armor magazine, november-december 1989

8/6/2019 Armor Magazine, November-December 1989

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Forty-five years ago, the Allied waragainst Germany in northwesternEurope had grown somewhat stagnant.The pace of success we had enjoyedsince the Normandy invasion, sixmonths before, had slowed. With theonset of one of the worst Europeanwinters in three decades, the accuracyof our intelligence preparationof the bat-tlefield had apparently diminished at theSame rate as supplies, which still had tocome across the Normandy beaches.

Hitler soon would disturb this relativecomplacency with a grand scheme thatwould pose an unparalleled crisis forthe Allied armies, involve more than amillion men, and highlight perhaps themost severe failure of battlefield intel-ligence in U.S. Army history.For his WachtAm Rhein operation, Hit-ler created 25 new divisions, pulledfrom the line and refitted four SS panzerdivisions, and created the 6th PanzerArmy under the command of SSObergruppenfuhrer Josef (Sepp)Dietrich. The objective of this force wasto seize Antwerp, thereby denying Allieduse of its port facilities, isolating Britishand Canadian forces to the north of thepenetration, and eliminating the threatto the Ruhr region. Such a grandscheme would surely collapse the al-liance, Hitler thought. German armieshad successfully attacked through theArdennes region in 1914 and 1940, whynot again?

From such situations are legends born.We can trace much of our heritage tothis period, and find many of our greattank and cavalry heroes as participants:George Patton, Bruce Clarke, CreightonAbrams, William Desobry, and JimmieLeach, to name but a few.These and others took their lessons

learned to the bank in later years in train-ing the force and designing organita-tions and equipment to meet the threat.Hundreds of the campaigns facetslend themselves to close examinationand provide lessons that still applytoday. Our space limits us to a look attwo facets. In Synchronizing MobilitySupport, Major Dom lzzo compares theuse of engineer support in the Germanattacks of 1940 and 1944, and the les-sons we can apply to mobility withtodays E-force concept.

Mark Clark examines Peipers spear-head attack, with Airland Battles deepattack doctrine as a yardstick, inJoachim Peiper and the Deep Attack.The German plan failed, not becauseof massive armored counterattacks inthe Kursk fashion, but because smallunits, many of which were throwntogether by chance, upset the German

timetable and denied the enemy criticalterrain, villages, road junctions, andbridges. And therein lies another lesson.-PJC

By Order of the Secretary of the Army:CARL E. VUONOGeneral, United States ArmyChief of Staff

Official:WILLIAM J. MEEHAN IIBrigadier General, United States ArmyThe Adjutant General


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Professional Development Bulletin of the Armor Branch PB-17-89-6

J. COONEYT. CLEMENS

THOMAS C. FOLEY

(ISSN 0004-2420) is publishedU.S. Army Armor Center. 4401KY 40121.e information contained in

R represents the professional opinions of

in other official Army publications.

training of personnel fortwo copies by

military letter to the editor-in-chief.materials for which the U.S. Army Armor: all armored. direct-fire ground combat

all weapons used exclusively in these

for ail SC 12A. 128, and

1989,Vol XCVIII No. 6

:eatures6 Guerrilla Antiarmor Tacticsby Captain RaymondW. Levesque11 The Mortar Against Armor

by Sergeant Gilbert Warner16 Training for Combat Casualty Care in Armor Units

by Captain Paul Dougherty, MD, and Captain Ralph Briggs

by Major Dominic l u o26 Joachim Peiper and the Deep Attackby Mark Edmond Clark

The SovietT-34 Tank: The Human Dimensionby Dr. George WindholzIntelligence Preparation of the Battlefield...Made Easyby Captain Anthony PaternostroTo Seize Advantage From the Enemyby Captain Andrew F. DeMario

by Colonel Michael A. Andrews

20 Synchronizing Mobility Support

31

37

43 Reconnaissance in Force:

46 Kentucky Windage

Departments224515495052

LettersContactsCommanders HatchDrivers SeatRecognition QuizRecognition Quiz AnswersBustle RackBooks


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Artillery Not "Broke;"It's Actually ImprovingDear Sir,This letter is in response to LTC PeterManza's article, "Tactical WeaknessesSeen at the NTC," in the MayJune 1989issue of ARMOR. Lieutenant ColonelManza is owed a debt of gratitude for hispositive efforts to improve the combatreadiness of our Army, especially duringhis tenure as a battalion commander(regimental commander) of the OPFOR atthe NTC. I must comment, however, onthe portion of his article that addressesfield artillery and fire support.

Lieutenant Colonel Manza addressed ar-tillery at the NTC by beginning with a now-trite and, frankly, inaccurate statementthat, "It is broke...". Certainly, I wouldagree with him that at the NTC, theresults are not optimum, but the samecan be said of any system on the bat-tlefield. The NTC recently provided a brief-ing to the Infantry Conference on theresults of direct-fire engagements. Thebriefing addressed successes andshortcomings. The briefing contained ob-servations from analysis of data gatheredfrom engagement simulation exercises(force-on-force) and from live fire. Thedata for engagement simulation exercisesproduced nteresting results.

e The percentage of OPFOR destroyedhas remained relatively constant at 55 per-cent per battle every year since PI86.

e Direct fire systems' contribution hasdropped from 41 percent to 33 percent.e Indirect fire systems have increasedtheir contribution of OPFOR destroyed by89 percent (even though it is still too lowat 25 percent)..The number of field artillery missionshas increased from an average of 27 perbattle to over 70.Data from live-fire exercises was evenmore dramatic for direct fire; however, the

(Note: Fort Knox AUTOVON prefix is 464.DIRECTORY - Pointsof Contact Commercial prefix is Area Code 502-624-xxxx).

Editor-in-ChiefMajor Patrick .I. CooneyManaging EditorJon T. ClemensEditorial AssistantVivian ThompsonProduction AssistantMary HaserContributing ArtistsSFC Robert TorsrudSPC Jody Harmon

A R M OR Editorial Offices2249224926102610261 02610

MAILING ADDRESS: , RMOR. ATTI ..ATSB-MAG, Fort Knox, KY 40121-5210.ARTICLE SUBMISSIO NS To improve speed andaccuracy in editing, manuscripts should be originals orclear copies, either typed or printed out in near-lctter-quality printer mode. Stories can also he accepted on5-1/4 loppy disks in Microsoft WORD. MultiMate.

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US. ARMY ARMOR SCHOOLCommandant (ATZK-CG)MG Thomas C. Foley 2121Assistant Commandant (ATSB-AC)BG J. B. Taylor 7555Deputy Assistant Commandant (ATSB-DAC)COL Claude L. Clark 1050Comm and Sergeant MajorCSM John M. Stephens 4952Maintenance Dept. (ATSB-MA)Comm and and Staff Dept. (ATSB-CS)COL A. W. Kremer 5855Weapons Dept. (ATSB-WP)1055Directorate of Training & Doctrine (ATSB-DOTD)COL Donald E. Appler 7250Directorate of Combat Developments (ATSB-CD)COL Edward A. Bryla 5050Dir. of Eval. & Standardization (ATSB-DOES)Mr. Duane Wolff 3446Training Group (ATZK-TC-TBF)LTC William0. alkemes 3955NCO A cademy/Drill Sergeant School (ATNCG)CSM Donald L. Baker 5150Director, Reserve Component Spt (ATZK-DRC)COL Charles W. Davis 1351LTC Ricky M. Rowlett 7809TEXCOM Armor & Engineer Board (ATZK-AE)COL Dan E. Deter 7850TRADOC Sys Mgr for Tank Systems (ATSB-TSMT)

COL James R. Joy 8346

COL George R. Wallace 111

Ofke of the Chief ofArmor (ATZK-AR)

COL Eugene D. Colgan 7955

2 A R M OR - November-December 7989


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collection method precluded definitiveresults for indirect fire. The force-on-forcedata indicates that commanders are think-ing and stressing fire support. We are. byno means, consistently achieving theresults we should, and we still havenumerous tactical weaknesses that wecontinue to address with each unit. Thesystem. however, is not broke.There is room for much improvement,and LTC Manza does address some solu-tions for maneuver commanders. We, asfield artillerymen, can do a great dealmore than we do to provide solutions. Em-phasizing successful techniques and pro-cedures to field artillerymen is my job. Ibelieve, however, that my fire supportteam can provide your readers with validobservations and successful techniquesand procedures that maneuver com-manders might employ to continue to im-prove fire support.You published one such article by

CPT(P) Rich Cardillo in the same issue asLTC Manza's article. Captain Cardillo's ar-ticle addresses commander's intent forfield artillery. I will have my fire supportteam continue to provide articles to yourmagazine on successful techniques forsynchronization of fire support, fire sup-port planning and back briefs. specificityof fire support guidance from maneuvercommanders. redundancy in fire supportexecution, the role of the maneuver com-mander in fire support rehearsals. employ-ment of the FSO (FSCOORD) in tacticalexecution, and many other issues.I enjoyed your May-June 89 issue and I

look forward to providing additional obser-vations on fire support from the NTC. Allof us have the same goal, and it is theOperations Group motto: "Train theForce!"LARRY D. AARONLTC, FASenior Fire Support TrainerOperations Group, NTCWho Should GetScout Leader's Reports?Dear Sir,We would like to comment on the techni-ques described in "The Battalion TaskForce S2 - Scout Platoon Leader Relation-ship." by CPT Herbert R. McMaster. Jr..(ARMOR, July-August 1989). We disagreewith his assertion that the scout platoonleader receives his instructions and is con-trolled by the task force S2.According to CPT McMaster, the S2monitors spot reports on the scoutplatoon net. then "disseminates it to thetask force commander, S3, nd companyteam commanders, and updates his situa-tional template." A key part of gaining theinitiative and winning is the rapid flow ofcombat information to the guy who needs

it, In order to make decisions faster thanthe enemy, our information flow to thedecision-maker must be faster as well.This requires the scout platoon leader tohave a direct communications line to thetask force commander.Information from the scout platoonshould be sent to the commander or S3on the command net. This technique alsoallows team commanders to monitor the

report. The S2 should eavesdrop, eitheron the scout net (preferably), or the com-mand net. The S2 updates the IPBtemplates and gives the commander peri-odic updates on how he sees the overallpicture. Sending information directly tothe commander also enhances his use ofreconnaissance pull. Sending informationthrough the S2 as a "filter" or "processor"will unnecessarily slow the decisionprocess. Many task force commandershave probably lost precious minutes be-tween the report by the scout platoon andthe relay from the S2, f it is relayed at all.Further. the scouts often move out ofradio range of the TOC, and the S2 sthen unable to monitor their reports.Although he never specifically addressesthe point, CPT McMaster implies that theS2 controls the scout platoon. The com-mander must synchronize the reconnais-sance effort with his maneuver concept. Inorder to use reconnaissance pull, both therecon unit and units from the main body

is the eyes and ears of the commanderand should report to him.CRAIG6.WHELDONLTC, ArmorCommander, 2/10 CavalryKRlS P. THOMPSONCPT, ArmorInstructor-Writer,USAARMSFort Knox, Ky.120-mm Accuracy ScreeningIs Being TightenedDear Sir,We appreciate the time and effort putinto SFC Lindsley and Captain Davis's ar-ticle, "Acceptable Margin of Error" (July-

