US. Army Armor Center, 4401Vine Grove Road, Fort Knox, KY 40121.Disclaimer: The information contained inARMOR represents the professional opinions ofthe authors and does not necessarily reflect theofficial Army or TRADOC position, nor does itchange or supersede any informationpresented in other official Army publications.

Official distribution is limited to one copy foreach heavy brigade headquarters, armoredcavalry regiment headquarters, armor battalionheadquarters, armored cavalry squadron head-quarters, reconnaissance squadron head-quarters, armored cavalry troop, armor com-pany, and motorized brigade headquarters ofthe United States Army. In addition, Armylibraries, Army and DOD schools, HQ DA andMACOM staff agencies with responsibility or ar-mored, direct fire, ground combat systems, or-ganizations, and the training of personnel forsuch organizations may request two copies bysending a military letter to the editor-inchief.

Authorized Content: ARMOR wil l print onlythose materials for which the U.S. Army ArmorCenter has proponency. That proponency in-cludes: all armored, direct-fire ground combatsystems that do not serve primarily as infantrycarriers; all weapons used exclusively in thesesystems or by CMF 19-series enlisted soldiers;any miscellaneous items of equipment whicharmor and armored cavalry organizations useexclusively; training for al l SC 12A, 128, and12C officers and for all CMF-1Qseries enlistedsoldiers; and information concerning the train-ing, logistics, history, and leadership of armorand armored cavalry units at the brigadehegi-ment level and below, to include Threat units atthose levels.Material may be reprinted, provided credit isgiven to ARMOR and to the author, exceptwhere copyright is indicated.

July-August1990, Vol XCIX No. 4

Features7

1217212430

36

414350

The Combat Reconnaissance Detachm entIn the Meeting Engagement and Defenseby Major Bryan L.OliverSix Imperatives for the Armor Forceby General Carl E. Vuono"Old Ironsides" - First Into Rom eby ARMOR Staff"Hell on Wheels" Rolled From Africa to Berlinby ARMOR StaffLearning the Hard Wayby Captain RichardS. FaulknerThe Regional Threatby Lieutenant Colonel John K. Boles 11 1and Captain Vincent C. SchmollLight Cavalry in the 10th Mountain Divisionby Captain Jeff Witsken and Captain Lee MacTaggatt120-mm Tank Gun System Safetyby Directorate of Total Armor Force ReadinessThe Abuse of Paragraph 3Aby Major Scott StephensonIn Mem ory (General 1. D. White)

Departments2 Letters2 Contacts4 Commander's Hatch5 Armor Force Reduction Update6 Driver's Seat

48 Bustle Rack51 Books

Second-class omclal mail postage paid at Fort Knox, KY. and addillonal rnaiilng offices. Postmaster:Send address changes to Editor. ARMOR, A m TSB-AM, Fort Knox. KY 40121-5210.

Distrlbution Restriction: Approved for public release: distribution is unlirnlled.USPS 487-970


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Scouts Need StingersOnly for SelfdefenseDear Sir:There are some soldiers in the field who

have misconceived ideas surrounding theability of the battalion scout to positivelyidentify, acquire, and engage hostileaircraft wlth the nondedicated Stinger. Iread in anguish the letter in the January-February 1990 issue of ARMOR titled,"Noh-dedicated Stinger Gunners Wouldn'tBeAs Effective, Air Defense Chief Argues."

Let us set the record straight! The art ofstealth reconnaissance implies the

deliberate actions of the scout to preventhis opponent from finding him. The busi-ness of reconnaissance and information-gathering mandates that battalion scoutsmaximize their abil ity to remain un-detected while executing the mission. Inview of this fact, battalion scouts employMan-Portable Air Defense Systems (MAN-PADS) only in their own selfdefenseagainst a hostile attacking air threat. Theintent is not to improve the air defense ofthe maneuver forces, which the letter sug-gests.

Certainly, it is not in the best interest ofthe commander to have his forward recon-naissance elements actively seeking hos-

tile aircraft. Nor Is it his intent todeliberately integrate the Stinger missilescarried by the scouts into his active airdefense plan. The dedicated ADA-support-ing unit is the focal point of that plan. Non-dedicated MANPADS do not replace exist-ing ADA MANPADS. On the contrary, theyare an addition to the dedicated ADA sup-port. Employing Stinger as an "after-effectof deploying the scout" is not even anissue here. Indeed, scouts with Stingersoften provide the only air defense avail-able to the reconnaissance force.

Let us now focus on the level ofproficiency the battalion scout must main-tain to employ Stinger effectivelyand safe-

(Note: Fort Knox AUTOVON prefix is 464.DIRECTORY- Points Of Contact Commercial prefix is ke a m e 02-624->000().ARM O R Editorial Offices

Editor-in-ChiefMajor Patrick J. CooneyManaging EditorJon T. ClemensEditorial AssistantVivian ThompsonProduction AssistantMary HagerContributing ArtistSPC Jody Harmon

22492249261026102610

MAILING ADDR ESS ARMOR, ATTN: ATSB-AM, Fort Kaox, KY 40121-5210.ARTICLE SUBMISSIONS To improve speed andaccuracy in editing, manuscripts should be originals orclear copies, either typed or printed out in near-letter-quality printer mode. Stories can also be accepted on5-1/4" loppy disks in Microsoft WORD, MultiMate,Wordperfect, Wordstar, or Xerox Writer (please in-clude a printout). Please tape captions to any illustra-tions submitted.PAID SUBSCRIPTIONS Report delivery problemsor changes of address to Ms. Connie Bright, circula-tion manager, (502)942-8624.UNIT DISTRIBUTION Report delivery problemsor changes of address to Ms. Mary Hager, AV 464-2610; commercial: (502)624-2610. Requests to beadded to the free subscription list should be in theform of a letter to the Editor-in-Chief.

U.S. ARM Y ARM O R SCHOOLCommandant (ATZK-CG)MG Thomas C. Foley 2121Assistant Commandant (ATSB-AC)BG James L.Noles 7555Deputy Assistant Comm andant (ATSB-DAC)COL Anthony Trifiletti 1050Command Sergeant MajorCSM John M. Stephens 4952COL James R. Joy 8346COL J. W. Thurman 5855COL George R. Wallace III 1055Directorate of Training & Doctrine (ATSB-TD)COL Donald E. Appler 7250Directorate of Combat Developments (ATSB-CD)COL Edward A. Bryla 5050NCO Academ y/Drill Sergeant School (ATZK-NC)CSM Donald L. Baker 5150Director, Reserve Component Spt (ATZK-RC)COL Charles W. Davis 1351Directorate of Total Armor ForceCOL Dennis H. Long 7809TEXCOM Armor & Engineer Board (ATm-AE)COL Dan E. Deter 7850TRADOC SysMgr for Tank Systems (ATSB-TS)

Maintenance Dept. (ATSB-MA)Command and Sta ff Dept. (ATSB-CS)Weap ons Dept. (ATSB-WP)

Readiness (ATZK-TF)

COL Eugene D. Colgan 7955

2 ARM O R - July-AUguSt 7990


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ly to avoid incidents of "fratricide." Studiesculminating from the summer '89. 24th IDScout Platoon Concept and EvaluationPlan (CEP), conducted at Fort Stewartand the NTC, reinforce this cavalry of-ficer's conviction that outfitting the bat-talion scout platoon with Stingers is move-ment in the right direction. In addition tosoldier comments, these studies con-cluded that with four Stingers, the scoutplatoon had an effective and readily-avail-able "revenge weapon." The 19D scoutoperation of the nondedicated MANPADSreceived intensive certification trainingfrom ADA personnel. On the average, cer-tification was achieved within three or fourhours. As a matter of record, the 19Dswere extremely proficient in their use ofthe Stingers. One platoon was creditedwith three HIND-D kills during the conductof its mission.

There is little weight to support thebelief that Mujahideen Stinger operatorsin Afghanistan were of greater intellectualquality than the U.S. Army battalion scout.In Afghanistan, intelligence was not aqualifying virtue, especially when theMujahideen had no aviation assets, andevery aircraft in the sky was assumed tobe hostile.

without question, the battalion scout Isstill the finest around1

Forge the Thunderbolt1J.W. THURMANCOL, CavalryFt. Knox, Ky.

Panama - BewareFalse Lessons LearnedDear Sir:I have just read the article, 'Sheridans in

Panama," in the March-April 1990 issue ofARMOR and feel Imust comment on it.

While the effectiveness and ammpl ish-ments of the Sheridans and the U V s andtheir crews cannot be disputed, we mustbe cautious about the conclusions wedraw from their use in Panama.A must be remembered that the US. for-

ces engaged in Panama did not face astaunch, organized enemy. The Sheridansand U V s did not face any enemy ar-mored vehicles. With the exception of theoccasional wild RPG shot, there was noenemy antiarmor defense. There was noevidence of enemy air attack. These factsmust be kept in mind if we are to keep

operations in Panama in proper perspec-tive, to preclude erroneous decisionsresulting from false "lessons learned." Ournext adversary may decide to fight hardwith all the weapons he has. ThePanamanians did not do either.

W.D. BUSHNELLLTC, US. Marine CorpsFt. Knox, Ky.

