No. 145

NEW SECURITY DIMENSIONS IN THE ASIA PACIFIC

Barry Desker

S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies

Singapore

29 October 2007

With Compliments

This Working Paper series presents papers in a preliminary form and serves to stimulate comment and discussion. The views expressed are entirely the author’s own and not that of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies.

The S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) was established in January 2007 as an autonomous School within the Nanyang Technological University. RSIS’s mission is to be a leading research and graduate teaching institution in strategic and international affairs in the Asia Pacific. To accomplish this mission, it will:

• Provide a rigorous professional graduate education in international affairs with a strong practical and area emphasis

• Conduct policy-relevant research in national security, defence and strategic studies,

diplomacy and international relations

• Collaborate with like-minded schools of international affairs to form a global network of excellence

Graduate Training in International Affairs RSIS offers an exacting graduate education in international affairs, taught by an international faculty of leading thinkers and practitioners. The Master of Science (MSc) degree programmes in Strategic Studies, International Relations, and International Political Economy are distinguished by their focus on the Asia Pacific, the professional practice of international affairs, and the cultivation of academic depth. Over 120 students, the majority from abroad, are enrolled in these programmes. A small, select Ph.D. programme caters to advanced students whose interests match those of specific faculty members. Research

RSIS research is conducted by five constituent Institutes and Centres: the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS, founded 1996), the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR, 2002), the Centre of Excellence for National Security (CENS, 2006), the Centre for the Advanced Study of Regionalism and Multilateralism (CASRM, 2007); and the Consortium of Non-Traditional Security Studies in ASIA (NTS-Asia, 2007). The focus of research is on issues relating to the security and stability of the Asia-Pacific region and their implications for Singapore and other countries in the region. The S. Rajaratnam Professorship in Strategic Studies brings distinguished scholars and practitioners to participate in the work of the Institute. Previous holders of the Chair include Professors Stephen Walt, Jack Snyder, Wang Jisi, Alastair Iain Johnston, John Mearsheimer, Raja Mohan, and Rosemary Foot.

International Collaboration Collaboration with other professional Schools of international affairs to form a global network of excellence is a RSIS priority. RSIS will initiate links with other like-minded schools so as to enrich its research and teaching activities as well as adopt the best practices of successful schools.

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ABSTRACT The paper highlights four key aspects of the new security dimensions in the Asia-Pacific. First, the US role in the Asia-Pacific is changing. While the US will remain a major player in the Asia-Pacific, it will no longer be the 800 pound gorilla in the region and will have to handle the emerging ambitions of a rising China, which could play the role of a regional challenger. Secondly, the states of the region, including the members of ASEAN and Australia, will have to deal with the rise of China. Thirdly, the rise of China is being accompanied by growing Sino-Japanese tensions which need to be managed, the parallel rise of India (which could pose a strategic challenge to China) and the articulation of Chinese norms and values embodied in the Beijing Consensus which is challenging the Washington Consensus of Western norms and values, which has shaped international institutions since the end of the Cold War. Fourthly, Asia’s security architecture is undergoing profound changes and a closer examination of the new overlapping regional multilateral institutions in the Asia-Pacific is warranted. The paper concludes by discussing the implications for Australia, before suggesting possible implications of these developments for policy-oriented research centres of international affairs.

The paper argues that because of the strategic and economic significance of China, it is imperative that China becomes a critical player in the incipient web of regional multilateral institutions which is being created in the Asia-Pacific. Australia and other states of the region need to engage China through these institutions. As China participates in these institutions, China is being socialised and influenced by the norms and values of these structures, even as China’s own values and disposition shapes these institutions. The paper raises the question whether there is an emerging clash of values between the norms advocated by the United States, the hegemonic power in the region since the Second World War, and those advocated by China, or whether it is possible for us to have a synthesis reflecting a marriage of American and Chinese values.

********************* Ambassador Barry Desker is the Dean of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University (NTU) and concurrently Director, Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, NTU. He was the Chief Executive Officer of the Singapore Trade Development Board from 1994 to 2000, after serving in the foreign service since 1970. He was Singapore’s Ambassador to Indonesia from 1986 to 1993, Director of the Policy, Planning and Analysis Division of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, from 1984 to 1986 and Deputy Permanent Representative to the United Nations, New York, from 1982 to 1984. He was educated at the University of Singapore, University of London and Cornell University.

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NEW SECURITY DIMENSIONS IN THE ASIA PACIFIC1

I am honoured by your decision to invite me to deliver the inaugural Michael Hintze Lecture.

Universities in Australia and Singapore, and more generally universities nurtured in the

British academic tradition, have long regarded education as a public good funded by

governments. However, if our universities are to compete in the global market for academic

talent, research funding and outstanding students, there will be an increasing need to adopt

aspects of the American academic culture, in particular, the development of a tradition of a

lifelong commitment to our universities reflected in gifts and grants to the universities by our

alumni. Governments will be constrained by competing demands on available funds and are

likely to adopt a very pragmatic approach in supporting requests for the recruitment of

faculty, the award of scholarships and the provision of new or upgraded facilities.

Michael Hintze’s endowment of a Chair in International Security demonstrates the

impact of such contributions by alumni and by members of the community within which our

universities exist. This gift, and generous supporting funding from the Vice Chancellor and

Dean, Peter Wolnizer, has enabled the establishment of a Centre for International Security

Studies (CISS) at the University of Sydney. The centre’s graduate programmes will result,

over time, in the emergence of a generation of Australians and others from the wider region

with an exposure to cutting edge theoretical insights on international relations issues as well

as a practical understanding of subjects that are the focus of the contemporary understanding

of international security. The conventional understanding of security is defined as the defence

of state sovereignty and territorial integrity from overt military aggression. The new

understanding of security in the region is dominated by the unconventional challenges of

terrorism sponsored by non-state actors against states, the globalization of religious

radicalism and resultant identity/ethnic politics, and the challenges of rebuilding war-torn

failed states. The study of conventional or traditional security issues would include attention

to the relative power and capabilities of states, the threats posed to national security and the

survival of states and the role of international institutions. There is also increasing attention to

non-traditional security issues such as the impact of international terrorism, trans-national

organized crime, pandemics, natural disasters, climate change, the environment, energy

1 An earlier version of this paper was presented as the Inaugural Michael Hintze Lecture at the Centre for International Security Studies (CISS) of the University of Sydney on 26 July 2007. The author would like to thank Alan Dupont, Khong Yuen Foong and Ralf Emmers for their comments and suggestions.