Based on previous Input from the field,the coordinating draft of Change 3 to FM17-12-1 reflects a change in 120-mmscreening. The range has been moved to1500 meters, and the screening targetsize has been reduced to an octagon-shaped 175-by-175-centimeterpanel.

The coordinating draft was mailed todivisions and higher during the week of16 October 1989 for comments.

August 1989 ARMOR, -Ed.).

GEORGE R. WALLACE 111COL, ArmorDirector, Weapons Dept., USAARMSmust be responsive to chan-ges in the situation. Both mustrespond immediately if thecommander wants to quicklyshift the main effort. Weshould avoid the tendency tomake reconnaissance aseparate intelligence operation.

The commander or S3should give orders to and con-trol the scouts, not the S2. Thescout platoon should be onequal footing with companyteams. The IPB and R&S planshould be developed by thecommander. S3. and S2, notsolely by the S2. The taskforce XO should be respon-sible for maintaining com-munications with and sustain-ing the scouts. The FSOshould be responsible for en-suring fire support is in range.We appreciate CPTMcMaster's article and sharehis concern about strengthen-ing the weak link so oftenfound between the scoutplatoon and the task force. Itis a link, however, which mustinclude the commander, XO,S3, FSO, and S2 in asynchronized, coordinated ef-fort. The S2 is surely a majorplayer, but the scout platoon

I I I

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Don Stiven 'Sergeant's Valor - Copyright. used Wih permissionReflections ontheYearoftheNC0Don Slivers has captured a partof the spirit of the Noncommis-sioned Officer Corps in his paint-ing, "Sergeant's Valor." SergeantConrad Schmidt of the 2d LIS.Cavalry rode back into a hail offire near Winchester, Virginia onSeptember 19, 1xCi4, to rescue hiswounded commander. It was neverrecorded why Sergeant Schmidtrisked death to rescue his captain.but his selfless braver^^ sets an ex-ample emulated by many other

NCOs down through our history.One hundred years ago, soldiersof America patrolled and pro-

tected the frontier. John Wayneportrayed the cavalry officer incountless westerns. Bu t how manyof us realize that the vast majorityof those long, lonely patrols wereled, not by the Captain NathanBrittles of the West, but by the Ser-geant O'Reillys and the CorporalKrugers? Often, with as few asfour troopers, they rode for dayson end across the American West.Their orders were oh-so-simple,and yet so very complex; patroland preserve the peace. They, too,present an image of the NCOspirit shining through the longyears of ~otaldedicatiort to ac-complishing any mission.

Sergeant Lafayette Pool of the 3dArmored Division demonstratedyet another aspect of the spirit wefind among our NCOs today.During the summer and fall of1944 in Europe, he directed the ef-forts of his tank crew so effectivelythat his record of success still

stands asccllence

L-ommanamg GeneralU S . Army Armor Center

an example of ex-today. In threeshort months 'his tank ac-counted for 258 enemyvehicles destroyed, 2.50prisoners taken, and 1.OOO killed.()hviously, Sergeant Pool possessedtechnical and tactical expertise. andthe ability to train and bind a crewtogether into an efficient team. Hisexample inspires all of us to achievethe same high standards of projks-siort alisrtt.

But the most important part of thespirit is not very visible. It is dif-ficult to portray on canvas, or evenin the written word. It isdemonstrated every day, for NCOsare the heart and soul of our Army.Their constant effort is necessary ineverythingWG do.

The Army is a vast hody; the of-ficers are the head, planning fortoday and looking forward to tomor-row; the soldiers are the arms andlegs, doing the work that needs tobe done here and now. But the ser-geants are the backbone, the nerves,and most critically, the heart of theArmy. Without sergeants, how manyof our small units would ru n effec-tively? How many tank rangeswould be run efficiently? How manyof the seemingly mundane hut im -portant tasks of everyday Army lifewould be accomplishcd? 1 daresayvery few!Why do they do it? It can't be forthe glory; their achievements oftzngo unrecognized. It can't be for the

pay; their leadership and manage-

ment skills would be Car betterrewarded in the factory or themarketplace. For most, I believe.it's the pride of knowing they aredoing a vital job few others could;they're doing it because their loveof soldiers is matched only by theirlove ol country.Our sergeants are the stabilizingforce in our Army. They maintainthe standard. Soldiers either

develop into NCOs or they returnto civilian life after three or fouryears. Officers often move so quick-ly from job to job, they sometimesforget the essentials of warfiphtingbetween troop assignments. But thesergeants stay in the turret, in themotor pools, and on the ranges,often for most of their entirecareers.It is the sergeant who trains thesoldier to light and win; it is the ser-

geant who takes the younglieutenant undcr his wing andteaches him to lead; and, it is thesergeant who takes the major orcolonel back into the unit andreminds him how to lead soldiers,fight his tanks, and win wars.Sergeants of Cavalry and Armor,sergeants throughout the Army,from the "Commander's Hatch," Isalute you!.Forge the Thunderbolt!

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The Excellence in Armor train isto increase its speed with

own programs. The

to the world that excel-if youa career andyou should

if you are aor leader.

Many of you have had questionsin Armor

, NCOES, etc.First let me throw a few numberst you. There are 3,200 soldiers inhe EIA program in both active and

of soldiers who haveassed certification test two is al-ost equal to the number of staff

ergeants promoted annually in theactive component. (If a sergeant isnot an Excellence in Armor NCOand has not passed certification testtwo, he will not he promoted tostaff sergeant). The competitiondrives the train.

What actions do you need to take,or do we need to take, to ensureour soldiers are not overlooked?

First, managing the program is thebiggest headache. It must be done

at company/troop level and con-solidated at battalion/squadron. TheChief of Armor provides an up-dated roster quarterly to the bat-talion/squadron commanders. Itsthe organizations responsibility topurify the roster by adding or delct-ing as necessary.

This must be done because of theprogram standards. The Chief ofArmor must be notified in order tomaintain a purified roster. I recom-mend you assign one of the PACclerks to maintain EIA fiIesseparately, supervised by the bat-talion CSM.

Training starts at OSUT for thoseselected when they first enter theArmy. A training program needs tobe developed in the organization tocontinue the training and/or thetraining of those selected for theETA Program in the unit. I recom-mend that company/troop mastergunners (for those units that areauthorized them) and bat-talionhquadron master gunnersdevelop a training program thatstresses vehicular, UCOfl, andhigher-level common tasks.

Your unit promotion programshould tie into the EIA program.Some units are reluctant to promotea soldier ahead of another, regard-less of capability. In the end, thegroup that feels the impact of thatkind of attitude is the unit itself.This is because, at sergeant andabove, we compete Army-wide - f

you dont stay competitive, you lose!The Noncommissioned Officer

Education System plays a big role inthe EIA Program. Your com-manders and noncommissioned of-ficers have been doing a great job ingetting the right soldiers to school.Early attendance in NCOES is amust for EIA soldiers. I recommendyou tie your EIA Lraining programto the BNCOC Program of Instruc-tion and beyond.

There is a new Armor EnlistedProponency Manual that explains indetail the Excellence in ArmorProgram and tells where to write orcall if problems exist. Use whatsavaiIable to you inside and outsidethe organization to ensure you havethe best program available for yoursoldiers.

It is my belief that in the not-so-distant future, th e Excellence inArmor Program will be fullydeveloped. The CommandersEvaluation change and PromotionPoint Worksheet recommendationspoint in that direction.

One last point before I close. Eachcommander and command sergeantmajor needs to jump o n his horseand raise th e flag about additionalretention money for EIA soldiers. Ifwhat we are doing is important andquality is needed, then it seems tome that we, as an Army, should at-tempt to try harder to retain qualitysoldiers on active duty.

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A - -.

Guerrilla Antiarmor Tacticsby Captain Raymond W. Levesque

One 1966 study showed that 60 to70 percent of a11 guerrilla combat ac-tions included some type of am-bush.' Another 1969 study showedthat mines caused 73 percent of alltank and 7 percent of APC lossesin Vietnam.- These are guerrilla an-tiarmor tactics. Guerrillas usedthese tactics against armor in WWIIand Vietnam, and still use themaround the world today.

Althoush many soldiers don'tthink of armor as a counterinsur-gent weapon, armor has been suc-cessful against guerrillas where ter-rain has allowed. The French usedarmor as a reaction force to relievebesieged outposts. Such operationsbecame more hazardous as the VietMinh, "often made diversionary at-tacks against isolated posts in orderto lure armored units into am-bus he^."^

In Northern Ireland, the Britishuse APCs to protect their soldiersagainst the more common threat -small arms fire and rocks. The Sal-vadorans use homemade armoredvehicles for convoy security androute recon, missions which werealso important in Vietnam. Accord-ing to General Donn A. Starry,"The missions universally shared byarmored units throughout Vietnamwere furnishing route security andconvoy escort. Few tasks were moreimportant than keeping the roadssafe and protecting the vehicles,men, and supplies that used them.At the same time, no task was moredisliked by armored soldiers.''

