armor magazine, january-february 1992

8/3/2019 Armor Magazine, January-February 1992

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TraTank

The good-byes are outnumbering thewelcomes.Putting our reduction in force in perspective,Secretary of the Army Michael P.W. Stone said,Over the next few years, the Department ofDefense will reduce its work force by moreworkers than GM would if it closed down its en-tire U.S. operation. The specifics:-cut about 250,000 soldiers, NCOs and offi-cers by 1995- c u t about 100,000 civilians by 1995--clo se 81 bases and 7 of 14 ammo plants inthe U.S.-Close or turn over some 160 sites over-seas.

For the next couple years, tankers, and caval-rymen who have se rved proudly and with greatdevotion and professional acumen, will beamong the hundreds of thousands who will re-turn to civilian life. They are victims not of in-competence but of their own mission accom-plishment. They and those who came beforeforced the end of monolithic Comm unism andthus wou nded their own raison detre.I cant think of a more difficult time to be acommander. All must counsel each and everyman in the unit to help him make the choice tostay, retire, or strike camp. And some mustcase the unit colors for perhaps the last time. It

is fitting that we salute the great units that haveserved our nation with distinction for manyyears, which have passed or will pass out ofthe Active Force but not out of the memories ofthose who wore their patches or unit insignia:

VI1 Corps8th ID3-35 Armor4-32 Armor1-69 Armor4-34 Armor4-7 C avalry4-66 Armor3-66 Armor2d ACR

3d AD1-35 Armor4-8 Cavalry3-8 Cavalry4-69 Armor3-7 Cavalry4-70 Armor2-66 Armor6-40 Armor

We will miss these 13 tank battalions and fivecavalry squadrons, but we will not forget themor what they have done.For those who remain in uniform and in theArmor Force, the challenges will remain. Its anew world in which we must operate - nethat we helped create, and it calls for qualityleadership and top-notch people. Secretary ofDefense Dick Cheney summed it up. There willbe good careers available for top quality peo-ple. It will be more competitive than its everbeen before, it will be tougher to get in, andthere will be higher standards to stay.This club has become more exclusive. Thosewho stay should feel proud of their accomplish-ments and more than a little lucky.For those who go on to other things, you cantake great pride in knowing that you made adifference. Your being here helped to changethe world, and your large footprints attest towhere youve been. Youve mattered. Youvecounted. Weve been proud to serve with you.Thank you and Godspeed. -PJC

By Order of the Secretary of the Army:

GORDON R. SULLIVANGeneral, United States ArmyChief of Staff

Official: -4-MILTON H. HAMILTONAdministrative Assistant to theSecretary of the Army


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ARMORThe Professional Development Bulletin of the Armor Branch PB-17-92-1

Editor-in4 hiefMAJOR (P) PATRICK J. COONEYManagingEditorJON T CLEMENSCommandantMG THOMAS C. FOLEYARMOR (ISSN 0004-2420) is published

bimonthly by the U.S. Army Armor Center, 4401Vine Grove Road, Fort Knox, KY 401 21.Disclaimer: The information contained in

ARMOR represents the professional opinions ofthe authors and does not necessarily reflect theofficial Army or TRADOC position, nor does itchange or supersede any information presentedin other official Amy publications.

Official distribution is limited to me copy foreach armored brigade headquarters, armoredcavalry regiment headquarters, armor battalionheadquarters. armored cavalry squadron head-quarters, reconnaissance squadron head-quarters, armored cavalry troop, armor company,and motorized brigade headquarters of theUnited States Amy. In addition, Army libraries,Army and DOD schools, HQ DA and MACOMstaff agencies with responsibility for armored,direct fire, ground combat systems,organizations, and the training of personnel forsuch organizations may request two copies bysending a military etter to the editor-in-chief.

Authorized Content: ARMOR will print onlythose materials for which the U.S. Amy ArmorCenter has proponency. That pmponencyincludes: all armored, direct-fire ground combatsystems that do not serve primarily as infantrycarriers; all weapons used exclusively in thesesystems or by CMF 19-series enlisted soldiers;any miscellaneous items of equipment whicharmor and armored cavalry organizations useexclusively; training for all SC 12A. 128, and12C officers and for all CMF-19-series enlistedsoldiers; and information concerning the training,logistics, history. and leadership of armor andarmored cavalry units at the brigaddregimentlevel and below, to indude Threat units at thoselevels.

Material may be reprinted, provided credit isgiven to ARMOR and to the author, exceptwhere copyright is indicated.January-February 1992,Vol. CI No. 1

Features7 Super Sixers Were In Heavy ContactDuring Most of WWli Campaign in Europe

10 Abrams Vehicles Fires: An Analysis of FY91by Gregory M. Skaff12 The 823d at Mortain: Heroes Ai lby Dr. Charles M. Baily and Mr. Jay Karamaies19 The Mounted Breach- Making itWorkby Captain Watter A. Ware24 A Leap of Faithby Colonel Lon E.Maggatt33 The Battie-Focused Combined ArmsTraining Strategy (CATS): Armorby Colonel Joseph D. Molinari and Mike Kelley40 Reserve Component Enhancement Trainingby Major Jimmy Jones44 Integrating IPB into Paragraph Three(And Other OPORD Briefing Techniques)by Captain Gregory P. Rowe47 Dust Clouds on the Horizon, Thoughts of the Futureby Command Sergeant Major Kurt G. Bensch Jr.49 COFT Matrix: What Do the Numbers Mean?by Command Sergeant Major Jake Fryer and Paul D. Foran

Departments2 Letters2 Contacts4 Commanders Hatch6 Drivers Seat52 Bustle Rack53 Books


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ImprovingReserveTrainingDear Sir:In a recent letter to the editor of the Army

Times (14 October 1991) I argued thatthere was a need to adopt a long-term planfor the development of qualified combinedarms leaders in the Reserve Components. Isuggested that, "Such a plan would pick uptoday with an emphasis on individual, crewand platoon proficiency and would culmi-

nate five years from now with each maneu-ver team starting a repetitive process thatwould see them undergo a two-week NTC-type experience at the company/teamlevel." Thereafter, every three to five years,that company would repeat the process oftrain-up, followed by an intensive trainingevaluation at a company-level ReserveComponent training center. In this manner,we would be requiring the company/teamcommander, through simulations, self andschoolhouse study, to learn to manage and

lead the various combined arms elementsof the combined arms teams."

The purpose of this effort is to:-argue that the Armor School and Cen-

ter should take the lead in the develop-ment, and then operation, of the proposedReserve Component training center. As theproponent for mounted warfare, the ArmorCenter is the obvious choice for develop-ment of the requisite program of instructionand scenarios to train the Reserve Compo-nent maneuver warriors of the future.

(Note: Fort Knox Defense Switch Network (DSN)prefix is 464. Commercial prefix is Area Code 502-DIRECTORY- ointsof Contact 624-XXXX).

ARMOR EditorialOffices U.S. ARMY ARMOR SCHOOLEditor-in-ChiefMajor (P) Patrick J. CooneyManaging EditorJon T. ClemensEditorial AssistantVivian ThompsonProduction AssistantMary HagerContributing ArtistSPC od y Harmon

22492249261026102610

MAILING ADDRESS: AR MO R A'ITN: ATSB-AM. Fortb o x . KY 40121-5210.

ARTICLE SUBMISSIONS: To improve speed and accu-racy in editing, manuscripts should be originals or clear copies, eithertyped or printed out double-spaced in near-letterquality printer mode.W e also accept stories on 5-1/4" floppy disks in MultiMate.Wordstar. Microsoft WORD, WordPerfect, XyWrite. Xerox Writer,and ASCII (please include a double-spaced printout). Please tape cap-tions to any illustrations submitted.

PAID SUBSCRIPTIONS: Report delivery problems orchanges of address to Ms. Connie Bright, Secretary-Treasurer, P.O.Bo x 607. Ft. b o x , Ky . 40121 or call (502)942-8624,FAX (502)942-6219.UNIT DISTRIBUTION: Report delivery problems or

changes of address to Ms. Mary Hager. DSN 464-2610, commercial:(502)624-2610. Requests to be added to the free distribution listshould be in the form of a letter to the Editor-in-Chief.

ARMOR HOTLINE- SN 464-TANK(The Armor Hotline is a 24-hour service to provide assistance with

questions concerning doctrine, training, organizations, and equipmentof the Armor Force.)

Commandant (ATZK-CG)MG Thomas C. Foley 2121Assistant Comm andant (ATSB-AC)BG James L. Noles 7555Deputy Assistant Comm andant (ATSB-DAC)COL Dwight A. Beck 1050Command Sergeant MajorCSM Jake Fryer 4952COL Phares E. Noyes 8346COL John B. Sylvester 5855COL E. G. Fish I1 1055Directorate of Training Develop.ments (ATSB-TD)COL Joseph D. Molinari 7250Directorate of Combat Developments (ATSB-CD)COL Edward A. Bryla 5050NCO Academy/Drill Sergeant School (ATZK-NC)CSM John J. Beck 5150Reserve Component Spt D iv (ATZK-PTE)LTC William S. Richards 5953Directorate of To h l Armor Force (ATZK-TF)Readiness FAX - 7585

Maintenance Department (ATSB-MA)Command and Staff Department (ATSB-CS)Weapons Department (ATSB-WP)

CO L Dennis H. Long 7809TRADOC System Managerfor Armored Gun System (ATS B-TS)COL Eugene D. Colgan 7955

2 ARMOR- anuary-February 7992


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Sequence of EventsPlatoons

Draw equipmentRoad m r c hOCCUPY AAPre-conhat inspectbnPassaged En-Hasty an&.BreachAdions on the Ob.A ARReconstkutionReceiveh issueOPORDHasty defensePrepare defense-Fire plans.Range cards-PMCS

'SIC.DefendReoDnstitutionA ARRoad march- e a dto ambushoccupy AATroop laading proceduresRepeat MondayRepeat TuesdayNight Me ndAAR

CompanyHQPrepareOPORD" hLOGPACissw OPORD"

