wittgenstein, rules, and normativity · wittgenstein makes regarding rules, though 1 shall conceive...
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W i t t g e n s t e i n , Rules, a n d Normativity
by
Frank M. Secky
A T h e s i s Submitted to the Faculty of Graduâte Studies in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
for the Degree of
MASTER OF ARTS
Department of Philosophy University of Manitoba
Winnipeg, Manitoba
O February, 2000
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Wittgenstein, Rules, and Normortivity
BY
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of Manitoba in partiai hilfillment of the requinments of the degree
of
Master of Arts
I;RANK M. SECKY O2000
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Wittgenstein, Rules. and Normativity
The aim of tb thais is to exmine the concept of "biiowing a d e " as it is
adai.csscd by Wiîtgcnsîein in his Phüapoplrial ~ ~ ~ & & I I I S §§143-242 and in certain
parts of the Raiiruficp on du FoundlttiO1~~ of MatAcntatjcS. The ccmcept of fOIIowbg a d e is essentiai 60r miderstanding certain key questions in the phrlowphy of m9id as w d
the philasaphy ab roQiI h a . Unfortmiately, there is little amsenms abord ho^ UR should mad Wittpnstein's trieatment of de-Mimukg, 1 vgoe that the claim thnt de s arise oat of a ~ g a i u d practice does not entul that the ccmmmity determines the
interpretation of des. The thinLers who daim that the community does &termine the
interpretaticm of des, the sa-calfed Conrm~ty Vim thcorists, an? nsoally mncemed to
put a stop to possible challenges by a rate *ceptic. Thc ComrnUmty Vxew theorists beiieve that the mie sceptic cpn challenge an indnndtd's de-fo1lOwing but not the
m~nm&ty's de-fbiiawing. I ciam, hawever, îhat the rule sceptic's w o y is incohemnt
and so is the solution to the sapticisn, the CommUmty View. Io discassing d e -
scepûcian and the Conrmunity View, I focus on Kripke's W- On R h Md
Ptiw& Lmgqp. Kriplre's appmch i s a sophistiated modification of the C o m m e
View. But even thou@ 1 aigrie, together with McGimi and Baker and Htcker, thpt the
Community View is fundament* incorrect, 1 think that it is interesthg to see why this Mew is so temptïng and why some Community View theoiists might want to attriiute it to Wittgenstein I bclieve that in interpreting Wiwnstein, one needs to appreciate the
. . deliute balance between the commPnNinui and the individualist aspects of his views an meaning and de-foiiowing. Although the commuuity is the most important source of
correctness, it does not mean that WC can equatc the right way of foiiowing a ruic with
the (nomative) attitude îhat the commulliify has towards that de. Tradition, eqlicït
rdes of various sorts and peopIe in a position of power or auîhority can be rlso a source of corriecbiess for determining the nght way of lonowing a de.
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Detailed T a b l e of Contents
I N T R O D U C T I O N : R U L E S AND NORMS
1.2 INTRODUCTION AND THE SCOPE O F THE THESIS
Thesis statement.
My presuppositions.
1. B C L A S S I F Y I N G R U L E S
Different conceptions of r u l e s and norms.
1. C EXAMPL.ES OF R U L E S WITH DIFFERENT U S E S
Classifying rules according to their use (legal,
mathematical, grammatical, game-rules etc.).
I.D NORMATIVE COMPULSION
Classifying rules according to the kind and force of
their normative compulsion.
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Secky 3
How is normative compulsion different from a natural
compulsion? (a preliminary treatment)
1. E FOLLOWING RULES VS. CONFORMING TO RULES
Classifying rules according to whether we can speak of
an agent (or the lack thereof : following rules vs.
conforming to rules or norms.
Why the norms encoded in the brain are not relevant to
an account of rule-following?
1. F THE SOURCES OF NORMATIVITY
Classifying rules and norrns according to their source
(verbal instruction, shared ways of life, "practice",
observation, conditioning, evolution, cybernetic
systems, etc. ) .
1. G EXPLICIT VS. IMPLICIT RULES
Rules as the logical condition acting.
Classifying rules according to the way in which the
agent obeys the rule (explicitly or implicitly) .
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Secky 4
What does constitute the following of a r u l e i n a
genera l sense?
I. H RULES VS. RULE-FORMULATIONS
1.1 WITTGENSTEIN'S USE OF "RULE"
II. THEORIES OF RULE-FOLLOWING
II. A REDUCTIONISM VS. NON-REDUCTIONISM
Introduction to theories of rules.
Reductionism. Are norms u n d e r l a i n by something
non-normative?
II. B ACTUALISM AND DISPOSITIONALISM
Dispositionalism and actualism: an introduction and
some g e n e r a l difficulties with t h e s e concepts.
III. THE "PARADOX" OF PI S201
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I1I.A KRIPKE'S "PARADOX"
Introduction to Kripke's interpretation of
Wittgenstein.
The "paradox" of Kripke's sceptic.
III . B KR IPKE ' S W I T T G E N S T E I N AND THE REAL W I T T G E N S T E I N
Secky 5
54
Kripke's "paradox" is not the paradox that Wittgenstein
addresses in PI S201 .
Why it is very u n l i k e l y that Wittgenstein would want to
offer a solution to the "sceptical paradox".
1II.C W I T T G E N S T E I N ' S PARADOX
The sceptic's "paradox" is a paradox for Wittgenstein's
interlocutor, rather than for Wittgenstein himself.
III. D REGULISM
The regress of interpretations argument revisited.
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III. E THE FOLLOWING OF A RULE I S A PRAXIS
How is the role of the comrnunity in Wittgenstein's
account different £rom that of Kripke's?
IV. THE SCEPTICAL SOLUTIOl\i
1V.A THE COMMUNITY VIEW
Secky 6
68
Community View -- the scepticism about rules applies
only to the individualistic conception of
rule-following.
K r i p k e : For A to be in accord with a rule is for the
community to have no disposition to reject A. This is
incorrect because it is quite possible for the
comrnunity to be wrong about a particular thing
(czlculating rnidsurnrner' s day) .
IV. B PRIVATE RULE-FOLLOWING
Wt~at is the difference between saying that r u i e
following is necessârily public and saying that it is
necessarily social? Could there be just one occasion
of foliowing a rule? T h e w e could be just one occasion
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S e c k y 7
of followinç a rule but that kind of rule-following needs to be
social.
V. SANCTIONS AND PKACTICES
V.A INTRODUCTION TO BRANDOM
An introduction to Brandomls account of normativity and
its connection to Wittgenstein's "rules".
V.B NORMZTIVITY AND CONDITIONING
Brandom's account of opewant conditioning and its
relation to Wittgenstein's "training".
V. C DIFFICULTIES WITH BRANDOM'S ACCOUNT
Possible difficulties with Brandom's xcount of reward
and punishment.
V. D INTZRNAL AND EXTERNAL SANCTIONS
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V. E BRANDOM ON ANIMALS AND INTERNAL SANCTIONS
Secky 8
1 0 5
Animals do n o t ac t because t h e y do not have a
conception of what t h e y are do ing . However, this does
not entai1 t h a t a n i m a l behaviour cannot be a source of
normativity.
Animal behaviour can be interpreted as resulting £rom
the non-propositional attitudes that animals have.
Does this entai1 t h a t anirnals h a v e beliefs?
How is Brandom f a i t h f u l t o t h e s p i r i t of the
P h i l o s o p h i c a l I n v e s t i g a t i o n ?
VI. CONCL U S I O N
B i b l i o g r a p h y
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Wittgenstein, Rules, and Normativity
by Frank M. Secky
1. INTRODUCTION: RULES AND NORMS
1. A INTRODUCTION AND THE SCOPE OF THE T H E S I S
Although discussions of rules can be traced as far back in
the history of philosophy as Plato's Eutnyphro, and although
r u l e s and norms are also addressed by Kant in T h e C r i t i q u e o f
P u r e R e a s o n in the eighteenth century, the concept of "following
a rule" became prominent in philosophy mainly as a result of
Wittgenstein's treatment of this topic in the P h i l o s o p h i c a l
I n v e s t i g a t i o n s (PI) §§143-242 and in certein parts of the R e m a r k s
on the F o u n d a t i o n s o f M a t h e m a t i c s (RFM) .
In this thesis 1 shall address some of the main claims that
Wittgenstein makes regarding rules, though 1 shall conceive rny
discussion of rules and norms in somewhat broader terrns than
Wittgenstein. 1 shall share with Wittgenstein, and other
philosophers whose work 1 am going to discuss, the presupposition
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Secky 10
that a l 1 intentionality and meaninq, whether human or otherwise,
is in some sense normative. That meaning is normative is quite
apparent when we consider the meaning of everyday words and
sentences, for example, when someone alters the meaning of a word
("Just among two of us") it cornes down to altering the r u l e that
governs the use of that word ("Among is used to refer to more
chan two entitiest'). 1 shall assume that the kind of normativity
that is relevant to specifically human acrivities, to language
and mind, is instituted largely by use and social practices.
