armor magazine, may-june 1987

8/6/2019 Armor Magazine, May-June 1987

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-SCHWERPUNKT

This is my final issue ofARMOR as your Editor-in-Chief. Idepartfor Ger-many and the 1st Ar-mored Division followingthe Armor Conference hismonth. Over the pasttwenty-one months Ihaveread hundreds of manu-scripts, articles, essays,letters, and briefings on Armor and ArmoredCavalry. Some of these writings we havepublished; some we have not. In this, my finalcolumn, though, I am going to give you onesoldier's op inion on what I believe should beour professional concerns now and in thefuture.No one can survive on the battlefield, thetrai ning field, or even in an office, by himself.Teamwork i s absolutely essential to success.We need toconcentrateour effortsat buildingand maintaining teams, whether they besquads, crews, sections, platoons, companyteams, battalion task forces, squadrons, regi-ments, or brigades. Working for the success ofthe team should be our personal goal.The best wa yto achieve that success sfir st-class, tough, real istic raining, and lots of it. Intimes of constrained resources, first-classtraini ng is very hard work, bu t there simply isnogood substitute or it. Theveritable survivalof our soldiers, our units, and our nationdepends on h ow wel l- nd ho w often- etrain . Noth ing else should ever have a higherpriority. The best form of welfare for thesoldier is, truly, first-class training.RobertC. Waddington, in his article, "Emer-ging Technology: Too Far, Too Soon" (DefenseUpdate. 72, 1986).wrote:Men figh t wars, not machinery, and it i smen who are, in the end, decisive inwinn ing these wars. Noamount of tech-

nology can replace a good soldier w it h areliable rif le in his hands, a soldier whois well-briefed and knows his task fromlong experience. It is a man who sitsbehind the most modern electro-opticalequipment. This equipment may be th ebest thin g since he machinegun, but ofwhat use can it be if the soldier behind t

is unsure of his task, is shaking withfear, or i s so fatigued that he fallsasleep?Many writers have called Armor "a tech-nical branch." Al l too often, Ibelieve, we usetha t description as an excuse to permit us to -place th e balance of our professional interestin echnology- in machines-ratherthan insoldiers. The equipment, the weapons, we aregetting today are the finest our Army has everhad. However, we must never, never forgetthat soldiers are the critical element of th ebattlefield. Excellent soldiers, as parts of awell-led and well-equipped team, will win.However, the best leadership and the bestequipment in he world wi ll not prove success-fu l if we fa il to care for the soldiers who followthat leader and use that equipment.Finally, the most effective form of leader-ship is leadership by example. It's not theeasiest form; it's the best, and th e mostimportant part of leadership by example isselfless service:Selfless service means put ting he needsand goals of the nation, th e Army, yourunit, and your soldiers ahead of yourpersonal interest.As a leader, you must be the greatest'servant' in your unit. You are not givenauthority, status, and posit ion as a per-sonal reward to enjoy in comfort. Youare given these so that you may be ofgreater service to your subordinates,your unit, and your country.FM 22-100, ilitary LeadershipWhen soldiers see that you are wil ling to gothrough their hardships and are putting theunit and them ahead of yourself, they willwork, train, and fight beyond any of yourexpectat ons.Wi th those four pieces

of unsoli cited advice,I idyou farewell and hopethatyou will continue to readARMOR. This publicationhas a wonderful, nearly100-year-old tradition.Through your support, itwill continue. -GPR


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PB-17-87-3The Professional Development Bulletin of the Armor Branch

Magazine StaffEditor-in-ChiefMAJOR G. PATRICK RllTERManaging EditorJON T. CLEMENSAssistant EditorROBERT E. ROGGEProduction AssistantVIVIAN THOMPSONContributing ArtistSFC ROBERT TORSRUD

United States Army Armor SchoolCommandantM G THOMAS H. T AUAssistant CommandantBG PAUL E. FUNKDeputy Assistant CommandantCOL CLAUDE L. CLARKChief of StaffCOL DONALD W. WILLIAMSCommand Sergeant MajorCSM JOHN M. STEPHENSMaintenanceCOL GARRY P. HIXSONCommand and StaffCOL ROBERT D. HURLEYWeaponsLTC DA N E. DETERTraining GroupLTC WILLIAM R. BROWNLEE. IINCO Academy/Drill Sergeant School*CSM LOWELL E. DICKINSONEvaluation and StandardizationCOL ROBERTA. KORKINTraining and DoctrineCOL CLAUDE W. ABATECombat DevelopmentsCOL DONALD SMART

Units194th Armored BrigadeCOL SAMUEL D. WILDER, JR.1stArmor Training BrigadeCOL NICHOLAS P. VAMVAKIAS2d Armor Training BrigadeCOL DOMIN IC W. RUGGERIO4th Training BrigadeCOL JAMES K. WOODWARD

Directorate ofReserve Component SupportDirectorCOL JAMES E. DlERlCKX

May-June 1987 Vol XCVl No. 3

FEATURES9

12

17

21

29

3238

40

Mission Tacticsby Captain John F.Anta1Soviet Forward Detachmentsby Joseph R . Burniece'Tool Room's Got It"by Captain Tyler N. Shewmake and Mr. James L. CasselThe Ten Lean Years- art 3by Major General Robert W. Grow, USA, RetiredHow to Fight the Difficult Terrainby Captain Clyde T. Wilson

Lessons Learned in the Attack on Canicattiby Dr. Norris H. PerkinsStrength Training For Tank Crewmenby Ed TarantinoWinning the Peacetime Battleby Captain Kris P. Thompson, Captain Charles R. Abbott,and Captain Walter F. Ulmer

DEPARTMENTS2 Letters6 Commander's Hatch7 Driver's Seat8 Recognition Quiz47 Professional Thoughts

51 Recognition Quiz Answers51 The Bustle Rack52 Books

ApprovaltoRimUseof unds for printing this publication has beenapprovedby Headquarters, Training and DoctrineCommand(TRADOC)on 13 March 1987 inaccordance with the provisions of AR 310-1 andapplicable provisionsof AR 310-2 and AR 310-3. Theproponent branch is Armor.

DischinmThe information contained nARMOR represents heprofessional opinions of the authors anddoes notnecessarily eflect the official Army or TRADOCposition. nor does t change or s u m e nyinformation presented n other official ArmyDublications.

0tRd.lDhMbUtknoffic ial distribution is imited o onecopy or eachheavy brigade headquarters. armored cavalryregiment headquarters. armor battalion headquarters.armored cavalry squadron haadquarters,reconnaissance squadron headquarters.armoredcavalry troop, armor company. and motorized brigadeheadquartersof the United States Army. In addition,

Army libraries. Army and DO0smods.HOOA andMACOMstaff gencies wrth responsibilllyforarmored. di r m ire. ground combat systems.organizations. and the trsining of personnel or suchorganizations mey raqum two wpies each throughtheir publication account

Authorh.dCommARMORwdl primonly those materials for wtwh theUnited States Army Armor Center hasproponemyThat proponency includes. all armored. d i r m ire.ground combat systems that do not serve primarilyasinfantry carriers, all weapons usad exclusively inthese systems or by CMF 19 soldlers, anymiscellaneous tems of aquipment which armor an darmored cavalry organizations use exclusively.trainingfor a11 SC 1%. 128.and 12Cofficersan dfora11CMF 19-series enlisted soldiers. and informationconcerning the training. logistics. history. andleadership of armor and armored cavalry unlts at thebrigade/regiment level and below to include Threatunlts at those levels


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Thoughts on the Roleof the AT-8 Kobra

Dear Sir:I have read, with increasing interest,various articles insuch fine publications asIDR. Jane's Defence Weekly, and ARMORon the Soviet AT-8 KOBRA. The contentionof these articles is that the KOBRA is asubsonic missile which is either a poorantitarmor weapon or a fair-to-good anti-attack helicopter system. The reasons fortheseassessmentsare numerous and neednot be reconsidered here. The purpose ofthis letter is to raise a third and heretoforeunconsidered possibility: that the Sovietshave mated wo advanced technology sys-tems into a potent long-range weapon

system.This possibility was initia lly investigatedby both myself and Dr. John Woehler whenwe were together at General DynamicsLand Systems' Advanced Development/Operations Research Departments . We in-'vestigated the mass of the 125-mm gunsystem and the recoil required to activatethe autoloader, calculating the impartedforce required at a resultant projectile ve-locity of just under lo00 m/s. This velocityis attainable, according to Dr. Woehler,without damage to hardened guidancemechanisms.Secondly, at the velocity indicated above,a sustainer motor is not necessary. Thisremoves the KOBRA from the "missile"category and into a guided projectile cate-gory, thus eliminating the need for singleload or connection requirements. Theround can therefore be stowed in the auto-loader and loaded in the standard way forthe 125-mm gun.

While all of this i s interesting, so what?Let's move one step further and considertha t the KGB or GRU have been active overthe past few years in obtaining foreignweapons technology in all areas of theworld. Further consider that they havesuccessfully infiltrated or obtained infor-mation, during the design and develop-ment stage, on the Bofors ABS-56 'BILL'ATGM. By incorporating the BILL'S ech-nology (a slanted shaped charge warhead)and adjusting the guidance parameters sothatthe weaponfliesa shortwayabo vethegunner's line-of-sight, we have both a goodanti-attack helicopter munition AND adeadly long range, accurate top-attack ATsystem.The question becomes, 'Why would theSoviets wish such a top-attack system?"Fortheanswer, exam inethe NATO battle-field: NATO forces are in defensive posi-tion, hull-down, as ttie Soviet tank forcesadvance. The hull-down positions providethe NATO force excellent protection fromthe standard direct fire of the Soviet tanksat long range, permitting at trition of Soviettanks. As the first NATO weapons beginfiring, there is an unexpected return en-gagement from a Soviet overwatch posi-

tion outside of the range of the NATO tankguns. As the Soviet rounds pass over theturrets of the NATO armored vehicles, therounds detonate, sending a jet of superhotplasma into the vehicle. The thin top armoris ignored by the et as it penetrates into hestowed ammunition and/or fuel ...In a scenario such as this, a hig h degreeof penetration is not necessary, as there isvery little armor to penetrate. The Sovietsdo not need to maneuver to attempt flank-ing shots to overcome NATO compositearmors. The speed of the round makesavoidance and even detection of the shotnearly impossible. Finally, the high hitprobability of the guided munition virtuallyensures it s effectiveness. It is simple-guided projectile rather than a missile, andrequires no special additional training ofthe gunner, other than to keep the cross-hairson hetargetfor afewseconds,whichhe would do to assess damage anyway.