Rewive raporbObserve rainingAnend AARLOGPAC

~ l o p ~ m p a n yObserveplatoonsSynchronize h l yLOGPAC

fire plan

LOOPAC

IssueOPORD"IssueOPORD"

Revert toConpany ContrdOccupy AA - MC S h t r ocp leading proceduresPassaged ZnssHasty attack-Breach.Defile DrillAdions on the objectiveReconstitutionAARMOM to ddens e sectorHasty defense-Fire plam.Barrier plan-Flex phnDefendDecontaminate (1 PR)ReconstitutionAARRoa d march to live fire areaReceive FRAGO for attackHasty defenseLive lire defense (offense for better units)Road march to MATESBegin turn-inTumidRetum to home station

.Upload ammo

"AARs willbsconducted and corrections made to the OP ORD sbefore they are issued to platoons.

options that might be viable. Ifthis brings those options out fordiscussion, then it has servedone of its critical purposes. Thekey is that whatever trainingplan is adopted, it must result inthe development of competentcombined arms leaders.The basic concept of the Re-serve Component Training Cen-ter (RCTC) is to establish a fa-cility with professional trainersand OPFOR. so that approxi-mately every five years eachmaneuver platoon and com-pany/troop would receive the in-tensive training that only such acenter could provide.The training cycle of a two-week Annual Training wouldconsist of one week of platoontraining and one week of com-pany/team-level training, culmi-nating with a combined armslive fire exercise (CALFEX). Thesequence of events is shown atleft.There are several keys tomaking these two weeks of in-tensive training successful. Thefirst key would be the quality ofthe observer-controllers andtheir ability to teach as well ascritique. The second key is thetrain-up, not only of the pla-toons and companies, but alsoof the battalion and brigadestaffs as they command andcontroVsynchronize the entireprocess. The train-up cycleshould consist of very specifictasks and drills thatcrews/squads/platoons shouldmaster during the precedingyears. These critical tasks, byyear, are shown below.1stYear

-suggest the elemenis that such a train-ing program might include.This is not to argue the merits of theissue of whether the Reserve Component(RC) leaders of today have the requisiteskills to synchronize the maneuver battle oftomorrow. This assumes that there is aneed, as noted above, to train the futureleaders of RC armored and mechanizedforces in the future, and that the com-pany/team level is the most appropriateculmination level of a five-year trainingplan. Obviously, there are numerous other

-How to conduct a rehearsavusea sandtable-Troop leading procedures- se t the standards-Offense

.Breach drills (demolitions)

.Formations

.Rules of engagementCa ll for fire.Use of terrain.NBC skills.Spot reports

-Reconstirution-First Aid- ombat Lifesaving*PMCS

-MILES

evehideRecovery.Log Reports

-Other basic ndividual and crew skills-2d Year

-Defense.Obstacle plans and emplacement.Range cards.Fire plans*Plt fire commands.Fighting positions.Camouflage*React to airattack*NBC skills*MILES refresher

3d Year-Gunnery-Flexdrills- ow to react o changing siiuationsand orders-from either the offense or defense

-Company-level sandtable drills-LOGPAC operations4th Year (Refreshep

-Fire plans and commands-Basic formations-Call for fire-NBC skills to include actual decon-Live fire platoon defense-Company-level maneuver raining-MILES

Throughout these five years, there is aneed to continue to use UCOFTs and othertraining devices to maintain individual andcrew gunnery skills and also to integrategunnery refresher training into each year'sactivities.The focus on platoons and companiesshould allow all of the support units to begainfully employed and trained if properlysynchronized by the parent brigade head-quarters. In this process, we would trainthese units and headquarters to performtheir wartime tasks.The challenge for the Armor Center is totake this idea and turn it into reality by re-fining the training plan, identifying a loca-tion for the RCTC, developing and costingthe training resources necessary- quip-ment, personnel, targets, ammunition, etc.- nd then selling the Total Army on theconcept. To not evaluate this concept is todo a disservice to the RC leaders of tomor-row.It is my hope that this letter will begin thisprocess.BRUCE B.G. CLARKECOL, ArmorCarlisle, Pa.

Continuedon Page 50ARMOR - anuary-February 1992 3


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MG Thomas C. FoleyCommanding GeneralU.S.Army Armor Center

Myth andWhen I last spoke to you in this col-umn, I said that we would examine

our strategies for Combined ArmsTraining in the future. We do that inthe article by Col. Joe Molinari andMike Kelley (p. 33) that clearly laysout our CATS strategy as it applies tothe Total Armor Force. Bu t personneland force structure, driven by the re-duction in size of our Army, havemoved to the front of everyonesminds, spawning myths and rumorsabout the future.There should be no doubt in

anyones mind by now that we, in theArmy in general and the Armor Forcein particular, are entering a period ofsignificant change. In the Army of theyear 2000, the Total Armor Force willlook significantly different and will besignificantly smaller than it is today.Now is th e time to separate myth andrumor from reality on downsizing the

The reality is that a large portion ofth e Army is going away. Many unitsstationed in Europe and the UnitedStates have already deactivated, andmany more will be deactivated in thenext 12 months. For the Active Com-ponent of the Armor Force it means

h Y .

Realitythat we will have 14 fewer tank bat-talions and two fewer division cavalrysquadrons in 1996 than we had in1991. Most of these reductions willoccur by the end of 1992. The myth isthat the quality of our smaller Armyand this smaller Armor Force willsomehow be reduced. Not so! With asmaller force, for example, unit rota-tions to the Armys key training cen-ters, such as the NTC at Fort Irwinand CMTC at Hohenfels, will con-tinue and may become even more fre-quent and of longer duration. Oppor-tunities to do the same tough, realistictraining that paid off so handsomelyduring Operation DESERT STORMwill continue, and soldiers and leadersat all levels will be challenged asnever before.

There is a myth that the Army, andArmor Branch, are no longer viablealternatives for soldiers seeking along, productive and fulfilling careerof service to the nation. Not so! Com-mand opportunity rates in our smallerArmor Force will be the same, if notbetter. Lieutenants entering activeduty, and those currently in the force,can expect the same challenging as-signments, career oportunities, and

promotion rates as before. Branchqualification opportunity rates will re-main high. This will be true for com-pany grade and field grade officers aswell as tank commanders, scout andcavalry squad leaders, and platoonsergeants. Tough, realistic trainingand assignments that will challengeyou mentally and physically to thedepths of your being will continue,and our smaller Army of the futurewill be an even better Army.

Improved technology will continueto benefit the Total Armor Force. Thelessons of DESERT STORM are wellunderstood. We are taking steps tosolve the identification friend or foeproblems that our forces faced. Weare ensuring that our forces get inex-pensive, but high quality navigationaids compmble to those used duringDESERT STORM. The MIA2 tank, afighting machine with great potential,is being run through a series of rigor-ous tests, and the competition amongcontractors to produce the new Ar-mored Gun System for our lightArmor and Cavalry units has alreadystarted and is sure to be intense. Theseare but a few of the technological im -provements awaiting the Total Armor

4 ARMOR - anuary-February 1992


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Force. Rest assured that th e quality oftraining and equipment in our smallerArmy will remain high.

Another reality facing us is the verysensitive issue of personnel cuts. It isindeed sadly ironic that our victoryduring the Cold War is now forcingus to trim from our force so many ofthose who worked so hard to achievevictory. We project that the activeArmor Force of the year 1996 will atmost number 3,838 officers and19,437 enlisted men, down from5,409 and 25,909, respectively, inFY91. These reductions are signifi-cant. The hard reality is that in orderto meet the FY96 goals, the Army hasdecided to hold a series of SelectiveEarly Retirement Boards (SERB) anda Reduction in Force (RIF). TheSERB will examine primarily the filesof officers with more than 18 years ofservice who are not on a promotionlist, and the files of sergeants majorwith basic active service dates be-tween 31 Aug 63 and 31 Aug 67.These boards began 15 Jan 92. TheRIF Board, which will meet 10 Mar92, will examine the files of officersin Year Groups 1978 and 1982, pri-marily majors with a date of rankfrom 2 Jul 89 thru 1 Mar 91, and cap-tains with a date of rank from 2 May85 thru 1 Sep 86. We expect thatArmy-wide nearly 750 majors and700 captains will not be selected forretention, and that Armor's share willbe about 100 officers, or about 50from each year group. It is importantto note that restricted files will be in-cluded for examination by the board.Right now there are no other RIFsphnned for other ranks during FY92.Reductions among more junior offi-cers and enlisted soldiers will be ac-complished through lieutenant reten-tion boards, tougher reenlistment stan-dards, normal attrition, and lower ac-cession levels.

The FY91 lieutenant retention boardconsidered officers primarily fromYear Group 88. A total of 705 offi-cers, including 59 Armor officers,were not selected for retention, and al l

~ ~~~ ~

of them should have been notified onor about 7 Nov 91. The FY92 boardwill convene in April or May of thisyear and will consider primarily offi-cers in YG 89. Current plans are foranother retention board in FY93 thatwill consider officers of YG 90. Al-though it is too early to be certain, webelieve the non-select rates for thesetwo boards to be about the same asthe FY91 board.

For junior enlisted soldiers, reduc-tions will come from tougher reenlist-ment standards, normal attrition, andlower accession levels. First-time drugoffenders, for example, will be sepa-rated, as will Alcohol and Drug AbusePrevention and Control Program fail-ures. Soldiers on the overweight pro-gram and those who are recurringAP l T failures will be barred from re-enlistment. QMP' zones for sergeantnow begin at eight or more years ofactive federal service. Your reenlist-ment counselor or chain of commandcan tell you more about the specificsof these programs and others. Thoughthese culling actions will be painful,the Armor branch strategy and expec-tation is to keep the very best leadersand soldiers on active duty. This goalis the responsibility of each of us.

