armor magazine, january-february 1988

8/6/2019 Armor Magazine, January-February 1988

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- ! O RThe Professional Development Bulletin of the Armor Branch PB 77-88-1

Editor-in-ChiefMAJOR PATRICK J. COONEYManaging EditorJON T. CLEMENSCommandantMG THOMAS H. TAITARMOR (ISSN 00042420) is publishedbimonthly by the U.S. Army Armor Center, 4401Vine Grove Road, Fort Knox, KY 40121.Disclaimer: The Information contained InARMOR represents the professional opinions ofthe authors and does not necessarily reflect theofficial Army or TRADOC position, nor does itchange or supersede any informationpresented In other official m y ublications.Official distribution is limited to one copy foreach heavy brigade headquarters, armoredcavalry regiment headquarters, armor battalion

headquarters, armored cavalry squadron head-quarters, reconnaissance squadron head-quarters, armored cavalry troop, armor com-pany, and motorized brigade headquarters ofthe United States Army. In addition, Armylibraries, Army and DOD schools, HQ DA andMACOM staff agencles with responsibility for ar-mored, direct fire, ground combat systems, or-ganizations, and the training of personnel forsuch organizations may request two copies bysending a military letter to the editor-inchief.Authorized Content: ARMOR will print onlythose materials for which the U.S. Army ArmorCenter has proponency. That proponency in-cludes: all armored, direct-fire ground combatsystems that do not serve primarily as infantrycarriers; all weapons used exclusively in thesesystems or by CMF 19-series enlisted soldiers;any miscellaneous items of equipment whicharmor and armored cavalry organizations useexclusively: training for all SC 12A, 128, and12C officers and for all CMF-19-series enlistedsoldiers; and information concerning the train-ing, logistics, history, and leadership of armorand armored cavalry units at the brigadelregi-ment level and below, to include Threat units atthose levels.Material may be reprinted, provided credit isgiven to ARMOR and to the author, exceptwhere copyright is indicated.January-February 1988 Vo l XCVll No. 1

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Reactive Armor: New Life for Soviet Tanksby Captain James M. WarfordA Scaled Target Engagement Rangeby John RasmusonThe Combined Arms Maneuver Battalionby Lieutenant Colonel Robert G. BernierBreakout from the Veszprem Railheadby Captain B. H.FriesenTactical Tank Gunneryby Lieutenant Colonel LonE.MaggartThe Battalion XO in Combat:Where Will He Be Most Effective?by Captain RonaldM.BonesteelAn Electric Transmission for Armored Vehicles:A Designers Dream Realized at Lastby Raymond SurlemontOperation Michael: The Seeds of AirLand Battleby Captain Hilario H. Ochoa

DEPARTMENTS22454453

Points of Contact, USAARMSLettersCommanders HatchDrivers SeatProfessional ThoughtsBooks


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aht of new in-Tormarion OT operanonai significance.Mission orders are. above all, a com-mand and control technique. The alterna-tive- - trying to control operationalevents through detailed control at the tacti-cal level - is usually foredoomed tofailure. A certainly offers very little scopefor adapting operational execution tochanging circumstances, or exploitingoperational opportunities. "Keep theenemy from working around our left flankin major force," is a more effective way tocommunicate an operational intentionthan specifying the location of every fox-hole.

The use of mission orders allows subor-dinates to be flexible and to bring moreresources to bear to fulfill the higher com-

Dear Sir:In his article, 'Mission Tactics,' Capt.John F. Anta1 says: The aim of mission or-ders is to 'leave the greatest possibleoperational and tactical freedom to subor-dinate leaders,'" quoting at the end thelatest edition of N 100-5. a p t . Anta1 cor-rectly notes the German origins of "Mis-sion Orders' (Auftraastaktik). The GermanArmy developed Auftraastaktik for use inthe operational sphere first (from the18709 onward), and only later extendedits use to the tactical sphere, (mostlyduring WWI).

To make mission orders work in theoperational sphere, you need a sophisti-cated sense of what operational art is.

miiirary nas only recenny regain- asense of the operational level of war.If both the commander and the subor-

dinate share a developed sense of opera-tional art, the commander can use mis-sion orders to specify an operational inten-tion. The subordinate then has freedom touse all available tactical and materialmeans to carry out that operational inten-tion, adapting it to changing battlefield cir-cumstances as required. Thus, in a sense,the proper use of mission orders reducesa subordinate's "operational freedom," atleast in the sense of freedom to make hisown operational "policy. " The higher com-mander has already set operationalpolicy, although the higher commander-

(Note: Fort Knox AUTOVON preflx Is 464.DIRECTORY- PointsofContact Commercial prefix is k ea m e 02-624-x)oOo.ARMOR Editorial Offices U.S. Armv Armor Center

Editor-in-ChiefMajor Patrick .I. CooneyManaging EditorJon T. ClcmcnsAssistant EditorRobert E. R a eProduction AssistantVivian ThompsonContributing ArtistSFC Robert Torsrud

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Commandant (ATZK-CGMG Thomas H. Tait 2121Assistant Com mandant (ATSB-AC)COL (P ) Dennis V. Crumley 7555Deputy Assistant C ommandant (ATSB-DAC)COL Claude L. Clark 1050Command Sergeant MajorCSM John M. Stephens 4952Maintenance Dept. (ATSB-MA)COL Garry P. H k o n 8-346Command and StaffDept. (ATSB-CS)COL A.W. Kremer 5855Weapons Dept. (ATSB-WP)LTC (P ) George R. Wallace 111 1055Dir. of Training & Doctrine (ATSB-DOTD)COL ClaudeW. Abate 7250Dir. of Combat Developments (ATSB-CD)COL Donald L. Smart 5050Dir. of Eval. & Standardization (ATSB-DOES)COL Robert A. Korkin 3346Training Croup (ATZK-TC-TBF)LTC Clarence Belinge 3955NCO Academy/Drill Sergeant S cliool (ATNCG)CSM JohnnyM. Langford 5150Director, Reserve Component SptATZK-DRC)COL James E. Dierickv 1351LTC Albert F. Celani 7809Army Armor & Engineer Board (ATZK-AE)COL Garrett E. Duncan 7850TRADOC Sp te m Manager for (ATSB-TSMT)

Office of the Chief of Armor (ATZK-A R)

Tank SystemsCOL Douglas R. Burgess 7955

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whose use the higher com-

handle on the operational situation).Armies which attempt to control subor-

onal sphere.BradleyJ. Meyer,Doctoral Candidate in Military HistoryCambridge, MAAbout Th ose "Killer Tanks" ..Dear Sir:That's it! 1 can't take it anymore! Weer tanks. We have gunnery exercisesFM 17-12, and commanders speak

it doctrlne.Let me tell you about the killer tank. HeI have"500 armor battles" mark iny five years of NTC experience, and I've

The killer tank falls Intotwocategories:1. He has an excellent window shot on a

it better to bypass. Now the real

2. He is firing MILES without gunfire sig-e from a wellcamouflaged position.

up and attempt to slug it out toe-to-a mass of vehicles as they closeposition. That's the enemy's

At the last Armor Conference, the

if you're willing to let a Soviet platoonthe chance that you

125-mm SABOT rounds and try- ake ten dollars and go

Las Vegas: you have as much chanceThe point here is that we need to train

to use good combat sense and ex-

ploit the situations they find themselves Into the best survivable advantage. The lastthing we need to do is expend their livestrying to stick to a foolish doctrine,

I have a great respect for this Army'sability to fight when it is unleashed. If it iswell trained, it will do the right thing whenthe time comes.

SFC John Bittay,Bn Master Gunner, 1-73 ArmorFt. Irwin, CATank Gunnery CommentsDear Sir:I applaud your recent article dealing

with tank gunnery. ("The Guts of TankGunnery," by CPT Kris P. Thompson,ARMOR, Jul-Aug 87) As the chief of M1gunnery at the M l New Equipment Train-ing Team at Vilseck, chief of the Grafen-woehr Tank Gunnery Evaluation Team,and, finally, the commander of C Com-pany, 2-64 Armor. in Schweinfurt, I hadthe unique experience of seeing bothsides of the evaluatlon issue. I offer a fewadditional comments based upon that ex-perience.

The first deals with the timeless issue oftechnical competence. Capt. Thompsonvery clearly spelled out the requirementsfor the lieutenants. This tenet, however,must hold equally for the noncommis-sioned officers. My experience as a com-mander leads me to believe that this isnot the case. The proverbial, "Leave mealone, lieutenant. I knew this before youwere out of diapers," generally is ablanket statement of a lack of knowledge.We must share the knowledge gleanedfrom the study of tank gunnery with ourNoncomniissioned Officer Corps. It mustalso be taught to our gunners as well.

During its last gunnery at Graf, my com-pany finished high in the 3d ID, largely be-cause of the word "DUMP. l taught all ofthe gunners the gun/sight relatlonships ofthe M1 tank, and that knowledge madethe difference for many of the crews. Theyare out there today as living proof of thatstatement.

The UCOFT...hhh ..what a trainer! Whoreally knows how to traln on it? I receivedthe first M i UCOFT in Europe while at Vil-seck, certified in the matrix five times witha variety of gunners, and stlll ponder overthat question.I found that the matrix progression, al-though a good technique, trained far toomuch on degraded-mode gunnery andnot nearly enough on the full-up engage-ments. In a unit, time is very valuable. Iconcentrated on TT Vlll tasks, finding avariety of replications within the matrix,and trained them over, and over, and overagain. I submit to anyone who challengesthat approach that the tank tables weredeveloped by Fort Knox to replicate the

tasks a crew can expect to encounter incombat. It is clearly loglcal to concludethat training to standard on those tasks isthe best road to TT V111A current issue that is very controversialis the use of MILES interface devices.