Suggests Staggered,Active/Passive OPsDear Sir:I read with great interest Captain Walter

F. Ulmer Ill's article titled "Tandem Ops:An Approach to Mounted Surveillance," inthe January-February 1990 issue ofARMOR. As a company grade officer In atank battalion, I feel Captain Ulmer haspresented a unique approach to employ-ing OPs in a training environment:however, I have to question its ap-plicability in a high-stress combat environ-ment.1 have had the opportunity to visit the

NTC as a tank platoon leader and havehad several NTC analogs at the YakimaFiring Center. The experiences gainedduring my rotation and my own experien-ces as a platoon leader lead me tobelieve that the use of tandem OPs intraining fosters a reliance and a depen-dency on a technique that is only ap-plicable prior to the first battle. ArmoredOPs play a vital role in all combat opera-tions, from occupying an assembly areato defending a battle position, and theemployment of these OPs is critical to suc-cess. The use of tandem OPs is a luxurythat will, unfortunately, not exist durlng ahigh-intensity conflict. The high-stress en-vironment of the NTC simulates the ef-fects of sustained combat operations andbrings to light how quickly a unit can bedegraded by casualties and maintenanceproblems. These effects will quickly forceyou out of the tandem OP technique inorder to provide yourself the securityneeded to survive and fight another day.Also, terrain and the enemy situation willeffect your OP posture, and again mayresult in foregoing the tandem technique.Why train your crews in a technique thatprobably will not be used? I feel it is bet-ter to train the crews for the worst-casescenario of operating as independent OPsinstead of training them to rely on theirwingman to share the responsibility.

Additionally, the idea of seven tanks in acompany at zero percent alert bothersme. In a platoon battle position with 125-150 meters between tanks, having only

two tanks alert seriously hinders yourability to cover your sector. Also, by dou-bling up, you increase the distance be-tween OP pairs and open yourself up toenemy infiltration. Of course, you can sup-plement with dismounted patrols, but theenemy has fewer eyes and ears to worryabout. In combat, is that a gamble youwould be willing to take? Also, by pairingup, you increase your chances of detec-tion by photographic and infrared satellitecapabilities.As a platoon leader, 1 have tried many

OP plans. After much trial and error, Iadopted a plan devised by my tank com-manders at the NTC. We staggered theplatoon, two tanks forward (active OP)and two tanks behind (passive OP). Thetwo passive OPs were offset 50-100meters to create a lazy W. The active OPswere at 50 percent, with the TC in thehatch and the TTS on and scanning. Thetwo passive OPs were at 25-50 percent,depending on crew size. The TC in thehatch was listening and watching withPVS-5s (if available). The two passivetanks kept the TTS off. We found that byrotating every two hours we helpedreduce the TTS "glaze" that resulted afterlong periods of scanning. This combina-tion maximized the platoon's eyes andears and reduced wear on the lTS. Thetwo passive OPs provided the ears thatthe TTS in the active OP usuallydegraded. Each tank was part of the OPplan, and was alert. Yes, it was demand-ing; however, in the words of Sir A.P.Wavell, "Remember that war is always afar worse muddle than anything you canproduce in peace." Also, this method wassafe and provided excellent security.Tough, realistic training instills discipline,and if you train to tough standards Inpeace, your soldiers will respond in war.

JOSEPH C. SHANNON1LT, ArmorD Co., 1-33 ArmorFt. Lewis. Wa.

Correcting the RecordDear Sir:Sgt. Leo J. Daugherfy 111 did a fine job

with his review of Hiah Treason: Essavson the Historv of the Red Army (March-April 1990). He is incorrect, however, in in-cluding the combined American, British,and French expeditionary force in NorthRussia with interventionist forces defeatedby Trotsky's armies. Beginning with afight at the village of Touigas, ArchangelProvince on November 11, 1918, and con-Continuedon Page 49

ARMOR - July-AuguSt 7990 3


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MG Thomas C. FoleyCommanding General

U S . Army Armor Center

t

Meeting Armors Challenges:The CavalryHere at the Home of Armor and

Cavalry, we are closely examiningthe expected battlefields of the 1996-2004 period. The first product ofthis examination is our White Paperon the future of the Total ArmorForce, which was distributed duringthe very successful 1990Armor Con-ference. Thanks in great part to theoutstanding feedback and com-ments of over 200 leaders repre-senting many branches, we are wellon our way to refining a concisevision and action plan for the futureof Armor as a key member of thecombined arms team. Over the nextseveral issues, I will lay out in thiscolumn the critical components ofthis road map for meeting Armorschallenges in the 1990s and the nextcentury.

Ill begin with the component ofour Army that most often enterscombat first - the cavalry. TheWhite Paper points to a continuedand expanded need for the cavalryand scouts in our warfighting or-ganizations, from corps to battalionlevel. The future battlefield will chal-lenge us to perform reconnaissanceand security ouerations over ex-

tended distances. The lethality ofweapons, coupled with improve-ments in target acquisition systems,will mean that dispersion will be anecessary condition. Some nowrefer to this as the non-linear bat-tlefield.

Cavalry units must be able tooperate over increased distances,and use the information provided bytarget acquisition systems to win thecounterreconnaissance battle andthen to find the enemys main for-ces, his command and controlnodes, and his lines of communica-tion. These vulnerable areas then be-come the prime targets for ourmaneuver forces to attack. Our ex-amination confiis the soundnessof our current doctrine - AirLandBattle. Every corps requires a caval-ry regiment to strip away enemyreconnaissance elements, maintaincontact with his main body, andideally, influence his speed anddirection of movement to put him inthe time and place for ourmaneuver forces to be most effec-tive.

The cavalry regiment must also beureoared to screen the flanks of the

corps main body, and press on tobegin the cycle again with theenemy follow-on units, while provid-ing security and early warning.

These requirements call for aflexible, responsive, and lethal regi-ment that combines tanks (main bat-tle tanks or light armor), cavalryfighting vehicles, stealthy reconnais-sance vehicles, and dual-purposeaircraft into a powerful, versatilecombined arms formation. We havedesigned an armored cavalry regi-ment incorporating these featuresas we continue to develop thedoctrinal concept. The regimentretains the capability to attack ordefend in an economy-of-force rolefor the commander of a forward-deployed corps, or a reinforcingcorps. In the case of our contingen-cy corps, the regiment retains thesame essential roles and missions,bu t is lighter.

The divisional cavalry squadronhas been the subject of muchcriticism during the past severalyears. This is especially true of thesquadron in our armored andmechanized divisions. Its lack of

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tanks, and the absence of a truereconnaissance vehicle, have beenthe major concerns, along with theoverall insufficiency of groundreconnaissance assets. The new or-ganization we have designed cor-rects these problems. Our analysisshows that the division commanderrequires a cavalry organization to ac-complish the same functions thatthe division cavalry regiment per-forms for the corps commander.Prototype units containing tanks willbe formed and evaluated this sum-mer in U.S. Army Europe. We alsohave work to do in improving thecavalry squadrons of the light in-fantry, airborne, and air assaultdivisions.

Our studies also show that thebrigade commander requires areconnaissance unit to be his "eyesand ears." Unlike the corps com-mander or division commander, hedoes not need a unit designed tofight for information. We believe hisrequirement can be best satisfied bya platoon identical to the battalionscout platoon of ten HMMWVs andfour military motorcycles. Keyequipment of the platoon includes a

variety of sensor and opticalcapabilities, which allows thesescouts to perform their reconnais-sance missions without being tar-geted themselves. These capabilitiesclearly provide the brigade com-mander with a more complete pic-ture of the battle and the battlefieldthan he previously had. Such a unitwas formed on an experimentalbasis and performed with outstand-ing results during REFORGER 90.

Finally, battalion level. Our studiesconfirm the validity of our doctrinefor a platoon-size organizationdesigned to acquire information bystealth. The recent decision to moveto a battalion scout platoon basedon the HMMWV stems from thisanalysis and from tests conducted in1989. Those tests clearly showed thesuperiority of a platoon organizedwith HMMWVs and motorcyclesunder a wide variety of battlefieldconditions. We have continued thisdesign in the ongoing conceptualwork and continue to see thebenefits of this decision. Effectivereconnaissance provides a largepayoff for the battalion commanderas he works to position his forces

and synchronize the combat powerat his disposal. These scoutplatoons survive better, despitetheir lack of armor protection. Notonly is their survivability enhanced,but they are able to move farther tothe front and flanks of the unit toprovide additional time for the bat-talion commander to maneuveragainst enemy forces.

Our emerging conclusion is thatthe nature of the future battlefieldmeans that cavalry/scout capabilitieswill be needed more than on anyprevious fighting ground - at bat-talion, brigade, division, and corpslevels. The challenge conlinues. Wemust work to develop the equip-ment these cavalrymen will need,along with the tactics, techniques,and procedures that will derive themaximum effectiveness from thesemen and their equipment. Addition-ally, we're challenged to devise train-ing and leader developmentprograms that will infuse this forcewith the boldness, the audacity, andthe decisiveness that have historical-ly characterized cavalry units andcavalrymen.Forge the Thunderbolt!

Armor Force Reduction UpdateSince the Chief of Armor's an-

nouncement of major reduc-tions in the size of the ArmorForce in the March-April issue;further cuts in the proposedsize of the Army have been an-nounced. These reductionswilllead to an even smaller ArmorForce over the next five years.This table summarizes the cur-rent and proposed force. Thetotals do not include currentArmor Center initiatives to es-tablish Light Armor CavalryRegiments and to increase thenumber of Light Armor Bat-talions in the force. Allstrengths are subject to con-gressional change and approval.

Army PersonnelActiveNational Guard/ReserveActiveNational Guard/Reserve

Active ArmyTank BattalionsCavalry SquadronsRecon SquadronsLight Armor BattalionsTDA BattalionslSquadrons

Reserve ComponentsTank BattalionsCavalry SquadronsReconSquadrons

Armor Personnel

Current1,540,000

764,000776,00057,14332,70724,436

5320519

51161

ProDosed1,225,000

580,000645,00040,86720,30020,567

3417419

42110

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CSMJohn M. StephensCommand Sergeant MajorU S .Army Armor Center

Teamwork at Its BestOver the past several years, I have

had the opportunity to addressmany subjects. In most cases, basicfundamentals and teamwork havebeen part of the writings. I firmlybelieve that it is the combination ofthose two that gets you to the levelof discipline, esprit de corps,morale, and proficiency thatqualifies an organization as combateffective!