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issues, the smuggling of people, drugs and goods across international borders, and the

consequences of economic crises such as the 1997–1998 Asian Financial Crisis.

Michael Hintze’s own background of service in the Australian Army, exposure to the

financial sector and hedge fund management highlights the importance of creating

institutions where graduates can synthesize different fields of knowledge and possess a

variety of capabilities and interests. The skills and exposure provided by the Centre of

International Security Studies should assist future military officers, diplomats, journalists,

civil society activists, investment bankers and hedge-fund managers, for example, in having a

better understanding of the changing regional and international geopolitical landscape,

training in political and economic risk analysis, an awareness of the opportunities and threats

posed by the regional and global environment, an exposure to the challenges involved in

peace keeping and peace building, and the need to think beyond academic disciplines so that

there is a broader appreciation of the complex, multi-faceted world in which we live. Like

Alan Dupont and his colleagues from CISS, my colleagues and I at the S. Rajaratnam School

of International Studies are attempting to build a professional graduate school of international

affairs that is inter-disciplinary in approach and with an emphasis on international security

issues of contemporary significance. We are a major graduate teaching and research

programme as well as a think tank undertaking policy-oriented research aimed at providing

solutions to real-life security problems while creating an awareness of faint signals which

indicate emerging trends. I am therefore particularly honoured by today’s invitation. I regard

your invitation to an Asian (and Singaporean) that has focused on Asian security issues as

reflecting an awareness that Australia’s larger security interests will be shaped by the security

environment and emerging security architecture of the Asia-Pacific region.

The Rise of China and its Implications for Asia-Pacific Security

For the purposes of this analysis, the “Asia-Pacific region” is broadly defined. It includes the

countries located on and within the edges of the Pacific Ocean as well as India, which is

beginning to play an important role in the politics of the region. The Asia Pacific has been

relatively stable since the end of the Cold War despite predictions in the early 1990s to the

contrary.2 A combination of engagement and enmeshment strategies by ASEAN states, and

the willingness of major powers to respond to ASEAN’s overtures, have made the prospects

for regional amity and stability much more promising. Yet today’s peaceful order cannot be 2 For more pessimistic views on order in Asia, see Aaron L. Friedberg, “Ripe for Rivalry: Prospects for Peace in a Multipolar Asia”, International Security Vol. 18 No. 3 (Winter 1993–1994), pp. 5–33.

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taken for granted. The rise of great powers and the challenge they pose to existing hegemons

have been marked by violence throughout history. The emergence of China as a peer

competitor to the United States in the Asia Pacific over the next two decades will test this

historical proposition. If China’s rise is to be an anomaly to such historical patterns, it will

stand alongside the Anglo-American transition at the end of the nineteenth century as a

fascinating case study of peaceful transitions. However, China’s emergence as a great power

is far from certain. Political and economic uncertainties abound. The prospect of a China

mired in serious difficulties will also pose grave security and economic implications for the

region. Dealing with this latter scenario is no less important than addressing the more likely

future with China as a major, possibly predominant, regional actor.

In this context, I would like to highlight four key aspects of the new security

dimensions in the Asia Pacific. First, the U.S. role in the Asia Pacific is changing. While the

United States will remain a major player in the Asia Pacific, it will no longer be the 800-

pound gorilla in the region and will have to handle the emerging ambitions of a rising China,

which could play the role of a regional challenger. Secondly, the states of the region,

including Australia and the members of ASEAN, will have to deal with the rise of China.

Thirdly, the rise of China is being accompanied by growing Sino-Japanese tensions that need

to be managed, the parallel rise of India (which could pose a strategic challenge to China) and

the articulation of Chinese norms and values embodied in what I call the Beijing Consensus,

which is challenging the Washington Consensus of Western norms and values that has

shaped international institutions since the end of the Cold War. Fourthly, we must therefore

recognize that Asia’s security architecture is undergoing profound changes and a closer

examination of the new overlapping regional multilateral institutions in the Asia Pacific is

warranted. I shall conclude by discussing the implications for Australia, before suggesting

possible implications of these developments for CISS.

My argument is that, because of the strategic and economic significance of China, it is

imperative that China becomes a critical player in the incipient web of regional multilateral

institutions that is being created in the Asia Pacific. Australia and other states of the region

need to engage China through these institutions. As China participates in these institutions, it

is being socialized and influenced by the norms and values of these structures, even as

China’s own values and disposition shape these institutions. The question I pose is whether

there is an emerging clash of values between the norms advocated by the United States, the

hegemonic power in the region since the World WarTwo, and those advocated by China, or

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whether it is possible for us to have a synthesis reflecting a marriage of American and

Chinese values.

The Future Role of the United States in Asia

Any discussion of the emerging security framework in the Asia Pacific must address the

future role of the United States. In 2003, U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld

announced plans to restructure U.S. forces in Asia. The defence strategy that was conceived

to cope with Cold War challenges was considered no longer adequate to deal with new and

emerging security threats such as global terrorist networks and traditional military challenges.

The new strategy called for the establishment of a series of outposts across the globe that

would permit nimble U.S. forces to respond effectively to emergencies. Rapid-response U.S.

forces would jump off these strategic “lily pads”—comparatively small but expandable

bases—and dive into and confront crises as and when they occur.3 As the 2006 Quadrennial

Defense Review (QDR) affirms, the United States has “[i]nitiated a post-9/11 Global Military

Force Posture Plan to rearrange U.S. forces around the world, while reducing the Cold War

era static footprint abroad, resulting in more expeditionary and deployable forces”.4 If

military transformation and the development of more agile and more formidable forces

proceed apace, the redeployment of U.S. forces from Asia will not compromise on

Washington’s ability to deter or destroy its adversaries. The upkeep of smaller bases overseas

could reduce the tension generated by the presence of sizeable U.S. military forces based in

countries like South Korea and Japan as well as lessen the pressure on U.S. forces stretched

by U.S. commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan. Significantly, in line with the plans set out in

the Global Defense Posture Review, Washington and Tokyo had adopted a road map in

October 2005 whereby some 7,000 U.S. military personnel in Okinawa would be relocated to

Guam and elsewhere.5 U.S. force levels in South Korea will also drop from 37,500 to 25,000

by the end of 2008 and will be based in the south, away from their current exposed positions

around Seoul.