Until the eye-safe laser can be producedand distributed to company level, theMILES interface system is virtually uselessfor training on a full-up system. The rangebutton has to be zeroed out on the CCP,and the battlesight button cannot be usedto Induce lead for a crew on full-upengagements on a local gunnery trainingfacility when MILES interface Is used in itscurrent form. I tried the MILES interfacedevice at Schweinfurt, and the crews, in-cluding my master gunner, almost alwaysshut the system off in order to inducelead during an engagement. This conceptof leaddumping is of critical importanceto a gunnery program and must be usedon a tank, as well as in the UCOFT duringhome station gunnery.

I found the virtual key to success is tohave a trained NCO corps within the com-pany, develop a gunnery plan, and letthem execute it. The people we havetoday are the very best and can lead acompany to sure-fire success on any gun-nery range if properly trained.

Mark T. LittelCaptain, ArmorFt. Leavenworth, KSCAT/Boeselager KudosDear Sir:I, too, would like to join the countless

others who congratulated 1-11 ACR fortaking home the Boeselager Cup, and the1st Platoon, D Company, 4-8 Cavalry, 3dAD, for its magnificant performance in theCanadian Army Trophy '87 (CAT '87)However, I would be remiss if I did notpoint out that the 1987 Canadian ArmyTrophy was won by NATO's Central ArmyGroup (CENTAG). The CENTAG team wascomposed of some of the finest tankers inEurope and consisted of platoons fromthe United States, Canada, and Germany.The 1st Platoon, D Company, 4th Bn,8th Cav, with a score of 20,490, was notonly the highest scoring platoon in thecompetition, but it also had the distinctionof being the first U.S. team to attain thishonor in the 24-year history of the bian-nual event.

The superior results attained by ourtankers at CAT '87 certainly validate ourtraining procedures as well as again prov-ing the excellence of the M1 Abrams ...

George A. IterLTC, Armor,HQ CENTAGAPO NY 09099

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M G Thomas H. TaitCommanding General

U.S.Army Armor Center

CavalryInit ativesRecently, in this column (March-

April 1987), I argued the value ofreconnaissance as a combat multi-plier, and that our current cavalryand scout organizations lack ade-quate reconnaissance capability.Our divisional cavalry squadronsare ill-equipped, for example, to ac-complish the broad range of recon-naissance missions. The air com-ponent is weatherllight dependent,while the ground element lacksSUE-cient depth and firepowercapability. Training at the NationalTraining Center and European exer-cises support this contention. Ourbattalion scout platoons need to bereorganized; six scout vehicles arenot enough. Our light cavalrysquadrons have no robustness andmust be reexamined. In short, wehave a lot to do.

We in the Armor School remaincommitted to correct these deficien-cies. Tanks belong in the divisioncavalry as does a third groundtroop. We also need simple RPVsthat allow commanders to look overthe next hill.

While we continue our efforts torealign our scout organizations, let

me update you on what we aredoing to challenge scouts in thefield. Two programs come to mind;one deals with the M3 Bradley,while the other focuses on trainingour young cavalry officers.

The Bradley Scout SectionQualification Program evaluates thescout sections tactical and gunnery

to accomplish combat crii.:al tasks(figure1).

Commanders select additional in-dividual scout tasks for evaluationfrom a supplemental list (figure 2).The unit evaluates these tasks in atactical scenario for both the dayand night phases of Table IX .

Table X, like Table IX, will have amix of 60 percent tactics and 40-abilities. Jointly developed -by the

Weapons Department and Com- Continued on Page51mand andStaff Depart-ment, theprogram stipu-lates that thescout sectionsmust pass bothTables IX andX in order tobe qualified.Table IX isdesigned to beconducted inthe LocalTraining Area(LTA) in anarea no small-er than 1x2kms. Scoutsare evaluatedon their ability

CriticalTaskGroupThe following are combat critical tasks thatmust be included in Tables IX and X:0 Action on contact0 Send a spot report0 Ca ll for and adjust indirect fire0 Control techniques of movem ent0 Control scout section fires0 Conduct a screen0 Conduct a passage of lines0 Select firing positions0 Conduct a zone recon

with vehicles

Figure 1



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CS M John M. StephensComm and Sergeant MajorU S . Army Armor Center

EIA Retentionand NCOReinforced TrainingI hope everyone had a joyous andsafe holiday. With the New Year

come many ifs. The budget reduc-tion has everyone looking for newideas and cheapcr ways to do busi-ness and maintain a high state ofreadiness.I would like to highlight retentionf our exccllent soldiers and rcin-orced training of our BNCOCThe three-year commitment for

in the Exccllcnce in Armore another choice to make,of EIA soldiers is important to

adership of our Army

gram is useless because we willenjoy the long-range goals of

1 recommend we start the newsment of thei n each bat-

of command and the NCOin retaining

establish some long-rangeguidelines and objectives. If we havekeyed on E M soldiers as theyprogress, then little should be re-quired when they near ETS exceptgood leadership and counseling. Ifthey have received promotions,recognition, schooling, and certifica-tion, then it is a matter of whetherthey want to stay or not. Maybesome want to return to college.Thats tine also; encourage them tojoin the ROTC program and returnto active duty as officers.

However, if there is no specificunit policy and guidelines coveringEIA, then you probably have aproblem and need to f i i it. Rcten-lion and EIA are commanderprograms. He, and only he, canmake both programs work or fail.I have one more recommendation

before I switch subjects. Look at allthe soldiers in the organization.Select those who would qualify forthe Excellence Program, regardlessof MOS, and develop a program forthem also. They could not meet Cer-tification Test I1 promotion pointqualification, but they could havethe opportunity for promotion tosergeant in the same time.The quality of retention today af-

fects the leadership of our Army forthe next 20 years.

The second sub.ject I want to ad-dress is the reinforcement trainingof the soldicrs we retain, specifical-ly, tank commander and scoutsquad leaders, especially afterBNCOC. I addressed this pointsome time ago, however, I still findorganizations that have absolutclyno knowledge of what trainingNCOs receive in NCOES. In ordcrto reinforce schoolhouse training,you must know what is taught ateach level and to what degree ofproficiency!

I will tell anyone that the besttraining 1 ever received was not 7thArmy NCO Academy, 7th ArmyTank Commanders Course, or anyother school I attended. The besttraining was the requirement Ireceived from my commander, of-ficers, and senior noncommissionedofficers to teach classes or performas an instructor after I graduatedfrom 7th Army NCO Academy. Itaught general subjects, leadership,marching the platoon to the motorpool, platoon physical training, etc.After I graduated from the TankCommander Course, I was respon-sible for teaching boresight, M737.62-mm, HB M2 S O cal, and otherclasses as I progressed. That train-ing not only reinforced the training I

Continued on Page 52-ARMOR - January-February 1988 5


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ReactiveArmor:New LifeforSoviet Tanksby Captain James M. Warford

At left, a T-80with reactive armor.

Captain MaiiSFeld was pleased withthe siiccess achieved by his tearitdiiriiig tlie last coiiple of d q s . nie'Xw ass iiis" had beeit deploved siricethe veri? bcgiiiiiiiig; arid had been incoiiibat sirice the dav aferClirislriias. Die bunied-oiit eiieriivtanks scattewd to the east of BPTiger were proof that h is tankers aiidBradley crews had done a good 48-hoiirs work. H e was jiist rehiniilig tohis own MI wlieri he started towonder wliv the eiteiiiy tanks Itad riotbeen as hard to kill as the S2 hadbriefed. Die briefing incliided adescriptioii of a riiiriiber of eiieiiivtanks fitted with a new gp e of aniiorthat coiild pose a threat to the taskforce 's firepower.

It seemed prem clear to CaptainMaiifleld, as li e a-aiiiiiied the slowlvdissipating coliiiiirts of siiioke coni-irig oiit of E A Tiger-Trap, that tlioseeiieiiiv tanks were not fitted with tlieiiew t jpe of aniior. H e was jiist uboiittopit these tlioiiglits oiit of his ittiridin favor of that riiglit's operatiorisorder when lie received a call oii thetask force coniiiiaiid net. n i e cull iii-chided a report froiii an iiifaiitn,team that had been attacked by anerieiiiy coiitpmiv wliile it was set iipiii arid aroiirid a towri to the nortli-

east of BP Tiger. Altlioiigli the eiieiiivattack occiined at rtiglit, the iifaiiti?,was able to report that the ericiiiytanks were fitted with a new hpe ofaniior that was apparentlv able totake a lot of piiriislinteiit. nie reportended with iiricorifiniied stories ofeneiiiv tanks mplod irig after being hit,arid then coiitiriiiiitg IO fire intofriendly positioris.nie images of the battle that hadtaken place in that town in the darkwere ciit short b),a spot report called

iii froiii his Brad& platoon leader.Several eiieiiiv tanks were approaclt-Big BP Tiger from the iiortlieast;eiieiiiy tanks that lie coiild riot specifi-callv ideiitifi. As the straiige-lookingtanks came into view, CaptaiiiMarisfield was able to corifinii thatt l i q were eiieiiiv, but lie coiild not besiire what niodel t l i q were. I t lookedlike each eneiiiv tank was coveredwith a l a w of blocks or bricks.Seconds later, his Bradlqs openedfire, followed iiiiriiediatelv bv thetank platoons.Jiist as Captaiii Man sfield was start-irig his own fire coriiriiuiid lie sawsometliirig that li e had i i e w seeiibefore. A t tliut nioiiierit lie couldn'tbe sure, biit it looked like tliese

modified eiieiiiv tanks were being hitarid aplodirig, arid tlicri retiirniiigfire...Origins in IsraelIn August 1982, advertisements for

the Israeli Military Industries ( IMI)two-tank ferry raft were in variousdefense-related magazines. Thephotograph that accompanied thead was significant more for thecargo than for the raft itself. Thatcargo consisted of two Israeli mainbattle tanks; a modified Ceiihirioii,followed by a modified MW. Eachof the tanks had a series of what ap-peared to be mounting points orstuds for some unseen equipment orgear belonging to the crcws.

