armor magazine janmar13

The Professional Bulletin of the Armor Branch, Headquarters, Department of the Army, PB 17-13-1

Editor in ChiefLISA ALLEY

CommandantCOL PAUL J. LAUGHLIN

ARMOR (ISSN 0004-2420) is published bi month ly by the U.S. Army Armor School, McGinnis-Wickam Hall (Bldg. 4), Suite W142, 1 Karker Street, Fort Benning, GA 31905.

Disclaimers: The information contained in ARMOR repre-sents the professional opinions of the authors and does not necessarily reflect the official Army, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command or U.S. Army Armor School position, nor does it change or supersede any information presented in other official Army publications.

Manuscripts and their accompanying figures become gov-ernment property and public domain upon receipt in AR-MOR editorial offices. (The ideas within the manuscript re-main the author’s intellectual property and may be reused by the author, but the work itself - the particular expression of the ideas - passes to public domain upon receipt of the manuscript.) ARMOR staff will make necessary grammar, syntax and style corrections on the text to meet publication standards and will redesign illustrations and charts for clar-ity and to standards as necessary. ARMOR staff may co-ordinate changes with authors in the interest of ensuring that content remains accurate and professionally develop-mental. As a non-copyrighted government publication, no copyright is granted if a work is published in ARMOR, and in general, no copyrighted works should be submitted for consideration to publish. On occasion, however, ARMOR may wish to publish copyrighted material, and in that in-stance, individual authors’ copyrights will be protected by special arrangement.

As the primary purpose of ARMOR content is the profes-sional development of Armor Branch soldiers, ARMOR prints only materials for which the Armor School has propo-nency: armored, direct-fire ground combat systems not serv-ing primarily as infantry carriers; weapons used exclusively in these systems or by CMF 19-series enlisted soldiers; mis-cellaneous items of equipment which armored and armored cavalry organizations use exclusively; training for all 19-se-ries officers and CMF 19-series enlisted soldiers; and infor-mation concerning the training, logistics, history and leader-ship of armor and armored cavalry units at a brigade/regi-ment level and below, to include Threat units at those levels.

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Reprints: ARMOR is published by the authority of the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, and is in the public domain except where copyright is indicated. ARMOR requests that reprinted material carry credit given to ARMOR and the author. Direct inquiries to Editor in Chief, ARMOR, McGinnis-Wickam Hall (Bldg. 4), Suite W142, 1 Karker Street, Fort Benning, GA 31905.

January-March 2013, Vol. CXXII, No. 1

Official:

JOYCE E. MORROWAdministrative Assistant to the

Secretary of the Army1229802

By Order of the Secretary of the Army:

Features 5 Armor School Hosts Inaugural Gainey Cup 7 How to Eat Steak with a Knife and Fork! A Return to the Core Competencies That Make Our Maneuver Force Indomitable by LTC Andre L. Mackey

12 Cavalry Leaders’ Course: More Than 25 Years of Training Cavalry Professionals by MAJ Ryan J. Gainey, CPT Joe Byerly and CPT Brian J. Harris

16 The Army Reconnaissance Course by Nicole Randall

19 Cavalry in the Future Fight: An Environment for Cavalry Forces by MAJ Irvin W. Oliver

23 Conventional Advising: A Tactical Leader’s Assessment of a Strategic Initiative by 1LT Pace L. Jaworski

26 Army National Guard Armor Schools by LTC Frederick P. Gilson

28 ADP/ADRP 3-90: Offense and Defense by Douglas A. Darling

29 Team Cobra: A Motorized Tank Company In Support of Operation New Dawn by CPT Patrick C. Howlett 32 Establishing a Multinational Partner Exchange Program: Why It Is Important to the U.S. Army as the Operational Environment Changes by MAJ Larry J. Croucher and CPT Tarik K. Fulcher

38 One Size Fits All: the Future of the Scout Platoon and Squad by SFC David J. Neuzil

43 Preparing for the Decisive-Action Training Environment by CPT Aaron E. Adams

Departments 1 Contacts 2 Reviews 3 Commandant’s Hatch 4 Gunner’s Seat 48 Supscription Information 49 Shoulder-sleeve Insignia: 34th Armor Regiment

RAYMOND T. ODIERNOGeneral, United States Army

Chief of Staff

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ARMOR Editorial Offices

Editor in Chief Lisa Alley (706) 545-9503 Email: [email protected] DSN 835

Deputy Editor Erin Wold (706) 545-8701 Email: [email protected] DSN 835

Art Director Jody Harmon (706) 545-5754 Email: [email protected] DSN 835

Editorial Assistant Jenny Forte (706) 545-2698 Email: [email protected] DSN 835

U.S. Army Armor School

Commandant (ATZK-DF) COL Paul J. Laughlin (706) 545-2029 Email: [email protected] DSN 835

Deputy Commandant (ATZK-DF) COL Scott D. King (706) 545-3815 Email: [email protected] DSN: 835

Armor School Command Sergeant Major (ATZK-CSM) CSM Miles S. Wilson (706) 545-2029 Email: [email protected] DSN 835

192nd Infantry Brigade (ATSH-BC) COL Ronald P. Clark (706) 544-8623 Email: [email protected] DSN 784

194th Armored Brigade (ATZK-BAZ) COL Kevin S. MacWatters (706) 626-5989 Email: [email protected] DSN 620

316th Cavalry Brigade (ATZK-SBZ) COL David S. Davidson (706) 626-8105 Email: [email protected] DSN 620

Office, Chief of Armor (ATZK-AR) George DeSario (706) 545-1352 Email: [email protected] DSN 835

Contacts

REVIEWS

When visiting Fort Benning, please stop in at any of our library locations:

�� Armor Research Library Bldg. 5205 (Harmony Church)

�� Donovan Research Library Bldg. 70 (Main Post)

For 24/7 access, visit http://www.benning.army.mil/library/

…the places where Soldiers go for information 24/7 wherever they are in the world.

MCoE Libraries

M.J. Akbar is editorial director of India To-day, an English-language weekly that is the region’s equivalent to Newsweek or TIME Magazine. Anyone interested in an Indian perspective of local and regional issues should peruse the magazine and its Web-site. The author lives in Delhi and is also an editor for the Sunday Guardian, another Indian weekly magazine. His book, Tin-derbox, offers a deep yet India-centric view of Pakistan’s history.

The author proposes that Pakistan is a suc-cessor state to the Mughal Empire, and a search for a Muslim space defines its identi-ty. To this end, Akbar discusses the scars that pre-date the formation of modern India and Pakistan. They include the Shiite Safavid Persian Nadir Shah (1739-1757), who en-tered Delhi and massacred 20,000 Hindus and Muslims. The Mughals, a Muslim dy-nasty ruling India, failed in its basic duty to protect its people from 58 days of terror, plunder and murder.

The Sunni cleric Shah Waliullah tried to make sense of this Shiite Safavid scourge. Waliullah’s remedy was to conduct an ideo-logical and emotional separation from Hin-dus. He advocated that Muslims should live far enough from Hindus that one should not see the smoke from their kitchen fires. Waliullah also stimulated opposition to the

British East India Company that culminat-ed in the 1757 Battle of Plassey.

Another figure the book discusses is Sayyed Ahmed Barlevi, a disciple of Waliullah, who incited battles against Sikhs in the Punjab, ending in the Battle of Balakot in 1831.

These events define identities in India as well as Pakistan.

It is regrettable that the founder of Pakistan, Mohammed Ali Jinnah, and the father of modern India, Mohandas Gandhi, died in 1948. In the case of Pakistan, the book ar-gues that Jinnah died without establishing a more moderate definition of the role of Islam in a polity. The father of South Asian Islamist politics, Maulana Maududi – whose views would be realized with the ascendan-cy of the dictatorship of GEN Zia-ul-Haq – defined this. Akbar argues that the remedy for Pakistan is the transformation of the body politic and the struggle between the visions of Jinnah vs. Maududi.

In case you think this history doesn’t matter, Akbar highlights four major figures in Mus-lim India:

Mahmud of Ghazni (d. 1030) emerged from Afghanistan and established the Ghaznavid Dynasty in parts of India, Afghanistan and Iran. Hindus hold him responsible for the sack of their temple in Somanath.

Muhammad of Ghauri (d. 1206) established Muslim rule from Gujurat to Bengal.

Zahir-u-Din Babur (d. 1530) founded the Mughal Empire.

Ahmed Shah Abdali (d. 1773) defeated the Hindus in 1761 in the Battle of Panipat, re-placing the Hindu king in Delhi.

All four of Pakistan’s nuclear missiles are named for these four figures of regional his-tory. Also, in 1951 Prime Minister Jawa-harlal Nehru unsuccessfully dissuaded his ministers from attending the rededication of the Hindu temple in Somanath.

The book does a great job outlining the evolution of Islamic thought in India, such as the codification of Hanafi law (one of four major schools of Sunni Islam) and how some sought a return to fundamentalism by emulating an idealized view of Arabs and not Turks or Hindus. Another fascinating aspect of the book is the discussion of Brit-ain’s sending 16 military expeditions be-tween 1850 and 1857, with a final push in 1863 to defeat what they termed a Wah-habi (a subsection of Hanbali Sunni Is-lam) insurrection in the Northwest Fron-tier provinces.

Akbar discusses how the British used the politics of sectarianism to divide and rule, and quotes Lord Macaulay (1800-1859): “We must do our best to form a class who may be interpreters between us and the mil-lions we govern.” This decade-long colonial policy exacerbated the trauma of partition in 1947.

There is much for the reader to learn with this book; I had to re-read chapters to un-derstand the nuances and complexity of the subcontinent. Readers with an interest in Pakistan and India will find this book worth reading, discussing and debating.

YOUSSEF ABOUL-ENEINCDR, U.S. Navy

2 January-March 2013

Tinderbox: The Past and Future of Pakistan by M.J. Akbar. Originally published in 2011 and re-issued in pa-perback in 2012 by HarperCollins (Harper Perennial), New York.

Reviews

gnette reminds us of the words spoken in the late 1970s by then-COL Crosbie E. Saint as he defined the ideal scout:

The requirement to conduct both recon-naissance and security belongs in all or-ganizations: infantry, Stryker and armored BCTs as well as in the echelons above the brigade level. This will be the major fo-cus for the Armor School as we work to deliver outcomes that will shape future Cavalry forces across all BCTs. Those outcomes will address the doctrine, or-ganizations, training, materiel, leadership, personnel and facilities considerations the Army must consider to get the future of reconnaissance right. Our Army is at a critical juncture in determining the future of reconnaissance and security, so please take the time to contribute to the debate when you read our products, and prepare and disseminate your own papers. Please consider attending our Reconnaissance Summit/Maneuver Conference in the fall.

Forge the Thunderbolt!

Giddyup! 47

COMMANDANT’S HATCH

COL Paul J. LaughlinCommandantU.S. Army Armor School

Reconnaissance and Security“You can never have too much recon-naissance.” - GEN George S. Patton Jr., War As I Knew It, 1947

As the Army transitions to the regionally aligned forces concept and to the Brigade Combat Team 2020 structure, we are an-alyzing our reconnaissance formations at every level. We are focusing the discus-sion on reconnaissance and security in the Army by having conversations with stake-holders and are drafting white papers and articles to shape the debate and inform a wide audience. Our intent is to mature these thoughts with your input and then discuss them at the 2013 Reconnaissance Summit/Maneuver Conference this fall. With this effort in mind, here are some initial thoughts on the future of recon-naissance and security operations.

Any time we are talking about reconnais-sance and security, we must ensure we are speaking from a common doctrinal refer-ence. Recommend we look to the past to inform our future and that we emphasize the established fundamentals of recon-naissance and the fundamentals of secu-rity. These fundamentals are time-tested and are applicable in all environments and at all levels when conducting either recon-naissance or security operations. The first priority must be to ensure that our recon-naissance formations can still apply these fundamentals in any and all environments.

Second, our scouts, even with all the in-telligence assets they may have access to, must always be able to fight for informa-tion. To do this, they require tactical mo-bility to maneuver and ability to occupy the terrain required to achieve the com-mander’s intent, the protection to survive encounter actions with a superior force, and sufficient direct and indirect firepower to defeat threats when necessary. These capabilities will help ensure that our scouts can report the commander’s infor-mation requirements in a timely manner and continue to report throughout the

length of the engagement. This, in turn, enables the commander to make contact with the enemy under the most favorable conditions possible.

Some within the Army are proposing that reconnaissance units place a larger em-phasis on surveillance vs. security. Sur-veillance is a tactical task that we inte-grate into all reconnaissance and securi-ty missions and is not a separate, distinct task. Experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan and the demands of future conflict place a premium on effective security opera-tions. We conduct security operations to protect forces, facilities and critical activi-ties and to prevent surprise. Area securi-ty across wide areas will remain a criti-cal Cavalry competency, as will offensive and defensive security operations. Our Cavalry and scouts must be able to pro-vide the commander with early warning, prevent the premature deployment of ma-neuver forces and protect freedom of movement along our lines of communi-cation. Our reconnaissance and security elements must be resourced to screen, guard and, at times, cover their parent or-ganizations when tasked to do so.

As we talk about our Cavalry’s require-ment to conduct both reconnaissance and security, one need only think of the 1st

U.S. Cavalry’s actions at Gettysburg. In that battle, GEN John Buford was able to first find the enemy and report their pres-ence to his commander. As the situation developed, Buford did what all good Cavalrymen do – he sent reports to every commander who needed to share the com-mon picture. These commanders, armed with knowledge of the situation, deployed effectively upon arrival. Most important-ly, Buford’s force was able to fight effec-tively on the first day to ensure Union forces gained situational awareness, re-tained the key terrain and prepared for battle. Buford’s ability to fight for infor-mation set the conditions for the Union Army’s victory at Gettysburg. This vi-

January-March 2013 3

“He must be capable of finding the enemy and knowing what he sees. He should be able to go forward to find the enemy and have the firepower with and behind him to get out of trouble. Most of all, he must be capable of semi-independent operations on the battlefield. He must be resourceful – he must be the most clever of all fel-lows. He takes individual actions that are not dictated by the actions of what other squads or platoons are taking; no one is constantly looking over his shoulder.”

Commandant’s Hatch

CSM Miles S. Wilson Command Sergeant Major U.S. Army Armor School

GUNNER’S SEAT

The Scout Platoon of 2020The Army is known as a regimented, dis-ciplined and uniform organization. We have regulations, manuals, tables of or-ganizations and allocations, and the Uni-form Code of Military Justice to ensure we all look and act alike. Standard oper-ating procedures; tactics, techniques and procedures; and Center of Army Lessons Learned notices ensure that even down to the lowest unit level, we as an Army operate very similarly. So what happened to the scout platoon?

I enlisted as a 19D in 1986. I was trained on the Cavalry Fighting Vehicle in one-station unit training. My first platoon in Germany consisted of six CFVs and 30 scouts. My second platoon at Fort Hood, TX, was the same thing. I had to success-fully pass all Bradley gunnery skill tasks just to get into the Basic Noncommis-sioned Officer Course. I attended the Bradley Master Gunner Course and com-manded a CFV in Desert Storm. I fol-lowed that up with a rotation to the Na-tional Training Center in February 1992.

Twenty years and a whole lot of history later, the Army has no less than five dif-ferent scout platoons.

On the surface, an armored brigade com-bat team reconnaissance squadron and a combined-arms battalion’s scout pla-toons look identical, but a closer look shows a difference in the NCO alloca-tions. These two platoons have three Bradleys, five humvees and 36 Soldiers. A Stryker BCT’s scout platoon is four Stryker reconnaissance vehicles and 23 Soldiers. An infantry BCT’s scout pla-toon is six humvees and 24 Soldiers. Fi-nally, the scout platoon in a battlefield surveillance brigade is six humvees and 18 Soldiers. We all know that scouts are very resourceful and that the Army wants flexible, agile Soldiers with a depth of experience. But the preceding differenc-es make it very hard for a young 19D to develop into a true subject-matter expert NCO.

We at the Armor School are the propo-nents for change to bring uniformity to Army scout platoons. We feel all scout platoons should be six vehicles and 36 Soldiers. We concur with the Stryker RV for SBCTs, the Bradley for ABCTs, and we definitely do not concur with any scout

deploying in a humvee. Platforms will always be different among the different BCTs, but having two different plat-forms in one platoon is crazy. Especially when scouts are asked to do their job in a highly vulnerable wheeled vehicle around everyone else in highly surviv-able armored tracked vehicles.

The infantry squad went through this same dilemma not long ago. GEN Mar-tin Dempsey, the 37th Chief of Staff of the Army, made the decision that an Army infantry squad was nine Soldiers. Pros and cons for a nine-man squad exist, but decision made – move on. We feel that needs to happen now with the scout pla-toon. Once we have the platoon set, we can then debate and decide what a scout section, squad and team look like. We look forward to your thoughts and rec-ommendations.

Let us also never forget those who have paid the ultimate price and can no longer be with us, and all those great Americans currently serving in harm’s way.

Forge the Thunderbolt! Armor Strong!


Gunner’s Seat

Gainey Cup schedule (by day)

Day 0 March 1

Day 0 starts with the finalization of registration and in-processing. Once in-processing is complete, teams are given a welcome brief in Patton Hall, Harmony Church, that provides them with an overview of the competition, a timeline and the scoring criteria. After the wel-come brief, teams are released to start preparing and resting for the start of the event the fol-lowing morning.

Day 1 March 2

Day 1 starts with a validus disciplus event that evaluates each scout’s physical fitness and endurance level. Teams are then tested on target identification and their ability to recognize various friendly vehicles, threat vehicles and weapon systems. Following target identifica-tion, scouts are issued weapons, night-vision devices, radios and other equipment for follow-on operations. At this time, teams are divided into two groups: Alpha and Bravo.

Day 2 March 3Day 2 sees the Alpha group at Fort Benning’s Digital Multipurpose Range Complex execut-ing a live-fire exercise and the Bravo group in the maneuver training area conducting a re-connaissance lane, OP emplacement testing and HLZ establishment testing.

Day 3 March 4 Day 3 is the same as Day 2, but Alpha group is on the reconnaissance lane and Bravo group is conducting the LFX.

Day 4 March 5

Day 4 begins with teams airlifted on rotary-wing aircraft from Fort Benning’s training areas to Harmony Church. There teams make a two-mile foot march, with all assigned equipment, to 194th Armored Brigade’s obstacle course. At the obstacle course, scouts take a written exam on reconnaissance fundamentals, then tackle six obstacles. Once teams are through all obstacles, they march three more miles as a tactical task to Brave Rifles Field.

The U.S. Army Armor School’s 316th Cavalry Brigade is hosting the first

Gainey Cup competition March 2-5 at Fort Benning, GA, to determine the Ar-my’s best scout team. The Gainey Cup will test Cavalrymen physically and mentally on their fundamental skills in reconnaissance and surveillance.

Twenty teams from Regular Army ma-neuver divisions, separate brigade com-bat teams and the Army National Guard are projected to provide their best or-ganic scout team to compete in the event. Teams will consist of five mili-tary-occupational specialty 19D Sol-diers: two noncommissioned officers (corporal, sergeant or staff sergeant) and three Soldiers (private/private first class and specialist).

“The 2012 Inaugural Gainey Cup will determine the best scout team in the U.S. Army,” said COL Paul J. Laughlin, 47th Chief of Armor. “It is a physically and mentally demanding world-class event that will rigorously test the troop-ers’ competence and fortitude in recon-naissance and security skills. This year we are excited to start up and host a high-quality team competition that our troopers will want to attend and com-pete in … now and in the future.”

Scout teams will run a gauntlet of tasks to evaluate their Cavalry-specific skills such as reconnaissance fundamentals, target identification, call for fire, troop-leading procedures, day and night live-

fire, obstacle courses, observation-post establishment, helicopter landing zone establishment, knowledge of weapons, communication devices and sensors, and physical endurance.

The Cavalrymen will charge headfirst on Day 1 with the validus disciplus. The event will challenge their physical apti-tude and ability to work as a team. The validus disciplus will start with a five-mile foot march. Cavalrymen must com-plete their march as a team in no more than 75 minutes; anything less will gain them a five-point reward, and anything slower will result in a five-point penal-ty. Each team can only begin the other events after each scout on their team fin-ishes the march.

Once scouts complete the march as a team, they will move toward the seven-event circuit that will consist of push-ups, sit-ups, pull-ups, dips, rope climb, tire flip and a “last 100 yards” dash that will consist of a humvee push, skedco pull, “farmer’s walk” with two five-gal-lon water cans and a final sprint.

Each event will consist of one team ac-complishing the event’s tasks individu-ally, with the only exception the last 100 yards, where the event must be accom-plished as a team.

•Push-ups and sit-ups will be graded by how many repetitions each scout on the team can do under one minute to the Army Physical Fitness Test standard.

Armor School Hosts Inaugural Gainey Cup•The pull-up event will begin and

end with each scout in the dead hang, doing as many pull-ups as possible by bringing his chin par-allel to the top of the bar for each repetition until muscle failure.

•The dips station will start with the each scout’s arms locked in the up position, doing as many dips as possible by lowering his body until his upper arms are parallel to the bar, then returning to the up position until muscle failure.

•The tire flip will force each scout to flip a tire across the field from a set starting position to a finish line.

•The rope climb will task each scout to climb the rope, touch a marker portion of the rope and return to the ground with no time limit.

•Finally, the last-100-yards event will test the whole team’s strength, speed and teamwork with a humvee push across a parking lot, a simulated skedco pull, a “farmer’s walk,” where a scout carries two five-gallon water cans, and a sprint to the finish as a team.

After the team completes their lanes, they will take a target-identification exam, where they will identify friendly and threat vehicles, and their weapon systems.