In this first chapter 1 shall set the stage for the thesis
by distinguishing rules £rom other norms, as well as by examining
some of the central features of rules and norms. In the
subsequent chapters 1 shall argue that the claim that r u l e s arise
out of a regular social practice does not entai1 that the
comrnunity determiries the interpretation of rules. The thinkers
who claim that the comrnunity does determine the interpretation of
r u l e s , the so-called Community View theorists, are usually
concerned to put a stop to possible challenges by a rule
sceptic. As we shall see, according to the Community View
theorists the rule sceptic can challenge an individual's rule-
foilowing ("How can you know which rule you have followed?") but
not the community's rule-following. The rule sceptic is thus
someone who challenges the individual's conception of his own
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action, for example, if someone
Secky
believes that he performs
addition the rule sceptic may challenge that person by suggest
that in fact he rnight be performing a different mathematical
ing
operation. I shall claim, however, that the rule sceptic's worry
is incoherent and so is the solution to the scepticism, the
Community View. In discussing rule-scepticism and the Community
View, I shaii focus on Kripke's W i t t g e n s t e i n : On R u l e s and
Priva t e Language. Kripke's approach is a sophisticated
modification of the Community View. But although 1 argue,
together with McGinn and Baker and ~acker', that the Community
View is fundarnentally incorrect, 1 think that it is interesting
to see why this view is so tempting and why someone might want to
attribute it to Wittgenstein. 1 believe that in interpreting
Wittgenstein one needs to appreciate the delicate balance between
the cornmunitarian and the individualist aspects of his views on
rneming and rule-following.
Given the broadly Wittgensteinian framework that an agent
can follow a rule only if he can, in p r i n c i p l e , provide reasons
for following the rule, 1 shall offer a defence of two important
Colin McGinn, Wittgenstein on Meaning (Oxford: Basil
Elackwell, 1 9 8 4 ) ; Gordon P. Baker and P.M. S. Hacker, Scepticism,
R u l e s and Language (Oxford: Blackwell, 1 9 8 5 ) .
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Secky 12
theses about rule-following, namely, that an agent follows a rule
only if
1. the rule that he follows is part of an established
social practice or its extension by an already
socialised individual and/or
2. the agent has individually followed the r u l e on a
number of occasions.
On a superficial reading, it might seem that (1) and (2)
contradict each other, or at least that (2) is susceptible to the
critique of Wittgenstein's private language argument, 1 shall
show why (1) and (2) are correct.
Lastly, I shall examine Robert Brandom's conception of
normativity in Making it Explicit. I shall agree closely with
Brandom's view that the community is central to an account of
rules (norms) and that only rational beings can follow rules.
Moreover, 1 shall agree with Brandom that it makes no sense to
rêduce normativity to something nonnormative, such as
dispositions to act, although I shall argue that Brandom's own
position cornes dangerously close to reductionism. Finally, 1
shall address Brandom's view of rewards ànd punishments. I shall
d a i m that even though rewards and punishrnents can be normative,
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Secky 13
Brandom's emphasis on reward and punishment in the context of
social interaction cannot pxovide us with an account of the kind
of normativity thctt is necessary for language and mind.
I. B CLASSIFYING RULES
Let me start by looking at some of the many ways in which w e
may conceive of rules and norms. A brief discussion of the ways
in which we might want to classify rules will draw our attention
to the different layers of meaning of the expressions "rule" and
"norm". We c m classify rules and norms according to:
their use (discussed in section 1.C)
the kind and apparent force of their normative
compulsion (discussed in section 1. D)
whether we can speak of an agent ( o r the lack
thereof); whether we can speak of following rules or
merely conforming to them (discussed in section 1.E)
their source (shared ways of life, evolütion,
cybernetical systems) (aiscussed in section 1 . F )
the way in which the agent follows the rule (explicitly
or irnplicitly) (discussed in section 1 . G )
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Secky 14
6. whether we speak of abstract entities ("the rules
thernselves") or concrete rule formulations (discussed
in section 1.H)
Some of these ways of classifying rules are philosophically
interesting while others are of marginal interest to philosophy.
Sone will be merely acknowledged in later sections of this
chapter, to close off blind alleys, so to speak, while others
will a l s o form the subject-matter of the subsequent chapters.
The ways in which 1 have classified rules are not, of course, the
only ones conceivable. For exarnple, Baker and Hacker note that
One might classify r u l e s according to their normative
function (viz. to prohibit, prescribe, permit, empower,
constitute or identify) or according to their social
functions (e.g. to discourage deviant behaviour, encourage
desireci conduct, create normative relationships at will, and
facilitate settlement of dispates). (WRGN 47)
Thus, my way of classifying rules and norms does not aspire to be
exhaustive. The aim of my rule taxonomy is rather to bring up
certain philosophical points, to sharpen our philosophical
perception and throw light on the discussion that is to follow.
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Secky 15
1. C EXFMPLES OF RULES W I T H DIFFERENT USES
Perhaps the most obvious way to classify rules is according
to their use, that is, according to the purposes and functions
that they serve. Let me corne up with a few examples of rules, to
some of which I shall refer later in rny discussion:
1. Do not trespass.
2. The bishop moves along the diagonal.
3. Stcp at the traffic lights if they are red.
4. Do not eat with your fingers.
5. To open the window, push down the handle.
6. In English, pluralising of most singular substantives
is done by adding the suffix -S.
7. Let y = 2x."
"y initial example of a mathematical rule was Ca,= 2x.
Dr. Schroeder claimed, probably rightly, that this not a
mathematical rule at a l 1 so 1 changed the example to somethinq
that both of us could agree on. The reason why 1 came with this
list gf rules in the first place was to suggest that "rule" need
not be just what we ordinarily call a rule. According to my
understanding, a "rule" is anything nomative that is subject to
"incerpretation", that is, subject to misinterpretation in the
sense of the Investigations S201 -- be it what we ordinarily call
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Secky 16
The above examples include a legal rule (l), a game rule (21,
part of a traffic code ( 3 ) , a rule of etiquette (4) , a guideline
or an instruction ( 5 ) , a rule of English grarnmar (6), a
mathematical instruction ( 7 ) , and a basic rule of logic (8).
1. D NORMATIVE COMPULSION
The fact that each of the rules frcm the list in section 1.C
has a different purpose or function is philosophically not that
interesting, but what is philosophically very interesting is the
fact that each of the rules in the list seems to have a different
k i r i d and force of normative compulsion.' However, 1 shali daim
a rule or an instruction, formula, guideline, etc. In other
words, a formula can be a kind of rule because its application
(the w a y the algorithm associated with the formula is meant) is
not determinate. (Note: Every formula has at lezst one
algorithm associated with it because otherwise the "formula"
would arnount to nothing more than some scribbles on paper. Thus,
it is the algorithrn that gives the formula a normative
dimension. As 1 have pointed out above, it makes no sense to
speak of a formula in the absence of an algorithm.)
' Given that some rules seem easier to break than others it
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Secky 17
that to whatever extent certain "very rigid rules" might seem
impossible to break, Aristotle's Laws of Thought for instance,
their force is normative, that is, categorically different from
the force of natural compulsion.
As Brandom points out, the laws of nature do not bind us by
obligation, but only by compulsion (51). The distinction between
the compulsion of rules and natural compulsion can be made ciear
by noting that it is an essential characteristic of rules that
they can be violated. If someone does not obey a certain rule,
chen generally the fault is with the agent himself. On the other
hand, if you detect what appears to be a violation of a natural
law, then you almost certainly have an indication that the
natural law has been wrongiy stated. This distinction also plays
a key role in the Investigations when Wittgenstein attacks the
understanding of a rule as an "impersonal rnechanism":
initially appears that normative compulsion cornes in degrees. It
might seem, for example, that the traffic rule (3) is easier to
break than the r u l e of logic ( 8 ) . However, this way of speaking
is only netaphorical and normative compulsion does not come in
degrees: what does come in degrees is the likelihood and
severity of punishment for breaking a rule or the perceived
inportance of the rule, whether at the social or the individual
levels.
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Secky 18
The machine as symbolizing its action: the action of a
machine -- 1 might Say at first -- seems to be there in it
from the start. What does that mean? -- If we know the
machine, everything else, that is its movement, seems to be
already completely determined. We talk as if these parts
could only move in this way, as if they could not do
a n y t h i n g else. How is this -- do we forget the possibility
of their bending, breaking off, melting, and so on?
[ . . . ] Fox instance, we give someone [a drawing of a machine] and assume that he will derive the movement of the
parts from it. (Just as we can give someone a number by
telling hirn that it is the twenty-fifth in the series 1, 4,
9, 6 . . . . (PI 5193)
When Wittgenstein talks here of the "machine-as-symbol" he is
war~ing us not to assimilate normative compulsior, to natural
cornpcilsion ("the action of a machine-as-syrnbol"). Moreover, this
metaphor concerning a machine shows that normative necessity is
quite close to "mechanical necessity" because, after ail,
"mechanical necessity" is just as non-compelling as normative
necessity (rules can be broken j u s t as machine parts can "bend,
break off, melt" and so on) . However, the machine-as-symbol, that is, a machine to which we do not attribute the possibility
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S e c k y 1 9
of f a i l i n g , i s a me taphor f o r a r u l e t h a t c o u l d n o t be broken .