Now, you must understand that theArmy is providing a very generouspackage of benefits for those whoseparate either voluntarily or involun-tarily. For example, separation pay ismore generous than ever before. Ifyou choose to leave the service ratherthan become selected to leave, there isa 50 percent kicker to your separationpay. See your chain of command todetermine if i t applies to you. Also,the Army has a program titled theArmy Career and Alumni Programthat, among other things, has a job as-sistance center. Furthermore, there area variety of other separation benefitsthat your chain of command can dis-cuss with you. The point is that everyArmor soldier must go over his fileswith his chain of command to deter-mine if he is at risk, and soldiers de-termined to be at risk must be coun-

seled about their various options forboth voluntary and involuntary sepa-ration. The fact is the Army, and wein Armor, are committed to treat allthose separated, whether voluntarilyor not, with care, concern, compassionand respect. Our soldiers, victors dur-ing the decades of the Cold War andDESERT STORM, deserve nothingless from Armor commanders.

Another reality facing the ArmorForce is that we will have a greaterreliance on a highly trained and readyReserve Component and a greater per-centage of our force quartered inCONUS. A smaller Active Compo-nent implies a greater reliance on Re-serve units that are trained, equipped,and ready for any contingency any-where in the world. Virtually everyArmor leader will have as one of histop priorities to contribute to thepeacetime training and mobilizationreadiness of the Reserve Componentof the Total Armor Force. Armortoday is already at the forefront ofseveral new initiatives to enhance RCreadiness to fight, and the continuingdevelopment of these initiatives willbe one of the key tasks for the future.A greater percentage of our forcequartered in CONUS will meangreater stability for you and your fam-ilies, less frequent PCS moves, and agrowing opportunity to approach areal regimental system. Morale, wel-fare, and recreation programs at Armyinstallations still will be fully staffedand funded. Better on-post housingfor married soldiers and enhanced bar-racks life and post activities for singlesoldiers continue to be of great con-cern to Armor commanders world-wide. The commitment to taking careof you, our great soldiers, and yourfamilies is a top priority.

I am personally committed to ensurethat the quality of the future TotalArmor Force remains high. You, thevictors of the Cold War and OperationDESERT STORM, deserve nothingbut the very best. There will be nomore Task Force Smiths! FORGETHE THUNDERBOLT!

ARMOR - anuary-February 7992 5


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~~ ~-6TH AD TANKS PASS COLUMN OF PRISONERS ON THE AUTOBAHN IN MARCH 1945.50th Anniversary - 6th Armored DivisionSuper Sixers Were in Heavy ContactDuring Most of WWlI Campaign in Europe

General Orders, Headquarters Ar-mored Force, activated the 6th Ar-mored Division at Fort Knox, Ken-tucky, on 15 February 1942. A fewhundred officers and enlisted menfrom other armored units formed thecore of the new unit. The 6th was or-ganized under the original armored di-vision table of organization, with twotank and one infantry regiments. InMarch 1942, the division moved toCamp Chaffee, Arkansas, where more

World War I I CampaignsNormandyNorthern FranceRhinelandArdennes- AlsaceCentral Europe

men joined up, bringing th e totalstrength to more than 15,000. TheUnit Mobilization Training hogram,along with US0 shows and War Bonddrives, filled the first months. Butsoon, the 6th took part in the VI11Corps,Maneuvers in Louisiana. There,the Super Sixth received its first M4medium tanks. In September 1942, the6th returned to Camp Chaffee andpicked up three artillery battalions.Early in October, the Super Sixthmoved by rail to Californias MojaveDesert. For five months, the divisionlived in the desert and trained, with anemphasis on offensive operations. Theprogressive training stressed funda-mentals and included corps-level ma-neuvers.

In March 1943, the 6th moved toCamp Cooke, California, where train-

ing continued. MG Robert W. Growtook command of the 6th in May1943, bringing his aggressive newideas for the role of armor. He wouldcommand the Super Sixth for theremainder of its training and in com-bat. In September 1943, the 6th reor-ganized as a light armored divisionamid rumors of overseas deployment.Word came on 31 December 1943that the 6th was headed to Europe.The division spent January 1944 load-ing and moving to Camp Shanks,New York. After processing and apass in New York City, the men ofthe 6th loaded onto eight ships andsailed for England.

After an uneventful voyage, th eSuper Sixth arrived at Liverpooland Bristol, England, and Glasgow,Scotland in February 1944. Men and

ARMOR - January-February 1992 7


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Ir -=

MG ROBERT W. GROW

equipment quickly moved by train tothe Oxford-Stratford-Cheltenhamareaof Englarid. Units spread out and bil-leted in the villages throughout thearea. For five months, the divisioncontinued ,to train and draw equip-ment. In June 1944, the division wenton alert, and in July loaded ontoships. On 18 July 1944, the first cle-ments of the 6th landed across UtahBeach and assembled at Le Mesnil,France.

On 27 July 1944, the division at-tacked through the 8th Infantry Divi-sion to clear the heights near LeBingard. Moving quickly, the SuperSixth crossed th e Seine River, seizedGranville, and linked up with the 4thArmored Division at Avranches.There, the division received orders toseize th e port of Brest. Once an attackpenetrated the enemy defense, thetankers exploited into Brittany. By-passing strong resistance, the divisionswiftly moved to Brest, and Combat

t68thTank Banalion anerriidri enters Hvraricines. rrarirx

World War II CommandersMG Wm. H.H. Morris Jr.February 42 - May 43MG Robert W. GrowMay 43 - July 45

a

Command A invested the city. Unfor-tunately, logistical constraints held the6th stationary in Brittany until Sep-tember 1944. However, the SuperSixth had demonstrated the value ofarmor in a rapid advance.

In September 1944, the 6th joinedLTG Pattons Third Army and re-lieved the 4th Armored Division inthe Nancy-Luneville area. Im-mediately, the division fought a bitteraction in the Gremecy Forest. MGGrow constantly sought to refine andimprove his division. He increased hisinfantry strength by turning all 57mmanti-tank gunners into riflemen and alllight machine gun squads into riflesquads. At the same time, the SuperSixers perfected close coordinationin their attacks on strong prepared po-sitions.

In November 1944, the division at-tacked as part of an army-wide offen-sive to occupy the west bank of theRhine River. The German defenderswere aided by the heavy rains andmud. Despite fierce resistance and de-termined local counterattacks, theSuper Sixth crossed the Seille Riverand cleared out the Nomeny area.Then, the division advanced in fourcolumns to establish a bridgeheadacross the Nied River. By December1944, the 6th had reached S m -guemines and adopted a defensiveposture.

Late that month, LTG Patton or-dered the Super Sixth north to helpblunt the German Ardennes offensive.In two days, the division disengaged,moved north, and relieved elements ofthe 9th and 10th Armored Divisionson the south shoulder of the Bulge.On New Years Eve 1944, the 6th at-

OREU UMSlRN

tacked on a broad front through thelOlst Airborne Division at Bastogne,Belgium, to expand the BastognePocket. However, the 6th attackedalone, and German resistance, com-bined with counterattacks, stalled thethrust after only limited gains. On 4January 1945, the division pulled backto more defensible terrain to face re-newed German attacks. Despite th eharsh winter weather, the SuperSixth held its ground and slowlydrove the Germans back. By 26 Janu-ary 1945, th e 6th had pushed the Ger-mans back behind the Siegfried Line.

Although the 6th was overdue for arest from combat, it remained in theline. MG Grow used a minimum oftroops to secure the front and empha-sized refitting. On 7 February 1945,the division attacked across the OurRiver and established a bridgehead.In two days, the engineers constructeda bridge, and armor crossed the river.Although the Germans had preparedstrong static defenses, the SuperSixth continued east and penetratedthe West Wall into Germany. ByMarch 1945, it had forced a bridge-head across the Prum River.

During the the night of 3 March1945, elements of the 90th InfantryDivision relieved the 6th. After 221days of consecutive combat, theSuper Sixth became SHAEF Re-serve. Then, on 8 March 1945, the 6thwas assigned to LTG Patchs SeventhAt about this time, the semi-monthlyArmored Attacker made its debut.

Many of the Super Sixers felt thatStars and Stripes overlooked their ex-ploits, and they started their ownnewspaper.

Army-

ARMOR - anuary-February 1992


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-Sandbagged Sherman passes knocked-out German 88 On 20 March 1945, the 6th passed

through the 3rd and 45th Infantry Di-visions and attacked northeast. Thenext day, it reached the Rhine River.The rapid allied advance caused the10th Armored Division to become en-tangled with the 6th. To sort out theirarmy boundaries, LTG Patton andLTG Patch simply switched divisions,and the 6th returned to the Third

On 25 March 1945, the SuperSixth crossed the Rhine near Oppen-heim, Germany, and passed throughthe 5th Infantry Division. Once again,the division used superior mobility to

h Y .

4

ledics rescue a wounded tanker near Oberdorla. Germany.bypass resistance, and the 6th estab-lished a bridgehead across th e MainRiver near Frankfurt. Then, the divi-sion turned north and reached theFulda River by 2 April 1945. As theGerman resistance grew incoherent,the Super Sixth continued to ad-vance. The 6th captured Langensalza,crossed the Saale River, and estab-lished a bridgehead across the ZwickMulde at Rochlitz when hostilitiesceased on 7May 1945.

After the war, th e point system ro-tated personnel in and out of the divi-sion. The 6th assumed the duty of oc-cupation and military government. In

September 1945, the division movedto a staging area near Le Havre,France. Soon after, units returned toth e United States. On 18 September1945, the 6th Armored Division wasinactivated at Camp Shanks, NewYork. During its short life, the unit es-tablished an incredible record of suc-cessful sustained combat. Today, thespirit of the Super Sixth remainsalive with the 6th Armored DivisionAssociation.

Captain John L. Buckheit prepared thisunit history while temporarily assigned toARMOR Magazine in summer, 1990.