Most of my columns have beenaimed at the squad and the platoon,again, focusing on the kind of team-work that separates mediocre fromoutstanding squads, crews, orplatoons.

The teamwork I would like to ad-dress in this, my last article, is arecent, coordinated effort within theTotal Army (Active and ReserveComponent) that gave a lot of sol-diers the opportunity to be trainedon the M1-series system before as-signment to another organization.

The stand-down of 1-33d Armorat Ft. Lewis, Washington, presented

a unique problem because therewere no M60 organizations to as-sign the soldier to at Ft. Lewis, norwere there M1 tanks on which totrain them at Ft. Lewis: as witheverything else nowadays, money isa major obstacle.

When planning any kind of activitythat requires MYMlAl tanks,moving the personnel to a fieldtraining site greatly reduced theoverall cost. Sending soldiers toGowen Field, Idaho, a NationalGuard training site, added a newdimension to our capability.

First, it demonstrated that we canlean on the Reserve Componentsand receive quality training whenneeded. Second, the Armys trainingrequirements for the AGR NCOs -to be fully MOS qualified, activecomponent BNCOC, Master Gun-ner Course, and active componentANCOC - gives the commander thequality noncommissioned officers toteach any group of soldiers, enlistedor officer, to a high degree ofproficiency in minimal time. Last, it

demonstrated to the Reserve Com-ponent the quality of soldiers thatwe have in our Army quality notonly in learning and retaining, butquality in discipline also. Immediatereaction to orders caused the train-ing and tank transition to go muchsmoother.

At a time in our Army when theelements of the Total Army will be-come more dependent on eachother, this was a great way to start.It demonstrated teamwork at itsbest, from the top to the bottom inthe Total Force.

This is my last article for ARMORas the Ft. Knox and the ArmorSchool command sergeant major,and as a soldier. I appreciate all ofthe support I have received fromthe commanders, officers, and non-commissioned officers for the lastseven years. I hope I have been ableto assist your organization and sol-diers in some small way.

Forge the Thunderbolt!6 ARMOR - JUly-AUgUSt 1990


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-.-- -

The Combat Reconnaissance DetachmentIn the Meeting Engagement and DefenseOr, how to beat them at their own gamebyMajorBryan L. OliverAcknowledgnterttsllte concept of a senti-independentadvance guard oganizatioit within ananitorl~iiecita~tizedask force is notan original one witlt this writer. BGWesley Clark, contritaitdec NTC Ft.Irwin, arid foniter brigade coni-ntander, addressed tlte need for an or-

ganization and tactics to counter tlteSoviet meeting ertgagernent doctrinein 1987, afer exercising Iris rotationalbrigade in riteeting engagentents atthe NTC. LTC J. Richard Wallace,contritartdirtg a balanced battaliontask force, achiallv employed asiritilar fonnatioit in riteeting eitgage-ntents at the NTC n 1988. rite ideasof these two oficers, arid tlte efiortsartd lessons-Ieanted of real soldiers

iirtder titent, have foniied tlte basis ofthis article.The ProblemThe Soviets believe the meeting

engagement will be the typical bat-tle of the next war. Their doctrineand trainiig focuses on removing orminimizing all of the unknownsprevalent in a meeting engagement.On the other hand, U.S. Armydoctrine for the battalion task forcein this situation appears to operatein a vacuum. It does not consider,nor capitalize, on the. predictabilityof Soviet doctrine for th e meetingengagement. FM 71-2 focuses on ameeting engagement with a singleenemy entity, whereas Soviets will

,move to contact in separateechelons, a technique gearedtoward defeating an opposing taskforce focused on one enemy entity!Our doctrine directs that the bat-talion task force designate a for-ward companylteam as its advanceguard, providing security, and ena-bling the task force main bodyfreedom to maneuver uncommitted.Curiously enough, it also directsthat the task force will support theadvance guard by following withintwo kilometers.' That short intervalcommits the main body to an axis ofadvance following its advance guardcompanylteam and will, within fourminutes, bring it under fire of thesame enemy (most likely the SovietForward Security Element or FSE)

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engaging the advance guard. Theclose proximity of the task forcemain body to its own advance guardmakes the job of reconnaissance forthe Soviet Combat ReconnaissancePatrol (CRP) and FSE so mucheasier. It puts the entire task forcewithin one sweep of the binoculars.The Soviet advance guard battalioncommander, yet uncommitted withhis main body, merely designatesthe appropriate battle drill, a direc-tion of attack, and the battalion ob-jective - an enemy task force at-tempting to extricate itself from afvring battle with the Soviets' ownFSE.

Just as significant, the vaguenessinherent in our doctrine requirescommanders to train for and con-sider a host of different contingen-cies, when they need focus on only afew, based on Soviet doctrine.Worse, they might focus on thewrong situation. That vagueness re-quires commanders to consider andtrain for any number of eventswhich SOPS and battle drills can'tadequately cover. Decision-makingtakes longer. Execution takeslonger. "The friction of war" infectsdecision-making and exemtion astired, confused leaders labor with amyriad of courses of action to coverevery contingency; subunits inter-pret and react to FRAGOs forwhich they did not anticipate orrehearse. So much for getting insidethe other guy's decision cycle.

A contrived scenario? No. Toomany readers have seen this actuallyhappen, or variations of it, at theNational Training Center at Ft.Irwin. The Blue Force meets defeatin the meeting engagement for anumber of reasons; piecemealdeployment of combat power, first-battle jitters, poor intelligencepreparation of the battlefield, etc.But there exists a more fundamentalweakness; we execute tactics based

on doctrine of FM 71-2 without suf-ficient consideration of Sovietdoctrine. Page-to-page comparisonof FM 200-2-1, Soviet A n y Opera-tions and Tactics, and our own FM71-2 illustrates the disparity.

Soviet View of MeetingEngagementsAccording to FM 200-2-1, Soviets

characterize the meeting engage-ment by0 Intense combat with con-0 Extremely limited planningocontinuous effort to seize and0 Deployment into combat from0Uncertainty due to lack of0 Sudden changes in the situation.0 Open flanks on each side.

siderable room to maneuver.

time; heavy reliance on battle drills.maintain the initiative.the march at high speed.detailed intelligence.

They will m i n i i e the meetingengagement as purely a chance oc-currence by anticipating it and plan-ning for it. Soviet commanders willmake extensive use of continuousreconnaissance. They will organizetheir forces to ease reconnaissance,extend their decision-making t\meand allow for speedy deployment.'

One could liken the Soviet's use ofthe FSE to a boxer's left jab. Theboxer jabs with his left, pushing,frustrating his opponent, sensing thedistance to his jaw, f ~ n gis exactlocation, all the while planning forthe instant to release a decisiveroundhouse right fist against theside of his opponents face.

Unfortunately, our accepted tacticof maintaining all of our task forceelements, advance guard and all,within. direct fire support of eachother, amounts to tying our own lefthand behind our back and smacking

our opponent's left jab with ourface!The SolutionThis situation is not all gloom anddoom. Soviet doctrine makes their

forces extremely predictable.Regimental and battalion-level bat-tle drills require extensive coordina-tion with supporting arms. Com-mand groups, especially at battalionlevel, are not effectively staffed toprovide either coordination orflexible responses to unexpectedsituations.3

We can still beat these guys simplyby turning their predictabilityagainst them, task-organizing forcombat to frustrate their organiza-tion and intentions, and gearing ourtactics to counteract their speedand inflexibility. Task organizationrequires no changes to ou r existingTOE. Our tactical doctrine is basi-cally sound. But, to be effective, itmust attend to the opposingdoctrine.Introducing he CombatReconnaissance DetachmentWe can task organize to create

our own "left jab" and still maintainenough combat power in ou r taskforce main body to outgun theenemy battalion main body. The fol-lowing task organization depicts thisnew force:

Combat ReconnaissanceDetachment0 Provisional Tank Platoon (con-0 M901TOW (1TV)Platoon0 Mortar Section (3Tubes)0 Engineer Platoon (Mobile

sisting of 6 tanks)

Obstacle Detachment)Each tank company will' detach

one headquarters tank. These four

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tanks will task organize with the twobattalion headquarters tanks and,under command of the battalion'smaster gunner, will form theprovisional tank platoon. Tanks willcomprise the principal combat ele-ment of the detachment. Overwatchand long-range fires will beprovided by one ITV platoon nor-mally cross-attached from the sistermechanized battalion. If the taskforce scouts are equipped withHMMWVs from within the bat-talion, their ITVs may join this ele-ment, further increasing itsfirepower. A split section of mortars(three tubes) with fire direction cen-ter (FDC) from the armor bat-talion's organic mortar platoon willprovide immediate indirect fire sup-pression and smoke by direct lay.An engineer platoon(-) (OPCON)will provide support in mobility,countermobility, and engineer recon-naissance. One squad from that en-gineer platoon will support thescout platoon with engineer recon-naissance.

The armor battalion's head-quarters company commander, nor-mally the most experienced combatarms company-grade officer, willcommand and control the detach-ment. Because the CRD's initialcontact will be critical to the con-tinued success of the mission, thetask force S3 should position him-self to provide overall direction tothe CRC, report its situation, andrecommend courses of action to thetask force commander based on itsprogress. He is the second most ex-perienced combat arms officer inthe field.

