status quo the greatest stability

8/6/2019 Status Quo the Greatest Stability

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Yunqi Lin

Status Quo: The Greatest Stability

Sometimes men want what they fear the most. Nuclear weapons are one of such things.

Because nuclear weapons are so destructive, the sheer fact that one state has those makes other

states awe and feel unsafe. Thus, with nuclear proliferation, states will blindly acquire nuclear

weapons for security and swaggering. With nuclear proliferation, states will face security

dilemma as other states acquire more and stronger nuclear weapons. In response to the security

dilemma, less secure states would also zealously engage in the arm race. The result, as was in the

case of Athens and Sparta, will be war. The only difference is that this might be a war that will

destroy the entire human race. Therefore, nuclear nonproliferation creates greater stability;

nuclear proliferation will only cause disasters.

Advocates of nuclear proliferation endorse the belief that the fear of retaliation is central

to successful deterrence (Sagan 223). They believe that as long as countries have the nuclear

weapons to secure a second strike, the deterrence will be successful, because no state wants to

suffer the pain. While I agree with this concept, I also agree to the danger of security dilemma. If

countries were able to obtain nuclear weapons freely, according to realism, they will try to

increase their relative power by increasing their possession of advanced nuclear weapons

incessantly. In the era of nuclear proliferation, the only way to secure survival is to become the

strongest power, the hegemon (Mearsheimer 65). However, independent action taken by one

state to increase its security may make all states feel less secure (Nye and Welch 17), and once

states start to arm race, they do not stop until a war breaks out; such a situation is highly unstable.

Once one country presents a threat to smaller, more vulnerable states, the threatened

countries are more likely to ally against it than join it (Walt 131-133). This attempt to balance of


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power makes individual states safer because they are able to obtain the protection from their

allies and avoid being the immediate victims. In this case, deterrence is playing a large role.

Nevertheless, if the alliances become rigid and their interests become increasingly

interdependent and complicated, tensions will be able to break out easily. A little spark may lead

to a dramatic chain effect. A situation that is similar to this would be the eve of World War I.

The Triple Alliance and Triple Entente were both rigid alliances and were strongly opposed to

each other; the spark of the assassination of Archduke Ferdinand of Austria triggered the alarm

of war in Europe and turned the entire Europe into a battle zone. If rigid alliances were to happen

among countries with nuclear possessions, the consequence would be the devastation of theentire world.

Some might also argue that the Cold War is a counter example of the aforementioned

World War I example. They say that there was no open fire during the Cold War despite the fact

that the relationship between the U.S. and the Soviet Union was extremely intense and both

countries possessed nuclear weapons. Advocates of nuclear proliferation claim that deterrence

was successful during the Cold War and it will also be successful in the future. I acknowledge

that the Cold War was a period of successful deterrence; nevertheless, I also want to emphasize

the fact that there were only two players in the Cold War the Soviet Union and the U.S.

Although both the U.S. and the Soviet Union had alliances, none of those allies appeared to be

powerful enough to be taken into consideration. It was the contest of the two super powers. This

makes the situation much more straightforward, because if one side strikes a preventive war, the

other has the sufficient power to launch an immediate retaliation strike solely on one target. The

simplicity of the situation makes it clear that theres no chance of attacking the enemy without


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destroying the attacker itself; therefore, preventive strike was unlikely and was able to be

deterred.

Having multiple players is a different story. If we allow nuclear proliferation, the

situation will be much more complicated. As the number of players increase, the likelihood of

cooperation decreases because it becomes more difficult to identify and realize mutual interest; it

becomes easier for any given player to unilaterally defect; and it becomes more difficult to

punish defectors (Oye 89-90). In the case of the Cold War, interests of each super power were

clear; and it was easy to punish the offender because there only existed one. Nevertheless, when

the number of nuclear states increases and they start forming alliances, the situation is much

more complex. First, alliances need to have mutual interests. As the number of allies increases, it

is harder to find common grounds; even if they were able to find mutual interests, they might not

be the most important ones for the allies. It will also be easy for one state to defect because one

allys interest in a pool of allies would not be as vital as its interest in a group with fewer allies;

thus, defection is likely given that the enemy provides better terms. Moreover, it is more difficult

to punish the defector because doing so will easily upset the defectors other allies and may even

lead to a breakdown of the cooperation and alliance and may put itself in a more vulnerable

position. Furthermore, having many allies decreases the efficiency of communication and

increases the difficulty of achieving consent. Whereas having only one enemy one can easily

retaliate; having multiple enemies one need to be able to investigate and identify the attacker

before striking back. This dilutes the retaliation power and thus makes war less efficient if there

were one. It also would prolong the war and increase costs.

One might ask why states would start war if they know that it would cost themselves and

the enemies dearly. The answers lie in between misinterpretation and the mistake of leaders.