All of the above are with in the technicalfeasibility of current Soviet industry andhave been demonstrated by Western armsmanufacturers in numerous mun itionsex-positions and symposiums. Several ofthese have been open o hegeneral public.The Soviets have repeatedly shown theirability to adapt foreign technology to theirrequirements and reverse engineer foreignsystems to their needs. While this possi-bility is only just that - possibility -would recommend detailed study of itslikelihood as a viable consideration.

HARRY 1. NIMON, JR .CPT, M IMDARNG

Query On Manual EditionsDear Sir:The article, "Required Field Manualsfo rArmor/Cavalry Leaders," in the Nov-Dec198 6 issue of ARMOR Magazine, left meconfused. Field circularsand field manualsare apparently issued in four forms: coor-dinating draft, approved final draft, pre-limina ry draft and test.Wouldyou please explain thedifferencebetween these editions? Hopefully, themanu al-writin g process is not beingmanaged like the materiel-acquisitionprocess.

JOHN H. DEWINGLTC, ArmorUSAR

in he publication's development.For example, the preliminary draft is hefirst copy of a new publication that isdistributed by the author primarily forcoordination, staffing, and comment fromwith in the Armor School. Feedback fromthe preliminary draft serves as a basis forrefinement and change in the pu blicationas the coordinating draft is developed.The coordinating draft is published inlimited quantities to facilitate solicitationof comments from TRADOC reviewingagencies, other proponent schools, majorcommands, and a sampling of ArmorForce units. Sixty to ninety days are pro-vided for review, and return of necessarycomments. All coordinating draft feed-back is reviewed by the author and, asappropriate, incorporated into the finaldraft of the publication.The final draft is again published inlimited quantities and distributed to th eTRADOC agencies and/or other approv-ing autho rityforfina l review and approval.Onceapproved, thisapproved final draft i sedited and camera-ready mechanicals areproduced for final prin ting and fielding ofthe publication. Approved final d rafts ofDA publications developed at the ArmorSchool may sometimes be locally printe dand distributed for field use, pending fina lDA print and distribution.Test editions are not a normal part of th eArmy publications development process.Unt il recently, test editions could be DA-printed and fielded for up to 18 months tofacilitate tryout of ne w doctrine and trai n-ing concepts. After tryouts, the proponentschool responsible for the test publica-tionsdevelopment wasth en able to decideif the publication would be rescinded orrevised and finalized for DA print. Testeditions have subsequently been deletedfrom the DA-TRADOC inventory an d areno longer authorized. Therefore, FM 17-15 Test)Tank Platoon Division 86 wasthelast test manual developed at the Arm orSchool.If additional information is needed onthe various publication editions, refer toTRADOC Pam310-6, Armywide Doc trinaland Training Literature (ADTL) Develop-ment and Preparation, dated 1 Feb 85.

CLAUDE W. ABATEColonel, ArmorDirector, DOTD

A Place for Armor in LIC?Reply From Director, DOTD,

Ft. KnoxDear Sir:Field circulars and field manuals aretypically given complete distribution intheir tinal form only. The various drafteditions of a single publication are printedin association with a corresponding phase

Dear Sir:There is increasing discussion on thesubject of low-intensity conflict (LIC) inmilitary and political science journals.Many experts, i n and out of the military,agree that, for the foreseeable future, LICwill be the most likely threat facing ournation and its armed forces. Is the ArmorForceof thefutureg oing to bea contributorto the Army's capabilities at this end of th e

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spectrum of war? It would appear thatcurrent trends in he Armor Force wil l limitour role i n LIC. The Army is not preparingthe force in terms of equipment and forcestructure to be an active participant in thislevel of war.With in the Army there is increased doc-trinal and structural emphasis on lightforces to deal with LIC, yet the Armycontinues to procure increasingly heavymateriel (M l, M2, MLRS) for t he ArmorForce's defense of Central Europe. WhileEurope's defense must continue to be ourprimary focus, these seemingly divergentavenues raise serious doubts about Ar-mor's viability in the LIC environment. Inother words, the Armor Force is "heldhostage" by a budget process that forcesthe Army to develop big ticket systems hatcompete for tax dollars with aircraft car-riers and strategic bombers. Because ofthis, the Armor Force is best prepared tofight in the least likely area of conflict-Central Europe. Procurement continues todrive the mission rather than the missiondriving the procurement requirements.

This is an alarming notion in that oursuperb Armor officers, soldiers, and unitsare essentially excluded from the Army'spreparations for LIC in areas outside theNATO sphere. The result is an unbalancedlight force dominated by light infantrymenwho need (and would welcome) the exper-tise and capabilities the Armor Force canprovide.What's the solution? The Armor Forceshould relook its role in LIC and educatethose who do not understand that we canhave a positive impact on our Army'scapa-bility in this area. Let's resurrect the as-sault gun system (AGS)- t's no longer athreat to M1 procurement- nd get be-hindit thist ime. Let'sdevelopaglobalviewwithin the Armor Force to temper ourtunnel vision in Central Europe. And fina l-ly, let's see some dialogue here in ARMORabout how the Armor Force can be anactive participant in he Army's preparationfor low intensity conflict.

GUY C. SWAN IllMajor, ArmorAlexandria, VA

Base Armor Badge on CIB. EIBDear Sir:

I have been reading about the ArmorForce Badgeflanker Badge controversy innearly every issue of ARMOR Magazine. Asa tanker, I feel that we deserve both. Thereason that the Armor Force Badge ismeeting resistance, I think, is that it isbased on an entirely new design. Anythingnew is bound o raisea few eyebrows. If theproposed Armor Force Badge were t o bebased on an existing design, I feel that itwould stand a better chance of being ac-cepted by the Army.I propose hat t he Armor Force Badge bebased on the current Combat Infantrymanand Expert Infantrymanbadges. Why shouldthe Infantry be the only combat arms

branch to have badges showing the ir pro-ficiency/combat experience?In the same vein, since the combat armsare the cutting edge of the Army, eachcombat arms branch should have its ownproficiency/combat badges.SGT RUSS SUNDLOFA Trp, 1 26th Cav

Georgetown, CTCorrection

The tank pictured on page 33 of theJanuary-February 1987 issue of ARMORMagazine is wrongly identified as a SovietT-80 MET. It is, i n fact, a Soviet T-72 thatwas being shown to a French delegation inOctober 1977. ARMOR regrets the error.

Company Master Gunners asU-COFT Instructor/Operators

Dear Sir:In reference to the article in January-February 1987 ARMOR by SFC DavidM.Gray, entitled: "The New Company MasterGunner":The M60A3 Displaced EquipmentTrain-ing Teams are located at Camp Shelby,Mississippi, and Gowen Field, Idaho. Ourmission is to provide M60A3 transitiontraining to National Guard tank crewscurrently equipped wi th M60. M60A1,and M48A5 tanks. The program w ill beineffect until September 1990. Obviously,there will be many crews to train, toinclude COFT utilizatibn. Our team isanxiously awaiting the arrival of our M-COFT in May 1987. The M60 A3 M-COFTtraining matrix is almost exactly the sameas the M-1 U-COFT.There has been much discussion be-tween myself, the operations officer, andthe team master gunners(currently , thereare four assigned to the team) regardingthe integration of the M-COFT into ourtraining schedule. The problem of "in-structor burnout" has been identified inour init ial concept discussions. Since onlyoneTC/gunner combination can be rainedat a time the COFT must be utilized manyhours during the day. The concensus isthat one man simply cannot sit at theI/Oconsole, staring at video monitors, formore than four hours a day withoutserious mental impairment.Our solution to this problem is to trainall of our armor instructors as M-COFTinstructor/operators. The initial fieldingpackage from General Electric providesfor the training of 1 2VOs. Inaddition, oneperson can be trained as an I/O trainer.This individual can train additional 110sas turnover occurs.My suggestion to SFC Gray is to havehis tank commanders and SGT gunnersqualified as COFT instructor/operators.This would prevent "instructor 'burnout"and provide a broad baseof COFT exper-tise throughout the company. The com-

pany master gunner could then overwatchthe COFT training program as the crewsprogress through the training matrix. Inthi s manner he could effectively managethe COFT program and be a better advisorto the company commander. In my opinion,making the company master gunner theU-COFT I/O is not the solution. Havinghim tiedup in he U-COFT all day wi ll leaveno time to perform training NCO duties.COFT utilizat ion and t rain ing techniqueswi ll be of great interest to units i n theNational Guard. Rest assured that a ll ofusat the M60A3 DETTeams wi ll be tuned into your fine publication for further discus-sion on this subject.