A meaningful assessment of the Pentagon’s plans and their impact on the Asia-Pacific

security order require the clarification of several issues. First, what are the long-term

implications of the Defense Department’s move to reduce U.S. military levels in Japan and 3 Kurt M. Campbell and Celeste Johnson Ward, “New Battle Stations?”, Foreign Affairs, September/October 2003, available at www.foreignaffairs.org/20030901faessay82507/kurt-m-campbell-celeste-johnson-ward/new-battle-stations.html. 4 Quadrennial Defense Review Report, 6 February 2006, p. viii. 5 US-Japan Alliance: Transformation and Realignment for the Future, 29 October 2005, available at www.state.gov/documents/organization/55886.pdf.

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South Korea on the Northeast Asian security architecture? Will the possible transfer of the

wartime control of Korean troops, which are now part of the U.S.-led Combined Forces

Command, to Korean hands undermine military effectiveness? Does this portend a shift from

a military-centred to a non-military-focused policy of engagement with Asia? If so, such a

shift might redound to the benefit of Washington. Although the United States is the leading

trading partner for most states in the region and a major source of foreign direct investment

(FDI), the United States is perceived as viewing the region primarily as an economic and

security threat rather than a possible source of future economic growth. As one report noted:

“As long as the Pacific Command remains the most visible presence of U.S. policy in the

region, there will be little sense by the region’s leaders and citizens that the United States

views the region as anything other than stationary aircraft carriers serving U.S. power

projection needs”.6 Second, what are the implications for Southeast Asia and U.S. policy

toward the region? If Southeast Asia’s reaction to the closure of Clark Air Base and Subic

Bay Naval Station are any indication, perhaps Southeast Asian states will adapt to the new

circumstances and react indifferently. Some regional states may even develop new

relationships with rising regional powers. Conversely, perhaps the defence posture review

may provoke some ASEAN states to expand military-to-military relations with Washington

while stirring others to forge new economic and political partnerships with the United States.

Notwithstanding its intention to re-deploy forces from Asia, the United States has

been upgrading its defence relations with key allies in the region. The move seems to be a

U.S. attempt to create structural constraints that may discourage Beijing from challenging

U.S. pre-eminence in the Asia Pacific. The United States has advanced its military

relationship with India over the last few years. Washington has also resumed aspects of its

military assistance programme to Indonesia. Significantly, in 2005, the Japanese armed forces

engaged American, Singaporean and Thai forces in military manoeuvres in Thailand. It was

the first time Japan had participated in Cobra Gold, the annual military exercise involving

U.S. and Thai troops. In 2006, Indonesia became the next country to actively participate in

the exercise. The significance is twofold. First, the development reflects Japan’s increasing

desire to be a “normal” state. Second, it suggests that there is a progressive multi-

lateralization of U.S.-led security cooperation in Asia, which originally formed part of

6 John Gershman, “Freedom Rules: Bush Offers Platitudes and Little Else to Asia”, Foreign Policy in Focus, 16 November 2005, available at www.fpif.org/pdf/gac/0511freedom.pdf.

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bilateral defence cooperation arrangements,7 often described as part of the U.S. “hub-and-

spoke” strategy.

Emerging Asian Regional Institutions

The U.S. focus on military alliances and the development of strategic lily pads reflects the

continuing emphasis on defence relationships in U.S. perspectives on the region, reinforced

since the September 11 terrorist attacks of 2001. By contrast, it is my contention that there is

increasing attention in the Asian region to the development of regional institutions, often

decried by U.S. policymakers as soft institutions unable to handle major security challenges.

This is a profound change in the region, particularly as the proponents of regional institutions

include ASEAN states with traditionally close ties with the United States. The members of

the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) have proceeded with regional

economic integration and enhanced security cooperation, even though the United States has

preferred to deal with member states on a bilateral basis. As a region whose prosperity and

stability is closely linked to that of Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia has actively attempted to

shape the evolving regional order since the end of the Cold War. As a coalition of small and

medium-sized states, Southeast Asia has banded together under ASEAN to enmesh great

powers in regional multilateral institutions in order to give each a stake in the established

order. Among them, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) stands out for its success in

establishing a multilateral forum where dialogue has been promoted and security cooperation

enhanced among its members.8 While ASEAN members highlight the consultative

mechanisms that create a process of dialogue, European and American participants have been

critical of the “soft” institutionalization and lack of concrete achievements of the ARF “talk

shop”. The ARF is likely to be much more effective in addressing non-traditional security

issues such as the risk of pandemics, natural disasters, trans-national terrorism, trans-national

crime and maritime security issues than in confronting the “hard” security challenges posed

by any great power conflict in East Asia, a crisis over Taiwan or the acquisition of nuclear

weapons by North Korea.

Although the various multilateral forums have been a boon to regional security, they

have also enmeshed Asia in an interlocking chain of political and economic links. A key

driver is the rapid rise of China as a major trading partner, not just of states in the region but

7 www.pacom.mil/speeches/sst2001/010719blairtokyo.htm www.latrobe.edu.au/socsci/staff/connors/connors-Thai-US.doc] 8 See ASEAN Regional Forum, available at www.aseanregionalforum.org/

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also around the globe. ASEAN-China trade totalled nearly US$79 billion in 2003, rising to

US$160 billion in 2006, as quoted by Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao in a speech at the

ASEAN-China annual summit in Cebu, Philippines.9 If political instability occurs in China, it

will have reverberations throughout the region. Political, economic and social trends in China

have thus seized the attention of Asian governments and analysts as they contemplate the

repercussions on regional and national security of developments in China. The optimal

situation is one in which China continues to maintain a high level of economic growth,

liberalizes its political system while preserving social stability, and maintains a benign and

defensive military posture towards its neighbours. Such an outcome would undoubtedly

redound to the stability and prosperity of the region. Conversely, the worst-case scenario is

that China’s economy collapses, its political situation implodes and it embraces a military

adventurism that wreaks havoc on the regional order. Such a situation would bring the region

into, at best, uncertain times and, at worst, a period of unprecedented chaos and political flux.