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Nuclear wars could easily break out if there is misperception because states are likely to

overestimate others hostility (Jervis). When one state increases its nuclear weapon purchase or

tries to launch a test of nuclear weapons, the enemy state may see it as an imminent threat or the

forecast of a preventive war and thus try to attack first. This kind of misperception derives from

the sense of insecurity and instability associated with Security Dilemma. Since nuclear weapons

are quick and destructive, when the attacking state realizes that it makes a dreadful mistake, it

would be too late to undo the error, and this error may lead to a chain of retaliations and it may

then progress into a massive nuclear war. Aside from misperception, some wars, however, have

been started by the eventual losers, which suggests that political leaders sometimes take risks or make mistakes (Nye and Welch 39). One example is the Japanese bombing of Pearl Harbor

during World War II. When leaders think that they were able to attack the enemies with nuclear

weapons and destroy their abilities to strike retaliation, they might take the risk for relative gain.

The complicated network of increased nuclear states, security dilemma, and the difficulty of

cooperation accompanied by nuclear proliferation will increase the possibility of a nuclear war

instead of stabilizing the situation.

In my opinion, the status quo creates the greatest international stability. It would be the

best if nuclear weapons were to be all destroyed and that we do not have to live under the fear of

them. In reality, that will not happen, nations who have nuclear weapons would not be willing to

destroy them because, first, these weapons are expensive and that they are symbols of ones

power and intelligence; second, they do not trust each other in destroying the weapons, if all the

states destroy their nuclear weapons except for one state, then that one state can abuse its power

and hurt other countries. This fear of being hurt and being subordinated eliminates the possibility

of nuclear countries to volunteering destroy their weapons. If there were only two countries that


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possess nuclear weapons, the global situation will be as intense it was during the Cold War,

because super powers will compete to become the hegemony and secure its survival. The current

number of nations with nuclear weapons is eight. In my opinion, nuclear weapons could not

continue to proliferate because any increase of this number increases the likelihood of nuclear

powers joining together to form alliances. Moreover, any increase in that number will make the

conversation and communication among countries more difficult.

Although advocates of nuclear proliferation believe that the destructive nature of nuclear

weapons and fear of retaliation will be able to deter nuclear attacks and prevent nuclear wars,

this cannot be taken for granted. If we allow all countries to possess nuclear weapons freely, it

will create security dilemma as countries try to ensure their security and maximize their chances

of survival. In the face of security dilemma, balance of power is the next step. The large number

of nuclear states will undermine the efficiency and effectiveness of communication and mutual

interests are difficult to achieve in cooperation. If opposite, rigid alliances were formed, the

situation will be untouchable and a spark that neutral parties view as trivial will dramatically lead

to a devastating nuclear war. Misperception and mistakes made by leaders will also contribute to

the possibility of nuclear war. Since it is impossible for existing nuclear powers to forgo their

nuclear weapons, the best way to prevent a future nuclear war is to pursue nuclear

nonproliferation, and in this case, to limit the number of nuclear states at the current number,

eight.


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Works Cited

Jervis, Robert. "War and Misperception." The Origin and Prevention of Major Wars . Ed. Robert

Rotberg and Theodore Rabb. 1988. 101-26. Print.

Mearsheimer, John. Anarchy and the Struggle for Power. International Politics: Enduring

Concepts and Contemporary Issues . Ed. Robert J. Art and Robert Jervis. Tenth ed.

Pearson Education. 2011. 59-69. Print.

Nye, Jr., Joseph S., and David A. Welch. "Chapter 1:Is There Enduring Logic of Conflict in

World Politics?" Understanding Global Conflict and Cooperation: An Introduction to

Theory and History . Eighth ed. Pearson Education, 2011. 1-30. Print.

Nye, Jr., Joseph S., and David A. Welch. "Chapter: Explaining Conflicts and Cooperation: Tools

and Techniques of the Trade." Understanding Global Conflict and Cooperation: An

Introduction to Theory and History . Eighth ed. Pearson Education, 2011. 33-68. Print.

Oye, Kenneth A. "The Conditions for Cooperation in World Politics." International Politics:

Enduring Concepts and Contemporary Issues . Ed. Robert J. Art and Robert Jervis. Tenth

ed. Pearson Education, 2011. 79-91. Print.

Sagan, Scott D. "Indian and Pakistani Nuclear Weapons: For Better or Worse?" The Spread of

Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed . Ed. Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz.

Norton&, 2003. 90-103. Print.

Walt, Stephen M. "Alliances: Balancing and Bandwagoning." Ed. Robert J. Art and Robert

Jervis. International Politics: Enduring Concepts and Contemporary Issues . Tenth ed.

Pearson Education, 2011. 127-33. Print.

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