I n m a n u s c r i p t 123 ( t h e e n t r y o f June 5L'), W i t t g e n s t e i n w r i t e s :
Must 1 r e p r e s e n t t h e r u l e a s a n i m p e r s o n a l mechanism which
o n l y works on m e and t h r o u g h me? For t h e l a t t e r i s what
rna thema t i c i ans would l i k e t o Say. T h a t t h e r u l e i s a n
â b s t r a c t mechanism. ( q u o t e d by H a l l e t t 280 )
H a l l e t t p o i n t s o u t t h a t W i t t g e n s t e i n h e r e s u g g e s t s t h a t i t i s
h i g h l y m i s l e a d i n g t o r e p r e s e n t t h e r u l e as a n i m p e r s o n a i
mechanism t h a t c a n never f a i l ( 2 8 0 ) . The e a r l y W i t t g e n s t e i n
b e l i e v e d t h a t t h e r u l e s o f l o g i c have a s p e c i a l status due t o
t h e i r h i g h " r i g i d i t y " , i n compar i son t o which a l 1 o t h e r r u l e s
l o o k l i k e f a i l e d r e p l i c a s :
F . P . Ramsey once emphas ized i n c o n v e r s a t i o n w i t h m e t h a t
l o g i c was a " n o r m a t i v e s c i e n c e " . 1 d o n o t know e x a c t l y what
he had i n rnind, b u t i t w a s d o u b t l e s s c l o s e l y r e l a t e d t o what
o n l y dawned on m e l a t e r : namely, t h a t i n p h i l o s o p h y w e
o f t e n compare t h e u s e o f words w i t h games and c a l c u l i which
have fixed r u l e s , b u t c a n n o t s a y t h a t someone who i s u s i n g
l anguage rnust b e p l a y i n g such a garne. [ . . . ] L o g i c does
n o t treat o f l a n g u a g e -- o r o f t h o u g h t -- i n t h e s e n s e i n
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Secky 20
which a natural science treats of a natural phenomenon
. . . . (PI 581, cf. BB 2 5 )
Thus, with some "very rigid" rules (such as the rules of
mathematics and of logic) we are sometimes tempted to assimilate
the normative compulsion of these rules to natural comp~lsion.~
However, this is a mistake because if something is to be a rule.
the failure to obey it must be possible (or at least well-
de£ inea) .
1. E FOLLOWING RULES VS. CONFORMING TO RULES
Turning now to the third distinction that 1 have made in
section I.B, we can Say that following a rule, whether expliciïly
or implicitly, is quite different from rnerely conforming with the
rule. When one follows a rule he always, at the same tirne,
conforms with it, but when someone conforms with a rule he rnay or
rnay not also follow it. Suppose that A and B live in a country
where martial law has been proclaimed. Further suppose that on
Monday evening B was arrested on charges of leaving his house
after 9 p . m . On Tuesday evening at 10 p.m. A is at home watching
' Or, as I have pointed out above, we mistakenly believe that the normative compulsion of the rules of logic is somehow
greater than the normative compulsion of the rules of the road.
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Secky 21
the Comedy News Network (CNN) while B is in prison. We can Say
that on Tuesday both A and B conform with the enacted martial law
but only A is following what the law comrnands. As 1 have noted
above, someone can follow a r u l e only if he also has the
possibility of not following it -- which is not the case for B.
Let me explore another example (1 have adapted it from Kenny
152 ff.). Compare the way in which a pianist and a pianola can
be said to play a polonaise. While the pianist follows certain
rules of translation of musical notation (let us disregard the
more complicated scenario in which the pianist plays from memory)
the pianola cannot be said to follow any rules at all. The
pianola cannot follow any rules because it has no conception of
playing music, reading musical notation etc. The distinction
cornes up clearly when you consider whac happens when the pianist
and the pianola stop playing suddenly in the midale of a
polonsise. In the case of the pianola we start to enquire about
what went wrong with the causal mechanism. In the cose of the
pianist, however, we enquire about the reason why he stopped
playing. Although we can also say that the "reason" why the
pianola stopped playing was that the battery is too old, this
should not confuse us: the explanation that the battery is too
old is an explanation of a causal relation, not a rational
jüstification. Something very different applies in the case of
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Secky 22
t h e p i a n i s t whom w e t r e a t as a n agent who h a s reasons f o r h i s
actions. The p i a n i s t c a n e x p l a i n , f o r example, t h a t he l i k e s
o n l y the f i r s r p a r t o f t h e p o l o n a i s e and s o he i s n o t g o i n g t o
p l a y t h e second p a r t . I n f a c t , it i s p r e c i s e l y b e c a u s e t h e
p i a n i s t c a n ( a t l e a s t i n p r i n c i p l e ) give r e a s o n s f o r h i s a c t i o n s
t h a t it makes s e n s e t o Say t h a t he f o l l o w s r u l e s .
However, someone might o b j e c t by a s k i n g , "But i s n o t t h e
p i a n o l a f o l l o w i n g t h e same r u i e s t h a t t h e p i a n i s t f o l l o w s ? A r e
n o t t h e y p l a y i n g t h e s a m e mus ic?" F i r s t 1 must emphas i se t h a t 1
do n o t deny t h a t t h e p i a n o l a has a c e r t a i n f u n c t i o n ( t h a t i t c a n
p e r f o r m well o r m i s p e r f o r m ) , t h a t t h e m u s i c wnich i s e m i t t e d by
t h e p i a n o l a i s t h e ( c o r r e c t o r i n c o r r e c t ) r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f t h e
same music t h a t t h e p i a n i s t p l a y s . 1 do n o t t h u s deny t h a t some
k i n d o f norm i s i n v o l v e d b o t h i n t h e case of t h e p i a n i s t a n d t h e
p i a n o l a . I f t h e p i a n o l a p e r f o r m s a c e r t a i n f u n c t i o n t h e n t h e r e
must be a n o m which i t c a n con£orm w i t h o r n o t . For t h e p i a n o l a
n o t t o conform w i t h a s p e c i f i e d norm amounts t o f a i l i n g t o
p e r f o r m i t s f u n c t i o n . W e c a n t h u s Say t h a t t h e p i a n o l a i s mere ly
conforming w i t h a c e r t a i n norm w h i l e t h e p i a n i s t , b e s i d e s
conforming w i t h t h e same norm, i s a l s o f o l l o w i n g c e r t a i n r u l e s .
The p i a n o l a , n o t b e i n g a n a g e n t , t h a t i s , n o t b e i n g a b l e t o act,
i t c a n n o t f a i l t o obey r u l e s and hence it cannot f o l l o w a n y r u l e s
a t a l l . Only a g e n t s can f o l l o w r u l e s and o n l y agency , i n t u r n ,
-
Secky 23
entails the possibility of giving and asking for reasons. This
is an assumption that 1 share with the neo-Wittgensteinian
movenent, which Baker and Hacker express as follows:
That a personts action is normative, that he is following a
rule, that he is guided by a rule (or better, guides himself
'Dy reference to a rule) is manifest i n t h e rnanner i n which
h e uses rules, invokes rule-formulations, refers to rules in
explaininç what he did, justifying what he did in the face
of criticism, evaluating what he dia and correcting what he
did, criticizing his mistakes, and so forth. (WRGN 45)
Baker and Hacker emphasise the point that someone can be said tc
follow a rule only if the rule plays ar? organic role' in his
reason-giving. This means, of course, that only people, agents
who are capable of acting, can follow rules because machines do
not act and cannot give reasons. Hence we can generalise from
An oràinary computer can be
"give reasons". This is an example
programmed such that it can
of inorganic reason-giving
because a machine state, and hence also its reason-giving, is
meaningful only in virtue of its being designed by people for a
given purpose. This is a fact whether or not an imaginary
supercornputer can have machine States that do have intrinsic
meaning and as a result c m give organic reasons.
-
the above that people can
machines can only conform
both follow and conform
to rules. Although the
Secky 24
to rules but
working
assumption
Hacker are
misleading
of this essay will be that the point that Baker and
making is valid, the passage cited here is possibly
because their examples seem to involve only instances
in which the agent follows rules explicitly. Baker and Hacker
clarify their conception of rule in the following way:
[It is not]
rule merely
no rules) . rule -- for
his present
enough that the behaviour of someone following a
conforms with the rule (a chess computer follows
Nor is Ft sufficient that he once learned the
that is past history . . . and the issue here is possession of an ability, not its genesis. Nor
would it suffice that the rule might be encoded in his brain
(whatever that might mean); for being caused to act by the
encoding of a rule is precisely not to follow a rule.
(WRGN 45)
This passage is, of course, quite contentious: Fodor,
certain teleosemantic philosophersO (Dretske, Papineau,
and
and
' Teleosernantics, or teleosemanticism, is a theory of mind claiming that the brain is a collection of structures which are
stipposed to stand in correspondence relations to States
of affairs in the world. In other words, the brain is nothing
-
Secky 25
o t h e r s ) , would p r o b a b l y d i s a g r e e , p e r h a p s c l a i m i n g t h a t b e i n g
caused t o a c t by t h e encod ing o f a r u l e i n o n e ' s b r a i n amounts t o
f o l l o w i n g t h a t r u l e . I n o r d e r t o u n d e r s t a n d such prima f a c i e
p u z z l i n g c l a i m s a s "a c h e s s cornputer f o l l o w s no r u l e s ' w e have t o
b e aware, f i r s t o f all, t h a t t h e c o n c e p t o f " f o l l o w i n g " i s b e i n g
used by Baker and Hacker (as w e l l as by W i t t g e n s t e i n ) i n a v e r y
d i f f e r e n t way than contemporary n o n - W i t t g e n s t e i n i a n p h i l o s o p h e r s
t e n d t o u s e it. ' Thus, c h e s s cornputers do n o t , on t h e
b u t a c o l l e c t i o n o f r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s . W e c a n t a l k a b o u t
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s b e c a u s e t h e s t a t e s o f a f f a i r s i n t h e b r a i n , o r
t h e b r a i n ' s s t r u c t u r e , c o r r e s p o n d t o t h e states of a f f a i r s i n t h e
wor ld . However, w e s h o u l d n o t t h i n k t h a t any k ind of
c o r r e s p o n d e n c e between s t a t e s of a f f a i r s c a n be c a l l e d a
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n . A r e p r e s e n t a t i o n i s a k ind of c o r r e s p o n d e n c e i n
w h i c h t h e i s o m o r p h i c s t â tes of a f f a i r s a r e supposed Co s t a n d i n
that r e l a t i o n . Accord ing t o a t e l e o s e m a n t i c i s t , o n l y minds can
represent b e c a u s e o n l y i n t h e c a s e of minds t h e r e i s supposed t o
be a c e r t a i n k i n d o f r e l a t i o n be tween t h e s t a t e s o f a f f a i r s i n
t h e world a n d t h e p h y s i c a l s t r u c t u r e s of t h e mind.