Unquestionably, however, for regional security and stability to be preserved, the integration

of an economically successful and militarily benign China as a major actor into the region is

absolutely vital.

Some U.S. analysts—such as John Mearsheimer—fret over the risk of confrontation

with a rising China and the desirability of developing relationships with states on the

periphery of China—such as Japan, India and Vietnam—that could balance with China.10

Bilateral alliances such as the U.S.-Japan treaty relationship will remain a primary instrument

of U.S. security policy while the U.S.-Australia security relationship under the ANZAC treaty

arrangement remains a cornerstone of U.S. defence relationships in the wider Asia-Pacific

region. Nevertheless, newer commitments such as the rapidly developing interactions with

India and Singapore will be based on a concert of interests and specific bilateral agreements

rather than broad treaty commitments.11 Cooperative arrangements spawned by the American

war on terror have facilitated closer linkages with Indonesia and the expansion of U.S.

involvement in the Philippines. As China increases its interactions with its Asian neighbours

and begins to flex its muscles, concerns about a possible return to a Middle Kingdom and

9 See www.abs-cbnnews.com/storypage.aspx?StoryId=63168. This figure of US$160 billion also corresponds to the estimate of US$160.84 billion presented by the China Balance Sheet Project, which is a U.S.-based joint project by the Centre for Strategic and International Studies and the Peterson Institute for International Economics (www.chinabalancesheet.org). 10 See John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, New York: W.W. Norton, 2001; John J. Mearsheimer, “China’s Unpeaceful Rise”, Current History Vol. 105 No. 690 (April 2006), pp. 160–162; Richard K. Betts, “Wealth, Power, and Instability: East Asia and the United States after the Cold War”, International Security Vol. 18 No. 3 (Winter 1993–1994), pp. 73–77. 11 Francis Fukuyama, “Re-Envisioning Asia”, Foreign Affairs Vol. 84 No. 1 (January/February 2005), p. 85.

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tributary state kind of relationship will lead some states to adopt balancing strategies

designed to expand bilateral linkages with the United States.12

This combination of cooperative enmeshment and balancing strategies is also seen in

the expanding membership of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).13 Arguably, as

a continental state, China has historically been much more concerned about possible threats

emanating from its west and north than from its eastern seas or southern borders. China

played a leadership role in conceiving the SCO, promoted its establishment in 2001 and has

worked consistently for the institutionalization of the SCO. The SCO has made the most

significant progress in institutionalizing security cooperation compared to other regional

institutions of which China is a member. The SCO has facilitated Sino-Russian security

cooperation while constraining attempts by the Central Asian states to develop closer

relations with the United States. The security orientation of the SCO is seen in its treaties on

the reduction of military forces on borders between member states, annual joint military

exercises, annual meetings of defence ministers and the identification of primary threats to its

member states as terrorism, extremism and separatism. In July 2005, after the war in

Afghanistan and Iraq saw an indefinite deployment of U.S. forces in Uzbekistan, Tajikistan

and Kyrgyzstan, the SCO summit in Astana, Kazakhstan, urged them to set a timetable for

the withdrawal of U.S. troops from member states. Since then, Uzbekistan has asked the

United States to leave its K-2 air base.14 The absence of the United States has led to

speculation that the grouping could be the nucleus of a balancing coalition if the United

States seeks to revive its hub-and-spoke network in the Asia Pacific or promote the expansion

eastwards of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

Some contend that the United States has already strengthened its network of alliance

relationships in Asia to meet the strategic challenge posed by a rising China. However, I

would argue that it is probably more important currently to develop trans-Pacific institutions,

which could enmesh China in a web of cooperative relationships in the region. The decision

to engage North Korea through the Six-Party Talks is positive, as U.S. leverage on North

Korea is much lower than that of traditional North Korean allies such as China and Russia.

The United States should provide greater support for the APEC forum and encourage

substantive cooperation within the APEC framework instead of the lacklustre support of

12 See Eric Teo Chu Cheow, “Strategic Dimension of ASEAN-China Economic Relations”, in Saw Swee-Hock (Ed.), ASEAN-China Economic Relations, Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 2007, pp. 318–338. 13 See Dr Martha B. Olcott, “The Shanghai Cooperation Organization-Changing the ‘Playing Field’ in Central Asia”, Testimony before the Helsinki Commission, September 2006. 14 See Shanghai Cooperation Organization, www.sectsco.org/

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recent years, characterized mainly by President George W. Bush’s annual attendance at the

APEC Leaders’ meeting. Similarly, greater attention should be given to the ARF process.

U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice’s decision to skip the 2005 ARF meeting was a

mistake.15 American inattention to East Asia left the field to Chinese Foreign Minister Li

Zhaoxing in Vientiane. By contrast, Rice’s participation in the 2006 ARF meeting in Kuala

Lumpur in the midst of the crisis resulting from the Israeli invasion of Lebanon drew warm

praise from participants and signalled a return of U.S. attention to the region. 16 The intention

of Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice to skip the ARF Foreign Ministers Meeting in Manila

in August 2007 and President George W. Bush’s decision to postpone the commemorative

ASEAN-U.S. Summit scheduled to be held in Singapore on 5 September 2007 confirms the

relatively low significance attached to these regional institutions by a U.S. President mired in

domestic and foreign-policy problems.

As sophisticated Chinese diplomacy leads to participation in multiple regional

organizations, ASEAN is developing closer linkages with China. These relationships are

perceived as a balance against U.S. unilateralism. Some of the newer members of ASEAN—

such as Myanmar, Laos and Cambodia—have benefited from Chinese largesse, and are

supportive of Chinese concerns within ASEAN. Older members such as Malaysia and

Thailand are beginning to bandwagon with China. Some long-standing U.S. allies such as the

Philippines are adopting hedging strategies. For ASEAN states that prefer a regional balance

of power such as Indonesia, Vietnam and Singapore, a regional security architecture that is

outward-looking and promotes the observance of international norms and codes of conduct is

preferable to one dominated by a single power. For these states, an active U.S. presence

would sustain this vision of the region’s future.17

15 See Ralph Cossa, “East Asian Community and the United States: US View—One Step Forward, Two Steps Back?”, presented at Japan-US-Asia Dialogue, “An East Asian Community and the United States”, 22 June 2006. 16 See Brendan Taylor, “Asia Pacific Security Architecture”, Paper prepared for IARU Conference on Security, Cambridge, 2–4 November 2006. 17 See Michael A. Glosny, “Heading Toward a Win-Win Future? Recent Developments in China’s Policy Toward Southeast Asia”, Asian Security Vol. 2 No. 1, February 2006, pp. 24–57; Evelyn Goh, “Great Powers and Southeast Asia Regional Security Strategies”; David C. Kang, “Getting Asia Wrong: The Need for New Analytical Frameworks”, International Security Vol. 27 No. 4 (Spring 2003), pp. 57–85.