These mounting points were invarious patterns and were weldedon to the front slope, hull deck, tur-ret front, turret side, and turret roofof each of the sand-colored tanks.The important role played by thesemounting points lo both Israelitanks and tank crewmen wasdramatically demonstrated twomonths earlier during Operation"Peace for Galilee."

On June 4, 1982, the Israeli armedforces launched an offensive into



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southern Lebanon. Thethree-pronged advance in-cluded large numbers ofheavily-modified armoredvehicles. During the firstfew days of the operation,news magazines printedphotographs showing Israelitanks with a previously-un-seen type of applique armorthat consisted of a series ofblocks or bricks. The ap-plication of these bricks wasso extensive that even atrained observer would beslow to properly identifyeach tank model. As morephotographs became avail-

Israeli Blazer armor array on M60, as first used inthe invasion of Lebanon in 1982. Note differentshapes of the armor blocks in different locations.- -able, it was possihle to examine thisnew armor more closely, and to

finally determine its purpose. Thearmor was a reactive type that theIsraelis have since named "Blazer."

DevelopmentHistoryRafael, an Israeli company,

developed Blazer specifically todefeat modern antitank weaponsthat rely on high explosive (HEAT).This massive category of tank-killingweapons includes both antitankguided missiles (ATGMs) and theless sophisticated rocket-propelledweapons (RPG-7/RPG-16) and lightantitank weapons (LAWS). ThisHEAT-defeating capability has at-tracted the interest of manycountries, especially the SovietUnion.

How It WorksBlazer armor consists of a series

of bricks, each attached to the tankby a bolt and nut, and containing aspecial plastic explosive sandwichedbetween two steel plates. In theory,this reactive armor "simply involvesthe use of chemically-stored energyto extend the range of the variablesof hardness, density, spacing, anddifferential obliquity."' When aHEAT warhead hits one of thesebricks, the plastic explosive inside

would also have the addi-tional drawback to anenemy of displaying avehicle signature (fromthe detonating bricks)where a conventionally-ar-mored tank would remainhidden.

In spite of Israeli claimsto the contrary, thisaspect of reactive armorprobably remains to beproved. During operation"Peace for Galilee," 'theartillery threat was atbest mod e~t ."~

the brick detonates. The explosiveforce of this detonation is directedaway from the brick's inner steelplate, and concentrates in the op-posite direction of the attacking war-head. This explosion forces theHEAT-formed "jet' to malform andlose its energy so that the heavily-weakened jet is not capable ofpenetrating th e tank's main armor.It is easy to see that a tankequipped with this type of armor,under attack by HEAT weapons,could give the impression that ithad received a crippling blow, whileactually it only sustained the loss ofone or more of it's reactive armorbricks. According to the manufac-turer, Blazer bricks "are not ac-tivated by small arms ammunitionfire, or artillery shell fragments.."One source stated that detonationof th e bricks would only occur if hitby 23-mm rounds or larger. In spiteof the capabilities that this newarmor has to offer, it does havesome limitations. The first of thesedeals with attack discrimination.The armor must have the capabilityto distinguish between artillery air-bursts, heavy machinegun fire, andattack by an antitank weapon. If ar-tillery shell fragments could causethe reactive armor to detonate, theeffectiveness of this armor could benegated by the preparatory firedelivered prior to an attack. This

The second limitation concernsthe prohlem of detonation chainreaction. The hit on a single brickmounted at 10 o'clock on the turretfront, for example, should not causea series of detonations that wouldleave the entire left side of the tur-ret exposed.

A third limitation deals with thesafety of friendly forces supportingtanks fitted with reactive armor. Areactive armor brick detonated byan RPG-16 could cause a seriousproblem for the tank's supporting in -fantry teams. This danger would notbe limited to dismounted infantry,but could include the unbuttonedcrew of the tank that was hit as well.While the employment of bodyarmor would lesson the danger tosome degree, this is an inherentproblem that may be impossible tosolve.

A fourth limitation concerns th elack of effectiveness of reactivearmor (as it is currently designed)against tank main gun-fired kineticenergy projectiles. These armor-piercing rounds, such as APDS-Tand AI'FSDS-T, are apparently onlymarginally affected by reactivearmor bricks.

The final point for discussion hereis more of a challenge than a limita-

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y capable main battle

Phase One:"Blanket Amor"The first phase of the

armor upgrade programegan some time prior to1984, and was first seenfitted to a T-72Ml in Novem-er of that year. Thismodification, which con-

sisted of "blanket" of non-Top view clearly shows added armor "blankets"onurret of this T-72. Experts disagree on its purpose.

metallic applique armor bolted tothe turret roof, like the third "reac-tive armor phase," relates directly toth e armor protection starting point(composite armor) described above.The non-metallic blanket fitted tothe T-72MI was approximately 35-50-mm thick and ap eared to bevery similar to KevlaF fiber panelsproduced in the West. Some sour-ces claim that the additional armorwas to counter the effects of en-hanced-radiation weapons inWestern Europe. While this theoryis possible, it is clearly not the mainSoviet motive for such a modifica-tion. A more likely reason for ad-ding the soft armor to the turretroof is the increasing threat posedby NATO topattack weapons.These weapons, ranging from 30-mm depleted uranium armor-pierc-ing rounds to "smart" submunitionsdelivered by a variety of sources,are becoming more and more impor-tant to NATO's antitank doctrine.The Soviet applique covers most ofthe turret roof area. to include thetank commander's (TC) and gun-n e r , ~hatches, the gunner's GPS"doghouse," and the mountingframes for t he TC's vision blocks. Itdoes not, however, cover the areadirectly above the turret frontalarmor. The Soviets apparently feltthat this area of the turret wascapable enough not to require theadditional protection of the armor

blanket. In May 1985, the Sovietsparaded the T-64 main battle tankfor the first time through RedSquare, giving Western analyststheir first opportunity to examine it.Unclassified sources have identifiedthis tank as a version of the T-64Bthat is "not fitted with the guidanceequipment for the Kobra guided mis-sile system."' Those T-64s were alsofitted with a non-metallic armorblanket. In this case, however, theapplique armor was of a differentdesign than that on the T-72M1. Onthe T-64, the blanket appeared tobe made up of several small sec-tions or panels bolted to th e turretvery closely together; while on th e T-72M1, the blanket was apparently alarge one-piece covering. The areaof the turret covered on the T-64also appeared to be smaller thanthat covered on the T-72Ml. Finally,unclassified photographs that haveappeared in defense-relatedmagazines like Soldat iind Techrtikand itfilitan, T C C ~ I I ~ O ~ O ~ V ,ave con-firmed that the non-metallic armorblanket has also been fitted to thehull deck above the driver's positionon both tanks.

Phase Two:"Horseshoe" Armoron Older TanksThe second phase of the armor

upgrade program appeared on

Soviet tanks deployed inAfghanistan in 1986. Thearmor modification, firstseen on a knocked-outSoviet T-55, consists ofsimple cast steel platesadded to the turret front(one curved plate oneach side of the maingun) and on t h e frontslope. This "horseshoe"armor is about 100-150-mm thick and is in-tended to defeat infantryantitank weapons? Sinceits first sighting, this ad-ditional armor has ap-

peared on T-54, T-55, and T-62main battle tanks.

Most of the information concern-ing this armor modification has be-come available since the well-knownwithdrawal of some Soviet forcesfrom Afghanistan. Photographs ofthese forces taken prior to theirreturn to the Soviet Union have ap-peared in news and defense-relatedmagazines. The tanks featured inthese photos are heavily-modified T-62s (labeled the T-62E by onesource for easy identification untilthe correct Soviet designation isknown) that have been fitted with avariety of improvements. The mostimportant is the added armorplates. Two cover the turret fromthe main gun around the turretfront to about th e 3 o'clock and 9o'clock positions. The tanks alsohad hull-length, non-metallic sideplates mounted on each side of th ehull. These plates, resembling Kev-lar' fiber panels, are angled slightlyoutward away From the tank and aremost likcly intended to protect th efender fuel cells from heavymachine-gudautomatic cannon fire.The armor plate added to the frontslopes appears to be identical to theturret plates, and covers the entirearea of the front slope.

Finally, these tanks also had fabricor rubberized hull skirting, three

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large smoke grenade launch-ers, and what appears to be asmall, boxed laser rangefindermounted above the main gun.While these modified T-54, T-55, and T-62s do not pose thesame threat as rlie inoreniodeni T-72, T-64, and 7 -NOS ,this phase of the armorupgrade program hasachieved it's goal. The oldertanks that are still in servicewith the Soviet army havereceived new life; and, in their

up to four layers of reac-tive armor panels."*' ASfar as the turret arraysare concerned, the bricksare in two parallel layerson the turret front of theT-64B; while on the T-SO,the bricks are fitted tothe turret in the shape ofa "V". This "V" is at-tached to the turret mainarmor at it's widestpoint, with the narrowestpart pointing away from-62 modified with applique armor on turret frontupdated forms, will continue and sides, non-metallic armor on fuel cells, and ;he turret. The result isto be used for training and com-rubber side skirts to predetonate HEAT rounds.that each array resembles the

bat into the future.Phase Three:Reactive Armor IsAdoptedThe final phase of this armor

upgrade program is the massive ef-fort the Soviets are undertaking tofit their most modern main battletanks with reactive armor. This ef-fort, first identified in 1984; is cer-tainly the most significant armor im-provement plan so far identified inthe Soviet army. Exactly when thisSoviet interest in reactive armorfirst came into being is not clear. Atthe unclassified level, however, allof the available information pointstive armor by the Israelis in 1982.LO the successf~l se of Blazer reac-

Several open sources have con-firmed that the Syrian army cap-tured a number of Israeli tanksfitted with Blazer reactive armor.Exactly how many they captured isunknown, as is the types. The mostprobable and widely-accepted infor-mation confirms that the tanks wereMWAIs and that the number theSyrians captured was small. Blazerreactive armor was subsequentlymade available to the Soviets. Thisacquired Israeli technology was ap-parently something that the Sovietswere waiting for. As a result, theywere able to rapidly field a reactivearmor systcm on their most moderntanks. These tanks, described byARMOR author Steven Zaloga as

premium tank types, were suddenlyappearing fitted with Soviet reactivearmor in East Germany.To date, the only Soviet tanks that

have been identified carrying reac-tive armor bricks are the T-64B andthe T-80. Unclassified drawings (i nthe case of the T-64B) andphotographs (in the case of the T-NO) have recently appeared indefense-related magazines. Thisrecently released information hasmade it possible to assess this newSoviet capability.