The LFX of Days 2 and 3 will test Cav-alrymen’s ability to observe named ar-eas of interest, acquire targets and en-gage them with both direct and indirect


The Gainey Cup, a new competition to determine the Army’s best scout team, is named for CSM William J. “Joe” Gainey.Gainey was the first senior-enlisted ad-viser to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, then a newly created position. The position was established to advise the chairman on profession-ally developing enlisted personnel as-signed to Joint billets.Gainey began to serve in this position Oct. 1, 2005. He retired April 25, 2008, after nearly 33 years of service.Gainey was known to carry a steel ball bearing from an Abrams tank in his pocket, which he called his “military bearing.” He encouraged Soldiers to ask him if he had his military bearing. If he was able to respond to the chal-lenge by producing it, both he and the challenging Soldier dropped and did push-ups. If he did not have it, the Sol-dier was awarded a battalion coin.Gainey completed basic training at Fort Knox, KY, in June 1975, and after that served in a number of enlisted leader-ship positions, from gunner to com-

Best scout team competition named for top enlisted leadermand sergeant major. Gainey’s assign-ments included driver, loader, gunner and tank commander, 1st Battalion, 67th Armor (Tiger Brigade), 2nd Armored Di-vision, Fort Hood, TX; gunner, tank commander and platoon sergeant, 4th Battalion, 73rd Armored, 1st Infantry Di-vision, Böblingen, Germany; platoon leader, 2nd Battalion, 70th Armored, 24th Infantry Division, Fort Stewart, GA; drill sergeant and senior drill sergeant, 19th Battalion, 4th Training Brigade, Fort Knox; platoon sergeant and operations sergeant, 3rd Battalion, 73rd Armor, 82nd Airborne Division, Fort Bragg, NC; pla-toon sergeant and first sergeant, 1st Battalion, 509th Infantry Airborne, Joint Readiness Training Center, Fort Polk, LA; and senior-enlisted armor adviser, Fort Jackson, SC.

Gainey’s command sergeant major po-sitions included 2nd Battalion, 68th Ar-mored Regiment, and 1st Battalion, 35th Armored Regiment, 2nd Brigade Com-bat Team, 1st Armored Division, Baum-holder, Germany; Eagle Base, Bosnia and Herzegovina; 1st Squadron, 2nd Ar-mored Cavalry Regiment, Fort Polk; 2nd Brigade, 3rd Infantry Division, Fort

Stewart; 2nd Armored Cavalry Regi-ment, Fort Polk; U.S. Army Armor Cen-ter, Fort Knox; and III Corps and Fort Hood.

Gainey’s deployments included Opera-tion Joint Endeavor, Operation Joint Guard and Operation Joint Forge in Bosnia and Herzegovina. He also served as the command sergeant ma-jor for the Combined Joint Task Force 7 and as the command sergeant major of the Multinational Corps-Iraq in Opera-tion Iraqi Freedom II.

Gainey attended many military schools and training programs, including Drill Sergeant School, Airborne School, Jumpmaster School, Air Movement Of-ficer’s Course, Observer-Controller Course, First Sergeants Course, Path-finder School and the U.S. Army Ser-geants Major Academy.

Gainey holds an associate’s of applied science degree from Vincennes Univer-sity, a bachelor’s of science degree in business administration from Touro Uni-versity International and a master’s of arts degree in education from Trident University International.

fires, and properly report. Fragmentary orders will instruct teams to observe two NAIs and will specify their engagement and displacement criteria. From a pre-established OP, scouts will engage tar-gets with the section of 81mm mortars that is providing them indirect-fire sup-port. A series of trucks, troops and ar-mored fighting vehicles will also be present to test scouts’ marksmanship and their knowledge of the engagement and displacement criteria.

Concurrently, teams on the DMPRC will be tested on weapons familiarization. Scouts will assemble, disassemble and perform a functions check on a variety of different weapon systems that are or-ganic to Cavalry formations. Weapon systems the scouts will be tested on are the M9 automatic pistol, M4 carbine, M240B machinegun, M2 heavy-barrel machinegun, Mk19 automatic grenade launcher and command launch unit for the Javelin. Each team must complete the day LFX, weapons familiarization and night LFX.

The reconnaissance lane of Days 2 and 3 will test Cavalrymen’s ability to plan and execute a dismounted reconnais-sance operation. Teams will be issued a FRAGO instructing them to observe an NAI that is about seven kilometers from their current location. They will be re-quired to plan their route, conduct a link-up with a host-nation force, maneu-ver into their OP and report any activity within their NAI without being compro-mised by enemy forces. Once they re-port activity in the NAI, they will dis-place to a specified location and estab-

lish an HLZ to standard. Following the HLZ’s establishment, the teams will be tested on their ability to establish a dis-mounted observation post to standard. At the OP site, teams will be given a Long-Range Advanced Scout Surveil-lance System with all needed equip-ment, tripod, range card and all equip-ment to build a directional antenna.

On the final day, Day 4, the teams will be airlifted out of the training areas back to Harmony Church to complete the last events, which will consist of a two-mile foot march, a written exam, a six-lane obstacle course and a final three-mile foot march to the finish line. Each team will conduct the air movement with all their gear and, upon landing, will start their two-mile foot march to the obsta-cle course. Once the teams finish the march’s first leg, they will then take a written test that will challenge their knowledge on reconnaissance funda-mentals.

After each team completes their test, they can begin the obstacle course, which team members must start and fin-ish together. Cavalrymen must take all their assigned equipment through each obstacle, with the exception of “The Tough One” obstacle.

After all six obstacles have been nego-tiated, each scout team will conduct the final three miles of the foot march to the finish line at Brave Rifles Field. Once all teams have crossed the finish line and have accounted for all their as-signed equipment, the scores will be tal-lied and the 47th Chief of Armor will

recognize the best scout team in the Army.

The Gainey Cup will be a spectator-friendly event that will allow friends, family and other interested personnel the opportunity to view the competition as it is underway. Buses will be used to transport spectators from Harmony Church to the competition sites. People interested in viewing the event should report to the 316th Cavalry Brigade’s battle captain’s desk at Bldg. 5142, Har-mony Church, Fort Benning, for a copy of the events and transportation sched-ules. No special equipment is required for spectators to watch the competition.

For more information about the Gainey Cup, contact CPT Joshua S. Hearn at (706) 626-8169 or [email protected]. Or, visit either the official Website or the competition’s Facebook page at http://www.benning.army.mil/armor/GaineyCup/index.html and h t t p s : / / w w w. f a c e b o o k . c o m / # ! /groups/528944870458594/.

DMPRC – Digital Multipurpose Range ComplexFRAGO – fragmentary orderHLZ – helicopter landing zoneLFX – live-fire exerciseNAI – named area of interestOP – observation postTLP – troop-leading procedures

Acronym Quick-ScAn


mailto:joshua.s.hearn.mil%40mail.mil?subject=

mailto:joshua.s.hearn.mil%40mail.mil?subject=

How to Eat Steak with a Knife and Fork! A Return to the Core Competencies That Make Our Maneuver Force Indomitable

by LTC Andre L. Mackey

During multiple conferences, summits and task-review boards, a common theme arose among leaders at the Maneuver Center of Excellence: our maneuver force needs to return to training the core competencies and re-emphasize precision gunnery and the fundamentals of reconnaissance and security. During the past de-cade, Army leaders prioritized efforts and resources for training counterinsurgency operations, knowing that most of their com-bat operations would center on COIN and not on combined-arms maneuver. That COIN focus necessitated our full attention and influenced the way a generation of Soldiers trained and pre-pared for operations. Along with the associated non-deployed activities, senior Army leaders now recognize that many critical combat skills of the maneuver force have atrophied and need a re-energized training focus.

The institutional-learning process associated with our return to execution of combined-arms maneuver includes shifting to de-cisive-action rotations at the combat training centers and to re-invigorating our functional training base. Many of the courses that ensure we successfully regain our combat skills are avail-able within the MCoE’s Armor School. To ensure Soldiers and leaders attend the appropriate courses, course managers and com-manders within the institutional force need to ensure operation-al-force commanders are fully aware of all schooling opportu-nities and the intended training audience.

This article will inform readers of available Armor and Cavalry functional courses, explain their purpose and describe the popu-lation each course trains. Starting with the Cavalry Leaders’ Course, this article will also highlight the Army Reconnaissance

Course and the various master-gunner courses. The overall ob-jective is to increase understanding of and attendance in these critical courses. (Editor’s note: Separate articles on the CLC and ARC are also available in this edition. MG courses will be fea-tured in a future edition.)

Third Squadron, 16th Cavalry Regiment, 316th Cavalry Brigade, conducts all Cavalry and Armor functional courses (CLC, ARC and various MG courses) at Fort Benning, GA.

CLCCLC is the only course in the U.S. Army focused on training troop-level leadership in Cavalry organizations. It is open to of-ficers and senior noncommissioned officers assigned to any type of Cavalry squadron. Chapter 10 of Department of the Army Pamphlet 600-3 states that 19A “officers assigned to a Cavalry organization after completion of [a captain’s career course] must attend the Cavalry Leader Course.”1 We want to ensure as many leaders as possible attend CLC, not only 19A officers.

To meet eligibility, you must be an officer in the Army or Ma-rine Corps with the rank of first lieutenant (promotable) through lieutenant colonel, and you must have graduated any captain’s career course. Also, you should be on orders for assignment to a reconnaissance Cavalry organization. Warrant officers (avia-tion, field artillery, military intelligence) in the ranks of chief warrant officer three through five who are serving in reconnais-sance units on staff or in aviation units are also encouraged to attend.

Figure 1. The daily focus of CLC’s class progression is the same for the resident or mobile-training-team course iterations.

The NCO audience is sergeants first class or above who are graduates of the Battle Staff Course and are assigned as, or se-lected to be assigned as, a reconnaissance/Cavalry troop first sergeant, squadron operations sergeant or operations sergeant major.

Our instructors conduct CLC over 15 training days with an em-phasis on understanding reconnaissance and security funda-mentals in addition to the tactics required to conduct reconnais-sance and security operations at troop level in support of unified land operations. The premise behind instructing and developing planning proficiency at troop level is that a professional under-standing of the roles of the commander and first sergeant direct-ly correlates to planning proficiency at the next higher level (squadron and brigade) as S-3s, executive officers and opera-tions NCOs or operations sergeant majors.

Figure 1 shows CLC class progression with a daily focus, and is the same for the resident or mobile-training-team course itera-tions.

ARCARC focuses on scout-platoon-level leadership and has a great-er emphasis on the execution of reconnaissance and security op-erations in the field. DA PAM 600-3 states, “ARC is required for all [19A-Armor] lieutenants assigned to a Cavalry or recon-naissance platoon regardless of the platform the unit utilizes.” ARC’s primary target audience includes section leaders, scout platoon sergeants and scout platoon leaders.

The prerequisites for ARC are:

•��Active Army/Marine and Reserve Component com-missioned officer (second lieutenant through captain) and commissioned allied officers – (1) who are as-signed (or will be assigned) to a reconnaissance unit; (2) who are in Career Management Field armor (19), infan-try (11), engineers (21), aviation (15), military intelli-gence (96), field artillery (13); and (3) who have suc-cessfully completed their branch’s Basic Officer Leader-ship Course.

•��Warrant officers (warrant officer one through chief war-rant officer three) – (1) who are assigned (or will be as-

signed) to a reconnaissance unit; and (2) who have com-pleted Warrant Officer Candidate-Aviation training.

•��NCOs – (1) who have successfully completed Advanced Leadership Course and (2) are assigned (or will be as-signed) to a reconnaissance unit.

As of Nov. 1, 2012, graduation from ARC awards an additional skill identifier of R7. This ASI will also be retroactive and apply to all graduates of the Armor School’s previous reconnaissance courses: Scout Platoon Leaders Course and Scout Leaders Course. The 3rd Squadron, 16th Cavalry Regiment, is currently working with the Office of the Chief of Armor to assign the R7 ASI to modified table of organization and equipment positions in all reconnaissance formations, regardless of platform, to formalize the requirements for all section sergeants, senior scouts and scout platoon sergeants.

ARC implements Army Learning Model 2015 and is the pre-mier course at the MCoE for integrating adaptive Soldier leader training and education (formerly known as outcomes-based training and education). This physically and mentally demand-ing course produces a Cavalry professional who possesses the following:

•��A higher understanding of the commander’s information needs;

•��Improved ability to plan and execute reconnaissance-and-security missions at the platoon level;

•��Competence with supporting assets (indirect fire and avi-ation);

•��Confidence at problem-solving; and•��Competence in mission-context problem-solving.

Figure 2 shows the course progression for ARC. Third Squad-ron conducts nine ARC classes annually, each class with a max-imum of 64 students. The ideal composition of each class is an approximately equal mix of officers and NCOs.

MG coursesThe Cavalry functional courses strengthen our Army’s ability to gain and maintain contact with the enemy by producing recon-naissance-and-security leaders capable of operating within the commander’s intent and by providing maneuver commanders


Figure 2. ARC’s course progression. Third Squadron, 16th Cavalry Regiment, conducts nine ARC classes annually.

Figure 4. Course progression for the pilot R8 MGS MG course.

with the information they need to bring forces to bear at the de-cisive point in support of ULO.

ULO execution requires delivery of overwhelming precision firepower from a mobile, protected platform. Technologically advanced platforms like the M1-series main battle tank and the Stryker Mobile Gun System require dedicated professional sub-ject-matter experts to advise commanders from the company/troop to corps level on all aspects of precision gunnery execu-

Figure 3. The Abrams K8/A8 MG courses’ weekly focus.

tion, crew training, range execution and tactical employment of these systems to ensure combat readiness of these formations.

For more than 30 years, MG courses have produced these ex-perts for tank formations and, in the last few years, have devel-oped the same rigorous course for the Stryker MGS community.

In a subsequent article, master gunners will highlight each of the courses offered (K8 for the M1A2 system-enhancement package tank, A8 for the M1A1 and R8 for the Stryker MGS).


rophied skill set, the Army must develop a new generation of Cavalry and Armor leaders who have a firm grasp of the funda-mentals that made the U.S. Army combined-arms organization an indomitable force. Simultaneously, the Army must retain the lessons of the past decade of COIN operations.

The 3rd Squadron, 16th Cavalry, and the entire Armor School stand ready to provide the operational force with the relevant, professional functional courses designed to train the world’s best Armor and Cavalry leaders. We have conducted in-depth reviews and continue to make adjustments to these courses.

LTC Andre Mackey commands 3rd Squadron, 16th Cavalry Reg-iment. Previous assignments include deputy G-3 for operations, North Atlantic Treaty Organization Rapid Deployable Corps-Spain, Valencia, Spain; regimental S-3 operations officer, Regi-mental Headquarters and Headquarters Troop, 16th Cavalry Regiment; and squadron executive officer, Headquarters and Headquarters Troop, 1st Squadron, 16th Cavalry Regiment. LTC Mackey’s military schooling includes Joint and Combined Warfighting School, Command and General Staff College, Com-bined Arms and Service Staff School, M1A2 Tank Commanders Certification Course, Armor Officer Advanced Course, Armor Officer Basic Course and Army Basic Airborne School. He holds a bachelor’s of science degree in physics from Ball State Univer-sity and a master’s of science degree in military history from the University of Southern Mississippi.

Notes1 Department of the Army Pamphlet 600-3, Commissioned Officer Professional Development and Career Management, Feb. 1, 2010.

Points of contact

CLCCourse manager: (706) 626-8436

Training specialist: (706) 626-8038 or email [email protected]

3rd Squadron, 16th Cavalry RegimentCommander: (706) 626-8029

Command sergeant major: (706) 626-8030

Operations officer: (706) 626-8052

ARCCourse manager: (706) 626-8456

Senior instructor: (706) 626-8454

Training specialist: (706) 626-8038 or email at [email protected]

MG schoolTraining specialist: (706) 626-7907/7911 or email at [email protected]

The “snake chart” in Figure 3 provides a summary of the K8/A8 courses’ weekly focus.

The target audience for each of the M1-series MG courses are 19K sergeants (promotable) or staff sergeants who meet the fol-lowing pre-requisites: at least six months as a commander on their specific platform (M1A2 SEP or M1A1), qualified on Gunnery Table VI within the last 12 months and a general-tech-nical score of 105 (with a cut-off score of 110). A five-point waiver may be granted for either the GT or CO score, but not both.

Today the MG school trains at Fort Benning alongside their Bradley MG counterparts and, when possible, conducts training together where their respective classes converge. Current topics for these “convergence points” include machine guns, training management and surface-danger-area diagrams.

The MG school is also developing a stand-alone course to pro-duce MGS MGs. This course eliminates the prerequisite of an 11-week long A8/K8 MG course, reducing the total training time from 16 weeks to 8½ weeks. The first pilot for this shorter MGS course is scheduled to begin Jan. 25, 2013.

Figure 4 provides the “snake chart” for the pilot course.

ConclusionAs the Army continues to re-orient its operational-force training efforts on core competencies, commanders and command ser-geants major must redouble efforts to build the maneuver force’s ability to conduct reconnaissance-and-security opera-tions and combined-arms maneuver. These mission capabilities will continue to become more critical as the Army shifts back to the execution of the full range of military operations. To suc-ceed at these complex operations and overcome a somewhat at-

ARC – Army Reconnaissance CourseASI – additional skill identifierCLC – Cavalry Leader’s CourseCO – combat operationsCOIN – counterinsurgencyGT – general technicalMCoE – Maneuver Center of Excellence

Acronym Quick-ScAn

MG – master gunnerMGS – mobile gun systemNCO – noncommissioned officerDA PAM – Department of the Army pamphletR&S – reconnaissance and securitySEP – system-enhancement packageULO – unified land operations


Cavalry Leaders’ Course: More Than 25 Years of Training

Cavalry Professionalsby MAJ Ryan J. Gainey, CPT Joe Byerly

and CPT Brian J. Harris

Since its creation in 1987, the Caval-ry Leaders’ Course has answered the call of the force to provide training to leaders of reconnaissance organizations. Over the years, we have adapted our focus as the reconnaissance communi-ty shifted from high-intensity conflict to counterinsurgency to present-day decisive action.

The new course consists of a 15-day training curriculum that concentrates on the student’s understanding of fun-damentals in addition to the tactical pro-cedures required to conduct reconnais-sance and security operations at troop level in support of unified land oper-ations.

A CLC graduate will:

•Beasubject-matterexpertonre-conandsecurityfundamentals:Understand the effect of fundamen-tals applied to maneuver tactics; ap-

ply the fundamentals into planning through synchronization, task/pur-pose and timelines; demonstrate ability to train fellow leaders in the fundamentals; and increase organi-zational understanding/application.

•Demonstrateapplicationofmis-sionanalysis:Demonstrate im-proved ability to assess terrain and its impact on maneuver and ob-servation; demonstrate improved ability to assess enemy-forces ca-pabilities, disposition and courses of action; and demonstrate im-proved understanding of Cavalry task organization and capabilities.

•Demonstratemissioncommand:Effectively communicate through written (graphics) and verbal or-ders; prioritize recon objectives through effective resource alloca-tion; understand the commander’s critical information requirements

of the higher commander; and de-velop commander’s guidance that effectively communicates intent.

•Integrate supporting assets:Demonstrate understanding of unit/system and supporting range/dis-tances; employ collection assets ef-fectively; and demonstrate ability to effectively plan the employment of air- and ground-based fires to sup-port recon and security operations.

The course has modified its format to align with Army Learning Model 2015, which emphasizes experiential learn-ing and shifts content delivery from instructor-led to instructor-facilitated. By avoiding the “sage on the stage” technique, CLC challenges students to expand their knowledge base through research and peer-to-peer learning, thus refraining from “spoon feeding” material and fostering a checklist men-tality.

The use of 12 tactical-decision exer-cises, a Cavalry-operations adaptive-planning exercise and professional reading and discussion guides a CLC student through the experiential learn-ing model.

TDEsTDEs range from simple problem sets to complex hybrid scenarios covering the gamut of traditional Cavalry mis-sions. Operating in a time-constrained environment, students conduct detailed terrain and enemy analysis to develop a tactical plan that is briefed for peer evaluation.

This phase is critical to the learning process, as it provides feedback to the presenter and reallocates ownership of knowledge to the students who must demonstrate their understanding of the concepts through their questions and critique of the presentation. Peer eval-uation allows the instructor to evaluate the students while simultaneously guid-ing group discussion and expanding student knowledge through the mentor-ship process, further diminishing the “instructor vs. student” mentality that is apparent in instructor-led models.

COAPEXThe COAPEX is a three-day event that centers on planning and integrating as-sets at squadron level. Students are di-vided into three-person groups, with the planning emphasis put on intelligence, maneuver and sustainment during the exercise. The course has steered away from teaching and executing the tra-ditional military decision-making pro-cess, adopting a focus on identifying and solving complex problems.

On Day 1, the students receive a hy-brid-threat scenario that requires their reconnaissance squadron to conduct a zone reconnaissance of a foreign city in a failed state to prepare maneuver bat-talions beginning operations. They plan operations for a 72-hour period and brief the class at the end of the day.

On Day 2, each group receives a list of tailored significant activities that took place during the 72 hours after their initial H-hour planning, along with up-dated priority intelligence requirements from the brigade. Students are required to prioritize their lines of effort and conduct a second iteration of planning for a second 72-hour period.

On Day 3, groups receive a fragmen-tary order from the brigade requiring them to establish a guard south of the city to defend against conventional forc-es moving north. Students are given limited time to plan and brief the mis-

sion before assuming roles of the troop commanders, writing detailed opera-tions orders for their final task of the course.

The COAPEX allows students to see the importance of planning and syn-chronization at the squadron level and how it can poorly or positively affect operations at the troop level.

Professional reading and on-line discussionCLC was among the first schools in the 1990s to use the Force XXI training program. The program allowed students to interface via the Internet directly with subject-matter experts from the Nation-al Training Center and around the force, considerably broadening in-class dis-cussion.1

CLC has reintroduced this concept with an on-line forum. Each night students receive one to two hours of profession-al reading that covers a myriad of top-ics ranging from historical vignettes to articles on mission command. Students share their thoughts and experience in response to reading on-line message boards and classroom discussion.