HUBERTJ. GRANT, JR .MAJ, ArmorMSARNG

Comments on Crews, Training,Ammo, Simplicity

Dear Sir:After reading last month's issue (Jan-uary-February 1987) and many other is -sues, I would like to interjec t a few com-ments concerning some of the often dis-cussed topics.This is based on discussion with fellowarmor soldiers and heavily influenced byrecently listening to the experiences ofinsightful veterans of WW II (Eastern andWestern fronts), who saw many fiercetank battles.Don't reduce crews below four. The fiveman crew wasoptimum. Morecrewmem-bers meant better target acquisition andthe ability to destroy many targets simul-taneously. The bowgunner earned his payby keeping off a determined infantry effortin the urban environment and dense ter-rain often found in Europe and Asia.Twenty-four hour continuous operationswi ll require tank crews to rotate on nightwatch or dismounted patrols/OPs (seat-bound tankers will die). A tremendousstrain will result in a 2- 3 man crew.Thesefacts seemed to hold true in WW I I and forall soldiers who have experienced theNTC. A dedicated and tigh tly knit 4 -5 mancrew wi ll have a better chance of survivaland success than an exhausted 2-3 mancrew. Casualties will occur. A 4-5 mancrewcan continue to fight effectivelyfor asustained period of time. A 2 -3 man crewwill be severely debilitated by inevitablecasualties. A 4-5 man crew can bettermaintain a vehicle in garrison and inwartime conditions. Who will maintainthese increasingly complex fighting ma-chines that "scoot" around the battlefieldwit h 2-3 man crews? We are maintaining .vehicles in garrison wi th 2-3 man crewsbecause of the normal personnel turn-overs. A TO&E of 2-3 men wil l have theresult of often having only 1-2 men as-signed to maintain and fight a very com-plex piece of machinery.Train the drivers as driver/mechanics,such as the wart ime Germans and Rus-sians. How specialized should we be-come? Perhaps the progression of the


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mechanic should be driver/mechanicandthen mechanical-pure MOS. There arebasic advantages to having drivers/crew-members fulfilling the role of first linemaintainers of the vehicle in a mannermore specialized than current doctrineshows. Drivers are often the overlookedcrewmember. He holds more responsibil-it y in regard to the survival of his crewthan acknowledged. Could basic turretmechanics make similar progressions?Perhaps our gunners could have trainingin simple tur ret repair and troubleshoot-ing.The driver/mechanic isa proven tech-nique that should be more closely ex-amined and pursued.Keep the conventional round. Veteranstalk of using the tank i n an ever-changingenvironment, from destroying tanks in heWestern desert to the dense jungles ofBurma. Our experience in Korea andViet-nam shows the advantage of the MBTbeing able to fi rea number of armor/ant i-personnel rounds. We have learned andrelearned many lessons at the NTC (atremendous training experience) but wecannot forget th e ability to fight close in,clearing jungle t rails or street rubble, bothinfested with determined infantry andwell-concealed armor. With that in mind,the tanker needs better and more flexiblesmall arms weapons.Finally, keep t simple. Veterans remem-ber the weapons that were simple tomaintain, reliable and produced in quan-tity.Theywill beused nallconditionsandmust be maintained in the worst environ-ments. German veterans talk of usingRussian submachine guns, not for theirrange or sophistication, but for the know-ledge that they would continue to fire inzero-degree temperatures, or bathed inmud. It is insightful listening to Germantankcommandersspeakingoffighting theSherman tank or Sherman Firefly. Al-though the Panther commanders wereconfident in their technological and tac-tical advantages, they knew that for everytwo or three vehicles destroyed, threewould press on the attack. These veteransspeak of the fundamentals of training anddrill. Fire commandswere kept simpleandthe lessons were stressed again andagain. Target acquisition and range esti-mation were the key to building a well-drilled tank crew. The stories and lessonsare numerous and we continue to drawnew conclusions and similarities.The challenge remains to design andbuild formidable AFVs, but not to forgetthe valuable lessons learned inour proudheritage as armor soldiers and leaders.

1LT BART HOWARDDCO 5-73 Armor194th BdeFort Knox, KY

Quick Fix For Spiral ThreatDear Sir:The threat of the Soviet AT-6 Spiralantitank missile, w ith itssupersonic5-km

range, is potent ially devastating. Asshown in the article in the March-Aprilissue, the Army is lacking any weaponthat can effectively engage a helicopterarmed wth Spirals. Two "quick fix" solu-tions are available off the shelf.The Chaparral is he Armyversion of theearly Navy Sidewinder. This weapon hasthe necessary range, but lacks the head-on attack capability required to engage anapproaching helicopter. The solution is toobtain the Navy's new AIM-9L version ofthe Sidewinder, which has a more sensi-tive heat seeker and can engage targetshead-on. This would require no R&D timeor funding. Simply cancel further produc-tion of the exist ing Chaparral and increasethe ongoing production of the AIM-9L tosatisfy Army requirements.The other solution is not quiteas quick,but is available. The Ital ians have mount-ed a 76-mm naval cannon (the OTO-Melara Compact)on a tankchassis. Whilestill a prototype, it has proven to be aworkable system. This cannon hasafull y-automatic capability and is designed foranti-airc raft use. It has a maximum rangeof 19,200 m and a wide range of ammuni-tion. It is produced in the US by NorthernOrdnance and used by dozens of Navyships. Adding it to a surplus M48 chassisshould be simply a matter of welding andwiring. It should be noted that if a con-tracto r is allowed to "design" such asystem, it w il l take a decade and a billiondollars. To save time, why not deliver afew cannons to selected tank battalionsand let the ordnance sergeants figure itout? This should take about two weeks.There areother possibilities. Af lechett eround could be firie d at the launch signa-ture inan attempt to intercept the missile.The versatile AAI Light Tank (i n prototypeform), w it h its 76-mm automatic cannon,could be added to mechanized units.Israeli-style reactive armor (already inproduction) could be added to tanks tomake them less vulnerable to missileattack.While three of my five proposals arecannon systems, as opposed to missilesystems, there i s a reason for that. Can-non systems are cheaper to build andsupply, can fire faster, have shorter flighttimes, have a multi-round, fire-and-forgetcapability, and are invulnerabletocounter-measures.As you can see. a number of "quick fix"solutions are available. Let's pick one (orbetter, pick several) and implement themimmediately.

STEPHEN V. COLEAmarillo, TX

Take Another Look. LieutenantDear Sir:In reference to a lette r by1LT Jeffrey D.Newsome. Jan-Feb 87ARMOR, it shouldbe pointed out that he has made somerather rash statements concerning ar-mored units during the Ardennes Cam-paign of 1944.

Specifically, which armored division re-treated from the Germans?Has Lieutenant Newsome ever heard ofa town called St. Vith, or a coupleof guyscal led Clarke and Hasbrouck, and a prettyfair armored division, the Seventh?Has Lieutenant Newsome ever heard ofCombat Command R, 9th Armored Divi-sion, or Combat Command B, 10th Ar-mored Division, whose units held blockingpositions in front of Bastogne, along wit hsurviving.elements of the 110t h Infantry,28th Infantry Division, long enough forthe 1 0l s t Airborne Division to take uppositions in and around the city?Is Lieutenant Newsome aware that bet-ter than fifty percent of the Bastognegarrison were not part of the lO ls t (al-though they were attached for commandand control purposes)? The facts are thatthe actions in and around Bastogne werea prime example of a successful defensecarried out by a heavy-light force mix.Lieutenant Newsome can have justifi-able pride in the accomplishments of air-borne soldiers and units, they need nottake a back seat to any unit. However, hissense of pride should not cloud his per-spective. Wars are won by a combinationof al l arms working together for a commonpurpose.

In my opinion, volunteer or draftee,paratrooper, ranger, tanker, or gardenvariety leg, it takes a pretty good man tofacean armedenemyonthefieldof battle,present h is credentials on the point of abayonet, or the business end of a maingun, and defeat him.CHARLES W. TREESELTC, INF. MDARNGClifton, VA

The Lieutenant Self-DestructsDear Sir:As a proud member of the Armor Branchand a dedicatedfollowerof thecontinuingcontroversy over the black beret and theExpert Armor Badge, I cannot fail toanswer the letter by First LieutenantNewsome printed in he January-February1987 issue of ARMOR Magazine.Lieutenant Newsome's final commentstotally destroy the rest of his unasked-forattack on Armor. All would agree that"it isnot t he beret that makes soldiers elite."Simply put, armor soldiers are asking forth e same recognition of dedication, volun-teerism, and advanced skills that distin-guish the soldiers in airborne, infantry,and even the crews of army helicopters.Armor soldiers currently are, or will, op-erate some of the most technically ad-vanced, tactically awesome ighting equip-ment th e world has yet to see. Compareth e complexity of t he systems installed onthe M 1 Abrams tank (named in honor ofGeneral Abrams - ven if he took awayour berets) wi th those of the various at-tack helicopters and other systems beingfielded.Armor soldiers are also volunteers atleast twice: once for jo ining the army and

4 ARMOR May-June 1987


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again for choosing ARMOR. They provethemselves a cut above the average sol-dier by choosing COMBAT ARMS as theirvocation and profession. There i s no com-parison between an airborne finance clerkand a non-airborne armor platoon ser-geant. The platoon sergeant is the cutt ingedge of the army: Responsible for thetraining, health, and welfare of his sol-diers both on and off duty, the mainte-nance of his assigned vehicles, and in theforefront of combat when it occurs.

Jokingly, Lieutenant Newsome refers tothe availabili ty of the Parachutist Badge,theAirA ssauIt BadgeandtheRanger Tab.When was the ast time, if ever, that tanksand tankers were parachuted from air-craft, assaulted with their t anksfrom heli-copters, or were directed to accomplishRanger tasks using tanks? Again, thesebadges and tabs are in recognition ofspecial skills and dedications, and thesame volunteerism that Armor soldiersalso seek. Just as the modern infantr ymantests for and can receive his Expert Infan-tryman Badge, so shoul d Armor soldiersbe able to test for and receive his ExpertArmor Badge.Inclosing, the "Bottom Line" is: Regard-less of branch, recognize soldie rs who, byvolunteerism, dedication, and specialskills, have set themselves above the no r-mal soldier. No matter what the recogni -tion, be it a beret, a badge, or di ffe ren t pay,we in the Combat Arm s have already setourselves apart from those that couldn'tor wouldn't accept thec omba t Armschal-lenge. Armor - The Mounted CombatArm of Decision.

GEORGE THOMAS FEAGANS I1CPT, ArmorVint Hill Farms, Warrenton, VA

The LieutenantStands Corrected- o A Fault

Dear Sir:Ihave been following, with interest, the

debateover beretsfor tankers andcavalry-men in ARMOR during the past fewmonths and must confess considerablesympathy for those desiring to resurrectthe distinctive headgear. After all. tankerscan claim that the black beret has been he"traditional international headgear" fortankers just as paratroopers can for themaroon cover.Although I understand (even if I do notagree with) the reasons for avoiding theproliferation'of distinctive unifo rm accou-trements in our army, Ihave never under-stood theattitude tha tthe awar dof a beretto tankers somehow impugns the distin-guished history of our airborne troops.This seems to be the gist of the letterwritten in he Jan-Feb issue ofARMOR byFirst Lieutenant Newsome of the 82d.Unfortunately, in his emotional attackagainst the black beret, Lieu tenant New-some manages to do violence t o the repu-tations of just about everyone but theairborne. For that reason I eel compelled

to offer a response.First of all, he alleges that duri ng theBattle of the Bulge "the only soldiers tostay to fight were paratroopers." Thismust come as a surpr ise o he veteransofthe 2d. 4th. and 99th Infantry Divisionswho gallantly held the shoulders of theGerman penetration. It also overlooks thebrave contributions of the 51st Engineersat Trois Ponts, th e 203d Antiaircraft Artil -lery at Parker's Crossroads. and the 10t hArmored Division, whose delay of the 5t hPanzer Army made possible the stand atBastogne. Healsoforgetsthat itwasTeamBrowne, built around the 420 th ArmoredField Artillery, that tur ned aside perhapsthe most serious threat to the 101st Air-borne's perimeter. Had "only" the para-troopers fought, the Germans would havegotten across the Meuse before the tw oairborne divisions left their rest areasnear Paris.