Unlike Blazer reactive armor, theSoviet bricks appear to consist ofone uniform design; although theirfitting to the two premium tanksmentioned above is not the same."The explosive brick measuresabout 250 x 150 x 70mm. It has fourbolt holes, one on each corner to at-tach one brick to another."ld Eachof these bricks attaches to the tank'smain armor with two mountingpoints that hold thcm at specificangles. Just how the bricks are ar-rayed on each tank type, however, isa different story. The reactive armorbricks fitted to the front slope ofboth the T-64B and T-80 are set upin the same manner. It is not untilwe examine the turret and hull-skirt-ing arrays that the difference be-comes apparent. "In the case of theT-SO, no panels (bricks) are fitted tothe side skirts, while the T-64B has

tip or head of an arrow. Thereason for these differences is notcurrently known. One theory is thatthe main armor of each tank re-quires a different configuration ofreactive armor bricks to achieve acertain level of overall protection.The number of bricks litted to eachof these tanks is also different. "TheT-80 pattern appears to be the moreeconomical of the two configura-tions, averaging 111 bricks, com-pared to 185-211 brick panels onthe T-64B."" This total number ofbricks includes what appears to be asingle layer of reactive armor fittedto the turret roof of each tank.

Finally, the T-64B and T-8U arethe only Soviet tanks that have beenseen carrying reactive armor. Thisdoes not, however, rule out t h e ap-plication of reactive armor bricks toanother tank type in a time of crisis.Based upon the modifications ap-plied to the latest identified versionof the 7-72, the groundwork has al-ready been laid.

That tank is known as the T-72MI(1986), first seen in November ofthat year. The smoke grenadelauncher array that has been astandard feature of late model T-72s had been changed with alllaunchers now mounted on the leftside of the turret in a single group.This change not only brought the T-72 series on line with t h e latestmodels of the T-64, it also clearedI i



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the future mounting of reactive

ConclusionThe Soviets realized many years

th e battlefield beforecomplexity of the new armor

to keep Soviet tanks withf Chohham-type

a rmyto rely on the

the armies of the1965.One of the primary reasons thatlike the T-64 and T-80 have

of ad-of these

The problem thehow to update

own against the much

armor.

ome sources have incorrectlyul-e protection a tank will probab-

ever need. This is far from theI have stated the various

entity. It is part of an ob-f i l l the

7-648 nd T-80 s u p

finally understand this signilicantnew threat lo NATO.

The significance of this new threatis apparent in the concentrated ef-fort that the armies in the Westhave initiated to counter it. NewATGMs like the German TRIGAT(two tandem HEAT warheads), theFrench HOT 3 (two tandem HEATwarheads, and the American TOW2A (two tandem HEAT warheads),are all examples of this NATO ef-fort. According to Jane's DefenceWeekit?,"If the Soviets are fittingreactive armor to tanks alreadyfitted with laminate (composite)armor, then they could well havecomplete protection againstATGMs on which NATO relies formuch of its antitank defensive capa-bilit~."'~The Soviets have suc-ceeded in rapidly fielding a stopgapimproved armor system that willallow them the time they need todevelop and field their own versionof Chobham-type armor. We mustfully understand this success andcounter it hefore NATO tank com-manders start their fire commands.Reactive armor is indeed new lifefor Soviet tanks.

Captain James M. War-ford was commissionedin Armor in 1979 as a dis-t in guis hed mil itarygraduate from the Univer-sity of Santa Clara,California. He has servedas a tank platoon leader,support platoon leader,and has commanded A/2-66th Armor Regiment(COHORT). He is current-ly the commander ofHHC/2-66th Armor Regi-ment, 2d ArmoredDivision (FORWARD).

Notes'Simpkin, Richard, "From

Array to Disarray7 TacticalAspects of Active and ReactiveArmors," Technoloav,April 1986, p. 20.

'"Blazer Add-on Reactive Ar-mour," International DefenseReview , vol. 16, no. 11, 1983, p.1534.

3Simpkln, Richard, "FromArray to Disarray? TacticalAspects of Active and ReactiveArmors," Military Technoloav,April 1986, p. 20.

%arford, Captain James M. ,"T-64, IT-122, and IT-130: TheSoviet Advantage," ARMOR, Sep-tember-October, 1985, p. 41.

5~a~oga, teven J., "SovietReactive Tank Armour Update,"Jane's Defence Weeklv. May23. 1987, p. 1011.

'Secretary of Defense, SovietMilitarv Power, US. Departmentof Defense, April 1986, p. 67.

'"Horseshoe Armour !Wed toSoviet Tanks," Jane's DefenceWeekiv, January 10, 1987, p. 18.

'"The T-80 Tank Unveiled,"Jane's Defence Weeklv, May 3,1986, p. 804.

'Zaloga, Steven J. , "SovietReactive Tank Armor Update,"Jane's Defence Weeklv, May 23,1987, p. 1011.

"lbid.. 1014.'' bid,''lbid.'3Russell, Simon O., "Soviets

to Deploy T-64 Reactive Ar-mour," Jane's Defence Weeklv,May 17, 1986, p. 863.

ARMOR - anuary-February 1988 11


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A Scaled Target Engagement RangeNew England ReservistsDefeat the R ange Space ProblemWith Ingenuity on a Large Scaleby John RasmusonA happier marriage of high-techand salvage there never was: lasers,

carage-door openers. car parts. andstore-bought gadgetry, all fitted in-geniously into a World War 11-eramovie theater at Fort Devcns. Mas-sachusetts.Called the Scalcd Targets Engnge-ment Range (STER). it is nearly aperfecl synergism - the whole cx-ceeding the sum of its Rubct ioldberg parts - that offers NewEngland-based Reserve Component

and Guard units incomparable an-titank training.The STER was born of need.Training space for tanks in thenorthcast is as scarce as winters arclong and punishins. Thus. the rela-tivcly modest $7OO,~K)O nvcstnienl inthe STER has returned immcdiatedividends in unit readiness. not tomention obvious savings in aniniuni-tion costs.Thc STER hiis three indoor firinglancs; eilch is complctc with I h O -scalcd landscapes that come to life

in n gunner's sight and each iscquippcd with ;i mis of' pop-up andmoving targets. A sound systcmadds the din of battle at the flick 01a switch, an d thc lights can replicate

the shadowy illumination cast byoverhead Ilares.With an M-55 ascr mountcd tothe tank's main gun with a BrewslcrDcvicc, gunncrs engage targets withlaser pulses at simulated distancesup to 1,800 meters. A flash of lightfrom an automobile dome lightwired into the base of the miniaturetargct signals a hit."For Tank Tahles 1 and 11. it's th emost outstanding indoor I'acility I'veevcr seen," says SFC Shaun Grim-Icy. master gunner with D Troop,5th Cavalry. 187th Inkintry Brigade(USAR ).

The overriding value of the STER,Grimley points o ut, is the amount of



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The Combined ArmsManeuver BattalionArmor and InfantryBuild a New RelationshipIn Ft. Hood Experimentby LTC Robert G. Bernier

''The or;Sanizatiori wlticlt CTsstircsiiriitv of coirthatarils sltould he Dcttcrtliroiiglioiit and rrtore rational... ol-diers, no matter how well drillc~rl,who are as.~eiithl~pdiapltazariilv irrtoconiparties arid battalioris will r i c whaw, rtwer hmu* had, Ilia1 cprilircBiiriie wltich is honi of niiihial (IC-qiairitariceship.

- Coloitcl Ardaitt r h i Picq.In early 1986. t he commander of111 Corps obtained approval to or-ganize three combined armsmaneuv er battalions. Two of the hat-talions would be armor hcavy; thethird would he balanced. with an in-fantry base and its organic antitankcompany. On 3 Septembcr 10.30, th e2d Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division,reo rga ni~ ed n accordance wi th theDA-approved Combined Arms

Maneuver Battal ion (CAMB)MTOE. The brigade will remain or-gani red under the CAMB MTOEfor at leilst two years for evaluation.Simply stated, a comhincd ;irmsmaneuver battalion is a hattalion oCmechanized infantry, armor, and an-titank companies, with : hcarl-qua rters company composed oC sup-port elements which arc in propor-tion to the number a nd types of line

companies.