T e l e o s e m a n t i c i s t s b e l i e v e t h a t t h e b r a i n i n s t a n t i a t e s t h e mind
because a l 1 minds a r e n o t h i n g else b u t systems o f i n t e r a c t i n g
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s .
- A s w e s h a l l see l a t e r , W i t t g e n s t e i n i a n p h i l o s o p h e r s t e n d
t o c h a l l e n g e t h e r e l e v a n c e o f n o n - r a t i o n a l norms ( t h e t y p e o f
-
Secky 26
Wittgensteinian view, follow the rules of chess because they do
not literally act. However, chess cornputers conform to the rules
of chess whenever they "playwe chess with a human or another
computer.
If the following of a rule would amount to being merely
caused io act by the encoding of a rule then people would be
reduced to the kind of complicated physical mechanism that
pianolas are and this seems preposterous.' It might be a
necessary condition that conforming to a non-rational norm"
norms that cannot be involved in asking for and giving of
reosons) to the kind of intentionality that gives rise to
language and mind. As Dr. Schroeder pointed out to me, however,
in the present case the emphasis Fs not on the expression "rule"
but on "following". Thus, according to the Wittgensteinian view,
a cornputer can still accord with the rules of chess without
fcllowing those r u l e s .
' Chess cornputers cannot be said to play chess in a literal way since playing (in the literal sense) amounts to acting and
cornputers do not act because they do not have intentionality.
' Or 1 should perhaps Say would be preposterous. If reductionist philosophers are right then doing what an extremely
complicated pianola does might be sufficient for having a mind. - - - Many philosophers use the expression "norm" to refer to
-
Secky 27
involves the encoding of that norm in the brain; but even if
thot is the case, it has no relevance to the account of rule-
following that 1 offer here. As I have suggested above, the only
way that we can meaningfully tâlk of following rules is to
reserve rule-following for agents, because following a rule is an
activity and only agents can act.
Let me return to Baker and Hacker by quoting a passage that
is possibly even more controversial:
Current jargon of "neural representations" of rules is
manifest nonsense since only symbols with a use can function
as a representation (formulation) of a rule, and nerve cells
are not syrnbols. Being knocked sideways by a board on which
is written "Turn left!" is not to follow the rule to turn
left, but only to be caused unwittingly to conform to it.
(WRGN 45)
a class of entities that includes both rules and naturâl norms.
1 have no difficulty with this but 1 shall sometimes designate
norms that are not rules as "non-rational norms" (including both
natural norms and artifactual norms) to bring up the point that
nies are a kind of norm which is defined, at least in part, by
the possibility of rationai agency.
-
Secky 28
1 t a k e B a k e r a n d Hacker t o be c l a i m i n g t h a t t h e r e c a n b e no r u l e -
f o l l o w i n g a t t h e n e u r o l o g i c a l l e v e l . Baker a n d Hacker need n o t
deny, o f c o u r s e , t h a t t h e b r a i n i n v o l v e s n o r m a t i v i t y o f some k i n d
-- t h e y o n l y need t o c l a i m t h a t t h e k i n d o f n o r m a t i v i t y t h a t i s
i n v o l v e d i n t h e b r a i n , s p e c i f i c a l l y t h e e n c o d i n g o f norms a t t h e
n e u r o l o g i c a l l e v e l , i s i r r e l e v a n t t o t h e a c c o u n t o f
rule-following n e c e s s a r y f o r a s u c c e s s f u l t h e o r y o f mind. The
p o i n t t h a t Baker and Hacker are making, t h a t it makes no s e n s e t o
s p e a k o f r u l e s b e i n g encoded a t t h e n e u r o l o g i c a l l e v e l , is q u i t e
i m p o r t a n t and I t h i n k t h a t it can b e s u p p o r t e d by t h e f o l l o w i n g
k i n d of a rgument . Suppose t h a t A is b o r n w i t h a n i n n a t e
d i s p o s i t i o n s u c h t h a t whenever someone g i v e s him a d i r e c t i o n t h e n
he would l o o k i n t h e d i r e c t i o n of t h e l i n e t h a t e x t e n d s £rom t h a t
p e r s o n ' s w r i s t t o h i s f i n g e r t i p . As f a r a s 1 know t h e a b i l i t y t o
give and t a k e d i r e c t i o n by p o i n t i n g i s n o t i n b o r n i n p e o p l e and
hence A ' s case is r a t h e r e x t r a o r d i n a r y , W e c a n t h u s Say that A
h a s a n i n n a t e d i s p o s i t i o n a b o u t p o i n t i n g o r t h a t t h e norms
i n v o l v e d i n p o i n t i n g have been encoded i n A ' s b r a i n s i n c e h i s
b i r t h . But c a n w e a l s o Say t h a t whenevex A l o o k s i n t h e
d i r e c t i o n t h a t h e i s p o i n t e d t o t h e n h e i s f o l l o w i n g a r u l e ?
Suppose t h a t A is b o r n i n t o a c u l t u r e i n which d i r e c t i o n is given
by p o i n t i n g w i t h o n e ' s e lbow, t h a t i s , one i s supposed t o l o o k i n
t h e d i r e c t i o n o f t h e l i n e t h a t e x t e n d s £rom someone ' s w r i s t t o
his e lbow. If A would behave i n s u c h a c u l t u r e as he i s i n n a t e l y
-
Secky 29
disposed to, then clearly he would not act in accordance with the
rule about pointing that existed in that culture. This shows
that whatever norms might be encoded in one's brain, they do not
nave to enter into my account of rule-following at all. While my
example can be interpreted in such a way that it conflicts with
the claims of teleosemanticism, my aim was not to show that the
teleosemantic account of normativity is incorrect. Rather, 1
want to point out that the meaning of a rule, unlike the meaning
of a natural norrn, is inseparable from its use': or social
practice. In other words, in the absence of an established use
. . - - Wheri Wittgenstein talks about meaning he usually has in
mind conventional meaning and it is in this context that he
claims that "meaning is use":
The meaning of a word can be fixed by all the rules that
govern the word. These rules constitute the meaning and
they cannot be fixed by an ostensive definition, but only by
the use of the word. The meaning changes when one of its
rules changes. (WL 3-4, cf. PI 431 ff.)
In other woràs, it is the peculiawity of conventional meaning
that it is correlative with understanding: marks on a paper by
themselves mean nothing if no one understands them, if they do
not have a use.
-
Secky 30
or social practice we can speak of conforming to a rule but not
of rule-following. I believe that rule-following is both a
necessary and a sufficient condition for the kind of
intentionality that gives rise to human language and rnind,
because rule-following entails acting and acting is
intentional." The kind of intentionality that is involved in
acting is a necessary condition for rule-following because it is
inconceivable that someone would be following a rule without
acting, as opposed to merely conforming with a rule.
I . F THE SOURCES OF NORMATIVITY
The fourth distinction that 1 have made in section 1 . B is
concerned with the sources of normativity. Rules are established
solely by convention whereas non-rational norms (that is, al1
norms other than rules) can be establishea not only by convention
but also by evolution (which gives rise to natural norms) or, as
Dr. Schroeder would have it, by a cybernetic system (which can
. - * It is, of course, true that humans can behave in such a
way that they do not act and yet the behaviour in question can be
intenticnal. In this passage 1 was concerned only with the kind
of intentionality that is necessary for giving rise to language
and mind.
-
Secky 31
g i v e r ise t o n a t u r a l o r a r t i f a c t u a l " norms) (CST 9 ff.). The
s p l i t be tween r u l e s a n d n o n - r a t i o n a l norms ( o r f u n c t i o n s ) r o u g h l y
c o r r e s p o n d s t o t h e two t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r y t r a d i t i o n s i n t h e
p h i l o s o p h y o f mind a s s o c i â t e d w i t h W i t t g e n s t e i n , S e l l a r s ,
~ randorn" and o t h e r s on t h e o n e hand, and D r e t s k e , P a p i n e a u and
o t h e r s on t h e o t h e r . Even i f p h i l o s o p h e r s o f d i f f e r e n t
traditions can a g r e e r o u g h l y how t o c o n c e i v e of r u l e s a n d norms,
and p e r h a p s e v e n açree on wnat are t h e v a r i o u s s o u r c e s o f
n o r m a t i v i t y , t h e r e i s n o t a n y c o n s e n s u s a b o u t t h e relevance of
t h e d i f f e r e n t k i n d s of n o r m a t i v i t y f o r t h e k i n d o f i n t e n t i o n a l i t y
t n a t i s i n v o l v e d i n l a n g u a g e and mind.