The South Africans use speciallydesigned armored vehicles in avariety of roles, from convoy escortand route security to offensiveoperations.

Common armored missions incounterguerrilla operations are:route security, convoy escort, reac-tion force, reconnaissance, and of-fensive operations. Because each ofthese important missions leaves thearmored vehicle exposed, and be-cause of armor's inherent strength,the guerrilla will attack armor usinghis favorite tactic - he ambush.

Mao Tse-tung wrote, "The solehabitual tactic of a guerrilla unit isthe ambu~h."~eorge Grivas, whofought for the independence ofCyprus, wrote, "Ambushes andsabotage constitute our two mainmethods of combat."6

Not only do guerrilla authors em-phasize the ambush in their writ-ings, this focus is evident on the bat-tlefield. "Concealed attacks on mainsupply routes were the most fre-



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"El Salvador's guerrillas have taken this lesson to heart. Inor bridge, for no other reason than to draw in theforce."of ambush used in

82 ambushes recorded in 195'1.14

6 in small villages."'Cutting LOCs is a basic guerrilla

or region. Attack-a country'sunits, and attrits the govern-

General Alberto Bavo wrote that atoas

so the

." Che Guevara expanded onof the weakest

s transporta-

This emphasis is reflected in ElFMLNs anti-

more significant operations. Theits periodic campaigns is

ch helpsof attack-

El Salvador's economy. BecauseEl Salvador's military has

mission of securing the LOCs.The guerrilla's emphasis on attack-

mission il l the proper ierraiii. Youmust realize that in cases wherearmor has been successful againstguerrillas, the terrain has favored ar-mored operations. Armored ele-ments have been destroyed whenthey've operated in restricted ter-rain, or without proper infantry sup-port.

The first step in defendins an ar-mored unit against ambush is toidentifv those circumstances, times,and locations that indicate there is abetter chance of ambush. Guerrillaswill do their hest to take advantageof each of these factors.

A common insurgent tactic is to at-tack a fiked site and set ambushesalong the relief force's likelyavenues of approach.

Guevara emphasized the impor-tance of blocking reinforcing ele-ments: 'Whenever there are suffi-cient forces...all roads should beprotected with ambushes in order todetain reinCorcements."'" He waseven more forceful when he wrote,"...the arrival of enemy reinforce-ments at the scene of the fight canbe prevented. A close watch overthe points of access is...an axiomnever to be forgotten by the guerril-la fighter.""

El Salvador's guerrillas have takenthis lesson to heart. In many cases,attacks are carried out against fiiedsites, such as a town or bridge, forno other reason than to draw in therelief force. On several occasions,the relief force has suffered as manycasualties as the defense force onthe site. A good example of this tac-tic occurred in June 1984when guer-

rillas captured the Cerron GrandeDam during the night. At dawn,three relief columns started out torelieve the dam, but guerrillas am-bushed and stopped each column.Not a single relief element arrivedon the ground. An air assault recap-tured the dam in the afternoon.(Depending on circumstances, onesolution is for th e relief element toattack the guerrillas' assault forceand not try to reinforce the defenseforce.)

Other opportunities for a guerrillaambush occur while friendly ele-ments are carrying out offensiveoperations. In these cases, guerrillaswill tr y to avoid the maneuver unitsthemselves and concentrate on am-bushes along supporting LOCs.

Another vulnerable circumstanceoccurs at the operation's end. Asunits return to garrison, they may berunning out of fuel, and the troopsmay be lax after days or weeks ofnot finding anything. Guerrillas takeadvantage of these circumstances.

The time of day can also be impor-tant. If the counterguerrilla forcehas good, close air support, iscapable of rapid reinforcement, orif the terrain is poor for guerrillaoperations. the guerrillas will putmore emphasis on night ambushes.The attackers can then use thecover of darkness to escape.

George Grivas recommended thatambushes are better, "at sunset totake advantage of the few minutesof light for the attack or, at anyrate, during the early evening hours,to allow sufficient time for the guer-rillas to make the getaway."



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think they can carry out a daylightambush and escape, they will. In ad-dition to the circumstances andtimes that increase the odds of am-bush. terrain is a critical factor.Guevara lists. "perfect knowledge ofthe ground." as an essential elementof tactics before attacking acolumn.'3

Some of the requirements Maorecommended for terrain are: good

cover for the attackers, yet allowingobservation of the victim; a site thatallows attackers to use maximumfirepower: and one that allows theattackers "to leap out rapidlv at onebound from ambush and come togrips with the enemy."" He alsoprefers spots where the enemy, "can-not use their weapons and where itis not easy for them to manifest

their full strength."" Grivas specifi-cally said to attack a motorizedcolumn near a bend in the road toslow it down, and where terraindoesn't allow the vehicles tomaneuver or for.them to use theirweapons.

Effective use was made of terrainfor ambushes in Malaya and Korea.

8~~



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In M alaya, the few roads were wind-ing, hilly, and cut through thickvegetation and narrow gorges. Mostambushes, "occurred while they (thevehicles) were moving throughdense jungles where the attackershad the tactical advantage of ,co n-cealnient and clos e-range firing. 16"In Korea, ambushers used thesame tactics. Although there wasn'tas much vegetation, there were plen-ty of boulders and rock outcrop-pings for concealment. "Convoysand patrols were frequently am-bushed in mountain passes wherethe road was through rock defiles.""In examining guerrilla writings andhow they apply their tactics, you canidentify a number of common am-bush characteristics.

cape. Overall, guerrillas ar e outnum-bered, and weapons and people arenot expendable. They don't have thegovernment's strength, or ability torecruit large numbers. For thisreason, a heavy emphasis is placedon withdrawal routes, and ensuringthe government force cannot reactquickly enough to block thatwithdrawal.

Guerrilla ambushes generally fol-low the same pattern. North Viet-nam's General Gia p described "fourquick phases of the ambush: quickconcentration, quick attack, quickclearing and securing, and quickwithdrawal. Other guerrilla writersaddress an important first step -one General Starry called "oneslow." This ste p is planning.

Guerrilla writers describe severaldifferent ways guerrillas can am-bush a column, but they all usethree basic principles. The first issurprise. As with our own principlesof war, surprise is required for asuccessful guerrilla ambush. Some-times the victim's force outnumbersthe ambusher's. Or, the victim'scapabilities to reinforce or to call inartillery are significant. In eithercase, guerrillas want surprise tonegate those advantages.

The second principle is violent at-tack. For the same reasons, guerril-las want to ensure that the victims'return fire, if any, is ineffective.Reacting to shock and casualties,the victims should not be able toreturn lire. Also, a quick attack al-lows the successful execution of thelast principle.

This last principle is withdrawal. Itdoes no good for guerrillas to havea successful ambush if they can't es-

The concept of guerrilla planningfor any military operation, includingthe ambush, is important. Guerrillas- both in practice, such as in ElSalvador and Vietnam, and in writ-ings - emphasize deliberate plan-ning, intelligence and rehearsalbefore carrying out operations. Ma oemphasized the importance of intel-ligence on the enemy column whenhe wrote, "But first we must under-stand their plans, the direction inwhich they are advancing, and thetime it will take them to pass. Wemust also reflect in detail on thelocation...." 8

Guevara goes into more detail onthe planning factors. Essential ele-ments of guerrilla tactics must al-ways be kept in mind: perfectknowledge of the ground, surveil-lance and foresight of escaperoutes, vigilance over all the secon-dary roads that can bring support tothe point of attack, intimacy withpeople in the zone for support,numerical superiority at a chosen

point, total mobility, the possibilityof counting on reserves."19 This listshows the amount of planning guer-rillas put into a deliberate ambush.

Th e first "qu ic k of the phases ofth e ambush is quick concentration.Because guerrillas are usually dis-persed to avoid detection, they mustcome together for th e attack. Theymust do it quickly to reducethe likelihood of detection andsubsequent counterguerrilla action.Guerrillas usually spend little timein the assembly areas or at the am-bush site for the same reason. Maorecommends not to lie in ambushtoo long because of the increasedchance of discovery, and becausethe vigilance of the guerrillas beginsto drop. Also, "...if we have alreadybeen discovered by the enemy, weshould immediately either launchour attack or withdraw."20

Next is qziick attack. This carrieswith it the element of surprise andthe coordinated use of firepower. Aquick attack reduces the possibilityof the enemy's ability to react, toreinforce itself, and to use artilleryor close air support; yet it allowsthe guerrillas to follow through onsuccess. Grivas emphasized a fewtimes that the attack should onlylast a few minutes. "Most importantof all, the duration of an attack wasvery short, only four or five minu tes,in which case the party or convoy at-tacked had not time to recover fromtheir surpr ise an d act.""

A typical guerrilla antiarmor at-tack can include antiarmor fire andthe simultaneous detonation ofmines. This is followed by a quickfirefight during which Molotov co ck-tails or other explosives can b e usedat close range.ARMOR - November-December 7989 9


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"Another step that dominates guerrilla thinking in the am-bush is the quick withdrawal. There is probably no otherpoint repeated as often as this by a variety of guerrillawriters and practitioners."The next "quick" doesn't receive as

much emphasis as the others, but ifthe guerrillas have neutralized thecolumn and are sure they can es-cape, they will quickly clear aridseciire the area. Often, ambusheshave the major objective of acquir-ing weapons, ammunition, ex-plosives, or other supplies. Clearingthe area also means collecting theirown casualties to prevent assess-ments of guerrilla casualties, or thecapture and interrogation ofwounded personnel.