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The Rise of China18

Although the United States has been the hegemon in the Asia Pacific since the end of World

War Two, it will not be the dominant presence in the region in the next 25 years. A rising

China will pose the critical foreign-policy challenge, probably more difficult than the

challenge posed by the Soviet Union during the Cold War. While the Soviet Union was a

political and strategic competitor, China will be a formidable political, strategic and

economic competitor. This development will lead to the most profound change in the

strategic environment of the Asia Pacific.

The U.S. Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) of 2006 regarded China as having “the

greatest potential to compete militarily with the United States and field disruptive military

technologies that could over time offset traditional U.S. military advantages”.19 The

American proponents of the China-threat thesis20 tend to make three key arguments. First, the

annual double-digit rise in Chinese military expenditures will give it a force projection

capability while its economic growth will provide the economic base for a sustained build-up

of military capabilities. Second, China’s rising energy and other natural-resource needs as

well as mercantilist approach to energy and natural resources will make it a global economic

and strategic competitor to the United States. Third, the nature of its authoritarian political

system will lead it to focus on external threats and to mobilize resources for war, especially if

it senses that Taiwan is moving towards political independence with U.S. support. Critics of

this approach contend that Chinese policy will be contingent on U.S. behaviour towards a

rising China as well as how the United States uses its current pre-eminent status.21 They

highlight that rising military expenditures and a quest for energy and natural-resource

security will characterize U.S. policy as well. Such critics further argue that the thesis that

authoritarian regimes are more likely to go to war while democracies do not go to war with

18 For more on the rise of China, see Avery Goldstein, Rising to the Challenge: China's Grand Strategy and International Security, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005; and Rosemary Foot, Does China’s Rise Constitute a Threat, unpublished paper. 19 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report, pp. 29 20 See especially Richard Bernstein and Ross H. Munro, The Coming Conflict with China, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1997. For a sense of changing U.S. assessments of China’s military and economic performance and capabilities, see the two annual reports to Congress by the U.S. Government: Annual Report on the Military Power of the People’s Republic of China; The National Security Implications of the Economic Relationship between the United States and China: Report to Congress of the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission. 21 See Harry Harding, “The Uncertain Future of US-China Relations”, Asia-Pacific Review Vol. 6 No. 1 (1999), pp. 7–24. Also see Zhang Yunling and Shiping Tang, “China’s Regional Strategy”, in David Shambaugh (Ed.), Power Shift: China and Asia’s New Dynamics, Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005, pp. 48–68.

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one another (the democratic peace argument) reflects the cultural bias of North American

analysts rather than an argument grounded in hard evidence.

Growing Sino-Japanese Antagonism

One aspect of the changing regional security dynamics has been the rising competition

between Japan and China. This development will make other Asians wary of being enmeshed

in a new regional cold war.22 China continues to remind the region of Japanese expansionism

during World War Two and the lack of Japanese remorse as evidenced by Prime Minister

Junichiro Koizumi’s annual visits to Yasukuni shrine, which holds the remains of 14 Class A

war criminals, and the downplaying of Japanese atrocities during the war. Chinese criticism

has evoked a strong reaction in Japan. Most worrying is the ultra-nationalistic response of

young Japanese and Chinese. We were reminded of these trends by the heightened rhetoric

between Chinese and Japanese decision-makers at closed-door international and regional

conferences in 2006, even as substantive economic links between China and Japan have

increased rapidly. Nevertheless, bilateral relations have improved in recent months, after the

assumption of office by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and his avoidance of symbolic gestures

that upset the Chinese leadership, such as Koizumi’s annual visits to Yasukuni.

In contrast to ASEAN members who have had four decades of institutional experience

in regional reconciliation, Northeast Asians have focused on bilateral ties and multilateral

forums such as the Six-Party Talks with a specific agenda. Although the East Asia Summit

(EAS) and the East Asia Community (EAC) provide opportunities for informal confidence

building and discussions on broad strategic issues that concern the region, participants in

these regional institutions note the competitive bids for regional leadership by China and

Japan.23 While Japan has favoured the EAS mechanism, China regards the EAC as a more

appropriate vehicle for regional community building. China’s decision not to proceed with a

separate summit of China, Japan and South Korea in Kuala Lumpur in 2006 suggests that the

ASEAN approach of using such opportunities to maintain informal contact even in the midst

of bilateral differences has not yet percolated to Northeast Asians. Nevertheless, the issue of

the Japanese lack of atonement for World War Two is one that resonates around the region,

22 For background on Sino-Japanese relations, see Ming Wan, Sino-Japanese Relations: Interaction, Logic, and Transformation, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006. 23 See Melissa G. Curley and Nicholas Thomas (Eds.), Advancing East Asian Regionalism, London: Routledge, 2007. For background on China and Japan’s competitive bids for regional leadership, see Peter Drysdale, “Regional Cooperation in East Asia and FTA Strategies”, Pacific Economic Papers No. 344 (2005); Mireya Solis, “How Japan’s Economic Class Views China and the Future of Asian Regionalism”, JIIA Policy Report, July 2006.