Lieutenant Newsome also refers to an"entire U.S. armored division [that ] hadretrea tedfrom he Germans." He obvious-lytook th is from a slick, though historicallymisleading, poster popular at Ft. Bragg. Itshows a heavily laden paratrooper movingup toth e ront alonga snow-covered road.Underneath, the poster recounts the wordsof a trooper of the 82d to a tanker from a narmored division retreating through hisposition. The trooper said something tothe effect that, "Don't worry, I am the 82dAirborne and this is as far as the b-----d'sare going."

Great stuff, but it neglects to mentionthat the armored unit retreating throughthe 82d in that fight was the 7th. thedivision tha t for six days had held the vitalcrossroads of St. V ith against overwhelm-ing odds, receiving a Presidential UnitCitation for its efforts. It retreated onlyupon the order of higher authority.Taking nothing away from the achieve-ments of the 1O ls t or the 82d. manyhistorians regard the stand of the 7thArmored Division at St. Vith as the deci-sive engagement of the Battle of th eBulge.

No branch or unit had a monopoly ofcourage in the Ardennes. Should Lieu-tenant Newsome wish to know moreabout the history of the Bulge than he canglean fro m a poster, I suggest Charles B.MacDonald's A Time For Trumpets.

The lieutenant is right, however, whenhe suggests that it IS not a beret thatmakes a soldier elite, or compels him tostand his ground when outnumbered. Butthe airborne community was sure upsetwhen, for a brief period, they were deniedtheir distinctive hats. They should havesome empathy, therefore, w it h their breth-ren from t he other combat maneuver armwho, w hile seeing the plethora of infantry-related uniform accoutrements, can wearnone themselves.

WILLIAM R. BETSONMajor, ArmorSchool of Advanced Mil itar y StudiesFt. Leavenworth, KS

"Make It Happen" -Differently

Dear Sir:I was disheartened to read Captain

Thomas R. Searle's feelings about thephrase "make it happen," in ARMORMagazine. Nov-Dec 86 issue. Althoughhis experience iscertainl y not unique, thephrase "make it happen" can also con-note aggressiveness, assertiveness, andcan affect one's destiny as often as, if notmore so than, "do the impossible," as healluded.As a Professor of Military Sciencechargedwith training potentialoff cersforth e U.S. Army, I have designated thephrase "make it happen" as the cadets'motto, with its former meaning.I'm sure we've all heard the saying,"Some people make things happen, somepeople see things happen, and some peo-ple wonder what's happening." SinceCap-tai n Searle took the tim e to express histhoughts in ARMOR Magazine, Isuspecthe would consider himself in the firstcategory.

PAUL W. FELLINGERLieutenant Colonel, FAPMS, Youngstown State University

HighTech at ARMORBeginning with our next issue,ARMOR will be produced on a desktoppublishing system under a pilot pro-

gram set up by TRADOC. This equip-ment, whi ch i s driven by the VenturaPublisher program, now permits ouracceptance of stories on 5'A-inchDS/DD floppy disks in certain word-processor formats. These include Mi-crosoft Word (Version 2.00). Multi-mate (V 3.31). Wordper fect (V 4.1).Wordstar (V 3.31). and Xerox Wri ter (V2.). If you do send a disk, please includea printout, too.

New text scanning equipm ent alsopermits direct computer entry of typedstories, but we've found that t he scan-ner does not "read" dot-mat rix copy orcopy typed with a faint ribbon verywell. And it cannot pick up penciled-incorrections. Clean, typed copy i s readaccurately and quickly.If authors are able to make use ofeither of these tw o options, t he resultwill be fewer transcription errors andfaster processing.

May-June1987 ARMOR 5


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MG Thomas H. TaitCommanding General IU.S.Army Armor Center

Noncommissioned OfficersThe noncommissioned officers(NCO) of the Armor Force a re th ebest ever. They are leaders, andthey lead the finest soldiers in theworld. They seek responsibility a ndoperate under t he old adage lead,follow, or get the hell out of theway. They are take-charge people,an d we, the officers and senior non-commissioned officers, need to en-

sure hey have every opportunity totake charge.When examining the effects ofthe Force Alignment Plan (FAP),wherein we lose or have lost up to60% of our reserve captains, it isevident th at casualty replacementsfor leadership at the company an dbattalion level will have to comefrom these highly trained and moti-vated sergeants via a battlefieldcommissioning program.One of our challenges is to retainour current NCOs and those superbyoung soldiers who are the ser-gean ts of th e future. We have someroadblocks; however, retention hasbeen excellent for a long time. In1986 we retained 45% of our 19K,48% of 19E, and 27% of 19D whileth e Army average was 36.7%.However, we a re having a prob-lem with promotions, which couldcause some of our soldiers to notreenlis t because the future doesntappeartoo bright.Our promotion statistics for thepast couple of years ar e not favor-able when compared to the Armyaverage.

1985 E-7 E-8 E-919K 44.2%19E 16.1%19D 4.3%19z 22.9% 37.1%Army Avg. ?4.2% 1913% 17.3%19 CMF Average 16.9%198619K 20.1%19E 23.8%19D 15.2%192 14.6% 8.6%Army Avg. 19.8% 15.5% 13.3%19 CM f Average 20.2%198719K 4.4%19E 2.8%19D 9.9%19 CMF Average 5.3%We need to do better.We are taking action to fix theproblem. We are recoding anumbe rof positions at Fort Knox th at will

increase the Army NCOs in theTraining Group an d elsewhere onthe installation. We are workingwith corps a nd divisions to recodesome TDA positions on thei r staf fsth at are filled, without support, bytan ker s and cavalrymen. We alsobelieve we have stopped the en-croachment of other specialties in-to the positions normally identifiedwith 19D and will turn some ofthem around. These actions willincrease the number of sergeantsavailable and should increase thenumber of Armor NCO promotions.

Another factor that hampers thepromotion of some of our best ser-geants is repetitive Master Gunnerassignments at the E-7 and E-8level without being given the oppor-tunity to serve as platoon sergeantsor first sergeants. If a Master Gun-ner is double slotted, as many ofthem are, when writing his Enlist-ed Efficiency Reports (EERs) en-sure that you highlight the factthat he was a great platoon ser-geant or first sergeant and that hewas also a superb Master Gunner.This is the on ly way we can en-sure tha t our super soldiers arejustly rewarded. Take the timewhen youre writing the EER toensure tha t you are making mean-ingful comments. We owe it to therated soldier to do it right.In order to be a Command Ser-geant Major (CSM), a n NCO mustbe a graduate of the SergeantsMajor Academy. If we do not getenough graduates, th en we will beforced to take CSMs from otherMOSS in our tank battalions andcavalry squadrons. This is unac-ceptable because the CSM is thesenior traine r in the unit, and un-less he understands the MOS hewill not be able o provide adequatetraining guidance or advice. Thedevelopment of the CSM startsandmatures in the unit. We need toensure that our best NCOs makethe grade. Think, a nd do somethingabout it. Trea t Em Rough!

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CS M John M. S tephensComm and Sergeant MajorU. S. Army Armor Center

A Progress Report:The Systems WorkingEvery once in a while, we need todo an assessment to find out wherewe are and where we are going.With the Excellence Program, Certi-fication Program, changes in theArmor Noncommissioned OfficerEducation System, Master GunnerProgram, assignment procedures,and increase in NCO positions, weare moving in the right direction,maybe faster than some mightthink, especially as we introducenew systems, doctrine, simulators,an d tra ining programs to the force.What we do have to watch, how-ever, is th at we give our programstime to grow. Sometimes we have atendency to be over-anxious andexpect too much too soon.The Excellence Program is ontrack, especially with regard to th esoldiers th at were identified in OneStat ion Unit Training. During mylast visit to Europe, I became per-sonally convinced that units areresponding well to the program.There are some slowdowns thatcant be helped: (1)early promotionto Specialist Four and, (2) earlyassignment to the gunners seat.Ear ly promotions are driven by theneeds of the Army. The slowdownis due to the BEAR program andretention. The gunners seats arebeing filled by second-termers whoare experienced tankers. It justtakes you longer to get there. Mostunits, though, are using extraUCOFT time to keep ExcellenceProgram soldiers trained up to, orto train them beyond, their presentduty requirements. More attentionis needed to identify a units out-standing soldiers for the program.