FIG. 1COMBINED ARMS clnkam.."....-"&

vmm"-- 2Ennsud..-"...m

TOTAL--749

m ~im YZ

MANEUVER BATTAUON

a m12 wol8 Yl W

(Balancad)

m ~mm: 13 M2 14 M I 12 wolWhy CAMB?CAMB's obiective is to opt imbethe warlighting capability (i f ourheavy forces by organi~ in~at -talions to train as they will fight. Itsbasis is in the Army's trainingphilosophy: "Successful armies train

as they intend to fi$ht, and fight asthcy are trained."- More to thepoint: "Units and headquarters thatwill fight togcther in teams, task for-ces. or larger units. should traintogetherCAMB improves the fishlingcapability of heavy forces by improv-ing leaders' proficiency at integrat-ing tanks and mechanized infantry;facilitates task organization and its

sustainment; i d apitalizes on thecffccts of constant association.CAMB units are also expected lorea p long-term professional develop-ment benefits in the exposure thcyprovide 1c:idcrs of combincd armsopera! ions.Thcrc is probably little argumentwith thc doctrinal necessity to trainroutinely in a cross-attached mode.Howcver, with the ficlding of ncw,

more capablc and more complcx

systems, the need to train that wayhas become increasingly urgent. Forthe first time, we have an infantryfighting vchicle intentionallyde si ge d Cor its employment in com-bination with the new main battletank. Wc expcct the effect of theBradley IFV and the Abrams tank,whcn properly employed together,to be grcater than that of either sys-tem cniployed separately.T h i s effect, however, is notautomatic. Events at the NationalTraining Center have shown thatunits find it difficult to obtain theirfull potential. The speed of t h e M Iand M2 makes their employmentharder to control. A friendlyplatoon covers the distance to aposition before th e artillery canprocess and fire its request for fire

on thiit posit ion. The demands toget infantrymen forward .to breachand clcar ohstaclcs compete withthe pressing need to keep BradleyTOW launchers firing from long~ t ~ ~ d - o f fanges. One quickly learnsthat, indeed. "The Bradley is not atank." as the enemy precipitouslydestroys thcm in a mutter ofseconds. The command and controlarrangcmcnts for dismounting in-fantrymen, unique to the Bradleyforce and necessarily effected hnsti-

ARMOR - January-February 798874


17/56


18/56

brigade." Beyond that, it followsthat it is much easier to go fromsome mix to any other mix, than tostart from a pure tank ormechanized infantry organization.For the CAMB headquarters andits support structure, there is cssen-tially no change in leadership whcnmaking furt her cross-attachment.

At this point, one might ask: Whymake CAMB a documented or-ganization? Could we not ac-complish the same goals through"semi-permanent" cross attachmentso l a lcw months duration? I n fact,many FORSCOM brigades do justthat for their train-ups before NTCrotations. I n reality, however, i fsuch provisional cross-attachmcntslast longer than a months. they be-come inefficient to the point ofbeing counter-product ive. Fromtheir prcvious experience at beingcross-attached for six monthswithout MTOE documentation, twoof the current CAMBs found thereto be some 73 administrative func-tions that required special or olf-line miinagemcnt. Actions normallyhandled in stride, ranging fromsimple personnel actions t o suhmis-sion o f USRs, ran counter to the"systcm" at every Icvel and con-sumed inordinate amounts of valu-able time. MI'OE documentationfor CA M B "legalizes" the unit in thesystem, resulting in the disap-pearance of problems associatedwith provisional organization.

CAMB In the 1st Cav Division

The combined arms maneuver bat-t ; i l i on organidon is shown infigures J an d 2. Task force 1-5C*ii\&y, balanced. is at figure 1.Task forces 1-8 Cavalry, and 1-32Armor, both armor heavy, are atfigure 2.It is important to undcrstancl thatthe CAMBs are composed of cxist-ing personnel and equipment

authorizations - a zero-sum cx-

change among the three battalions.In addition to the line companycross-attachmcnts, which includeeach compmv's maintenance team,some adjustments in personnel andequipment were made to align theHHC's.

The most immediate lesson o lCAMB orgnnijlation is the need toalign the HHC's of the tank andnicchani;led infantry 17attiilions.Undcr their .I-scries MTOEs, theHHCs of thc two type battalions arenot suited t o rilpid cross-attiich-mcnt, nor for the sustainment oftask forces. The liggcst differenceis in the support platoons. Thc in-fantry hattalion's support platoonhils 5-ton cargo i d ank and pumpunit (TPU) trucks: while the tankhiittalion has the IO-ton cargo and2,3(K)-gaIlon fuel H EhlMTs. Thetwo types of trucks have con-siderable differences in cross-country m obility and load capacity.

Undcr normal circumstances oftask organization. infantry task for-ces find it hnrd to meet the addition-al fuel i d mmunition needed bytheir attached tank companies. T ocompensate for this, tank hart. I' on snormally sen d two cargo HEMMTsand two fucl HEMMTs with theirdetached tank companies. Infmtrybattalions respond in kind with S-ton cargo trucks rind TPUs. This ex-change solves the transportationprohlem but creates a problem inmiiintcnancc. The tank battalion'smaintenance scction has the tools.mechanics. and repair parts to sup-port 5-ton trucks; but the infantrybattalion has no mechanics(MOS03S). spccinl tools, or parts t?support the HEMM T.

There arc further problems. Theinfantry and armor hattiilions bothhave some M2/M3-qualiliecl mcch-a n i q and hlYM.3 PLL. becausetheir scout platoons (MZ-equipped) itre th e same. But thetank hattalion's assets are insufli-

cicnt to sustain even on e attachedBradley company; and the infantrybattalion has no tank maintenancecapability at all. The traditional soh-t ion to these maintenance supportproblems is to breitk ou t o f each bat-talion's maintenance section a "spe-cial maintenance package" t o sus-tain cross-attachments. This is time-consuming and is not a completesolution, heciiuse the leaders o leach type battalion are not normallyfamiliar with the other's vehiclesand equipment. The CAMB solu-tion was to cross-level trucks andH EMM Ts, drivers. fuel handlers,i d mechanics, ancl to adjust t h ebattalions' PI.Ls. The result is Ihitteach CAMB has most ol' t h e rc -quired assets in place to sustain i ttask organization. And. by workingwith the different vehicles on a didyhasis. maintenance leaders becomeincreasingly more qualified to per-form their service support functions.

Because t h e CAMB exchangeswere made from within existing as-sets. there remain some sho rtfalls inTMDE ancl STE. The inliintry-hascd CAMB, for example, is leftcritically short one set o f M adapt-er hardware for STE-MI/FVS andMI break-out boxes.

There was one other significantchange under the CAMB MTOE.The hattalion executive officer andS3 Air slots of the tank andhali tnced CAMBs were changed toreflect Infmlry and Armor primaryspecialties, respectively.

Bottom line, the reorgani7ation toCAMB rcquires no additionalpeople. I f CAMB were to beformcd permanentlv, we would haveto address equipment rcquircnientssuch as additional STE-MIhardware for the infantry-basedCAMB. The HHCs would probablybe better suited for the sustainmentof cross-attachments if all had theHEMMT, but that is really an issuescparate from CAMB. The 5-ton

ARMOR - January-February 1988 I


19/56

cargo truck has some good fcatttres -the troop hauling capability, for ex-ample. and the 5-lon/HEMMT com-hination worked-out under thc cur-rent CAMBs might prove to be afeasible alternative. As a side note,the reorganbation to CAMB sur-faced some other significant dif-ferences in the .?-series MTOEs ofthe tank and infantry hattalions. Forexample: although the infantry com-pany X O is a second-in-commandlighter, like any other line companyXO. he rides in an M J.3, which can-not keep up wilh the rest of his com-pany. A tank company XO com-mands a tank, which keep\ him upand enables him to take commandniore rapidly.

What Has Not ChangedUnder CAMB, many things do not

change and ;ire not intended tochange. The line company organiza-tions do not change at all. Theytrain as they always have, and theirplatoons are occasionally cross-at-tached to form company teams. Atevery opportunity, the CAMBs takeon their normal conibat support andservice support "slice" to train asfull-up task forces. Organizationalrelationships with fire supportteams (FIST). engineers, and so on,remain unchangcd.

Views of the CAMB Experience

In FY 1988, authorities will makeformal assessments to determinewhether the CAMB concept shouldbc pursued further. To bc sure, theanswers to many questions will heelusive. Evaluation will he largelysubjective, relving heavily on thesensings of CAMB leaders and sub-ject matter experts. Those measurc-ments that are quantifiable will beinfluenced by numerous varinhlesand will, in many cases, lack ap-propriate basclines or precedentsfor comparison. Meanwhile, it maybe of interest to consider somc of

the issues and obscrvations alreadysurfacing.

To say that CAMB is an emolionalissue in relation to branch allilia-lions is a gross understatement. Oneof the first issues inevitably raised isthe suspected degradation of in-dividual training that may resultfrom hranch biases of the variousCAMB leaders.

A casc in point is the concern overtraining and use of the Bradley-mounted infantryman, (MOSllM).To he candid. the feeling is that,particulnrly under an armor-basedCAMB, the 11M soldier will notreceive adequate training in basic in-fantry fighting skills. The implica-tion is that the quality and contentof individual training stem directlyfrom the battalion commander andhis infantry-or-armor-flavored staff.But, in reality, individual trainingtakes place almost entirely withinthe purview of company command.Under CAMB, recall, nothing chan-ges at line company level. BTMSand its botlom-up approach to plan-ning remain in effect, and theleadership positions in CAMB com-panies remain occupied by hranch-qualified individuals.O f equd significance is the veiled

suspicion that iirmor and infantryCAMB commanders will rcspectivc-Ig pay less attention to thc infantryor armor-specific training needs o ftheir soldiers. Even if one were toassume this concern to he a reality,as a natural function or battalioncommanders' hackgrounds. thenone might just 11s ell assumc that acommander who came up through aCAMB or similar experience wouldbe niore inclined l o pay due attcn-tion to both tankers and in-fant rymcn.

Finidly. we should remind oursel-ves that CAMB is an organizationalissue - how best to train an or-ganimtion to fight other organiza-tions. Individual training is certainly

one consideration; hut, it is short-sighted to weigh the relative meritsof this concept on the basis of in -dividual performance.

One CAMB commander raisedtwo interesting points. Thc Grst in-volves ownership. Normnlly, whenan infantry battalion commander,for example, gets an attached tankcompany, he does not overly con-ccrn himself with its state of tmin-ing. The company's shortcomingssuccumb to the temporary nature ofits attachmcnt. But, under CAMB,the battalion commander "owns"that tank company and, therefore,has a vested interest in its perfor-mance. For that reason alone, thebattalion commandcr sets higherstandards for the company. Indeed,he is able to set higher stitndards,because he hits lcarned more aboutwhat to look for - has becomemore technically proficient - withrespect to the tank company. Final-ly, his ownership of the companyenables the CAMB commander toenforce the standards he sets for it.