11

especially in Korea, and could lead to Japan’s isolation. In this context, Japan’s renewed

commitment to its bilateral alliance relationship with the United States contrasts with the

uncertainties over South Korea’s attachment to its alliance with the United States. Indeed,

there is even a body of opinion within the present South Korean administration that regards a

continued U.S. presence as destabilizing and undermining the prospects of re-unification with

North Korea.24

Rise of India

While attention has focused on the rise of China and its impact on relationships in East Asia,

the emergence of India is now attracting increased attention and there is growing concern

over the possibility of strategic competition between China and India and its possible impact

on the region.25 Firstly, in May 1998, India justified its series of underground nuclear tests by

referring to the Chinese threat to India and China’s assistance in Pakistan’s nuclear weapons

programme. Although India subsequently toned down its rhetoric and asserted that it did not

regard China as a threat—and there have been a series of high-level exchanges—Sino-Indian

competition remains an undercurrent in the interactions of both states with Central Asia and

Southeast Asia. Secondly, while most analysts earlier saw India as a stagnant economy, the

transformation of the Indian economy in the past decade has led to India’s current ranking as

one of the world’s top 10 economies and predictions that India will emerge as the third

largest economy by 2050, after China and the United States. Thirdly, while considerable

progress has been made in resolving competing Sino-Indian boundary claims, there remain

substantive differences between the two sides and the claims can be revived whenever there

are bilateral issues between the two parties. Fourthly, the burgeoning U.S.-India relationship

has highlighted the use of balancing strategies by these two powers. The strengthening of

India-U.S. relations and the highlighting of their shared democratic heritage contrasts with

U.S. congressional criticism of the Chinese political system and U.S. wariness of China’s

growing economic capabilities. This has reinforced China’s concern that a new U.S.

24 For more on the changing U.S.-South Korea alliance, see Choe, Sang-Hun, “Roh Warns US Over North Korea”, International Herald Tribune, 26 January 2006, pp. 1. Also see David I. Steinberg (Ed.), Korean Attitudes Toward the United States: Changing Dynamics, M. E. Sharpe, 2004; Derek J. Mitchell (Ed.), Strategy and Sentiment: South Korean Views of the United States and the US-ROK Alliance, available at www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/0406mitchell.pdf, accessed in June 2004. 25 See C. Raja Mohan, Impossible Allies: Nuclear India, United States and the Global Order, New Delhi: India Research Press, 2006. Also see C. Raja Mohan, Crossing the Rubicon: The Shaping of India’s New Foreign Policy, New Delhi: Penguin, 2003; Jing-dong Yuan, “The Dragon and the Elephant: Chinese-Indian Relations in the 21st Century”, The Washington Quarterly Vol. 30 No. 3, pp. 131–144.

12

“containment strategy” aimed at isolating China and preventing the rise of China while

promoting U.S. alliance relationships with a rising India is being developed.

The Washington Consensus versus the Beijing Consensus

The renewed self-confidence in East Asia today and the awareness that the era of U.S. pre-

eminence in East Asia is drawing to a close is likely to give rise to revived debates over the

validity of claims for an Asian model of development and the significance of Asian values in

shaping Asian responses to global and regional developments. Since the demise of the Soviet

Union and the emergence of the United States as the sole superpower in the 1990s, attention

has been drawn to the existence of a Washington Consensus in favour of elected

democracies, the sanctity of individual political and civil rights, support for human rights, the

promotion of free trade and open markets, and the recognition of doctrines of humanitarian

intervention.26 However, the rise of China and a revival of confidence in Asia’s growth

paradigm is likely to see the articulation of a case for a Beijing Consensus founded on the

leadership role of the authoritarian party state, a technocratic approach to governance, the

significance of social rights and obligations, a reassertion of the principles of national

sovereignty and non-interference, coupled with support for freer markets, and stronger

regional and international institutions.

So far, these views have been presented by Chinese scholars such as Liu Xuecheng27

and Zhang Yunling28 as well as former policymakers such as Qin Huasun29 in debates at

academic conferences and Track 2 institutions such as the Network of East Asian Think-

Tanks and the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP). Growing

Chinese self-confidence will lead in the coming decade to the articulation of Chinese

26 For more on the Washington Consensus, see John Williamson. “Development and the ‘Washington Consensus’”, World Development Vol. 21, pp. 1239–1336; Daniel Yergin and Joseph Stainslaw, The Commanding Heights: The Battle for the World Economy, New York: Free Press, 2002; Thomas Friedman, The Lexus and the Olive Tree, New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1999; John Williamson. “Did the Washington Consensus Fail?”, Outline of Remarks at CSIS, Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, 6 November 2002. However, Williamson and other proponents used this term to describe a set of economic policies, including “macro-economic discipline, a market economy and openness to the world (at least in respect of trade and FDI)”. Its critics, including Joseph Stiglitz (see Joseph Stiglitz, Globalization and its Discontents, New York: W.W. Norton, 2002) contended that these neo-liberal economic policies were imposed by the Washington-based financial institutions on developing countries in the 1990s. However, I am broadening the use of the term “Washington Consensus” to highlight the political agenda favoured by Washington in its interactions with developing countries. 27 Liu Xuecheng, Senior Fellow and Director, Division of American Studies, China Institute of International Studies. 28 Zhang Yunling, Director, Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. 29 Qin Huasun, former Chinese Permanent Representative to the United Nations; and Chairman, CSCAP-China, between 2001 and 2005.

13

perspectives on the structure of international society and the norms and values underpinning

international order. The Asian financial and economic crisis of 1997–1998 led to the collapse

of the earlier debate on Asian values, which had reflected the economic rise of East Asian

states and whose leading voices were Lee Kuan Yew, former Prime Minister of Singapore,

and Mahathir bin Mohamad, then Prime Minister of Malaysia, as well as intellectuals in

Malaysia and Singapore who moved comfortably between the academic, think-tank and

policymaking world such as Nordin Sopiee, Tommy Koh and Kishore Mahbubani.30 The new

debate is likely to reflect the changing power relations within East Asia as well as highlight

alternative views on the appropriate ways and means of ordering societies and different

understandings of the role and function of regional and international institutions. U.S.

triumphalism with the end of the Cold War and the emergence of the United States as the sole

superpower have led to increasingly unilateralist behaviour by the United States, culminating

in the series of decisions that led to the U.S. invasion and subsequent quagmire in Iraq. As the

United States has become increasingly introverted and both the U.S. Administration and its

critics have focused on how to extricate the United States from Iraq without the loss of its

standing in the Middle East and the world, less attention has been paid to other areas of the

world such as East Asia. The frenzied pace of establishing new regional institutions in the

Asia Pacific has therefore proceeded with minimal American involvement.