When I am introduced to soldierswho, the chain says, are outstand-ing, I immediately ask if they arepart of the Excellence Program.The Scouts in the EIA Programare sta rting to appear in the field innumbers. Soon, they will be givenan opportunity to attend AirborneSchool after OSUT, enroute to theirnext assignment.The Tank Commander Certifica-tion Test I (TCGST) and the Certi-fication Test 3 (Master Gunner) arebeing administered in a timelymanner. Standards are being de-manded a nd met. The Scout Com-mander Certification Test is nowbeing fielded. The standards of th ecertification test are being met as agraduation requirement from theBasic Noncommissioned OfficerCourse for both tankers an d scouts.We have not been too successfulwith Certification Test 11.With thenew armor BNCOC in the Noncom-missioned Officer Education Sys-tem, I believe we will start to see th esuccess of the program; however,the Certification Test I1 is not easyand does require a lot of studying ofthe Advance Study Guide (see yourTCO).The Noncommissioned OfficerEducation System for ArmorBNCOC and ANCOC isgrowing byleaps and bounds. The POI istougher, and the NCOs are demon-strating a much higher degree ofproficiency and excellence as theygraduate.BNCOC for the most p ar t is fixed!We graduate noncommissionedofficers who have demonstratedcompetence in the technical and

tactical requirementa of the system,both in tanks and cavalry. Eachmust be certified and demonstratehis capability to be a vehicle com-mander by negotiating a series oftactical exercises.ANCOC was upgraded a yearago; however, we are now doing thenew POIs (see ARMOR MagazineDrivers Seat (March-April 1987).The Master Gunner Course hasbeen opened for sergeants (E5).There have been some pros andcons concerning this issue. I per-sonally feel we are on target forboth tank s and the Bradley M3. Wehave had excellent soldiers to workwith over the las t few years and weneed to take advantage of a nd re-tain these soldiers in the force. Asergeant (E5) master gunner ex-tends the longevity of the unitmaster gunner and retains out-standing NCOs in Armor ratherthan losing them to other-than-Armor assignments.There are other training programsbeing looked at for the master gun-ner. With all gunnery skills beingtaught as you graduate fromANCOC, the opportunity is there tolook at other ar eas in which theunit master gunner must be tech-nically proficient. Simulators arequickly becoming the commandersprimary train ing vehicle. He needsan expert who can advise him andmonitor the application of stan-dardization as each crew/platoontra ins on the simulators.The new multipurpose ranges an dcombined arms live-fire exercisesintroduce many new weapons sys-Continued on Page37

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The May 1986edition of th e U.S.ArmysFM 100-5,Operations,statesth at the dynamics of combat powerdecide the outcome of battle. Com-bat power is measured by th e effectcreated by combining maneuver,firepower, protection, and leader-ship in combat actions against a nenemy in war. AirLand Battle doc-trine demands a command an d con-trol system tha t is superior to theenemys. To gai n th is superiority,AirLand Battle doctrine stressesthe use of mission orders; ordersthat specify what must be donewithout prescribing how the mis-sion must be accomplished. Theaim of mission orders is to leavethe greatest possible operationaland tactical freedom to subordina teleaders, and thus gain speed indecisive execution over the enemy.

by Captain John F. Anta1Indeed, it may be said that anarmys war-fighting style, as dis-played in its command an d controlphilosophy, is often the decisiveelement of combat power. But is ourtraining keeping pace with doc-trine? I s the U.S. Army practicingthe techniques required to developthe superior command an d controlsystem th at will win on the battle-field? This discussion contrastsU.S. war-fighting command styleswith Soviet styles and proposestechniques to improve the commu-nication of mission tactics, a tech-nique that emphasizes the tradi-tional strengths of the U.S. Army.Orders-OrientedTacticsThe Soviet war-fighting style isaptly described by the German mil-itary term Befehlstaktik,or orders-

oriented tactics. Orders-orientedtactics epitomize attrition warfare,a method of warfare tha t suits theSoviet style of war and plays to theSoviet numerical advantage. TheSoviet system of command is de-rived from a bureaucratic Sovietsociety tha t emphasizes exaggerat-ed planning and the uninterruptedcontrol of almost every aspect of anindividuals existence. The Sovietsystem, therefore, is orders-inten-sive and orders-dependent. Divi-sions an d lower organizations arerequired to fight according to adetailed batt le plan which specifiesthe who, what, when, and how forevery par t of their operations.2Nothing is left to chance or inde-pendent judgment. The Soviets ex-pect their leaders to execute theplan efficiently. Improvision be-

May-June 1987 ARMOR 9


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Mission Tactics, Operatior s Order Format1. Situation

a. Enemy Forcesb. Friendly Forcesc. Attachments/Detachmentsd. Commanders ntent -A clear statement of the intent (whatis to beaccomplished)of t h e commanders two echelons up .

2. Mission- clear statement of what the uni t isto do, usually definedin t e rm s of t he enemy, not t he terrain.3. Execution

-Commanders in ten t -Aclear statement of the intent (howthe battlewill be fought) of the commander of t he unit that is to accomplish themission. The commanders ntent is explained in the terms of the AirlandBattle:Close operations- howthecommander intends ofightthe close-inbattle.Th e focus of the main effort mus t be clearly stated.Deep operations - ow t h e commander intends to fight deepoperations within h is area of interest (optional for un i t s belowbrigade level). Deep operations are aimed at inhibiting the freedomof action and cohesion of the enemy.Rear operations- ow the commander intends to f ight t h e rearoperations battle. The aim of rear operations is to retain freedomofaction to continue operations.

a. Concept of the operationb. Subordinate uni t missionsc. Coordinating instructions4. Service support5. Command and signal

a. Signal instructionsb. Command posts and t h e location of the commanderFigure 1

yond the letter of the order is notencouraged. Any Soviet officerwho ac ts on th e American premiseth at regulations are but a guide...will probably have a very short;undistinguished military ~a r e e r . ~The Soviet command style, there-fore, is a t a disadvantage n a fast-paced, mobile war, where events donot a lways go according to plan. Insuch a war, the synchronization ofcombat power will depend on themental agility of junior leaders toseize and retain the initiative.

Mission TacticsThe concept of Auftragstakt ik ormission tacti cs is not new to war-fare. The Prussians in the mid-19thcentury adopted mission tacticsas th e logical method to control the

decentralization of the battlefieldbrought about by the technologicalimprovements of th e rifle and fieldcannon. This increase in the killingcapabilities of more modem weap-ons forced a rmies to seek safety ingreater dispersion. It was no longerpossible to lead men in a tight massformation. The Germans attackedthis problem with historical mili-tar y thoroughness and determinedthat there were two methods ofbattlefield control on the decentral-ized battlefield.One method, the attempt t o planfor every eventuality and seek preci-sion in execution through th e strictadherence to a pre-arranged plan,was adopted by the Soviet Unionand is described above. The Ger-man solution is the antithesis of

the orders-oriented process. Thisprocess was labeled mission tac-tics.Mission tactics are based upontrust. Leaders a re expected to makedecisions without constant super-vision and without asking for per-mission as long as their decisionsare within the framework of thecommanders intent. Mission tacticsreplace control with guidance andallow the subordinate leader to dowithout question or doubt whateverthe situation requires...Even thedisobedience of orders was not in-consistent with this phil ~so phy .~Mission tactics are th e preferredmethod of waging maneuver war-fare. The technique is as much amental thought process as it is atactical concept. The point is al-ways to gain a time-decision ad-vantage over your enemy. Any com-mand and control method t hat in-creases your speed of decision andaction should be employed. To gainthis time-decision advantage thefollowing command and control ele-ments are essential: (1)employ mis-sion type orders, (2) shorten tac-tical reports by reporting by excep-tion, and (3) develop well-trainedand trusted subordinate leaders.

Mission Type OrdersMission type orders are designedto speed up the decision-reactioncycle and gain the initiative overthe enemy. An example of a mis-sion type operations orderis shownin figure one. The mission order isdifferent from the standard five-paragraph field order in three signi-ficant ways:0 SITUATION; paragraph 1.dThe commanders intent is added toclearly explain how the battle isvisualized by th e commanders twoechelons above the unit that willexecute the order.

MISSION; paragraph 2: Themission statement, in a missiontype order, is usually defined interms of the enemy, not the terrain.0 EXECUTION; paragraph 3.a,includes the commanders intent,which clearly st ate s how the com-mander visualizes the battle andwhy. The focus of the main effort isdesignated.The mission order shouldbeissuedorally, from brigade level down, topreclude unnecessary time delays.A verbal order issued by the com-mander on th e battlefield is better

ARMOR May-June198710


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than a written order, prepared inquantity , but issued late.Reporting By ExceptionIn the confusion and fog of

battle, commandersconcentrate onfighting their units. Reporting tohigher headquarters takes a backsea t to the deadly business of ma-neuvering ag ains t the enemy. Re-porting b y exception accepts thisphenomenon and trus ts subordinateleaders to continu e the mission asestablished by the commanders n-tent. Major successesor failures arethe only reports tha t are transmit-ted over the command frequency.Higher headquarter s should employthe eavesdrop technique of lis-tening in on subordinate radio nets,without interfering with the com-mand and control of the fightingunits. With commanders forward,the need for reports is lessenedfurther still.Trained Subordinate Leaders

Distractors in garrison consumeinordinate amounts of time whichshould be spent on traini ng leadersfor combat. Commanders must re-lieve their subordinates of thesemundane, non-war-fighting tasksthat drive much of our day-to-daypeacetime training. When leadersfail to develop subordinate leadersin garrison, they lack trust in theirleaders on the battlefield and arereluctant to delegate tasks an d au-thority to these leaders in combat.Commandersmust develop subor-dinate leaders capable of seizingan d exploiting battlefield opportuni-ties and trust these subordinates totake such actions within the guid-ance established by the commandersintent.Junior leaders must also become

tactically proficient with their weap-ons and the employment of theirunits (both the science a nd t he art ofwar). This can be accomplished byconcentrating heir time on a seriousstudy of war. Only when command-ers se t priorities, designa ting train-ing hours for study, wargaming,and war seminars will junior lead-ers have the opportunity to maturean d develop into the kind of leaderscapable of fighting under the mis-sion tactics s tyle of maneuver war-fare.5

ConclusionTh e U.S. Armys ability to defeatthe Soviets in %at tle will be deter-mined by our ability to execute the

elements of corribat power. The So-viet Armys greatest weakness istheir orders-oriented approach tobattle. Mission tactics attack thisSoviet weakness by launching aseries of aggressive actions andcounteractions tha t are designed todisrupt the pre-planned sequence ofthe orders-oriented approach to bat-tle. By contf ronting the enemy withsurprising and unanticipated situa-tions, we can multiply the poten tialof men, weapons, and combat re-

FootnotesField Manual (FM) 00-5, Operations, D epartment of the Army, Washington, D.C., May1986, p 21. On page 22, the manual states that,If an unanticipated situation arises, commit-

tedmaneuver unit commanders should under-stand the purpose of theoperation well enoughto act decisively, confident that they are doingwhat their superior commander would orderdone were he present.2Lieutenant Colonel William A. Walker,USA (Ret.), The Deep Battle,ARMY Maga-zine, July 1986, p. 28.Lieutenant Colonel Will iam P. Baxter,USA (Ret.), Soviet AirLand Battle Tactics,Presidio Press, Novato, Calif., 1986, p. 71. For

I .