In Na t u r a l i z i n g the Mind, D r e t s k e d i s t i n g u i s h e s be tween
c o n v e n t i o n a l l y a s s i g n e d f u n c t i o n s and f u n c t i o n s t h a t a re
n a t u r a l l y a c q u i r e d . Peop le are t h e s o u r c e o f c o n v e n t i o n a l
f u n c t i o n s whereas n a t u r a l s e l e c t i o n i s t h e main s o u r c e o f n a t u r a l
- - - B y " a r t i f o c t u a l norms" 1 mean t h e k i n d o f norms t h a t a r e
c r e a t e d b y t h e o p e r a t i o n o f rnanmade c y b e r n e t i c s y s t e m s
( a r t i f a c t s ) and whose f u n c t i o n o r meaning may o r may n o t depend
on t h e s o c i a l c o n t e x t .
- . - A s w e s h a l L see i n c h a p t e r V, Brandomian norms e l u d e a n
easy c l a s s i f i c a t i o n , b e c a u s e t h e y a r e s u p p o s e d l y g i v i n g r ise t o
language a n d rnind w h i l e a t t h e same t i m e b e i n g c r e a t e d a t t h e
unconsc ious level.
-
Secky 32
f u n c t i o n s . T h a t a t h i n g h a s a f u n c t i o n , w h e t h e r c o n v e n t i o n a l o r
n a t u r a l , p r e s u p p o s e s t h e i n v o l v e m e n t o f r u l e s o r norms: it makes
s e n s e t o s p e a k o f a f u n c t i o n b e i n g p e r f o r m e d w e l l , o r of a t h i n g
m a I f u n c t i o n i n g , o n l y i f t h e r e i s a n o m t h a t s a y s ( o r
e s t a b l i s h e s ) what i s t h e g i v e n t h i n g ' s f u n c t i o n . The f u n c t i o n o f
a teacher i s t o t e a c h c h i l d r e n a n d t h e t e a c h e r c a n t h u s p e r f o r m
his f u n c t i o n w e l l o r n o t , S i r n i l a r l y , t h e f u n c t i o n of a t o a s t e r
is t o t o a s t b r e a d a n d a g a i n t h e t o a s t e r c a n p e r f o r m its f u n c t i o n
w e l l o r n o t . Each o f t h e s e manrnade f u n c t i o n s t h u s d e p e n d s on
. .. some kind of a s o u r c e o f c o r r e c t n e s s o r a norm.-= These s o u r c e s
of c o r r e c t n e s s may i n v o l v e t h e i n t e n t i o n s o f t h e d e s i g n e r , t h e
p u r p o s e s o f t h e u s e r , t h e e s t a b l i s h e d way of d o i n g t h i n g s ,
c o n d i t i o n i n g , c y b e r n e t i c s y s t e m s ( b o t h n a t u r a l a n d a r t i f a c t u â l )
o r s imp ly w h a t e v e r f a c i l i t a t e s t h e s u r v i v a l of t h e s p e c i e s .
T h e r e cre, of c o u r s e , many o t n e r s o u r c e s o f c o r r e c t n e s s b u t o n l y
some s o u r c e s o f c o r r e c t n e s s a re r e l e v a n t t o s p e c i f i c a l l y human
a c t i v i t i e s , t o t h e k i n d o f n o r m a t i v i t y t h a t i s i n v o l v e d i n
language a n d mind.
" I t s h o u l d b e n o t e d t h a t natural f u n c t i o n s d o n o t depend on any norms a t a l 1 b u t a re a s p e c i e s o f norms t h e m s e l v e s . Non-
n a t u r a l f u n c t i o n s are n o r m a t i v e b u t a r e n o t norms o n l y by
t h e m s e l v e s ( t h e i r n o r m a t i v i t y d e p e n d s on , i n p a r t , t h e i n t e n t i o n s
of t h e d e s i g n e r , t h e p u r p o s e s o f t h e u s e r , e t c . ) .
-
Secky 33
It is the peculiarity of some n o m s that they are, at least
in part, constituted by a physical mechanism, for example, the
existence of the right kind of a physical mechanism can be
sufficient for the existence of a biological norm. However, the
existence of a physical mechanismL6 is not sufficient for the
existence of rules, for example, the physical existence of a
chessboard and chessmen is not sufficient for h~ving the rules of
chess. In order to have chess we have to have chess players and,
for example, a tradition of playing chess from which the rules of
chess spring. Thus, the reason why the existence of a physical
mechanism is not sufficient for having rules is that the
existence of al1 rules depends on the existence of social beings
who use t h o s e rules. It is possible to object that there are
many rules that do not have any use at all, for example, the
rules of boring games that no one plays, but 1 shall suggest that
objections of this kind are incoherent, or at least misleading,
because (1) rules that do not Ssve a use are not rules in the
literal sense or, more importantly, (2) the existence of, for
example, the rules of boring games that no one plays still
aepends on an agent who formulated them.
- - - " Or, as Dr. Schroeder would like to specify, the
existence of a non-personal physical mechanism is insufficient
for having rules. (Whatever "personal physical mechanisms" mignt
be.)
-
Secky 3 4
R e t u r n i n g t o m y example i n v o l v i n g a p i a n o l a we c a n t h u s Say
t h a t t h e p i a n o l a conforms w i t h a g i v e n norm i n v i r t u e o f a
certain p h y s i c a l mechanism. U n l i k e t h e case of a b i o l o g i c a l
norm, however, t h e p h y s i c a l mechanism o f t h e p i a n o l a ( t h e
c y l i n d e r w i t h s p i k e s ) c o n s t i t u t e s t h e encod ing o f t h e norm o n l y
i n p a r t , b e c a u s e t h e norm is a l s o p a r t i a l l y d e f i n e d by o u r
e x p e c t a t i o n s , t h a t is t o say, by o u r g i v i n g t h e p i a n o l a a c e r t a i n
f ü n c t i o n a n d e x p e c t i n g t h a t it w i l l p e r f o r m t h a t f u n c t i o n i n a
s p e c i f i e d way. The norms t h a t t h e p i a n o l a i s c o n s t r a i n e d by a r e
of a quite d i f f e r e n t s o r t t h a n t h e r u l e s t h a t t h e p i a n i s t f o l l o w s
-- b u t there a l s o h a s t o be someth ing i n comrnon t o b o t h of t h e s e
c a s e s b e c a u s e t h e r e s u l t i s t h e " s a m e " k ind of music . 1 t h i n k
that w e c a n a v o i d t a l k i n g a b o u t " u n d e r l y i n g norms" by p o i n t i n g
o u t t h a t b o t n t h e p i a n i s t and t h e p i a n o l a can conform t o t h e same
r u l e , a l t h o u q h o n l y t h e p i a n i s t f o l l o w s that r u l e .
E X P L I C I T VS. IMPLICIT RULES
The p e n u l t i m a t e c l a s s i f i c a t i o n t h a t I have made i n t h e l i s t
i n s e c t i o n 1 . B d i s t i n g u i s h e s between e x p l i c i t and i m p l i c i t r u l e s .
Although i t is t r u e t h a t any r u l e can, i n p r i n c i p l e , be s t a t e d
e x p l i c i t l y , i t must n o t be t h o u g h t t h a t whenever 1 f o l l o w a r u l e
1 am f o l l o w i n g it e x p l i c i t l y . T h e " i n p r i n c i p l e " c l a u s e i s t h u s
v e r y i m p o r t a n t , b e c a u s e p e o p l e c a n f o l l o w r u l e s i m p l i c i t l y even
-
Secky 35
though n o one has e v e r t h o u g h t o f f o r m u l a t i n g them e x p l i c i t l y ,
f o r example t h e r u l e s o f L a t i n b e f o r e a n y grammarians c a m e a l o n g
and f o r r n u l a t e d L a t i n gramrnar i n t h e form o f e x p l i c i t r u l e s .
Rules i n t h e sense i n which I a m g o i n g t o d i s c u s s them i n t h i s
t h e s i s a r e t h e l o g i c a l c o n d i t i o n o f a c t i n g , a s opposed t o o t h e r
kinds of b e h a v i o u r o r a mere n a t u r a l o c c u r r e n c e , t h a t is t o Say,
ail a c t i o n s , o r a l 1 mean ingfu l b e h a v i o u r , i n v o l v e t h e f o l l o w i n g
of r u l e s , whether e x p l i c i t ( " c o n s c i o u s " ) o r i m p l i c i t
( "unconsc ious" )
A l 1 o f t h e e i g h t r u l e s t h a t 1 have l i s t e d i n s e c t i o n 1.B
e n a b l e m e t o engage myself i n some k i n d o f a c t i v i t y . Even t h e
f i r s t k i n d o f r u l e , t h e p r e c e p t " D o n o t t r e s p a s s " , a l t h o u g h i t
l i m i t s m y f reedom t o some e x t e n t , i t a l s o e n a b l e s m e t o ac t i n a
c e r t a i n way, namely a s a l aw-ab id ing t r a v e l l e r e tc . I f 1 would
ac t w i t h o u t r e g a r d t o any r u l e s a t a l1:- t h e n it would n o t rnake
. - - That is , i f t h i s w e r e c o n c e p t u a l l y p o s s i b l e . I f 1 w e r e
t o a c t i n s u c n a way t h a t 1 would, f o r example, v i o l a t e a l 1 r u l e s
t h a t 1 were t o e n c o u n t e r t h e n 1 c o u l d s t i l l be s a i d t o f o l l o w t h e
rule, "Break a l 1 t h e r u l e s t h a t you e n c o u n t e r " . 1 c a n a l s o
behave i n s u c h a way t h a t 1 d o n o t f o l l o w any r u l e s a t a l l , f o r
example, when 1 have a n e p i l e p t i c s e i z u r e , b u t s i n c e h a v i n g a n
e p i l e p t i c s e i z u r e i s n o t a c t i n g , t h i s k i n d o f b e h a v i o u r h a s no
r e l e v a n c e t o a n a c c o u n t of r u l e - f o l l o w i n g .