- th Armored Divlsion a t t a c h- ttacks of other armored dlvlsionsSiegfried Line

rml Lin. 0600 houm 20 March



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Abrams Vehicle Fires:An Analysis of FY91byGregory M.Skaff

The lives lost and resources spent onaccidents involving modem Armyweapon systems are staggering. Acci-dents in th e Armor Force are no excep-tion. Although Abrams vehicle firestypically do not result in fatalities orinjuries, the potential is always there.During th e past three years, there havebeen ammunition and personnel heaterfires within the crew compartment,which have resulted in at least threefatalities and serious injuries. Abramsfires do, however, tend to be very ex-pensivein vehicle damage and repair. Avery small fire lasting only a few min-utes can result in thousands of dollarsworth of damage (for example, the av-erage cost of an Abrams fire duringFY91 was over $130,000). Once a fire

has occurred, investigationcompleted, and findingspublished, the bottom lineusually is that the accidentwas caused by human erroror maintenance oversights,and wm preventable.During FY91 there were 43 Abramsvehicle fires reported. Ten fires werereported in Southwest Asia, and 33 invarious other locations. This total repre-sents a slight increase over the FY90total of 39 fires (Figure 1).The increasein Abrams fires can be explained by theincreased operations and reserve com-ponent mobilization in supportof Oper-ation DESERT STORM/DESERTSHIELD. What catches the analystseye is that 28 of the 43 fires(65percent)

70

60

SO

40

30

20

10

0

I ABRAMS VEHICLE FIRES I

IIilFigure1

FY89 FY90 FY91(59) (39) (43)

reported during FY91 were directly re-lated to maintenance shortfalls and/orsoldiers not following proper proce-dures. The followingsummary is an ex-ample of a costly fire caused by an over-sight or poor vehicle maintenance:M l I P Abrams tan ks were conductingfield training exercises at the NationalTraining Center (NTC). The crew onone tank turned on its smoke generatorsystem to create a smoke screen on thebattlefield.As the driver wa s backingout of position, he noticed fu el on the

ground. H e notified his TC. turned ofthe smoke genera tor, and stopped thevehicle. The crew heard a loud noisefrom the engine andflames were seencoming f r om the gr i l l doors . Thevehicles automatic i rs t shot fire extin-guisher discharged, second shot wasmanually discharged, many hand-heldextinguishers were expended, and thefire continued to burn. The local fir edepartmentfinally extinguished thefire.The investigation revealed that the u elline fitting, located between the smokegenerator check valve and the T-fitting,was loose, and allowedfirel to leakontothe hot engine and ground . The cost ofvehicle damage was estimated at morethan $300,000.A review of FY91 fire reports showsthat the causes, by subsystem, are verysimilar to the trend established over the11-year history of Abmms vehicle tires.Fuel and electrical fires continue to bethe top two fire categories, followed by



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ABRAMS FIRES BY SUBSYSTEMFY 91 FIRESTOTAL FIRES FY91 - 43

INCLUDES10SWA

ELECTRICAL -- 10FUEL -- 1

OTHERS -- 9

HYDRAULIC-- 4 NBCSYSTEM- 2Figure2

ABRAMS FIRES BY SUBSYSTEMTOTAL FIRESOTAL FIRES THRU FY91 331

FUEL -- n LECTRICAL-- 96

RANSMISSION-OTHERS -- 28

U B C YSTEM -- 11HYDRAULIC -- 63

hydraulic fluid fires (Figure 2). How-ever, one unusual occurrence surfacedduringth e fiscal year, which needs to behighlighted. There were seven smokegenerator fires reported during FY91,compared to 18 reported from FY80through FY90. All but one of the smokegenerator fires occurred because ofmissing or improperly installed hard-ware. Other points of interest are high-lighted in Figure 3.The number of Abrams vehicle fires

over the past few yearshas not increasedsignificantly; however, the number offires that continue to occur, whichshould have been prevented, is alarm-ing. There have been many hardwareretrofits and operator/maintainer man-

ual changes made, which should correcthardware deficiencies and alert crew-medmaintainers to problem areas. Ad-ditionally, films have been made anddistributed, Chief of Armor messagesand safety-of-use-messages transmit-ted, and hip-pocket checklists distrib-uted to alert the force about Abramsfires and what soldiers should andshould not do to prevent vehicle fires.These fire prevention efforts wereaimed at warning everyone of potentialfire hazards and hardware changes thatneed immediateandcontinual attention.Our efforts have been rewarded, andAbrams fire numbers are holdingsteady. However, we cannot be com-fortable with these results and turn ourattention elsewhere,becausebattery bus

bar retainerboltsare still found missing,spray cans are still placed in the turreton the personnel heaters, fuelhydraulichoses are found loose, and other seem-ingly minor oversights are occurring inthe field that will lead to vehicle firesand possible catastrophes.

This summaryof FY91 Abrams vehi-cle fires should serve as a reminder ofthe extreme dangers vehicle fires poseto the Armor Force. In addition to thehazards fires pose, they are extremelycostly to the forceas a whole in this eraof diminishing resources. Abrams vehi-cle fires can and must be further mini-mized and controlled by continuous at-tention and supervision of operationsand maintenance.

Abrarns Vehicle FiresFY91Key Highlights:

Ten of the Abrams fires occu rred in SW Asia.There were seven smoke generator fires in FY91, compared to 18 in the10 previou s years.Ten of the fires involved National Guard units.Four of the fires occu rred at test sites.Damage from the 10 SW Asia fires cost m ore than $5 million.Damage from the remainder of the fires cost $1.7 million, an average ofFive fires caus ed no reported damageTwenty of the fires resulted in costs below $10,000.$52,798.

Figure 3ARMOR - anuary-February 7992

Mr. Gregory Skaf f hasbeen the Armor SystemsSafety Engineer for the Di-rectorate of Combat Devel-opments, Armor Center andSchoo l, Fort Knox, Ky. since1987. He has a Bachelor ofScience Degree inCivil En-gineering from West V irginiaUniversity and an MS in En-v i ronmenta l Hea l th andSafety Management fromIndiana University.

11


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The 823d at Mortain: Heroes Allby Dr. Charles M. Baily and Mr. Jay KaramalesForce comparisons usually result inbeancounts of men and weapons.However, one important factor, cour-age, usually cannot be quantified bythe models used to compare forces.But bravery counts, and at Mortain,France, in 1944 it overcame bothtechnology and numbers when Ameri-cans stopped an enemy attempt to sal-vage German fortunes on the Westernfront.At Mortain, the beancount wasparticularly bad for U.S. orces. The25,500 attacking Germans out-numbered the 6,000 men in th e regi-

1

ments of the defending 30th InfantryDivision, and XLVII Panzer Corpshad about four times as many tanks?Further, American units were at a dis-tinct technological disadvantage be-cause neither the infantrys organicantitank weapons nor the guns of at-tached tank and tank destroyer (TD)battalions could penctrate the front ofthe German Panthers hull?For nearly six wecks following D-Day, the Germans had confined theallies to a narrow lodgemcnt area andgrinding attrition warfare. But on 25July, the Americans broke out at SI.

Lo! For the Gcrmans, the situationwas disastrous. In static defense, theGermans had been able to hold thcirown. Largely horse-drawn and withtheir movements exposed to allied airsuprcmacy, the German Army couldnot compctc in mobile warfare. To re-store the situation, the Germans dcs-pcratcly assembled forces to coun-terattack toward Avranchcs and cutthe Arncricans only supply route.Gcrman ficld commanders hopcd toreach Avranchcs and establish a dc-fcnse along thc Scc River, cutting offthe forccs exploiting to the south,



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Neither the Infantrys organic antitankweapons nor the guns of attached tankand tank destrover battalions could

while HiUer optimistically dreamed ofsweeping the Americans into the sea.The Battle of Mortain

For the attack, the Germans assem-bled four Panzer divisions: 1st SSPanzer, 2nd SS Panzer, 2nd Panzer,and 116th Panzer. Altogether, thesedivisions had 120 to 190 tanks, abouthalf of them Panthers. Leading th emain attack, 2nd Panzer was to attackalong the Barthelemy-Juvigny road,followed by 1st SS , which would ex-ploit and capture Avranches. The116th Panzer was to cover the north-ern flank, while 2nd SS protected thesouth and captured Hill 314, tacticallyvital because it offered observation ofall American forces south ofAvranches (Fig. 1). At H-hour, mid-night of 6 August, only the 30th In-fantry Division and its attached tankdcstroyer battalion, the 823rd, stood inthe way.

On the morning of 6 August, the30th Infantry moved south to relievethe 1st Infantry Division at Mortain.Hampered by traffic snarls, it took thedivision all day to move into position,not closing until 2000, only four hoursbefore th e attack was to begin. The117th regiment protected St.Barthelemy, the 120th occupied Mor-lain and Hill 314, while the 119th

5

stayed in reserve. Lack of time forceda hasty occupation of the 1st IDS po-sitions, intended only for protectionduring a temponry halt. Later, the30th ID concluded that the inability toprepare its own defensive positionswas its major difficulty in defendingMortain.6

Delayed by their own tnffic snarls,the Germans were not able to get theirattack underway until about 0600.7 Inthe south, th e 2nd SS launched a two-pronged drive around Hill 314. The

southern drive overran the Americandefenders, captured Mortain, and pen-etrated about five miles to the south-west, but the roadblock at LAbbaye-Blanche stopped the northern thrustdead in its tracks. Second Panzer, by-passing resistance at St. Barthelemy,managed to advance as far as leMesnil Adelee. But the main attackbogged down by noon of 7 August,more than ten miles from its objective(Fig. 1). Overall, the German attack atMortain was a harbinger of the later

I

---_m=?:-- --------- - -

~~

Fiaure 1.ARMOR - anuary-February 7992 13


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offensive at the Ardennes; the mainattack went nowhere, while secondaryefforts made frighteningly deep ad-vances, but in operationally pointlessdirections.