China’s increasingly active role in regional forums such as the SCO, ASEAN Plus

Three (APT) and future Northeast Asian institutional structures suggests that Chinese

participants will attempt to focus these new institutions on regional cooperative security and

economic development rather than human security. Just as Western dominance in the past

century has led to Western ideas shaping international institutions and global values, Asian

leaders and Asian thinkers will increasingly participate in and shape the global discourse,

30See Daniel A. Bell. East Meets West, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000. Also see Alan Chong, “Singaporean Foreign Policy and the Asian Values Debate, 1992–2000: Reflections on an Experiment in Soft Power”, The Pacific Review Vol. 17 No. 1 (March 2004), pp. 95–133. Nordin Sopiee, “The Development of an East Asian Consciousness”, in G. Sheridan (Ed.), Living with Dragons: Australia Confronts its Asian Destiny, Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1995. Kishore Mahbubani, “The Pacific Way”, Foreign Affairs Vol. 74 No. 1 (Jan/Feb 1995); Tommy Koh, “Does East Asia Stand for Any Positive Values?”, International Herald Tribune, 11–12 December 1993. Tommy Koh, “The 10 Values Which Undergird East Asian Strength and Success”, International Herald Tribune, 11–12 December 1993, pp. 6. See also the comments of Lee Kuan Yew, “Society vs. the Individual”, Time, 14 June 1993; Fareed Zakaria, “Culture Is Destiny: A Conversation with Lee Kuan Yew”, Foreign Affairs Vol. 73 No. 2 (1994); Mahathir Mohamad’s address at the Asia Pacific Management Forum on Asian Values and International Respect, available at www.apmforum.com/news/apmn21.htm, 21 May 1996.

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whether it is on the role of international institutions, the rules governing international trade or

the doctrines which under-gird responses to humanitarian crises. The argument that there is

an emerging Beijing Consensus is not premised on the rise of the “East” and decline of the

“West”, as sometimes seemed to be the sub-text of the earlier Asian-values debate. However,

like the Asian-values debate, this new debate reflects alternative philosophical traditions. The

issue is the appropriate balance between the rights of the individual and those of the state.

What is significant for the purposes of our analysis is that this emerging debate will highlight

the shared identity and shared values between China and the states in the region, even if

conventional analysis suggests that realist perspectives a la Mearsheimer will result in

“intense security competition with considerable potential for war” in which most of China’s

neighbours “will join with the United States to contain China’s power”.31 These shared

values are likely to reduce the risk of conflict and result in regional pressure for an

accommodation with China and the adoption of policies of engagement with China, rather

than confrontation with an emerging China. At the same time, the awareness in the region of

the emerging norms in international organizations and international society is leading to

greater attention to individual rights and liberties. The evolution in regional thinking on the

balance between individual rights and social obligations is seen most clearly in the current

move to adopt an ASEAN Charter. Whereas ASEAN had resolutely emphasized sovereignty,

non-intervention and non-interference in the internal affairs of states since its inception in

1967, the Kuala Lumpur Declaration on the establishment of the ASEAN Charter of 12

December 2005 called inter alia for the promotion of democracy, human rights and

obligations, transparency and good governance and the strengthening democratic

institutions.32

One test of this perspective will be the regional handling of the recalcitrant Burmese

(Myanmar) leadership’s lack of commitment to the restoration of democracy and the

upholding of human rights.33 While the United States continues to lead the opposition to

Burma’s participation in trans-Pacific institutions, maintains its embargo on Burma and calls

for Burma to be referred to the UN Security Council as a threat to peace and security in the

31 Mearsheimer, “China’s Unpeaceful Rise”, op. cit., p. 160 32 See Kuala Lumpur Declaration on the East Asia Summit, Kuala Lumpur, 14 December 2005, available at www.aseansec.org/18098.htm (2005). 33 See Tin Maung Maung, “Myanmar: Challenges Galore but Opposition Fails”; and Bruce Matthew, “Myanmar’s Human and Economic Crisis and Its Regional Implications”, in Daljit Singh and Lorraine C. Salazr (Eds), Southeast Asian Affairs 2006, Singapore: ISEAS, 2006, for recent developments in Myanmar. Also see Christopher B. Roberts, “Myanmar and the Argument for Engagement: A Clash of Contending Moralities?”, IDSS Working Paper No. 108 (2006).

15

region, Burma has strengthened its bilateral political and economic relationships with China,

India and Thailand, and forms part of a significant caucus within ASEAN composed of

Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos and Burma. These regional relationships allow Burma to ignore

pressures from the West, even for symbolic liberalization measures such as the release from

house detention of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi. The perceived threat from the United States,

improbable as it may seem to nearly everyone other than the Burmese leadership, has resulted

in Myanmar’s recent decision in April 2007 to restore diplomatic relations with North Korea

(DPRK), which had been broken off in 1982 following a DPRK commando attack on the

South Korean President and his entourage during a state visit to Rangoon (Yangon).34 It is

also the rationale for the otherwise inexplicable decision to move the Burmese capital to

Pyinmana (now known as Naypyitaw or Abode of Kings).

The patience of older ASEAN members is now being tested, especially after Burma’s

lack of progress on its commitments to implement its road map for democracy.

The United States and Asian Regionalism

The U.S. pre-occupation with the war on terror, an unpopular occupation in Iraq and its

unilateralist approach to international institutions during the tenure of the George W. Bush

Administration has provided an opportunity for China, the rising power in the region, to

strengthen its relationships in the region. To say that the Southeast Asian states wish China to

rise as an active and benign actor in the region is not to imply that they desire a concomitant

American retreat. Nor do they want other states like Australia, India, Japan and South Korea

to be marginalized. Rather, as evidenced by ASEAN’s efforts at the ARF and ASEAN Plus

Three dialogues, there is an active engagement policy mounted by ASEAN towards countries

such as the United States, India, Japan and South Korea.35

The interesting feature is the contrasting U.S. and Chinese strategies with regard to,

on the one hand, the APT and the EAS and, on the other, the ARF and APEC. The first two

clearly reflect the values and the preferences of China partly because they exclude the United

States while the last two are now preferred by the Bush Administration. Chinese diplomacy

has been much more successful in recent years and the Americans are only now trying to

catch up by offering an alternative model to institution building by refocusing their efforts on

34 See Seth Mydans, “North Korea and Myanmar Restore Diplomatic Ties”, International Herald Tribune, 26 April 2007. 35 For more on ASEAN’s external relations, see ASEAN Secretariat’s website. External Relations, available at www.aseansec.org/4918.htm. Also see N. Ganesan, “ASEAN's Relations with Major External Powers”, Contemporary Southeast Asia Vol. 22, 2000. pp. 258–278.