an excellent summary of the Soviet commandand staff system, see Chapter 3 of SovietAirLand Battle Tactics.Lieutenant Colonel John A. English, A Per-spective on Infantry, Praeger Publishers,N.Y., 1981, p. 76. On page 76, LTC Englishfurther states that as far as the Germans wereconcerned, the first demand in war was deci-sive action.5WilliamS. Lind, Maneuver Warfare Hand-book,Westview he ss , Boulder, Colorado, 1985,p. 44. Linds book on maneuver warfare is anexcellent collection of lectures and tacticalproblems that highlight the techniques of ma-neuver warfare, officer education and tacticalreform.

sources into superior combat power.To develop this combat power, theU.S. Army must be deadly seriousjabout the tra ining and developmentof its junior leaders. Techniquessuch as the use of mission ordersan d reporting by exception must bethe norm, not the exception.Mission tactic s is a concept thatseeks fast, decentralized decisionmaking. It is an important conceptto the success of the AirLand Battleand must h ave immediate emphasisin all our tactical training . We des-perately need leaders who can op-eratedecisively with minimum guid-ance. These leaders ar e our greatestcomba t multiplier.

i

f

QIAPTAIN JOHN F. ANTAL

11 1 is Chief of CollectiveT rain-ing, G 3 Operations, 1st Caval-ry Division, Fort Hood, TX . H egraduated from the UnitedStates Military Academy in1977. His most recent assign-ments include, aide de campto the Deputy CommanderUSFK. c o mman d of A l l 72Armor (M60A3). and Battal-io n S3, 2-72 Armor at CampCasey, Korea.

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The Soviet Forward Detachmentby Joseph R. Burniece

IntroductionOver the as t few years the experi-ments, developments, and combatpossibilities of the Soviet operation-.a1 maneuver group (OMG) havecaptured the imagination and at-tention of many Western analysts .Often overlooked, but of equal im-portance, is the past and presentdevelopment of the forward detach-ment (FD), forerunner of the OMG.Historical Background

Most readers a re probably well-acquainted with th e conceptual de-velopments of the Soviet OMG. Forour purposes, we might briefly re-call that the OMG was developedfrom aWW I1predecessor known asthe mobile group. That formationwas usually a stand ard division-sized tank corps of some 150 tanks,six battal ions of infantry, a nd sup-porting arms. The mobile groupdesignator was then assigned forth e course of a n operation. General-ly, one mobile group wa s assignedto a rifle army (today a combinedar ms army) of three to five infant rydivisions, in th e first echelon. Itsassignment was as the mobile ele-ment designated to a ssist th e firstechelon achieve its objectives and,where possible, simultaneously pushdeeper into the enemy rear area tobreak open the front. At t ha t point,a second echelon might be commit-ted to continue the combat andcreate a major breakthrough inpreparation for a mobile operation.As the war continued, the Sovietsbecame ever more adept at mobilegroup operations until by 1944, fewoperations lacked such formations.In tha t same time frame, the So-viets recognized th at major combatformations to either flank of anoperation involving mobile groupscould often benefit from, and insome cases match, t he performanceof the forces on the primary axisthrough the use of smaller, localmobile elements fielded by the firstechelon rifle divisions themselves.These mobile forces were known asforward detachments.

The Forward Detachmentin WW I1The forward detachments in theearly (1942-43) stages were oftenhastily trained or ad hoc forma-tions created by drawing upon di-

visional resources. First came selec-tion of several of the younger of-ficers, who had demonstrated ini tia-tive and leadership, to lead the FD.The activity and demands of theFD were expected to exceed thosenormally expected of the rifle bat-talion in the line, so the mosttrained, aggressive, and resource-ful battalion was often assigned.Since nearly the entire rifle divi-sion was on foot while supplies andheavy weapons were transportedby horse a nd wagon, the troops ofthe FD were often assigned to rideon the back of assault guns or tanksassigned to the division for thecurrent operation. Support arms, toinclude mortars, air defense weap-ons, communications an d logisticselements, were in like manner hasti-ly organized and equipped or sup-plied on a catch-as-catch-can basis.As the war progressed, the Sovietfield commanders at every rankbecame more adept and aggressive.Simultaneously, equipment- ar-ticularly tanks, assault guns, andinfantry mortars/artillery - be-came more plentiful as Soviet fac-

tories recovered from the disloca-tion brought about by the Germaninvasion and moved into hig h pro-duction with the influx of ra w ma-terials a nd Lend-Lease aid.By 1944, the FD became a fixedfeature of most rifle divisions aswell as ta nk and mechanized corps(Figure 1).Continuing war experi-ence had created the additionaltrained leaders an d roops to createsupplemental FDs. As one FD wascommitted to an axis of advance,suffered attrition, or fell out ex-hausted, a new FD would be orga-nized and sen t forward to continuethe advance into the depth of theenemy operational area.From the middle of 1944, everyoperation had numerous FDs. Forexample, in the Crimean operationof th at year, no fewer than 11FD swere detailed from formations ofthe 2nd Guards Army fi rst echelonalone. In the Lutsk-Rovno andMogilev offensive operations, the13th and 49th [Rifle] Armies eachdetailed eight detachments withintheir operational zones. Further-more, corps and a rmy detachmentswere detailed in addition to t he FDsof the divisions constituting thosesenior field organizations.The more experience gained withthe FDs, th e more clear became thelesson that greate rnumbers of FDs

12 ARMOR May-June 1987


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substantially improved the opera-tional performance of the parentformations.Forward Detachmentsin the 1970s

As both the Soviet Union andNATO fielded and enlarged theirstocks of tactical and theater nu-clear weapons, the Soviet Armyintensely studied the means to bestexploit nuclear fire strikes.As the most mobile and, theo-retically- iven the correct choiceof aggressive commanders - hemost skilled battalions, FDs of th epast were expected to fulfill twovery valuable functions. First, theFD was tasked as previously todrive deeply into the enemy reararea, to overrun enemy artillerypositions and headquarters, dis-rupt communications, and delaythe forward or lateral movement ofenemy reinforcements. Secondlyand perhaps a moreimportant role,was to seek out, or drive for undermission order, an y of the local nu-clear weapon storage and launchsites.It was furthermore expected th atproper employment of th e FD couldensure rap id and effective exploita-tion of nuclear fire strikes by Sovietforces. Whether awaiting the out-come of a nuclear strike and thefollow-on combat of the NATO sur-vivors by Soviet/Warsaw Pact firs techelon forces, or in some instancesini t ia t ing forward movementthrough previously identified weaksectors in the NATO lines prior tothe nuclear strike and general en-gagement, the FD as a battalion-sized formation was seen as the oolto once ag ain facilitate the forwardmovement of the parent division.Once again, the FD would mostlikely consist of a tank-based bat-talion formation with attached in-fantry, air defense, and artilleryasse ts tailored to the situation, andas limited by the available re-sources,

Soviet Analysisof NATO DefensesCritical analysis of the NATOdefenses over the years has provid-ed the Soviets with the clear under-sta ndi ng of the limited numbers ofWestern combat troops in the Cen-tral European Theater. Althoughrelat ive pari ty in tact ical andtheater nuclear weapon forces has

EMPLOYMENT OF FORWARD DETACHMENTS I N SURPRISE.PREEMPTIVE AllACKS TO FORESTALL ORGANIZATION OF ENEMY DEFENSE

(NOT TO SCALE)0

IAIN DEFENSE AREANOT YE T FULLY OCCUPIEDIO R ORGANIZED).CUD:B .Tanh&RlliOIR .T.& RLp,mewIR R - Molmomd I1L R.#nml

DIVISION DIVISION oivisionFORWARD FIRST SECONODZACHMENTS (TB+) ECHELON ECHELObAN0 ARMY REGIMENTS REGIMEN1FORWARDDZACHMENT (TR+) -

RMY FIRST ECHELON

Fig 3

resulted in a reported general reluc-tance on the par t of the Soviets tocontinue discussions of their em-ployment in a future war, th e sim-ilar relative abundance of chemicalweapons, for which the Soviets arebest prepared, or the often-pro-mised, soon to be fielded smartweapon technology of NATO, pre-disposes th e Soviets to believe tha tthe battlefield of the future will bemuch like that postulated in the1960s for th e nuclear battlefield.With resources scarce and fl anksusually not just open - ut wideopen - n the projected initial en-counters on the inner Germanborder, the Soviets apparently be-lieve the conditions in CentralEurope for NATO will be ana logousto those of the German Army in1944and 1945. In those times, whenthe G ermans lacked the troops an dequipment to prepare more thanone major defensive line, the FDcould, a s noted, rapidly find a gap

to penetra te and plunge deeply intothe enemy rear area.Supporting Assets forthe Forward Detachment

Stemming from discussions an ddebates in the 1970s, the expandedsupport requirements for a battal-ion organization performing therole of FD in m any ways reads liketh at of the larger OMG.Of param ount concern to the So-viets is the establishment and main-tenance, under all circumstances,of a strong and reliable communi-cations systems. With it, the FDmay rapidly move, change direc-tion, hal t to repel an enemy counter-attack, or strike off on an entirelynew mission. I t can receive and, insome instances, specifically lendsupport. Without it, the FD is essen-tially a powerful but blind boxer.It may still move and attempt tocomplete its mission, but has nomeans other than the limited re-

ARMOR 13ay-June1987


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Soviet Forward Detachments- 945A t o r m d d.bch-ofthiityp.mafomud byOm. doborodov nAuguat. 1946t 0~8 i#tl h. 3ooa,R i t hDMmon. 26th RiffsCotpa, puahmpidty torward to byp...Jawner Unit. n MMchuM.

connaissance assets immediatelyat hand to identify either potentialtrouble or very real disaster.Intelligence on the enemy andhis movements is perhaps th e sec-ond most critical facet for the rea-sons already cited. As the forward-most combat element of the Easte rnforces, the FD is i n th e position torequire both t he most timely infor-mation and intelligence - nclud-ing especially available air recon-naissance photos and reports aswell a s intercepted radio traffic -and to provide such intelligence onNATO forces, deployments, andsituations as it can, given thesituation.Air defense is considered a role asmuch for the Soviet air force as forground-deployed air defense weap-ons. Once again, in order to suc-cessfully maintain a combat airpat rol of MiG-21,MiG-29, MiG-31orHIND-E over the FD, to defea t our

* attack helicopters, a reliable com-munications net is mandatory.Given the intended high-speedmovement of the FD an d the highprobability of encountering NATOcombat elements- nd, particular-ly, NATO close air support aircraf t- n the first five days of a majoroffensive, Soviet tactical air sup-port is critical. If discussions ofsimilar problems confronting theSoviets and their Warsaw Pactallies on the employment of thelarger OMG are relevan t, it may beth at NATO air power is currentlythe greatest concern to the FDplanners.