Even though Mortain and St.Barthelemy fell, the 30th Infantry Di-vision, with heavy losses, stopped th eadvance down th e Juvigny road andheld Hill 314.* In their writings afterthe war, German authors were loath togive any credit to the tactical skill orcourage of American soldiers whenthey explain their reverses on the bat-tlefield, usually ascribing defeat to Al-lied air power and lavish expenditureof materiel. Writing about Mortain,one German author described it as thefirst attack stopped totally by airpower. But this description does notexplain why the Germans main at-tack bogged down by noon on thefirst day, before the fog lifted and aircould play a role. The explanation forthe defeat of th e German attack isfound in the actions of the defenders.This account focuses on the men ofthe 823d TD battalion.The Fight of the 8234

One of these men, LieutenantGeorge Greene, Third Platoon leader,B Co., arrived at St. Barthelemy justbefore sunset on 6 August (Fig. 2).Directed by the infantry to occupyformer positions of the self-propelledtank destroyers supporting the 1st ID,Greene found the sites to be very poorones for his towed guns, but in thedark he had no opportunity to findnew ones. Further, there was no op-portunity to coordinate with the infan-try; Greene had no idea where theywere deployed. Dense fog began set-tling over the Mortain area during thenight. At about 0500, German artilleryfire began in earnest but did littledamage to the defenders of St.Barthelemy. Recognizing the b m g e

Figure2. U.S. positions are seen in greater detail in Figure4, page 17.as the prelude to an attack, the Ameri-cans were now fully alert. When theb m g e lifted at about 0615, the menof 3rd Platoon stood to their guns.

Soon, the tank destroyer men heardshouts and German voices jabberinglike monkeys. The Germans werefrom 1st SS Panzer, who expectedthat St. Barthelemy had been clearedby 2nd Panzer, and a Panther led theiradvance. Apparently alerted to the un-expected presence of Americans, thetank advanced slowly while sprayingthe sides of the road with its hull-mounted machine gun. Crouched be-hind the thin shield of gun numberone, Platoon Sergeant Martin waitedtensely while listening to the unmis-takable metallic squeal and clank oftank tracks approaching. Finally, hecould see muzzle flashes from the ma-chine gun. He ordered his gunner toaim at the muzzle flashes and fire.The guns muzzle blast broke the fogand revealed that one 3-inch round atless than 50 yards range had set thetank on fire and caused it to slewsideways, blocking the road. Pro-tected by the fog, the Germans strug-gled for nearly an hour to clear theroad while pouring small arms fire atthe Americans. Finally clearing the

Panther from the road, th e Germanssent another one its way. At a nngeof about 30 yards, Sergeant Martin re-peated his earlier performance and an-other Panther burned. For the timebeing, the German advance. up theroad from Mortain was stalled.

Meanwhile, the Germans were at-tacking St. Barthelemy from sevenldirections, and fighting was becomingintense. By 0800, the fog was becom-in g patchy, rising and falling like acurtain. Elements of 2nd Panzer at-tacked from the northeast, and 3rdPlatoons number three gun killed oneof its tanks at 50 yards. At about thesame time, the crew of gun numbertwo to the south spotted a Panther try-ing to cross the field to the southeastless than a 100 yards away. Two AProunds into the side of the tankstopped it.

Fighting in St. Barthelemy was be-coming more bitter and confused asGermans continued to assault the out-numbered American infantry and in-filtrate through the town. During thenext couple of hours th e situation de-teriorated as Americans were killed ordriven from their positions and smallarms fire cracked around Greenesmen. By about 1000,higher headquar-



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-If either the Infantrymen or TD crews ha d abandoned their positionswhen it became obvious they were outmatched, certainly by about0900, the Germans might have had a chance to cover the 70miles toA vranches while stili protected by fog.

ters was convinced that St.Barthelemy had been overrun. Duringthis period, it would have been easyfor lesser men than those of 3rd Pla-toon to convince themselves that theyhad done enough and should with-draw. Bu t courage prevailed in thissmall unit; the men stayed at theirguns.About 1O00, the lifting fog revealedanother tank to th e crew of numberthree about 100 yards away. Twoquick AP rounds destroyed it. Shortlyafterward, the Germans eliminated thetroublesome gun. Similarly, to th esouth the lifting fog exposed the num-ber one gun to a German tank, whichdestroyed it. To replace the gun,Greene decided to reposition numberfour, which had not fired all morningbecause of bad fields of fire. In addi-tion, German half-tracks and infantry,protected by a hedgerow, were begin-ning to move up a sunken trail south-west of gun two. Under a hail ofsmall arms fire, Greene tried two dif-ferent positions for number four, evendigging a gap in the hedge in the lasteffort, but the gun could not be de-pressed enough to engage the half-tracks. Ultimately, the crew had topull the firing pin and abandon thegun.About the same time, between 1030

and 1100, the last remaining gun,number two, spotted a Panther mov-ing up the Mortain road through a gapin the hedgerow that had preventedthe gun from hitting the tanks en-gaged earlier by Sergeant Martin. Thetank destroyer men put a round into.the side of the tank, but it continuedto roll into the town where it stoppedand began to bum. Shortly afterward,another German tank spotted the gunand hi t it with a round of HE, injuringsome of the crew and forcing them toabandon the now useless gun.

By this time, it was clear to Greenethat it was time to get what was leftof his platoon out of St. Barthelemy.Before he could act, an infantry ser-geant ran into his CP begging for amachine gun to prevent hi s unit frombeing overrun. Taking a machine gunfrom one of the half-tracks, Greeneand the sergeant set off for theinfantrys position. A Panther put around into the hedgerow next to them,killing the infantryman. Greenesprayed the hedgerows to keep th eGermans at bay until he ran out ofammunition.* Unarmed, he ran into aGerman and had no choice but to sur-render. Most of hi s men met the samefate or were killed; only a few made itback to the battalion.

In hindsight, the action was a tacti-cal defeat for the 3rd Platoon, but itwas part of a larger victory. The stoutdefense of St. Barthelemy by the menof the 30th ID and the 823d cost theGermans over six hours at a placethey had expected to move throughquickly. If either the infantrymen orTD crews had abandoned their posi-tions when it became obvious theywere outmatched, certainly by about0900, the Germans might have had achance to cover the 10 miles toAvranches while still protected byfog. By the time they could beginmoving through the town, the fog wasgone. Allied fighters filled the sky andruthlessly strafed and rocketed anyGerman trying to move down theJuvigny road. For his part, Greene re-ceived no decoration for his actions.Instead, he was rewarded with eightmonths as a POW, including a gruel-ing mid-winter march through Ger-many that should have killed him.

Before Greenes platoon succumbed,the infantry had already begun to rein-force St. Barthelemy. About 0900, thecommander of the 117th Infantry or-dered Lt. L. Lawson Neel, First Pla-

toon leader, B. Co., to move to St.Barthelemy to reinforce the belea-guered defenders.I3 Reconnoiteringfor a gun position, Nee1 reached thetown and found Germans everywhere,and he assumed the infantry had been0~errun. l~y 0930, he had returnedto the town with a gun (Fig. 2). Thecrew had barely finished emplacingthe gu n when a Panther, accompaniedby infantry, emerged from behind ahouse. The tank commander spottedthe gun, and Neel, from only 20 yardsaway, could hear the tank commanderbarking fire commands. Damn it,shoot, yelled Neel, and a 3-inchround slammed through the side ofthe tank. Its crew bailed out, and theGerman advance halted. Almost im-mediately, small arms fire from theGerman infantry began hitting the gunshield like water from a hose, andthe Germans were close enough to tryrolling grenades under th e shield.After removing the firing pin, thecrew abandoned the gun and half-track. One of the men asked Neel ifthis meant that they were running; th elieutenant assured him they were onlyrelocating.

As Nee1 walked down the road tohis platoons position, he encountereda jeep carrying an unknown senior of-ficer. This man, seeing what musthave appeared to be an officer fleeingthe battle, angrily demanded, Whereare you going, Lieutenant? Nee1 re-sponded tersely, To get another gun.The officer drove away.

Nobody ordered Neel to return tothe fight. In the tradition of otherbrave soldiers, Nee1 rearmed himselfand marched to the sound of the guns.By 1100, Neel and another gun crewfound a position about 800 yards westof St. Barthelemy along the road toJuvigny. The west side of a hedgerowthat ran perpendicular to the road of-fered concealment from the advancing



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IAbbaye-Blanche7 - 12August 1944-mhectomctor _._

IC (),/ Machlm Gun (u1lb.r) / LandinesFigure3.

Germans. About noon, the crew couldsee the muzzle brake of a Pantheremerging from around the hedgerow,bouncing up and down as th e tankcrept forward fitfully. After a thou-sand forevers, the gun tube and thenthe tank finally appeared 50 yards infront of the tensely waiting gun crew.Neels gun sent a round into its flank.After the crew bailed out, Nee1spurred their flight with a round ofHE. An overwatching German tankfired a round of explosive into thehedgerow, spraying the crew with dirtand hot fragments. Abandoning thegun, the TD men joined infantry de-fending the next hedgerow to thewest. The abandoned Panther blockedthe road to Juvigny and became thehigh water mark of the Germnnsmain attack. Again, American groundforces had effectively StoDDed a Ger-

man advance before air power enteredthe equation.South of St. Barthelemy, the defend-ers of Abbaye Blanche were also con-tributing to the Germans defeat. Dur-ing th e afternoon of 6 August, in-fantrymen from the 30th Division anda TD platoon began establishing a pe-rimeter around the illa age.'^ The in-fantry unit was a platoon from the120th Infantry Regiment, reinforcedby the regimental antitank company.But defense against tanks dependedchiefly on Lt. Tom Springfields pla-toon from B Company, 823d. In con-trast to Greenes experience, the twolieutenants, with Springfield in com-mand. established a coordinated dc-fense to cover the norlhern ap-proaches to Momin .When he arrived at Abbaye Blancheat about 1700 on the 6th, Springlicld

had orders to occupy the 1stInfantrys former positions. LikeGreene, he judged the positions to bethoroughly unsuitable, but in his casehe had time to find better positions ona ridge about 200 yards to the north(Fig. 3). He emplaced two guns be-hind a hedgerow where they couldcover Highway 3, about 400 yards tothe east. He positioned the other twoguns on each side of Highway 2 toprotect that avenue of advance. By thetime darkness fell, the crews had dugin their guns. During the night, sol-diers of 2nd SS Panzer division ad-vnnced to launch a two-pronged at-tack around Hill 314. South of Mor-t i n , th e Germms struck at about0100, quickly overrunning the Ameri-can roadblocks and entering the town.The northern attack did not beginuntil about 0500. A reconnaissance

~ ~



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Figure 4.unit with an armored car made firstcontact as it advanced down a trail to-ward an infantry roadblock. At closerange, the Americans knocked out thearmored car with a 57-mm gun. Ma-chine gun fire took care of the othervehicles and killed most of th e Ger-mans.