The message board, found on the CLC milBook page (https://www.milsuite.mil/book/groups/the-cavalry-leaders-course), enables students to extend dis-cussions beyond the classroom and onto a professional forum accessible by leaders throughout the force. This knowledge crossover allows students to not only learn from each other but also from military leaders with varying backgrounds and experiences. These collaborative on-line discussions en-hance the student’s learning experience while also generating more topics and ideas for the instructor to lead in class professional discussion.

Not only for Armor officersSince its initial inception, the course has traditionally focused on training post-career-course maneuver captains slated to command a Cavalry organiza-tion. While this remains true for most of the student population, we have ex-panded the course to encompass the maneuver community’s senior non-commissioned officers (E-7 to E-9) who are preparing to serve or are cur-rently serving as troop first sergeants or squadron-operations sergeants major.

Their inclusion in the course enables NCOs to achieve a better understand-ing of reconnaissance and security operational planning. Most important-ly, it enhances the NCO’s understand-ing of how to integrate their concept of

support into these operations. Also, the vast experiences these NCOs have of-ten bring a unique perspective to the small group during the multitude of collaborative exercises and discussions conducted throughout the course.

In addition to NCOs, CLC also provides a great opportunity for infantry officers without Cavalry experience who are selected to command a Cavalry troop to garner a better appreciation for recon-naissance and security operations. Since successful Cavalry operations have al-ways been a combined effort across several of the warfighting functions, the course is open to officers and NCOs from all branches that support recon-naissance operations.

An S-6 who has a clearer understand-ing of what a troop does is better able to develop a communications plan that supports the entire squadron. A com-mander in the forward-support com-mand who understands the logistics and complexity of screen-and-guard opera-tions is better prepared to train his Soldiers who support these types of missions. In opening our doors to lead-ers from other warfighting functions, we’ve found that their participation has greatly enhanced the overall effective-ness of this course.

Bringing CLC to youCLC has greatly expanded its reach to the operational force using mobile train-ing teams. In Fiscal Year 2012, CLC conducted nine MTTs, including the Joint Multinational Readiness Center in Germany, the National Training Cen-ter at Fort Irwin, the Marine Corps School of Infantry Light Armor Recon-naissance Course and several National Guard units supporting pre-deployment and annual training events.

The limited resources required to con-duct a CLC class make an MTT a lu-crative option for most active and Na-tional Guard units. For the cost of send-ing one Soldier on temporary duty to Fort Benning for a residential class, a unit can fund one CLC instructor to trav-el to home station to conduct a course, training up to nine leaders.

While some courses may differ slightly on a MTT from its residential counter-part, CLC is able to replicate its lesson plans on the road. This ensures a CLC graduate is the same no matter the lo-cation.

In addition to standard MTT classes, CLC cadre have provided unit men-torship during training-center rota-tions and home-station training events, as well as augmenting unit staff train-ing to assist squadron staffs in planning


Acronym Quick-ScAn

CLC – Cavalry Leaders’ CourseCOAPEX – Cavalry-operations adaptive-planning exerciseFY – fiscal yearHHC – headquarters and head-quarters companyMSM – Meritorious Service MedalMTT – mobile training teamNCO – noncommissioned officerOLC – oak-leaf clusterTDE – tactical-decision exercise

reconnaissance and security-centric scenarios. Though these additional events are not Army Training Require-ments and Resources System-coded training, they provide units with Cav-alry subject-matter experts who are useful for refining their current prod-ucts and tactics or to simply “re-blue” Cavalry leaders in doctrine and tech-niques.

The wide range of MTT experience has resulted in a strong relationship be-tween the cadre and operational units and training centers. This relationship means that the CLC cadre is up to date with current tactics, trends and task-organizational changes being used across the Army. Coupled with our close link with the reconnaissance and secu-rity doctrine writers at the Maneuver Center of Excellence, CLC cadre are a powerful tool for Cavalry commanders to use in training and evaluating their formations.

Course contact informationCourse administrative offices are locat-ed in Patton Hall on Fort Benning, GA. Leader resources, professional reading and discussions, and course and in-structor contact information are locat-ed on the course milBook page.

As we move toward a new phase in our Army’s history, CLC continues to be the only source for Cavalry training for troop-level leadership. This course will ensure that leaders are taught “how to think rather than what to do, [which is] central to building mental mobility and ensuring the ability to function in any operational environment.”2

MAJ Ryan Gainey is an instructor for CLC, 3-16 Cavalry, Fort Benning. His assignments include commander, B Troop, 1st Squadron, 3rd Armored Cal-vary Regiment, Fort Hood, TX (Opera-tion New Dawn, 2010-2011); squadron planner, 1/3 Armored Calvary Regiment; MTT chief, MiTT 31, Babil Province, Iraq (Operation Iraqi Freedom, 2008-2009); surveillance-troop executive of-ficer, D Troop, 2nd Squadron, 1st Caval-ry, 4th Brigade, 2nd Infantry Division, Fort Lewis, WA; and anti-tank platoon lead-er, H Troop, 2nd Squadron, 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment, Fort Polk, LA (Op-eration Iraqi Freedom). MAJ Gainey’s military education includes Armor Of-ficer Basic Course, Scout Leaders’ Course, Maneuver Captains’ Career Course, Cavalry Leaders’ Course and Airborne School. He holds a bachelor’s of science degree from Northwestern

State University of Louisiana in health and exercise science. He is the recipi-ent of a Bronze Star Medal (one oak-leaf cluster), Meritorious Service Medal, Order of St. George bronze medallion and Draper Armor Leadership Award-Individual.

CPT Joe Byerly is also an instructor for the CLC, 3-16 Cavalry, Fort Benning. Previous assignments include plans officer, 2nd Armor Brigade Combat Team, 3rd Infantry Division, Fort Stewart, GA; commander, Headquarters and Head-quarters Company, 1-64 Armored Reg-iment, and C Troop, 3-7 Cavalry; squad-ron plans officer, 3-7 Cavalry; and pla-toon leader, A Troop, 2-1 Cavalry, Fort Lewis. CPT Byerly’s military education includes Advanced Officer Basic Course, Scout Leaders’ Course, Maneuver Cap-tains’ Career Course and CLC. He holds a bachelor’s of science degree from North Georgia College and State Uni-versity in criminal justice. CPT Byerly is the recipient of the Bronze Star Medal (one OLC), MSM and Purple Heart. He is also the FY11 Recipient of the Gen-eral Douglas MacArthur Leadership Award.

CPT Brian Harris is course manager/in-structor for CLC, 3-16 Cavalry, Fort Ben-ning. He previously served as command-er, A Troop, 1-17 Cavalry, 82nd Airborne Division, Fort Bragg, NC; assistant S-3 plans officer and tactical operations of-ficer/pilot-in-command, B Troop, 1-17 Cavalry; and mortar-platoon leader, HHC, 2-72 Armored Regiment, 2nd In-fantry Division, Camp Casey, South Ko-

rea. CPT Harris’ military education in-cludes Pathfinder School, Airborne Course, CLC, Aviation Captains’ Career Course, Joint Firepower Course, Army Aviation Tactical Operations Officer Course, Aviation Warrant Officer Basic Course, Initial Entry Rotary Wing Course/OH-58D FSXXI Course and Ar-mor Officer Basic Course. He holds a bachelor’s of arts degree in history from University of Central Florida and is a re-cipient of the Bronze Star Medal, Purple Heart and four Air Medals.

Notes1 Cameron, Robert S. Dr., To Fight or Not to Fight? Organizational Trends in Mounted Maneuver Reconnaissance from the Inter-war Years to Operation Iraqi Freedom, Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2010.2 Ibid.

SFC Mark Leavens issues a troop-level operations order to fellow students during the reconnaissance phase of the course at Fort Benning. (Photo by CPT Joe Byerly)


The Army Reconnaissance Courseby Nicole Randall

It’s 11:04 a.m., and students at the Harmony Church train-ing area on Fort Benning, GA, emerge from the forest behind Checkpoint 38 where, for one of the first times in 96 hours, they will take off all their equipment, wash their hands and sit in an air-conditioned building. This is the final day of Op-eration Bushmaster, the first operation students in the Army Reconnaissance Course will undergo to develop a skill set they will use not only throughout the rest of this course, but throughout the rest of their Army careers.

The Army Reconnaissance Course is a 27-day class designed to transform Soldiers from cavalry troopers, infantrymen and tankers into reconnaissance leaders and to build the Army’s most adaptive and critical problem-solving leaders of the fu-ture, according to the former course commander, MAJ James Corbin.

“Here we focus on adaptive Soldier-leader training and edu-cation methodology, which provides us the ability to devel-op agile and adaptive leaders,” said CPT William Biggs, course manager. Through three phases, the course builds on the knowledge infused into students by using a logical link-age of activities. By designing the course this way, the in-structors can ensure students retain the information they are taught.

ARC’s first phase uses classroom instruction, simulations like Virtual Battlespace Training and a field-training exer-cise to teach students how to recognize the effects of terrain features in a military aspect, evaluate routes and obstacles, infuse troop organizations and capabilities, and conduct en-emy-threat analysis. After extensive classroom instruction, students head out to Operation Bushmaster. Because ARC is about training adaptive leaders, students are first given the opportunity to plan the mission themselves.

“ARC uses outcomes and performance measures to evaluate its students,” said SFC Jared Martin, ARC teach chief. “This is what sets the course apart from all other military courses. The use of outcomes enables the student to use multiple methods to achieve course outcomes.”

Phase IPhase I is individually graded, where students evaluate them-selves for any flaws they see in their skill sets. Well-trained instructors, who are specifically equipped to recognize lead-er attributes and train out bad habits, accompany them.

“Day 1 is primarily instructor-led; Day 2 is less instructor-led and more student-led; and Days 3 and 4 are a culmina-tion of all the skills that have been taught either by being re-inforced or introduced,” Martin said. For students coming out of courses like the Basic Officer Leaders Course, land-navigation skills that have already been ingrained are built up. For students coming into ARC who have very basic land-navigation experience, these skills will be introduced in Phase I and will continue to be built upon in later phases.

“Typically, when they come out for Operation Bushmaster, they have already demonstrated that they understand land navigation and some terrain analysis,” Martin said. “When they come out here, we teach them more in-depth terrain analysis but in a military aspect.”

After spending four days sleeping on the ground, swatting away Georgia wildlife and avoiding obstacles like Fort Ben-ning’s lakes or streams, students return for an after-action review. During the AAR, instructors learn which parts of the course have been effective and what the students have learned

during their first field operation. This is also the time instruc-tors learn which students adapt quickly and display the lead-ership attributes needed for future exercises.

While the Army has learned many lessons during its 11 years at war, it is still building the Army of the future. However, with the current operations tempo and the complex threat present today, Army leaders need to be ready for anything. Courses like ARC teach future leaders to think for them-selves. “The course design links each day to the next, like a building block of instructions,” Martin said. “Students are accountable for retaining the knowledge they received on previous days, as they will have to continue to demonstrate the skills they have been taught in the context of a reconnais-sance mission.”

If students know of only one solution, they don’t search for any other options. During combat, if the solution doesn’t work and the leader isn’t practiced in critical problem-solv-ing, he or she may not be equipped to plan for a different outcome. The course recognizes that many skills and situa-tions have more than one acceptable way of solving the prob-lem. During ARC operations, students plan missions and are not handed the solution but are guided by experienced in-structors.

Phase IIPhase II of ARC will see the students in virtual training at Harmony Church’s Clarke Simulation Center, where they use the VBS2 weapons-simulation system to gain vital knowl-edge and skills like troop organization and capabilities – as well as intelligence preparation of the battlefield. This pre-pares them for Operation Golden Eye, which takes their re-connaissance tactics to a new level. Students are organized into platoons, and Soldiers with leader attributes are given platoon-leader or platoon-sergeant assignments and must lead their platoons for a given amount of time through the exercise.

“In Phase I, everything was an individual movement and evaluation. In Phase II, they come together as a squad, and they’re going to operate as a section in either an infantry bri-gade combat team or a Stryker brigade combat team,” Mar-tin said.

For Operation Golden Eye, the student’s objective is to ef-fectively reconnoiter into an urban area. Using one of two reconnaissance techniques, students will either maintain co-vert operations or avoid detection from enemy threats or lo-cal population – or students will actively conduct overt re-connaissance or carry out their mission without concealment, Martin said. The students will attempt to conduct a thorough tactical analysis to determine where the enemy could poten-tially be located while they choose multiple approaches lead-ing into urban environments that they will later report to the commander. With the addition of platoon-sized operations, students will use a form of transportation.

“They’re going to be on vehicles in this phase,” Martin said. “They’re going to do a route reconnaissance moving into an urban environment, where they find a couple of routes to get this urban environment – all relevant information a platoon or squad is going to have to report to their commander and tell him this is the type of force he needs or what type of equipment he needs to bring.”

The hardest part of Phase II, or Operation Golden Eye, is learning how to operate effectively as a platoon as well as


collecting relevant intelligence in ambiguous conditions. An-other challenge with Phase II is that the students are given 96 hours to complete their objective, which means that pla-toon leaders and sergeants need to plan their mission down to every detail, including the points where logistics – even physiological requirements – are needed.

“Typically, students try to solve the whole problem in one shot and two days into this thing, and they forget to plan for when they need to sleep and start struggling with time and space,” Martin said.

After students return from Operation Golden Eye, they will have gained experience operating as a platoon in various mounted platforms.

ARC incorporates the student-centric teaching method and Adaptive Soldier Leader Training. “ARC uses a 360-degree assessment tool,” Mar-tin said. “This provides feedback an instructor would not typically get. There are four as-sessment forms used: self-assessment, peer assessment, cadre assessment and the per-formance rubric.”

This style of evaluating each other will hold each student not only ac-countable to himself and his ability to retain information, but to stu-dents they learn and serve with. “This assessment allows these guys to be introduced for the first time to the professional evalua-tion of another student,” Biggs said. “They assess the student’s ability, his intangibles based on the outcomes of ARC, and those are the things we look for. We’re standardized here at ARC by our out-comes, not just by a learn-and-go basis.”

Phase IIIPhase III of ARC includes training on the VBS2 system as well, but this time it is a squad-level operation. Students put their virtual skills to the test as they practice what they will do in their final operation.

“[Operation] Blackjack is the final portion of ARC; it’s the culmination of all the skills they’ve been taught up to this point,” Mar-tin said. Students are bused to the airfield hangar, where they board a Blackhawk that carries them to an unknown location in Alabama. Their air insertion simulates a common combat experience where re-connaissance Soldiers are inserted into unknown territory to reconnoiter and report relevant information to their commanders. After students exit the UH-60, they convene with their pla-toons in the woods beyond the drop zone and start their longest reconnais-sance yet. Their goal? To accurately con-duct reconnaissance of the area from where they were dropped to Harmony Church, where their objective ends.

“Students will coordinate with the Blackhawk pilots on Fort Benning to insert them onto one of the various hot landing zones. Students will struggle with time and space during this operation,” said Martin. “Students will operate as a recon-naissance platoon, again from either an IBCT or SBCT. They will conduct this operation both as a mounted platoon and dismounted squad. Once each platoon has reached a certain portion of this operation, they will be removed from the field and placed into simulation to finish out the exercise.”

Students use the skills they have acquired the last 22 days of class while gathering relevant intelligence. The exercise pri-marily focuses on security operations, including air-ground integration. After students reach a certain point, they are giv-en transportation in the form of humvees or Strykers. While screening or providing in-depth security for a larger element, students are part of a combined, simulated security opera-tion, conducting proper reconnaissance of the area they trav-eled and selecting a variety of routes the force coming through can use.

They end back at Patton Hall in Harmony Church, where they use simulators to finish the exercise virtually. They will op-erate as a platoon-sized element, with all the assets assigned to a BCT such as indirect-fire capabilities and fire-delivery platforms. The simulated environment allows them to actu-ally play that out and conduct security operations for a larg-er element to provide time and space, Martin said.

During the final simulated hours of Operation Blackjack, stu-dents encounter the enemy and are incorporated into the en-tire force as part of a combined-arms maneuver. “[The sim-ulation] allows the students to employ the force multipliers they have chosen to mitigate the identified risks,” Martin said.

ARC’s advantagesARC takes the best training methodologies of the current force and incorporates them into innovative leader- and stu-dent-centric training. Instructors use 360-degree assessments, ASLT and a multitude of other techniques to train the Army’s future leaders and future recon Soldiers to think critically, innovate in their problem-solving and lead Soldiers in a pro-longed stressful environment.

“This isn’t one of the courses where it’s memorize and for-get,” Martin said. “You really have to apply everything you’ve been taught up to this point into these problems.”

What makes ARC so effective and its training so innovative are the instructors, according to Biggs. “The leaders who [graduate] from ARC leave here with an unprecedented amount of knowledge,” he said. “The cadre we have here are professionals, top-tier individuals, and that – coupled with the learning methodology we use – will create better, adap-tive Soldiers, leaders and thinkers.”

Outcome-based training relies more on the expertise of its instructors rather than the student’s ability to follow scripts and procedures. “[Outcome-based training] helps the instruc-tor provide specific areas to target during the developmental counseling each student receives at the end of each phase,” Martin said. With the proficiency every ARC instructor has, students are able to maintain the appropriate amount of con-trol during their mission, knowing an expertly trained in-structor has their back.

“Instructors will exploit [students’] struggles to keep the threshold of training toward the side of chaos,” Martin said. “This threshold of training allows the instructor to control the level of chaos students are in by changing the conditions to allow the student still to learn. If chaos becomes over-whelming, students will no longer learn but will put their heads down and just try to bear through it.”

ARC trains the Army’s future recon leaders in the most con-trolled yet adaptive environment possible. “ARC focuses on the mastery of reconnaissance skills and the development of the leader attributes of adaptability, anticipation, critical thinking, deliberate thought and risk management,” Martin said. The lessons these future platoon leaders and platoon sergeants learn will stay with them as they move through their career, incorporating the same learning methodologies and skills they learned at ARC.

Nicole Randall is a reporter for Fort Benning Television, Ma-neuver Center of Excellence Public Affairs Office, Fort Ben-ning, GA, where she previously served as the news director. Ms. Randall holds a bachelor’s of science degree in commu-nications-journalism and a bachelor’s of science degree in English from Plattsburg State University.

Videos Fort Benning Television produced on ARC:

Phase I: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7p0skXYZLJE&feature=plcp

Phase II: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=F67uo4LirBA&feature=share

Phase III: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3lldfQCJd7w

Acronym Quick-ScAn

AAR – after-action reviewARC – Army Reconnaissance CourseASLT – Adaptive Soldier Leader TrainingIBCT – infantry brigade combat teamSBCT – Stryker brigade combat teamVBS2 – Virtual Battlespace Training


Manuscript deadlines 2013Edition Suspense for manuscripts

April-June 2013 Feb. 4, 2013

July-September 2013 May 3, 2013

October-December 2013 Aug. 9, 2013

January-March 2014 Nov. 5, 2013

Cavalry in the Future Fight:An Environment for Cavalry Forces

by MAJ Irvin W. Oliver

A force that can conduct reconnaissance and security operations has been miss-ing from the Army since the elimina-tion in recent years of true cavalry for-mations. In the future, the Army will again need forces that can conduct the types of operations that were the cav-alry’s bread and butter. The brigade combat team, the primary operational force of the Army, must be able to se-cure itself and fight for information while preserving combat power for de-cisive operations. To provide this capa-bility, the redevelopment of cavalry units should be a central consideration to force planners.

The growing need for a force capable of conducting reconnaissance and se-curity operations for the BCT creates a vacuum that a cavalry force most ef-fectively fills. The increased capabili-ties and operational objectives of po-tential threat forces will drive the need for the Army to field and maintain sig-nificant cavalry forces in its operation-al headquarters. These threat forces, both conventional and asymmetric, will increase the need for ground recon-naissance and counter-reconnaissance and security operations, while the clas-sic economy-of-force role of cavalry forces will extend the capacity of larg-er maneuver forces and provide a re-serve force for the higher commander.

Third maneuver battalionThe operational level of war consists of sustained tactical operations oriented toward a common objective: the cam-paign. Within the Army, corps were the

echelons capable of conducting cam-paigns, as the requisite enabling capa-bilities were organic only at that level. Divisions, however, were central in campaign planning. With the shift to a brigade-centric organization, the Army has made many of those capabilities or-ganic to the brigade. These capabilities include engineers, a variety of com-bat-support assets (intelligence, signal, military police and chemical) and lo-gistics. This modular BCT lacks a third maneuver battalion, which is, arguably, its most significant weakness.

With the recent force-structure chang-es to the number of BCTs, the Army added a third maneuver battalion in ad-dition to the armed reconnaissance squadron.1 While this addresses a ma-jor shortfall of the modular BCT, it still leaves the BCT incapable of being the fulcrum for campaigns. The armed re-connaissance squadron is simply a re-connaissance organization. In doctrine and in practice, the armed reconnais-sance squadron lacks the ability to con-duct most security operations; it is un-able to guard or cover for its parent BCT.2 This requires the BCT to task a maneuver battalion, which drains its combat power for such operations.

Losing capabilitiesAs the Army faces a reduction in the number of Soldiers in its ranks, it be-comes clearer that the Army – and the nation – will lose some of the capabil-ities it currently possesses. With the loss of the ability to conduct large-scale counterinsurgency operations and the United States’ shift towards the Pacific Region, the Army must adapt and evolve to maintain relevancy. The three different BCT formations – infantry, Stryker and armored – need a cavalry capability that has not existed since 2005. In real terms, this means that the Army divested itself of the ability to conduct security operations using an economy of force.

The primary maneuver bat-talions of the infantry

and heavy BCTs

must screen, guard and cover the BCT. In a conventional combat setting, this potentially degrades the maneuver bat-talions’ ability to prepare for succes-sive operations and may also result in a loss of forces. This says nothing of the need for counter-reconnaissance op-erations, which are arguably decisive in the contemporary environment. For the BCT to be capable of truly becoming the building block of campaigns, it must have a security capability that en-ables the main-force elements to sus-tain offensive and defensive operations.