Coupled with the experience ofthe CRD's commander (if properlyselected), engineer platoon leader,ITV platoon leader, and battalionmaster gunner, a preponderance ofleadership now lies forward in thetask force, where it can best in-

fluence a most critical stage of themeeting engagement.CRD EffectivenessAgainst Soviet DoctrineAptly named, this unit will fight as

an advance guard, detached from itsparent armor task force, up to sevenkilometers forward and away fromimmediate direct fire support. Cur-rent doctrine designates a com-pany/team as the advance guard,depriving the commander of 25 per-cent of his combat power formaneuver against the Soviet ad-vance guard battalion. The CRDprovides a separate, detached com-bat force to deal with the CRP andFSE, leaving the armor task forcelargely intact. The commander stillhas four complete company/teamswith which to maneuver against theSoviet advance guard battalion.

The mission of the CRD is uncan-nily similar to that of the FSE. Thescout platoon will vector the CRDtoward the Soviet platoon-sizedCRP. The CRD will attempt to am-bush and destroy the Soviet CRPquickly, or fm him with direct andindirect fires. Whatever the out-come, the CRD will not embroil it-self in that fight, because its primarymission is to find and ambush theSoviet FSE. Once the scouts ac-quire the FSE, they will now vectorthe CRD toward an engagementarea where it can expect to engageand fur the Soviet element. TheCRD intends to destroy the FSE, orneutralize it so that, on order, itmight position itself to block a likelyavenue of approach of the Soviet ad-vance guard battalion.

In a movement to contact, theCRD will march at .least sevenkilometers behind the leading scoutplatoon screen,. and approximatelysix kilometers forward of the armortask force. Assuming the scouts can

see forward three kilometers, thatinterval gives the CRD commanderten kilometers of maneuver space,but only ten minutes or so to deployagainst the Soviet CRP. Remember,the two forces are closing on eachother at a combined 60 kilometersper hour. Assuming the CRP can beengaged and destroyed within fiveminutes - not unrealistic, consider-ing the CRD will ambush it with atwo-to-one advantage - the CRDstill has another 10 to 15 minutes,based on Soviet march rates, to getset against the oncoming FSEP Iftime runs short, the CRD com-mander uses his option to drop asmall sub-element from his detach-ment to fur the CRP, taking it out ofthe play and away from a positionto observe and report to the Sovietbattalion commander. He still main-tains a favorable ratio of forces withwhich to ambush the FSE.Timelyand accurate reports by the scoutsare critical to enable the CRD com-mander to anticipate engagementareas around which he can establishan ambush. In addition tofirepower, his advantage lies inability to get set first and ambushthe Soviet units, rather than collidewith them and likely suffer one-for-one casualties.

The detachment can sustain it -self in all classes of supply throughvarious options. Preferably, it mayreceive logistical support throughthe mortar platoon's resources,under supervision of the mortarplatoon sergeant, or a designated"field first sergeant" from head-quarters company assets. The uni-que logistical requirements of itsdiverse weapons systems makes thisoption most attractive, especially ifthe CRD will permanently task-or-ganize under HHC control.Another option would consist ofhabitually assigning logistical respon-sibility to a line company/team.Under this option, the detachment

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would co-locate for replenishmentwith the nearest habitually assignedcompany team.

Picture, if you will, this CRDs im-pact from the perspective of aSoviet advance guard battalion com-mander moving to contact. His CRPplatoon leader reported that he hasengaged a combined arms elementof approximately company size(much bigger than a platoon), butsees no sign of a larger body.Where is it? The Soviet commanderhas two options at this point. Hecan deploy his FSE to an an-

ticipated flank of that last contact,hoping the remainder of theAmerican task force will appear, orhe can maintain the FSEs originalroute of march.

Either way, the FSE will make con-tact with, and be fmed by, th e CRD.He cannot fm a location of the taskforce because it remains over threekilometers beyond the contact, outof visual observation, but moving,awaiting the scouts first spotreports of the Soviet advance guardbattalion. As the Soviet FSE andthe CRD make contact and transmit

ADVANCE GUARDOF MAIN BODY

The Combat Reconnaissance tAs Advanced Guard for the Taa

letachment;k Force

initial contact reports, the Sovietbattalion commander still lackshard intelligence on the location ofthe task force. Once again, he hastwo options: march to the sound ofthe guns, hoping the task force willappear in the vicinity of the contact;or bypass the fight, and kick outanother FSE and CRP to continuethe search.

With his FSE in contact he hasonly two-thirds of his combat powerremaining with which to maneuver.He intends that speed will offset hislack of numbers. Meanwhile, theAmerican task force is still intact.If the scouts are successful, they willhave detected the movement anddirection of the Soviet advanceguard battalion. The task force com-mander now has the information heneeds to select an engagement area,deploy his company/teams, andengage the Soviet battalion on hisown terms.

When his CRD made contact withthe Soviet FSE, his task force andthe Soviet battalion would be clos-ing from, by doctrine, eight to tenkilometers. Enough time? Probably,considering that the task force easi-ly outguns the Soviet battalion, itmaintains a reconnaissance ad-vantage over a relatively %blindSoviet battalion, and it still hasroom to maneuver.

With this task organization, youhave given the task force com-mander a means to accomplish hismission without drastic or fancifulchanges to TOE, or doctrine. Hewill win because his tactics and tasko%anization are designed to disruptthe Soviet battalion commandersreconnaissance, prevent prematuredecisive engagements, and increasehis own freedom of maneuver andreaction time. With these ad-vantages, the task force commandercan seize the initiative.

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CounterargumentsWhat aspects of the organization

and tactics of employment of thecombat reconnaissance detachment,might possibly contradict doctrine?It departs from FM 71-2 in twoareas. The CRD, as advance guardfor the battalion task force, marchesseven kilometers Forward of the taskforce main body, rather than theone-to-two kilometers stated in FM71-2. The increased intervalprotects the main body from beingengaged simultaneously with its ownadvance guard.

Secondly, effective execution re-quires some increased interval be-tween scouts and the advanceguard, ideally one-half hour ormore. Real world considerations ofpassing through an allied unitrestrict early crossing of the LD/LC.It follows that the acceptable inter-val from scouts to advance guardcould be gained only by delayingthe CRD's crossing of the LD.Similarly, the task force main bodywould delay crossing the LD for atleast 15 minutes after its CRD. Thetotal time required by a lead taskForce of a brigade combat team tocomplete passage of lines and crossthe LD will approach 60 minutes, along time, but necessary in order tobuild the interval needed thatprovides adequate security to thetask force and ultimately, thebrigade.

Summarizing the AdvantagesThe CRD provides the following

advantages:0Allows more efficient use of

combat power, creates economy offorce, gives four maneuver teamsback to the task force.

.Places a preponderance of ex-perienced leadership forward at acritical location on the battlefield.

0 Gives the task force commandera standoff capability, allowing himto maneuver unobserved withgreater combat power against theSoviet main body.0 Headquarters tanks are now bet-

ter used as fighting vehicles ratherthan command and control vehicles.

.Gives added depth to the taskforce defense in sector.0 Forces early deployment and dis-

rupts synchronization of Soviet at-tack.0 Can organize without changing

current TOStEs.

ConclusionSoviet doctrine demonstrates that

they have made the meeting engage-ment a critical scenario, one theyplan on winning. By their use of bat-tle drills, the Soviets have made themeeting engagement an exercise inreflexes. Those of us who have ex-perienced that doctrine, as prac-ticed by the OPFOR at the NTC,can attest to its effectiveness.

Unfortunately, our o m presentdoctrine fails to attend to the meet-ing engagement with the samedeptn of analysis. It fails to accountfor the left jab and roundhouseright punch in the Soviet combat for-mations.

Employment of a CRD willcounter his left jab by neutralizinghis reconnaissance, and destroyingthe formation with which he intendsto fuc our task force. The CRD willaccomplish its mission sufficientlyforward to allow the task force mainbody freedom to maneuver, unob-served and intact, against the Sovietadvance guard battalion. The CRDgives added depth to the task

force's defense mission. All of thiscan happen without changingTOSrE, or adding extra personnel.The means already exists within ourorganizations. All that remains is tomake it happen.

Notes'Field Manual FM 17-2. The Tank and

Mechanized lnfantrv Battalion Task Force,September 1988, pp. 3-44 - 3-46.

*Field Manual FM 200-2-1. The SovietArmv. Operations and Tactics, 16 July1984, p. 5-30.

%.J. Dick, "Soviet Battle Drills, Vul-nerability or Strength?," InternationalDefense Review,No. 5, 1985, pp. 663-664.

4Timings for friendly forces are basedupon a 12-15mph march speed, at whichit would take just over 2.2 minutes totraverse one kilometer. Soviet forcesmove at a doctrinal rate of march of 30kilometers per hour. At that pace, theywould traverse one kilometer in exactlytwo minutes.

Major Bryan L. Olivergraduated from West Pointin 1974. He led tank andscout platoons at FortHood, Texas, and Ger-many, and commanded atank company. He taughttank and cavalry platoontactics at the Armor Schoolat Ft. Knox and com-manded an OSUT Cavalrytroop. Major Oliver actedas operations officer for thecommandant at West Point.He graduated from CGSC,Ft. Leavenworth, and hasrecently completed a two-year assignment as a tankbattalion S3 at Ft. Carson.He is presently assigned asArmor Branch AssistanceTeam Chief, ReadinessGroup, Ft. McCoy, Wiscon-sin.