-
Secky 36
sense to say that I am really acting, because the very
possibility of acting is enabled by my following some kind of
rüle, by restricting my action in some way. What distinguishes
actions from other kinds of behaviour is the fact that in the
case of actions failure is well-defined. But this is only
another uay of saying that choosing between various actions cornes
d o m to choosinç between different rules that are to guide mÿ
action. When we Say that A has failed in performing a certain
action we really Say that A has violated a rule that governs the
performance of that action.
As 1 nave suggestea above, actions, as opposed to other
kinds of behaviour, are intelligible only in the context of
asking for and giving of reasons. That is to Say, the fact that
al1 rules have to be, at least potentially, explicit makes them
proposi t i o n a l in character. However, this statement is possibly
rn is leaaing because sDmeone might think that since a reference to
an explicit rule is needed, the explicit rule is more
fundamental. In fact, 1 shall argue in chapter II that the
implicit rule, the rule grounded in practice, is more fundamental
than the explicit one. It would be more precise to Say that
there is only one kind of rule that c a n be followed in two ways:
explicitly or implicitly. One can follow a rule such that he
-
Secky 37
g u i d e s h i m s e l f b y t h e r u l e ( h e obeys it explicitly) o r else h e i s
g u i d e d by t h e r u l e ( h e f o l l o w s it implicitly) .
1. H RULES VS. RULE-FORMULATIONS
The l a s t c l a s s i f i c a t i o n t h a t 1 have made i n s e c t i o n 1 . B F s
n o t c o n c e r n e d w i t h k inds of r u l e b u t r â t h e r w i t h t h e d i f f e r e n c e
between r u l e f o r m u l a t i o n s and t h e " r u l e s t hemse lves" . I t i s
c l e a r t h a t rules canno t b e i d e n t i f i e d w i t h r u l e f o r m u l a t i o n s
b e c a u s e one p a r t i c u l a r r u l e c a n be f o r m u l a t e d i n s e v e r a l
d i f f e r e n t l a n g u a g e s , it c a n be e x p r e s s e d i n v â r i o u s s t y l e s and s o
on . B u t d o e s t h i s mean t h a t r u l e s a r e a b s t r a c t e n t i t i e s , t h a t
they have some k i n d o f o n t o l o g i c a l status i n t h e way t h a t , f o r
example , P l a t o ' s Forms have a c e r t a i n o n t o l o g i c a l s t a t u s ? 1
t h i n k that t h e i n c o h e r e n c e o f what w e may cal1 " n o r m a t i v e
nominalisrn" ( r u l e s a r e t o b e i d e n t i f i e d w i t h r u l e f o r m u l a t i o n s )
d o e s r ~ o t imp ly "normat ive r e a l i s m " (rules have a P l a t o n i c r e a l i t y
of s o m e sort). A s Baker and Hacker n o t e , one r e a s o n t o t h i n k
t h a t n e i t h e r o f t h e two e x t r e m e v i e w s i s c o r r e c t i s t h a t r u l e s
and r u l e f o r m u l a t i o n s a r e o f t e n i n t e r c h a n g e a b l e o r t h a t t h e
"grammar o f ' r u l e ' and ' r u l e - f o r m u l a t i o n ' r u n s , f o r a s t r e t c h ,
along p a r a l l e l t r a c k s " (WRGN 4 2 ) . This is an i m p o r t a n t p o i n t b u t
n o t a p o i n t t h a t can e a s i l y s a t i s f y u s because , a s w e s h a l l see
l a t e r , t h e "no rma t ive P l a t o n i s t " c a n e a s i l y r e s o l v e c e r t a i n
-
difficulties &out rule-following
Platonist" hâs to struggle with.
that
This
the
is,
"normative
of course,
that rules exist in some kind of Platonic reality but
Secky 38
non-
not to Say
that
"normative Platonism" can be persuasive when viewed in a certain
kind of light and hence we should not dismiss it too quickly.
Another way that we can frame this question is to ask
whether rules are a kind of n o m or whether they are an
expression of norms. Let us assume, for the purposes of this
thesis, that ruies are a kind of norm. We have to be aware,
however, that norm in this sense describes the class of normative
entities (rules, natural norms, functions) as opposed to itself
being, for example, a kind of artifactual norm. It is also worth
observing that any norm (that is, any rule, natural norm or
funccion) Fs distinct from a norm-formulation (that Is, rule-
formulation, natural norm-formulation or function-formulation).
What this clearly suggests is that nom-formulations are merely
epiphenomena (the function of an animal heart is to pump blood
whether or not there are any people around to formulate the
heart's function). But though it is possible to ask about the
ontological status of the various norms, as opposed to norm-
-
Secky 39
formulations, this question is too general to be directly
relevant to the present thesis." It is sufficient when we
define norms as distinct frorn norm-formulations and leave it at
tnat.
1. I WITTGENSTEIN'S USE OF "RULEf'
In order to prepare us for the discussion in the subsequent
chapters, 1 shall conclude chapter I with a brief description of
Wittgenstein's use of the expression "rule". According to
Wittgenstein' s Tracta tus Logico-Philosophicus, language is a
system of definite and hidden rules (TLP 4.023, 4.002). The
rules of the tractarian language are definite in the way that the
rules of calculus are definite. In the Investigations,
Wittgenstein compares language to garnes rather than to calculus.
. - -' As we shall see later, however, the distinction between
rules and rule-formulations is central to this thesis. Since my
present general account of norms and norm-formulations suggests
that rules in their propositional forrn, that is, rule
formulations, are merely epiphenomena we shall be able to
conclude that what is actually followed are not the rule-
formulations (as the regulists would have it) but rather the
"rules themselves", the rules grounded in practice (as the
Wittgensteinians would have it).
-
Secky 40
Throughout the Investigations we xead that speaking is like
playing chess and words are like chess pieces. The metaphor of
language-game captures the later Wittgenstein's conception of
language quite well because when one plays a game he often does
not think but only a c t s and r e a c t s . The later Wittgenstein is
concerned with deeds rather than with the tractarian systems of
hiaden rules and this is partly because at the bottom of the
language-game lies acting (OC 9 2 0 4 ) . Moreover, both language and
games are rule-guided activities and this strengthens the analogy
between language and games.
As Brandom notes, the later Wittgenstein uses "rule" ( R e g e l )
in three different senses (64 f f . ) :
whatever one consults while being engaged in a certain
activity: an explicit r u l e
whatever guides one's conduct, whether it be a n
e x p l i c i t or a n i m p l i c i t r u l e
whatever is subject to n o r m a t i v e a s s e s s m e n t , whether
one is "following a rule" and is aware of following it
(explicitly or implicitly) or not (also cf.
PI S54, 981)
-
Secky 41
1 have used and 1 shall continue to use the expression
" r u l e " in the first two senses. 1 find the third sense rather
problematic because it is in a danger of being mixed up with a
mere regularity, "a natural law". Moreover, the third sense of
Regel seems to conflate being a rule with being regulated. Let
me elucidate Wittgenstein's third sense of "rule" by considering
s u c h an activity as giving direction. If someone directs me to
St John's College by pointing 1 might be following an explicit
rule such as "When someone gives you a direction, look in the
direction of the line that exteads from that personfs wrist Co
his fingertip". It is also possible that I might follow this
r u l e implicitly. But in what sense could it be said that 1
looked in the direction of the fingertip w i t h o u t following any
rde, whetner explicit or implicit? Presmably, that would be
the case if looking in the direction of the fingertip was natural
for people, for example, if there had been encoded a certain k i ~ d
of norrn in every man's brain since his birth. This kind of cctse
involves "rule" in the third sense -- a case in which I would
prefer, as 1 have already indicated, to use the expression
"non-rational norm". In other words, the third sense of "rule"
that Brandorn identified is not a rule at all, at least not in my
terminology, even though Wittgenstein rnight have used the German
expression Regel in al1 three cases. The fact that an event can
be described in normative terms does not mean that it involves a
-
Secky 4 2
rule (in my sense) although, of course, the event has to involve
a norm of some kind.
II, THEORIES OF RULE-FOLLOWING
II. A REDUCTIONISM VS. NON-REDUCTIONISM
In chapter 1, 1 have outlined some of the various ways in
which we can conceive of rules. 1 would like to start this
chapter by briefly looking at how we can classify the competing
t h ê o r i e s of rules. We can identify two very broad categories of
theories, namely non-reductionist and reductionist.