Many conflate the terms reconnaissance and surveillance; they are not inter-changeable, however. Reconnaissance is the active collection of information through various methods in terms of re-connaissance. Surveillance, however, is a more passive observation of the en-vironment that may yield information and intelligence. The BCT must have the ability to collect intelligence in all environments and against all possible adversaries. The future force structure of the Army will be smaller, which will require its expeditionary BCTs to de-velop a detailed picture of the enemy force before decisive engagement.

Providing the BCT with the ability to aggressively conduct reconnaissance op-erations thus enables it to conserve the brigade’s combat power while collect-ing a clearer picture of the enemy ar-ray, which then gives it the opportunity to choose the time and place of deci-sive engagement. Reconnaissance op-erations have traditionally been econ-omy-of-force operations – focusing on subordinate units two levels smaller than the parent headquarters. To give the BCT the ability to seize or maintain the initiative, it must have a larger pro-portion of its combat power dedicated to reconnaissance operations.

Future threatsFuture battlefields are likely to see an enemy’s use of unmanned surveillance vehicles in the skies, lethal obstacles along likely avenues of approach and an enemy force with substantial com-munications capabilities. Detailed re-connaissance operations will be neces-sary to defeat lesser reconnaissance threats, identify disruptive obstacles be-fore they achieve their purpose and neu-tralize the enemy’s ability to reposition its forces based on updated informa-

tion. The need for a cavalry force be-comes evident with consideration of likely future threat forces and the con-temporary security environment.

Potential threat forces are likely to make deception and information-denial op-erations primary missions against the clear U.S. advantage in technical intel-ligence, surveillance and reconnaissance assets. Technical intelligence-collec-tion efforts by the United States have been very effective in identifying and targeting high-value targets, making deception an essential task. Physical confirmation of intelligence will thus be a necessity for Army forces. The need to fight for information is unlikely to go away.

U.S. technical ISR efforts have been highly effective against HVTs in the Afghanistan/Pakistan border region, the Arabian Peninsula and the Horn of Africa. Success against small targets al-lows the logical assumption that gains against larger conventional targets will be similarly advantageous. Unmanned aerial vehicles, which can conduct both surveillance and strike missions, have been central to recent counter-ter-rorism operations from Yemen to Paki-stan. These successes follow the 2006 death of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in Iraq, where a UAV was the observer for the 500-pound bomb that killed Zarqawi.3

Unmanned aerial surveillance opera-tions have also helped neutralize al-Shabab in the Horn of Africa.4 Future

adversaries recognize the capabilities of U.S. aerial surveillance platforms, and mitigating such a technical advan-tage will be central to any strategy. Pursuit of such a military strategy will place a greater burden of intelligence collection on ground forces, especially at the tactical level of operations. Sat-ellite intelligence collection may not be as vulnerable as UAVs, so deception will be critical against all forms of technical ISR.

States with anti-satellite capabilities are likely to try to destroy U.S. satel-lites, while states and non-state actors without such a capability will rely heav-ily on deception. Some countries have already demonstrated an anti-satellite missile capability and, in the event of conflict with a major state, the destruc-tion or neutralizing of U.S. satellite-based ISR systems is another likely ac-tion.5 Modern U.S. warfighting relies heavily on these space-based systems, and such reliance is clear to the world. Technology will continue to prolifer-ate at ever-increasing rates, which means tomorrow’s enemy may have a comparable capability. Consider Isra-el’s use of UAVs as a path the United States may follow.

The Israeli Defense Force pioneered the use of UAVs in the early 1980s. IDF success with the use of UAVs has led to their enemies employing UAVs in increasing numbers against Israel. Hezbollah used UAVs against the IDF during their 2006 war, which for a va-

riety of reasons – including Hezbol-lah’s material capabilities – saw Israel fight to a draw. Hezbollah used Irani-an-provided UAVs as an ISR platform similar to Israeli and American drones. This suggests that potential U.S. adver-saries will both neutralize U.S. ISR as-sets and employ their own against U.S. forces. Deception operations may be quite elaborate, which will make aggressive ground reconnaissance crit-ical before commitment to a course of action.

Reconnaissance operations will be de-cisive for an Army organized at the bri-gade level for expeditionary opera-tions. Because BCTs are ideally self-contained combat forces, the inherent expectation is that they will be capable of sustaining operations for extended periods of time. In a smaller Army, each BCT will need to be able to dom-inate a larger area of operations than they are expected to today. In the event of a crisis, deployed BCTs will likely need to seize and maintain the initia-tive while awaiting reinforcement. A cavalry force will aid the BCT in do-ing so. Protracted force deployments leading to large field armies may not arrive in a timely manner, which plac-es the onus on initial forces. Political constraints may also limit the deploy-ment of requested forces. Army BCTs, therefore, must be capable and flex-ible from their introduction in theater to mission completion.

Future deployment scenarios are more likely to look like they have over the last decade – smaller initial forces ar-riving in lieu of a large Desert Storm-

style buildup. This means that BCTs are likely

to be the central actors at the op-

erational level

of war, conducting campaigns with limited external support. For the BCT to prevail at the operational level, any of its endeavors must see it maintain the initiative and momentum of its op-erations.6

Smaller initial force deployments are likely in a political environment that seeks to limit U.S. involvement or due to force constraints. This is a trend likely to continue as the Army reduces its ranks. This is nothing new to the Army, as small force deployments have been relatively commonplace over the last generation of U.S. military opera-tions. Beyond the small force deploy-ments of Afghanistan in 2001-2002 and Iraq in 2003, there is more precedent for this in Somalia and the Balkans.7 Such deployments place a premium on cav-alry forces that are capable of provid-ing both area security and reconnais-sance prior to, or in the absence of, the introduction of additional forces.

Deployed forces must be able to secure themselves as an economy of force while also gaining information. Recon-naissance forces will be central to de-veloping the battlefield picture before decisive engagement occurs. Forces entering decisive engagements without a clear operational awareness risk dis-ruption of theater operations. For ex-ample, the discovery of the Fedayeen Saddam during the initial combat op-erations during Operation Iraqi Free-dom highlights the utility of cavalry forces.

The paramilitary guerrilla forces of the Fedayeen Saddam took U.S. forces by surprise, but strategic intelligence as-sets made their existence known. Of the two remaining corps-level cavalry forces, the 2nd and 3rd Cavalry Regi-ments, neither served as the vanguard for V Corps’ drive north, and V Corps had not planned on fighting these para-military forces.8 Essentially, the divi-sions attacking under V Corps had only their organic division cavalry squadrons to fight for information for them. The division cavalry squadrons, like the 3rd Infantry Division’s 3-7 Cavalry, found themselves in ambushes or being sur-prised by Iraqi forces. This enabled the divisions to preserve combat power, but it slowed or halted movement due to the temporary loss of their recon-naissance and security capability.9 Cav-alry units at each echelon from the corps to the brigade may have enabled an even faster tempo, forcing Saddam Hussein’s Fedayeen to react to an even more dynamic situation. In the future, forces that conduct operations with-out such a capability are likely to find themselves at a serious disadvantage.

Using technology against usGiven a combination of technology proliferation, the use of unorthodox human intelligence collectors and the growing imperative of information su-periority, threat forces are likely to conduct aggressive reconnaissance op-erations against U.S. land forces. This will make counter-reconnaissance an-other decisive operation, and the secu-rity operations that cavalry forces his-torically perform are central to defeat-ing these efforts. Technology prolifer-ation makes reconnaissance easier for conventional and asymmetric threats to collect intelligence on U.S. forces. Night vision, advances in global navigation and mobile communications all serve to make threat reconnaissance more ef-fective and more lethal when combined with conventional fires or indirect guer-rilla fires.

Recent wars around the world have proven this to be true. Hezbollah and Hamas have used modern technology against the IDF, and U.S. forces in Af-ghanistan and Iraq have found this technology on the battlefield in use against them. The genie of technology is not returning to the bottle, and the Army should recognize the decreased likelihood of having technological su-premacy against future enemies. The use of off-the-shelf technology like cellphones, the Internet and civilian Global Positioning System systems may neutralize many of the United States’ advantages in technology.10 This technology will aid future threats fight-ing the United States and this makes security operations during all forms of operations even more important.

Looking at the future from a reconnais-sance perspective, finding the enemy will get even harder than it already is. Future battlefields are likely to center in or near urban population centers that have a major civilian population, which will make identifying human-intelli-gence collection more challenging. Machine-centric intelligence assets will be useful but will have significant lim-itations. The judgment, experience and intuitive abilities of the human being have yet to be replicated in a machine. Identifying who an enemy fighter is out of a crowd of people will be a more common task. Having more reconnais-sance forces will enable Army forma-tions to provide information and anal-ysis to the higher commander – provid-ing not just a picture, but also an inter-pretation.

On the security side of this issue, other actors – both states and non-state – are

improving their reconnaissance capa-bilities. This, including the wider use of technology, means that counter-re-connaissance may be decisive in the future. Non-state actors are increasing the use of unmanned drones, informa-tion technology and the using civilian populations to hide, which facilitates reconnaissance against conventional forces. For example, Hezbollah em-ployed UAVs against Israel in 2006, and their use has not only increased within Western military forces, but also among guerrilla and irregular forces.

This is a capability that should be of greater concern for the United States. Like other technologies in use today, it makes sense to expect an enemy to em-ploy UAVs with similar capabilities as American UAVs – including night and thermal vision and to also use them as a weapons platform. Hezbollah’s UAVs may have even been equipped with ex-plosives and night-vision capabilities.11

In Iraq, insurgents have even seized U.S. UAVs, possibly for use against U.S. forces.12 It is not a stretch of the imagination to envision guerrilla forc-es collecting intelligence or conduct-ing strikes using off-the-shelf products adapted for their use as well as co-opt-ing captured Western UAVs. Keeping in mind the human reconnaissance such non-sate actors use extensively, securi-ty operations like counter-reconnais-sance take on even greater importance. States are also worth noting when look-ing at the importance of more recon-naissance forces in the BCT.

Several countries that may influence the international landscape are in the midst of defense buildups, which sug-gests that modern conventional threat forces will have more capabilities than those the United States has faced over the last 10 years. One need only to look at recent reports of several large coun-tries moving to modernize their armies, and an emphasis on ISR is one of the main improvements these countries are focusing on.13 If the United States were to face one of these countries, the re-connaissance fight would almost pre-dict success or failure. Coupled with the ability to counter U.S. technology, it seems to make sense to invest in addi-tional reconnaissance capability within the BCT.

Current Army forces will need more re-connaissance assets to best orient com-bat forces for successful engagement. Because of the decisiveness of recon-naissance and counter-reconnaissance operations, forces with these tasks must no longer be economy-of-force con-siderations. With the brigade formation being the focal point of an expedition-


ary Army, the Army should resource its centerpiece with capabilities, preserve the power and multiply the force of the BCT. As the Army restores the third maneuver battalion to the BCT, it would do well to equip the BCT with more than a reconnaissance capability.

The BCT’s ability to conduct security and economy-of-force operations, in ad-dition to more in-depth reconnaissance operations, will enable it to be success-ful in an operational sense; it will be able to successfully campaign and main-tain the momentum of its own efforts. Forces that arrive in the early phases of a contingency will be better organized to act as more than just a placeholder and, in some situations in a joint/com-bined environment, the need for a larg-er force may not be necessary. A real Cavalry force has been absent for far too long, and this is an operational risk the U.S. Army should no longer assume.

MAJ Irvin Oliver is a strategic planner with 2nd Infantry Division, Uijongbu, Ko-rea. He previously served as assistant professor, Department of Social Scienc-es, U.S. Military Academy, West Point, NY; commander, Medical Processing Unit, 4th Infantry Division, Fort Hood, TX; commander, D Company, 1st Battalion, 67th Armor, 4th Infantry Division, Fort Hood, TX; brigade assistant, S-3 Plans, 2nd BCT, 4th Infantry Division, Fort Hood. His military education includes the De-fense Strategy Course, Combined Arms Service Staff School, Armor Captains Career Course, Infantry Mortar Leaders Course and Armor Basic Officer Lead-

ers Course. MAJ Oliver holds a mas-ter’s of arts degree from Columbia Uni-versity in international affairs and a bachelor’s of arts degree from Prairie View A&M University in political science. He is the recipient of the Combat Ac-tion Badge, the Bronze Star and Army Commendation Medal with valor device.

Notes1 Tan, Michelle, “Thousands Will PCS in Re-organization of BCTs,” Army Times, Feb. 25, 2012, http://www.armytimes.com/news/2012/02/army-thousands-of-soldiers-forced-to-pcs-brigade-combat-team-reorga-nization-022512w/; accessed July 28, 2012.2 Melton, Stephen, “Why Small Brigade Com-bat Teams Undermine Modularity,” Military Review, July-August 2005, http://usacac.leavenworth.army.mil/CAC/milreview/down-load/English/JulAug05/melton.pdf; accessed July 28, 2012.3 Knickmeyer, Ellen, “Insurgent Leader Al-Zarqawi Killed in Iraq,” Washington Post, June 8, 2006, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/ar ticle/2006/06/08/AR2006060800114.html; accessed July 28, 2012.4 Unattributed, “U.S. Airstrikes on Al-Shabab Training Bases Kill 46 in South Somalia,” Press TV, June 28, 2012, http://www.presstv.ir/detail/2012/06/28/248435/us-airstrikes-kill-46-in-south-somalia/; accessed July 28, 2012.5 Gill, Bates, and Kleiber, Martin, “China’s Space Odyssey,” Foreign Affairs, May/June 2007, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/arti-cles/62602/bates-gill-and-martin-kleiber/chi-nas-space-odyssey-what-the-antisatellite-test-reveals-about-d; accessed July 28, 2012.6 Luttwak, Edward N., “The Operational Lev-el of War,” International Security, Winter 1980-81.7 United Nations Website, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unosom2man-date.html; accessed July 21, 2012.

Acronym Quick-ScAn

BCT – brigade combat teamHVT – high-value targetsIDF – Israeli Defense ForcesISR – intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissanceUAV – unmanned aerial vehicles

8 Otterman, Sharon, “Iraq: What Are the Fe-dayeen Saddam?” CFR Backgrounder, March 31, 2003, http://www.cfr.org/iraq/iraq-fedayeen-saddam/p7698; accessed July 21, 2012.9 Naylor, Sean D., “Behind the Lines with 3/7 Cav: Ambushes, Confusion, but Survival,” USA Today, March 25, 2003, http://usato-day30.usatoday.com/news/world/iraq/2003-03-25-iraq-ambush-acover_x.htm; accessed Nov. 10, 2012.10 McLeary, Paul, “High-Tech Weapons Are Standard Issue for Insurgents,” Aviation Week, Feb. 13, 2008, http://www.aviation-week.com/aw/gener ic /s tor y_gener ic .jsp?channel=dti&id=news/DTIINSURTECH.xml&headline=High-Tech%20Weapons%20Are%20Standard%20Issue%20for%20Insur-gents; accessed July 28, 2012.11 Cordesman, Anthony, The “Gaza War”: A Strategic Analysis, final review draft: circu-lated for comment and updating, Washing-ton, DC: Center for Strategic & International Studies, 2009.12 Hambling, David, “Insurgent American Drone Discovered in Baghdad Cache,” Wired.com, June 20, 2008, http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2008/06/insurgents-unma/; ac-cessed July 28, 2012.13 Putin, Vladimir, “Being Strong,” Foreign Policy, Feb. 21, 2012, http://www.foreignpol-icy.com/articles/2012/02/21/being_strong; ac-cessed July 28, 2012.

Conventional Advising: A Tactical Leader’s Assessment of a Strategic Initiative

by 1LT Pace L. Jaworski

As Operation Enduring Freedom con-cludes and International Security As-sistance Forces initiate the transition of security and responsibility to the Af-ghan National Security Forces, Armor and Cavalry leaders may be called on to abandon their mounted platforms to conduct an unfamiliar mission as an ad-viser on a security-force assistance team. This article provides Armor and Cavalry leaders with insight into the challenges faced during the first SFAT mission in Afghanistan from a tactical leader’s viewpoint.

Although combat operations will most likely cease by the end of 2014, it is plausible that U.S. armed forces in some capacity will continue to serve in Af-ghanistan to ensure long-term stability. In 2012, Presidents Barack Obama and Hamid Karzai signed the Enduring Stra-tegic Partnership Agreement between the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and the United States, a legally binding agreement. This agreement ensures our commitment to strengthening Afghan institutions and governance, reinforc-ing regional security and cooperation and advancing long-term security.1

The agreement went into effect July 4, 2012, and confirms our commitment to Afghanistan by stating: “The strate-gic-partnership agreement commits Af-ghanistan to provide U.S. personnel ac-cess to and use of Afghan facilities through 2014 and beyond. The agree-ment provides for the possibility of U.S. forces in Afghanistan after 2014 for the purposes of training Afghan forces and targeting the remnants of al-Qaeda, and commits the United States and Afghan-istan to initiate negotiations on a bilat-eral security agreement to supersede our current status-of-forces agreement.”

According to the agreement, it is pre-sumable that the U.S. armed forces com-mitment in Afghanistan beyond 2014 will be in an advisory capacity, which the U.S. Army began employing with the SFAT mission in early 2012.

Contrary to popular belief, developing capabilities and increasing capacity through advising is an operation the U.S. Army has conducted for more than one hundred years. The Army has per-formed advisory missions to increase the capability and capacity of foreign militaries from the Philippine Insurrec-tion at the beginning of the 20th Centu-ry to more recent conflicts in Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan.

SFAT missionsAdvising missions are complex in na-ture and regularly performed by Spe-cial Forces and Civil Affairs units trained extensively in foreign inter-nal-defense operations. Foreign inter-nal defense is typically performed in developing nations with unconvention-al, small-scale armed forces, making them ideal missions for Special Forces and Civil Affairs. In response to a de-veloping need to train a large-scale force in Afghanistan, the U.S. Army designed and implemented SFATs from modular brigade combat teams to in-crease the capability and capacity with-in the various ANSF organizations.

The SFAT mission is crucial to the stra-tegic success in Afghanistan but con-tains countless challenges that need ad-dressing as ISAF begins to transfer re-sponsibility to the ANSF. The SFAT mission can succeed if the U.S. Army can identify the proper personnel, lever-age the appropriate resources, and pro-vide an effective and accurate assess-ment tool to solve the complex problem sets within the vastly different ANSF organizations.

The SFATs in Afghanistan can produce tremendous results with their partnered

units, provided teams are equipped with experienced leaders extensively trained in advising, an implemented adviser-centric pre-deployment training rota-tion, and modifications to the current ANSF assessment tool to ensure evalu-ation of advised units on applicable metrics.

The SFAT is similar in theory to the military transition teams and special-ized transition teams that many are fa-miliar with from Operation Iraqi Free-dom. Although similar in mission and scope, SFATs provide all personnel from organic, modular BCTs rather than sup-plying personnel piece-mealed from various Army units.

SFATs benefit from a unified chain of command and team familiarity, where-as various units and personnel unfamil-iar with each other until arriving in the-ater may construct the MTT. For exam-ple, my brigade deployed about 350 se-nior leaders (sergeants first class and above) to construct 30 12-man adviser teams deployed across Regional Com-mand South, Afghanistan. Our team, assigned to an Afghan National Army infantry battalion, consisted primarily of our company leadership, including the company commander, first ser-geant, fire-support officer and noncom-

Noncommissioned officers and company-grade officers from the Afghan National Army Corps and U.S. Army attend a map-reading class at Forward Operating Base Shoja, Af-ghanistan to learn proper identification of friendly-unit locations during missions to the tactical-operations center. This enables the 6th Kandak to gain situational under-standing during daily patrols and named operations. (Photo by 1LT Pace L. Jaworski)


http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/2012.06.01u.s.-afghanistanspasignedtext.pdf




missioned officer, three platoon lead-ers, one platoon sergeant, a medic and two officers from the brigade’s head-quarters and headquarters company. The five line companies from our bat-talion formed teams that all reported to my battalion commander’s team, which advised the ANA brigade staff. This alignment was beneficial, as many team members had worked together dur-ing the previous deployment to Iraq prior to the SFAT mission in Afghani-stan. Preceding the SFAT concept, ad-viser teams may not have been provid-ed an opportunity to train or work to-gether before deploying, a monumental disadvantage for teams when faced with the complex mission.

An additional benefit of the SFAT model is the unity of command within the reporting chain. With our entire brigade leadership forward, it provid-ed teams with the necessary com-mand-structure support that augment-ed adviser teams typically do not re-ceive. On the other hand, the SFAT the-ory can possibly cause friction between battlespace-owning units and the SFAT chain of command.

The SFAT model is unique as a bat-tlespace-owning unit while also re-sponsible for reporting through their respective brigade SFAT, which tacti-cally controls battalion-level teams. Brigade SFAT teams are typically led by a lieutenant colonel, who is a former

or current battalion commander and is accustomed to that level of responsibil-ity. Serving on an SFAT mission is a humbling experience for all leaders, as it requires relinquishing the authority accustomed to in respective home-sta-tion units to support the advisory mis-sion.

All things considered, the SFAT con-cept contributed to our team’s overall success in Afghanistan. We were able to build continuity at home station prior to deploying and assembled a cohesive team that was mission-effective in Af-ghanistan.

Team personnel traitsThe SFAT concept is desirable for ad-vising a large, conventional force, but the team’s effectiveness to the specific problem set in Afghanistan largely de-pends on the expertise and traits of the assigned personnel. According to the Commanders Handbook for Security Force Assistance, “The most important aspect of advising is the degree of in-fluence an adviser is able to cultivate with his host-nation counterpart.”2 When we arrived in Afghanistan, I was a 24-year-old lieutenant with two years of active-duty service in the U.S. Army advising a 45-year-old battalion-oper-ations officer with more than 20 years of experience in the ANA. It proved challenging to earn my counterpart’s respect and develop a sphere of influ-

ence in a culture that heavily emphasiz-es the importance of age and respect of elders.

Our SFAT consisted of five lieutenants in similar situations. Our limited train-ing at this point mainly consisted of squad, platoon and company mounted and dismounted maneuvers based on current counterinsurgency doctrine. This training was not enough for the level of responsibility required to ad-vise a battalion staff and created an un-reasonable situation for the young of-ficers on the team who lacked the per-ceived experience of their counterparts. I believe our team could have been more effective had the lieutenants been replaced with higher-ranking officers, either captains or majors, preferably with previous advising experience.

