armor magazine, may-june 1991

8/4/2019 Armor Magazine, May-June 1991

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The combat portion of Operation DESERTSTORM has been over for more than aquarter of a year already, but ENDEX is notyet within sight. It is evident now that theshooting war may prove to have been theeasiest part of our deployment to the PersianGulf region. The problems of keeping thepeace, protecting regional inhabitants fromfurther atrocities, and redeployment are nowremoved from the front pages of newpapers.

Nevertheless, the war against Iraq mayprove to generate more written words perhour of combat than any other conflict in his-tory. Until now, the media wrote most ofthose words, but now, accounts are startingto come forth from the participants them-selves. (See page 7 for the account of"Ghost Troop," and page 13 for the 1-4 Caval-ry's story.)The recent annual Armor Conferencesparked record attendance, in large part, Ithink, because many of the senior com-manders of DESERT STORM were here totell their stories and to shed some light onwhat was great about the operation andwhat was not so great. The structuredpresentations gave way to free-flow discus-sion, which could have continued for days.Soldiers redeploying to Fort Knox during theconference reminded us that while we gatherlessons in a pseudo-academic state of mind,the mission is not yet complete.Many things became clear during the struc-tured presentations and in the countless off-

line discussions between individuals at the so-cial events. Most of the equipment performedbetter than expected: some of it clearlyearned epithets. But the common thread, theoverwhelming opinion was that our soldiersperformed magnificently. This will be the onegreat lesson learned, that well-led Americansoldiers, highly trained and given properequipment, can accomplish any missionanywhere in the world. It seems to me thatthis is a lesson we already knew.

I encourage all participants of OperationDESERT STORM to find some time to writefor ARMOR, while your experiences are stillfresh. We would like to see all points of view,from the HET driver to the cupola, from thegunner's seat to the TOC, from sergeants tothe generals. We are interested in deploy-ment issues, organization, tactics, main-tenance, communications, equipment, first-person accounts, unit narrations, andanalysis. Don't wait 10 years to write yourbook. Send usan article today.

- PJC~

If you want video tapes of the conference, sendblank tapes to:US Army Armor SchoolDOTD, Television DivisionFt. Knox, Ky. 40121Call DSN 464-3725 or 502-624-3725.

ATTN: ATSB-TDV

IOfficial:PATRICIA P. HICKERSONColonel, United States ArmyThe Adjutant General

By Order of the Secretary of the Army:CARL E. VUONOGeneral, United States ArmyChief of Staff


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ARMORThe Professional Development Bulletin of the Armor Branch PB-17-91-3

Editor-in-ChiefMAJOR PATRICK J. COONEYManaging EditorJON T. CLEMENSCommandantMG THOMAS C. FOLEYARMOR (ISSN 0004-2420) is published

bimonthly by the US. Army Armor Center,4401 Vine Grove Road, Fort Knox, KY 40121.

Disclaimer: The information contained inARMOR represents the professional opinionsof the authors and does not necessarily reflectthe official Army or TRADOC position, nordoes it change or supersede any informationpresented in other official Army publications.

Official distribution is limited to one copy foreach armored brigade headquarters, armoredcavalry regiment headquarters, armorbattalion headquarters, armored cavalrysquadron headquarters, reconnaissancesquadron headquarters, armored cavalrytroop, armor company, and motorized brigadeheadquarters of the United States Army. Inaddition, Army libraries, Army and DODschools, HQ DA and MACOM staff agencieswith responsibility for armored, direct fire,ground combat systems, organizations, andthe training of personnel for suchorganizations may request two copies bysending a military letter to the editor-inchief.

Authorized Content: ARMOR will print onlythose materials for which the U.S.Army ArmorCenter has proponency. That proponencyincludes: all armored, direct-fire groundcombat systems that do not serve primarily asinfantry carriers; all weapons used exclusivelyin these systems or by CMF 19-series enlistedsoldiers; any miscellaneous items ofequipment which armor and armored cavalryorganizations use exclusively; training for allSC 12A, 126, and 12C officers and for allCMF-Isseries enlisted soldiers; andinformation concerning the training, logistics,history, and leadership of armor and armoredcavalry units at the brigadelregiment level andbelow, to include Threat units at those levels.

Material may be reprinted, provided credit isgiven to ARMOR and to the author, exceptwhere copyright is indicated.May-June 1991,Vol. C No. 3

Features7

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Ghost Troop's Battle at the 73 Eastingby Vince CrawleyRiders on the Stormby 1-4 CAV Operations StaffTwo Scouts Under Fire Helped Injured BuddiesDuring Night Battleby Captain Michael Gollaher, VI1Corps PA0Lucky Scouts Dodge "Big Bullets"That Ripped Their Bradleyby Tony Wunderlich, VI1Corps PA0"Shooting Blind Men in the Dark..."by Bill Armstrong, VI1 Corps PA0Pumped Up...Ready to Roll(DESERT STORM Photos)Splattered! (Iraqi tank photos)Armor and the Future Armyby General Carl E. Vuono, Chief of Staff of the ArmyLight Cavalry in a Peacekeeping Roleby First Lieutenant Erick A. ReinstedtFuture Heavy Forces: The Need For Better Air Deployabilityby Captain Cole MilsteadSOUM: The Safety-of-Use Message Networkby The Directorate of Total Armor Force Readiness

Departments2245

44495152

LettersContactsComm ander's HatchDriver's Seat"Tanker!" A poem by C haplain Patrick A. Dolan)The Bustle RackArmor Branch NotesBooks


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A NewTraditionDear Sir:

received a red rose because he was anArmor officer. General Armstrong was cor-rected by the undersigned during the 9thDivision change of command when it wasexplained that the rose had a great sym-The outgoing commander of the 9th bolism for the Cavalry; for "The red of the

Motorized Division was presented with a rose stands for the glory, the spirit, thesingle red rose and a spray of baby's grit and determination, the valor and thebreath during the division change of com- gallantry that one always associates withmand on March 1, 1991. This was the the Cavalry; and the soft, fragile, delicatebeginning of a new Cavalry tradition at blossoms of the spray of baby's breathFort Lewis, Washington. stand for the nobility of character, theloyalty, the dignity, the virtue, the courage

and the sacrifice of the Cavalry trooper."he commander, Major General ChuckArmstrong, an erstwhile infantryman, com-mented during a retirement ceremony the General Armstrong earned the right toprevious day that a retiring soldier receive the rose and join the ranks of the

legion of Cavalrymen who have riddenthe road to the fabled Wddler's Green, forhe commanded the largest light Cavalrydivision in the history of our Army, the 9thMotorized Division (Light Cavalry). Its 8uc-cessor is the 199th Motorized Brigade(Light Cavalry) that was organized as the100th Mechanized Cavalry troop, 100thDivision, during World War II. It's great towelcome a historic Cavalry unit back intoour ranks.

THOMAS H. TAlTMG, US. ArmyDirector, DESERT STORMSpecial Studies GroupFt. Leavenworth, Kan.

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(Note: Fort Knax B hn s a Switch Notwork(DSN) refix is 464.Commercial prefix is AreaDIRECTORY - Pointsof Contact C o d e 5 0 2 4 2 4 m .

A R M O R EditorialOfficesEditor-in-ChiefMajor Patrick J. CooneyManaging EditorJon T. ClemensEditorial AssistantVivian ThompsonProduction AssistantMary HagerContributing A rtistSPC Jody Harmon

22492249261026102610

MAILING ADDR ESS ARMOR A'ITN: AT SB AM . FortK ~OXY 40121-5210.

ARTICLE SUBMISSIONS To impmve speed and ac-curacy in editing, manuscripts should be originals or clear copies,either typed or printed out in near-letter quality printer mode.Stories can also be accepted on 5-1/4" floppy disks in MicrosoftWORD, MultiMate. Wordperfect, Wordstar, or Xerox Writer(please include a printout). Please tape captions to any illustrationssubmitted.PAID SUBSCRIPTIONS: Report delivery problems orchanges of a d d m to Ms. Connie Bright. circulation manager,(502)942-8624.UNR DISTRIBUTION Report del ii ry problems or chan-

ges of address to Ms. Mary Hager, DSN 464-2610 commercial:(502)624-2610. Requests to be added to the free subscription listshould be in the form of a letter to the Editor-h-Chief.ARMOR HOTLINE - DSN &TANK(The Annor Hotline is a %-hour service to provide assistance withquestions concerning doctrine. training. organizations. and q u i p -ment of the Armor Fo m . )

U.S. A R MY A R MO R SCHOOLCommandant (ATZK-CG)MG Thomas C. Foley 2121Assistant Commandant (ATSB-AC)BG James L. Noles 7555Deputy Assistant Com mandant (ATSB-DAC)COL Donald E. Appler 1050Command Sergeant MajorCSM Jake Fryer 4952COL James R. oy 8346C 5855C 1055GIT~CLUI-ULCL BlaIuIug rnvelopments (ATSB-TD)LTC Craig S. Harju, Sr. 7250Directorate of Combat Developments (ATSB-CD)COL Edward A. Bryla 5050NCO Academy/Drill Sergea nt Schoo l (ATZK-NC)CSM John J. Beck 5150Directorate of Reserve Com ponent Spt (ATZK-RC)COL Eduard Yates 1351

Maintenance Dept. (ATSB-MA)Command and Staff Dept. (ATSB-CS)V (ATSB-WP)

Directorate ofTotal'Armor Force (ATZK-TF)FAX -75857809IXALJUC system managerforArmored Gun System (ATSB-TS)COL Eugene D. Colgan 7955

2 ARMOR - May-June 1991


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Refining CSS for ScoutsDear Sir:Captain Timothy Flanagan's "Combat

Service Support in the Task Force ScoutPlatoon" (ARMOR, January-February 1991)was right on target. He brings up severalgood points and cuts to the heart of whatbad logistics can do to the TF scoutplatoon. Having been responsible forkeeping the scouts in the fight over twoNTC rotations (once as a support platoonleader, once as a TF S4 ) I'd like to passon a few more comments.