Non-reductionists believe that our normative concepts cannot be
reduced to something non-normative, such as to dispositions to
act, and that r u l e s and their applications are internally
reloted. Hence I shall also cal1 non-reductionist philosophers
f 1 internalists" because the expression "internalism" captures the
central tenet of non-reductionism that 1 am interested in. There
are various aegrees in which a non-reductionist can be committed
to internalism about rules. The comrnon ground among internalists
seems Eo be that rules and their applications are internally
related in the sense of a particular rule being inseparable £rom
the way it is applied in practice while at the same time the
practice of the comrnunity does not determine the correctness of
-
S e c k y 43
t h e a p p l i c a t i o n o f r u l e s i n p a r t i c u l a r i n s t a n c e s . There i s an
i n t e r n a l r e l a t i on : ' between a g iven r u l e and i ts a p p l i c a t i o n and
it is i r r e l e v a n t , f o r example, how t h e majority of t h e rnembers of
a comrnunity i s disposed t o fo l l ow t h a t ru1e . l "
. - -' A n i n t e r n a 1 r e l a t i o n can be d e f i n e d such t h a t t h e
r e l a t i o n between two e n t i t i e s i s i n t e r n a l i f and o n l y i f it i s
i n c o n c e i v a b l e t h a t t h e e n t i t i e s do n o t s t a n d i n t h a t r e l a t i o n
( c f . TLP 4 .123) . If a n o b j e c t is red , f o r i n s t a n c e , it i s i n t o r n a l l y r e l a t e d t o al1 green o b j e c t s such t h a t it is of a
d i f f e r e n t c o l o u r t h a n t h e s a i d g r een o b j e c t s . W e can thus s c y
t h a t t h e i n t e r n a l r e l a t i o n between two o r more e n t i t i e s i s
analogous t o ~ h e a n a l y t i c i t y of two o r more p r o p o s i t i o n s .
A more r e l e v a n t s e n s e i n w h i c h w e can speak about " i n t e r n a l
relation" i s with r e f e r e n c e t o t h e i n t e r n a l r e l o t i o n of t h e
central concep t s i nvo lved i n ru l e - fo l l owing . I n S225 of t h e
Investigations, f o r example, W i t t g e n s t e i n makes t h e impor tan t
p o i n t t h a t "The use of t h e word ' r u l e ' and t h e u se of t h e word
'same' a r e in terwoven. ( A s a r e t h e use of ' p r o p o s i t i o n ' and t h e
u s e of ‘truc'.)" - - - T h i s c l a i m is, of cou r se , q u i t e c o n t e n t i o u s , because, a s
we s h a i l see l a t e r , i t d i r e c t l y c o u n t e r s t h e d a i m s of t h e
Community V i e w .
-
Secky 44
Internalism about rules is, or appears to be, dangerously
close to the rules-as-rails view which is discussed by McDowell
(145 f f . ) . At its extreme this view is a kind of "Platonism"
proclaiming that the applications of rules are already determined
or "pre-interpreted", quite independently of human dispositions,
customs etc. Wittgenstein expresses this view as follows:
Wnence cornes the idea that the beginning of a series is a
visible section of rails invisibly laid to infinity? Well,
we might imâgine rails instead of a rule. And infinitely
long rails correspond to the unlimited application of a
rule. (PI S 2 1 8 )
As I have pointed out above, the internalists believe that the
relation between a rule and its application is internal, that is
to Say, it does not depend on, for example, dispositions. But if
the correctness of the application of a rule is related only
the rule itself, is not the application of a rule somehow
determined or "pre-interpreted"?
rule were to 5e "pre-interpreted"
would be that of "rails invisibly
If al1 of the applications
then our picture of a rule
laid to infinity", that is
S a y , a picture of objective interpretati~ns of rules existing in
sorne kind of Platonic realm. But, of coLrse, al1 of the leading
internalists working on the philosophy of mind, namely Gordon
-
Baker, Peter
this accusat
M.S.
Secky 45
Hacker and Colin McGinn, would vehemently deny
ion that is sometimes raised against them (cf.
Malcolm 147 ff.). This accusation would not affect Robert
Brandom who also counts himself to be a normative
non-reductionist but, as we shall see in chapter V, if he is a
non-reductionist at all, it is in a different sense from the
internalist philosophers that 1 have just mentioned. 1 snall
further elaborate on internalism in chapter IV.
Reductionists believe that our normative practices are
underlain by something non-normative. We can subdivide
reductionist theories according to the non-normative foundation
of normativity that they rely on. With respect to philosophers
whose work is relevant to this thesis, we can distinguish
primarily between reductions of normative properties to
dispositions and to actual behaviour. It should be noted that in
al1 cases the norms to which the reductionist wants to reduce
benaviour (dispositions, actual behaviour) are those that make
language and mind possible, not non-rational norms of the kind
that make hearts possible. Some well-known normative
reductionists include2' Peter Winch (The Idea of Social Science),
- - - In Discussions of Wittgenstein, Rush Rhees sometirnes
tâlks like a normative reductionist, but I have not read enough
by him on this subject to be able to include him in this group
-
Secky 46
Norman Malcolm (Nothing is Hidden), Christopher Peacocke ("Rule-
Following"), Robert Fogelin (Wittgenstein), Crispin Wright
(Wittgenstein on the E'ooundation of Mathematics) , Saul A. Kripke
(Wittgenstein: On R u l e s and P r i v a t e Language) , and Hilary Putnam
(Realism and Reason). Al1 of the reductionists that 1 have just
mentioned espouse some f o m of the "Corrununity View", that is,
th2y believe that what gives substance to rules âre social
dispositions or the actual behaviour of an entire community as
opposed to the dispositions or actual behaviour of an individual
consiciered in isolation.'* In the next section 1 shall introduce
these two views in a little bit more detail.
II. B ACTUALISM AND DISPOSITIONALISM
Comrnunity actualism is the view that actual past behaviour
of the rnembers of a community determines the corxectness of the
application of r u l e s . The individual's âctual behaviour, when
t a k e n only by itself, is quite unimportant, for example, red is
of thinkers. - - " A reductionist philosopher who does not espouse the
Comunity View but believes in the foundational role of
individual dispositions is Gilbert Ryle. However, although Ryle
is a dispositionalist about the mind he is not a normative
theorist about the mind.
-
Secky 4 7
what m o s t p e o p l e a c t u a l l y c a l 1 " r e d " , t h a t is t o Say, r e d i s what
most p e o p l e h a v e c a l l e d " red" i n t h e p a s t . F o r example, i f a
s i n g l e i n d i v i d u a l w e r e t o d e s c r i b e t h e map le l e a f i n t h e c e n t r e
o f t h e Canad ian f l a g a s "b lue" t h e n t h i s s i n g l e i n d i v i d u a l ' s
a c t u a l b e h a v i o u r would have no i n f l u e n c e w h a t s o e v e r on t h e r u l e s
gove rn ing "red". I n o t h e r words, what i s a t t h e b a s i s o f
com.un i ty a c t u a l i s m i s a v a r i a t i o n on t h e a e m o c r a t i c p r i n c i p l e 2 '
t h a t t h e m c j o r i t y is a l w a y s r i g h t .
- - '' But t h i s p r i n c i p l e s h o u l d b e p e r h a p s c a l l e d "mobocra t i c "
because i n r e p r e s e n t a t i v e democrac i e s t h e p r i n c i p l e t h a t t h e
m a j o r i t y i s a l w a y s " r i g h t " (wha teve r t h a t m i g h t mean) i s r e g a r d e d
o n l y a s a t n e o r e t i c a l g u i d e l i n e t h a t has l i t t l e c o n t a c t w i t h
s o c i a l r e a l i t y . T h a t i s t o say , in r e p r e s e n t a t i v e democrac i e s
t h e r e i s a gap between what is d e s i r e d by t h e p e o p l e and what i s
desirea by t h e i r r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s . T h i s g a p i s p o s s i b l e b e c a u s e
t h e " t r u t h t ' p o s s e s s e d by t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s i s g e n e r o l l y
r e g a r d e d a s o f a g r e a t e r v a l u e t h a n t h e t r ü t h t h a t i s h e l d by t h e
m a j o r i t y of t h e p e o p l e b e c a u s e t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s a r e ,
supposed ly , b e t t e r a c q u a i n t e d w i t h t h e q u e s t i o n s a t i s s u e , r e l y
on t h e a d v i c e o f v a r i o u s e x p e r t s and s o on . T h i s s i m p l e f a c t
suggests t h a t i t i s n o t t h e c a s e , a s t h e Community V i e w t h e o r i s t s
suppose , t h a t i t i s t h e d i s p o s i t i o n s o r a c t u a l b e h a v i o u r of t h e
m a j o r i t y t h a t d e f i n e s what i s c o r r e c t a n d what i s n o t . (See
below. )
-
Secky 48
One of the difficulties with this version of the Community
View is that there cannot be a correct application of rules if
there are no precedents to a given activity at the level of a
cornmuni~y.'' Taken to an extreme, this view would seem to entail
that if a new rule is formulated there cannot be a correct way of
following it for the first time. However, although this is a
seriotis difficulty 1 believe that in the context of this thesis
the £sr greater difficulty is the inability of community
actualism to distinguish between a clairn's being correct because
it accords with an objective standard, a rule, and a claim's
being correct because it accords with what most people actuzlly
do. It is this second difficulty, at the heart of which is the
assurnption that rule-following is necessarily social, that 1
shall focus on in my discussion of K r i p k e in the following two
chapters.