The Security Force Assistance Intro-ductory Guide identifies maturity, pro-fessional competence, cross-cultural negotiation and problem-solving, lead-ership and region-specific skills as ide-al adviser traits.3 Most junior compa-ny-grade officers do not embody these characteristics, and therefore are not ideal for executing the SFAT mission in Afghanistan. From my perspective, an SFAT adviser would have a mini-mum of two leadership positions. Ide-ally one of those positions would be from battalion, brigade or division staff. This would provide advisers with experience, knowledge, flexibility and competence that our counterparts re-quire to ensure a successful transition of security from ISAF to ANSF.

Advising is a specialtyLikewise, the U.S. Army could benefit from creating an adviser course with an associated skill identifier to appropri-ately recognize the subject-matter ex-perts within the force and thus assign personnel to future advising missions accordingly. In an era of persistent conflict, I think the U.S. Army will be expected to execute future advisory missions with large-scale conventional forces similar to the ANSF. The Ar-my’s leadership will benefit from the SFAT’s flexibility to perform security-force assistance and/or foreign internal defense in possible future conflicts rather than committing combat troops.

The SFAT’s success with a convention-al force such as the ANSF will allow the U.S. Army to perform this mission set, rather than relying exclusively on Special Forces and Civil Affairs, who are often undermanned due to their complex skill set. Future SFATs could benefit from school-trained personnel with advising expertise who could

1LT Joshua S. Butcher teaches an Afghan noncommissioned officer from Headquar-ters and Headquarters Company, 6th Kandak, 1st Brigade, 205th Afghan National Army Corps, how to properly set the headspace and timing on a M-2 .50-caliber flex machine-gun at FOB Shoja, Kandahar Province, Afghanistan. (Photo by 1LT Pace L. Jaworski)


train fellow team members on effec-tive advising tactics, techniques and procedures. Furthermore, the Special Forces and Civil Affairs community could provide instructors familiar with security-force assistance and foreign internal-defense operations to enable conventional advisers.

My team was fortunate enough have a team leader who recently served as a brigade adviser to the Iraqi Army. His knowledge, tact and technique were an invaluable asset to our team, who had little previous advising experience. Al-though Iraq and Afghanistan are two distinct operating environments, his previous experiences as an adviser pro-vided him with a general situational understanding for our mission. He was able to teach the team effective tech-niques for counterpart engagements that served him well in the past and contributed to our success with the ANA.

Most SFATs did not have the luxury of an experienced adviser but could have reduced the learning curve on some teams if provided one. If the U.S. Army is provided the ability to efficiently train and identify suitable advising per-sonnel, we could rapidly deploy ad-viser teams to volatile conflicts while still evaluating the threat to decide if combat troops are necessary.

Joint Readiness Training CenterIn addition to our difficult mission set, our team had four months from receipt of our orders to our deployment, which

included home-station training, a rota-tion at the Joint Readiness Training Center and block leave. In my opinion, this compressed timeline did not help provide the inexperienced junior lead-ership with adequate training to per-form the SFAT mission.

Our home-station training was benefi-cial and consisted of weapons qualifi-cation, drivers training, situational-training exercises and medical training. This training was developed to ensure all leaders were proficient in Skill Lev-el 1 tasks and battle drills. Due to the limited personnel on the SFAT, first lieutenants were assigned as drivers, sergeant first classes became gunners and captains and/or first sergeants served as dismounts or vehicle com-manders in a three-vehicle patrol con-cept. Clearly, everyone had to be pro-ficient and master the perishable skills that leaders typically do not perform, and the home-station training allowed us all this opportunity prior to deploy-ing.

Although we were provided a security squad when we arrived in Afghanistan, it would have been beneficial if we were assigned a security squad organic to the unit. It would allow for increased continuity within SFATs while en-abling the battlespace commander with more combat power.

The JRTC rotation proved to be anoth-er challenge due to our unit being the first SFAT rotation in the midst of con-ventional combat rotations. Our rota-tion was a hybrid of adviser training with 162nd Infantry Brigade and an Af-ghanistan-specific training exercise.

The training exercise proved to be of little value since we conducted similar situational-training exercises at Fort Carson. Unfortunately the JRTC was faced with the challenge of executing an unexpected, irregular rotation. Ob-server-controllers were unfamiliar with the SFAT mission and unclear about the relationship between the SFATs and battlespace-owning units. Our after-action review comments should help develop a more realistic readiness exercise, which will better simulate the SFAT experience in Af-ghanistan.

Although the Afghanistan-specific training exercise was of little value, the adviser-specific training conducted by the 162nd Infantry Brigade prior to our field exercise provided us with ba-sic knowledge of the ANSF, a cultural overview and introductory negotiation skills. This was the type of training that future SFAT rotations should be entirely focused on. JRTC was chal-lenged by an unexpected advisory ro-tation, and although it was difficult as the rotational training unit, I think it provided JRTC with the ability to ad-just rapidly for unforeseeable future training missions.

Commander’s unit assessment toolComparable to our transition from Op-eration Iraqi Freedom to Operation New Dawn in Iraq, the SFAT mission in Af-ghanistan will continue beyond the pro-posed combat troop commitment of 2014. This requires a careful assess-ment of all respective organizations within the ANSF. Some Army leaders use the term “Afghan good enough” to describe the acceptable progression of our ANSF counterparts. As an adviser to the ANA, I found myself asking what exactly was “Afghan good enough?”

It is crucial for the adviser to under-stand his counterpart’s progression and comprehend “Afghan good enough” for the SFAT mission to be successful. Advisers understand that our ANSF counterparts cannot be expected to per-form at the level of coalition forces, but after nine months in Afghanistan, I still don’t know how to measure or grasp “Afghan good enough.” In an attempt to calculate ANSF progression, ISAF created the commander’s unit assess-ment tool to measure ANSF capabilities and provide situational understanding

CPT Graham P. Shelly (SFAT 36 intelligence officer) meets the 6th Kandak assistant in-telligence officer, CPT Abdullah, and 6th Kandak NDS representative, CPT Noorullah, for the first time at FOB Shoja, Kandahar Province, Afghanistan. (Photo by 1LT Pace L. Jaworski)


Continued on Page 36

Army National Guard Armor Schoolsby LTC Frederick P. Gilson

While most people associate the training of scouts and tankers with the Maneuver Center of Excellence at Fort Benning, GA, fewer are familiar with the Armor trainers in the Army National Guard. There are seven Armor schools across the country that provide military-occupation specialty, Noncommissioned Of-ficer Education System and functional courses for 19-series Career Management Field Soldiers in the ARNG.

In early 2012, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command pub-lished its One-Army School System implementation plan, which outlines the need to provide commanders and Soldiers maximum training and education opportunities across all Army schools and institutions, regardless of component. This action formal-ized the process for Active Army Soldiers to attend ARNG schools.

OASS requirementsFor a school to be OASS compliant, TRADOC directed that all courseware be Total Army Training System compliant, meaning that courses must be single-phased or able to be executed in consecutive phases at the same institution, equipment variants must be the same and, regardless of component, all Soldiers can attend. This directive effectively provided ARNG and Active Army commanders with an alternate way to train their Soldiers quickly and efficiently at several sites throughout the continen-tal United States.

In an effort to meet OASS requirements, 19D MOS training was refined, with the help of the Directorate of Training Develop-ment, 194th Armor Brigade and 316th Cavalry Brigade at the MCoE. This ensures training for all scouts on the A3/Operation Desert Storm situational-awareness Bradley, M1151 humvee,

Long-Range Advanced Scout Surveillance System and all asso-ciated weapon systems within a 20-day program of instruction. Likewise, the 19K MOS-T was refined and split into two 20-day courses to facilitate training both M1A1 SA and M1A2 Systems Enhancement Program V2 crewmembers.

To round out NCOES requirements, the Armor Advance Lead-ers Course and Maneuver Senior Leader Course are available. The ARNG Armor schools also offer intensive functional cours-es such as Tank Commander’s Certification Course and the Scout Commander’s Certification Course designed to reintroduce of-ficers and NCOs to the weapon systems after several years of deployments without tanks and Bradleys.

Finally, the ARNG’s Warrior Training Center offers courses for prospective tank and Bradley master gunners to help hone their skills prior to attending Abrams and Bradley MG courses at the MCoE.

Regional training institutesThe ARNG Armor schools are separate training battalions or companies operating under regional training institutes. These RTIs are located in Idaho, Minnesota, Tennessee, Pennsylvania, Mississippi and Texas. Certified instructors and, in many cases, MGs with years of experience make up the staff for the RTIs.

All the schools that teach 19Ds are fielded with, or are in the process of fielding, equipment such as ODS-SA and/or A3 Brad-leys. Idaho and Mississippi train 19D, but are the only two ARNG schools that also train 19K using M1A1 SA and/or M1A2 SEP V2 with the commander’s remote-operated weapon station. The ARNG Armor schools also have access to great instructional

School code 958 1016 998 1012 1017 1012

Location

Gowen FieldArmor SME Site IDARNG

Boise, ID

ARNGRes. Tng CtrSmyrna, TN

Camp ShelbyHattiesburg, MS

Fort Indiantown Gap

Annville, PA

Camp MabryAustin, TX

Camp RipleyLittle Falls, MN

ARNG RTI 1-204th 2-117th 1-154th 1-166th 1-136th 175th Regt

M1A1 Tank Commander Certification171-SI3M/19K2/3/4

X

Scout Commander Certification171-SI3X/ASID3

X X X

Cavalry Scout (MOS-T)171-19D10 (humvee/M3) (R)

X X X X X X

Cavalry Scout Adv Ldr171-19D30-C45

X X X X X

Armor Crewman (M1A1)171-19K10 (M1A1) (R)

X X

Armor Crewman (M1A2)171-19K10 (M1A2) (R)

X

Armor Crewman Adv Ldr171-19K30-C45

X X X

Courses highlighted in yellow are not yet supported with required equipment.

Table 1. ARNG Regional Training Institutes (RTIs).


classrooms and range facilities to accommodate all neces-sary live-fire requirements, including both tactical and gun-nery simulation.

Each ARNG Armor school must conform to and be evaluated by the same TRADOC enterprise-accreditation standards as the MCoE. This extensive review covers 29 areas, including quality assurance, maintenance, supply, facilities, operational-environ-ment integration, lessons-learned and implementation of the Army Learning Model. All ARNG Armor schools are accredited, and five are evaluated as institutions of excellence with a score of 95 percent or higher.

The ARNG Armor schools maintain a close relationship with the MCoE and are included in courseware development, input to both the 19D and 19K critical-task lists and other issues per-tinent to maintaining consistency and relevancy in the Armor community. Driven by the potential for a third combined-arms battalion in the armored brigade combat teams and the need to return to the basics of gunnery/maneuver while operating in an environment of constrained resources, the ARNG Armor schools offer great opportunities for training 19 CMF Soldiers.

LTC Frederick Gilson commands 1st Battalion, 204th RTI (Armor) and is the ARNG Armor subject-matter expert based at Gowen Field, Idaho. During his career, he has served in various Armor and Cavalry command and staff positions, including active ser-vice with 4-64 Armor, 1-10 Cavalry and 2-7 Cavalry. He also served as an Armor trainer with the 91st Division as a member of the U.S. Army Reserve and a tank company commander, battal-

Acronym Quick-ScAn

ARNG – Army National GuardBCT – brigade combat teamCMF – career management fieldMCoE – Maneuver Center of ExcellenceMG – master gunnerMOS – military-occupation specialtyMOS-T – military-occupation specialty trainingNCOES – Noncommissioned Officer Education SystemOASS – One-Army School SystemODS-SA – Operation Desert Storm situational-aware-ness (Bradleys)RTI – regional training instituteSA – situational awarenessSEP – Systems Enhancement ProgramTRADOC – Training and Doctrine Command

ion S-3 and brigade S-3 with 116th Cavalry BCT, Idaho Army Na-tional Guard His military education includes the Armor Officer Basic Course, Armor Officer Advanced Course, Combined Arms Services Staff School, Command and General Staff Col-lege and the Army War College. LTC Gilson holds a bachelor’s of science degree from the University of Central Florida in busi-ness administration and a master’s of science degree from the U.S. Army War College in strategic studies.

Instructor SSG Ron Eckley (kneeling) provides guidance prior to live-fire. (Photo by 1-204th RTI)


The recently published Army Doctrine Publication 3-90 and Army Doctrine Reference Publication 3-90 are updates of Field Manual 3-90, Tactics, 2001 edition.

Tactics are the employment and or-dered arrangement of forces in relation to each other, according to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 5120.02B. Through tactics, command-ers use combat power to accomplish missions. The tactical-level command-er uses combat power in battles, en-gagements and small-unit actions.

ADRP 3-90 is the introductory refer-ence for all Army students of tactical art and science. ADRP 3-90 maintains the traditional tactical taxonomy, upon which its two subordinate publications (FM 3-90, Volume 1, Offense and De-fense, and FM 3-90, Volume 2, Recon-naissance, Security and Tactical En-abling Tasks) will be built. ADRP 3-90 is also the source document for almost a hundred offensive and defensive tac-tical terms from actions on contact to zone reconnaissance.

ADP 3-90 is an executive summary of the information contained in ADRP 3-90.

Most of the terminology changes in ADRP 3-90 reflect changes made in other manuals. The most important of these are:

•Calculated risk and military gamble are no longer approved military terms.

•ADRP 3-90 now mentions the other operational frameworks (deep-close-security and main and supporting efforts) men-tioned in ADP 3-0.

•ADRP 3-90 changes the defini-tion of the division echelon.

•ADRP 3-90 changes reconnais-sance and surveillance where appropriate to information col-lection.

•ADRP 3-90 changes the discus-sion of protection tasks and

ADP/ADRP 3-90: Offense and Defenseby Douglas A. Darling

other warfighting functions to reflect the list in ADRP 3-0.

•ADRP 3-90 changes terminol-ogy from heavy to armored, motorized to Stryker and light to infantry for Army forces.

ADRP 3-90 has five chapters. Chapter 1, “Tactical Fundamentals,” introduces the art and science of tactical opera-tions. The key points contained in Chapter 1 sum up as:

•Your opponent is always think-ing and wants to beat you.

•Mastering the art and science of tactics requires constant study and training.

•There are no checklists; doctrine merely provides a set of tools that the tactician must adapt to meet the needs and conditions associated with a specific situ-ation.

Chapter 2 defines basic tactical con-cepts commonly associated with the conduct of both offensive and defen-sive tasks. It provides a figure that il-lustrates the doctrinal taxonomy estab-lished in ADRP 3-0. That doctrinal tax-onomy is the basis for not only how Chapters 3-5 are organized but also the organization of the soon-to-be-pub-lished FM 3-90, Volumes 1 and 2. Chapter 2 also defines tactical echelons from the fire team to the division.

Chapter 3 provides the basics of the of-fense. It discusses the purposes and characteristics of the offense. It ad-dresses common offensive control measures and defines the forms of ma-neuver. Further, it discusses common offensive planning considerations by warfighting function. The chapter clos-es out with a discussion of the transi-tion to an emphasis on the conduct of either defensive tasks or stability tasks.

What Chapter 3 does for the offense, Chapter 4 does for the defense.

Chapter 5 addresses those tactical en-abling tasks that are not the subject of

their own manual. Tactical enabling tasks are usually employed by com-manders as shaping operations or sup-porting efforts during the conduct of decisive action but are not primary of-fensive, defensive, stability or defense-support-of-civil-authorities tasks. Thus Chapter 5 does introduce reconnais-sance, security operations, troop move-ment, relief in place, passage of lines and encirclement operations, but not mobility operations, which is the sub-ject of its own manual.

The topic of operations in an urban en-vironment is included in Chapter 5, even though it is an environment and not a tactical enabling task, because under Doctrine 2015 urban operations is not allocated its own field manual.

Douglas Darling is a military analyst (doc-trine) with the Combined Arms Doctrine Di-rectorate, Fort Leavenworth, KS. He has also served as a military analyst (concepts) in Concept Development Directorate, Fort Leavenworth; military analyst (CSS), Center for Army Lessons Learned, Fort Leaven-worth; and project officer, Combined Arms Training Integration Directorate, Fort Leav-enworth. Mr. Darling’s military schooling in-cludes Command and General Staff Officer Course, Combined Arms and Services Staff School, Infantry Officer Advanced Course and Armor Officer Basic Course. He holds a bachelor’s of science degree in national se-curity and public affairs from the U.S. Military Academy and a master’s degree in strategic studies from the Army War College. He is the author of the 2001 edition of FM 3-90, Tactics, the 2003 edition of FM 7-15, Army Universal Task List, and the 2008 edition of Field Manual-Interim 3-0.1, The Modular Force.

ADP – Army doctrine publicationADRP – Army doctrine reference publicationFM – field manual

Acronym Quick-ScAn


When a tank company deploys to con-duct counterinsurgency or stability-and-support operations, task organiza-tion is generally necessary to allow it to execute the specific missions it re-ceives. Task organizing is the act of con-figuring an operating force, support staff or sustainment package of specific size and composition to meet a unique task or mission.1

Based on its modified table of organi-zation and equipment, an Armor com-pany consists of three platoons with an officer and 15 Soldiers each, as well as a headquarters element of two officers and six Soldiers, totaling 56 maneuver personnel. In contrast, the MTOE for a mechanized infantry company provides for up to 135 maneuver personnel.2

Both elements are commonly augment-ed with fire-support officers, medics and mechanics from the battalion head-quarters and headquarters company and the forward-support company to sup-port operations.

Realities in IraqI’ve set the stage because, as the 2nd Ad-vise and Assist Brigade of 1st Cavalry Division, my Cobra Company, 1st Bat-talion, 8th Cavalry Regiment, deployed to Iraq’s Diyala Province in support of Operation New Dawn. We faced multi-ple challenges to reconcile our assigned

Team Cobra: A Motorized Tank Company In Support of Operation New Dawn

by CPT Patrick C. Howlett

missions with the limited capabilities inherent in our smaller size while still maintaining combat effectiveness.

As a tank company conducting SASO, Cobra Company received a variety of missions and tasks. One major task as-signed to the company was to execute force-protection missions to prevent en-emy combatants from attacking U.S. forces and installations. To accomplish this objective, the company conducted both mounted and dismounted counter-indirect-fire patrols and clearances of named areas of interest to deter indi-rect-fire attacks on Contingency Oper-ation Site Warhorse.

While C-IDF missions were the pre-dominate form of force protection, the more decisive operation involved over-seeing security for the line of commu-nication between COS Warhorse and Joint Base Balad, a route heavily trav-eled by logistics convoys conducting re-supply operations for COS Warhorse and other U.S. installations in Diyala Province. Also, Cobra Company was tasked with area-security operations to escort Department of State personnel from the Diyala Provincial Reconstruc-tion Team to and from their various meet-ings and project sites.

The infantry unit that Cobra Company replaced in Southern Diyala had ample resources to conduct these operations

based upon their MTOE, which provid-ed for more than twice the number of maneuver personnel based on their MTOE. As a tank company, the Cobras faced the particular challenge of accom-plishing the same tasks with significant-ly less company power than the infan-try companies had.

An additional burden placed on units de-ploying to Operation New Dawn, de-signed to aid in the eventual withdraw-al of U.S. forces, was the emplacement of a force cap. A force cap limits the number of Soldiers a unit can deploy; Cobra Company was limited to deploy-ment with only 74 Soldiers. The tank platoons assigned to Cobra Company deployed with about 17 Soldiers, in-cluding a medic and a forward observ-er, who provided information and intel-ligence updates as part of the company intelligence-support team.

Task organizationAfter some mission analysis at the bat-talion level upon arrival at COS War-horse, the leadership determined to task-organize Cobra Company by at-taching one tank platoon to HHC, while a mechanized-infantry platoon attached to Cobra Company. The tank platoon at-tached to HHC was tasked with provid-ing area security for the battalion com-mander and command sergeant major

as their personnel-security detachment, and was replaced with a mechanized-infantry platoon of about 30 Soldiers.

The result constructed a combined-arms company team with one or more non-organic tank, mechanized-infantry or light-infantry platoons to a tank, mech-anized-infantry or light-infantry com-pany, either in exchange for or in addi-tion to organic platoons.3 The change from being a pure organic tank com-pany to a combined-arms company team greatly increased the combat power and flexibility in Cobra Company, allowing it to accomplish all tasks given it.

After the platoon became part of Cobra Company, the company commander and first sergeant decided to take two three-Soldier teams from the infantry platoon and task-organize them within the company to each of the two remain-ing tank platoons. This decision was based on Cobra Company’s previous training events from situational-train-ing exercises at Fort Hood, TX, and dur-ing the brigade mission-readiness ex-ercise at the Joint Readiness Training Center, Fort Polk, LA.

Thus, when conducting motorized op-erations, the tank platoons would have the platoon leader, the Bravo Section sergeant, all the assigned loaders on the tank crews and the attached medic act-ing as dismounts whenever the platoon needed to dismount from their vehicles. This only provided a total of six dis-mounts, with a medic to provide medi-cal support. Adding those three infan-try Soldiers enabled the tank platoons to operate with the capability of a stan-dard nine-man dismounted squad while conducting force protection and SASO.

It is worth noting that one sergeant team leader and two Soldiers made up the

small infantry team attached to the two tank platoons. This not only aided the two tank platoons, giving them about 20 Soldiers for their platoons to conduct patrols, but it also provided an experi-enced noncommissioned officer with a strong understanding of dismounted tactics. While the three-Soldier team made it easy to integrate the platoon in a timely manner, making them an asset, an increase in the number of attached infantry would always ensure a sizeable dismount force.4 This combination of in-fantry and Armor Soldiers “brought the training and experience of mounted and dismounted tactics together and made the [platoons] extremely lethal.”5

With the requirement to send Soldiers on environmental morale leave, each platoon was sending at least two Sol-diers a month. The remaining infantry allowed their platoons to maintain enough Soldiers to conduct patrols. Also, it did not degrade the infantry pla-toon’s ability to conduct patrols, as their mine-resistant, ambush-protected Max-Pro Plus vehicles did not have the ca-pacity to carry all 30 of their Soldiers on patrols.