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Six Imperativesfor the Armor Forceby General Carl E. Vuono

IntroductionAs we celebrate the 50th Anniver-

sary of the combat arm of decision,we can look back over the past halfcentury with great pride at the con-tribution that the Armor Force hasmade to the defense of peace andfreedom. Your unrelenting readi-ness to defend freedom has notbeen in vain.

Simply put - we are winning, andthe triumph of democratic idealsthat we are witnessing in Europe isdue in no small part to the selflessservice of millions of American sol-diers - soldiers who, supported bythe other services, stood shoulder-to-shoulder with our Allies, forminga bulwark against communist aggres-sion and providing a beacon ofhope for those oppressed. For itwas the American soldier whobought time for the inherent weak-nesses of communism and thegathering momentum of democracyto bring the Soviet satellite regimesto their knees.

~

the haunting words of Neville Cham-berlain when he announced in 1938that the world had achieved "peacein our time." Less than a year later,that same world would be engulfedin th e mightiest war in human his-tory - a global conflict that wouldconsume whole nations and leave 50million dead.

Nor can we forget the rush todemobilization after World War I1that left us with a poorly trained, ill-equipped, and ill-prepared Army -an Army that could not stem thetide of North Korean aggressionuntil thousands of Americans hadshed their blood. These soldierspaid with their lives to rebuild anArmy that only five years beforehad stood battle-tested and vic-torious.

Today, once again, there are thosewho claim that the wolves of thisworld have been driven from thedoor, and that we can dispense withthe military power that kept them atbay. Nothing could be further fromthe truth.

While we rejoice in the awakeningof democracy in Eastern Europe,we must recognize that the struggleis not over. Although the nationaleuphoria over the events of the pastyear has led some to argue that wecan decimate the military posturethat has been the foundation of oursuccess so that we can start spend-ing the "peace dividend that wehear so much about, those of uscharged with the responsibility forour nation's security cannot forget

Role of Armorin a ChangingWorldAlthough we have witnessed un-

precedented changes in Europeover th e past months, the Army'sfundamental strategic mission hasnot changed. That mandate issimple - o deter aggression and todefeat attacks against our nation'sinterests wherever they occur.In order that you understand clear-ly how the Army will. execute its mis-

sion, I want to outline the Army'svision of the future and the place ofthe Armor Force in that vision. Ialso want to highlight our plans toshape the force for this decade andbeyond. Finally, I want to challengeeach of you to meet the high stand-ards of professionalism that will beessential to a trained and readyArmy in the years to come. For, thesuccess of that Army will rest on theshoulders of the leaders and sol-diers who serve our nation withpride and distinction.

Just as the mission of the Armyhas not changed, there has been noalteration of the role of the ArmorForce. Armor continues to providethe commander with the mobilityand firepower needed to win quick-ly and decisively. Armored forcesremain vital to dominating themodem battlefield, and their readi-ness gives pause to enemies whowould threaten us.

Although we can applaud thechanges that are occurring in theSoviet Bloc, we must not forget thateven as the Soviet empire is under-going radical and sometimes violentchanges, Soviet military capabilitiesremain massive.

We must remember also that his-tory is replete with examples inwhich the collapse of mighty em-pires ripped apart the establishedorder, resulting in uncontrolled in-stability and untold human suffer-ing. If recent events are an indica-tion, there is no reason to believethat the disintegration of the Sovietempire would be any different.

Even as our attentions and emo-tions are drawn to the events inEurope, we must retain a broaderperspective. For, in this complex

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world, there is one simple truth theUnited States is a global power withinterests around the world. Toremain a global power and toprotect its interests in the face ofpowerful adversaries, it must have apowerful Army. And at the heart ofthat Army will be the Armor Force.The growing arsenals of tanks, artil-lery, and other sophisticatedweapons in the possession of na-tions around the world that do notshare our commitment to peace andfreedom are persuasive argumentsfor retaining the devastating combatpower of armor units.

Ever since the days of the horsecavalry, mounted troopers have per-formed the vital missions of recon-naissance, security, and decisivemaneuver to destroy the enemy. Al-though the weapons systems and or-ganizations have evolved con-siderably since buffalo soldierspatrolled the plains of theAmerican Midwest, these missionsand the attributes required of theCombat Arm of Decision have not,and will not change.

First, armor of the future mustcontinue to be mobile - and armorunits must be able to use theirmobility to see, disrupt, deceive,and destroy the enemy. Second, theArmor Force must be agile - ableto act faster than the enemy canreact. Third, the mission to closewith and destroy the enemy requiresthat armored forces be survivable inthe blazing cauldron of modemcombat.

Armor - like the Army - mustalso be versatile to respond tocrises, conflicts, and contingenciesworldwide. Its soldiers, units, andleaders must be prepared for mis-sions that span the spectrum of con-flict, from contingency operationsthat require relatively small ar-mored formations to high-intensity

~~

combat in which massivemechanized armies collide.

Whatever the mission, the ArmorForce must be lethal - lethal tocrush enemy resistance, lethal to sur-vive the brutal clash of armoredcombat, and lethal to dominate thebattlefield against the best force anyadversary can hope to field. Toachieve this kind of lethality, wemust combine technologicalleverage with unmatchcd tacticaland technical competence. Then wemust integrate mobility, firepower,and shock action - the essence ofArmor - with the other elementsof the combined arms team.

Finally, we must be able to con-figure armored formations intopowerful and deployable force pack-ages. The superb mobility our ar-mored systems enjoy today on thebattlefield must be enhanced, andaccompanied by the ability todeploy them from the continentalUnited States to trouble spotsaround the world.

Our objective is to ensure that suf-ficient strategic air and sea lift isavailable to allow us to project over-whelming land combat power towherever it is needed, in a timelymanner. But we in the Army mustdo our part to enhance strategicmobility by developing lethal, surviv-able, and mobile systems thatfacilitate rapid deployment by airand sea.

Acquiring systems that combinethe strategic and tactical mobilitynecessary to project power effective-ly, and with the survivability andlethality essential for victory on 21stcentury battlefields, will require usto apply innovative solutions thattake full advantage of emergingtechnologies. We must aggressivelypursue advances in areas such ascomp-osites, active and passive

countermeasures, and modulararmor. In the near term, we willmeet our needs by procuring an ar-mored gun system that uses current-ly available technology to provideair-droppable armored firepower toour contingency forces.

The characteristics I have outlineddescribe what the Armor Force ofthe 21st century must be - a forcethat is trained and ready when it iscalled on again to march to thesound of guns. As we work to thisend, we are building on a solid foun-dation, for, the Army of 1990 isquite simply the finest peacetimeforce this nation has ever fielded.And in the forefront of that Army isour Armor Force - the besttrained, best equipped, and best ledin the world.

Imperatives forToday and TomorrowThe Armor Force of the future

will have the characteristics justdescribed only if we adhere to thesix enduring imperatives that haveforged the Army and the ArmorForce of today. In an era of greatchange, they provide continuity ofpurpose and assure continuity andadequacy of capabilities.

The first imperative for Armor isto maintain a flexible, warfghtingdoctrine - he principles that guideour actions on the battlefield. TheArmor Center, as the proponent formounted, mobile combat, has beencentral to much of the progress wehave made over the last decade inthe development of maneuverdoctrine and the embedding of thatdoctrine in all our preparations forwar. The Armor Center will con-tinue to play an important role aswe develop the concept of AirLandBattle-Future, the doctrine that willcarry us into the 21st century.

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As our doctrine evolves to meetthe challenges of the future bat-tlefield, the challenge for Armorleaders is to ensure that the uniqueand timeless characteristics of themountcd force are effectively incor-porated in the way we fight the bat-tlcs of the next century. Then youmust translate these doctrinal prin-ciples into weapons, organizations,training, and leader developmentprograms that will generate power-ful, fielded capabilites.The second imperative is to main-

tain an appropriate mix of forces.The Army of tomorrow must havean effective mix of heavy, light, andspecial operations forces, an ap-propriate blend of active andreserve elements, and a combina-tion of forward deployed, contingen-cy, and reinforcing forces.

In view of the collapse of the War-saw Pact, there are those who areanxious to write the obituary for theArmor Force, arguing that we onlyneed light forces for contingenciessuch as Panama. Nothing could befurther from the truth. Regardlessof the fate of the Soviet empire,armor forces will remain thedecisive element of land power andan indispensable component of ourfuture force mix. Because potentialenemies have extensive armored for-mations, the United States mustretain formidable, ready armoredforces capable of fighting and win-ning on the high-intensity bat-tlefields of the future. For, onlysuch forces will provide thecredibility necessary to deter suchconflicts.

The b y f today and tomorrowwill be an integrated combinedarms team. The colors of the Armorpatch say it all. The red, blue, andyellow symbolize the spirit of com-bined arms - a spirit that is firmlyfmed in the hearts of mountedtroopers and that must be thehallmark of the entire Army. For,

only by integrating the uniquecapabilities all of our branches andcomponents - heavy with light, ac-tive with reserve - will we be anArmy that is capable of dominatingany battlefield, against any enemy.Such an Army will be credible fordeterrence and capable of defense.

The next imperative is to continueto modernize our Army. Thetealities of the budget have forcedus to make some difficult decisionson modernization. The fact is thatwe cannot afford every system thatwe want or that we need. As aresult, we have made some toughchoices to ensure that the Army hasthe essential warfighting capabilitiesthat our nation needs today andthat will bring victory in the future.

Some procurement of near-termimprovements in capabilities hasbeen sacrificed in order to fund re-search and development that willprevent our soldiers from beingovermatched by forces hostile toour interests in the decades ahead.For example, we have virtuallyeliminated production of the M1A2tank in order to pursue the Ar-mored System ModernizationProgram.