The use of LOGPACS specifically for thescouts is the only opti6n. The scouts needpriority of resupply during the reconnais-sancelcounterreconnaissance phase ofthe battle, or the TF will have no eyes. ButI disagree with CPT Flanagan's use of theHHC first sergeant as the individualresponsible for scout resupply. Obviously,this is personality driven. But thefirepower that the HHC first sergeant car-ries with that diamond he wears is not tobe underestimated. The HHC first ser-geant can perform a more vital service forthe task force by energizing line companysupply sergeants, as well as his own as-sets, and ensuring that the myriad detailsof logistics for the rest of the task forceare worked out at the lowest level. Oursolution was to leave the HHC first ser-geant in the field trains and task the HHCXO with resupply of both the scouts andmortars. This way, the resupply of thescouts was conducted on their terms -this is the way it has to be. The HHC XOwould resupply the mortars on his way toor from the scouts. The S4 gets his situa-tion report after the conduct of the resup-ply, and the HHC XO is on his way backto the field trains. This system also workswell if the battalion is employing an adhoc counterreconnaissance force builtaround the scouts.

To keep a scout "package" of Classes 111and V uploaded at the CTCP proved verysuccessful in our experiences. Two fuelHEMTTs and an ammunition truck keptwith the CTCP can refuel and rearm ascout platoon in five minutes or less. Allthat's required is a grid for the HEMTTs todrive to. Simple. But the HHC XO canalso bring a TPU with the daily LOGPACto keep the scouts moving. If the HHC XOdoesn't have a truck, then he needs aHMMWV with a trailer in order to carryeverything the scouts would need. No-where else in the task force is it more im-portant to have a "push" logistics systemthan it Is with the scouts.

Also, to put the 52 in the scout ogisticsreporting chain doesn't work. When thingsget hot and heavy, logistics for the scoutsis the last thing on the S2's mind. Per-haps a better solution is to keep a logis-tics representative at the TOC (the bat-talion senior supply sergeant is a strongpossibility). This way, there is a desig-nated link from the scouts (via the scoutor O&I net) to the S4. The logistics repwould simply monitor the reports andrelay to the S4 on the A/L net. To equipthe scouts with an OE-254/RG292 anten-na can be effective in allowing them toreport on the AJL net. The scouts shouldhave a designated "window" of reporttimes for them and them alone. Our ex-perience was that the PJL net unclogs it-self between 2100 and 0300.During thiswindow, traffic on the AJLnet can be mini-mized to allow the scouts access. This al-lows them some flexibility. To mandatethat the scouts submit reports along withthe rest of the battalion on an SOPschedule does not work.

CPT flanagan's plan for medical support is also well stated. Another option forevacuation available to the S4/scoutplatoon leader is to task the nearest linecompany to provide medical evacuationfor the scouts. The number of VINSONdevices available would determine who inthe tasked line company monitors thescout net for an evac call. Either the linecompany XO detailed to evac the scouts,or the medics themselves. The medicalplatoon leader would then send an am-bulance from the CTCP to replace the linecompany ambulance that was dispatched.Obviously, this requires tight coordinationand rehearsal. In all cases, aeromedicalevacuation for the scouts should beplanned. If aeromedical support is l imited,then priority should go to the scouts.All loglstics for the scouts needs to be

planned in depth. The depth starts withmaking the scouts as self-sufficient astime, training, and space allow. There arelimits to how far this can go. But if we faileven to address the impact of logistics,then we open ourselves up for failure.

MICHAELP. GILROYCPT, QMOffice of the Quartermaster GeneralFort Lee, Va.

They Also Served...Dear Sir:Your January-February 1991 chart of

Armor-Cavalry units serving in OperationDESERT SHIELD was very helpful, but in-

complete. Both Troop A and Troop B ofthe 2d Squadron, 1st Cavalry took partunder their own guidons in the operationas attachments to 1/7 Cav with the 1stCavalry Division.

Since 2/1 was on the inactivation blockwith the rest of the 2d Armored Division,and 1i7's second ground troop was in theMississippi National Guard, 111 Corps at-tached the two Blackhawk ground troopsto the 1st Cavalry Division. As a result, 1/7deployed with three ground and two airprobably the heaviest division cavalrysquadron in the operation.

PETER D. WELLSCOL, ArmorBurke, Va.

Tank Combat Award OverdueDear Sir:Well, 50 years of armored combat and

the spearhead of the combined arms totalforce still doesn't have a combat award. Inrecognition of the dynamic mission ac-complishment that was done by ourtankers in DESERT STORM, I think it'sabout time. They broke the back of theRepublican Guards and the effort shouldbe forever recognized.

But, you know tankers are used to being"treated rough" and take it all in stride. Sohow about a tank gunnery qualificationpatch for Tank Table XX fired in theKuwaiti Theater of Operations?

MSG JOHN BITTAYOakdale, Pa.

Another Call for Branch BadgesDear Sir:The creation of a series of expert and

combat badges for combat arms soldiers(in addition to 11-series infantry) is longoverdue. Armor crewmen, artillerymen(air/field), aviators, green berets, combatengineers, and scouts should be recog-nized.

I am an MlAl tank platoon leader inDESERT STORM. Clearly, my main con-cern is not what should be pinned abovemy breast pocket. My top priority ispreparing for war; nevertheless, as mymen and 1 await the order to roll north, Icannot ignore the fact that many soldiersare being overlooked.

Continued onPage 47

ARMOR - MayJune 7997 3


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MG Thomas C.FoleyComm anding GeneralU S .Army Armor Center

Conference Capped a Triumphant YearThe 1991 Armor Conference

provided us an excellent oppor-tunity to review one of the mostdramatic years in recent history, ayear in which we are celebrating thevictory of the forces of freedomboth in Europe, where the end ofthe Cold War was dramaticallydemonstrated by the unification ofGermany; and in the desert ofSouthwest Asia, where the aggres-sion and oppression of Saddam Hus-sein ended in crushing defeat. Itwas fitting that, at the Home ofArmor, we reviewed the successesof the recent past, discussed lessonslearned, and charted the path forthe future of the Total ArmorForce.

The highlight of the Armor Con-ference was the address, "Armorand the Future Army The Challen-ges of Change and Continuity,"presented by the Chief of Staff,General Carl E. Vuono, which is in-cluded in this edition of ARMOR. Iencourage you to review hisremarks and reconsider the "Six Im-peratives" in light of our recent ex-perience in Operations DESERTSHIELD and DESERT STORM.

We were extremely fortunate toshare the insights of DESERTSTORM commanders during aseries of presentations, which beganwith a videotaped message fromLTG Franks, commander of VI1Corps, in Southwest Asia, and anoverview of VI1 Corps operations.MG Funk, MG Griffith, MG Tilelli,BG Frazar, COL(P) Holder, andLTCs Goedkoop, Craddock, andStewart detailed the operations oftheir units, providing us accounts ofthe skill, determination, andcourage of the soldiers whodemonstrated to the world the truemeaning of firepower, maneuver,and shock effect. Clearly the pastand present leadership of the Armydeveloped the doctrine, training, or-ganizations, leaders, and materiel re-quired to achieve victory in the firstbattle of DESERT STORM. Thechallenge for current and futureArmor leaders is to continue theevolution of the Armor Force in achanging world, as it prepares towin the first battle of the next war.

GEN John W. FOSS, ommanderof the U.S. Army Training andDoctrine Command, delivered our

keynote address. He reminded usthat we have entered an era of fiscalrestraint, and that the downsizing ofthe Armed Forces, the decliningresources available to us to conductessential training, and the presenceof forces capable of opposing thevital interests of the United Statesare realities. Our challenge is to con-tinue to develop the doctrine, train-ing strategies, devices, and simula-tions that will allow us to maintainthe training edge over our potentialadversaries in light of these realities.

As guest speaker for the ArmorAssociation Banquet, GEN CrosbieE. Saint, CINC USAREUR andSeventh Army, discussed the manykey contributions of USAREUR sol-diers to DESERT SHIELD andDESERT STORM. Dr. Lewis Sor-ley addressed our assembly during astand-to breakfast. GEN Edwin H.Burba, CINC Forces Command,detailed the need for more lethalityin our light forces. He also spokeout strongly for the integration ofreserve components in the totalforce. Reserve component unitsmust train to the same standard asactive units; they will play a greater



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role in the Army as we downsize.MG Peter McVey briefed us on thesystems the Army is developing tomeet the challenges of the futureand enable us to execute AirLandoperations. We engaged in excellentexchanges of information in a seriesof meetings for brigade andregimental commanders, mastergunners, and the Honorary Colonelsof the Regiments. Participants inthe 1991 Armor Conferencereceived copies of the coordinatingdraft of the Armor 2000 studyBranch Operation Concept for theirreview. The presentations of thedirectorates of the Armor Centerand the equipment displays pro-vided our guests an opportunity toreview the progress we are makingat Fort Knox to prepare the ArmorForce to continue as the spearpointof the combined arms team.

The 1991 Armor Conference al-lowed us to review our recent ex-periences and, in light of this

review, clearly see the five challen-ges facing the Armor Force:0 We must sustain a decisive tank

and cavalry force..We must organize, equip, and

train a rapidly deployable lightarmor force.0 We must fully integrate thereserve components into the armor

force.0 We must modernize the total

armor force to maintain the edgeover potential threats.0 We must maintain the quality of

our superb armor leaders and sol-diers.

This is an exciting time for Armorand the Army. In the next decadeand the next century, Armor will be-come an even more diverse andchallenging branch of our profes-sion. The Iraqi T72 tank recentlyadded to the collection of the Pat-ton Museum stands as a physicalreminder of the accomplishments ofthe period between the 1990 and

The Driver's Seat

Command Sergeant MajorResponsibilities and Dutiesby CSM Jake Fryer, Command Sergeant Major, U.S. Army Armor CenterA capable command sergeant

major's supporting and carrying outthe commander's intent at the keyplaces in battle add credibility tothe operation; it also gives soldiersa combat role model they can aspireto, because few, if any, will ever becommissioned. They must have anenlisted combat leader to look up toand follow.

Many CSMs are lime soldiers withyears of combat unit experience andability to lead an d influence smallunit actions. We should continue to

use this expertise and not relegatethe CSM to solely routine rear area"things" - duties. Stories abound,and the most remembered andrespected CSMs in the eyes of sol-diers were the ones that were for-ward with the operations. The warin Asia is an example - manysenior CSMs or retired CSMs aretalked about today because theywere among the few that were outwith the troops during the fightingoperations. Today, the CSMs whocan help tank crews, TCE a tank,run a calibration range, conduct a

1991 Armor Conferences. Therecord attendance at the con-ference, both of active and retiredarmor leaders and the repre-sentation of the Marine Corps inour retreat ceremony, honoringDESERT STORM warriors demon-strates the vitality and, I believe,resurgence of the true spirit ofmounted combat. I am sure we willmeet the five challenges of armor aswe have met all our past challenges.The Armor Force has proved to theworld a fact we have always knownto be true: All of the elements ofthe DESERT STORM campaignwere synchronized to defeat theenemy. He suffered a punishing aircampaign, was cut off from his sup-ply and support, lost his morale,was deserted by his leaders, but hedid not surrender until Armor,Cavalry, and Mechanized Infantryclosed with him and threatened hisdestruction.