Having a full nine-Soldier dismounted squad in each platoon greatly aided in the execution of the company’s mis-sions in Southern Diyala. Most of the area in which the company operated consisted of palm groves and farmlands. Also, in the small cities and villages, most of the streets were very narrow. With the vehicle platform being the MRAP, most of the terrain was heavily restricted for mounted maneuver, re-quiring dismounted squads to maneu-ver in certain areas. Not only did the terrain dictate that the company would be forced to use dismounted squads for investigating potential enemy indirect-

fire attack points, the specific missions assigned to Cobra Company required a greater emphasis on dismount support.

Lessons learnedHowever, the coordination of the task organization was made very late. The unit had already been conducting the relief in place/transfer of authority with the redeploying unit before the decision to task-organize was made. Not only did Charlie Company and the attached Al-pha Company platoon have to execute some logistical problem-solving, there had been no cross-training before the deployment between the two units, forcing both elements to quickly adapt.6 Some of the infantrymen had been at-tached to Charlie Company during STX events and the JRTC rotation, but they did not stay permanently attached and there was no time to learn about the leadership they would be working for, nor the company’s standards. Ensuring the same Soldiers train with the platoon before the deployment would greatly improve the effectiveness of the task or-ganization.7 While mission require-ments are constantly adapting, deci-sions about task organization need to be finalized well in advance of the combat training center rotation.

Most importantly, a tremendous amount of Cobra Company’s combat power fo-cused on the C-IDF mission, with an average of two C-IDF patrols a day. COS Warhorse was a constant recipient of indirect fire from enemy insurgent groups from the surrounding farm areas in Diyala. To successfully disrupt enemy indirect-fire operations, patrols were re-quired to disrupt areas where the enemy had previously fired from and areas de-termined to be potential attack sites. (This was referred to as terrain denial.)

Based on the restricted terrain and the limitations of the company’s maneuver platform, the use of dismounted squads were crucial in ensuring clearance of potential indirect-launch points as well as disrupting the enemy’s ability to suc-cessful launch indirect fire upon COS Warhorse.

Cobra Company was also responsible for one of the key lines of communica-tion in Diyala Province. Due to the Ti-gris River separating the brigade’s main support base of JBB with COS Warhorse, the brigade’s supply convoys could only travel on Route Dover that contained a bridge to cross the river.

However, the U.S. supply convoys were predictable, so local insurgent groups would target U.S. vehicles regularly with explosive-formed penetrators. In response to this threat, Cobra Company

The author, 1LT James McGregor and SPC E.J. Ervin conduct a patrol. (Photo by 1LT Brian D. Bowers)


assignments have included tank-com-pany commander, C Company, 1st Bat-talion, 8th Cavalry, Diyala, Iraq; troop ex-ecutive officer, B Company, 5th Battal-ion, 4th Cavalry, Fort Riley, KS, and Baghdad, Iraq; and scout-platoon lead-er, C Company, 1st Battalion, 13th Cav-alry, Fort Riley, KS. His military school-ing includes Ranger School, Air Assault School, Scout Leader Course, Maneu-ver Captains’ Career Course and Armor Basic Officer Leadership Course. CPT Howlett holds a bachelor’s of science degree from the U.S. Military Academy at West Point in U.S. history.

Notes1 Field Manual 5-0, The Operations Pro-cess, Department of the Army, March 2010.2 FM 3-90.1, Tank and Mechanized Infan-try Company Team, Department of the Army, December 2002.3 FM 101-5-1, Operational Terms and Graphics, Department of the Army, Septem-ber 1997.4 Interviews with 1LTs Benjamin Mower and Nicholas Potter, platoon leaders for 1st Pla-toon and 3rd Platoon, C Company, Aug. 16, 2012.5 Interview with 1LT Mower.6 Interview with 1LT Jeffery Tolbert, platoon leader of 3rd Platoon, Alpha Company, 1-8 Cavalry, Aug. 10, 2012.7 Interview with 1LT Potter.8 Interview with 1LT Tolbert.9 Ibid.

assumed a specific mission upon RIP/TOA, which involved emplacing small kill teams along Route Dover to inter-dict any insurgent groups attempting to emplace EFPs along the route. Pro-viding two elements, a mounted secu-rity and quick-response element and the SKT, required more personnel to oper-ate and defend the mounted element; allow the SKT to maneuver separately; and have enough personnel to maintain security and maneuver and engage in-surgents placing explosives. While this mission was more suited for a larger in-fantry platoon, the two tank platoons were tasked with executing this mission on multiple occasions without any hin-drance. Without the added infantry dis-mounts to each tank platoon, Cobra Company would not have had success in its LOC-security mission.

Personnel securityOne mission Cobra Company dealt with that was critical in SASO was the secu-rity of the Diyala PRT. Almost every day DoS personnel would conduct meetings with the Diyala governor, local judges and other provincial leaders at the gov-ernment center in the provincial capital of Baqubah. Cobra Company was re-sponsible for providing area security around the government center and per-sonnel security for PRT members.

On many occasions, PRT members would have concurrent meetings at dif-ferent locations within the government center, requiring multiple dismounted security elements to escort them to the secured vehicle-staging area and their meetings. Shortly after the RIP/TOA, while a tank platoon was providing se-curity for the PRT at the government center, a violent-extremist-network in-surgent group attacked the provincial building 500 meters away. The platoon was able to maintain security at the gov-ernment center with a section while maneuvering the other section to the provincial building to aid Iraqi security forces in regaining control of the build-ing. The increased dismount capability within the two tank platoons allowed them to easily handle the tasks placed on them to provide security and allow the PRT to accomplish their missions despite the multiple locations of per-sonnel within the government center.

ConclusionsWhile the attached infantry platoon still maintained the largest formation with-in the company, the task organization implemented by Cobra Company al-lowed each platoon to complete any of the patrols tasked to them. The attached infantry platoon “benefitted from the

task organization as they learned much about mounted operations from [the tankers],” learning certain skills and making them successful in the mounted operations conducted by the unit.8 It provided the commander a tremendous amount of flexibility, as in the event of an attack or a recent intelligence report, he could send the most readily avail-able platoon, not a specific one, as all were equipped to handle every mission.

Another benefit from this specific task organization was the ability to rotate platoons among specific patrols. Rotat-ing platoons between the PRT escort mission, C-IDF and counter-EFP pa-trols regularly prevented complacency forming within the platoons from con-ducting the same missions repeatedly.

Above all else, the decision to task-or-ganize “gave more combat power and added dismounted knowledge to the platoons they were tasked to.”9

When a mechanized-infantry platoon attaches to a tank company, they main-tain their full amount of infantrymen, and the two tank platoons remain at their pure organic allocation of Soldiers. This generally leads to specific missions be-ing assigned to each of the two types of platoons. Also, in conventional of-fensive and defensive operations, there are no added capabilities, nor anywhere for an organic tank platoon to add any more personnel.

In the current operating environment dealing heavily with SASO, the tank platoon, which operates the MRAP and humvee, is required to operate in a vast-ly different form than exposed to in ini-tial training.

Clearly, task organizing and adding those extra infantry dismounts greatly aided both the tank platoons and the compa-ny as a whole to accomplish the com-mander’s intent and succeed. Having those attachments allowed an experi-enced noncommissioned officer to aid in dismounted operations, provide flex-ibility to the commander in assigning patrols to the platoons and provide the additional personnel vitally needed to allow the platoons to operate while main-taining security and accomplishing their missions safely. As armored brigade combat teams now begin to deploy to Afghanistan to conduct stability opera-tions, task-organizing their Armor com-panies in a similar manner could prove invaluable to support their missions.

CPT Patrick Howlett commands mech-anized infantry, A Company, 1st Battal-ion, 8th Cavalry, Fort Hood, TX. His duty

C-IDF – counter-indirect fireCOS – contingency operation siteDoS – Department of StateEFP – explosive-formed penetra-torFM – field manualHHC – headquarters and head-quarters companyJBB – Joint Base BaladJRTC – Joint Readiness Training CenterLOC – line of communicationMRAP – mine-resistant, am-bushed-protectedMTOE – modified table of organi-zation and equipmentPRT – provincial reconstruction teamRIP/TOA – relief in place/transfer of authoritySASO – stability-and-support op-erationsSKT – small kill teamSTX – situational training exercise

Acronym Quick-ScAn


Since the beginning of our nation’s armed forces, whenever the U.S. Army engaged an armed enemy in conflict, Soldiers from foreign countries stood alongside their American coun-terparts. During the Revolutionary War, France provided armed forces as we battled for independence and established the norm for multinational operations. Throughout our his-tory, multinational operations continue to be the norm. This includes traditional support in the form of armed forces in times of conflict as well as peacetime advisory roles through-out various regions of the world.

Over the past decade, U.S. forces are again serving along-side allies in both Iraq and Afghanistan. During Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation New Dawn, more than 40 coun-tries provided Soldiers and support to Multinational Forces-Iraq. Support ranged from more than 46,000 forces from Great Britain down to multiple countries that provided 100 or fewer soldiers.1 In Afghanistan, multinational support re-mains an important aspect to current operations. As of Sep-tember 2012, 50 countries provided Soldiers in support of operations throughout the country.2

The U.S. Army stresses the importance of understanding the operating environment. Army Doctrinal Publication 3.0 dis-cusses the characteristics of friendly forces on the modern battlefield and has implemented the term “unified action.” According to ADP 3.0, “Effective unified action requires Army leaders who can understand, influence and cooperate with unified-action partners. The Army depends on its Joint partners for capabilities that do not reside within the service, and it cannot operate effectively without their support.”3 Al-though ADP 3.0 discusses unified action in terms of Joint operations with other services and government organizations, unified action also implies the need to understand our mul-tinational partners.

Joint Publication 3-16, Multinational Operations, further highlights unified action and stresses the importance of building rapport with multinational partners. It states, “U.S. commanders and their staffs should have an understanding of each member of the multinational force. Much time and effort is expended in learning about the enemy; a similar ef-fort is required to understand the doctrine, capabilities, stra-tegic goals, culture, religion, customs, history and values of each partner.”4

As we serve alongside allies during times of conflict, we quickly realize that differences between how we plan, oper-ate and communicate force our organizations to learn how to work with each other. As global combat operations involv-ing U.S. and multinational forces decrease and our military forces return to home-station training, the establishment of an enduring military partnership between nations remains a vital requirement. This will ensure lessons-learned over the past decade are preserved and passed on, and that our armies maintain an open dialogue to discuss training and operation-al methodologies.

Establishing a Multinational Partner Exchange Program:

Why It Is Important to the U.S. Army as the Operational Environment Changes

by MAJ Larry J. Croucher and CPT Tarik K. Fulcher

A method available to establish and maintain enduring rela-tionships with multinational partners is a formal unit ex-change program. The U.S. Army has a history of partnering with multinational partners, specifically with armies in Eu-rope and on the Asian continent. The 4th Squadron, 3rd Cav-alry Regiment developed an exchange program with a Cana-dian unit, Lord Strathcona’s Horse (Royal Canadians), as part of an effort to establish an enduring relationship with an international partner. The purpose of this program is to re-energize a military-to-military relationship through leader exchanges and sharing of common experiences, cavalry his-tory and tactics, techniques and procedures to better prepare leaders for future missions involving multinational partners.

Establishing the programLeaders from our squadron initially met leaders from Lord Strathcona’s Horse during the U.S. Army reconnaissance summit at Fort Benning, GA, in March 2012. During this event, the idea to start a unit exchange program was dis-cussed. Our two Cavalry organizations shared a similar lin-eage and would benefit from an enduring relationship cen-tered on sharing history and TTPs, and developing a social network to facilitate ongoing dialogue. Both units shared a high level of interest in committing to this program and we established a “way ahead” which includes key-leader ex-changes and future joint training exercises.

To begin an exchange program, we needed to meet require-ments set forth by Army regulations and international dic-tates for travel. The 4th Squadron, 3rd Cavalry, discovered that

LTC David Foley, commander, 4th Squadron, 3rd Cavalry, discusses training with the commander of Lord Strathco-na’s Horse, LTC P.J. Peyton. (Photo by MAJ Larry Croucher)


authority to allow leaders to travel to Canada was reserved at U.S. Army Forces Command level. The squadron was re-quired to request approval in writing through III Corps G-3 to FORSCOM G-3. This was necessary to ensure forward-ing of approval to the Canadian army to ensure they con-curred with the exchange concept.

U.S. Northern Command Instruction 10-213, dated Feb. 1, 2008, provides guidance on the approval process for train-ing outside the contiguous United States.

Prerequisites for travel did not hinder our ability to execute the visit to Canada, and the benefit gained from our trip far outweighed the effort required to prepare for travel. The pri-mary lesson-learned is that you need to submit the formal request for travel to FORSCOM no later than 90 days before departure to allow adequate time to process it.

In addition, travelers must clear through the Aircraft and Per-sonnel Automated Clearance System (https://apacs.dtic.mil/apacs/login.jsp). This site provides guidelines for travel re-quirements, to include mandatory completion of training pri-or to approval.

Finally, it is critical to allocate funding for an exchange pro-gram early. For our program, the regimental headquarters provided the funding necessary to execute the visit.

History of Strathcona RegimentAs discussed earlier, Joint doctrine reinforces the importance of understanding our partner’s history and culture. Our ex-change began with a study of the background of LdSH (RC). This unit has a proud and extensive history that begins when they were formed by Donald Alexander Smith, 1st Baron Strathcona and Mount Royal, to provide elite troops for the British fighting the South Africans in the Boer Wars in 1900.5 During the Boer Wars, Canadian units became experts in de-feating “Boer tactics,” later termed guerrilla warfare.6

LdSH (RC) has also participated in campaigns in both world wars and from 1951 to 1953 in the Korean War. The motto earned during the campaigns of the Boer Wars for the regi-ment is “perseverance.”

LdSH (RC) also has a recent history of serving along coali-tion partners, and they recently deployed in support of Op-eration Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. Most notably, as a part of Task Force Kandahar, LdSH (RC) provided a con-tinuous presence of heavy armor to aid in the clearance of Panjwaii and all other major operations since September 2006 to the withdrawal of combat forces in December 2011.

Visiting our counterparts helped the organization better un-derstand a foreign command structure. The Canadians have adopted the British model for command structure. A major commands a Canadian squadron (equivalent of U.S. compa-ny-sized formation); all other levels are in line with the U.S. Army. The Canadian staff structure is similar to the U.S. staff structure, with a few changes in responsibilities. Their non-commissioned-officer corps is almost identical to ours, with some differences in rank structure. For example, there is no first-sergeant rank in the Canadian army. They use the rank of sergeant major at the troop/company level and above.

Overview of visitAs part of the vital requirement in establishing an enduring relationship with a multinational partner, a solid foundation based on forming personal relationships between key lead-ers needs to be established. One of the many things that made our visit to LdSH (RC) in Canada successful was the diver-sity of the team we sent to establish our relationship. There was no official request from LdSH (RC) on who we should send, so our organization conducted detailed analysis on who would best represent our unit and effectively serve alongside Canadian counterparts.

Our team consisted of both key leaders and staff members of differing ranks and responsibility levels. It also included both officers and NCOs. Our team was made up of the squadron S-3, assistant S-3, S-4, S-1, headquarters and headquarters troop commander, one troop-level executive officer, two troop/company first sergeants and a mortar-section leader. As you can see, the group is leader-intensive, but it struck a balance between staff and line-unit leadership.

We also strove to balance the type of leaders and experienc-es. The strength of this team was the wealth and diversity of experiences it brought to the table. Everyone on the team had combat experience, and three of them had experience in Af-ghanistan. The most important common denominator was that everyone was passionate about partnering with and learning more about the Canadian army.

Another thing that made this team successful is that we all understood the trip’s expectations. Members understood the commander’s intent was to establish the foundation for an enduring relationship with counterparts. The primary goal for this initial visit was to learn how the Canadian army planned and operated in a training environment and to draw lessons-learned from our experience. It was refreshing to get out there, work and learn from a force without the pressures of combat. We always stress the concept of “train how you fight.” The U.S. military fights on the modern battlefield with the support of its allies, so it is only natural we should train with them.

The itinerary established for this initial visit ensured that U.S. leaders participated in a wide range of events, including those designed to orient the members to the unit’s lineage and

CPT Tarik Fulcher, troop commander, 4/3 Cavalry, serves alongside Canadian recce soldiers during urban-oper-ations training at CFB Wainwright. (Photo by MAJ Larry Croucher )


CPT Alex Nitu, Lord Strathcona’s Horse, leads U.S. partici-pants through a reflexive-fire exercise at CFB Wainwright dur-ing 4th Squadron, 3rd Cavalry’s visit. (Photo by MAJ Larry Croucher)


headquarters, events designed to showcase how the Canadian army trains and opportunities to socialize with our counter-parts. Participants initially received a brief on the history of the regiment, to include guided tours of the regimental footprint. Members toured their mounted troop and historical-vehicle troop. The mounted troop is a ceremonial horse cavalry unit that performs all over Canada. The historical-vehicle troop maintains period vehicles from World War II to the Cold War.

Training events were observed at Canadian Forces Base Wainwright in Alberta, Canada. Participants observed train-ing at both individual and collective level, focusing on the recce squadron (troop-sized organization). The first training event we participated in was the urban-operations lane. Three U.S. Soldiers had extensive experience in urban operations and assisted Canadian troops (platoons) in teaching how to enter and clear a room. This training culminated with a pla-toon attack on a built-up area.

The culminating event for the team was the opportunity to command-and-control the recce squadron (U.S. troop equiv-alent) during a zone recce mission. Our team assumed con-trol during the operation as the squadron commander, troop commanders and warrants platoon sergeants. This is when we saw how differently we operated. The most glaring differ-ence is that the normal U.S. Soldier talks six times as much on the net as our counterparts did. Seeing them use hand-and-arm signals and brevity codes on the net demonstrated a mas-tered art form. We also saw how comfortable they are operat-ing in small sections as they demonstrated mission command. Clear and concise guidance was issued, and leaders would ex-ecute and report. This allowed for efficient and effective re-connaissance of a large distance.

The culminating event for the regiment was the validation of a tank squadron (U.S. tank-company equivalent) within LdSH (RC). They conducted a squadron-level live-fire to validate them as ready to deploy. The mission for this operation was a deliberate attack. One tank troop acted as a support by fire, another was the assault element and one was held in reserve.

Most of the U.S. team observed on high ground overlooking the objective, although two rode with range-safety-officer vehicles directly behind the assault force and support by fire position. The safety measures they had in place are worth talk-ing about, as they differ sharply from U.S. standardized rang-es.

Each RSO team was comprised of three vehicles, one on each flank and one behind. The vehicles on the flanks en-sured that the vehicles stayed in the proper axis of advance, while the vehicle behind made sure that the vehicles re-mained on line. Each vehicle crew received strict instruc-tions to engage targets only within a 45-degree radius of their direction of travel. Looking at it from our vantage point, it looked exactly what you would think a tank assault should look like. It was the most realistic company-level exercise we ever witnessed.

Key lessons-learnedA critical component of the intent behind the establishment of an enduring relationship with LdSH (RC) is to share les-sons from both past and current operations. As part of this effort, our team focused on documenting observations dur-ing our initial visit. The biggest takeaway from this initial visit is that the Canadian army embraces many of the con-cepts the U.S. Army is trying to instill in the leaders and fu-ture leaders of our force, particularly the concepts of mission command and adaptability. They practice mission command as though it is second nature to them.

By looking closely at how they plan and conduct missions, such as a squadron zone reconnaissance, you can tell that they fully believe in mission command. The U.S. Army de-fines mission command as “the exercise of authority and di-rection by the commander using mission orders to enable disciplined initiative within the commander’s intent to em-power agile and adaptive leaders in the conduct of unified land operations.”7 LdSH (RC) accomplishes this by issuing orders that focus on a strong commander’s intent and well-defined tasks that have clear and concise endstates. In turn, the subordinate commanders receive the mission with enough time to turn it over to their NCOs so parallel planning can occur. During execution, the individual sections were able to operate independently and efficiently. Everyone knew the commander’s intent, and when the conditions changed, they could quickly seize the initiative to accomplish the mission.

We also learned that the Canadian army believes and prac-tices the principle of adaptive leadership. They have been asked to accomplish a wide variety of missions, and they consistently think outside the norm to accomplish them. As an example, the Canadian army was the first North Atlantic Treaty Organization force to use heavy armor in Afghanistan. The Canadian army initiated an offensive in the Panjwii dur-ing Summer 2006. The Light Armored Vehicle III did not do well because of the many farmer fields and hedge groves they could not safely cross without exposing themselves to rock-et-propelled-grenade fire. The Leopard I at the tactical level brought much-needed direct-fire support, enhanced optics and precision weapon systems to the fight.8

Leaders who participated in the deployment explained to us that LdSH (RC) was in the process of decommissioning all tanks for placement in museums when the commander re-ceived a call from the Canadian army’s chief of staff that he wanted heavy armor in Afghanistan in three months. LdSH

(RC) took those orders, executed them violently and helped clear the Taliban out of that volatile region. This is a case study in adaptive leadership and problem-solving.

Another key lesson-learned is the importance of empower-ing junior leaders. On one of the days we went out with a pla-toon to build a fighting position out of trees. This is not a for-mal evaluated task for this unit but is a necessary part of their fieldcraft when deploying within certain operational environ-ments. They call the design a “crib,” which is a miniature log cabin filled with sand and can withstand several 105mm tank rounds; we used the axes and bow saws that were a part of their pioneer tools. The entire troop (U.S. platoon equivalent) pooled their experiences to help complete this task. Many of the lower-enlisted came from logging backgrounds and could easily identify good trees to cut down and proper techniques. One Soldier on a vehicle crew with an extensive logging back-ground had overall responsibility for cutting and moving all the trees. When it came time to assemble the crib, there was another Soldier who had built several log cabins by hand before he joined. Everyone contributed their expertise or just worked hard as one team.