Another step that dominates guer-rilla thinking in the ambush is thequick withdruwal. There is probablyno other point repeated as often asthis by a variety of guerrilla writersand practitioners. In fact, this phaseis so important that guerrillas usual-ly will not execute a deliberate am-bush without a good possibility of es-cape.

Both Mao and Guevara em-phasized the importance of plan-ning good escape routes. Mao said,"...we must carefully select in ad-vance the route for our ownwithdrawal."2' Grivas also wrote,"Generally speaking, the question ofour retreat after the engagementshould be studied from the momentwe set the ambush. A path of es-cape must be constantly borne in

The reason for this em-phasis is that guerrillas are usuallytactically outnumbered - and theydon't like useless casualties.

The importance and use of an es-cape route is exemplified by a VietCong ambush against the 11th ACRin October 1%. The Viet Cong es-cape route was planned along a trailunder a heavy canopy of jungle.They built defensive bunkers at key

locations to defend the route, andadditional bunkers along twokilometers of trail for shelteragainst close ai r attack. Thispreparation proved to be key be-cause the relief units quickly movedinto the area. Yet, despite the reliefforces getting to the ambush area in35 minutes, "the squadron failed totrap the main force of the enemy."24It's important to remember that

the guerrilla's capability to attackarmor can vary from group to groupor even band to band. Only byknowing the specific threat in yourarea can you anticipate how he willattack an armored force. However,keep in mind the principles andphases of a guerrilla ambush. Ex-pect surprise. Remember the am-hush will be a short, sharp firefightat close range. Anticipate his escape.

Notes'American University Special Opera-

tions Research Office, *rets of Under-ground Oraanization and ODerations.(Washington D.C., American University,1966). p. 213.*Dorm A. Starry, Mounted Combat inVietnam. Vietnam Studies (WashingtonD.C., Department of the Army, 1978), p.79.

3Simon Dunstan. Vietnam Tracks:Armor in Battle, 194575, (Novato, Calif.,Presidio Press. 1982). pp. 13-15.

4~tarry, . 106.5Ma0 Tse-tung, Basic Tactics (New

York. Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers,6George Grhras, General Grivas on Guer---illa Warfare (New York, Frederick A.

Praeger, Publishers, 1962), p. 99.7 ~ e r i c a n University special Opera-

tions Research Office, Secrets of Under-ground Oraanization and Operations, p.214.

1966).p. 102.

8~tmrto hy o, aestions tor aGuerrilla, (Boulder, Colo. Paladin Press,1975), p. 30.

'Che Guwara, @errilla Warfare (tin-coln, University of Nebraska Press, 1985).p. 63.

"lbid., p. 105."lbid., p. 66.12Grivas,p. 61.13Guwara, p. 64.151bid., p. 103."American university Special opera-

tions Research Office, Secrets of Under-ground Oraanlzation and Operations, p.

14~a0, . 104.

215.171bid.18Mao, p. 103"Guevara, p. 64.20Mao, p. 105.21Grivas, pp. 63-64.=Mae, p. 103.23Grivas, p. 100.24John Albright . and Allan W.

Sandstrum, "Convoy Ambush on Highway1," in Seven Firefiahts in Vietnam. ed.John A. Cash, (Washington D.C.. Officeof the Chief of Military History, 1985). p.57.

Captain Raymond W.Levesque has served as the52, 1st Battalion, 8th Caval-ry (Armor), 1st CavalryDivision; editor, Military In-telligence Magazine; officer-in-charge, El SalvadorAnalytical Cell, U.S.Southern Command; andas an instructorlwriter in theLow-Intensity Task Group,U.S. Army IntelligenceCenter and School. Herecently commanded FCompany, 2d MI Battalion.He is currently assigned asJ2, USSOUTHCOM.



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The Mortar Against Armorby Sergeant Gilbert Warner

Ask the average tanker whatthreat mortars are to his tank andhe will more than likely tell you."None." The mortarman confidentlyreplies, "If we hit you, we'll kill thattank." Who is right? Can the mortarbe a threat to tanks?Well, let's look at the mortar'sboast. First, mortars most common-ly used by Western armies are the81-mm or 3-inch, the 107-mm or 4.2-inch, and the 120-mm. All haveshells available with delay fuzesdesigned to explode after penetrat-ing hard surfaces. Because of thesteep trajectory of the mortar shell,a hit strikes the top of the tank.where the armor is not over two in-ches thick.Usually the top includes hatches,air intakes, and optics. It is th e

weakest point of the tank, thereforea hit on the top should make thetank ineffective.But, with the equipment in theU.S. Army inventory, a mortar willnot hit a moving armored vehicle ex-cept through luck or massive use ofammunition. Why?The mortar is a four-part system,including a forward observer whocan see the target and report itslocation, a fire control center tocompute the sight and charge set-tings, the gun and crew, and - astof all - he ammunition.To hit a moving target is like shoot-ing geese. A consideration of speedand time is a prime requirement. Avehicle moving at only 12 mph (20kph) moves 333 meters every

BombletRoundsLike a shotgun, the un-guided mortar shelldepends on the disper-sion of its bomblets toincrease probability ofa hit within a 70-140meter "footprint"circle.

minute, 5-1/2 meters per second. Amodern tank can kill within 10seconds after target acquisition. A4.2-inch mortar typically requires 15seconds for the call for fire, 15seconds for the computations, 20 to30 seconds for the gun crew to aimand p repare ammunition, and an ad-ditional 20 to 30 seconds while theround is in the air. During this 70 to90 seconds, the target has moved400 o 500 meters.

These time estimates assume thatthe mortar section is set up andready to shoot. If it is not, times andinaccuracies go up. Our goosehunter/observer's chances of havingthe correct lead are remote. Can weimprove these odds? I will notargue that they should be. If a sys-tem can kill the enemy, or force himto accept our policy, we should use

ARMOR - November-December 1989 I 1


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sonnel. The bomblets are spreadover a 60- y 70-meter area.

The Greek version is a 107-mmshell that carries 20 grenades.Armor penetration is 80 mm,enough to break through the top ofmost armored vehicles. The disper-sion "footprint" varies from 70 to140 meters in diameter. Lethalradius against troops is threemeters. Against infantry, thesewould be more effective than con-ventional rounds.

The Swedish and British antiarmormortar rounds are more sophisti-cated, and offer a better chance of ahit. These self-guided antiarmorprojectiles use sensors to detect thevehicle, identify it as a target, andcuide themselves to the target evenas the victim moves. The sensorsmay use infrared, millimeter-wave-length radar, a laser designator, or acombination of these methods.

Strix, developed in Sweden, is a120-mm round with a range of 600to 8,000 meters. It is carried in twosections, and can accommodate arocket booster for extra range. I twill penetrate over 400 mm ofarmor, providing a useful degree ofoverkill.

The British round, called Merlin.is the most compact. It is designedfor an 81-mm system. and is said tobe usable by any modern 81- or 82-mm mortar. It searches within a 300-by 300-meter area. using an activemillimeter-wave radar capable ofdetecting th e target under trees orcamouflage. It can defeat 12 inchesof armor. The Guided AntiarmorMortar Pmiectile (GAMP) shouldbe operational this year. Its range isabout 4000 meters. West Germanyhad been working on a 120-mm ver-sion of GAMP, called Bussdrd. Itwas to have an interchangeableguidance system, so that the ob-server can use infrared, radar, or

laser designation. Range was tohave been 800 to 5000 meters. Suc-cessful firings were reported in 1983.

Are Smart RoundsSmart Enough?Smart munitions will allow a mor-

tar to engage a moving target with adecent chance of a hit. However,some have raised objections to theGAMP, on the grounds that theguidance system cannot tell the dif-ference between friend and foe.

It may be possible to develop afiber-optic-linked round, similar tothe FOGM, but the operator wouldhave only 10 seconds or so to ac-quire the target and home in on it,making it appear to be an im-probable approach. How could ahuman operator reliably tell the dif-ference between a T-72 and an M2Bradley in two or three seconds,from the top, and at a range of 1000meters on a fuzzy TV screen? Per-haps it would be better to train theforward observer in the characteris-tics of the round and equip him insuch a way that the round won'tnotice him.

L.B. Holley, in his Ideas aridWcaporis, states that we must alwaysremember that new weapons createthe need for new tactics. He wasnot speaking of a mere improve-ment, like from the M3 Stuart to theM4 Sherman, but something like thechange from the smoothbore mus-ket to the rifle.

The combination of the mortar car-rier capable of shooting from a briefhalt, and the antiarmor round, is acomparable change. It alters com-pletely the abilities of the system,and creates a new weapon. It doesat least require that we considernew tactics and the organizationalexpression of those tactics. To em-phasize the point, we should remem-ber that, in the 1940 Battle of

France, the French had more tanksthan th e Germans. Generally, theFrench tanks had thicker armor andbigger guns. The Germans won, inlarge part, because they organizedtheir tanks better. Correct tacticaluse of a weapon requires correct or-ganization.An improved M1M or M125 mor-

tar carrier, armed primarily withGAMP, would be able to travelcross-country at about 25 kph andkill armored vehicles between 500and 6OOO meters away, dependingon the eventual range of t h e round.The improved vehicle has limitedlethality against light armor insideof 10oO meters. Its own protectionwill not allow it to close with War-saw Pact light armor. In a way, it isanalogous to a sniper, powerful butvulnerable.

The tanks now in the inventory arefaster cross-country. Their fire isfast and deadly out to 2000 meters.They have the ability to surviveagainst most fire, most of the time.Compared to the improved mortarcarrier, the tanks are submachinegunners, close-in brawlers.

Brigadier Richard Simpkin, thelate British armor authority, advo-cated tank destroyer/fire supportvehicle pairs. Looking at the twotypes as 1 just have, perhaps he indi-cated how we should proceed. Sup-pose, therefore, that we organize aplatoon as three pairs, each pair in-cluding an MTB and an improvedmortar carrier (IMC). The IMC at-tacks long-range targets. The tankprovides close-in shock and protec-tion. The platoon leader has enoughunits for fire, maneuver and reserve.