Forge the Thunderbolt!

passage of lines and operate an ar-mored vehicle forward, are highlyrespected by troops.

What do we expect the CSM todo? With warfighting as the thrustof our intent, the following aresome activities the CSM should do:

.Get on a tank with the TCE ona moving range and be able to as-sess the crew and the TCE's abilityto perform to th e standard of FM17-12 and present methods to cor-rect oroblems.

ARMOR - May-June 7997 5


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Ghost Troop's Battle at the 73 EastingByVince Crawley(Reprinted from Stars and Stripes)

Specialist Patrick Bledsoe heardan explosion echoing through thedistance, and he was afraid. Thiswas two days after the cease-fire, soprobably the explosion was thesound of soldiers blowing upanother dead Iraqi tank somewherenearby. Still, Bledsoe went off to sitin the desert by himself for awhile,and when ,he came back, no oneasked him' why he'd gone. Theydidn't have to.

"A certain part of you just dies,"said 1LT Keith Garwick. "Some-body trying to kill you so desperate-ly, for so many hours, and comingso close. We just couldn't under-stand it. I still don't understand it.Those guys were insane. Theywouldn't stop," Garwick said of theIraqi Army's Republican Guard,which hurtled wave after wave oftanks at him. Ghost Troop's gun-ners would blow up the oncomingvehicles, only to watch the enemysoldiers jump out and start firingautomatic rifles uselessly at theAmerican armored vehicles. "Theykept dying and dying and dying,"said 25-year-old Garwick, a WestPoint graduate and cavalry platoonleader from Fresno, Calif. 'Theynever quit...they never quit."

The Americans who fought thereare calling it the Battle of the 73Easting, a line on a map in a name-less part of Iraq.

The 150-man troop comes fromBamberg, Germany, and is part ofthe 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment,whose job was to sneak intosouthern Iraq and spearhead theVI1 Corps in its search and destroymission against the RepublicanGuard. Upon finding them, thecavalry regiment was supposed topull aside and let the heavy ar-mored divisions roll in and annihi-late the elite Iraqi forces. And that'spretty much the way it happened, ex-cept for the six hours that GhostTroop spent fighting the Guard'sTawakalna Division on the 73 East-ing.

"If the rest of their army hadfought as hard as the Tawakalnafought, we would have been introuble," Garwick said.

PFC Jason E. Kick was driving aBradley fighting vehicle on Tuesdaymorning, Feb. 26. The sky was stilldark from an overnight rain storm.Kick, 18, from Pembroke, Ga., haddropped out of high school andjoined the Army not long after turn-ing 17. The "young buck of thetroop, he kept quiet and wasmaking rank fast. He'd gotten hisGED diploma in basic training andwas talking about going to college.He carried a small tape recorderand was narrating his impressions ofthe war into it. He wanted to sendthe tape home to his mom after-

ward. He was also carrying his luckycigarette lighter, the one he hadwith him when the Bradley shot1,000 at Grafenwoehr last year.

Ghost Troop had crept into Iraqfrom Saudi Arabia more than 12hours before the ground war official-ly began. The cavalry soldiers drovedue north for a couple of days, thenbegan swinging to the right. By thatTuesday, they were driving due east.

"We expect contact at any time,"Kick told his mother in a slowdrawl, speaking into the recorder. Itwas a little after 8 a.m. "77ic iirtifsthat were in Kuwait, that the Maiirteshave driven out, are headed direct&our way. And reirifoxeitients, insteadof going back into Kuwait, are alsoheaded our way. So' iili, weye gortriahit a lot of sliooting.'

At around 8:30 a.m., the sun brokeout for a moment. Ghost Troopscouts spotted an Iraqi vehicle inthe distance. There were 20 enemysoldiers packed into the personnelcarrier. They all got out as if to sur-render, but three suddenly ran backto the vehicle, and others firedrifles. Ghost troopers said later thatthere might have been some overkillwhen they blew apart the vehicle,but they wanted to make sure thethree Iraqis couldn't get a chance tosend any radio messages to their of-



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There was another explosion, showering sparksac ross the front of the Bradley. "l t was just like som e-body hit us with a sledgehammer," Bledsoe sa id.ficers. They apparently didn't.There was a lot of blood."All I can say," Kick told his tape

recorder, "Is better them than me.That sounds cruel, but it's true." Ithad been Ghost Troop's first kill ofthe war.

The debris turned out to be fromthe Tawakalna Division, and intel-ligence people said that the regi-ment would probably meet up withthe front line of the Iraqi divisionnear the 73 grid line, about 13 milesfarther east.

By 1 p.m., the fog and clouds hadgone. Instead, a ferocious windraged in from the south, creating ablizzard of sand. Iraqi vehicles andinfantry were scattered here andthere. Ghost Troop killed severalmore personnel carriers and, ataround 3:30 p.m., three enemytanks. An hour later they reachedthe 73 Easting.

Off on their right, Eagle, Iron, andKiller Troops already were fightingagainst dug-in Iraqi soldiers. "I hada feeling," said Ghost Troop com-mander, CPT Joseph Sartiano, 29,from San Francisco. "Everybodyelse was making contact. So Ikicked all my scouts back, and putmy tanks up front."

A cavalry troop is half tanks andhalf Bradleys. Normally, the Brad-leys drive up front, and the tankshang back a little, ready to defendthem. Instead, Sartiano lined up thewhole troop along the 73 Fnr*:-rr

Garwick, the Bradleyleader, was in position atMost of the troop, he sailhind a small hill and ridge, overiuuK-ing a wide, shallow valley that the

Arabs call a wadi. Enemy vehiclesand infantrymen were all over theplace, dug in on the other side ofthe wadi.

" W e h rilled rip on line now,' Kicksaid into his tape recorder. "We'reengaged in a pretty decent firefiglitright now... we're shooting again. Ican see where we're sltooting at, brit Ican't see a victor (a veliicle) .. ntis ischaos Itere... "This s total chaos."

Battle commands flooded theradios, adding to the confusion. !'Icart see smoke 011 the Aori:on," Kicksaid into his tape recorder. 'ntatriteairs we killed sontetlting. Wiat itis, I don't know... Wiite One, lie'sthe platoon leader. You can hear it inIris voice. He's all shook up. l?itte,4.54... this is coav firing. Ente is 5:lOp.ni. We're still ir t coiitact. . Tltere's afew PCs Itere mid there, itiost(v in-famy. I just spotted tlie biggest d a mqdosiori at about 12 o'clock. I don'tknow what tlie lie11 it was..."

Garwick's platoon alone had al-ready killed nine personnel carriers.The enemy had started shootingback at them at about 5 p.m. Artil-lery began falling around the Brad-leys.

"A tremendous volume of smallarms fire and shrapnel hit the bermto my front," peppering his Bradleyand another, Garwick said. Iraqi in-fantrymen ran forward and weremowed down. The enemy gunfire in-creased, and airburst artillery beganP-lnrlkn Aver their hparlc Turn

"One just got one of our guys,"Kick shouted.

SPC Patrick Bledsoe, 20, from Ox-nard, Calif., was driving Bradley G-16. All he saw was.shooting. "Wewere in a little wadi," he said, butthe top of the vehicle looked outover the valley. "We were kind ofskylined..."

The Bradley's gunner was 23-year-old SGT Nels A. Moller. The co-axial machine gun was jammed, andthe track commander, another ser-geant, was trying to fix it when helooked up and saw Iraqi infan-trymen running toward them. Heasked Moller, "You got troops tothe front?"

Suddenly, there was an explosion.From his seat at the gun sights,down inside the Bradley turret,Moller couldn't see the area rightoutside the fighting vehicle. 'Whatwas that?" he asked, hearing the ex-plosion.

According to Bledsoe, that wasthe last thing Moller said. Therewas another explosion, showeringsparks across the front of the Brad-ley. "It was just like somebody hit uswith a sledgehammer," Bledsoe said.

He jumped out and ran behind theBradley. Moller was dead. Theother sergeant was slightly wound-ed. Friendly tanks were shootingover Bledsoe's head, and enemy firewas hitting the berm in front of him.He jumped down just as there wasve t annthpr pm lnc i nn PFC Jeff-aatui& vAp"""'Ej "I"& II".I YVUUU. A .I " J - . -.,.-.I- -----. - - I

Bradleys in Garwick's platoon wereAt 5:40 p.m., he saw three tank

Pike, 21, of Binghamton, N.Y.,f platoon positioned over his right shoulder. driving Sartiano's tank. It was neconfirmed, but he be-lieves the 1d, was be- rounds hit the ridge in front of him, explosion was Sartiano's gun442 p.m.

l - - L ---L -L-& 1 ---_ - &Le D--Al-.,* .... 'F C< +hn tn..L +hn+caw1 S I IUL FIUSCI L O LllC Y l d u lG y J u11his right. The last shot hit.

NaSverlastner

auuuuu5 a I-JJ, tuk taun L u a L ,..ledMoller.



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. . . e . .



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Bledsoe tried to get away. "I low-crawled up the the other track, andknocked on the back door, but theydidn't hear me. I went up andknocked on the driver's hatch. Thedriver opened it. I said, W e got hit.We got hit. I think Moller's dead'."His own track, G-16, "was just smok-ing."

At 547, Kick spoke into his taperecorder. "It was one-sir that got h it."A fav miitrites later, he continuedhis voice steadier. V7te ginner of one-sir, SGT Moller, is dead. 77te TCand observer are on one-five rightnow. SGT Moller...SGT Moller waskilled... time about 5:49."

He paused a moment, then added,"Can't let this... can't let this affect 11sor get tis down at all. Or we're goitriadie. And he wouldn't want that. Hedon't want that...But I'm scared."1LT Garwick told his men to keep

fighting. Artillery, tanks, and ma-chine guns were firing all aroundthem on the hill. More were de-stroyed. More fired." T h i s is chaos," Kick reported at

60 4 p.m. "Total chaos... got ninedead victors to our front. Enemy t i c -tors. An d got ntow contirig."The sandstorm had worsened. Gar-

wick could see only about 50 yards.But the thermal sights cut throughsome of the murk. With those, hecould see more than half a mile.Two more enemy tanks were com-ing.