Although we are forced to acceptsome risk in the near future, theArmy is irrevocably committed tothe long-term modernization of ourarmored forces. Armored SystemModernization and the light helicop-ter are the Armys highest modern-ization priorities. For, we cannotand we will not ask youngAmericans of the next generation tobattle armor forces of the 21st cen-tury mounted on 20th century tech-nology. To this end we are puttingresources into the development andacquisition of the armored vehiclesthat our soldiers will need in theyears to come.

Modem equipment in the handsof poorly trained soldiers is of little

benefit. So, the fourth imperativeshaping the Armor Force is to con-duct tough, realistic training to highstandards - the kind of trainingthat has served as the hallmark ofthe Armor Force for a half-century,and that has been a model for therest of the Army. The importance oftraining cannot be overstated, fortraining is the foundation of readi-ness and essential to maintaining aquality force. And the talentedyoung men and women who fill ourranks today will stay if they continueto be challenged by tough, demand-ing training.

As we shape the Army of the fu-ture, we must ensure that trainingremains our top priority. According-ly, we will not cu t back on our corn-mitment to training. For example,the pace of operations at the com-bat training centers is being sus-tained, for they are essential tomaintaining the ability of units tooperate as a combined arms team.Indeed, we are increasing our ef-forts to integrate heavy and light for-ces by expanding the number ofcombined rotations.

Because the cost of such trainingis increasing, we must ensure thatour soldiers receive the maximumbenefit from every training dollar bytaking full advantage of simulationsand training devices. As you look atinnovative ways to train, however,never lose sight of the overriding im-portance of mastering basic armorskills that serve as the foundationfor trained and ready units. One ofthe most important lessons taught atthe CTCs is that solid basic skillsreally make the difference betweenvictory and defeat.

To help squeeze the best trainingout of each dollar spent, we are con-tinuing our campaign to improvetraining quality by publishing FM 25-101, the companion manual to FM25-100. This manual is aimed at bat-talions and companies and provides

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clear guidance on implementing thetraining doctrine outlined in FM 25-100. Distribution of FM 25-101should be completed this year, andits use should assist leaders indeveloping a well planned and ex-ecuted training program.

Quality training requires qualityleaders, and quality soldiers der-serve nothing less than the best.Therefore, the fifth imperative is tocontinue to develop the competent,confident armor leaders at all levels.Developing these leaders is one ofour greatest responsibilities, andperhaps our greatest legacy.

Initiative, imagination, and bold ac-tion have characterized theSheridans, Mackenzies, Pattons,and Abramses throughout the his-tory of cavalry and armor. Armorleaders of tomorrow, as today, willhave to be decisive, even in the "fog"of war. Such bold imaginativeleaders are not born, they are theresult of careers spent dedicated tothe study of the military profession.Armor has led the way in thedevelopment of such leaders andmust continue to focus its efforts ondeveloping officers and NCOs whoreflect t h e traditional cavalry spiritof initiative, resourcefulness,courage, and tenacity.

The final imperative, but the mostimportant, is to maintain a qualityforce. Quality is the linchpin of theentire Army and, indeed, is essen-tial to the very fabric of our nationaldefense. For, in the final analysis, itis the quality of the combat soldierthat determines the fate of nations.Vision of th e Future

Unrelenting adherence to these siximperatives has forged an Armythat is the best in the world - anArmy that stands as a mighty bas-tion for peace, and that serves asthe ultimate guardian of our na-tion's security. With the imperatives

as our guideposts, we must moveforward aggressively to shape theArmy and the Armor Force torespond to the challenges of thechanging international environmentand of increasingly austere budgets.We must apply the lessons of ourpast and take command of our fu-ture. For, if we do not, someoneelse surely will.

Although we must adjust to declin-ing resources, I want to make itclear that we will not compromise,equivocate, or yield on the six im-peratives. We cannot allow thesweat we have expended, and thesuccess we have achieved in build-ing the trained and ready Army oftoday to be squandered away. Evenunder the most Draconianbudgetary constraints, we mustnever accept an Army that is under-manned, poorly trained, or ill-equipped - for such an Army can-not protect our nation in an uncer-tain world.

Now is the time to roll up oursleeves and to continue to forge thethunderbolt - responding to chal-lenges to our vital interests with for-ces that can strike with devastatingeffectiveness. In short, let's use thetalents that brought us victory in theCold War to preserve our achieve-ments.

Accordingly, over the course ofthe next several years, we will care-fully, deliberately, and graduallyshape a smaller force. This is a dif-ficult course of action, but essentialif we are to maintain the readiness,training, and quality that stand asthe bedrock of our nation's securityin the years ahead.

As a result of the reshaping of theArmy, the Armor Force of the nextdecade - like the rest of the Army- will be smaller. Butt it will con-tinue to be second to none. We willcontinue to have units forwarddeployed - although in smaller

numbers - in Europe and the FarEast. And we will have forces coiledin readiness within the UnitedStates - prepared to respond tocontingencies around the globe,with active and reserve units poisedto reinforce combat operationsanywhere in the world.

If we are to retain an ArmorForce that has the characteristics es-sential to the Army we will need inthe future, it must have leaders ofdedication and vision - leaderswho will ensure that Armor remainsrelevant to a changing battlefieldand who are able to integrate itsunique contributions with the restof the combined arms team.

In the 1930s,while some were wail-ing about the demise of the horsecavalry, General Chaffee and otherfarseeing professionals developedthe doctrine and organization thatformed the foundation for today'sArmor Force. Although the horseno longer carries mounted warriorsinto battle, the mission, the at-tributes, and the spirit of the cavalrylive on today - as relevant now asever before. The Armor Force willremain a central element of ourArmy into the foreseeable future aslong as in your ranks there are Pat-tons and Chaffees to lead it.

Professionalism

Although we face some challeng-ing times ahead, and th e Army willgrow smaller, there will always beroom for capable, dedicated youngsoldiers and leaders within ourranks. We will continue to be a high-ly competitive profession, because atrained and ready Army requiressoldiers and leaders who are profes-sionals in every sense of th e word. Itis professionalism that will guide allof us through the stormy seasahead, and it is professionalism thatserves as the ultimate antidote foruncertainty about the future. Profes-

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Iionalism is neither easy nor free. Itcomes from an unrelenting dedica-tion to the principles of com-petence, responsibility, and commit-ment, each essential to professionaldevelopment and each vital to theArmy of tomorrow.

First, each of us must be com-petent in the profession of arms andexpert in the art of war. Com-petence is not an inherited trait -it grows from study, discipline, andplain hard work. It comes from shar-ing ideas and innovative thinking.Contributions such as the ArmorWhite Paper developed at theArmor Center are extremely usefulto these efforts as they help stimu-late informed discussion throughoutthe Army community about the roleof armor.

For our younger oEcers, com-petence grows from one of thegreatest sources of practicalknowledge - the corps of noncom-missioned officers that forms thebackbone of the Army. Through theages, the most celebrated leaders inthe profession of arms began theirrise with the simple words, "Ser-geant, show me how."

But competence alone is notenough. To be a professional, wemust willingly embrace respon-sibility - responsibility for the per-formance of our units and respon-sibility for every soldier entrusted toour care. We need leaders in theArmy who personally practice everyday of their lives the guidance ofGeorge Marshall: "When eveningcomes and all are exhausted,hungry, and dispirited, you must putaside personal fatigue, and look firstafter the needs of your soldiers."

Finally, a professional must becommitted to the profession of armsand to the nation. He must be will-ing to serve in the difficult assign-ments, in the isolated posts, in thetasks that drain every fiber from his

being. And he must be willihg torisk his very life in the defense ofhis country. It is this commitmentthat lends meaning to s ad ice ; it isthis commitment that gives a visionto see beyond the next hill, it is th iscommitment that brings honor andhumility to personal achievement.

Those qualities of competence,responsibility, and commitmentmake up the professional of today -a leader of rare distinction and anasset to be carefully nurturedthroughout an entire lifetime.ConclusionOur profession asks much of us,

but that is not surprising, for ours ina special calling. We are entrustedwith a vital responsibility - theprotection of our great nation. Asleaders, we are entrusted withAmerica's most treasured asset -the young men and women whohave volunteered to serve theircountry.

Forty years ago, a young Califor-nian named Robert Young enlistedin a peacetime Army - an Army inthe midst of a world exhausted fromthe cataclysmic struggle of thegreatest war in history. Assigned tothe 8th Cavalry Regiment, he wasunexpectedly and violently thrustinto the crucible of combat in acountry called Korea. In the leadtank of the lead company, he sud-denly came under a devastating bar-rage of enemy mortar andautomatic weapons fue thatdecimated his company and left himseverely wounded. Ignoring his ownpain, he held his position, directedadvancing tanks against the enemy,and became the rallying point forhis battalion. Finally, after hisheroic and single-handed defensehad turned the tide of the battle,PFC Young died from hiswounds.

He w a s a cavalryman who under-stood that freedom isn't free - who

"Competence is not aninherited trait - t growsfrom study, discipline,and plain hard work. Ifcomes from sharingideas and innovativethinking.

understood what some fail to realize- it is bought with the sweat, thecourage, the commitment, and some-times the blood of the American sol-dier. To those who have freedom,and to those who hope for freedom,the American soldier - ike RobertYoung - s the embodiment of theideals and principles of individualliberty for which this country stands.

We - you and I - have a sacredduty to the men and women welead, to the United States, and tofreedom everywhere. We can neverrelax our efforts to maintain atrained and ready Army to supportand advance the principles forwhich our nation stands. In this taskwe must not - and shall not - ail.

Editor's Note: lliis atticle is anadaptation of GEN Viiono'saddressto the Amior Confmnce on 8 May1990.