As we saw earlier, the mortar is afour-part system. It is not completewithout observers. Each platoonalso has three scout/forward ob-server teams. They would bemounted on small vehicles, such as



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motorcycles, ATVs, or even some-thing like the WASP individualflying device. These troops mustremember that their primaryweapon is the mortar. Under morestatic conditions, they patrol a wes-sively, seeking to find the enemy.Thus the platoon has combat intel-ligence and the muscle to do some-thing with it. It is a true combinedarms unit.

The company would be composedof four platoons. Two platoons areon the firing line, one is reserve(recalling that reserves win battles),and one is replenishing. Head-quarters platoon consists of a pairof Bradleys, to give the commanderroom for work and for his extraradio equipment. Headquarters alsocarries the antiair responsibility.Concept of EmploymentTo see how this would work in

combat, let's look at a possible ac-tion.

A Soviet mechanized infantry bat-talion with an attached tank com-pany moves westward. Probingeastward, with the mission of find-ing and delaying or stopping theenemy, is a new type armor com-pany. The Soviets have 33 BMPs, 10T-72s, and four BTR mortar car-riers. The Americans have 12 Mls,12 IMCs, two M2s, and 36 motor-cycles.

First and second platoons are for-ward, third and fourth behind. Thescouts are out about XXK) metersahead of their platoons. The reserveplatoons trail by about loo0 meters,depending on cover and terrain.Visibility is average for CentralEurope, that is. about 3OOO meters,except for the woods and hills. Bothsides are moving at about 250meters per minute, a closure rate of500 meters per minute.

The scouts first see elements ofthe Soviet forces 6000 meters aheadof the main line mortars and tanks.Calls for fire go out at 5000 meters,two minutes later. Mortar tracksstop, fire a first round and move outagain, while the tanks take coveringpositions. Range is down to 4500when the first volley strikes. FourBMPs and a T72 stop, hi t and smok-ing.

The next wave of rounds comes in,then a slow steady rain. The closurerate of the two forces has slowed,on the American side because ofthe halts to fire, on the Soviet be-cause of deployment from march.For about every three rounds fired,a vehicle is hi t and knocked out ofthe battle. His tanks have no targetsyet, his mortars have just started todcploy, but have no one to givethem the positions of the NATO for-ces.

The scouts are moving at a crawl,literally, as they play hide and seekfrom ditches, trees, and bushes.Still, their calls for fire and sitrepsgo back. As long as they can seeand report, they are effective.

Only 10 minutes after first sight-ing, the range is down to 2000meters. The tanks start to engage,and the company commander hasordered the reserves to open fire.By this time each of the six leadplatoon mortars has moved andfired 10 times. If they fired tworounds each time, that was 120GAMPs. Now, with the reservesconcentrating on the remnants ofthe tanks, the enemy force hasceased to exist. The stragglers gethit by the tanks. No Soviets make itto within loo0 meters of our com-pany.

At a rate of 250 meters perminute, it takes only 10 minutes tomove to point-blank range throughthe effective range of our tanks. Use

of cover and concealment mayreduce the actual exposure time tothree or four minutes in 10- to 20-second glimpses. Scouts, hiddenahead of the firing line, will be bet-ter able to see targets and'call forfire, or even cue in the platoon'stanks.

In the example we have just seen,if the tanks had to wait until theSoviet battalion was 3OOO metersaway to open fire, some ol' the tar-gets would have made it to underloo0 meters range, that is, to effec-tive range of a BMPs 71mm gun.There simply is not enough time toshoot, move 100 meters, move into aposition, acquire a target, move tur-ret up, fire, back out, and repeat theprocess more than about 20 times ina 10-minute time span, even assum-ing that a target will present itself atthe time that our forces are ready tofire in the new position. One of themost important lessons of the NTCis how rapidly the range closes. Oneof the other lessons is how impor-tant it is to have scouts and outpoststo give early warning and to beginto attrit the enemy.

Properly organized and equipped,the mortar can be an equal partnerto the tank. To make it so, we mustbreak down some of our old ideason the weapon and imaginativelydevelop all of the mortar's promise.

Sergeant Gilbert Warnerserved 7 years in 4.241. mor-tar sections, including ser-vice with the 11th ACR and3-63 Armor in Germany andthe 4-40 Armor at Fort Car-son, Colo. His jobs includedchief computer and sectionleader. He currently lives inNewport News, Va.. and isassigned to the 329thTransportationCo.



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1

Vehicle RecognitionQuiz

4.

5.

6.

Answers on Page 49

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Training for Combat CasualtyCareInArmor Unitsby Captain Paul Dougherty MD,and Captain Ralph Briggs

What sort of casualties can a com-mander expect over a 24-hourperiod in a future conflict of high in-tensity, such as the October 1973Arab-Israeli War? What skills dosoldiers need to treat the wounded,and what is the best way to train forcombat casualty care? This articlewill give a better understanding ofthe number and types of battle in -juries that a combined arms bat-talion may sustain, the skills essen-tial for their management, and howbest to train for combat casualtycare at the unit level.

The Wounded SoldierWe have used Danon's analysis of

1,499 Israeli battle casualties fromthe October 1973 war to get an ap-proximate distribution of the casual-ty load that a combined arms unitmay expect in a high-intensity con-ventional war.

Additionally, we have used aBritish study of 333 tank and 769crew injuries from WWII, and twosmaller studies for Korea (57 tanksand 181 casualties). and Vietnam(40 anks and 57 casual tie^).^-^* lo

Let us assume the casualties arefrom a .I-series TOSrE combinedarms battalion. A commander couldexpect over 24 hours to have ap-proximately 80 battle casualties ofthe following relative distribution:

20 KIA (25 percent mortality)10 Head/Face/Neck30 Extremities (arms and legs)7 Trunk (chest and abdomen)5 Multiple (some combination

S Burns

of the above)

In addition to those who arewounded in action, one could ex-pect about 15-20 soldiers whowould fall into the category ofpsychiatric or combat stress reac-tion. Some authors would put thisfigure higher. Fcw of these soldierswill have true psychiatric disorders,such as schizophrenia?

Soldiers who have been woundedin combined arms units have twobasic types of injuries: thermal andballistic. Unlike non-mechanized in-fantry war wounds, there are alarger number of bums. About 10-12 percent of wounded soldiers withcombined arms units have bums asopposed to one to nine percent forthe foot soldier.'" Toxic fumes, blastoverpressure, and blunt trauma arerelatively infrequent, and are usuallyassociated with other injuries.

Injuries of those in and aroundtanks are also different. About 25percent of tank crew casualties sus-tain burns. These are mostly flash-type burns of the face, neck, hands,and forearms. This distribution does

ar to have changed sinceWWII.

Ballistic injury is responsible forthe majority of the rest of the in-juries seen with tank crewman.Those are characterized by multiplesmall-fragment injuries, often of softtissues (skin, subcutaneous fat, andskeletal muscle) only. DuringWWII, wounds to British crewmaninside of tanks were from multiplesmall fragments, which weighed lessthan about 4 grains in 80 percent ofthe sampling. This is less than 1/15of thc weight of the M-16A2 riflebullet, the M-855.

HeadFaceINeck- Living woundedsoldiers generally have soft tissue in -juries only. The incidence of eye in -juries is about five to seven percentof the hospitalized soldiers in theOctober 1973 war, and for Britishtank crewman in WWII, which ishigher than the one to two percentseen in non-mechanized infantrycasualties. Airway compromise isvery infrequent, from 0.3 to 0.8 per-cent.

Tmnk (chest and abdomen) -The collapsed lung is the most life-threatening of injuries to this area,involving about three to four per-cent of all casualties. Injuries to theabdomen need prompt surgical careover the next several hours toprevent overwhelming infection. In--



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juries to both the chest and the ab-domen may cause a patient to gointo shock, which requires urgenttreatment.Extremities (arms and legs) -

These compose the single largestcategory of wounds. About one halfof the hospitalized patients will havefractures or traumatic amputations.TriageWhat system do we have toevaluate casualties? Triage is ameans of providing care first tothose who need it most, based onthe predicted outcome of certaingroups of patients. It is ac-

complished, initially, by thecorpsman at the com pany level whosets priority for his treatment andevacuation plan. Casualties can bedivided into roughly three types atthis level:Urgentllmmediate: Those whohave life-threatening problems thatneed timely care. A traumatic am-putation or a collapsed lung are twoexamples. By analysis of Vietnamdata, about 14 percent of casualtiesrequired treatment of the "ABCs" -airway, breathing, and circulation -10 percent in shock, two to threepercent respiratory compromise,an d 0.8 percent airway com-promise." O ne survey of battle

casualties, taken in Italy duringWWII, found that about nine per-cent of the casualties were non-transportable and needed urgentsurgery.14

Minimal/Delayed This is a patientwhose clinical course will not be al-tered by a delay of several hours.Most soft tissue wounds fall intothis category, as well as the majorityof the extremities wounds. Thiscategory of battle casualties is themost frequent.

Expectant: This patient's coursecannot be altered to any great de-gree. Very few individuals fall intothis category. A person with aARMOR - November-December 7989 77


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penetrating head wound, with fuced,dilated pupils, who is not breathingon his own, is an example.

Evacuation of a wounded crew-member is a hazardous task thatmay, ironically, cause further casual-ties. The chain of evacuation in acombined arms unit starts from theindividual vehicle to the medical M-113 at the company level. Themajority of casualties will be able todo so by themselves, or with thehelp of one another.

When to remove a crewman is de-pendent on the tactical situation.Only patients in the urgenthm-mediate category need to beevaluated at the BAS as soon as pos-sible. Lightly wounded crewmanshould seek treatment during a lullin the fighting. Ideally. a woundedcrewman should leave the vehiclewhen it is in a hide position. safefrom small arms and artillery fire. I fthe vehicle is immobilized. this maynot be possible. Medical M-113drivers should emphasize tacticaldriving to avoid losing medical as-sets when extracting combat casual-ties under fire.