The establishment of an enduring military partnership be-tween nations remains a vital requirement as operations shift from theaters of conflict to home stations. JP 3-16 states that “effective partnerships take time and attention to develop.”9 Our initial visit, as the foundation for an enduring relation-ship, afforded leaders from both organizations the opportu-nity to share lessons-learned from combat operations over the past decade, along with current training philosophies. Our intent is to preserve and pass on these lessons and main-tain an open dialogue to discuss training and operational methodologies. By continuing to build rapport with our mul-tinational partner in Canada and gaining a deeper understand-ing of their culture, history and doctrine, our organization will be better prepared to execute operations in the current operating environment.

The way aheadAs the relationship continues to develop, both organizations anticipate formally recognizing this partnership through the formation of a reciprocal unit exchange program. By formal-izing this enduring relationship, both units share a perma-nent bond, and Soldiers and leaders in both organizations will be able to carry forward the partnership well into the fu-ture and forever link our Cavalry organizations.

To continue the initiative established during our initial visit to Canada, the squadron will maintain momentum by plan-ning future events with our Canadian counterparts. In De-cember 2012, Lord Strathcona’s Horse received a formal in-vitation to travel to Fort Hood, TX, to observe U.S. Army operations and participate in the squadron’s spur-ride pro-gram. Along with this visit, leaders and staff members in both organizations will continue to communicate via various social-media outlets to continue dialogue and share TTPs and lessons-learned. To further develop this partnership, more training in 2013 and beyond is planned.

MAJ Larry Croucher is an operations officer with 4th Squad-ron, 3rd Cavalry Regiment, Fort Hood. His previous duty as-signments include operations officer, 4th Squadron, 3rd Cav-

alry Regiment, Fort Hood; security assistance training officer, Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan, Camp Eggers, Kabul, Afghanistan; troop commander, 1st Squadron, 16th Cavalry Regiment, Fort Knox, KY; company commander, 1st Battalion, 34th Armor Regiment, Fort Riley, KS; and pla-toon leader and company executive officer, 1st Battalion, 8th Cavalry Regiment, Fort Hood. MAJ Croucher’s military edu-cation includes Command and General Staff College, Com-bined Arms Services Staff School, Armor Officer Basic Course, Airborne School and Armor Officer Advance Course. He holds a bachelor’s of arts degree from Indiana University in telecommunications and a master’s of science degree from the University of Louisville in human-resource education.

CPT Tarik Fulcher commands Headquarters and Headquar-ters Troop, 4th Squadron, 3rd Cavalry Regiment, Fort Hood. Past duty assignments include Cavalry troop commander, 3rd Squadron, 3rd Cavalry Regiment, Fort Hood and Diwaniyah, Iraq; brigade liaison officer to the 3rd Armored Calvary Regi-ment, 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry Regiment, Mosul, Iraq; and platoon leader and company executive officer, 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry Regiment, Fort Carson, CO. CPT Fulcher’s mili-tary schooling includes the Maneuver Captain’s Career Course, Airborne School and the Armor Officer Basic Course. He holds a bachelor’s of science degree from Florida A&M University in economics.

Notes1 “Iraq War Coalition troop deployment,” retrieved from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Multi-National_Force_%E2%80%93_Iraq, no date.2 “International Security Assistance Force key facts and figures,” re-trieved from http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/epub/pdf/placemat.pdf, Sept. 10, 2012.3 ADP 3.0, October 2011.4 JP 3-16, March 2007.5 “Lord Strathcona’s Horse (Royal Canadians),” retrieved from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lord_Strathcona%27s_Horse_(Royal_Canadians)#History, Sept. 3, 2012.6 “Second Boer War,” retrieved from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sec-ond_Boer_War#Canada, Sept. 27, 2012.7 ADP 6-0, May 2012.8 Bergen, Bob, Dr., “Our Leopard tanks make the leap to Afghanistan,” no date.9 JP 3-16, March 2007.

ADP – Army doctrinal publicationFORSCOM – U.S. Army Forces CommandJP – Joint publicationLdSH (RC) – Lord Strathcona’s Horse (Royal Canadian)NCO – noncommissioned officerRSO – range safety officerTTPs – tactics, techniques and procedures

Acronym Quick-ScAn


1SG Stephen M. Freeman shakes hands with his Afghan counterpart, CSM Jan Ali, dur-ing M-2 .50-caliber flex machinegun training at FOB Shoja, Kandahar province, Afghan-istan. (Photo by 1LT Pace L. Jaworski)

Conventional Advising Continued from Page 25

for ISAF leaders to evaluate “Afghan good enough.”

The CUAT seeks to provide a complete assessment of a mentored unit on the characteristics of leadership, operations, intelligence, logistics, equipping, per-sonnel, maintenance, communications, training and education, partnership, unit corruption, infrastructure and facilities and drug use. Currently, the rating sys-tem tracks these categories through a five-point scale beginning with “estab-lished” and increasing to “independent.”

Some would argue that “independence” is an unachievable standard to begin with due to the broken ANSF logistics system, as Adam Mausner writes in his 2010 essay, Reforming ANSF Metrics: Improving the CUAT System.4 In ad-dition to the contested unrealistic “in-dependent” rating, some CUAT rating standards themselves are misleading and ambiguous. Most of the rating standards are objective and quantitative in cate-gories such as “equipping” but subjec-tive and qualitative in other categories, such as “leadership” and “intelligence.” Each rating is coupled with a subjec-tive narrative portion, which allows the adviser to expand on the rating assess-ment but does not provide the adviser with guidance specific to the narrative

portion. The result is an inconsistent report that varies from one SFAT to an-other.

One issue we faced repeatedly with the CUAT is that our mentored unit easily met the quantitative standards for an “independent” rating in most cases but fell far short of this rating in reality. For example, our counterparts were able to conduct an operation indepen-dent of ISAF but that did not justify, in our mind, their “independent” rating. There were still issues of lackluster leadership participation, poor planning and less-than-average execution. The CUAT’s rigid guidelines for some rat-ing definition levels need to be adjust-ed in the future, but more importantly, advisers must qualify each rating with a focused narrative to explain the de-served rating, bring to light key issues and explain the way forward.

Arguably, the biggest issue with the CUAT is the exaggerated, inflated rat-ings of the ANSF. This can be attribut-ed to the subjective nature of the re-port. Due to the narratives in each cat-egory, most of the CUAT is subjective, and it becomes difficult to observe a clear standard. Advisers may also be-come pressured through the chain of command to upgrade or rate units at in-

accurate levels to show the ANSF pro-gression according to the ISAF time-line.

After reading the CUAT from our pre-vious unit, it left an impression that there was little room for improvement within our “independently” rated Af-ghan battalion. This was far from the truth, as my team witnessed within the first 90 days on the ground. This could have been a result of the subjective na-ture of the report itself, or the previous adviser may have been pressured to rate the unit at a certain level, resulting in an inaccurate report. Advisers may be-lieve their counterpart’s success, or lack thereof, reflects personally on the adviser.

The bottom line is that the ISAF lead-ership deserves an honest ANSF assess-ment as they decide where to place limited resources and personnel. and to accurately review the timeline for true ANSF “independence.”

Moreover, the subjective narratives pro-vide flexibility within the CUAT but do not adhere to every organization within the ANSF. The ANSF is comprised of police and military forces, which makes the CUAT unsuitable in attempt-ing to assess the ANSF within a mili-tary framework. Mausner confirms this in his essay as he writes, “No system can be useful that does not measure the number of local recruits, men given po-lice uniforms and the interaction be-tween elements of the police and local militias, local government, and a func-tioning justice system – including courts, jails, etc.”

Although I partnered with an ANA in-fantry battalion, I can imagine the chal-lenge of assessing a police force with-in a pure military framework. A sepa-rate CUAT for the various ANSF orga-nizations – which include Afghan Na-tional Civil Order Police, Afghan Bor-der Police, Afghan Uniform Police and Afghan National Police – would be ben-eficial for the SFATs assigned within the assorted ANSF organizations. An individualized CUAT for different or-ganizations could allow ISAF to gain visibility on key issues necessary for evaluating organizational growth throughout the ANSF.

Also, the CUAT does not have any rat-ing for civil-military operations. Af-ghanistan is similar to Iraq in regards to the COIN campaign, which will con-tinue to rely heavily on the ability of the ANSF to successfully engage the


bility if equipped with capable advis-ers. The SFAT mission is a key compo-nent to assist the ANSF in providing internal and external security. Future advising teams will flourish in Af-ghanistan if the U.S. Army can iden-tify the proper personnel, leverage the appropriate training resources and pro-vide an effective and accurate assess-ment tool to solve the complex problem sets within the vastly different ANSF organizations.

1LT Pace Jaworski is a currently a com-bat adviser with Security Force Assis-tance Team 36, Combined Task Force Arrow Head, Regional Command South, Afghanistan, where he previously served as a tank platoon leader with C Compa-ny, 1st Battalion, 68th Armor Regiment, 3rd Brigade, 4th Infantry Division, Fort Carson, CO. His military education in-cludes the Armor Basic Officer Leader Course and Air Assault School. 1LT Ja-worski is a Distinguished Military Grad-uate from the University of Iowa ROTC Program. He also holds a bachelor’s de-gree in marketing from the University of Iowa.

Notes1 “The U.S.-Afghanistan Strategic Partner-ship Agreement,” fact sheet, 2012. Retrieved Aug. 23, 2012, from http://www.whitehouse.gov/ the-press-of f ice/2012/05/01/ fact-sheet-us-afghanistan-strategic-partnership-agreement.2 Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance, Commander’s Handbook for Security Force Assistance, Fort Leaven-worth, KS, 2008.3 U.S. Special Operations Command, Secu-rity Force Assistance Introductory Guide, Washington, DC: Government Printing Of-fice, 2011.4 Mausner, Adam, Reforming ANSF Met-rics: Improving the CUAT System, Wash-ington, DC: Center for Strategic and Interna-tional Studies, 2010.

Acronym Quick-ScAn

ANA – Afghan National ArmyANSF – Afghan National Security ForcesBCT – brigade combat team

COIN – counterinsurgencyCUAT – commander’s unit as-sessment toolISAF – International Security As-sistance Forces

JRTC – Joint Readiness Training CenterMTT – military transition teamSFAT – security-force assistance team

population as the transition from ISAF to ANSF security continues. Unfortu-nately, the CUAT primarily tracks ki-netic characteristics, which is only a portion of COIN operations. The CUAT also ignores rating the ability of the ANSF to work within the governance mission, equally crucial to the success of our efforts in Afghanistan.

FixesThe lack of civil-military ratings, cou-pled with the inflexible nature of the CUAT for the distinct ANSF organiza-tions, creates an inaccurate report, in-capable of truly providing a complete assessment of the ANSF. Added to the partiality of the report that allows for inflated ratings of partnered units, it’s evident that the CUAT must be further revised to suit the intended purpose of the report. I recommend distinct quan-titative rating definitions within each category to ensure advisers understand the expectations of ANSF “indepen-dence.” Hard numbers are less suscep-tible to open interpretation and, cou-pled with a narrative, could provide ISAF leadership with situational un-derstanding of an ANSF mentored unit.

After serving on the first SFAT mis-sion, I believe advising the ANSF is crucial to facilitate a successful transi-tion of security within Afghanistan. The United States benefits from more than 200 years of a professional Army, whereas Afghanistan’s security forces are in their infancy. The ability to repel the Taliban rests on the capability and capacity of the ANSF to work towards the common goal of securing the civil-ian population and their borders from potential enemies. It is a daunting task, to say the least, and partly depends on an adviser’s ability to teach, coach and mentor the ANSF.

The SFAT mission is the necessary link to facilitate our transition and bring home combat troops that have been fighting for more than a decade. Fur-thermore, SFATs will be successful in future conventional advising efforts if

provided with the effective personnel suitable for the specific mission set. Adviser teams could benefit from school-trained personnel who have the ability to specialize in an advisory ca-pacity, as I believe the Army will con-tinue to advise large-scale convention-al forces in the foreseeable future.

Moreover, the training administered to advisers preparing to deploy is currently insufficient due to the complex prob-lems advisors face within the ANSF. Pre-deployment training must be com-pletely adviser-centric and focused with-in the specific ANSF problem sets. Brigades are equipped with all the re-sources at home station to certify and ensure SFATs are able to secure them-selves in sector, whereas the rotational training center should be responsible for providing in-depth, adviser-specif-ic training.

Ultimately the SFAT mission will be successful if provided with an effec-tive assessment tool to properly gauge the development of the ANSF. It is too difficult to assess the vastly different ANSF organizations with the current CUAT. Each organization faces unique issues within their various stages of growth and should not be gauged on identical standards. Most importantly, the CUAT depends upon advisers pro-viding an honest assessment of their counterparts that reflect the ANSF’s current abilities. If those abilities re-gress from one reporting cycle to the next, the CUAT should reflect those changes rather than keeping the status quo or needlessly upgrading the unit to an undeserved rating. ANSF leadership may be unaware of their organization’s shortcomings and could use an advis-er’s honest assessment to help grow the organization and show the way forward. Moreover, the ISAF leadership deserves a truthful report to measure the SFAT success.

The U.S. Army is ready to transition security to the Afghans, and the ANSF is completely capable of this responsi-


One Size Fits All: the Future of the Scout Platoon and Squad

by SFC David J. Neuzil

If someone asked you to describe the organization of a U.S. Army scout platoon, could you do it? Many leaders in the Army cannot answer, since the right answer is “it depends,” which often results in a misunderstanding of the scout mission and scout-platoon capabilities.

This is because we currently have scout platoons in four types of brigades (armored, infantry, Stryker and battlefield surveillance brigades), and these brigades’ scout platoons have different organizational structures, even within their re-spective brigade combat team. (See Figures 1-6.) All our existing scout-platoon organizations are not tactically opti-mized to operate in our current environment or in anticipated future environments, as compromises were made to stay within the constrained force structure. As we transition to the new BCT structure and add the needed third maneuver battalion, now is also the time that we optimize and standardize the scout-platoon structure across BCTs by devel-oping the proper balance of mounted and dismounted capabilities to succeed in full-spectrum operations.

This article recommends that U.S. Army ABCTs and SBCTs organize all their scout platoons with six Bradley Fighting Vehicles or Stryker vehicles and 36 personnel. These Soldiers would further organize into three dismounted squads of six scouts each, working with six crews mounted on scout platforms.

For IBCTs, I propose 10-wheeled platforms and 36 personnel. The 6 x 36 or 10 x 36 platoons offer more tactical versatility with the balance of dismounted and mounted capability and better command and control. This will provide standardization across the BCTs and increased firepower, mobility and protection, anticipating a transition back to decisive-action operations and additional tactical versatility through the addition and organization of dismounted per-sonnel.

There is one disclaimer – this article is referring to modified table of organization and equipment and to doctrinal or-ganization, and acknowledges that other enablers are often added to the scout platoon.

Lastly, to standardize across combined-arms formations, I propose to assign the titles “squad leader” to replace “sec-tion sergeant” and “team leader” to replace “squad leader.”

As already stated, our scout-platoon organizations vary from unit to unit. Some scout platoons’ squad MTOEs call for three troopers, while others have five. This article argues that a six-man squad is the best organization for the scout squad. This six-man squad would consist of two noncommissioned officers and four junior-enlisted Soldiers. The SL would be a staff sergeant, and the TL would be a sergeant.

To round out the platoon, there is a platoon leader squad and a platoon sergeant squad, both containing six total per-sonnel. (See Figure 1.) This organization gives the scout platoon up to six squads, with six Soldiers per squad, for 36 assigned personnel in all scout platoons. (See Figure 2).


Platoonleader

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2 4 41 2 321 321 3211

1 SFC 3 SSG (-3 compared to combined- arms brigade scout platoon)22 SPC and below

Leader-to-led ratio 1:1.6936 Soldiers, 35 enlisted (MOS 19D)

Number of squads: 0Number of OPs:2-man: 73-man: 44-man: 3

CFV 5 per = 15 Humvee 5 per = 25Total seating in platoon = 40

Figure 1. The structure of the ABCT’s current armored reconnaissance squadron.


Platoonleader

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1 SFC 4 SSG 6 SGT24 SPC and belowLeader-to-led ratio 1:236 Soldiers,35 enlisted (MOS 19D)

Number of squads: 6Number of OPs:2-man: 93-man: 64-man: 46-man: 3

6x CFV 5 (6) per = 30Total seating in platoon = 36

Order of personnel:Bradley commanderGunnerDriverDismount leaderDismount scoutDismount scout

1 4 2 53 6

Increase to platoon types:ABCT: 0 IBCT: 12SBCT: 13

Figure 2. The recommended scout platoon as a Bradley platoon.

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1 SFC 2 SSG 6 SGT13 SPC and belowLeader-to-led ratio 1:1.5623 Soldiers, 22 enlisted (MOS 19D)


Humvee 5 per = 30Total seating in platoon = 30

3 3 4 3 3 3 1734 4 4 431 1 12 2 4 42

Figure 4. The IBCT’s current reconnaissance squadron.


3421 21 2CR 3CR

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1 SFC 2 SSG 13 SPC and belowLeader-to-led ratio 1:1.4423 Soldiers, 22 enlisted (MOS 19D)


Stryker 7 per = 28Total seating in platoon = 28

Figure 3. The SBCT’s current reconnaissance squadron.

1 2 3 4

3


The six-man squad increases the platoon’s “leader-to-led” ratio and offers a better distribution of leadership across the platoon. When mounted, the platoon leader leads the platoon with his platoon sergeant and NCO vehicle commanders. During dis-mounted operations, the platoon sergeant assumes control of the mounted element, and the PL is in charge of the dismounted element and the platoon as a whole. The proposed organization-al structure shown in Figure 2 would also reduce the amount of leader movement within the vehicles when deploying dismounted squads. The only scouts who would move inside the vehicles in this proposed platoon are the PL, his gunner and one dismount-ed scout. This dismounted scout will train to serve as the PL’s backup gunner.

In Figure 5, you can see distinct lines dividing the platoon into familiar sections, and then another line dividing the platoon be-tween mounted and dismounted elements. This proposal chang-es our current manning to four staff sergeants in the platoon, but recommends that only two be assigned as vehicle commanders or mounted squad leaders. The other two staff sergeants will serve as dismounted squad leaders. This organization gives all six squads a senior and junior leader, which would allow com-manders the flexibility to task-organize the platoon and squads into NCO-led teams if necessary.

The next benefit of this six-man squad over existing squad structures is increased versatility. To explain this point, we will consider a Bradley platoon with six BFVs as a model. Each sec-tion is large enough and has adequate leadership to operate in-dependently. For example, if the platoon must dismount to search an urban area and the PL does not want to bring in large tracked vehicles, the mounted element could establish an overwatch or

support-by-fire position to support the dismounted element’s movement. In the event of contact, the mounted element can support with long-range precision fires, additional maneuver or casualty evacuation as the situation requires. Because the mount-ed section has six vehicles assigned, the mounted teams can de-ploy. As a further example, if there is a casualty-producing event, two or three vehicles could quickly move to recover the casualties, and the remaining three to four vehicles can remain in the support-by-fire position to continue to provide overwatch and precision long-range fires.

This proposed configuration also anticipates a return to com-bined-arms maneuver and decisive-action operations. It also al-lows for more robust operations, providing enough manpower for more dismounted scouts for extended observation-post op-erations. In ABCTs and SBCTs with six squads of six Soldiers each, the scout platoon now has the ability to employ up to 18 dismounted scouts while retaining an 18-man section mounted on six vehicles. Given current tactical guidance from Afghani-stan and from experience in Iraq, this gives the troop command-er the ability to employ each section independently or as a 36-man element based on mission, enemy, terrain, troops available, time and civilians involved. The commander may elect to em-ploy any number between six and 36 personnel with ready-made organic squads and adequate leadership to accomplish the mission. Building these robust dismounted elements is the best way to adequately meet the myriad of missions a scout platoon receives.

Finally, this recommendation deliberately uses the terms squad leader and team leader, which we acknowledge are the same ti-tles used in the infantry. These terms are common across the

Platoon SGT

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4 5 6

1 2 3

Dismounted squad Mounted squad Crew

Figure 5. The recommended scout platoon.

Army, since even sustainment units are broken down and equipped as squads. Units may still use terms like section sergeant and senior scout, but that is least preferred and would not be official terms on the unit-manning roster or evaluations. By comparison, terms such as section sergeant are not used in mechanized in-fantry units; they still refer to their staff sergeants as squad lead-ers. When scout NCOs are a vehicle commander in charge of two or more vehicles, they may refer to themselves as a “section sergeant,” but even then, it is not their principle duty title, since the UMR would list them as a “mounted scout squad leader.”

There are no perfect answers. This proposed 6 x 36 and 10 x 36 structures of the scout platoon address the core scout missions of route reconnaissance, area reconnaissance, zone reconnais-sance and screening operations in current and future operating environments. In this article, we have discussed a number of topics surrounding the scout platoon 6 x 36 and 10 x 36 con-cepts. We redefined the scout squad and platoon, and recom-mended the use of terms standard across the Army for our scouts’ duty positions. Most importantly, we demonstrated how this pro-posed organization will best increase the scout platoon’s versa-tility. Finally, we offer that the 6 x 36 and 10 x 36 scout-platoon structures provide a more efficient organization for C2 at the platoon, squad and team levels.