As it became light, the crews ofSpringfields one and two guns couldsee, through patchy fog, German vehi-cles moving north on Highway 3. Thehighway climbed a hill in front of theguns, which forced the vehicles toslow down and provided easy targets.Opening fire, they quickly destroyed atank, three half-tracks, and an ammu-nition truck- he latter identified bya gratifying secondary explosion.

An hour later, about 0600, he Ger-mans attacked down Highway 2 to-ward guns three and four. Infantry ac-

companied by two half-tracks, onemounting a 75-mm gun, made the at-tack. The two 3-inch guns quicklykilled the half-tracks, and infantrymendrove off the remaining Germans.Ex-cept for heavy and continuous Ger-man artillery fire,most of which over-shot the ridge line, this 15-minuteskirmish was to be the last attack onthe Abbaye Blanche roadblock on 7August. But the defenders had morethan artillery to keep them busy.

Inexplicably, or perhaps just stu-pidly, the Germans kept trying to pushvehicles up Highway 3 toward St.Barthelemy all day on the 7th and 8thof August. As the vehicles slowed toclimb the road, they provided a shoot-ing gallery for the crews on guns oneand two. As Springfield later recalled,For two days, we fired all day. Notbothering to keep score at the time, he

later estimated that his guns killedabout 30 vehicles during the battle, in-cluding at least 10tanks.

During the night of 7-8 August, theGermans pounded the roadblock withheavy Nebelwerfer rockets, woundingabout four defenders. At dawn, the SSrenewed their attack on the roadblock.About 0500, German infantry salliedfrom the orchard northwest of gunsthree and four, but the Americansdrove them off. Simultaneously, a pa-trol attacked the outpost at Villeneuve,and infantry defeated this attack also.Soon after, the Germans struck thetwo guns with tanks and infantry. Thegun crews quickly killed two tanksand four half-tracks, but the Germaninfantry, reinforced by a flame-thrower, continued the attack dis-mounted. Led by Springfield,a strikesquad repulsed the attack, dispatch-

ARMOR - anuary-February 1992 17


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ing the flame-thrower operator in aball of fire.

During the following days, pressuredecreased on the roadblock as heavyAmerican reinforcements moved intothe Mortain area and shifted to the of-fensive. On the loth, the Germanslaunched a final attack on th e road-block, but the defenders repulsedthem with heavy losses. That night, asa fitting end to the battle, a lost andconfused German half-track loadedwith wounded rolled up toSpringfield's CP. Looking from a sec-ond floor window, he announced tothe Germans that they were now pns-oners of war. The battle of Mortainwas over. On the 12th, the 30th Infan-try Division and the 823d joined th emassive Allied pursuit toward Ger-many.

The stories of these three platoonsare, of course, an incomplete accountof th e Battle of Mortain. But their ex-perience illustrates the courage andcompetence that American soldiersbrought to the battlefields of North-west Europe during World War 11.Numbers would have amounted to lit-tle without their devotion and skill.And, in passing, it should be notedthat none of the three platoon leaderswas a professional soldier. These menwere citizens answering theircountry's call in wllrtime. Americawill need to have men such as thesein the future.As a. more practical lesson fortoday's soldiers, the value of coordi-nation between units is demonstratedby these actions.'Although the oddsagainst Greene were probably tooheavy for a successful defense of hisposition, the contrast between thechaos at St. Barthelemy and the suc-cessful defense of Abbaye Blanche isillustrative.

.

Notes'Authors' Note. This article is m ade possible

by a study sponsored by the US. Army Con-cepts Analysis Agency and conducted by Sci-ence Applications International Corporation.Other members of the SAIC research teamwere: Victoria Young, Albert Mcloynt, andJoyce Boykin. The team condu cted intensive re-search into unit records at the National Ar-

chives and available materials at the Infantryand Armor Schools. uncovering data that hasnot been published previously. But most im-portant, interviews with the three platoon lead-ers described in this article, L. Lawson Neel,Thomas Springfield. and George Greene, un-covered information that had remained un-ta ped byhistorians.

'Figures for American units are from G-1Journ al and File, 30th Infantry Division, Augu st1944, Record Group 407. National Archives.Suitland. MD. The 117th Regiment had 2,534men. and the 120th had 3,008. Approximately300 men from the tank destroy er battalion rein-forced the regiments. The total was rounded upto account for other attachments. German fig-ures are from Gersdorff. General Freiherr von,The Campign in Northern France,Volume IV,Chapter 4, "The German Counterattack AgainstAvranches." unpublished manuscript, MS B-725. Foreign Military Studies. National Ar-chives, Washington. D.C.In July 1944, First Army conducted testsagainst captured Panthers to detemiine the ef-fectiveness of U.S. weapons. The results werediscouraging. Neither the organic antitankweapons of the infantry divisions, the 57-mmantitank gun and 2.36-inch rocket launcher @a -zooka), or the 3-inch guns of reinforcing tankdestroyer battalions could penetrate the front ofthe Panther's sturdy hull at any range. At closerange, 200 yards, the 3-inch gun only had achance of penetrating the turret's f ront. Butidentifying the problem did not rectify it. Laterarrival of more powerful 90-mm guns onlypartly alleviated the problem. For a more com-plete account of the effectiveness of Americanantitank weapons se e Charles M. Baily. FaintPraise: American Tanks and Tank Destroyersin World War I / , (Hamden, Conn.. Sh oe StringPress, 1983). pp. 1 06-110. The results of theFirst Army test are in Records of the ArmoredFighting Vehicles and Weapons Section. Euro-peanTheater of Operations, Record Group 338,National Archives, Suitland, Md.%e general account of the battle is com piledfrom several sources but the most importantwere: Martin Blumenson, Breakout and Pursuit,(Washington, D.C.. OCM H. 198 4) and Ro bertL Hewitt, Workhorse of the Western Front -The Story of the 30th Infantry Division, (Wash-in ton, D.C., Infantry Journal Press, 1946).'The 823d was a towed battalion ; each of itsthree gun companies had 12 guns and used half-tracks as prime movers. About half the TD bat-talions in the theater were towed. The otherswere self-propelled and equipped with M-10s(3-inch gun) or M-18s (76-mm gun). T he moreeffective M-36 (90-nun gun) did not begin ar-riving in the theater until September.%-3 Joumal and File, 30th Infantry Division,6-7 August 1944, Record Gro up 407. N ationa lArchiv es, Suitland, Md.. a nd Hewitt. Work-horse, pp. 56-77.'Stoeber. Hans, Die Sturnput und do s Ende(Osnabruek, Mumin Verlag GMBH, 1976). p.243 (informal translation).%-1 Journal and File, 30th Infantry Division;117th-317. 119th-23. and 120th-217. After Ac-

3

tion Report, 823d TD Battalion. Record Group407. National Archives reports 109men lost.'Stmber, Die Sturmflut. p. 245.'%e detailed account of the action relies pri-marily on four sources: I ) "30th Infantry Divi-sio n, Mortain." Folder 96. ET0 Combat Inter-views. Record Group 407, National Archives,Suitland. Md. (hereafter cited as Combat Inter-views; this collection is a series of interviewsconducted by ETO's Historical Section sh o d yafter the battle. and this folder has detailed mapoverlays of units down to squad level.), (2)After Action Repon, 823d Tank Destroyer Bat-talion. Record Group 407, (3) Committee 24,Officer's Advanced Course, The ArmoredSchool, Employment of Four Tank DestroyerBanalions in the ETO, (Fort b o x . Ky.. May1950. and (4) interview of George Greene, 25January 1990. McLean, Va."Greene, Interview."Greene, Interview, and the 823d AAR re-ports that Greene was last seen firing a 30cali-ber machine gun from the hip.13Combat nterviews. and Interview with Mr.L Lawson Neel, 1 December 1989, Thomas-ville, Ga.I4Figure is from map overlay in Combat In -terviews. The account is primarily based onNeel, Interview.'SCom6at Interviews and interview withThom as Springfield, 24 January 1990.

McLean, Va.

Charles Baily is a senior an-alyst at Science ApplicationsInternational Corporation inMcLean, Va. Before joiningSAIC, he served 22 years asan Armor officer in a variety ofcommand and staff positionsin Vietnam, Europe, andCONUS. He holds a Phd. inhistory from Duke Universityand is a graduate of the Na-tional War College.

Jay Karamales is a databasedesigner and historical analystfor S A C . He designed the Ar-dennes Campaign simulationand Anti-Armor Defense DataStudy databases for theArmy's Concepts AnalysisAgency and has conductedanalyses of the OperationalTest and Evaluation Agency'sweapons testing programs.He is currently writing a his-tory of two North Carolina reg-iments in the Civil War.



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The Mounted Breach-Making It Workby Captain Walter A. Ware (Scorpion 15)

We should congratulate ourselves.We can now breach complex obsta-cles without relying on manual tech-niques. With the fielding of plows androllers, we not only enhanced ourbreaching capability, but began a pro-cess to develop quickly the expertiseneeded to use these assets. The Na-tional Training Centers heightenedemphasis on breach operations en-abled task forces to acquire the exper-tise and develop standardized tech-niques. The basic philosophy was exe-cution with minimal soldier exposureto fires. Buttoned up was the norm forprotection. Recent rotations validatedthis philosophy, but also brought tobear the complexity of making itwork.

This article addresses many of thetechniques employed, problems en-countered, and solutions developedduring these rotations.The Threat

The Samaran doctrine used byNTCs OPFOR portrayed a genericSouthwest Asia threat. The standardplatoon deliberate defense shown inFigure 1 is discussed in detail in NTCST 91-2. The complexity and depth ofthe obstacle posed a significantchallenge to attacking task forces. Theminefields consisted of buried AT andAP mines (3 to 1 mix). The tankditches were two meters deep, fourmeters wide, and had an enemy sideberm two to three meters high.Intelligence

Breach planning placed a stringentrequirement on gathering enemy ob-stacle intelligence. A comprehensiveand detailed reconnaissance and secu-

rity plan was required to co n f i i ordeny the enemy obstacle template. Al-though the above should not be newto anyone, the R&S plan was usuallywhere the breakdown occurred. Toomany times, units crossed the LDwithout any more information thanthat included on the original template.Some noted problems include:

.R&S plans lacked the detail re-quired for elements to fully under-stand what they were looking for andthus, what to report, such as type ofwire, type of mines and mix, presenceof booby traps, enemy patrol strength,etc. One technique was to augmentthe scouts with an engineer section orsquad. This should be a habitual rela-tionship.