Because the large majority of softtissue wounds, fractures, and burnscan be managed at the companylevel for several hours, vehicle runsare feasible by the medical M-113to the patient collection point orbattalion aid station. Medical M-113s are usually set up for two litterand five ambulatory paticnts. Whenthere are a large number of casual-ties, alternative vehicles may beused.

TreatmentWhat treatment is required at the

company level for our group ofcasualties? (See chart, upper right.)

Those who havepsychiatric or combatstress reaction willreceive evaluation ini-tially at the companylevel. Light cases ofcombat stress reactionmay return to duty.More severe cases mayneed further care at thebattalion aid station, orwith the combat stresscontrol dctachment at-tached to the medicalcompany of the for-ward support battalion.The majority of soldierswith combat stress reac-

Company-Level Treatment and Suppliesfor Typical CasualtiesBums

HeadlFacelNeck

Extremities(6traumaticamputations)

Trunk

Multiple

Antibiotic creamBandagesAnalgesia, if neededBandagesAnalgesia, if needed6 Tourniquets24 splints (or more,some may bemultiple)6 IVsBandagesAnalgesia, f needed4 Occlusive Dressings7 Intravenous luidsBandagesAnalgesia, f needed.Combination of above.

tion can return to duty before 72hours, and can perform on a parwith their peers. Treatment for com-bat stress reaction is as far forwardas possible, and consists of the "fourRs" - rest, refreshment, reas-surance. and return to duty (within72 hours).

Prevention"Stout armor" is the best protec-

tion from injury to armored vehiclecrews. Unfortunately, at some point,any vehicle's armored envelope canbe overmatched by antiarmorweapons. When designing an ar-mored vehicle, there is always atrade-off between protection,mobility, and firepower.

Crew survivability was the toppriority for the design of theAbrams M1 tank. "Live-fire testing"has been carried out on the Abramswith actual Threat weapons. Resultsshow the majority of injuries ex-pected would be ballistic, and thatthe Abrams design reduced burns.

As mentioned above, there isabout a five-to-seven percent in-

cidence of eye injuries with com-bined arms or armor units. No eyeinjuries occurred with Israeli crew-men in Lebanon in 1982, when theywore go_ggles with 2 mm polycar-bonate lenses.

No casualty data are available fortank crewman with and withoutbody armor. In a Korean War study,the protective vests stopped about75 percent of small fragments, andreduced the percentages of KIAs(killed in action) from chest woundsfrom 26.7 percent to 16.9 percent.Protective armor appears to savelives.

Israeli use of Nomex suits (Nomexis a proprietary flameproof fabric. -Ed.) does not appear to have al-tered the distribution of burn in -juries when compared to BritishWWII tank crewman, though Israelidata shows a reduction in burnseverity from 1973 to 1982.l.' In the1982 Lebanon War, Israeli use ofNomex gloves reduced the percent-age of hand burns from 75 percentto nine percent: Because about 75percent of burned crewman have fa-cial bums, a usable face mask for



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burn protection is being developed,and needs to be fielded.

Training skills for the treatment ofcombat casualties need to be rein-forced on a regular basis beyondbasic training. Not all first aid com-mon tasks apply to combo[ casual-ties. For example. casualties do notdie of heart attacks; therefore, car-diopulmonary resuscitation (CPR)is of limited usefulness o n the bat-tlefield. The first aid common tasksthat are most useful for combatcasualty are"^.'^ are application oftourniquets and pressure dressings,splinting, and bandaging.

Current annual testing of theseskills is inadequate to maintain ahigh level of proliciency; therefore,we recommend soldiers be testedon a quarterly basis to ensure thoseskills are second nature. This canfree the medics to perform triage,start IVs, give pain medication, aswell as adjust splints and bandages.How should the medics train?From analysis of combat casualties,

the skills most needed will be:0 Triage (patient evaluation).Splinting (a variety of splints

with various materials. as shown inFirst Aid for Soldiers. FM 21-11)0 Hare Traction Splintse ntravenous (IV) fluids0 Intramuscular ( IM) injectionsStarting IVs is a skill that needs to

be practiced on actual patients.Temporary duty in a hospital topractice starting IVs and giving in-tramuscular ( IM) injections will en-sure the medics' proficiency in war-time. (Civilian Quality Assurancestandards may not allow this prac-tice in Army hospitals.) It is neces-sary that the medic practice triagewith a realistic number of patients,so that all of the important wartimeskills can be maintained.

It is imperative for the commanderto be the driving force behind main-taining proficiency for skills neces-sary for the treatment of combatcasualties. The quality and specificprograms for training are theresponsibility of the battalion sur-geon, or the brigade surgeon if onedoes not exist at battalion. Failureto do so may result in a needlessloss of life in a future conflict.

Notes

' Wright, H.B.; Harkness, R.D. A Surveyof Casualties Amonast Armored Units inNW Europe, Jan 1946. Medical ResearchCouncil Team, 21st Army Group.

McRae. V.; Coox, A.D., Tank vs TankCombat in Korea, Operations ResearchGroup, Tech Memoranda, ORO-T-278. 8Sep 1954.

Daily, J., Some Observations of RPGImDacts on the M48. M551. and M113 inSouth Vietnam, Mar 1977, USAMSAA,Aberdeen, MD.

Bellamy, R.F., "The Causes of Deathin Conventional Warfare: Implication forCombat Casualty Care Research,"Medicine 149, pp.55-62, Feb. 1984.

Bellamy, R.F., "How Shall We Trainfor Combat Casualty Care?," MilitaryMedicine 152, 12:617-621, 1987.

Bellamy, R.F., "Death on the Bat-tlefield and the Role of First Aid," MilitaryMedicine 152, 323634635. 1987.

Shafir. R.; Nili, E.;Kedem, R., "Burn In-jury and Prevention During the LebanonWar. 1982." Israeli Journal of MedicalScience 20:311-313. 1984.G i n , M.E.; Treister, G.; Shlomo, D.,"Eye Injuries and Ocular ProtectionDuring the Lebanon War, 1982." lsraeliJournal of Medical Science, 20:333-338,1984.

Belenky, G.L.; Tyner, C.F.; Sodetz,S.J., Israeli Battle Shock Casualties 1973and 1982, Walter Reed Army Institute ofResearch Report NP-83-4, WRAIR,Washington. D.C. 20307.

3

4

1

7


lo anon, Y.L; Nili. E.; Dolev, E.,"Primary Treatment of Baffle Casualties inthe Lebanon War, 1.982," Israeli Journal ofMedical Science. 20:300-302, 1984.

Herget, C.M.; Coe, J.B.; Beyer, J.C.,Chapter XII, "Wound Ballistics and BodyArmor in Korea." In Wound Ballistics(edited by J.C. Beyer) Government Print-in Office, Washington, D.C., 1962.92 Bellamy, R.F., Personal to the

author, Feb 20, 1989.l 3 STP 21-1-SMCT, Soldiers Manual of

Common Tasks, Skill Level 1, pp.455512.Government Printing Office, 1987.l4nyder, H.E., Chapter XVI, Fifth U.S.

Army. In Activities of the Suraical Consul-tants, Volume 1, p403. Government Print-ing Office, Washington, D.C., 1962.

Captain Paul J. Doughertyserves on the orthopedicsurgery service at Letter-man Army Medical Center,San Francisco. He earnedhis medical degree at theUniformed Services Univer-sity of the Health Sciences,Bethesda, Md., after under-graduate and graduatestudies in anthropology atSan Francisco State Univer-sity, where he was also alab instructor in anatomy.His professional interests in-clude trauma surgery andgunshot wound ballistics.

Captain Ralph Briggs is a1979 graduate of VirginiaMilitary Institute. He at-tended the Armor OfficerBasic and Advanced Cour-ses and was troop com-mander of 4-4 Cav, 3d In-fantry Division. He is current-ly an instructor at the ArmorSchool Leadership Branch,Command and Staff Depart-ment, Fort Knox, Ky.19


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At left, German combat en-gineers closely supportedrapid river crossings in the Ar-dennes during the 1940 driveinto Belgium. By 1944, few ex-perienced engineers were left,and even small streamshindered mobility.At right, the present bridgeover the Ambleve River atTrois Ponts. The Belgians blewa bridge here in 1940; theAmericans did the same in1944 to slow the Germans.

Synchronizing Mobility Supportby Major Dominic Ino

IntroductionSynchronized, violent execution isthe essence of decisive combat.Th e division piles on com bat powerusing combat multipliers. The sap-per or engineer combat multipliergenerates enhanced mobility to per-mit unimpeded maneuver. Heavyforces synchronize mobility supportto maintain the initiative, preservefreedom of action, and maneuverdecisively. Good organization andrepetitive combined arms training

engender the superlative commandand control necessary to syn-chronize m obility support.Wehrmacht Mobility SupportIn the ArdennesThe Germans launched two offen-sives through the Ardennes inWorld War 11. The first, in May1940, quickly penetrated the dif-ficult terrain of this wooded, moun-

tainous area and lead to victory.The second, in December 1944,stalled in spite of complete surpriseand local superiority in tanks and in-fantry.The differences in Germanmobility support in the two Arden-nes offensives are relevant andoften overlooked. The panzer spear-hea d crossed the Meus: River al-most in strid e in 1940, bu t wasstymied in 1944 by smaller rive rslike the Salm, the Ourthe, and theAmbleve? U.S. engineers renderedyeoman service blocking the way in1944, while dispersed and worn-outGerman Pioniere could not clear the

way for a lightning advance of heavyTiger and Panther tanks. What wasthe difference between 1940 and1944?In the 1930s, Heinz Guderian, thefather of the German armoredforce, had preached synchronization

of the combined arms team duringthe formation of the panzer arm.His mechanized force was like anorchestra, which only plays in har-

mony if every instrument plays itspart? Guderian included sappers,combat engineers, in hismechanized, combined arms force.In 1940, well-trained sapp ers were apart of the combined arms teamthat made blitzkrieg happen.Synchronized mobility support ex-plains the impressive ability ofWehrmacht armored formations tomaneuver in the early years of thewar. Sappers - pioniere -synchro-nized with tanks and infantry,crossed rivers, cleared obstacles,and reduced fortifications inPoland, France, and Russia!