The second point i s ahout trainingfocus. Because it is more closely or-ganized for warfighting, CAMBtends to focus its conimandcr's train-ing efforts more sharply on mission.Again, using the 1 I M infantrymanas an example, t h e CAMB com-mander finds himself more inclinedto train his infantrymen in the tasksassociated with their specialty; e.g.,breaching and securing maior tankohstacles. There is liltle perceivedneed, and precious less time, to betraining the 11M soldier as a manfor all seasons - doing such thingsas rapelling and airmobile assaults.


20/56

meCAMB ExperienceProblemsandSolutions:LOGISTICS0 Armor and Infantry support platoons use two kinds of trucks -

the 5-ton and the 10-ton HEM TT - with different mobility and load-car-rying characteristics.MAINTENANCE0 Infantry units can't support HEMTTs or maintain tanks.0 Armor unit's assets insufficient to maintain Bradleys.0 Infantry-based CAM6 is short M1 adapter hardware for STE-COMMAND & CONTROL0 Infantry XO rides in an M 113 that has difficulty keeping up.

M l I W S test equipment.

SOLUTION: UnRs exchangetrucks.

SOLUTION: Cross-leveltrucks, HEMTTs, drivers, fuelhandlers, mechanics.SOLUTION: None found.

SOLUTION: None found.

so many b uilt-in training efficienciesthat it may well be the best hargdnin town. Resourcing, cross-training,and professional development are iifew areas in which CAMB offersextra returns o n investment.When it comes to rcsourcing,CAMB i s an especi:illy good deal.When a CAMB wants lo go to th cfield as a task force, or wants tosend out a company team of tanks

and infantry, the resources to do s oare readily at hand. However, apure battalion must coordinate withanother battalion to set its desiredtank or infantry element. This is notonly time-consuming. hut, often onefinds the other battalion in a dif-ferent training cycle, or following itsown (conflicting) schcdule, whichprevents the opportunity entircly.The problem of having to break acompany out or its parent bat-talion's schedule is nonexistentwhen the companies required forcombined arms training arc alreadywithin one's hattalion.

Commanders have traditionallytried with varying and usrliilly sliphtdegrees of success to gct thcir unitsto cross-train their soldiers. CAMBsstill make these concerted, formal-izcd efforts. But, to a very liirgc dc -gree, cross-training in ii CAM B oc-curs naturally and affects cveryone

from the battalion commander toth e private soldier. Through thismode, officcrs i d men of CAMBslearn routinely - in the normalcourse of daily operations - whatother battalions will only experiencein task-organized field op erations.

Consider for a moment the case ofthe battalion motor ofliccr (BMO).on a large scale with the fault diag-nosis, rcpir. services, parts iclcn-tities, and so on , of both tiink and in-fantry systems. Compare that withthe case of hi s pure battalioncoun terpart, who must deal with thetwo systems For the first time. andthen only temporarily, whcn his bat-talion is task organi7ed in the field.The three existing CAMBs have al-ready produced BMOs. technicians,and N C O supervisors who "know"the Bradley as wcll as they alreadvknew the tank. In response to ques-tions on what hc h:td lea rne d i t h u tthe vehiclc, one BMO, ;in armor of-ficer, went beyond that iisped. Hesaid, "1 havc not only learncd theBradley, I have learned thc peoplewho maintain i t. When a new Brad-Icy mechanic is iissigncd to my in -filntv company's maintenance tcam,1 know from experience hiscapaldities. I know what the school-house taught him, and what we

Evcry dity, the CAMB'S BMO dcitls

must teach hi m here. Before. 1 onlykncw such things of tank m echanics."At the mechanics' Icvel, the cross-training that naturally permeatesgarrison maintenance and servicespays huge dividends in the work-sharing that necessarily occurs inthe 24-hour-a-day efforts of unitmaintenance collection point(UMCP) operations. O n the job,C'AMBs produce bona fide "new sys-

tems mechanics." The high ()peril-lional rates that the CAMBs havesustained throughout extcnsive fieldexercises are likely a manifestationof what their mechanics and main-tenance supervisors learned throughcross-fertilization.O ne of the clearest examples o fthe cross-training opportunity o f -fered by CAMR is in the supportplatoon. Except in the event of war,

a standard lx~ttalion's supportplatoon will iilmost certainly nevcrexperience the handling andtransport of both tank and Bradleymunitions. But CAMB supportplatoons get that experience all yearlong - every time their units go toany live-firc range.ProfessionalDevelopmentCAMB provides a singular oppor-

tunity to "train the trainers" of~ ~ ~~ ~~18 ARMOR - January-February 7988


21/56

heavyonly other place such

in regimen-c;lvi1Iry, where commanderssystems throughout

o f a typicalIf he did nothoth tanks and in-

in at Icast one N TC rotation.staffs do

In time, theyto train sub-

th e multiple systems ofIn ficlrlbasctl more onexperience and less on sup-

it should not ovcrlyones imagination to foresee theS3 or coniniandcr that

as the BMO justight one day become.

Implicit in most of what I havethiitthe CAMB. Exceptr Ihe adherence to branch

com-

of-

nd so on. As thesc officcrs (andsenior NCOs) move on toth them valuable ex p ie n ce .

Normally, armor and infantry bat-go ahout their business withneed to talk with one anothcr.

so on, art into

tactics, SOP, and citreer counseling.The swapping of idcas and assetsfosters teamwork in the hrigadc andwould seem bcnclicial to the forceas a whole.Task O rganizationand SustainmentAs a rcsult of the HHC realign-mcnt, CAMBs have become moreadept at supporting further cross-at-tachments. Changes in task organiza-tion, which usually involved the addi-tion of a fourth or lifth company,have hecn cxecutcd in stride. Theonly rcid xljustrncnts were adapta-tions to new p ersonalities.Thc anticipated improvcnients inmaintenance support and supportplatoon operations were realized inARTEPs and NTC rotation. In oneNTC battle. the armor CAMBs in -fantry company sufkred 70 percentcasualties. The battalion was able toevacuate all casualties in one hour.Th e battalion XO attrilwted the suc-cess 0 1 this feat to the stafrs and in-fantry companys familiarity with

one anothcr and to their commonknowledge o f the battalions combatservice support SOP. The XO ex-pressed fear at whiit might have hap-pened h i d the infantry companybeen unfaniiliar, or had the staff nothad routine experience in support-ing an infantry company.ConclusionWhether the Army will build on

the strengths of CAMB remains tobc sccn. Crcation of the existingCAMBs has at lcast caused somehealthy i d timely introspccticmabout our iipproach to trainingheavy forces for employm ent in com -ha^. In the process, some irrefutableorganizational design changes haves u r f x u l ; some of the hranchstovcpiping hiis been removed: andmany leaders perspectives on thecmploymcnt of combined arms havebroadened.

ARMOR - January-February 1988

The relative merits of CAMB maybe extremely difficult to quantify.Bccause of the rcnlities and cffcctsof variables such as personnel lur-hulcncc, for example, expected im-provements in commanders abilityto integrate tanks and infantry maynot be inimcdiatcly apparent. If th edccision-makers at least acceptCA M B as a promising idea, then indeciding to pursue it furthcr, theywill need to rely largely on subjec-tive assessments and their own intui-tions. We have seen thatFORSCOM brigades recognbe theneed to form their battalions intotask forces for NTC train-ups. oftenfor up to siu months. So a goodquestion to ask is this: W hy do theygo hack to pure battalions for theremainder of the training year?

NotesIn his two-year command, the authorsbattalion actually assumed three differentconfigurations: first. as a balanced,MlIM2-equipped task force extended incross-attachment for six months; then, asa pure M1 tank battalion for a year: and,for the last six months, as a CAMB ofthree Abrams tank companies and one

Bradley infantry company.FM 25-1 (Training).3FM 1CC-5 (Operations).4FM 100-5 (Operations).

LTC Robert G. Bernier wascommissioned in Armor fromthe University of Maine in1967 and holds a Master ofArts degree in Managementfrom Webster University. Withservice in five different caval-ry squadrons, in CONUS andoverseas, he has served multi-ple tours as platoon leaderand troop commander. Hehas also been a squadronS3 , squadron XO, brigade S1and brigade S3. Most recent-ly, he commanded the 1stBattalion, 8th Cavalry(CAMB), 1st Cavalry Division.He is currently attending theNaval War College at New-port, Rhode Island.

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Breakoutfrom theveszprem Railhead

by CaptainB.H. FriesenManeuver is one of the most im-

portant principles of war influenc-ing a mechanized army. Withoutmaneuverability, both decisive at-tacks and strong defensive actionsare not possible. Not all maneuverhowever, is dependent on combatvehicles moving under their ownpower from one point to another.When movement is not possible dueto mechanical limitations or fuelshortages, units can use othermeans, such as rail, to gain the in-itiative.

The German Army made excellentuse of railroads to transport troopsduring both World Wars, therebygaining strategic advantages. Veryfew historical works, on t h e other

hand. cover rail movement in thetactical realm. During WWII, theGerman Army made good use ofrailroads to move armored vehiclesshort distances, minimizing fuel con-sumption and wear on thosevehicles. But there is not always arailhead located well within friendlylines. The 2nd SS Panzer Division's("Das Reiclt") tank regiment facedthis problem in March 1945. Thebreakout from Veszprem depicts ex-actly how close to the forward lineof troops an armored unit can suc-cessfully execute a rail-loadingoperation.