Kick watched them get shot threeminutes later. "Boont. Hit. Hit andkill. He hit it. 77tat's revenge for SGTMoller. You sontifabitch rtg Iraqis.God I hate tltent. SGT Moller was agood guy. We killed tltent. ntat's fotirIraqi PCs killedfor this track alone."

Garwick's scouts told him that 12more tanks were coming. Possiblyas many as 25. Iraqis down in thevalley would just leap from their per-

sonnel carriers and run at Garwick'splatoon, fving rifles. Getting killed.All Kick could see was rounds

going downrange.

ing right on top, ricocheting aroundus. We were in a corner of hell. Idon't know how we made it out ofthere. I don't."

It went on like this - total chaos- for nearly four io r e hours. Atone point, SPC Chris Harveylooked out from the back of his per-sonnel carrier."All I saw were things burning,"

said the 24-year-old artillery ob-server form Virginia Beach, Va."For 360 degrees. Nothing but ac-tion."

Garwick called for the Air Force,but the planes were diverted toanother mission two minutes beforethey got to Ghost Troop. Instead,he held back the tanks by calling inartillery and rockets, pounding eachwave as it appeared on the farridge. The Bamberg squadron's ex-ecutive officer watched from a van-tage point a short distance away. Itlooked, he said, like Armageddon.

One of Garwick's biggest prob-lems was that the radios were sofrantically busy that he couldn't callthrough. Several times, he had tojump out of his Bradley and crawlover to the artillery observers to tellthem in person where he neededthem to shoot.

On one of these occasions, atabout 8:30 p.m., he had crawledhalfway to the artillery observer'svehicle when a round of airburstwent off just on the other side of anearby Bradley. He and the artil-leryman, Sgt. Larry C. Fultz, soughtcover under Garwick's Bradley.

Another wave of tanks was comingin.

"We just sat there crying, justshaken, until we could get back outfrom underneath the Bradley," Gar-wick said. "The air bursts were com-

Days later, in a quiet tent in freeKuwait, an officer from the regi-ment tried to explain what had hap-pened to Ghost Troop.

The Republican Guard's Tawakal-na Division had gotten tangled upwith the 12th Iraqi Armored Divi-sion, and both enemy units weretrying to retreat through the samenarrow piece of terrain, said MAJSteven L. Campbell, 35, the regi-ment's intelligence officer. TheIraqi path of retreat, a shallow val-ley between two ridgeliies, ledstraight into Ghost Troop.

Campbell theorized that the Re-publican Guard might have foughtso fiercely because they were des-perately trying to escape.

Those guys wanted to get out ofthere, and those guys are supposedto be the best fighters. In my mind,they weren't trying to break thedefenses (the line Ghost Troop washolding). The way the terrain was,they had to go through here to getby."

The soldiers in Ghost weren't theonly ones fighting that night. Atleast half of the regiment's troopsand tank companies were on line atone point or another. But most ofthem were fighting against dug-insoldiers. None of them faced thewave-after-wave onslaught that wasaimed at Ghost.

More than once, artillery savedGhost Troop. Helicopters helpedkill tanks. And, near the end, whenthe troop was desperately short onammunition, a tank company,Hawk, came in to relieve them. Inits 100 hours of combat, the regi-ment destroyed 100 tanks, about 50personnel carriers, and more than



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30 wheeled vehicles, plus some anti-aircraft artillery systems, Campbellsaid.

He estimated that 85 to 90 percentof those vehicles were killed in thebattle at the 73 Easting, but no onehad yet counted the vehicles inGhost's sector.

The equivalent of an Iraqi brigadewas destroyed that night, the firstground defeat of the RepublicanGuards, Campbell said. Within 36hours, most of the others were gone.

The morning after the battle, some-one made a wooden cross and stuckit in the sand, and a chaplain cameto say a few words about Moller. Acolonel spoke, too.

Everyone from Ghost Troop wasthere, worn-out men with sunkeneyes, their faces covered with dirtand gunpowder. It was the first timein two months that they had allbeen together in one place, insteadof spread out over the desert, intraining, or combat formations. Sev-eral hugged each other, glad to seetheir friends alive, then gathered ina semi-circle, took off their helmets,and listened to the chaplain and thecolonel.

Then they were told to get readyfor the next battle. It never came. In-stead, a Cease-fire was called, andthe cavalrymen had time to sitamong themselves and try to under-stand what had happened.

They said SGT Nels Moller diedwith his hands on the trigger of theBradley gun, looking for enemy toshoot. His TOW missile launcher,the Bradley's main antitank defense,wasn't working, and Moller knew itbefore he entered the battle.Reason enough to stay out, but hedidn't.

"He died like a soldier," said oneof Ghost's artillery officers, 2LT Joe

Deskevich, 23, of Rockville, Md."He didn't run, and he didn't die fornothing."

He came from Paul, Idaho. Sar-tiano, the troop commander, deci-ded he will take leave and visit thedead sergeant's parents.

The morning after the battle, Kickand another soldier stood in frontof their shrapnel-scarred Bradleyand talked about Moller.

"He was about the only sergeant,"Kick said, still with a bitterness inhis voice, "who'd sit down and listento your problems and treat you likea human being, instead of a private."

That night, before the cease-firewas called, the scouts took moreprisoners and had to stay up guard-ing them. Bledsoe, who'd beenMoller's driver, said that he and theothers had stayed awake by talkingabout Moller.

"We talked about it for threehours," Bledsoe said. 'We decidedthat when he went up on that hill,he wasn't worried about it. He said,'If they get me, that's just anotherbullet that was gonna hit somebodyelse'."

In Bamberg, the cavalrymen live ina place called Warner Barracks 2,and when they get back, they wantto give it a new name - Moller Bar-racks - if the Army will let them.No one, however, really knew whatto call the battle they had just livedthrough. The officers were all call-ing it the 73 Easting, because theywere the ones looking at the maps.SSG Waylan Lundquist, a 29-year-old tanker from Aurora, Mich., sug-gested the Battle of the Tawakalna.Another man thought it should beMoller Ridge. And none of themcould judge how important it hadbeen. They didn't know how hardanyone else had fought in the 100-hour war. They still don't. It might

take months or years before thepeople who write history books willdecide whether Ghost Troop isworth a page or not. "At the time,"said Garwick, the platoon leader,"none of us understood what washappening."

All they knew was that they'd hada tough night, one they found hardto describe in language that can beprinted in newspapers. It had snow-balled into chaos before anyonereally knew what was happening.

The chaos was relative, though,and all battles are chaotic to themen fighting them. "All I did," Sar-tiano said, "was manage theviolence." At his level on the bat-tlefield, one rung up from Garwick,two up from most of the others, hehad felt in control. It had, after all,been a decisive victory. Capturedprisoners confirmed that the Tawa-kalna had been caught completelyby surprise. And Sartiano, like theothers, was proud of it.

One morning Garwick gatheredhis men around to talk to them andadmitted that he still wasn't surewhat had happened. "All I know isthat a squadron's supposed to beable to take a brigade. A troop'ssupposed to be able to take a bat-talion. A fire team, a company. Ourfire team took out a brigade."

He paused a moment, and thewords seemed to be sinking intohim as much as in the others. 'Thatreally was above and beyond thecall of duty."

Garwick, it seemed, had beenchanged the most. He'd been spoil-ing for a fight and got more than heexpected. "That morning I was so ex-cited to have killed a RepublicanGuard: said the 25-year-old lieu-tenant. "And at the end of the bat-tle, if I never saw another Re-publican Guard in my life, I'd behappy." Or perhaps he's not so



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M I A 1,Bradley, Defied the Criticschanged. He still wants to get mar-ried as soon as he gets back - hisfiancee is a former classmate fromWest Point, now a military intel-ligence officer at Fort Polk, La.And he jokes about how his platoonwill fail its next gunnery at Grafen-woehr - the first target will popup, and Ghost Troop will instantlyblast 40 ounds into it.

The night after the cease-fire,when his men rolled into freeKuwait, he stood beside his Bradleyand watched the eastern sky. GhostTroop was camped in a quarry thathad been turned into a RepublicanGuard stronghold, a city-sized mazeof 20-foot ridges transforming theflat desert into a miniature moun-tain range.

Orange flames from the burningKuwaiti oil fields glowed in the east- someone had counted 57 fires -and a little to the south of that, anearly full moon was rising.

"I couldn't wait to see combat.What a fool I was." The killing, hesaid, became almost too easy, andthat seemed also to make him un-comfortable. He questioned his fu-ture, now that he's finished livingwhat he thinks might be the mostimportant night of his life. But whatbothered him most was anotherquestion that really doesn't have ananswer - he wanted to know why.

"Why did they fight?" he askedslowly, and repeated it. "Why didthey fight?"

He looked again at the sky. Some-G m m c k- c&I hn c n k c D r n r r n r l tht=

The following excerpts are from The Jayhawk, the VI1 Corps newspaper.The author Is Sergeant Major Martin L. Shupe of VI1 Corps PAO.Probably no armored vehicle has

seen more controversy than theBradley.. Skeptics claimed itburned when hit, its weaponswouldn't kill enemy armor, and itcouldn't swim.

Cavalry troopers from the 4thSqdn., 7th Cavalry, 3rd AD provedcritics wrong on two of those char-ges during Operation Desert Storm.

During an intense battle that lefttwo of their comrades dead, two ofA Troop's platoons took on a bat-talion of Iraqi Republican Guardarmor. After the battle, they praisedthe vehicle and claimed it savedmany of their lives.

Whe n we took hits, damage wascompartmentalized," said 1LTDaniel J.W. King, whose platoontook several tank main gun hits."The fire suppression systemsworked," he said of the Bradley'sHalon extinguishers. "It's an awe-some weapon when you have to gotoe-to-toe with enemy armor."

"The Bradley is better than Ithought it was," said SFC IveryBaker, platoon sergeant in A Troopand a 12-year cavalry veteran. Hesaid he saw several take hits withoutcatching fire or blowing up. "Thepersonnel had flash burns andshrapnel. One was totally unin-jured," he said. Baker's platoon losttwo of six Bradleys. Balancing thatwas the destruction his unit causedthe enemy. "Our main guns blew upevery BMP they fired at, and ourTOW missiles destroyed every tank

another desert on another world, aquarter of a million miles away. still praised the machine. "We usedHE from the 25-mm gun at a BMP

until it went up in flames. We sawtwo more and fired 10 to 15 roundsat each and killed them," he said.Later, they fired at a tank, thinkingit was another BMP, and when therounds obviously didn't do anydamage, they then fired a TOW mis-sile that blew up the tank.