The ForwardDetachmentin the 1980sThe value of the FD has tradi-tionally been recognized for its in -herent ability to act as a reyd orraid ing force. Of battalion size orlarger, (Figure 2) the FD consti-tutes a force with firepower simila rto th at of the standard NATO mech-anized combat battalion whichwould theoretically be encounteredon any given 3-5 km frontage inCentral Europe. Free to operate out-

side of, but in coordination with,the Soviet/Warsaw Pact mainforces rate a nd axis of advance, theFD has th e wherewithal to elect toengage in combat or decline andseek another path further into therear of the enemy defenses.Avoiding battle is a primaryfacet of the FD mission. Even giventhat, the FD has usually been astandard tank or motorized riflebattalion organization augmentedwith artillery and communicationsassets, the FD roleis one of findinga way deep into he rear in numbers(Figure 3).Combat near the line ofdeparture would simply reduce thepower a nd effectiveness of t he F Dat the crucial moment deep in t herear area - f it even managed toam v e there after combat.By avoiding combat, an d select-ing the most propitious axis foradvance, the FD may- nd usual-ly in exercises (and history) does-increase its mobility relative to itssister battalions in the Soviet linewearily thrashing their way for-ward through the tough Westerndefenses common to NATO.

Unshackled from the responsibil-ity to main tain strict coordinationand overlapping front lines withunits on either flank, the FD, likethe larger OMG, can move muchmore rapidly with the same amountof equipment and troops, given itsfreedom of maneuver.The desire on the part of SovietSTAVKA (high command) is cer-tainly t ha t any and every motorizedrifle an d tank battalion could per-form as a FD. In theory, of course,th is would be true, given the rela-tive equipment and training equiva-lency of al l Soviet (and WarsawPact) formations. In reality, thissimply isnt the case. More impor-ta nt th an training of the troops,equipment available, and desire onthe part of senior command com-ponents, is the realization t ha t oneof th e most important, indeed vitalelements of the Soviet FD is theextremely important and oftenhard-to-come-by qualitative ele-ment of junior officer commandskill. In a national system whichfrowns upon deviation from thenorm an d views with suspicion inpeacetime any overt display oforiginal ity, the personality require-ment s for the commander of t he FDmission calling for exactly th at in-dividual role presents a formidablechallenge.

As difficult a s it may be then tofind a number of gifted junior of-ficers to entrust with the role of FDcommander, the more pertinentquestion is where will the relief FDsbe found? With offensives requir-in g up to 800-km drives from Cen-tral Europe to the English Chan-nel, and assuming combat in anynumber of circumstances a nd loca-tions along th at route, i t st ands toreason (as the Soviets well recog-nize) that FDs will of necessityhave to be replaced from time totime.14 ARMOR May-June1987


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Since the number of qualifiedjunior officers a nd staf fs possess-ing the initiative and training toperform in the role of FD is prob-ably limited in the Soviet society, itmay well be a case th at those fewqualified are given even greaterresponsibility. Th at is, rather thanlimiting the effectiveness of the su-perior command staff by restrain-ing resources, actions could betaken to increase their effective-ness by increasing the size andnumber of combat attachments inorder to create an even larger FDwith greater fighting and stayingpower.This la t ter poss ib i l i ty wasbrought up as early as 1966 by thenColonel I. N. Vorobyev, SovietArmy, as he postulated the future ofFDs.

Blitzkrieg Regimentsand the OperationalForward DetachmentAccording to Vorobyev, the sizeof the FD could grow in order toincrease the impact of th e individu-al FD o n the enemy defenses. Thelarger the FD, the greater the abili-ty to overcome small (company tobattalion)-sized NATO blockingforces which might attempt to ob-struct forward movement and thu s

reduce Army momentum. It is pos-sible that Vorobyevs argumentswere no t only soundly understood,but steps may have been taken toimplement the means to make FDsmore powerful and, therefore, moreindependent.In 1977, General George Keegan,USAF, identified a series of sevenSoviet formations in the Group ofSoviet Forces, Germany, whichwere at that time termed blitz-krieg regiments. According to Gen-eral Keegan, these formations ex-hibited much greater firepower,while also displaying a consider-ably increased logistics capability.The lat ter would be of gr ea t impor-tance for deep, long mission pene-trations, while the former wouldcertainly emphasize the importanceof the FD to the a rmy commanderseeking a means to lever forwardhis four or more divisions.As larger formations the FD, orblitzkrieg regiments, would by defi-nition fit progressive conceptual ar-guments for the eventual develop-ment of operational forward de-tachments (OFD). Though nom-

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Soviet Forward Detachments- 980The FD depicted ia rspnmt.thnoi~IIOOOhkh might habmnd at division andarmy level (NATO carp.level). It ia organized aroundsmotoriredriflebattalion andwpportingwsapons. A tank battalion could alwwwaasthe baseorganizationsl.tructure. anditisoftensuggened thatsuchuni~would.erveba.tforauch.misaion. Larger (regiment) evelFDa, aimilar in atrunurn. may be cmand as well.

inally controlled by division, it ispossible that such otherwise inex-plicable formationsas the fifty-tankreserve battalion of the motorrifle division is not half so much atank reserve as a very vital connec-tor between tpe divisional tacticsand the operations of the army.

In concertwith airborne an d air-mobile-inserted infantry elements,the FD or OFD, of whatever size, isexpected to drive fast and deep intothe enemy rear area. I n this com-bination, it should be expected th atgreat confusion will arise on thepa rt of NATO forces. This is exact-ly as desired by the Soviet com-mander.With greater confusion on the

part of the enemy usually goesgreater mobility on the part offriendly forces. Greater mobility inturn usually begets lower casual-ties and a greater willingness onthe part of the unior commander tomix it up with NATO tacticalfield forces. If thi s should occur, itis almost to be assumed that thepace of advance of forward Soviet/Warsaw Pact formations will quick-en, given the limited number ofNATO forces readily a t hand in theopening stages of a potential futu reconflict in Central Europe.

If the rat e of advanceincreases, itis very probable th at interminglingof tactical combat formations willin turn increase. The result in So-viet eyes, would most likely be th atNATO could not employ tacticalnuclear, chemical, or biologicalweapons - which, in turn , wouldassist in speeding up the advanceof operational forces (divisions),since their tactical densities wouldremain the s ame a t battalion levelbut would be very concentrated bycomparison at division level as th ebreakthrough of the NATO linewas effected.The most significant problem forNATO forces may be that the FD(asis the army OMG)is expected tooperate considerably in advance(as much as 30-100 km) of theparent conventional Army forma-tions.The Forward Detachmentand Advanced GuardGiven the strategic value of FDsto the Soviets, one of the interest ingproblems facing NATO command-ers is finding a means to identifythem. With the possible exceptionthat in a rare event a given Soviet/Warsaw Pact battalion-sized com-bat element may strive mightily toavoid combat when it would other-wise seem most reasonable to en-



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gage (say a NATO combat-reducedmechanized company), the oddswould seem rather slim tha t a FDwould be recognized as such. Size,as noted, would also seem to offerlittle assistance in this regard.Very simply, the FD role, as anyrole, is little more tha n a missionassignment for a particular battal-ion and its affiliated supportingelements. This is also certainly thecase for the mission assignment ofa battalion within areg imen t to actas advance guard. Since, theoreti-cally, a ny Soviet battalion, ta nk ormechanized, may be assigned eitherthe FD mission or the advanceguard mission, and both formationswill include attached supportingarms as available or mission orient-ed, it may be th at t he more criticalFD escapes to complete its missionas outnumbered NATO battalionsseek combat with any elementsseemingly willing to come to terms.The problem becomes more acuteas we consider the hypothetical

situation in which the advanceguard for three Soviet/WarsawPact regiments ad vanci ng in lineare suddenly activated as FDs, tobe replaced by follow-on battalionsassigned as the new advance guard.Or, in a more sinister vein, theproblem of NATO dealing with per-haps a division-sized OMG which,once in the r ear area, spawns bat-talion-sized FDs on lateral axes toconfuse, confound, disrupt , and ul-timately encircle and ent rap NATOforward elements.It is very possible that the onlyfai r means to recognize the moreimportant role of the FD will beeither by th e absence of reconnais-sance detachments left far to therear (an unlikely and probablyhighly suspect method given thelikelihood of FDs receiving someform of reconnaissance elements),or by radio intercept of missionorders and reports, also a ratherunlikely event, given traditionalSoviet respect for radio security.