In mid-March 1945, a portion ofthe Eastern Front ran throughwestern Hungary (Map 1). TheHungarian 3rd Army defended thenorthern sector, from Komarno to

Kisper. The 6th SS Panzer Armydefended from Kisper south toLake Balaton. On the evening of 18March, the majority of the Hun-garians deserted or went over to theRussians, leaving a large gap in thefront. The 2nd SS Panzer Division'stwo panzer grenadier regiments im-mediately rushed north to plug thegap, while the neighboring 3rd and9th SS Panzer Divisions extendedtheir fronts to absorb thewithdrawal (Map 2).

The Panther tanks of the 2nd SSDivision's tank regiment neededrepairs badly. They pulled backseveral kilometers to a railheadnear the town of Veszprem, ratherthan roadmarch the 60 kilometersnorth to the break in the front. Thelead elements of the Panzer regi-



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The majority of the Hungarian units in the northern sector deserted or wentover to the Russians on 18 March, forcing 2d SS Panzer Division to send itstwo panzer grenadier regiments north to plug the gap.

the units sector at 12oclock. The unit desig-nated to engage the targetdivided the target fromleft to right, the left-mostfriendly element engagedthe left-most enemy ele-ment and then worked in-ward. The right-most ele-ment simultaneouslyengaged the right-mostenemy element and alsoworked inward. The cen-ter friendly elementsengaged their centerenemy counterparts andworked outward. Ceasefire was automatic whenthey destroyed all encmyelements. This procedurewas simple enough foreveryone to use, andflexible enough to apply toany given formation.

Rauchs loader an-nounced that he hadloaded and primed the an-titank round. Rauchspotted the antenna of aRussian company com-manders tank and or-dered his gunner t o fire atit. Two seconds later, theantitank round slammed

while the others just burned. Noneof the crew members emerged.Sporadic artillery fire began im-

pacting within and around the vil-lage. Rauch assumed it was mortarshells and high explosive tankrounds, hecause the fire was toolight to do much damage. This was,no doubt, a Russian spearhead. Hisown artillery was still too far behindto fire on the Russians. As therounds came down around him,Rauch spotted 15-20 T34s chargingthe German left flank at full speed.Infantrymen clung to the sides of

the tanks. The T34s were firing onthe move, but were not hitting any-thing. He was about to report hissighting when the same voice overthe radio announced, T34s, twooclock, headquarters sectionengage. Rauch directed his gunnerto the center of the target group inaccordance with his sections operat-ing procedure. All sections,platoons, and companies in the pan-zer regiment had a standard proce-dure governing target group engage-ment. They used the clock methodto identify the target groupsgeneral location, with the center of

into the T34s fuel cell,causing a violent ex-plosion. Rauch was gladthey had destroyed the

command tank because it was theonly one in the Russian companywith a radio. The other Russiantank commanders were now withoutdirection and would blindly followthe last command given. It was com-mon knowledge in the


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"...The Veszprem action also illustrates the importance of team-work and swift target identification. Units must practice standardoperating procedures so that all actions are automatic. All units,down to individual tank crews, must have the discipline to holdtheir fire until ordered to fire ...'I

high explosive shells were still im-pacting in Hercnd as the trainpulled clear of the village.

All of the tanks on the train es-caped, reinforcing a new defensiveline forming farther west. The 2ndSS Panzer Division's ability towithdraw the ma.jjority of its ar-mored force intact prevented thatportion of the Eastern Front fromcollapsing. Actions such as thiscould no longer win the war, but ex-tended it several weeks. Thisenabled thousands of refugees tomake their way west, escaping lifebehind the Iron Curtain.Uit~ersfiinnfiielrrcrtwrKnocke's com-pany joined a regular army unit and

fought its way through the Russianlines. Although Knocke's companywas behind enemy lines, the unit'sdiscipline preserved its fightingspirit. The men had confidence intheir commander and in themselves.All 10 Pantltcrs were destroyed innumerous fire fights, but most ofthe crew members rejoined theirregiment at Esterhazy eight dayslater.

This small military operation stres-ses that there is no such thing as asecure railhead during wartime. Theforward line of troops can changequickly, with enemy armored spear-heads penetrating tar into thefriendly rear area. Even if enemyunits are far away, there is still agreat possibility of enemy agentsoperating in the railhead area.Units should train for these pos-

sibilities so that soldiers do notpanic if such situations arise. Allweapons systems not directly in-volved in the loading operationmust deploy quickly to repel the at-tacker. If a prolonged defense isnecessary, individual vehicles mustbreak off, one by one, to load ontothe train. As the outer defensiveperimeter becomes thinner, vehiclesalready on th e train must use theirfirepower to supplement thedefense. Makeshift antitank andmachine gun crews are the finaldefensive measures if no infantrysupport is available. Such an opera-tion is very difficult, but by nomeans impossible.

The Veszprem action also il-lustrates the importance of team-work and swift target identification.Units must practice standard operat-ing procedures so that all actionsare automatic. All units, down to in-dividual tank crews, must have thediscipline to hold their lire until or-dered to fire. This conserves am-munition and ensures engagementsat decisive ranges, both of which arevery important when fighting anumerically superior enemy. TheGcrmans did this very well atVeszprem. Individual companiesengaged the entire target group,rather than the whole regimentfiring at will. They hcld out for sixhours using this system, but usedonly a fraction of their ammunition.The key link in this system is oneovera~~ommander. If no organiccommander is present, a senior in-dividual must take charge, or the

units will begin to fight separately.Finally, Peter Rauch's crew

portrays how vital it is that a tank'screw members work together asclosely as the fingers on one hand.Each crew member must bethoroughly familiar with the others,and know how they will react in allsituations. This saves valuableseconds of reaction time, and givesthe crew a decisive edge over th eenemy. To keep tank crews togetheras long as possible is th e only wayto develop such teamwork. The Ger-man Army stressed crew integrity.Wounded soldicrs always rcturnedto their crews after convalescence,and crews were never split up un-less promotion or death made it im-possible to do otherwise. TheVeszprem operation typifies theresults of this system. High qualitycrew-teams are the key to destroy-ing enemy tanks.

Captain B.H. Frlesen wascommissioned in Armorfrom the USMA in 1983. Hehas served as an M1 tankplatoon leader and com-pany XO with 1st Bn., 64thArmor; and assistant s4 at2d Bde. in the FRG. Agraduate of the AOB,AOAC, Airborne School,and Cavalry LeadersCourse, he is currently as-signed to 3d Sqn., 3d ACRat Fort Bliss.

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and the normal training distractorsthat any unit experiences. Becausean OPORD governs its execution,FRAGOs can make any adjust-ments easily and effectively,

To prepare for the gunneryperiod, each company commanderprepares a plan that providesspecific guidance to his platoonsbased on battalion goals and objec-tives. This plan must includespecific company requirements andconcurrent training. A typical bat-talion gunnery program begins withpreliminary gunnery training thatthe company commander and hismaster gunner design to meet thespecial requirements. The companyprogram considers past crew perfor-mance, previous training and unitcommitments during the train-upperiod.

In addition, emphasis is on vehiclemaintenance during this phase.

'I...The precombat inspection is an excellentoppoflunify for the company commander andhis officers and NCOs to train subor-dinates...before training starts in earnest. It isalso the first step toward the team-buildingprocess necessary for survival in combat -and at theNTC ...'I

Beginningwith the last ser-vice before the gunneryperiod, the turret receivesa thorough check, whichincludes borescope andpullover, sight purge,synchronization, and ballis-tic solution checks.Setting UpAssistance TeamsTo reach the desired

high gunnery standards,we organized a battalion

tank gunnery assistance team(TGAT) well before we startedtraining. The company master gun-ners and the best tank commandersand gunners form the nucleus of theteam. The gunnery team conductedthe tank crew gunnery skills test(TCGST) and selected the tankcrew evaluators (TCEs) whoevaluated company and battaliontraining during the remainder of thegunnery period.

While many units have de-em-phasized the role of the evaluators,we found them to he a significantaid in evaluating crew performanceduring training and yualilication.More important, the evaluators areoften the best teachers available toour soldiers. While it is possible loevaluate crew functions from thetower, it is unlikely that the crewcan learn how to shoot more effec-tively without an on-board expert(coach) to provide meaningful com-

ments at the conclusion of each run.The evaluator also kept everyonehonest by ensuring that the crew fol-lowed the rules. The battalionmaster gunner certifies each mem-ber of the assistance team and eachevaluator before training begins.

The battalion's first centralizedgunnery training was th e crew gun-nery skills lest. The master gunnerand the S3 validated the test to en-sure that instructions, evaluation,and goals were in accordance withbattalion guidance.

The success of the gunneryprogram first became evidentduring the gunnery test as soldiersquickly learned that we would en-force high standards of gunnery per-formance. No one, including the bat-talion commander, was allowed toproceed to the next tank table untilhe had mastered the test. The com-pany commander can conduct addi-tional concurrent training if hedesires. MILES gunnery techniques,terrain driving, wingman training,and platoon obstacles are examples.

Upon completion of the companygunnery skills test, the battalioncommander conducted a precombatinspection of personnel and equip-ment.

Precombat InspectionsThe precombat inspection is an ex-

cellent opportunity for the company

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Before range firing began, the lowed by an OPORD and overlay to Some company commanders usedNTC standards, which set the stage the link-up time to evaluate respon-for TT VIII. Using the "one-third, siveness to orders.two-thirds" rule, the company com- The use of on-board smoke asmander prepared a company order part of the movement criteria, andfor his platoon leaders. The intent the use of some or all of the pas-

company commanders planned fora calibration exercise and TT VI asa tactical operation. Because of thenature of these two events, oneplatoon could fire, while the othersremained concealed in the as-sembly area and worked onprepare-to-fire checks and con-current training. Units should beencouraged to be imaginativeduring this phase because theycan learn many tactical lessonswith little or no expenditure ofresources. To illustrate thepoint, one platoon firing on thecalibration line can usecamouflage nets, establish a hotloop, and practice reporting pro-cedures according to t h e unitSOP. The platoon leader is nowable to practice platoon firecommands while he runs the exer-cise. The company commandershould use this time to check loadplans and crew drills. Meanwhile,battalion sets up a sand table exer-cise to train leaders on the controland distribution of fires and intel-ligence preparation of the bat-tlefield (IPB).