The concensus was that the Brad-ley was a great infantry fightingvehicle, but too large for scouting.Complaints also centered on thecoax machine guns: all 18 of ATroop's machine guns jammed.M l A l s Held Their BoresightOver 200 Miles of Desert

"The M1 has been great," said SFCJames Williams of C Co., 4th Bn.,37th Armor, 1st ID. "With dailymaintenance, cleaning air filters andfuel filters, it hasn't failed us yet."SFC Williams' unit had just covered200 miles of desert to engage theRepublican Guards. 'We got onthem so fast, they weren't expectingus. We caught them with their pantsdown," he said.

SSG John Sawyer, master gunnerof C Co., 3d Bn., 35th Armor,praised the tank's main gun. "Allthe gunner has to do is keep hissight on the target, and the cannonfollows his line of sight. Lookaround you and you can see how ef-fective our weapons are," he added,pointing to dozens of destroyedIraqi vehicles.CPT Henry Kievenaar, CO of D

Co., 1st Bn., 35th Armor, said his--'led over 200 miles in five

uough all extremes of"The M1 hit deadly ac-

for five days after we~ ~ ~ ~ u . e . . t e d .ll of our 14 tanksmade it... I would take an Ml Alover a T-72M1 any day.".



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uRidersontheStormA narrative history of the 1-4 Cavs campaign in Iraq and Kuwait - 24 January - March 1991by 1-4 CAV Operations Staff

G-Day, 24 Feb91For Operation DESERT STORM,

the divisions mission was to destroylead elements of the Iraqi 26th InfDiv, establish a breachhead, passthe 1st UK Armored Division, andon order continue the attack (Fig-ure 1). The division placed its caval-ry squadron under the operationalcontrol (OPCON) of 1st Brigadefor the operations initial phase.

At 0420 hrs, we began our zonereconnaissance north of PL Ver-mont, which was the border be-tween Iraq and Saudi Arabia. FirstBrigade arrayed 1-4 CAV on theleft, TF 2-34 in the center, and TF 5-16 on the right. On our left flank,312 ACR assigned us a liaison of-ficer, CPT Delgado. The squadroncollocated the field trains with thelOlst SPT Bn.

We moved forward in zone andremained tied in with TF 2-34. Thescout weapons team (SWTs) recon-noitered forward and maintainedcontact with our flank units. By1000 hours, we sat along PL Plumwith no enemy contact. At thattime, the Forward Area SupportTeam (FAST) began refuel opera-tions under the control of the com-mand sergeant major and the HHTcommander. This operation took lit-tle more than an hour.

During refuel operations, CW3Winters SWT flew over the Iraqipositions to our front. This singleact caused several Iraqis to sur-render. By 1030 hrs, B Troop hadtaken 21 prisoners. The B Troopfirst sergeant consolidated the pris-oners at the refuel site. The com-mand sergeant major, HHT com-mander, and flight operations per-sonnel assisted in the evacuation ofthis group of prisoners, which in-cluded several officers. At the sametime, CPT Tovsens SWT, who re-lieved CW3 Winters SWT, engagedand destroyed an AML scout car.

Due to the lack of any significantresistance, MG Rhame ordered thedivision to continue the attack at1500 hrs. An intense artillery bar-rage began at 1430, TF 2-34 and 5-16 began breaching operations at1500 hrs. The squadron con-solidated near Attack Position Dra-goon, in preparation for our pas-sage through the breach.

At 1530, 1st Brigade ordered thesquadron to follow 1-34 ARthrough the breach, clear OBJ 15Kand secure PL Colorado. A and BTroops passed through the breach

at 1630, and began to collect severalenemy prisoners of war (EPWs).The Iraqis surrendered as soon aswe approached their positions. ATroop received some indirect fire atthe breach site, but continued todrive north.

During the squadrons movementforward, we did not search all of thebunkers, fearing booby traps. Thesquadron placed a higher priorityon controlling the friendly forwardline of troops and preventing frat-ricide between friendly flank units.

The squadron was along PLColorado by 1730, then tied in with1-34 AR on the right. We could nottie in to any 1st Brigade unit on ourleft, due to the brigade com-manders desire not to move TF 5-16 during darkness. TF 5-16 wouldattack OBJ 12K the following morn-ing.

After dark, the A Troop CP cap-tured roughly 80 EPWs, numerousweapons, and assorted equipment.The squadron captured an addition-al 34 prisoners, and destroyed fourtrucks, an AML, and three AT guns(105mm). Total number of enemy

A RM O R - May-June 1991 13


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Breaching the Iraqi DefensesEaA. Zone Recon2. Breach Iraqi Defenses3. Screen PL Coloradokilled is unknown. Total distancecovered was 35 km. We rearmed/refueled that night.COMMENTS:DPICM on the bat-tlefield posed severe problems for

dismounts and wheeled vehicles.This made refuelbearm operationsextremely hazardous, especially atnight. The bomblets injured person-nel and destroyed tires. SWT teamswere invaluable for reconnaissanceoperations and maintaining contacton our flanks. The Global Position-ing System greatly enhanced naviga-tion.

I taFigure2.G+I 5 Feb91. Screen of Breachead2.Move to Attack Position

1 --:14 ARMOR - May-June 1991


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G+1,25 Feb 91 -Cloudy/OvercastFirst Brigade ordered the squad-

ron to move our screen line NE toscreen the Corps Restrictive FireLine (RFL) no later than O900(Figure 2). TF 5-16 seized OBJ 12Kat 0800. We tied into 1-34 AR toour right and TF 5-16 to our left.While the division passed the 1stUK Armored Division and an artil-lery brigade forward, we maintainedthe screen and destroyed the enemyequipment abandoned in the area.The B Troop engineers destroyedseveral bunkers and ammunitionstockpiles on OBJ 15K.

At 1500, the division ordered thesquadron to prepare for Contingen-cy Plan (COP) Jeremiah 11. 1-4CAV came under division controland occupied attack positions Aand B along PL New Jersey at 1900.At 2000 the squadron commanderbriefed COP Jeremiah 11, which re-quired the squadron to conduct azone recon forward of the division,as it moved to contact. During thatevening, refuelhearm actions werereduced due to the extremely haz-ardous conditions posed by DPICMand CBU bomblets.

Total distance traveled was 10 km.The field trains remained with lOlstSPT Bn - 25 to 30 k m s distant.The squadron XO, in conjunctionwith the S-4 and HHT commander,decided to continue the FAST con-cept. This was a fortuitous decision,given events to come.COMMENTS: 1:25O,OOO overlaysallow too much margin for error

among units from different divi-sions. 1:25O,OOO maps must be ac-companied by a list of points thatdefine boundaries. 1:100,000 mapswould be better.G +2, 26 Feb 91, CloudyFiainy

During the night, the 1st UK Ar-mored Division to our south had sig-

nificant enemy contact. In order togive the 1st UK maneuver room andprevent fratricide, the divisionszone was cu t half of its width(brigade-size zone). 3d AD was toour north, with 4-7 CAV as theflank unit.

The squadron departed from its at-tack positions at 0315 to occupy PLOmaha before the divisions LDtime of 0500. The squadron led thedivisions movement in zone (Figure3). We encountered no initialenemy resistance, only scatteredpockets of enemy, who gave them-selves up as we approached. Thetroops disarmed and passed severalEPWs to the rear. A Troop en-countered a series of enemybunkers and trench networks thatthe Iraqis abandoned. Visibility wasvery limited (500-600m).

By lo00 hours, we closed on therear of 2 ACR along PL Abilene.2d ACR was conducting an attackeast of PL Abilene from north tosouth against what they believedwere elements of the RepublicanGuards Tawakalna Division. Duringthe zone recon, A-25 encounteredand destroyed an abandoned T-62and a ZSU-23-4.

At 1400, the squadron commandermet with the CG, who gave thedirective to contact 2d ACR andcoordinate the night forward pas-sage of the division. MAJ Burdan,the S-3, coordinated the passage.Additionally, we established andmaintained contact with 4-7 CAV ofthe 3d AD. The passage began at2130. The squadrons mission was topass the divisions combat elements,then screen the divisions northflank during the attack to OBJ Nor-folk. Total distance traveled was 120km.COMMENTS: CPT Morrison,

HHT commander, directed twocritical refuel operations. He timedthese to minimize disruptions of thesquadrons momentum or the

Division Movementto ContactG+ 2 26Feb911. Zone Recon2. Screen PLAbilene3. Flank Screen

divisions movement. All units com-pleted refueling within one hour.The squadron finished the days ac-tion with full fuel tanks, prepared tocontinue the advance forward. At1700, CPT Morrison returned tofield trains vic PT7709 to refuel theM978s. He began a hazardous nightmovement with 1SG Colangelo andfive M978s to link up with the com-bat trains. Total distance: 60 km,with an uncertain enemy situation.The division and 2d ACR dem-onstrated remarkable discipline dur-ing the forward passage of lines.Poor visibility kept the squadronfrom fully utilizing the air scouts.We had rain and fog in the morningand a dust storm in the afternoon.G+3, 27 Feb 91,Cloudy/GroundFog

We started moving to thedivisions northern flank at 0130.The squadron positioned fuel for-ward to top off the tanks before ourmovement east to OBJ Norfolk. Thedivision stouued at OBJ Norfolk.



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The squadron set at the 70-85 north-south grid line.

The squadron commander inHQ66, the S-3 in HQ63, the FSOand ALO in HQ34 went forward atapproximately 0400 to inspect thescreen l i e in preparation for con-tinued operations (See Figure 4). BTroop reported engaging anddestroying a T-55 to its front.

As the command group a pproached the screen line, HQ63spotted a T-72 at close range in tur-ret defrlade, with turret traversing.Upon backing up, HQ63 acquiredthe T-72 and an additional tank, a T-55, as well as numerous dismounts.Keeping the tanks under observa-tion, the command group requestedassistance from a B Troop tank.After maneuvering to the T-72'sright flank, the B Troop MlAldestroyed the tank. HQ63 destroyedthe T-55 with 25mm through the tur-ret and hull. Upon destroying thetanks, the numerous dismounts inthe area took cover. The commandgroup displaced, as B Troop ac-quired additional T-72 tanks in thesame vicinity. B Troop commandersent 2LT Lowndes with two M3A2sand two MlAls to search out anddestroy the tanks. B Troop reportedspotting a red and green starcluster, followed five minutes laterby artillery fire on their positions.The troop went to MOPP 4 andtested for the presence of anychemical agents. Artillery also land-ed near the combat trains and

A A A A A .._ - _P A A A

FAST. The area had not beencleared by 2d ACR.