ConclusionUltimately, it seems the problemNATO faces as regards FDs isgreater tha n th at posed by the sim-ilar , but more powerful, OMG. Un-able to ascertain with an y degree ofcertainty that a Soviet tactical ele-ment is or is not a FD, or tha t itmight not become one, each suchunit encountered near or, o the im-mediate rear of NATO forwardpositions will of necessity have tobe eliminated. As difficult as thiswill certainly be, it is not beyondthe capabi lity of our forces if we usethe inherent initiative, ingenuity,and drive of our junior officers andNCOs to arrest the movement ofthe enemy and maneuver quicklyand decisively to shat ter each ene-my element in turn. It will, how-ever, require an aggressive, well-

trained integrated air and groundtactical force prepared for non-stopmaneuver and engagements. Thequestion is: Dowe now possess theskill and determination to succeedin this task?References

Armstrong. MAJ Richard, USA, Fightingthe Threat Advance Guard, ARMOR,May Jun e 1982.Baxter, LTC William P., USA (Ret.); SovietAirLand Battle Tactics, Presidio Press,1986.Bunce, SF C PeterL.,USA; The Soviet Reac-tion to a Flank Threat, ARMOR, Novem-ber-December 1985.Dick, C. J.; Soviet Battle Drills, Znterna-tional Defense Review, VOL XVIII, No. 6,1985.Donnelly,C. N.; Soviet Tactics f or Overcom-ing NATO Anti-Tank Defenses, Znterna-tional Defense Review, VOL XII, No. 7,1979.Donnelly, C. N.; Tactical Problems Facin gthe Soviet Army, Znternational Defense Re -view, VOL XI , No. , 1978.Douglass, Josep h D.,Jr. an d Hoeber Amoret-ta M., editors; Selected Readings from Mil-itary Thought- 1963-1972,Volume5,PartI.Douglass, Josep h D., Jr. an d Hoeber Amoret-ta M., editors; SelectedReadings fr om Mil-itary Thought- 1963-1972,Volume5, Par t11.Eshel, LTC David M. ID F (Ret.); The Devel-opment of Soviet Motorized In fantr y,Bornin Battle Magazine, No. 12, 1980.Glantz , LTC David M., U SA August Storm:Soviet Tactical and Operational Combat inManchuria, 1945, Leavenworth Papers,No. 8, Combat Studies Inst itute, U.S. ArmyCommand an d General Staff College, June ,1983.Glantz , LTC David M., USA, AugustStorm:The Soviet 1945 Strategic Offensive inManchuria, Leavenworth Papers, No. 7,Combat Studies Institute, U.S. Army Com-man d an d General Staff College, February,1983.Isby, David; Weapons and Tactics of the SO-uiet Army , Janes Publishing Incorporated1981.

Ivanov, S. P., chief auth or; The Znitial Periodof War, Moscow, 1974, tra nsla ted by U.S.Air Force.Monteverde, Roberto and Tamai o, Maurilio;The Soviet Combined Arms ReinforcedBattalion, Military Technology, No . 10,1985.Patrick, Stephe n B.; Fir efigh t- U.S. andSoviet Small Unit Tactics, Strategy& Tac-tics, No. 56, May Ju ne , 1976.Scott, Harriet Fast and Scott, William F.,editors; The Soviet Art of War- Doctrine,Strategy & Tactics,Westview Pres, 1982.Simpkin, BG Rich ard E., British A rmy (Ret.);Red Armour - n Examination of the SO -viet Mobile Force Concept, Brasseys De-fence Publishers, 1984.Soviet Army Operations, IAQ-13-U-78, De-partment of th e Army, United States ArmyIntelligence and SecurityCommand, UnitedStates Army Intelligenceand Thr eat Analy-sis Center, Arling ton, VA, April, 1978.Soviet Tactical Limitations, Strategy &Tactics,No. 71, November-December, 1978.Soviets Fo rmi ng Seven New Blitzkrieg Regi-ments in East Germany, asserts GENGeorge Keegan, Znternational Defense Re-view, VOL x, No. 6,1977.The American a nd Sov iet Rifle Company,Strategy & Tactics, No. 69, July-August,1978.The Soviet Army, Operations and Tactics,FM 100-2-1, Headq uarte rs, Department ofthe Army, Washin gton, D.C., 16 Ju ly 1984.The Soviet Army, Specialized Warfare andRear Area Support, FM 100-2-2,Headquar-ters, Department oft heArmy, Washington,D.C., 16 Ju ly 1984.The Soviet Arm y, Troops, Organization an dEquipment, FM 100-2-3,Headquarters, D epartm ent of th e Army, Washington, D.C.,16 July 1984.Vigor, P. H.; Soviet Blitzkrieg Theory, TheMacMillan Press, Ltd., 1983.Waccheman, Helmut; Beating the Odds,Combat Weapons, Fall, 1985.

JOSEPH R . BURNIECE iscurrently co-director of TheFoundation, a conservativeWashington, D.C.-based de-fense and budget think tankfounded in early 1986. Mr .Burniece was for the pre-vious three years a consul-tant with the Project on Mil i-tary Procurement. Holding aB.A. in History from the U ni-versity of Minnesota, he hasspent seventeen years study-ing military history, tactics,weapons, and technology. Atone time part owner in adefense-related business in-volved in developing trainingsystems for NCOs and of-ficers, Mr. Burniece has alsoserved as a contract adminis-trator and small businessconsultant in the areas ofprofitability, productivity, andperformance.

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"Tool Room's Got It"A Cavalry SquadronDevelops I ts Tool RoomAs a Maintenance Indicator

by Captain Tyler N. Shewmake and Mr. James L. CasselThe 3d Squadron, 2d ATB, wasformed in September 1985, andimmediately began organizing asquadron maintenance tool room.The unit personnel literally builtthe new tool room from the groundup, having no established standa rdoperating procedures (SOP)and lit-tle written guidance. After a year-long learning process, geared to-ward perfecting the tool room, we've

developed both procedures and phi-losophies tha t go to the hea rt of themaintenance operation, and we be-lieve others can benefit from ourprogress report.Our original goal was simple: toquickly an d inexpensively developa system to support more th an 100MOS 63- and 45-series mechanicswho service a 180-vehicle cavalrysquadron tha t employs more th an

20 vehicle types.Although located at Fort Knox,the Home of Cavalry and Armor,the squadron was plagued by thesame problems and frustrationsencountered by any organizationattempting to start up or improveits tool room operations. There werethe usual shor tag es of space, per-sonnel, materials, and time, all ofwhich influenced operations to


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Commonly used parts are mounted on plywood sheets, marked with the binlocationsof each part (top photo). Mechanicscan locate he parts they need -andthe bin number- efore going to the parts attendants window.

Tee, prompang constant30 the resulting product

LcIlcLcp years worth of daily com-promises and adjustments in ourtool room operation.Although the tool room is bu t asmal l slice of our maintenance op-eration, it is the foundation of ourservice program. More often th annot, our tool room accurately re-flects the health of our overallmaintenance. The centralization ofthe tool room systems with themaintenance indicators they pro-vide, allows the unit leadership aquite valuable view of overall oper-ations. The tool room accuratelyreflects the areas critical to effec-tive maintenance. In the course ofour normal tool room operations,

we constantly revise, implement,review, and revise our operationalprocedures to address these criticalareas. Th is article includes some ofth e operational procedures and in-spection methods we found effec-tive.Of course, this squadron has n otachieved the optimum in tool roomoperation i n only a year; that wouldbe an absurd claim. But we havesuccessfully assembled a tool roomand a system - nder less thanoptimum conditions- nd we havea healthy start.May-June19878 ARMOR


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The Tool RoomAs Information CenterIt is possible- he way our, andmost other maintenance opera-tions, are configured- o determinethe status of five or more criticalmaintenance operating systemswithout leaving th e tool room. Mak-in g a one-hour, on-site review ofyour tool room operations ca n pro-vide greater i nsights into your op-erations tha n just about anythingelse you can do in 60 shor t minutes.During a routine stop -when wespot-check test, measurement, anddiagnostic equipment (TMDE), forexample - we obviously can seethe overall condition and calibra-tion status of that equipment. Butmore importantly, we gai n insightinto what isnt being done. Its apretty good bet, for example, tha t ifthe 600-foot-pound torque wrenchor STE-ICE is unserviceable or notcalibrated, its not being used.Good main tenance depends on fol-lowing procedures and meetingtolerances. Field expedient repairshave no place in a scheduled ser-vice. Guesswork is expensive.Special tools - he category oftool that the Army expends limit-less time a nd effort to field - n-able your mechanic to accomplishspecific maintenance operations ona specific vehicle. Without thosespecial tools to accomplish an op-eration, it generally doesnt getdone. For each vehicle type as-signed, we review the special toollistings in the corresponding -20maintenance manual , and comparethe list with the tool rooms on-hand quantities. At a glance then,we see that Bradley Fighting Ve-hicle fire suppression tests arentbeing done because th e tool isnt on-hand. Also check to see if the spe-cial tools an d TMDE on ha nd aredisplayed and easily available.Odds are good that if they arecubby-holed, hey arent being used.The frequency of using parts andtools usually determines how easilythey can be issued: The tool roomattend ant will, by na ture, keep theoften-used tools handy.We can form a fairly accuratepicture of the supply sta tus of theoperation on a weekly basis, i n avery few minutes, by inspecting theitems we stock and the due-instatusofmissing bench stock items.The questions asked are simple.

Monitoring the condition of safety equipment gives the leader a good indicationofhow frequently it is used. Keeping the safety equipment readily available helpsensure that it will be used.



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Are the re empty bins? Doesthe ooland spare parts attendant havestockage control cards or some sys-tem to ensure that the parts na-tional stock numbers are retained?Are there stockage levels for eachpart? Does the tool and repair par tsatt end ant have document numbersto account for all zero balanceitems? Does he stock sufficient par tlines for the number and types ofvehicles we maintain?Are there metric items on-handtorepair those vehicles requiringthem? (Deadlining a n Ml Al for acritical metric washer shouldnot bea common practice. How difficultisit to identify, locate, and issue abench stock item? One way to findout is to grab a bolt off the shopfloor- here ar e always a few onth e floor under th e par ts washer-and ask the attendant for a nut tofit. Then observe. What processmust t he att end ant complete priorto issuing the nut? Try to think of asimple process so th at the customerca n easily, accurately, and quicklyidentify th e needed part by a ca ta-loging system before involving theatten dant . One way to do this is tomount all stocked QSS items on 2square sheets of 3 / 4 plywood,within reach of the mechanic, andcataloged by alphanumeric bin lo-cation. All the mechanic h as to dois match the in-hand part to thedesired par t mounted on the board,and provide the a ttendant with thecorresponding bin location. All th eattendant has to dois locate the binspecified by the mechanic, andissue the part. The less time theattendantha s to spend in the trans-action, the better.

Monitoring Shop SafetyIn looking at the s tatus of safetyitems, your operation comes intoeven clearer focus, an d it will bequickly obvious the extent to whichyour organiza tion stresses safe

operation.The presence, serviceability, a ndlocation of safety equipment, (orlack of same), graphically revealshow often it is used. By checkingth e tool issue log for a past issue ofa n tem of equipment requiring pro-tective gear, it is easy to seewhether protective gea r was issuedwith t he item. Are there sufficientsets of hearing protection readilyavailable to each person assigned?Are safety glasses issued to eachsoldier wearing glasses? Are faceshiel

armor magazine, may-june 1987

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