General Carl E. Vuom, hasbeen Army Chief of Staffsince June 1987. He wascommissioned in the FieldArtillery upon graduatingfrom USMA in 1957. He com-manded 1-77 A, 1st Caval-ry DMslon in Vietnam;DIVARTY, 82d AirborneDivision; 8th infantryDivision (M), USAREUR;U.S. Army Combhed ArmsCenter and Fort Leaven-worth; and the U.S. ArmyTraining and Doctrine Cornmand.


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"Old Ironsides"- First Into RomeThe 1st Armored Divisiondrew two of World War 11'stoughest assignments -North Africa and Italy

WORLD WAR II CAMPAIGNSAlgeria - French MoroccoTunisiaNaples - FoggiaAnzioRome - ArnoNorth ApenninesPo Valley

WWll COMMANDERSMG Bruce R. MagruderJuly 1940 - March 1942MG Orlando WardMarch 1942 - April 1943MG Ernest N. HarmonApril 1943 - July 1944

MG Vernon E. PrichardJuly 1944 - May 1945

73is article was prepared by theARMOR staff Major soiirces in-cluded Elizabeth Rltoades Akroyd's"The First Amtored Division 1940-1990," arid Shelby L. Stantort's "OrderofBattle -US. m y n World WarII.."

Although the history of the 1st Ar-mored Division begins in 1940, itsheritage is rooted in the 7th CavalryBrigade (Mechanized), formed in1932 as the Army's first truemechanized fighting force. The con-cept of the 7th Cavalry Brigade car-ried into the new armored divisions:that mechanized forces shouldstand alone, rather than being simp-ly tank support for infantry divisions.

M3 OUTSIDE MAKASSNY, TUNISIA, IN 1943.were organized. The 1st AD, for ex-ample, provided cadre for the for-mation of the 4th ArmoredDivision, organized in April 1941.

MG Orlando Ward was the newcommander of "Old Ironsides" whenthe 1st AD shipped out for WorldWar 11. Embarking on the QueenMary, the division went first toIreland, then England, lo preparefor the invasion of North Africa.

The brigade became the nucleusfor the new division and its formercommander, Major General AdnaChaffee, became the first com-mander of the Armored Force,which included the 1st and 2d Ar-mored Divisions. The first com-mander of the 1st AD was MGBruce R. Magruder, who camefrom the provisional infantry tankbrigade at Fort Benning.

The division trained for war fortwo years, but frequently lost keyDersonnel as later armored divisions

NORTH AFRICA

The mission of OperationTORCH was to invade Algeria,Morocco, and Tunisia - on NorthAfrica's western shores - to keepRommel's forces from moving west,away from the Libyan desert wherethe Germans were fighting a war ofmovement against British forcesclosing in from the east. Algeria andMorocco had been part of theFrench colonial emDire. and after


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.the fall of France in 1940, were con-trolled by forces of the FrenchVichy government. No one knewwhether the French would opposethe landings, which took place inNovember 1942.

As it happened, they did. Attempt-ing to land at Oran, Algeria, as partof the Center Task Force of thethree-pronged invasion, the ThirdBattalion, 6th Infantry Regiment,part of Combat Command B of the1st AD, took 180 casualties whenFrench shore batteries opened upon two British ships bringing themashore. Only 47 soldiers of the bat-talion were unhurt.

French resistance subsided in amatter of days after the landings, al-lowing the 1st AD to move eastwardto Tunisia, where reinforcementswere pouring in to bolster the sag-ging Afrika Korps and to opposethis new threat to its supply lines.By late November, 1st AD units had

tangled with Axis forces. The 1stADS CCB, fighting at El GuessaHeights, sustained heavy equipmentlosses during the first week ofDecember and was placed inreserve. Its next attack, into the Ous-seltia Valley, was more successful.

Combat Command A fought atFaid Pass in early February, pushingon to Sidi Bou Zid, where it sus-tained heavy losses on 14 February.A week later, a relief forcecounterattacked to support CCAand also sustained heavy losses.CCB successfully reacted to a Ger-man attack on Tebessa, leading tothe beginniig of a Germanwithdrawal.

Despite their considerable tacticalsuccess in the series of battles nowlumped together as the battle ofKasserine Pass, the Germans weredenied operational success: theynever drove any farther east.

Three more months of hard fight-ing in Tunisia eventually forced aGerman withdrawal toward Bizerte.During this period, PVT NicholasMinue, a 1st AD soldier, wasawarded the Medal of Honor post-humously for his brave charges ofenemy gunners entrenched on a hill.His was one of the few awards ofthe Medal in the North Africa cam-paign, which ended in the secondweek of May with the surrender ofthe German forces in Africa.

ITALYOld Ironsides returned to Moroc-

co to rest and refit before theItalian campaign. Its combat ex-periences, good and bad, becamethe basis for many changes in train-ing, organization, and tactics forboth the 1st AD and the other ar-mored divisions still preparing forwar. After the successful Siciliancampaign, the Allies planned a two-

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SHERMAN OF T H E 1S T T K BN CROSS ES THE ARNO RIVER NEAR CASOINA ITALY

pronged thrust up the Italian boot,the U.S. Fifth Army moving alongthe western coast of the peninsula,with the British Eighth Army push-ing up the Adriatic side. Two of the1st AD'S subunits, the 27th Ar-mored FA Bn., and the 16th En-gineers, were part of the initial land-ings at Salerno in early September1943. The rest of the division was tofollow once the American forceswere ashore.

After the Salerno landings, Ger-man resistance crumbled, and the in-vasion force pushed ahead toNaples. During this period, soldiersof the 16th Engineers bridged ariver on the average of on'ce everythree or four days. Naples had beenabandoned by the retreating Ger-mans, who fell back to their WinterLine, one of the first of a series ofgreat defensive barriers thrown upacross the peninsula. The hilly, river-crossed country greatly favored thedefense, which could situate on highground and cover the valleys withwithering indirect fire.

By November, the remainder ofthe 1st AD arrived in Italy and as-sembled for the assault on theWinter Line. The 6th Armored In-fantry, a 1st AD subunit, foughtsharp actions along the Rapido

River and in the Mount Lungo area.Another action, at Mt. Porchia,resulted in heavy losses, with the 6thInfantry and Co. A of the 16th En-gineers winning Presidential UnitCitations for their part in the action.Although the Winter Line waspierced, the high country aroundMonte Cassino blocked any furtheradvance to Rome.

In an attempt to break this defen-sive stalemate, the Allies plannedan amphibious landing at AnzioBeach, hoping to threaten the Ger-man rear and force a withdrawal ofGerman troops from the heightsblocking the approach to Rome.While CCB of the 1st AD remainednear Mignano, the rest of thedivision leapfrogged ahead throughthe new beachhead, fighting off Ger-man counterattacks on the beach-head while supported by heavy airand artillery bombardment. CCAand CCB linked up to break out ofthe Anzio beachhead and pushtoward Rome. They took heavy los-ses in a victory at Campoleone Sta-tion and pushed ahead despitecounterattacks by German rearguards. The division fought throughto Albano, and the first tank - fromCompany H, 13th Armored Regi-ment - entered Rome on 4 June1944.

The pursuit up the Italian "boot"continued through July, when the1st AD was reorganized in light ofpast battle experience. The regimen-tal structure gave way to threeseparate tank and infantry bat-talions, and strength was cu t from14,000 to 10,OOO. In addition toCCA and CCB, division artillery,and division trains, a new head-quarters was formed, calledReserve Command, to control thedivision reserve. The "new" 1st ADwas more flexible, with roughlyequivalent infantry and tank bat-talions capable of being tailored toa greater variety of missions. The ad-ditional infantry would be extremelyimportant in the mountain fightingahead.

In much of the fighting that fol-lowed, the 1st AD tankers often hadto light as infantry in the face of hor-rible winter weather, steep moun-tain terrain, and the formidable Ger-man defense, called the GothicLine, that blocked the northern ad-vance. The division was only thirtymiles from the Po Valley, but thesteep Appenine Mountains aidedthe defense in maintaining astalemate until the spring of 1945.

In mid-April, the Allied assault onthe Germans entrenched in thenorthern Italian mountains con-tinued again, with 1st AD unitsentering the Po Valley on 20 April.Milan fell on the Bth, and Germanforces in Italy surrendered fourdays later. Less than a week after,all German forces in Europe sur-rendered.

POSTWAR SERVICEAt the end of June 1945, 1st AD

units transferred to Germany for oc-cupation duty until the followingspring. The unit headquartersreturned to the United States andwas inactivated, although many ofthe 1st AD subunits remained in



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Germany as part of the U.S. Con-stabulary, the occupying militarygovernment. The 6th Infantryremained stationed in Germanyuntil the 1950s.

KOREAThe success of North Korean tank

units early in the war led to the reac-tivation of the 1st AD at Fort Hoodon 7 March 1951. While the divisiondid not participate in the war, it suc-cessfully fought another battlecloser to home, the battle to in-tegrate th e Army. The division com-mander, MG Bruce C. Clarke, hadcommanded U.S. Constabularyunits in Germany after the war andhad successfully integrated black sol-diers into these units, and upontaking command of "Old Ironsides"in 1951, he did the same thing. Al-though the rest of the Army was notintegrated until 1953, black andwhite officers and men worked sideby side in th e 1st AD almost twoyears earlier, as photos in thedivision yearbooks show.As the only combat-ready armored

division in the United States, the 1stAD was first to receive the newM48 tank in 1953, and the followingyear became involved in tests of anew organization, "The AtomicField Army," designed to be effec-tive in a nuclear warb

In February 1957, the 1st AD wasone of the first of the new "Pen-tomic" divisions, made up of five ele-ments, each independent enough tofight and survive on a decentralized,nuclear-ravaged battlefield. This or-ganization lasted less than a year,and again, the 1st AD was reducedin size. One combat command sur-vived the reorganization, becomingone of the battle-ready units of theStrategic Army Corps (STRAC),formed to fight limited wars, ratherthan nuclear Armageddons.