.Lack of emphasis on tracking theexecution after R&S responsibilitieswere issued.

.Little or no lateral coordination ofassets: sapper teams, scouts, and dis-mounted patrols.

.Information that was gathered didnot get to the S2.

.When the S2 did receive informa-tion, he issued a raw informationdump to subordinate units without an-alyzing and refining his template.

.Too much emphasis on c on f i i ngtemplated obstacles as opposed toconfirming that the axis up to the tem-platedknown obstacles was, in fact.clear. Both areas require equal empha-sis. Units often wasted valuable timebreaching nonexistent obstacles or en-countering unexpected obstacles.



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.Not clearly identifying thecommanders expected outcome of theR&S effort. What informationdoes hewant by LD?

.Attempting to execute R&S andcovert breach plans, simultaneously.We should not commit covert breachforces until the results of the R&Splan are in and analyzed. Pre-commit-ment often compromised R&S assetsbefore their mission was complete.Use th e information gathered to planthe covert breach.FM 34-2-1 and FM 90-13-1 are ex-

cellent tools for R&S plan develop-ment.

Breach Force and MobilityReserveThe breach force base was normall:

an m o r company team with a mini-mum of one engineer platoon at-tached. The two tank platoons wereaugmented with additional plows androllers, to a minimum of two plowsand one roller per platoon. The engi-neer platoon was augmented with twoAVLBs, two CEVs/ACEs, and an ad-ditional MICLIC (total of two MICL-ICs in the platoon).

The engineer company (-) formedthe base for the mobility reserve. Themobility reserve moved in support ofthe breach force, providing quick re-placement of disabled forward breachassets or reopening blocked lanes.Once at the breach site, uncommittedplows remained on the friendly sideunder the command and control of theengineer company commander.Breach Sequence

Units soon realized that the order orsequence of breach equipment deter-mined success or failure. Using gath-ered intelligence and enemy doctrine,the S2 and TF engineer graphicallyportrayed the anticipated or knownenemy obstacles by type and order(see Figure 1). The staff analyzed thegraphic display and carefully deter-mined what breach assets were avail-

.

20

Standard Platoon Deliberate Defense

- 00-3OOM- Revet nen suu r;;nks

systems

150 - 200M Trenches

Minefieldw / W i r eJ

0000000000

200Mt ,0000000000075MJ.3J200 - 400M

00000000000125M- 0000000000J?50 -100M

Minefieldw / W i r e

Tank DitchMinefield

800

Figure 1

1OOOM

loi o 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Minefield



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Breach Sequence Graphic Displaycoooooooooool~ _ _ooooooooooo l10000000000

0000000000000000000000

l ooooooooooo lI ooooooooooo i- -PI#PLOW

AVLB0 ENGRAPC

PLOW

ACE w/MICLIC

ENGRAPCFigure 2

PLOW

PLOW

AVLBPLOW

PLOW

~~ ~~~~

able to breach each type obstacle.This determination showed how bestto sequence the equipment. If buriedmines were suspected, and the leadingedge of the initial or second minefieldwas not identified, a roller was incor-porated into the sequence. Other vehi-cles incorporated into the sequencewere engineerAPCs for marking. An-other plow, ACE or AVLB, and MIC-LIC were added for redundancy. Anyplanned sequence was based on avail-able assets. For example: Given thecomplex obstacle in Figure 1 and as-suming the leading edges of the mine-fields were not identified, a possibleobstacle solution is minefield - mine-field - tank ditch - minefield - mine-field, thus dictating th e vehicle se-quence as roller - plow - AVLB -Engr AFT - plow - ACE w/MICLIC -Engr AFT.

A graphic display of this solution isdepicted in Figure 2.Steps

1. The roller detects the leading edge2. The plow clears the lane.3. The first engineer APC marks the

lane.4. The second engineer AFT placesth e far, intermediate, and funnel guidemarkers.5 . The roller regains the lead, fol-

lowed by original sequence.6. The roller detects the leading edgeof second minefield.

7. The plow Clem the lane to tankditch, backs up and moves off thelane to the side (clearinga path).8. The AVLB moves forward, brid-ges the tank ditch, and backs up toallow the plow back onto the lane.

9. As the plow moves over thebridge, th e AVLB launcher occupiesthe cleared side path vacated by the

10. The first engineer AFT followsthe plow and marks the lane.11. The second engineer APC placesthe far, intermediate, and funnel guidemarkers, but remains on the friendlyside of the lane. Upon completion,

of first minefield.

plow.

ARMOR - January-February1992 21


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CLAMS

they fall under the command and con-trol of the mobility reserve.

The remaining plows and ACES stayon the friendly side of the secondminefield ready to react if a forwardplow or AVLB is disabled. If they arenot committed by the time the lane iscompleted, they fall under the com-mand and control of the mobility re-serve.Breach Location

If possible, breaching was conductedon an assailable flank. However, indesert operations the wide open ter-rain and boundless linear obstaclesusually required frontal assaults. Se-lecting the point of breach dependedon several factors, including: a deter-mined weakness in the defense (likelyunit boundaries), location where ter-rain best concealed breach, location ofa suitable support by fire position, andtrafficability. Two lanes per task forcewas the standard. The purpose forplanning two lanes was not only to fa-cilitate passage, but also to provide re-dundancy if problems arose clearingone of the lanes. As forces were com-mitted to the first open lane, efforts tocomplete the second lane did notcease. Vehicles were often disabledin the initial lane, or the lane wasblocked by enemy FASCAM. A com-pleted second lane allowed quick tran-sition and a sustained assault on theobjective. As soon as the situationpermitted, two-way traffic was estab-lished to allow evacuation.

Planned spacing between lanes wasa minimum of 100 meters. Lanescloser than 100 meters were too easilytargeted by direct and indirect fires.As the distance increased, there was atmde-off of command and control infavor of dispersion.Ass aul t Lane Marking

The assault marking of lanes was ac-complished by a variety of techniques.Some task forces used Tippy Tomsand VS-17 panels.

Tippy Toms are lane markers aboutfive feet high, weighted at the bottom,with a glass fiber mast and markerpanel at the top.

When they are thrown out the backof the APC, he weight causes them toright themselves.

Others relied on little other thanCLAMS and the plowed path left bythe breach vehicles. The latter methodproved acceptable for lead vehicles,but follow-on vehicles and units haddifficulty identifying the location ofthe lane. If the location was found,vehicles could not clearly identify thelane itself and often veered off intominefields. CLAMS proved difficultto guide on after several vehicles hadpassed through the lane.

The most successful technique usedVS-17 panels or highway markers toprovide far, intermediate, and funnelguide markers and Tippy Toms tomark the actual lane. Tippy Toms sig-nificantly increased the speed ofmarking and limited the exposure of

soldiers. Tippy Toms were stored onthe inside of the APC.They were thenlobbed out of the open hatch at 20-25meter intervals on the left-hand sideof the lane. The entrance and exit ofthe lane were designated by an addi-tional Tippy Tom on the right handside.

Logistical and time constraints re-quired two dedicated engineer APCsper lane. A typical lane marking pack-age included 30-40 Tippy Toms and8-12 VS-17 panelshighway markers.The first Apc, it h Tippy Toms, wasresponsible for marking the lane, andthe second APC placed the initial rec-ognition markers. If possible, a back-up marking team, with identical as-sets, moved with the mobility reserve.A critical part of the lane markingAPCs mission was to maintain i ts po-sition within the breach sequence. As-signing the entire marking mission toonly one engineer APC proved toodemanding a task.

Appendix F of FM 5-71-100 (Feb91, Coordinating Draft) describesavailable lane markers and examplesof lane marking systems.

Con tinge ncy PlanningPlanning for contingencies was an

integral part of the breach operation.Successful task forces designatedbreach assets for contingency opera-tions and organized a mobility reserveto control these assets. Situations re-quiring this reserve frequently m-



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curred and detailed planning was es-sential for timely resolution.

The mobility reserve should stay onthe friendly side of the obstacle untilall key elements have cleared thelanes. This requires that the mobilityreserves command and control alsostay on the friendly side of the obsta-cle. The best technique was to desig-nate the engineer company com-mander as the breach site/mobility re-serve commander. He already was re-sponsible for marking the lanes andfor assisting with the passage of fol-low-on elements. As breach site com-mander, he incurred the additional re-sponsibility of maintaining trafficflow through the lanes and authorityto commit mobility reserve assets.

If all the mobility reserve assets arenot under th e engineer commanderscontrol during movement, then estab-lished criteria implement turnover ofcommand and control.FASCAMPlanning locations and criteria for

execution of FASCAM were majorconsiderations during breach planning.Task forces developed five basic stepsfor success.

1. Evaluate possible conflicts withfriendly movement before finalizingany plan.2. Determine weaknesses in flank

security and suitability for FASCAM.3. Anticipate enemy repositioningand counterattack avenues and deter-

mine need for FASCAM in delayingor deterring these enemy movements.4. Ensure execution criteria were es-

tablished before committing this lim-ited and valuable asset. Determine de-cision points (DPs) and assign surveil-lance responsibilities to verify criteriaare met. Keep in mind the time re-quired to deliver the FASCAM on tar-get, its duration, and impact on avail-ability of other fires during FASCAMfiring.5. Plan FASCAM targets in excess

of your allocation. Prioritize and exe-cute FASCAM targets as the criteriaare met. Know where the brigade con-trolled FASCAMs are targeted andtheir criteria for execution.

RehearsalsTo conduct a full-up combined arms

rehearsal was not a last minute, checkthe block, requirement.It was the crit-ical activity in preparation for thebreach. Planning for the rehearsal in-volved not only setting aside suffi-cient time, but also early detailing ofthe engineers to construct a model ofthe anticipated enemy obstacle.