While in MOPP 4, 2LT Lowndes'sections maneuvered and engagedfive tanks. SSG Robinson killed twotanks with TOWs, and SGT Mar-bach killed three tanks at pointblank range with his tank's maingun. Upon completion of this en-gagement, B Troop's test for chemi-ca l agents was negative. B Troopcommander gave the "all clear."

At 0515, the squadron commanderpulled the screed line back becauseof contact with the T-72s inprepared positions. The squadroncommander and S-3 decided to at-tack the positions once all thesquadron's forces were set (Figure5). At 0615, the squadron attackedthe enemy position, with A and BTroops on line. First Platoon, ATroop was the first with contact,and destroyed two T-72 tanks withTOWs. As A Troop continued the

-.A A A AB TROOP SCREEN

Figure 4. CommandGroupContactG+3 0330-0430 27Feb91

attack, an Iraqi captain moved outof his bunker and surrendered hismen. First Platoon, A Troop dis-armed the soldiers and moved themsouth. Second and 3rd Platoons, ATroop, continued the attack to theeast, destroying an apparent 2S1bat-tery and several towed artillerypieces. B Troop encountered dug-intanks, BMPs, trucks, and numerousbunkers.

By 0715, the squadron hadreached its l i t of advance, as Aand B Troops continued to destroyenemy vehicles in the area. Thecommand group went back into thearea where the troops had en-countered the tanks earlier in themorning. Both the T-72 and the T-55 were destroyed. HQ63 noticedanother T-72 in hull defilade withan Iraqi in the turret. When theenemy dropped down inside thetank, HQ66 destroyed the tank witha TOW at 150m.

The squadron commander calledoff the attack at 0830 hours after itappeared all enemy elements in thearea were destroyed. For two hoursthe squadron had methodicallymoved and destroyed 11 tanks, artil-lery pieces, fuel, and cargo trucks.We refueled our tanks while waitingfor the division to resume the at-tack. The brigade commanders andCG discussed in detail their fuelstatus and expected rates of ad-vance before halting for resupply.

16 ARMOR - MayJune 1991


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1

Figure6. KDivision Attack Eastward G +3 27 Feb 911 and 2.FlankScreen; 3, Cut Road

At 0930, the squadron resumedthe moving flank screen (Figure 6).A Troop led the screen, followed byB Troop. During the extremely fast-paced move, A Troop destroyed 23tanks, 25 APCs, and numerousbunkers, many of which appearedabandoned. Additionally, A Troopdisarmed and pushed south morethan 100EPWs.

At 1330, the CG ordered thedivision to continue the attack NEof PL Berlin to prevent the IraqiArmy from retreating from KuwaitCity north to Iraq. The brigades ob-jectives were to the northeast .alongthe main Basra-Kuwait City high-way. The squadron would continueto screen the divisions north flank,north of 2d Brigade.

The squadron arrived at PL Berlinat 1230, where it conducted refueloperations. HQ 66 then noted vehi-cle movement on a ridgeline 500mfrom the squadron. The S-3 orderedB Troop to send a team to inves-tigate. 2LT Karns led the scouts andtankers from B Troop and des-troyed one BMP, one BTR, and arocket launcher that were attempt-ing to flee the area.

At approximately 1300, the com-bat trains passed through what ap-peared to be an unoccupied defen-sive position. Seven enemy soldierssurrendered to CPT Harmon andthe combat trains. The EPWs indi-cated that there were more Iraqi sol-diers in the surrounding bunkerstoo injured to walk. CPT Stokes andthe maintenance section used theAMV to clear the immediatevicinity, while LT Butler and Dr.Hanson, with escorts, proceeded tothe wounded in the bunkers andtreated their wounds. The combattrains stopped, passing ground am-bulances from 4-5 FA, whichevacuated the wounded. The trainscontinued forward at 1430 to estab-lish contact with the squadronground elements.

The attack continued at 1430.SWTs reconnoitered forward and toour flanks. Mr. Perkins SWTengaged and destroyed several ar-mored vehicles while supporting thesquadrons moving flank screen.The squadron passed a heavily for-tified, but unoccupied, defensiveposition. The position had rein-forced (concrete) berms, trenches,and bunkers. The squadron lost con-tact with division, but relayedthrough 2d Bde our position and ob-jective coordinates. At 1500 hrs, theTOC, led by the squadron executiveofficer, MAJ Wimbish, which wasmoving with 2d Brigade, departedinto hostile territory to link up withA and B Troops. Enroute it by-

\

passed numerous fortified areas,captured three enemy tanks, and dis-armed 93 Iraqi soldiers.

Upon approaching our objectiveat 1630, the squadron commanderdirected B Troop to establish ascreen line west, and A Troop eastof the Basra-Kuwait City highway(Figure 7). A SWT under CPTPeters, scouted ahead of A Troopand reported personnel andvehicles moving northward as wellas what appeared to be a bunker bythe road. As A Troop approachedthe road, it observed several vehi-cles and many personnel movingnorth along the main road. Thesquadron commander ordered ATroop to secure the road lOkmssouth of the Kuwait-Iraq borderand cut the line of communications.Upon receipt of the order, CPTPope ordered 1st Platoon to lead,followed by 2d, 3rd, mortars, andtrains.

At approximately 1700, 1st Pla-toon reported contact with numer-ous enemy dismounts, tanks, andAPCs along the highway (Figure 8).The Iraqis appeared to havestopped before continuing north.Unlike the previous vehicles, theenemy either manned or attemptedto man their equipment.

As the enemy spotted 1st Platoon,several vehicles attempted to movenorth. One T-55 attempted totraverse on A14, which immediately

Figure7.Attack to Cut he Road to Basra 1600 27 Feb91 /~ ~~



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U

Figure8.A Troop CutsBasra-KuwaitCity Highway1700 27 Feb 91

m

s!

destroyed the Iraqi tank. Farthernorth, A15 destroyed the lead BMP,effectively blocking the road. Withthe road now blocked, CPT Pope in-structed 1st and 2d Platoons tomove northeast across the road,destroying all enemy vehicles intheir path.As 1st and 26 Platoons continued

to engage vehicles, each platoonbegan to gather a greater number ofEPWs. The A Troop commander or-dered 2d Platoon to establish anEPW collection point vicinity of hisM3A2. At approximately 1830 hrs,elements of all platoons began todeliver EPWs to the collectionpoint. During this time, all elementswere still engaging vehicles andequipment. Eventually, A Troop col-lected about 450 EPWs. By thistime, night arrived, and the situationbecame even more confusing. Withthe majority of enemy vehiclesdestroyed, the commander ordereda section from each of 1st and 2d

Platoons to move north and estab-lish security northeast of the trooparea.

As the scope of the task facing ATroop became too great, the squad-ron commander ordered B Troopto abandon its screen line and moveto assist A Troop. The squadronproceeded to set up a hasty defen-sive position, preparing for either apossible enemy counterattack fromthe north or a large armored forceattempting to break out to thenorth. Both A and B Troops tem-porary EPW holding areas con-tinued to grow. The TOC informed2d Brigade of our position, situa-tion, and enemy assessment.

We were informed that the VI1Corps commander halted thedivisions attack due to the presenceof the 1st UK Armored Division tothe south. Once the division halted,1-4 Cav was not only the sole con-troller of this key highway, but alsothe easternmost unit in VI1 Corps.

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CSa1ttSIr1

Enroute, CPT Morrison and CPLHall captured eight Iraqi soldiers.In addition, CPL Hall later single-handedly captured 20 heavily armedIraqi soldiers.

With the combat trains in position,maintenance, support, and HQ per-sonnel began to secure the area andtake additional prisoners walking upthe highway. The combat trains as-sumed control of the EPW site inorder to allow A and B Troops themanpower to better secure thesquadrons perimeter.

The medical platoon immediatelyset up the aid station to treat thewounded EPWs, and summoned theJump Aid Station from the TOC.MAJ Hansen, C W 3 Harston, and2LT Butler worked diligently totreat more than 200 Iraqi casualties.Fortunately, an Iraqi and a Kuwaitidoctor provided much needed assis-tance. Working throughout thenight, this team of professionalssaved many lives. Little water orfood was available because of the ex-* I-- & I:.--

18 A


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alert all night. Discipline and mis-sion focus prevailed; we sustainedno friendly deaths or injuries.Squadron engineers and soldiersfrom the combat trains and fieldtrains handled EPWs in an ex-emplary manner. Squadron medicalpersonnel and the squadronchaplain treated EPWs as if theywere their own. FLT OPS, FARPpersonnel and the support platoonworked all night, repositioning unitsfor future operations. TOC person-nel remained calm and in control,while maintaining the vital com-munications link to the division. Airtroops worked all night preparingthe aircraft for an early morninglaunch.

It became obvious upon examiningthe EPWs that the Iraqis themselvesmistreated many of their owncountrymen. Some were old men of50 or 60; others, boys of 13 or 14years of age, pulled from the streetsof Basra and pressed into the ser-vice. They had been students, ar-tists, writers, and teachers.

The squadron was lucky that wecut the road to Basra during aperiod of limited visibility. We were30 kilometers in front of ourdivision, with an Iraqi division 12kilometers to the north. Hill 4.66was a SCUD site (located besidethe airfield), and enemy personnelfound on the hill had a commandingview of the squadrons positions.G+4, 28 Feb 91

The division placed the squadronunder the operational control of 2dBrigade at 0600. We captured about1,400 EPWs and 700-900 weaponsand demolitions. We air evacuated15 injured Iraqis. We could not getadditional rations, water, or blan-kets for the EPWs, but we gavethem what we could. It was an-nounced that a cease-fire would gointo effect at 0800, later changed to

0723. Second Brigade linked up onthe ground with A Troop at about0900 hrs (Figure 9). One infantrycompany, 2-16, was to help guardPOWs. Engineer ACES built aPOW berm. We pushed out thescreen in accordance with the 2dBrigade plan and consolidated.There were no squadron casualties.We hit three mines, placed enemyKIAs in body bags, and continuedto police up enemy weapons fordestruction. Final count was 2,098EPWs, 1,400 weapons, munitions,and many destroyed vehicles.