Dr. Schroeder suggested to me that in several sections
of the Investigations Wittgenstein seems to espouse a version of
normative actualism according to which actual future behaviour
determines, for instance, how 1 meânt tc go on (cf. PI 5S187,
190). It is true that Wittgenstein talks in this way but 1 think
that the main emphasis in passages such as PI SI87 is on the fact
that at present the interpretation of a rule is not determined,
that is, the steps that 1 am to take do not somehow exist prior
to my interpretation of those steps by actually taking them.
-
Secky 49
The community disposition thesis avoids the lesser
difficulty of community actualism that can result £rom the lack
of precedent behaviour by focusing solely on dispositions, that
is, potential future behaviour. According to comunity
dispositionalism, dispositions of members of a community
determine the correct application of rules, for example, red is
what most people are disposed to cal1 "red" whether or rrot
someone has actually used the predicate "red" in the past or not.
In other words, dispositions are actual "attitudes of tne minci1'
that determine the propriety of an action. However, as Kripke
points out, w e cannot ultimately distinguish between a correct
performance and an incorrect performance because the only thing
that counts are the individual's dispositions. When someone is
disposed to always make a particular mistake, for example, to
cali the maple leaf in the centre of the Canadian flag "blue",
then there is no way to distinguish correct performance from
incorrect performance since both calling it "red" and calling it
"blue" are simply dispositions (29-30). When 1 follow Kripke in
claiming that dispositionalists cannot distinguish correct
performance £ r o m incorrect performance by referring to
dispositions 1 am claiming, in effect, that dispositionalists
conflate performances that are correct because they accord with
given dispositions and performances that are correct because they
accord with given rules. For example, there can be a rule
-
Secky 50
defining "red" by a reference to the maple leaf in the centre of
the Canadian flag but the dispositionalist view implies that when
someone calls the maple leaf "blue" then he is correct in virtue
of the fact that he is disposed to call the maple leaf blue. It
must be realised, of course, that the dispositionalist can object
that what really counts are the dispositions of the community
rzther than the dispositions of the individual. Even so, we can
raise the same objection regarding the dispositions of the
community as xe have raised regarding the dispositions of the
individual -- there is no reason why the comrnunity as a whole
could not make mistakes in following a particular rule. For
example, there can suddenly erupt a global chemical war and once
it is over al1 of the survivors can have their sensory apparata
damaged in s u c h a way that they are disposed to call the maple
leaf in the centre of the Canadion flag blue. Even if al1 people
on Earth were disposed to call the Canadian maple leaf "blue"
that does not mean that it is really blue. Of course, the reason
why al1 the survivors of the chemical war are wrong about calling
the naple leaf in the centre of the Canadian flag blue, even
though al1 of them are disposed to call it blue, is that they
violate the rule for using the expression "blue". 1 have defined
" ~ d " above as being the colour of the maple leaf in the centre
of the Canadian flag, and hence the maple leaf is red regardless
of anyone's dispositions, and we can make a rule for "blue" in a
-
Secky 51
similar way." Moreover, Kripke is quite right when he claims
that
The dispositional theory attempts to avoid the problem of
the finiteness of my actual past performance by appealing
to a disposition. But in doing so, it ignores an obvious
fâct: not only my actual performance, but also the
totality of my dispositions, is finite. It is not true,
for example, that if queried about the surn of any two
nurnbers, no matter how large, 1 will reply with their
actual sum, for some pairs of n.~mbers are simply too
large for my mind -- or my brain -- to grasp. (Kripke 26-7)
As we shall see later, since dispositions cover only a finite
segment of, for example, a given mathematical function, two
- - , - - - To avoid someone's objection that perhaps the chemical
warfare did not damage people's sensory apparata but changed the
chemical constitution of al1 objects in such a way that, for
example, the autumal maple leafs are now blue, we can define
"red" by specifying its wavelength. In this way we can show that
the rule for using "red" is quite objective and it is this
cbjective rule that defines Our use of "red", not people's
dispositions.
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Secky 52
individuals may agree on their computations even though they are
actually computing different mathematical functions.
Thus, we can conclude that dispositions cannot be normative
because, as we have seen above, it makes no sense to speak of a
norm without the possibility of violating it. Dispositions
cannot be violated because it would not make any sense to say
that someone has acted in accordance with or against his
- - dispositions," A community dispositionalist can object, of
course, that a n o m is violated not when an individual acts
against his dispositions but when his action is in conflict with
the dispositions of a cornmunity. This conflict can come about in
various ways. It is possible to Say, for instance, that someone
has acted against his dispositions if we introduce the
- > '' Dr. Gerwin has made the interesting objection that when
I make a typing error 1 might possibly act against my disposi~ion
to spell the word correctly. However, 1 do not think that this
objection can endanger my general line of argument at all. The
reason is that there is nothing normative in my disposition to
spell a given word in a particular way, that is to Say, the
reason why 1 cal1 a particular typing error an error is not
because it conflicts with my disposition to spell the word in a
çiven way but because it conflicts with the rules of English
spelling.
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Secky 53
distinction between "higher order dispositions" (those of the
experts, for example) and "lower order dispositions" (those of
the ccmmons, for instance) in the way that certain soft
determinists distinguish between "higher order desires" and
"lower order desires". But then the "higher order dispositions"
would be in some sense "right" regardless of how many people had
those dispositions and hence dispositions would cease to be the
kind of brute facts that are requirea for a truly
dispositionalist theory of normativity. At the same time, if we
were to Say that a norm is violated whenever an individual's
disposition conflicts with the dispositions of the m a j o r i t y of
the members of a community then we could also ask what it is
about the dispositions of the majority that it makes them in some
sense "right", or at any rate, a standard according to which
other dispositions can be wrneasured". 1 shall address this
difficulty in more detail in chapter IV because it does not
concern only dispositionalism but ail versicns of the Community
View, including Kripke's actualism. It is worch noting that
Kripke's actualist account has also dispositionalist elements,
althougn it is not necessarily the case that it is these
aispositionalist elements that make the present difficulty
relevant for him (cf. Kripke 90 ff., quoted below) . Kripke is
probably right when he notes that Wittgenstein's views have
dispositional elernents in it, although, of course, that does not
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Secky 54
meân that Wittgenstein should be thought of as a dispositionalist
( 2 5 ) .
III. THE "PARADOX" OF PI §201
I I 1 . A KRIPKE'S "PARADOX"
One of the most debated interpretations of Wittgenstein's
Pni losophical I n v e s t i g a t i o n s is Kripke' s W i t t g e n s t e i n : On R u l e s
and Priva te Language. Kripke thinks that the "paradox" of 5201
is "perhaps the centrnl problem" of the Phi losopnica l
Invsstigations and may be regarded as a "new form of
philcscphical scepticism" (Kripke 7 ) . According to Kripke's
interpretation of the rule-following considerations in the
Pnilosophical I n v e s t i g a t i o n s , were it not for the "sceptical
solution", Wittgenstein would reach the paradoxical conclusion
that tnere are no facts about what a speaker means by a given
expression (Kripke 21 ff. ) Kripke' s "sceptical paradox"
culninates in the claim that rules cannot guide one's action and
as a result, were it not for the "sceptical solution", al1
language would be meaningless (Kripke 21) . '' *
- - .. .
Any interpretation of Kripke's W i t t g e n s t e i n has to be
problematic from the beginning because Kripke does not clearly
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Secky 55
But although S201 is the focal point for Kripke's
interpretation of the Investigations, he sets up his sceptical
problem rather differently. The question of Kripke's sceptic is
this: "How do you know that you have always meant 'addition' by
+ not 'q~addition'?"~" For Kripke's sceptic, "quaddition" is
attribute the "sceptical paradox" to hirnself nor to Wittgenstein
but claims that it is "rather Wittgenstein's argument as it
struck Kripke" (Kripke 5) , I think that the "paradox" that
Kripke presents us with is quite different from the one that
Wittgenstein treats in the Investigations S201 and hence I shall
talk about "Kripke's paradox" although it would be perhaps more
precise to cal1 it "Kripkenstein's paradox".
- - , - - In Fact, Fiction and Forecast, Goodman provides us with
a sceptical technique that can be used to challenge any
predicates by means of their temporal definition, for example,
"green" csn be contrasted with "grue", where "grue" means "green
until time t and blue thereafter". Thus, we can predicate of a
grue object that it is green at t-1 and blue at t+ l . Kripke
essentially applies Goodman's sceptical technique about
predication to rules (Kripke 20 ff.). Wittgenstein himself used
a similâr example, the one involving the recalcitrant pupil
(PI §§143, 185). In S185, for instance, Wittgenstein considers
that someone might understand the order "add 2" as "add 2 up to
1000, 4 up to 2000, 6 up to 3000 and so on". Nonetheless, since
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Secky 5 6
an arithmetical operation like addition, but whose operator is
' i q ~ ~ ~ " ("8") rather than "plus" (Kripke 9) :
x e y = x + y, i f x , y < 57
x @ y = 5, if x, y 2 57
Kripke's sceptic asks, "How do you know that your response to '67
+ 58' was always supposed to be '125' and not ' S v ? " The sceptic
doubts whether anything that 1 have done in the past can justify
the