TROOP 6.1-1 CAV RETURNS FIRE IN AN AMBUSH NEAR KHE SANH. 1971.The 1st AD reorganized again in

1962, this time as a "ROAD"division, which could be recon-figured more easily. The Army wasseeking a versatile, multi-purposetype of formation to fight whateverkind of conflict developed. The com-bat command structure gave way tobrigades, and aviation units wereadded. New vehicles, notably theM60 MBT and the M113 APC,were tested by the 1st AD.

CUBA AND VIETNAMThe year 1962 brought the 1st AD

up to combat status again in timefor the Cuban missile crisis. It mobi-lized and moved to Fort Stewart,Ga. by rail and air. The division con-ducted live-fire exercises and prac-ticed amphibious landing techni-ques in the six weeks of tension thatfollowed.

From 1965 to 1967, the 1st ADhad a major role in training Viet-nam replacements and lost many ofits best soldiers to levies for thefighting in Southeast Asia. Then,relieved of its basic training mission,the 1st AD again attained combat-ready status. One occasionally seesthe 1st AD patch on the rightshoulder of a Vietnam vet. This isbecause two of the division's sub-

units, the 1st Sqn., 1st Cav., and the501st Aviation Battalion, were neverofficially detached from the 1st ADwhen deployed to Vietnam.

Also seeing action were three 1stAD infantry battalions and a 2d ADartillery battalion, reorganized in1967 as the 198th Infantry Brigade.Serving in Vietnam for five years,the 1st Squadron, 1st Cavalryearned a Presidential Unit Citation,two Valorous Unit awards, andthree Vietnamese Crosses of Gal-lantry for action in Vietnam.

During the late 196Os, soldiers ofthe 1st AD deployed to Chicago forriot control duty during the racialdemonstrations that followed the as-sassination of the Rev. MartinLuther King. The division alsohelped out in several other civilemergencies, including floods andhurricanes near its Texas base.

The 1st AD was to be disbandedin the post-Vietnam reductions inforce, but a letter-writing campaignconvinced officials to keep the 1stAD on the rolls of active units. In-stead, it was decided to deactivatethe 4th AD in Germany. The 1stAD took its place at Goeppingen,its first "return" to Germany sincethe war. It has remained there eversince.

20 ARMOR - JU/y-AUgUSt 7990


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1

WWll CAMPAIGNSAlgeria - French MoroccoSicilyNormandyNorthern FranceRhinelandArdennes - AlsaceCentral Europe

WllCOMMANDERS

MG Charles L. ScottJuly 1940 -January 1941MG George S. Patton Jr.January 1941 - February 1942MG Willis D. CrittenbergerFebruary 1942 -July 1942MG Ernest N.HarmonJuly 1942 - May 1943MG Hugh J. GaffeyMay 1943 - V-E Day

M3 LIGHT TANKS OF 66TH ARMOR TRAIN AT FORT BENN ING, MARCH 1942.

50th Anniversary - 2d Armored Division

"Hellon Wheels" RolledFrom Africa to BerlinThe 2d Armored Division, one of

two U.S. armored divisions or-ganized on 15 July 1940 and theonly continuously active armoreddivision for the past 50 years, begantraining at Fort Benning, Ga. underMajor General Charles L. Scott.

Within two months, MajorGeneral George S. Patton hadtaken command. He would lead thedivision through 18 months of train-ing, including three majormaneuvers, before leaving forhigher command.

Patton's spirit and hard-drivingtraining techniques carried thedivision through seven major cam-paigns in WWII, including action inNorth Africa, Sicily, and WesternEurope. Moreover, men of the 2dArmored were constantly tapped

for reassignment to form cadre forlater armored divisions.

In three years overseas, "Hell onWheels" captured 95,000 enemytroops and liberated over 22,000 Al-lied prisoners. It participated in theinvasioh of North Africa, conducteda daring end run to exploit gains inSicily, earned two invasion ar-rowheads for its part in the D-Dayinvasion of France, and twiceearned the Belgian Fourragere ofthe Crok de Guerre for its actionsafter D-Day.

It was a key unit in the breakoutfrom the Normandy beaches,helped seal the Falaise Pocket, andwas poised to attack east across theRoer River when the Germansbegan their Ardennes offensive. The2d Armored successfully marched

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75-100 miles over icy roads to reachthe fighting in Belgium. At Celles,the 2d Armored caught anddestroyed the German 2d PanzerDivision in the Celles Pocket. Fight-ing continued until the division suc-ceeded in occupying Houffalize.Then it was relieved for a brief restto refit.Six weeks later, the 2d Armored

crossed the Roer River, despite in-tense German counterattacks, andattacked across the Cologne Plain,taking Verdingen, on the RhineRiver, on 4 March 1945.

One of its subunits, a companyofthe 17th Armored Engineer Bn.,earned a Presidential Unit Citationfor its construction of a pontoonbridge across the Rhme River in therecord time of less than seven hourswhile under fire. By March 26, 1945,the division was moving into Ger-many, helping to seal off the greatRuhr industrial complex and trap-ping 350,000German troops.

The diGsion moved so quickly,overrunning 3,000 square miles ofGerman territory, that temporarysecurity battalions had to be formedto secure its rear areas until addi-tional troops could move up. Inmany actions, the division wascalled upon to help consolidatebridgeheads, as the Germans stub-bornly fought to stem the tide. AtLippstadt, Germany, the 2nd Ar-mored linked up with the 3d Ar-mored Division and began a seriesof difficult river crossings on theirbattle east. During the course ofApril 1945, "Hell on Wheels"crossed the Weser River, the Leine,and the Oker before making a 57-mile final push to the Elbe at Mag-deburg. Following the successful as-sault on that city, the 2d Armoredmoved to an area south of

2DARMORED DIVISION TROOPS ASSEMBLE IN E NGLAND BEFORE D-DAY

CREW OF A 66TH ARMOR SHERMAN LOAD AMMO

RUSSIANS WATCH AS THE 2D AD CROSSES THE ELBE.

ARMOR - JUly-AUgUSt 1990


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Braunsweig. Several days of fightingfollowed when a task force of Nazifanatics held out in the ForstKonigslutter. They were surroundedby elements of the 2d Armored anddestroyed.VE Day found the men of "Hell

on Wheels" assembled south of Wol-fenbuttel, where there was a dis-mounted review for visiting Russiantroops.

By the end of June, 3,000 of the 2dArmored's men with the longest ser-vice left for the States. Theremainder of the division road mar-ched east, crossed the Elbe at Tor-gau, and covered the 100 miles toBerlin through territory liberated bythe Russians. "Hell on Wheels" wasthe first American division to oc-cupy the city.

After serving on occupation dutyin Germany, men awaitingtransports home spent theChristmas holidays at the Frenchchannel port of Calais or on libertyat the Riviera beaches before ship-ping home to New York. Thedivision was dispersed at Camp Kil-mer, NJ. Those receiving dischar-ges were transferred to posts neartheir homes, while the rest receivedorders to Fort Hood, where thedivision was reorganizing.

The reorganized division was filledwith remnants of the 20th ArmoredDivision and other deactivateddivisions. It was reorganized fromits "heavy division" status in WWIIto a lighter organization. Its Sher-mans gave way to the newer M26s.

In 1950, two subunits, the 6thTank Battalion and the 92nd Ar-

mored Field Artillery Battalion, leftfor Korea, and the rest of thedivision became a training base forreplacements in the Korean conflict.Later that year, fears arose that theSoviets would attempt to overrunEurope while the United States wasembroiled in Korea, so the 2d Ar-mored was once again brought tofull strength. After parading in NewOrleans on 4 July 1951, the 2d Ar-mored was again on its way toEurope.

That fall, the 2d Armored wasagain crossing the Rhine, this timeas part of maneuvers to trainagainst the possibility of a Soviet at-tack on the Rhine bridges. Thismaneuver was the first of manyCold War training exercises in thenext six years, as the NATO coali-tion grew in strength. In 1957, t h e2d Armored returned to Fort Hood.

During the Berlin Crisis of 1961,an advance party of "Hell onWheels" returned to Germany toprepare equipment for the division,if needed. Again in 1963,' thedivision returned to Germany, thistime as part of Exercise Big Lift, aSeventh Army maneuver involvingriver crossings and counterattack ofan "enemy"penetration.

From 1965 to May 1967, thedivision's mission changed again tobasic combat training. Several 2dArmored units went to Vietnam inmid-1967. The 50th Infantry and 2dSqn., 1st Cavalry joined the 1stCavalry Division in Vietnam, andother subunits were later assignedto the 198th Light Infantry Brigade.

Stateside duty included assistingcivil authorities in a maior hurricane

HELL ON WHEELS1that hit Texas in 1967, and the or-ganization in 1968 of two brigadesof troops for civil disturbance con-trol following the assassination ofDr. Martin Luther King.

The stateside routine of training,new equipment tests, and field exer-cises continued until 1978, when abrigade task force was sent toGarlstadt, in northern Germany.This subunit, 2d Armored Division(Forward), remains stationed inGermany today. Its purpose hasbeen to maintain combat readinessand be prepared to receive the restof the division's subunits shouldNATO be attacked.

As this issue went to

armor magazine, july-august 1990

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