COMMENTS: Because of thelarge quantity of unexploded muni-tions on the ground, no movementwas allowed after sunset.G+5, 01 Mar 91

At 0240 the squadron commanderreceived an urgent call from the CGto move into Iraq and secure theSa ha n Airfield (QU550370) for theupcoming cease-fire negotiations.Our mission was reconnaissance; wewere not to get decisively engaged(Figure 10). The squadron went toREDCON 1. We were instructed todelay our LD until 0615 andreceived an Apache Company OP-CON. Our plan was to move twoground troops abreast, preceded byair recce to the objective, which was10 kilometers north of the Iraqi-

Figure9360-Degree Defenseon Basra-Kuwait City HighwayG +4 28 Feb91

Kuwaiti border. The AH-64s werein a holding area at the TOC, withthe company commander monitor-ing the squadron command netfrom within the squadron TOC it-self. The squadron commandermoved with B Troop, S-3 with ATroop. A SWT flew in front of eachtroop under squadron control. Theyprovided the squadron with an ini-tial picture of enemy units. Thesquadron crossed the Line ofDeparture at 0615 hrs, and withinone hour, had already bypassed orcrossed numerous vacated bunkersand trenches. We observed andreported numerous T-72s, T-55~5,MTLBs, AMXs, and ZSU-23-4s inthe area surrounding the airfieldand made face-to-face contact with

Figurelo. G + 5 i M a r 9TheCapture of Safwan Airfield1. Zone Recon, 2. Capture of Ai~~



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Iraqi units in the area. Thesquadron commander moved to thepoint of contact and approachedtheir defensive position. The enemyhad an armored brigade inprepared positions, with three bat-talions abreast and one in depthdefending north of the objective.The squadron commander then or-dered B Troop to abandon its as-signed OPs and move to the line ofcontact.

Additionally, the squadron com-mander dismounted his M3 and con-fronted several Iraqis. At ap-proximately 0900 hrs, an Iraqi col-onel arrived in A Troop's sector.CPT Pope dismounted his vehicleand began to explain to the Iraqicolonel that he must move his unitout of the area. The colonel refusedto move his force without instruc-tions from his higher HQ. The Iraqiofficer asked CPT Pope if he knewthat he was in Iraq. CPT Popereplied that, yes, he knew that hewas in Iraq, and that his unit wasthere to secure the site for cease-fire negotiations. The Iraqis had as-sumed the talks were to be held inKuwait City. Additionally, thecolonel seemed offended that theAmerican soldiers were giving hispeople food and responded bydirecting his men to prepare foodand hot tea for A Troop. The ATroop soldiers drank the tea whilethe colonel departed to confer withhis superiors.

At approximately 1020, the colonelreturned and stated he still did nothave orders to leave the area. CPTPope told the colonel that in orderto prevent a confrontation, he mustleave the area now. At roughly thesame time, a flight of A-10s flewoverhead, and CPT Pope told theIraqi that the aircraft would attackif he did not leave.

At this point, the squadron com-mander arrived and reiterated tothe Iraqi colonel that he must leave20

the area. The colonel finallyrelented and ordered his unit toleave the area

In a separate incident, the S3,Mkl Burdan, was approached byan Iraqi captain and a major andasked if he knew that the squadronwas in Iraq. They seemed totallysurprised 'at our sudden appear-ance. The S-3 smiled and repliedyes. He told them they needed toleave the area and then asked themwhat unit they were from. Themajor smiled this time and replied"Iraqi Army!" He refused to identifyhis unit. The Iraqis then drove awayin a state of consternation.

Meanwhile, in the B Troop sector,CPT Bills put together a small con-tingent of armored vehicles, threeBradleys and two tanks, whichmoved in an inverted "V"towardthe Iraqi defense. 1LT Danussi, theXO, led the contingent toward agathering of Iraqi soldiers. Once theformation came to a stop, CPT Billsdismounted and approached theIraqi officers and soldiers. Themajor then sent for his battalioncommander, a lieutenant colonel,who spoke broken English. His firstcomment to CPT Bills was "Why

are you in Iraq? Are you lost?" CPTBills replied that he was here tosecure the cease-fire negotiationssite and that the Iraqis must leavethe area in order for the talks tobegin. The Iraqi officer refused toleave without instructions fromhigher. The enlisted soldiers weretold to leave, leaving 15-20 officerssurrounding CPT Bills. He startedto hand out MREs. One was of-fered to the battalion commanderbut he refused to accept it, saying"Saddam feeds me well!" CPT Billsthen returned to his screen line. Ashort time later, CPT Bills returnedto meet again with the Iraqi com-mander. This time, the battalioncommander was angry and asked'Why are you Americans here?"The troop XO moved forward andestablished contact with an Iraqiarmor battalion in their vicinity. Asin the other sector, the Iraqis had tobe persuaded to leave their posi-tions and head north. The Iraqi of-ficer said they would leave in 30minutes. CPT Bills was escortedback to his vehicle by the major andanother soldier. He was dressed ina camouflage uniform, black leatherjacket, scarf, beret, and AK-47. OIIschedule, 30 minutes later, the Iraqibattalion began to pull out. By 1200

TrucksBunkersAPCTanksArtyAAARadarsRocket LPOWSKIA

Squadron Battle Damage Assessment3 210 706 405 350 110 50 00 0

-392110182011

- -3 00 03 70 70 22 00 00 0

Diesel fuel consumed from 22-28 Feb 91 = 25,900 gallons

Total combat flight hours:123.9 OH-5875.4 AH-114.6 UH-1

Total6691666515151

13010Numerous

ARMOR - May-June 1991


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The sign tells the story.

hrs, most of the Iraqis in thesquadron sector were on the roadmoving north toward Basra. Afterthe squadron had secured the air-field, the CG ordered 2d Brigade tomove to the airfield and join in itsdefense. The squadron was thenplaced OPCON to 2d Brigade. Sec-tors were adjusted and 2d Brigadeassumed responsibility to preparethe site for peace talks. CPT Mor-rison worked all night to clear therunway and assist corps in settingup the negotiations site. We learnedthat night that the peace talks hadbeen delayed 24 hours.

COMMENTS: We continued to as-sist the division and corps inpreparation for the cease-firenegotiations. The squadrons perfor-mance in accomplishing this dif-ficult mission was magnificent.Aidground coordination was su-perb. Good order and disciplineenabled us to move a RepublicanGuard armored brigade out of itsprepared positions without blood-shed.

Two Scouts Under Fire HelpedInjured Buddies During Night Battleby Captain Michael Gollaher, Vi1Corps PA0As night closed in on February 26,

a rugged battle awaited a group ofscouts from the 4th Battalion, 32ndArmor.

First Lieutenant James BarkersBradley, HQ-21, moved into posi-tion on a screen line to the northfront of the battalion. Joining HQ-21 were HQ-24 and HQ-26, com-manded by SSG Christopher Ste-phens. To their right rear flankwere elements of Task Force 5-5Cav scouts. The night was overcastand pitch black.

The 4-32 scout platoon had beenin position about five minutes whena T-72 came into view on a nearbyberm. With his night vision goggles,1LT Barker could see the Iraqi tankand some dismounted infantrymenas they headed toward Stephenstrack. The tank was part of theRepublican Guards Tawakalna Di-vision, and the Bradleys were nomatch for its 125-mmmain gun.

Stephens spotted the tank, report-ed it, and fired two TOW missiles.The first missed, but the secondknocked off one of the T-72sroadwheels. The gunners on HQ-21and HQ-24 then opened fire on thedismounts with their 25-mm, andBarker fired a TOW, whichstreaked toward the target andpopped the turret off in an ex-plosive fireball. The sky lit up assecondary explosions began to en-gulf the doomed T-72.

What happened next isnt exactlyclear. Platoon Sergeant Dennis

McMasters, in HQ-21, said he sawStephens track taking fire from anunseen position. The incomingrounds caused some of the Brad-leys ammunition to cook off.DeMasters tried to raise Stephenson the radio, but no one answered.

PFC Frank Ranger Bob Bradishwas in the open hatch of HQ-26,reloading TOWS, when the tracktook incoming rounds. The blastsseverely injured Bradishs righthand, Stephens suffered shrapnelwounds of his head and legs, andPFC Adrian Stokes, Bradishs fel-low observer on the track, sufferedsevere abdominal and groin injuries,but was still alive. SGT DonaldGoodwin was struck in the chest,but was conscious. PFC JohnMcClure was the only member ofthe crew who did not have life-threatening wounds.

McClure and Bradish kept theirheads, as if they were seasoned com-bat veterans. Bradish reported,saying he was OK, but Stokes washurt bad. He tried to pull Stokesfrom the vehicle. Goodwin was ableto climb out of the disabled track.McClure assessed the situation,pulled some flares from the ammobox in the turret, and secured theradio. He passed these to Bradish,who also grabbed his M-16 withgrenade launcher, and prepared todefend his friends. While McCluretended to the wounded, Bradishcalled the lieutenants track, report-ing they were hit and needed amedic. He cursed at the flares be-cause he couldnt open them with



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his injured hand. He managed toopen them with his teeth instead,then sent them up to mark theirposition. Bradish then told McClurethat he was worried about his ownhand wound, but urged him to con-tinue treating Stokes and Goodwin.As McClure treated his friends,Bradish heard enemy forces ap-proaching.

Meanwhile, 1LT Barker radioedbattalion to send some tanks and anambulance track to their location.He saw an enemy infantry squadheading directly toward Bradishand McClure, so he called in mor-tars on their position and watchedas the rounds dispersed the attack-ing enemy dismounts. He thenheaded for the stricken Bradley,where he linked up with Bradish.

Within 20 minutes, SFC Craig Ken-dall's M1 platoon from CharlieCompany arrived with two am-bulance tracks. SGT Sergio Nino, aHQ Company medic, assessed thecasualties. He went fast toStephens. "Is he gone?" askedDeMasters.

"Im afraid so," SGTNino replied.Inside HQ-21, Stokes had gone

into shock. SGT Nino and medicMichael Gindra redressed Stokes'wounds and tried to start an in-travenous infusion, but it was nouse; Stokes had lost too much blood.

Only after his friends were treatedand ready to evacuate did Bradishmention that he needed help."Ranger Bob" was injured muchworse than he'd let on. He had lostportions of his right hand, suffereda painful groin injury, and hadtaken a round through both upperthighs.