Successful task forces did not justtalk their way through the breach.They assembled the actual personneland vehicles involved and executedthe breach, as many times as neces-sary. They discussed contingency op-erations and practiced them. Involve-ment of support and assault forceswas essential.

As the complexity of this battle drillwas simplified through repetitious re-hearsals, an additional benefitemerged. Company/teams could nowuse a variation of this same drill toexecute in-stride breaches quickly,through less complex obstacles withorganic assets. This new found abilityproved significant during missions forwhich the enemy situation was not asclear. Good rehearsals have enabledotherwise doomed operations toachieve success.Conclusion

The lessons learned at NTC and dur-ing Operation DESERT STORM areshaping the future of breach opera-tions. As advancements in technologyand techniques are implemented, ourability to make it work can only im-prove.

Captain Walter A. Ware isthe Engineer CompanyTrainer on the MechanizedInfantry TF Training Teamat the NTC. He has pre-viously served as projectengineer, St. Louis EngineerDistrict; platoon leader, D/1EN Co., lID (F ); and assis-tant S3 and company com-mander, 237 th EN Battalion.He attended the Armor Offi-cer Advanced Course.



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A Leap ofbyColonel Lon E. Maggart

T h e real subject of this article iscohesion. Cohesion allowed theleaders of this brigade to attackand destroy substantial Iraqi forcesand equipment under the most dif-ficult of conditions decisively andwithout hesitation.Devil 6, This is Dreadnought 6... Ihave some concerns about this attack.

If I am alive tomorrow morning, Iwould like to talk to you about thisoperation! Devil 6, This is Demon6... If Im alive in the morning, in -clude me in the discussion too!Dreadnought 6. Demon 6, This isDevil 6. If Im alive tomorrow, I willbe more than happy to discuss thisoperation with you both!

This somber radio conversation tookplace late on the night of 26 February1991 in eastern Iraq, just before th e1st Brigade, 1st Infantry Division wasto conduct a forward passage of linesthrough the 2d Armored Cavalry Reg-iment to attack and destroy what re-mained of the Tawakalna Division ofthe Republican Guards. The eventswhich lead to this moment in time in-cluded the deliberate breach and de-struction of the 110th Infantry Bri-gade, 26th Iraqi Division, over theprevious two days and an approachmarch of some 125 kilometersthrough rain, high winds, and blowingdust that had begun at 0530 thatmorning. The night attack and subse-quent operations described in this arti-cle are both important and interestingfrom a historical viewpoint. However,the real subject of this article is cohe-sion. Cohesion allowed the leaders ofthis brigade to attack and destroy sub-stantial Iraqi forces and equipmentunder the most difficult conditions de-cisively and without hesitation. Whatfollows is the story of a cohesive unitin combat and what made it that way.

Faith

.-- - - t . nFigures 1 and 2 graphically depict theoperation and can be used to referencespecific information found in the text.

The morning of 26 February startedwith the brigade moving in columnbehind an advance guard provided bythe 1-4 Cavalry through a seven-kilo-meter comdor between the 3d Ar-mored Division on the north and th e1st (UK) Armoured Division to th esouth. The division mission was to es-tablish a corps directed reserve posi-tion 85 kilometers to the northeast byearly afternoon. However, as the daywore on, the location of the reserveposition began to shift farthereastward. Eventually, the mission

changed as well. When th e brigadehalted at mid-afternoon for refueling,the division commander issued achange of mission over th e radio forthe 1st and 3d Brigades to attack eastto destroy the Tawakalna Division,which the 2d Armored Cavalry Regi-ment had fixed in place 40 kilometersto the east. He set th e start point timefor 1730 hours, just as night was fall-ing.

There was time only to reviewquickly a three-week-old intelligenceoverprint of the Tawakalna Divisionslocation and disposition and to pro-duce a rudimentary operations order.

The Battle of Norfolk26-27 Feb 1991

1-34 It;.

31 k3/LO A PL MILFORO.W.%.P.sWPL LIME ....

bn I I I0 5 n nPT70 7 5 80 85

Fiaure 124 ARMOR - anuary-February 1992


27/56

The brigade continued to move relentlessly toward a collision with the Tawakalna Division.In reality, th e order gave only a mis-sion, a series of way points that de-fined the direction of attack, three ob-jectives, and a limit of advance calledPhase Line Milford. The brigademoved out promptly at 1730 with thefirst order of business to simplifycommand and control by closing thetwo lead battalions together. This ac-tion massed the brigade and elimi-nated the possibility of fratricide be-tween organic units. During the firstminutes of the move, lead battalionsalso had to mark their vehicles withchemlights for identification duringthe rapidly falling darkness. All ofthis was no small task because thelead battalions were separated by sixto seven kilometers, and all necessarycoordination had to be made over theradio while the brigade was moving.To further complicate the operation,the trailing battalion, TF 5-16 Infan-try, had closed on the refuel point

only moments before the two leadbattalions began moving to the east.Navigation in the desert was diffi-cult, even with the Magellan globalpositioning system. However, th emost consistently difficult aspect ofthis approach march was to keep th etwo lead battalions aligned. One bat-talion attacked using a box, while theother used a diamond. ,Considerablecross-talk was necessary to keep ev-erything generally aligned to preventfratricide.

During the course of the move, thedivision commander provided severaladditional instructions. The first was achange in the passage of lines throughthe 2d ACR. In the original concept,the brigade was to pass through th e 1-4 Cavalry, then, approximately ten ki-lometers farther to the east, passthrough the 2d ACR in zone to attackand destroy the Tawakalna Divisionthat was defending from prepared de-

IqP

PL LIME PL MILFORD PL PLUM PLBERLW70 80 90 CO 10 20 30 40 50 60I I I PTlOT I I I I I 1

Figure 2

fensive positions. The area betweenth e line of departure and Phase LineMilford, the limit of advance, wasObjective Norfolk. As a result, thisbattle became known as the Battle ofNorfolk.As the brigade moved rapidly to-ward the enemy, the division com-mander issued a second fragmentaryorder that required the brigade to con-duct the passage through the 2d ACRalong a specific ten-kilometer zoneidentified by two sets of grid coordi-nates. In addition, he gave a radio fre-quency and the call sign Cougar toenable the brigade to contact the 2dACR to coordinate the passage. Thisfrago necessitated a complete changein direction for the brigade. It is diffi-cult to describe how complicated itwas to redefine the direction of attackand to change formations whilebouncing across the desert in th e deadof night at high speed using a1:250,000 scale map. Even with theMagellan, this was an incredibly diffi-cult undertaking. Notwithstanding theproblems of changing the plan en-route, the brigade modified the zoneof action and continued toward thepassage point.

The brigade continued to move re-lentlessly toward a collision with th eTawhlna Division when th e divisioncommander called once again to di-rect that a brigade representativemake physical contact with the 2dACR to coordinate the passage. I de-cided that this meeting would occuronly after th e brigade was closer tothe regiment.As the brigade closed on the 2dACR, it was apparent that a pitchedbattle was in progress. Green and redtracers filled the air along with burstsof light from tank cannon fire, MLRS,and conventional tube artillery. Firesfrom destroyed enemy vehicles wereburning fiercely on th e horizon. It was



28/56

like a scene from an old war movie.The members of the brigade knewthey were about to become part of agreat battle.

Just short of the line defended by the2d ACR, the brigade halted longenough to permit the S3 to move for-ward and coordinate the passage of

26

lines. The halt allowed the brigade to The meeting between the brigade S3reposition artillery, to define fire sup- and the 2d ACR yielded little infor-port relationships,to do fire planning, mation that would help in the passage.and perhaps, most important, to reor- We did find out that the brigadeganize after a long and difficult ap- would pass through two differentproach march. Further, this short lull squadrons. Therefore, each of the twoallowed TF 5-16 to close on the main lead battalions, TF 2-34 in the northMY- and 1-34 Armor in the south, would



29/56

have to coordinate with a differentsquadron at the point of passage. Thiswas to cause some difficulty in con-trolling the fight later.At 2230 hours, the brigade began the

passage of lines through the 2d ACR.Coordination bctween 1-34 Armorand the squadron through which it

was to pass occurred quickly and effi-ciently. Enemy locations and, moreimportant, the specific locations of thesquadron, were available to the com-mander of 1-34Armor before the pas-sage. Unfortunately, the situation wasless clear in the north. The exact loca-tion of the squadron through which

The passage into enemyheld territory was an eerie,almost surreal experience.The night sky was filled withcatastrophic explosions andraging fires the likes ofwhich I had never seen be-fore. . Horrible fires roaredfrom the turrets of Iraqi tankswith flames shooting highinto the night air.

~~~ ~~

TF 2-34 had to pass was never clear,and no information on the enemy wasavailable in the zone.

The commander of TF 2-34 was in adifficult position with respect towhere he would be clear of friendlyunits and when he could initiate en-gagements against th e enemy. In theabsence of further information, thecommander of TF 2-34 and I jointlyagreed that the 71 grid line would, byall accounts, place his battalion east ofall 2d ACR units. Given the unclearpicture in the north, I moved into thenorthern sector from my initial posi-tion centered between the two leadbattalions. This was to be a wise deci-sion as the battle unfolded.

The passage into enemy held tem-tory was an eerie, almost surreal expe-rience. The night sky was filled withcatastrophic explosions and ragingfues the likes of which I had neverseen before. Even the destruction offour T-55 tanks during th e breach wasnothing compared to the sight thatjoined our eyes during the transitionfrom friendly to enemy ground. Hom-ble fires roared from the turrets ofIraqi tanks with flames shooting highinto the night air. At the exact pointof passage through the 2d ACR in theTF 2-34 zone, a T-72 tank that theregiment had destroyed earlier thatevening still burned brightly, fillingthe air with the pungent smell ofburning oil, rubber, and flesh. Therewas also present a peculiar smell weal l came to associate with burning So-viet combat equipment. It was a smellthat no one could identify from previ-ous experience, but one than none

armor magazine, january-february 1992

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