By 1944, however, the Wehrmachtsapper corps was bled white, moreso even than the infantry. Losses intrained leaders, armored vehicles,and specialized equipment were notmade up. In November 1944, G e r -many was able to mass tanks, in-fantry, artillery, and logistics for theArdennes offensive, but could notmass enough sapper companies tomaintain the initiative gained bytheir surprise attack? More damag-ing was the failure of the German

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leadership in 1944 to get mobilitysupport, scarce as it was, to the criti-cal point. Again and again. leadingpanzer units lost valuable timetrying to bypass seemingly insig-nificant obstacles? The result in1944 was a s tm , a traffic jam, in-stead of the blitzkrieg of 1940.The Divisional Sapper BrigadeExperience at the National Train-

ing Center, and in field training ex-ercises, shows that getting sappersto the right place at th e right time isa problem. Engineer command andcontrol often does not keep up withchanging operations. The divisionalengineer platoon leader, todaydoctrinally the task force engineer,is overwhelmed."

The brigade staff engineer, oncethought to be the solution to thesapper command and controlproblem, often cannot integrate non-divisional engineer units quicklyenough. The time factor has be-come compressed in the years sinceWWII.

Engineer command and controlsystems currently need more reac-tion time than is available on thebattlefield. The sometimes-appliedanalogy of mobility support fromsapper units to fire support from ar-tillery units oversimplifies theproblem. The synchronization ofsappers with maneuver forces is sig-nificantly more difficult. For ex-ample, the teamwork necessary be-

Above, an Armored VehicleLaunched Bridge (AVLB)team moves forward tobreach a tank ditch in condi-tions similar to the Ardenneswinter.

Below left, a Combat En-gineer Vehicle (CEV) movesout after breaching a tankditch. The CEV's power equip-ment and armament canbreach obstacles and destroyfortifications.

Below, mechanized en-gineers in M113s clear aminefield.



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tween sapper and maneuver unitsfor an in-stride breach is harder toorchestrate at task force level thant h e tire support that goes with it.

Synchronized mobility support re-quires intensive combined armstraining at brigade and task forcelevel to achieve the necessary de-gree of command and control.

A divisional sapper brigade couldsolve this problem by providing asapper battalion headquarters tosupport each maneuver brigade,under a concept the EngineerSchool calls E-force.

E-Force does not change the totalnumber of sappers in the corps." E-Force moves sapper structure fromthe "corps slice" into th e division toimprove command and control ofthe mobility combat multiplier andinstitutionalizes combined armstraining. Eight conventional linecombat engineer companies will bereorganized into nine smaller, moreleader- and equipment-intensive E-Force sapper companies. Thesenine sapper companies will formthree E-Force sapper battalions.one per maneuver brigade. Thisreorganization is in the spirit ofchanges in the tank and infantry bat-talions which have increased theleader ratio in the last few years.More important, E-Force providesa battalion headquarters in routinedirect support of each maneuverbrigade for improved planning, con-trol of additional non-divisional sap-pers, and improved logistical sup-port of sapper units. If nothing else,E-Force will improve the combinedarms training of the current non-divisional combat engineers bybringing these sappers formally intothe division family.

Students of mechanized warfaremay contend that another brigademakes the division too unwieldy foreffective command and control. The

The E-ForceDivision Engineer Organization

concept of a larger sapper organiza-tion in the division is not novel,12but has been criticized as too cum-bersome.13

Opponents argue that task-organiz-ing corps battalions to the division,as needed, provides the multipliereffect without creating a "fat"division. However, engineer com-mand and control for the sapperbattalions that doctrinally work inthe division is now broken. In fact,the habitual association and com-bined arms training necessary foradequate command and controlargue for a divisional sapperbrigade if we are to have effective,synchronized mobility support.HabitualAssociationTheoretically, commanders can

synchronize operations in smalldivisions more easily than in largerones where the span of control, andtherefore the friction of war, isgreater.

However, the real size of adivision changes as non-divisionalunits are attached for specific opera-tions. Doctrinally, the heavy divisionwill have two mechanized corps sap-per battalions in support, in addi-tion to its divisional batta1i0n.l~

U.S. divisions in Europe today haveat least one battalion habitually as-sociated. As part of the "corpsslice," the non-divisional sapper bat-talion trains with its division regular-ly." In M I , habitual association"often led to engineer combat groups- sapper brigades - becoming defacto divisional units." Thus, theperceived flexibility of assigningthese battalions to the corps troopsis a mirage. If the sappers have notjoined the division in habitual as-sociation, then the friction of warmakes synchronization difficult toachieve at best.

To have an effective habitual as-sociation, non-divisional sappersmust train with the division regular-ly. This means the non-divisionalsapper plans all his training aroundcombined arms training with thedivision. Essentially, the non-divisional sapper battalion's entireoperations revolve around thedivision. Making th e battalion partof the division just streamlines theprocess. Clearly, problems withSOPS,battle drills, codes, and logis-tical support take critical staff timeand training to sort out. The corpsengineer slice and the division needto "cohabitate" before operations toestablish working relationships. Onthe human level, sappers must learn



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to interpret the maneuver com-manders intent. How muchcohabitation. and how many train-ing exercises are necessary h r effec-tive synchronization is a vexing ques-tion for training managers. But theteamwork required for realsynchronization does not happenovernight. Operation Schmidt, aWWII attack over difficult terrainnorth of th e Ardennes, is an ex-ample of unsynchronized sappersand a devastating failure in mobilitysupport.Sappers at SchmidtThe Huertgen Forest in 1944 was

a foot soldiers nightmare. The 28thInfantry Division (28th ID)employed the equivalent of a sapperbrigade to support its attack tosiezc the town of Schmidt on 2November 1944. In addition to the1171st Engineer Combat Group,28th ID had a dozen artillery bat-talions, a tank battalion, a tankdestroyer battalion, and hundredsof aircraft to support its attack.

The division mission was to breakthrough the Siegfried Line, seize theRoer River dams, and secure theright flank of VI1 Corps for an up-coming offensive into th e industrialheart of Germany. The Germansrepulsed the attack with bloody loss.

In spite of the mobility supportavailable, the attacks of the 109thand 110th Infantry Regiments didnot break through fortifications andobstacles defended by exhausted,third-rate German infantry.

The 112th Infantry made the mainattack and captured Schmidt, butwas cut off and overrun because theKall Trail, the only road across adeep, wooded gorge leading toSchmidt, was not kept open. The1171st did not provide adequatemobility support to 28th ID, al-though the engineers distinguishedthemselves in close combat. The146th Engineer Combat Battalion,for example, conducted a counterat-tack, which restored the divisionsfront line at a critical point.

Poor synchronization of mobilitysupport was a factor in the failureof the attack at Schmidt.18 Therewere enough engineers, but they didnot get to the right place at theright time. Infantry soldiers were un-able to clear the way alone. Theavailable tanks and tank destroyers,as well as the desperately neededcombat service support, could notget forward in the required quan-tities. The battalion assigned toclear the Kall Trail was notsynchronized with the main effort ofthe 112th Infantry. The sappers did

AVLB...1944-StyleTank bridgelaying vehicle,based on M3 tank chassis,was used to set treadwaysacross antitank ditches.Photo below shows tread-way sections being placed.Above, the vehicle crossesthe ditch. The cannon at left

of the hull is a dummy - themantlet hinged forward andacted as an entry hatch.



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not provide 28th ID the mobilitysupport to maneuver decisively andfulfill the commander's intent. TheAmericans lost the command andcontrol contest to the Germans. Al-though 28th ID initiated the attack,its sappers took longer to clear theway than the Germans took tocounterattack. The 116th PanzerDivision marched some 50 km andattacked before the Americanscould organize effectively to clearthe way to the 112th Infantry inSchmidt. Without synchronizedmobility support, the 28th ID failed.

The Huertgen Forest is similar tothe Ardennes, the Thuringerwald,and many other heavily woodedareas throughout central Europewhere we may have to fight. 2%h IDenjoyed superiority in artillery,aircraft, logistics and engineers. The28th ID, in fact, had more engineersupport at Schmidt than U.S.divisions in Europe have today.Clearing the way fo r decisivemaneuver of today's heavy divisions,with more and heavier vehicles thanthe WWII infantry divisions, willdemand first-class command andcontrol to synchronize the sapper ef-fort in the division and keep thelead tanks moving.ConclusionTo synchronize mobility support,

the division requires an agile sapperorganization. The E-Force mech-anized sapper brigade, organizedfrom the current assets of onedivisional and one corps battalion,will do the job. Corps combat en-gineer battalions have often been defacto divisional units, due tohabitual association. E-Forcelegitimizes the marriage and en-sures synchronized mobility supportfor decisive maneuver in divisionoperations.Notes'FM 100-5, Operations

2Liddell-Hart, B.H., ed. The RornmelPapers. Rommet describes this campaignfrom his viewpoint as the commander ofthe 7th Panzer Division. His depiction ofcrossina the Meuse is Darticularlv inter-T s , The Damned Enaineers,Houghton-Mifflin, 1970, describes thefight of the 291st Engineer Combat Bat-talion in the path of the 1st SS PanzerDivision. Heck, Bortz, Lynch, Maya, andWeld, The Corps of Enaineers: The WarAaainst Germanv, Chapter H I, USACMH,1985, describes engineers in the Arden-nes. pp. 461-488.

4Guderian, Heinz. Panzer Marsch! ed.Oskar Munzel, Munich, 1955, p.152.

'During the 1940 campaign in theWest, a German airborne sapper platoonwas the key to the fall of Fortress EbenEmael in Belgium.