The medics wondered how he hadrun around, popping flares, radioingfor help, tending the wounded, andtrying to set up perimeter security.

Holding up his injured hand,Bradish quipped, "They thoughtthey got me, but I fooled them... Ishoot left-handed."

Centurion on our left. SGT Jones,my 36 Bradley commander, calledin contact with enemy infantrytroops and, right after that, with aBMP.

Bradish received the Purple Heartand McClure was awarded the Sil-ver Star for actions under fire.

Lucky Scouts Dodge"Big Bullets" ThatRipped Their Bradleyby Tony Wunderlich,VI1Corps PA0SABOT rounds rip armor anddestroy tanks and tank crews, unless

the crew gets lucky. Some scouts of3rd Plt., 4th Squadron, 7th CavalryRegiment, needed every ounce ofluck they could muster on Feb. 26,when two of the deadly roundsripped through a Bradley FightingVehicle during the ground war.As these scouts engaged the

Tawakalna Division of the IraqiRepublican Guard, Bradley 36, com-manded by SGT Roland Jones, wasdisabled by enemy fire, prompting arescue mission by the Bradley teamin 31. After the 31 team, led by 2LTMichael J. Vassalotti, retrieved thecrew from 36, an Iraqi tank un-loaded two SABOTS on 31. Bothrounds penetrated the Bradley'sarmor. But in a stroke of tremen-dous luck, the rounds did not hitthe scouts inside. A flash bum wasthe most serious injury.

Recounting the event, Vassalottistarted at the beginning. "Our mis-sion was to execute recon on 3d Ar-mored Division's right flank with aone-kilometer sector between 3rdAD and the 2nd ACR," said the 23-year-old 3rd Platoon leader."An additional mission was to

maintain contact between them,specifically between 4/34 Armor

"SFC Ivery Baker, my platoon ser-geant, reported troops to the frontalso, so I immediately reported tomy commander that we had sightedone BMP. That quickly became twowhen the Bravo section platoon ser-geant called in another. Then, Ser-geant Jones called in a third.

"By the time I called in the first,one was in flames because SGTBaker had given the fue command,"Vassalotti said. He added thatbefore he could finish calling incontact with the second and thirdenemy vehicle, all three had beendestroyed.

Vassalotti said 36 had gone for-ward and taken up a firing position.'We moved up with them on lineand continued to engage the enemy.We moved south, out of the way of2nd Platoon, which came through usto start firing and, in the process,we went blank on ammunition. Wehad to reload.

"Second Platoon took the heat offus while we pulled back and aroundthem to the right and began reload-ing," Vassalotti said.

SGT Jones picked up the narra-tive: "LT 'V'came over the net andsaid we had to move south about800 meters. As we were shifting, myloader was reloading a TOW mis-sile. When we took up position, weengaged another BMP and a tank.We were getting low on ammo, so Itold my driver to pivot so we couldreload. 1 realized we were still upfront so we started backing up. Itsounded like we lost a track, so Itold him to stop. As soon as westopped, we took a round in thetransmission. Later, we found out itwas from a 12.7-mm machine gun.

22 ARMOR - MayJune 1991


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We lost all power. I called forhelp and then evacuated the track.

"When 31 arrived, my track tookanother round. We're not sure if itwas from an RPG round or a SAG-GER. My driver took some shrap-nel from that. We got evacuatedinto 31. On the way back to thetroop trains to get my driver to themedics, we were engaged by a T-72tank and took two sabot rounds.

"When the first round hit, I wasscared. When the second one hit,that terrified me. After the firstround, I thought I could keep run-ning, but after the second round, Iknew they had a bead on us. I waswaiting for a third round, but itnever came. One of the tracks in2nd Platoon - Lieutenant King'strack, I believe - ook out the tankthat was firing at us. That saved mylife and the lives of the other guys inmy crew."

SFC Baker, platoon sergeant for3rd Platoon, said the scouts stoodtheir ground despite the hairy situa-tion. "Maintaining contact is what ascout's supposed to do," he said."With ground fire, rounds coming inall over, and vehicles getting hit, wemaintained contact with the enemy."

One crew member had plenty tosay, as well, about the sparks of feargenerated by the heavy-duty rounds.

"I was scared to death. I could seepretty much what was going oneverywhere; it was scary," said PFCRichard Legendre, a 21-year-oldammo loader. "I saw two of ourthree vehicles that got hit, and I wasworried that my buddies weren'tgoing to make it."

Legendre, though, maintained hisfooting. He did his job. "I'm aloader, so I just started breakingammo apart, knowing we weregoing to need it." Finally, he felt theburden of the battle lifting from hisshoulders. "I was relieved to hear ar-

tillery. It was constant bombard-ment, continuous for minutes onend. There's no way the Iraqiscould've survived that. I knew itwould go this fast."

"Shooting Blind MenIn the Dark ..I1by Bill Arrnstrong, VI1 Corps PA0A combination of better training,

troop discipline, and an overwhelm-ing technological advantage movedthe soldiers of 3rd ArmoredDivision's Co. A, 4th Battalion, 18thInfantry Regiment swiftly throughIraqi trench lines in the alliedground offensive. And when thesmoke cleared, the mechanized in-fantry soldiers of Alpha Co. dis-covered some shocking facts abouttheir "elite Republican Guard op-ponents.

SFC Marvin Rutherford, a platoonsergeant with Alpha Co., wasamong the first in his company toencounter enemy forces. Two pairsof Bradley Fighting Vehiclesbounded forward, protecting eachother during the advance throughIraq, toward Kuwait, in the earlyhours of the morning on Feb. 27.

"We saw a missile coming towardus, Rutherford said. "At first, wethought it was a flare coming down,but it kept coming closer andcloser."

The flare turned out to be an an-titank missile. Rutherford's gunner,SPC Donald Barker, shot the mis-sile down 200 meters shy of its des-tination.

For Rutherford and his men, thefight was just beginning. "We didn'tknow what we had gotten into. Theyhad tanks in the trench lines andthey were hard to see. Again, mygunner got on them and we startedwhipping HE (high explosive),

TOWs, and AP on them." The bat-tle proved to Rutherford and hismen that a Bradley could kill bothT-62 tanks and thinner-skinned ar-mored vehicles.

Not far from Rutherford's platoon,CPT Charles Forshee engaged anIraqi tank while backing up his ownBradley. The Alpha Co. com-mander's crew then killed a T-62tank, in addition to two armoredpersonnel carriers, by firing theirTOWs and 25-mm main gun.

Forshee looks back on the battleas one of no contest. "We killedstuff that was blind to us," he said."Shooting blind men in the dark."

SPC Barker attributes the victory,in part, to superior vision capa-bilities. 'We had such an advantageover them with our thermal sights, itseemed like they couldn't even seeus," the 22-year-old gunner said.

And with first light came mass sur-render. The Iraqi troops wanted nomisconception of their intent. "Theycarried large white sheets or sleep-ing mats or anything that was white,and just walk en masse," said SFCMichael Jones, another Alpha Co.platoon sergeant. As the enemyprisoners of war came closer to thevictors, the U.S. troops began toquestion some of the things theyhad heard about their "elite" op-ponent. "They were scared, reallyscared," said SPC James Singleton,an infantry soldier. "One grouplooked like they had been diggingthrough garbage cans because theyhad pieces of our food here andpieces of it there. The guys that wetook looked like they had been plan-ning their escape for quite a while."

Starvation and a lack of adequateclothing were common among thecaptured Iraqis, according to PFCJames Barnette. "Most of the EPWswe picked up didn't have shoes.They had blisters on their feet thesize of their thumbs. One of them- - - ,.



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told our first sergeant it had beentwo or three days since he had foodor water, and there's little to noth-ing of them there. It's like grabbingsomebody who's been starved todeath." h4AJ Robert Leonhard, whowas in charge of the battalion's com-bat training, felt some pity towardthe Iraqi soldiers, who had been im-mersed in combat with his men justa few hours before.

"We could see in their eyesdespair. The immediate responsewas fear, either fear of the unknownor fear that they were going to beexecuted," Leonhard said."Our oldiers were very careful, ob-

viously, but very compassionate atthe same time."Not one soldier of Alpha Co. was

killed during the battle. The men intheir Bradleys were able to killthree T-624 three PT-76 am-phibious light tanks, and nine ar-mored personnel carriers, despiteseveral pockets of resistance.

SSG Thomas Gregory, an AlphaCo. squad leader, admits that Iraqitroops may have had the advantageof being combat veterans going intothe fight. But he points out, "Theyhave never met a force with suchtechnology that rolls them up likethat."

Gregory adds that tough traininggave his squad the edge in battle."We found them with their pantsdown. All of their equipment wasstocked, but it wasn't loaded. 'I

On March 4, as the soldiers ofAlpha Co. stood in formation on abarren, sandy plain in centralKuwait, MG Paul E. Funk pinnedthe Bronze Star for valor on thechest of Forshee, the company com-mander.

But he made it clear to the forma-tion that every soldier standingthere could be considered a hero.

Contract haulers on the Tapline Road carry ammo west in preparation or the assault

_PUMPED UPm1

r'I1

L II I I

Tank and Bradley crews in the last days beforethe attack make final adjustments to theirweapons, check commo, and prepare to saddle upfn r thn r l t m h , r i r l o nnrth.-. .," -.""., , ". ., .

24 I - May-June 1991


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Armor in its element - The 3d Armored Division masses in the desert prior to its assault into Iraq.

READYTO ROLL

MlAl tanks of the3d AD begin to rollacross the desert inthe 100-hour war.

Photo SFC Gail Thueson

WhatThey Faced..These Iraqi obstacles were typicalof those along the Saudi-Kuwaitiborder. The "dragons' teeth" oneither side of the wide antitankditch protected a crossing pointused by the Iraqis. An access roadruns parallel to the ditch, and be-hind that, several lines of wireobstacles stretch across the desertat the top of the photo, probablystraddling a minefield.ARMOR - May-June 1991 25


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SPLATTERED!

After a gramoredottereveatanksPageafter -

At hundreds of locations in the featureless deserttions were little more than hal fdug graves for fighand crews that had been abandoned by their leavehicles were almost new: the T-72 track at far r igspots of the track - he road wheels were barelyseveral hundred kilometersof use. The illuminatisome T-72 turrets, was intended o spoof antitank



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ug-in Iraqi tanks and ar-cation,

A helicopter tour

es

parts (above right). On-scene observers

armor magazine, may-june 1991

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