SFC David Neuzil is a career manager with Office of the Chief of Armor, Fort Benning, GA. His previous assignments include operations noncommissioned officer, 2nd Brigade Special Troops Battalion, 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 82nd Airborne Division, Fort Bragg, NC; platoon sergeant, K Troop, 3rd Squadron, 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment, Fort Hood, TX; recruiter, Chico Recruiting Station, Chico, CA; section sergeant, A Troop, 1st Squadron, 2nd

ABCT – Armor brigade combat teamBCT – brigade combat teamBFV – Bradley Fighting VehicleC2 – command and controlIBCT – infantry brigade combat teamMTOE – modified table of organization and equipmentNCO – noncommissioned officerPL – platoon leaderSBCT – Stryker brigade combat teamSL – squad leaderTL – team leaderUMR – unit-manning report

Acronym Quick-ScAn

Armored Cavalry Regiment (Light), Fort Polk, LA; and squad leader, C Troop, 1st Squadron, 1st Cavalry, 1st Armored Division, Armstrong Kaserne, Buedingen, Germany. His deployments in-clude Operation Joint Endeavor Implementation Force, Bosnia; Operation Joint Forge Stabilization Force, Bosnia; two tours during Operation Iraqi Freedom; Operation Unified Response, Haiti; and Operation New Dawn, Iraq. SFC Neuzil’s military edu-cation includes the BFV Transitions Training Course, Pathfinder Course, Senior Leader Course, Army Recruiting Course, Ba-sic Instructor Training Course, basic Airborne training, Air As-sault School, Advanced Leaders Course and Warrior Leader Course. He holds an associate’s degree in business adminis-tration from American Intercontinental University. An inductee of the Excellence in Armor Program, he has received many awards and decorations, including the Order of Saint George.


Platoonleader

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1 SFC 2 SSG 2 SGT12 SPC and belowLeader-to-led ratio 1:2.418 Soldiers, 17 enlisted (MOS 19D)

Number of squads: 0Number of OPs:2-man: 03-man:04-man: 0

Humvee 5 per = 30Total seating in platoon = 30

I Corp III Corp XVIII Corp

201 504 525

Figure 6. The BfSB’s current reconnaissance squadron.

Preparing for the Decisive-Action Training Environment

by CPT Aaron E. Adams

This article reviews the training and execution of operations during a deci-sive-action rotation at the Joint Multi-national Readiness Center from the per-spective of an observer/coach-trainer. This article’s intent is to outline train-ing lessons-learned for unit leaders to increase awareness on how to best pre-pare and execute a DA rotation. My ob-servations are focused on a company/troop-level organization.

As the U.S. Army transitions from con-ducting overseas contingency opera-tions, units are beginning to conduct DA training rotations at our combat training centers. As with any shift in focus, many units will experience sig-nificant growing pains as they adjust to this new training environment. The stan-dard focus for most units over the last decade has been training and conduct-ing mission-rehearsal exercises in prep-aration for an upcoming deployment to either Iraq or Afghanistan. In most cas-es, training plans have shifted from the once high-intensity conflict to the in-surgent threat to prepare our formations for future combat operations. Due to this shift, a large part of our current formation has not experienced the high-intensity training that was once normal for our formations.

As we now transition to the DA envi-ronment, we must ensure our junior leaders and Soldiers are trained and prepared to conduct decisive operations. I wrote this article to provide observa-tions and lessons-learned from recent DA rotations and to provide a synopsis of what units can expect when attend-ing a DA rotation. Also, this article of-fers recommended training techniques to prepare units to execute this type of a rotation.

In the course of one year, JMRC has hosted two DA rotations in Europe. Operational design changed from the first to the second rotation. During the initial DA rotation, training was strict-ly focused on U.S. forces only; however, multinational partners were integrated during the second rotation. Along with the rotational unit, multinational part-ners from all over Europe participated to replicate host-nation forces as well as augment the opposing forces. Par-ticipating nations included Germany, Romania, Bulgaria, the Czech Repub-

lic, the United Kingdom, Slovenia and Poland.

The most recent rotation was designed to be executed among the German pop-ulace, outside of the traditional train-ing areas, in what is known as a ma-neuver-rights area. To accomplish this, the German government had to approve the training and agree to land use out-side of the U.S. military training areas. This provided the rotational unit with an exercise that was realistic, with real-world risk and cultural considerations.

PreparationThe foundation for operations conduct-ed at training centers are built year-round with each unit’s training plan. At the company level, units routinely build training plans that support their mis-sion-essential task list and support their higher headquarters’ mission sets. These mission-essential tasks serve as the foundation on which the company will be evaluated at their respective CTC rotation. METL-focused training and preparation for a DA rotation should inherently occur year-round as part of any company training plan. At JMRC, it has been observed during previous rotations that some units typically do

not focus on the DA threat during their training exercises before coming to the training center. This results in units at-tempting to build the base knowledge during situational-training exercises and then immediately execute the rotation. With the amount of personnel turnover in units, training and preparation must be sustained year-round to ensure pro-ficiency on all METL tasks.

Once at the CTC, units draw all re-quired equipment, including the Mul-tiple Integrated Laser Engagement Sys-tems for both personnel and vehicles. While not required, it is encouraged that units routinely ensure their MILES equipment is both zeroed and function-al. A typical trend is that units do not zero their weapon MILES, thus result-ing in minimal effects on the enemy during the rotation. For mounted or mechanized forces, we recommend that units conduct MILES gunnery before executing any training lanes. This gun-nery not only zeros the weapon MILES, but it also allows the unit to conduct a gunnery exercise and refine its stan-dard operating procedures.

Following equipment draw, units con-duct STX lanes while their battalion headquarters concurrently conducts a

Soldiers from 173rd Airborne Brigade conduct a rehearsal prior to executing operations at the Joint Multinational Readiness Center in Hohenfels, Germany. (Photo by SPC Tristan Bolden)


command-post exercise. This allows staff planning to be conducted concur-rently with company- and platoon-lev-el training. It is highly recommended that units include the company head-quarters in the CPX. By including the company in the CPX, the unit leader-ship will have visibility and understand-ing of their unit’s planning capabilities.

Also, this will provide company com-manders more training opportunities on planning and orders production, which is something companies typical-ly struggle with. This understanding re-duces the amount of additional frag-mentary orders published during exe-cution of the rotation. Routinely, bat-talions issue multiple FRAGOs during the rotation, which causes confusion at company level; this confusion typical-ly occurs because the FRAGOs are is-sued with a short execution time, leav-ing the company commander little to no time to plan and rehearse with his company. In essence, the one-thirds/two-thirds rule is essentially non-exis-tent in these types of conditions.

Before executing the rotational mis-sion, units conduct STX lanes at the company and platoon level. During a DA rotation, we recommend that these lanes focus on offense, defense and sta-bility operations. The largest trend in units is a lack of understanding in how to conduct defensive operations, spe-cifically the development of engage-

ment areas. Commanders should en-sure they include EA development in their STX concepts for a DA rotation. By executing training lanes focused on unified land operations, all service mem-bers receive training on current doc-trine and are provided an opportunity to refine their SOPs.

OffenseThe operational plan in the offense has traditionally called for an area recon-naissance to be conducted, followed by the unit’s main effort. This reconnais-sance is designed to create time and space to allow follow-on units to suc-cessfully move from the tactical assem-bly areas without significant enemy contact. The reconnaissance element typically establishes passage points along a designated phase line where fol-low-on units conduct forward-pas-sage-of-lines before continuing the mission. Once the FPOL is completed, units typically conduct a movement-to-contact until reaching a designated phase line. The offensive operation then culminates with the rotational unit at-tacking to secure a key urban area be-fore transitioning to stability operations.

While the enemy situation is often un-known, units issue specific engagement criteria to shape the battlefield accord-ing to the operational plan. Engagement criteria are critical to the offense’s suc-cess, as they prevent units from becom-

ing decisively engaged and weakened prior to reaching their objective.

Units tend to use high-speed avenues of approach out of their TAA. This tech-nique allows the unit to gain maximum momentum but forces them to use trav-eling overwatch and sacrifice security. In one specific example, a unit encoun-tered a small-arms ambush shortly af-ter crossing their line of departure. Be-cause the unit was somewhat canalized on a main road, they could not maneu-ver due to the restrictive terrain. The unit managed to return fire and quickly moved out of the kill zone with no ca-sualties or battle damage. Realizing the need to get off the high-speed avenues of approach, the unit quickly transi-tioned from traveling overwatch to bounding overwatch and began using lateral routes that were less traveled. This adjustment proved to be a wise decision as the high-speed avenues of approach were well overwatched by enemy forces.

Once onto lateral routes with open ter-rain, the unit began using terrain to their advantage. The commander un-derstood that to maintain tempo, he would also need to ensure the unit’s survivability, and this simply could not be accomplished by traveling along main roads. The commander used the rolling terrain to secure movement for the rest of the company by establishing support-by-fire positions. The terrain supported the establishment of SBF

U.S. Army Soldiers from 2nd Cavalry Regiment camouflage a Stryker armored vehicle during a decisive-action training environment exer-cise. (Photo by SGT Robert Sheets)

U.S. Army Soldiers from 173rd Airborne Brigade pull security during a decisive-action training exercise at the Joint Multinational Readiness Center, Hohenfels, Germany. (Photo by PFC Michael Sharp)


positions as well as provided security for other platoons bounding forward.

The unit’s security was accomplished by bounding from terrain feature to ter-rain feature and establishing SBF posi-tions to scan ahead to identify enemy forces. Concurrently, the company mor-tar section rapidly established mortar-firing points, fully prepared to support the company’s maneuver with indirect fires.

By deliberately moving across terrain features, this ensures the unit has an early warning of enemy forces and ob-stacle belts forward of their positions. This early warning enables the compa-ny to maintain survivability while also serving as a reconnaissance for the bat-talion, all the while maintaining the tempo of the offense.

On a different occasion, a unit made sure to use concealed routes through the dense forests and treelines to con-duct their maneuver. This terrain pro-vided concealment for vehicles and en-sured the unit would not be identified by enemy ground or air forces. Maxi-mizing the use of thermal capabilities, many of these forested areas could be observed well in advance of occupa-tion, once again ensuring survivability for the rotational unit.

The use of terrain is an important vari-able in conducting a successful offense. Ensuring that junior leaders understand terrain and how to effectively use it is a task that must be trained. At compa-ny level, commanders are encouraged to conduct training exercises without troops to train junior leaders on terrain. This can accomplished through a two-part leadership professional-develop-ment exercise. One part should focus strictly on terrain and how it enables success; the second part should be the terrain walk outside the garrison envi-ronment.

In many instances during DA rotations, units that effectively maneuver with the terrain identify enemy forces before physical contact is made. This element of surprise allows the unit to establish an attack position and effectively en-gage the enemy force without compro-mising its positions. By effectively re-ducing the enemy threat, the unit can continue its maneuver and continue the offensive operation. In short, properly using terrain will undoubtedly main-tain survivability in the offense.

Another critical skill during the offense is the ability to rapidly deploy an infan-try fighting force, as this allows the

cupation and occupation by force. To properly occupy an assembly area, units use a quartering party to recon-noiter the area, organize the area based on the commander’s guidance, mark entrances and exits, and mark tentative vehicle locations. During previous ro-tations, units rarely used quartering parties and typically occupied by force – units occupy assembly areas by force simply because (1) they do not know how to properly occupy an assembly area or (2) choose not to because occu-pying by force is simpler and requires less time.

Commanders should include occupa-tion of assembly areas into every train-ing event at home station. When a com-pany goes to a range or training area, occupy an assembly area to train your SOPs; this will ensure a better knowl-edge base during execution during a DA rotation.

DefenseFollowing the offensive and stability operations in a DA rotation, the rota-tional unit typically establishes a de-fensive posture to prepare for the ene-

U.S. Army Soldiers of 2nd Cavalry Regiment conduct a security halt during a deci-sive-action training environment exercise. (Photo by SGT Ian Schell)

commander to quickly engage enemy positions without endangering his mounted platforms. As seen in previ-ous rotations, units struggle with effec-tively dismounting their infantry squads and synchronizing efforts between the dismounted force and the vehicle plat-forms. A recommended training tech-nique to build this skill for any mount-ed unit is to conduct a combined-arms maneuver live-fire exercise before de-ploying to a CTC. A CAMLFX enables maneuver units to develop and/or re-fine SOPs that focus on integration of dismounted infantry in a mounted fight. A CAMLFX provides a controlled train-ing environment using both blank and live ammunition to meet the training objective. Incorporating this training event into a company training schedule will greatly increase the success of the unit, both at the CTC and in combat operations.

As rotational units conduct offensive operations over multiple days, they typ-ically establish TAAs for their units to occupy overnight. TAAs have recently been an issue for units conducting DA rotations. Assembly areas can be occu-pied using two methods: deliberate oc-


As with traditional defenses, combat enablers need to be integrated into the planning and execution to be success-ful. Some of these enablers include en-gineers, fire-support assets, air support and surveillance platforms. Units that are conducting a DA rotation typically have some, if not all, of these assets available during their rotation.

The main point of failure for integra-tion of enablers at the company level has traditionally been with the engineer platoon. Units have routinely wasted critical time emplacing obstacles and preparing battle positions simply be-cause they did not fully understand the engineer platoon’s capabilities. In one recent rotation, the company received the engineer platoon at 1 a.m., yet no work began until 8:30 a.m. – the com-pany wasted more than seven hours trying to figure out the engineer pla-toon’s capabilities and how to emplace their obstacles. This issue could have been reduced if the engineers were tied into the battalion and company plan-ning process.

Integration of enablers begins at home station, not during a rotation. Units should receive capability briefs from their supporting units before training events to ensure a greater understand-ing of the support that can be provided. This can best be done as an LPD for company-level leadership, as this pro-vides a good venue for the supporting element to answer any questions the maneuver units may have. This can be applied for all enablers, including fire-support and military-intelligence assets.

Once in a defensive posture, units usually plan to establish blocking ob-stacles in their area of responsibility as well as battle positions for the pla-

toons to defend from. Also, com-pany commanders may

plan to emplace turning obstacles to turn the attacking force into the main EA. This defensive

concept, built around the terrain, allows for

the dismounted teams, in concert with the mor-tar section, to attrit the initial reconnaissance force of the enemy, thus leaving minimal targets to engage. Pri-

mary, alternate and sub-sequent battle positions are then prepared for each pla-toon to use during the engage-ment. Units that have not been training on DA opera-

my counterattack. This is no different than what we have observed during training events at JMRC. While secur-ing the brigade or battalion objective, units will establish defensive positions and begin developing their EA.

EA development in the defense is crit-ical to the operation’s success. The pro-cess to develop an EA applies to any type of organization or unit. During previous DA rotations, units typically struggle with EA development. The trend is that units seem to lack the doc-trinal knowledge of the process to de-velop EAs.

The three key points of failure for ro-tational units are emplacing weapon systems, establishing fire-control mea-sures and conducting an EA rehearsal. Units tend to emplace weapon systems without completing range cards for their positions. They further fail to iden-tify dead space and fail to ensure fires interlock. This seems to be a recur-ring trend in units conducting training rotations.

Soldiers at the lowest levels must un-derstand the importance of range cards and sector sketches, as well as have the skills to accurately complete them for their weapon systems and positions. This will eventually translate to the company sector sketch, which will iden-tify failures in the defense. The main issue during rotations is that this is not being completed at the company and platoon level.

tions or who have experienced signifi-cant personnel turnover struggle with establishing and synchronizing a good defensive plan.

Once the engineer platoon completes obstacle emplacement, they typically transition to preparing battle positions for the company. Primary, alternate and subsequent battle positions are typically prepared for the rotational unit; these are dug-in positions and are not notion-al. Since battle positions are prepared, freshly disturbed terrain is noticeable around these positions. This requires fieldcraft at the lower levels to conceal these positions using natural foliage sur-rounding the position. It also requires fieldcraft in concealing vehicles that will be positioned in these battle posi-tions. Far too often units do not use fo-liage for concealment; rather, they are content with occupying the positions as-is and prepare to defend them. This leaves not only the positions visible to the enemy, but also the vehicles that occupy them.

Use of terrain for cover and conceal-ment greatly increases the unit’s sur-vivability unit throughout DA rotations. Over the last decade, our force has be-come accustomed to entering into an operation “as-is.” The fieldcraft our ju-nior Soldiers once mastered no longer exists at the lowest levels of our forma-tions. Teaching junior leaders and Sol-diers in our formations the skills to con-ceal vehicles and dismounted positions by using their natural surroundings may mean the difference in an operation. When enemy forces have a capability to observe and engage from the air, cam-ouflaging vehicles and positions be-comes extremely important.

Units should incorporate fieldcraft into regular training events. Simply estab-lishing a battle position is not good enough if all the defending forces can be observed from the ground and air. Training should include techniques for camouflaging positions that aid in con-cealment while not hindering any ve-hicular or weapon system. Through sus-tained training, fieldcraft will once again become second nature in our formations.

When planning battle positions, it is important that units ensure they have interlocking fields of fire in the EA. This is typically not an issue within a company-sized formation, but is an is-sue with adjacent units. Coordination with adjacent units in a defense is crit-ical in ensuring there are no gaps for the enemy to exploit. In recent rota-tions, units have failed to properly con-duct adjacent unit coordination with sister companies to ensure all areas are

Acronym Quick-ScAn

AOR – area of responsibility CAMFLX – combined-arms ma-neuver live-fire exerciseCPX – command-post exerciseCTC – combat training centerDA – decisive actionEA – engagement areaFPOL – forward-passage-of-linesFRAGO – fragmentary orderJRMC – Joint Multinational Read-iness CenterLPD – leadership professional de-velopmentMETL – mission-essential task listMILES – Multiple Integrated La-ser Engagement SystemSBF – support by fireSOP – standard operating proce-duresSTX – situational-training exerciseTAA – tactical assembly areaTEWT – training exercises without troops

covered. This trend has led to enemy forces exploiting gaps between compa-ny AORs and resulted in the enemy successfully breaching defensive lines.

Additional focus should be placed on adjacent unit coordination at the com-pany and platoon level. On several oc-casions throughout rotations, severe breakdowns in situational awareness occurred because platoons were not communicating with adjacent units lo-cated a few hundred meters away. Pla-toons most often relied on the compa-ny/troop headquarters to coordinate with adjacent units and relay the infor-mation back and forth. Shorten the link by training platoons to coordinate with other elements outside the organization. By making this a focal point, junior leaders will have the confidence and initiative to make recommendations and decisions for the betterment of the organization.

The battalion/squadron normally estab-lishes engagement and displacement criteria for the defense; this synchro-nizes the defensive effort for all com-panies defending. An example of en-gagement and displacement criteria are: engage when three or more enemy ve-hicles enter your EA and displace when three enemy vehicles have been de-stroyed. This same displacement crite-ria works from the alternate and subse-quent battle positions. Under this con-cept, the commander can calculate the destruction of no less than 27 enemy vehicles before displacing from their subsequent positions back to their final defensive line. With adjacent compa-nies operating under the same engage-ment/displacement criteria, the battal-ion can conceivably defeat 81 enemy vehicles before making the final defen-sive stand.

Fires planning at the company level are critical in supporting the defensive op-eration, especially if the company has organic mortar systems. The company fires plan should incorporate targets to destroy enemy forces as they encoun-ter defensive obstacles. Also, obscura-tion targets should be planned that sup-port the displacement of friendly forc-es from their battle positions. This has the effect of concealing friendly forces maneuvering to alternate positions and slows the enemy advance to create time and space for the defending force. Tar-gets planned at the company level should also be sent higher for inclusion into the battalion fires plan, something many units fail to do in a rotation. Or-ganizations that plan and integrate le-thal fires have greater success against a mechanized enemy force.

Fires planning for the defense must be stressed at the battalion level as a pri-ority and cannot be thought of as a sec-ondary security measure. Indirect-fire support is a key enabler during a DA operation. Having the ability to employ accurate and timely indirect fires often means the difference in the operation’s outcome.

Rehearsals seem to be another critical issue for rotational units. Commanders fail to provide adequate time to con-duct rehearsals with their platoons be-fore defending. In most cases, rehears-als are limited to radio rehearsals, which prove inadequate during the exercise. Commanders should incorporate re-hearsals into their planning process to ensure enough time is allocated to con-duct a terrain walk with their key lead-ers and rehearse actions on contact; this will translate to a successful de-fense once the engagement begins.

Most of our leaders have never conduct-ed defensive operations and are there-fore not proficient in EA development. By conducting TEWT lanes at the bat-talion/squadron level, we can ensure our commanders and platoon leader-ship is trained and ready before a DA rotation. We can further use the same model to certify leaders prior to exe-cuting a DA rotation, similar to how we certify leaders prior to conducting live-fire exercises.

Lessons-learnedThroughout these training exercises, there are many lessons-learned that should be the focus for any unit prepar-ing to conduct a DA rotation. As with all operations, proper training and re-hearsals make the key difference for success in all we do. Commanders should focus their efforts in not only doctrine but also on the basic skills at Soldier level to ensure wide-based knowledge and understanding of how to successfully execute operations in a DA environment. Some key areas that units should focus training on before conducting a rotation are terrain, em-ployment of fire-support assets, use of dismounted teams, cover and conceal-ment, planning timelines and coordina-tion with adjacent units.

A larger emphasis should be placed on conducting training events that support the unit’s actions and roles in a DA en-vironment. Company training plans must evolve to incorporate these skill sets into training year-round to ensure Soldiers maintain their proficiency in these areas. With integration of DA training into year-round training plans,

incoming personnel will also have the opportunity to be trained and indoctri-nated with the unit SOPs and will there-fore be better prepared for a DA rota-tion. Simply relying on STX lanes to train our formations is unacceptable and inadequate. As the guardians of our na-tion, we must always be ready to deploy and assume the mission we are given. We owe it to our country to be the best-trained fighting force possible, ready for all situations and threat forces.

CPT Aaron Adams is an Armor officer currently serving as an observer/coach-trainer at JMRC, Hohenfels, Germany. He has also commanded Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 525th Bat-tlefield Surveillance Brigade, Fort Bragg, NC; and Headquarters and Headquar-ters Troop, 1-38 Cavalry, also at Fort Bragg. He served as a scout platoon leader and company executive officer with 1-75 Cavalry at Fort Campbell, KY. CPT Adams’ military schooling includes the Armor Officer Basic Course, Air As-sault School, Airborne School, Maneu-ver Captain’s Career Course and Cav-alry Leader’s Course. He holds a bach-elor’s of science degree from Florida Southern College in political science. CPT Adams completed two deployments in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom and one deployment in support of Op-eration Enduring Freedom.


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