'Wilhelm Willemer, Enqineer Attacks onFixed Fortifications, MS P-0600,USACMH. 1952, describes German sap-per assault techniques in three actions inRussia.

'Petter, Dietrich, and Bernhardt, Harri.Pioniere: Entwickluna einer deutschenWaffenaattunq, Darm-stadt, 1963.

'Cole, Hugh M. The Ardennes: Baffle ofthe Bulae, The United States Army inWorld War II , Washington, DC, 1964, p.77.

'Cole, op cit, pp. 316-322. The turningof the 116th Panzer Division away frapthe Ourthe River on 19 December 1944,and consequently the reorientation of theLVlll Panzer Corps attack from west tonorth was one fateful decision caused bylack of mobility support forward.gineers in the Combined Arms Taskm,ndustrial College of the Armed For-ces. Washington, DC, 1986 (alsopublished as TC 5-71-2) describes thisproblem in detail. MG Richard S. Kem,LTC J. Richard Capka and MAJ Houng Y.Soo, in "E-Force: an Update," Enaineer,Volume 18, July 1988, state unequivocallythat the engineer system is broken in theheavy division.

"Nahas, Albert J., and Deter, D.E.,

l1em, et al, op cit, p.6.12Coll, Keith. and Rosenthal, The Corns

of Enaineers: Troops and EauiDment,OCMH, Washington, 1958, pp.10-11. The

U.S. infantry division of World War I hadan engineer regiment.

l3Ibid, p. 43, LTG Leslie J. McNair keptthe divisional engineers to a battalion Inthe WWll division to keep it easy to con-trol. Similar arguments from the GermanWWll experience are in Hans Joachimvon Hopfgarten, "Aufgaben eines PzPiBtlinnerhalb einer Panzer-division,"Wehrkunde, Vol 2, p.21, 1953. VonHopfgarten states that a sapper regimentwas advocated for the panzer division,but the idea was rejected because of thesize of the division.

14FM 5-100, Enaineer Combat Opera-tions, 22 Nov 1988.TFM 25-100, T m , March 1989,describes Corps Slice Training.

16House, Jonathan, Towards CombinedArms Warfare, USAC&GS, 1984, p.107,describes how engineer groups often be-came part of a division during WW ll .Division commanders did not want togive them up.

"MacDonald, Charles B., and Mathe-ws, Sidney T., Three Battles: Amaville. Al-tuzzo. and Schmidt, OCMH, DA,Washington DC, 1952, describes the bat-tle in detail.

18Taylor, LTC Benjamin G., "OperationSchmidt." Militant Review, August 1954,p.10, attributes the failure to seven fac-tors, among them the difficult supplyroute, and the failure to get sufficient ar-mored support across the Kall River onthe Kall Trail.

Major Dominic l u o , a 1974graduate of the USMA, is ex-ecutive officer of the 237thEngineer Battalion, 7th En-gineer Brigade, VI1 Corps, inHeilbronn, FRG, having pre-viously served as the bat-talion S3. He served in anumber of company posi-tions while assigned to the12th Engineer Bn., 8th In-fantry Div., and commandedthe 58th Engineer Co., 11thACR.ARMOR - November-December 1989 25


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45 Years Aaa;

Joachim Peiperand the DeepAttackby Mark Edmond Clark

Today, the U.S. Army has in-tegrated the concepts of maneuverwarfare into its doctrine more thanever before. FM 100-5 (1986) is arecognition of the operational levelof war, the requirement of mission-type orders, initiative at the lowerlevels, and the concept of striking atan enemys weaknesses. But, thedoctrines emphasis on the conceptof hitting deep into an enemysflank and rear is perhaps one of itsmore intriguing aspects.To hit deep into the rear of static

or dynamic enemy forces is certain-ly not a new consideration for com-hat on a European battlefield. Asrecently as WWII , there were manyoccasions when mechanized and ar-mored forces made deep penetra-tions into opposing formations inorder to reach an ob.jective or tostop an attack. This is especiallytrue with regard to German forceswhich counterattacked against ad-vancing Allied armies on both theEastern and Western fronts. ManyGerman officers achieved promin-ence for their skill and success inconducting such deep attacks. Oneofficer of special note was Oberst(Colonel) Joachim Peiper, com-mander of the 1st SS Panzer Regi-ment of the 1st SS Panzer Division.

This article is a brief examinationof Colonel Peipers use of the deepattack during the German Ardennesoffensive of 1944, known as the Bat-

tle of the Bulge. Its purpose is toprovide some insight into themilitary tactics and decision-makingof this commander during thisoperation. Hopefully, it will alsoprovide a few ideas on some of themany considerations commandersshould make when conducting adeep attack on an offensively pos-tured enemy. It will alsodemonstrate how many of todaysgenerally accepted concepts on theuse of mechanized and armored for-ces in the deep attack served askeys to the deep attacks of the past.

Although well educated and fluentin English, Peiper was a tough, ar-rogant, and hard-core Nazi officer.He was famous for his ruthlessnessand for his success in performingnotable feats of daring in Russia.Typical of his exploits was his res-cue of the German 302nd InfantryDivision in 1943.The 302nd was withdrawing under

pressure from an area near thewestern banks of th e Donets River,and was burdened with more than athousand wounded. The 1st SS Pan-zer Division was tasked to come toits aid at a time when the 1st SS wasitself under severe assault on theDonets. Obedient to his orders,Sepp Dietrich, the commander ofthe 1st SSI withdrew a pa~tzcrprertadier - mechanized - bat-talion, which Peiper commanded,and sent it in. Peipers unit crossed

the Donets, smashed through the ad-vancing Russian Army, repelled theRussians furious counterattacks,and pushed on until it had locatedthe 302nd. The battalion formed aprotective ring around it and heldoff Russian assaults until all of thedivisions remaining elements gotsafely across the frozen river.

However, at the point of crossing,the river ice was too thin to bear theweight of Peipers halftracks. Heswung the battalion around anddrove it through the rear of the Rus-sian forces until he reached abridge near German forces, whichwas capable of bearing the vehicles.

With a record of such operations,it is understandable that the Ger-man High Command, while develop-



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ing its plan for a major offensive int h e West during the winter of 1944,selected Peiper for the assignmentof commanding the lead elements ofthe principal drive. The offensivewas essentially an all-out effort byGermany to stave off defeat. Rough-ly, the plan was to push through theweakly defended Ardennes Forest,which lies within the borders of Bel-gium and Luxemburg, drive on tothe Meuse River, and seizeAntwerp, a Channel port in Bel-gium. The capture of Antwerpwould have given the Germans anoutlet to the sea.

The German High Commanddepended on two key elements forits attack. First, it depended on fogand weather to ground Allied air

power. Second, it depended on com-plete surprise. Because surprise wasa key element for success, manydetails of the attack were keptsecret even from its participantsuntil days before its start. It wasunder this cloud of secrecy that theArdennes operation began forPeiper.

Brought to the West two daysbeforehand, Peiper received orderson December 14 to drive the 1st SSPanzer Regiment rapidly throughthe northern region of the Arden-nes and reach the Meuse River, toignore his flanks, and to capture asmany U.S. fuel dumps as possible.Briefings and maps included mostof th e tactical necessities, such as ac-curate information on the U.S. situa-

tion and the composition of U.S. for-ces.

From his maps, Peiper recognizedthat environmental factors would beof great importance to his attack.The roads assigned to his unit andremaining elements of the 1st SSPanzer Division, which were re-quired to follow him, were generallybad. Their negotiability by trackedvehicles would be difficult. InPeiper's opinion, the roads werebest suited for bicycles. Yet, despitethese misgivings, he recognized thatthe route provided many bridgesthat would aid the speed of the ad-vance.

To fulfill his mission, Peiper firstturned to task organization. Hewanted to fight an integrated com-



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bmed arms battle, and sought aprecise mix of forces. Armored andmechanized capabilities had to beused to their maximum advantage,and the strength of each had to beconsidered in terms of how it couldenhance and overcome the weak-nesses of the other.

The forces available for Peipersattack included one battalion ofMark IV and Mark V medium Pan-ther tanks, one battalion of Tiger I1heavy tanks, and one battalion ofpaltier grenadiers. After consideringfactors such as mission, enemy, tcr-rain, and troops and time available.Pciper organized his unit into akariipfpippe - combat team. Inorder to give Peipers advance addi-tional support, the German HighCommand reinforced his unit withone regiment of paratroopers fromthe 3rd Fallschirmjager Division.However, cooperation between thetwo units was brief. Only a rein-forced company of the paratroopersremained with Peipers column afterthe morning of December 17, whichwas its first day of attack. Thecolumn would be 25 kilometerslong. Most combat elements had tobe in the front of the column be-cause it was impossible for thevehicles in the rear to overtakethose in the front due to the badroads. Peiper decided that a fewhalftracks would proceed ahead asfast as possible until they met resis-tance. The medium tanks would beamong the forward elements. Theheavy tanks would be kept in therear until the unit reached theMeuse River. Then they wouldproceed at medium speed.

Since contact with U.S. forces waspossible at any point during the ad-vance, Peiper made all forward com-bat elements, except for the leadhalftracks, capable of quicklydeploying for attack. He created anassault formation from these forces.The formation featured two Panther

tanks as point, followed next bytroops in halftracks, and then by amixture of Panther and Mark IVtanks.

Any decision to make a hasty at-tack after contact with U.S. forceswould be a critical decision becauseall movement would be halted. Indeciding Peiper would have to giveconsideration to force ratios, U.S.force dispositions, and possible U.S.force intentions. To expedite thisdecision-making process, Peiper is-sued orders against firing into small

the roads leading to Honsfeld full ofU.S. vehicles traveling from thefront, Peipers tanks and halftrackssimply fell into the column andentered the town with them. Al-though they were initially obliviousto the Germans presence, the U.S.troops soon discovered the situationand retr

armor magazine, november-december 1989

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