The point is that no matter whatthe primary training ob-jective, unitscan practice many tactical skillsfrom crew to company lwei in al-most any environment. All that is re-quired is attention to detail, con-centrated planning, and some im-agination. More important, the ef-fort to reduce the distinction be-tween gunnery and tactics continuesin a subtle but effective manner.

I! We conducted the nightphase similarly, except that weincorporated night tacticaloperations techniques. We usedlight sticks to mark routes andfiring positions. Wingmen usednight vision devices both fortraining and safety..."

TacticalMovementto theRangeLate in the day, when TT VI is to

completed, the company com-mander issued a warning order, fol-

was to practice t h e steps necessaryto give each tank commander anorder and overlay in a timelyfashion. This is important becausefailure to receive and to understandthe commander's intent at platoonand crew level has proved time andagain to be the weakest link at theNTC.

The S3 controlled execution of lTVI11 with assistance from the bat-talion master gunner and the gun-nery assistance team. This groupplanned target location, engage-ments, tower and wingman scripts,and certified all evaluators workingthe range. The company is respon-sible for providing firing tanks andwingmen at the specified time andplace.

In executing the OPORD, the tankcrew, under the control of hiswingman (who was always the com-pany commander, platoon leader orplatoon sergeant) departed the tacti-cal assembly area at the designatedtime along a prescribed route to thefirst checkpoint on his overlay.

sage point procedures specifiedin the ARTEP are options avail-able to the company com-mander as part of the trainingpackage. Some company com-manders chose to use the initialcheckpoint as an attack positionto evaluate crew performance inaccordance with his unit SOP.In any case, the crew shouldtest-fire machine guns at thefirst checkpoint, thcn proceeddown the qualification course.

The tank commander's overlayhad all necessary graphics toportray correctly the tactical situa-

tion, including a series of pointsthat roughly corresponded to thefiring positions. The tank com-mander navigated between eachcheckpoint, using terrain driving.The wingman issued specific targetinstructions to make the exercisetactically meaningful, but conductedall engagements in strict accordancewith FM 17-12-3.

At the last engagement, the tankcommander receivcd a spot reporton some type of enemy activity thatrequired him to make a call for fire.He had to execute the request cor-rectly within thirty seconds. If hedid so, the battalion heavy mortarplatoon executed the call for fire. Inaddition to the obvious benefits forthe tank crew, the mortar platoonreceived excellent training in in-tegrating their fires into the tacticalscheme. Because the mortarplatoon historically has difficultywith tactical integration at the NTC,this element was a positive effort tosolve that problem.

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"...The benefits were substantial in leadership development, mastery ofgunnery skills, performance at the NTC, and most importantly, theeliminationof the distinction between tactics and gunne y...."

~~ ~

cluded crew cuts and thescore. We used thedebriefing as the primaryteaching tool throughoutthe gunnery program be-cause it represented athorough evaluation of allt - r - - Lp tactical and gunnery skills.the debriefing was that thecrew's own platoon leaderor sergeant was a par-ticipant. In addition to the

An important feature of

-. b z- -.- - %-Practicing Night OperationsIn Conjunctionwith GunneryWe conducted the night phase

similarly, except that we incor-porated night tactical operationstechniques. We used light sticks tomark routes and firing positions.Wingmen used night vision devicesboth for training and safety.Wingmen called for illumination toadd realism and to further train theyounger leaders. We used unitrecognition signals at the attackposition and throughout the exer-cise. The outbrief includcd night tac-tical operations to assist tank crewsin becoming more expert underthose conditions.

SummaryThe most important benefits of

this gunnery program are total crewinvolvement in the integration of tac-tics and gunnery, and the tacticaldevelopment of the platoon leaderand sergeant in bringing effectivetank fires on the enemv. We ac-complished these important lessons

through the tactical nature of theprogram and by using the chain ofcommand as wingmen. The com-pany commander, platoon leader,and platoon sergeant were respon-sible fo r directing the movement oftheir wing tanks, providing engage-ment instructions, and for observingfires. In the process, they gained themental and oral communicationskills necessary for survival and suc-cess on the battlefield. The interac-tion between tanks on the rangestressed the development of a men-tal picture of desired battlefield out-comes in the minds of the juniorleaders and exercised the com-munication skills necessary to con-vey that picture to subordinates inthe wing tank, all in a short radiotransmission.

At the conclusion of each run,both the tank crew evaluator andthe wingman debriefed the crewusing the after-action review format.Tower personnel provided input forthe briefing to bring out strengthsor weaknesses that they noted. Thedebriefing was a formal presenta-tion of each engagement, which in-

team-building benefits, thecrews hclpcd theirwingmen to become betterleaders and com-municators by pointing

out deficiencies in technique or in-structions during the engagements.At the conclusion of TT V111, thecompany either continued on to TTIX or returned to the motor pool.

The conduct of such an extensivegunnery program required areasonably large expenditure ofmanpower from the battalion.However, the benefits were substan-tial in leadership development,mastery of gunnery skills, perfor-mance at the NTC, and, most impor-tant, the elimination of the distinc-tion between tactics and gunnery.Graduates of this program are tankfighters who have the skills anddesire to meet the enemy and todestroy him.

Lieutenant Colonel Lon E.Maggart commanded 2-69Armor, Fort Benning, Geor-gia, from April 1984 to April1986. He is presently as-signed to the InspectorGeneral's Office, HQ, VCorps, in the FRG.

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TheBattalionXO in Combat:Where Will He Be Most EffecbyCaptainRonald M. BonesteelAmong the more sipificant points

in After-Action ReviewsAARs) at the National Training

(NTC) is that o f the physicalocation o f the battalion executivefficer (XO) prior to and during anngagement.The XOs primary consideration i s

o place himself where he can I m tfulfill his responsibilities to the com-

ander and to the battalion. This isuch an obvious fact that it hardly

seenis worthy o f discussion, but liketoo many crystal-clear factors, i t isoften overlooked simply because itis out in plain sight.

In order to determine the XOsbest (most functional) placement inattle, we must first review his most

important duties from the battalioncomrnandcrs point of view--and Iiydoctrine. Opinions vary on justwhere the XO should be during bat-tle. They range from that which sayst h e XO is primarily responsible forthe Combat Service Support (CSS)function and should work from theBrigade Support Area (BSA), tothat which says the XOs main func-tion is to coordinate the entire bat-talion staff and to monitor the infor-mation flow between battalion andbrigade. This latter premise holdsthat the XO should be at the Tacti-cal Operation Center (TCIC). Athird theory holds that the XOshould be forward in l h c battalionssecondary effort area where he cankeep ahreasl of the ongoing battle.Yet another proposal would placethe XO at the TOC during the ac-tual fight and then have him free to

ive?circulate from front to rear areas, asneeded, during lulls. All of theseopinions take into considerationthat the XO may have to assumebattalion command at a momentsnotice.

For the purpose of this article, Ichose four criteria to evaluate thecourses of action in placing the XU:0 Ability of the XO to coordinate

the staff.0 Ability of the XO to assume

command.0 Ability of the XO to control the

CSS effort.0 Ability of the bat1 I on lo react

to changing battle situations andflex missions.

The first three items specificallydelineate the XOs three most im-portant doctrinal responsibilities,and thc fourth provides a cause-and-effect relationship between theXOs actions and the battalions suc-cess. Therefore, how the XOs posi-tion affects each of these fourcriteria becomes the major deter-mining factor in deciding his loca-tion.

General InformationIn 1984, Major Generals FrederickJ. Brown and John W. Foss, com-

mandants of the Armor and In-fantry Schools respectively, sent amessage to LTG Carl E. Vuono, theTRADOC commanding gcneral,

that gave their interpretations of theduties of the XO:

Keep abreast of his own, liiglieclower, arid adjacerii i rri i t opera-tions...anticipate fiiiiire rcqtrirenieiiisaiid ot*emce ilie plaririirig process...cavesdrop O J ~his OIVJI aiid highercoriiriiarid net.~...cporf io arid relayorders aiid riiessages fmm highertiori and plaririirig of the CS arid CSSoperations..ake o w a combatvcliiclc arid become direct!v irivohvdiii the battle as directed bv the coiri-iiiander, arid he prepared io takeconmiarid... Additionally, FM 71-21outlines the requirement for the XOto transmit the commandersguidance to th e staff and to coor-dinate the staff in its efforts to ful-full that guidance.

headqiianers... oordinate the c\CClI-

The TOC responsihilities aremany and complicated, but itsprimary job is to keep the com-mander informed on all aspects offriendly and enemy situationsduring battle. In addition to this all-encompassing requirement, BGLeland, a former NTC commander,says th e TOC must provide the com-mander with all of the informationin a consolidated and analyzedform; it must remain stationary atcritical times and must providereflcx responses, such as droppingto internal nets of unanswering com-panies, relaying for distant stations,and checking compliance with thecommanders instructions.

TOC manning is composed of thehnttalion S2 and S3 sections, and1 i

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In 1?44, the Soviet army carried(IS-E)f t h e Staiiti heavy tank, with an

transmission and a modified

Up to this time, electric transmis-- three tons in the case of

TOG - than an

of thevehicles.

In the mid-l?60s, the FMC Cor-A4113 APC with both AC and

of electric drive.Ten years ago, a Belgian electrical

engineering company, the

an electric transmission system fortracked armored vehicles. The com-pany drew on its experience in thefield of electric transmissions forlocomotives and tramways. Itspreliminary cxpericnces of anelectric drive on an M24 Ciiuffeelight tank, and then on an AMX-IOPAPC, convinced the engineers th

armor magazine, january-february 1988

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