16

ASEAN, the ARF and APEC. This urgency is perhaps the result of a realization that the

process of institution building will take place with or without the United States. This is in

sharp contrast to the early 1990s when the United States still had a kind of “veto power” on

this issue and U.S. objections led to the successful effort in blocking Malaysian Prime

Minister Mahathir Mohamad’s initiative to establish an East Asian Economic Grouping

(EAEG) that excluded the United States, Australia and New Zealand.

Nevertheless, it should be noted that there has been a more consistent approach

towards the development of bilateral relations during the term of President George W. Bush.

One of the hallmarks has been the mature military relationship between the United States and

a host of Southeast Asian states, including Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand.

Manila and Bangkok were accorded Major Non-NATO Allies status by Washington in 2003,

and furnished significant aid relief. International Military Education and Training (IMET) ties

with Indonesia were restored in March 2005 and the embargo on military sales lifted.36

Singapore led the signing of bilateral trade and economic agreements with a host of

significant trading partners, including the United States, Australia, Japan, South Korea and

India. These agreements led other regional states such as Malaysia, Thailand and the

Philippines to embark on similar negotiations, especially as the Doha Round of WTO

negotiations did not seem to be making headway.37 The result has been a lattice framework

of interconnected bilateral and multilateral ties that may go some way towards reducing the

possibility of conflict among the major powers, and between the regional states for spheres of

influence. Underlying this approach is the view that with more complex economically

interdependent relations and with greater stakes in the established order, the regional states

and the major powers will find it less in their interest to engage in military adventurism.

However, this trend in the region has also resulted in East Asia’s changing role within

international institutions. Once a defender of multilateral trade liberalization in the WTO and

a critic of the trend towards regional trading arrangements exemplified by the establishment

of the European Union and NAFTA, East Asia has witnessed a rash of regional and bilateral

trading arrangements since 2000. Japan and India have sought permanent membership to the

UN Security Council, whose permanent membership still reflects the power relationships at

36 For more on U.S. Military arrangements, see Quadrennial Defense Review, 2006. Also see Stanley Foundation, “Political Islam and Counterterrorism in Southeast Asia: An Agenda for US Policy”, Policy Bulletin (2003). For more on U.S.-Indonesia relations, see Bruce Vaughn, “Indonesia: Domestic Politics, Strategic Dynamics and American Interests”, CRS Report for Congress, 2006, available at www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL32394.pdf. 37 For more on regional free-trade agreements, see Barry Desker, “In Defence of FTAs: From purity to pragmatism in East Asia”, The Pacific Review Vol. 17 Issue 1, March 2004, pp. 3–26.

17

the end of World War Two. Ironically, it is China, already a member of the Security Council,

that has been most reluctant to expand the Council to include these regional states. East Asian

states have also been pushing for greater representation in global financial institutions such as

the International Monetary Fund (IMF), especially as the perceived failure of the IMF during

the Asian financial and economic crisis of 1997–1998 is deemed to be a consequence of the

lack of adequate Asian representation within the IMF and Washington’s focus on free capital

markets. Larger representation in the IMF is seen as an appropriate response to Asia’s

increasing share of global wealth as China, for example, has a smaller share of the IMF’s

weighted vote than the combined vote of Belgium and the Netherlands.

East Asian Community

A new initiative, which may potentially exclude the United States, is crystallizing. The

inauguration of the East Asia Summit (EAS) on 14 December 2005 in Kuala Lumpur was a

historic event.38 The EAS was held at a time when East Asia has been displaying a new

vitality following its recovery from the 1997–1998 Asian economic crisis. More importantly,

the EAS seems to have reconfigured existing security alignments. The summit brought

together the ASEAN states, China, India, Japan, South Korea, as well as Australia and New

Zealand into an Asian regional grouping—with Russia also sending an observer.

This broader inclusive identity is likely to exist simultaneously and compete with an

exclusive East Asian Community (EAC) comprising the ASEAN Ten plus China, Japan and

South Korea.39 Its emergence is somewhat accidental. In Vientiane last year, Prime Minister

Abdullah Badawi of Malaysia offered to host an East Asian Summit involving the ASEAN

Ten Plus Three. Premier Wen Jiabao of China offered to host the second summit. If this

occurred, the centre of gravity would move away from Southeast to Northeast Asia, an

unwelcome development from an ASEAN perspective. This led to a desire to include other

states that had substantial interactions with the region. The participation of India, Australia

and New Zealand was seen as ensuring that ASEAN remained at the centre of any emerging

East Asian community. India was also perceived as a balance to China. Indonesia, for

example, sought to avoid aligning with China while retaining friendly ties to other powers

such as the United States—a classic “hedging” strategy. 38 See Kuala Lumpur Declaration on the East Asia Summit, Kuala Lumpur, 14 December 2005, available at www.aseansec.org/18098.htm (2005). 39 See Termsak Chalermpalanupap, “Towards an East Asian Community: The Journey has Begun”, presented at the Fifth China-ASEAN Research Institutes Roundtable on Regionalism and Community Building in East Asia, organized by The University of Hong Kong’s Centre of Asian Studies, October 2002, available at www.aseansec.org/13202.htm.

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Conspicuous by its absence at the East Asian Summit was the United States, which

remains distracted by its commitment in Iraq. The United States is unlikely to participate in

the EAS as long as it is unwilling to accede to ASEAN’s Treaty of Amity and Cooperation. It

is uncertain whether the United States will ignore the next summit or act as a spoiler. What

will emerge from these developments is ambiguous. What is less vague is that Asia’s security

architecture is undergoing profound changes. The U.S. hub-and-spoke model of the Cold War

is not the only organizing principle and the emerging regional institutions in the Asia Pacific

will be an increasing significant factor.

While the EAC offers a “closed”, exclusive model of East Asian regionalism, the

EAS adopts an “open”, inclusive model. The EAC is based on a model of participation by

contiguous states (known as ASEAN Plus Three in ASEAN circles but as the 10+3 in

Chinese reports, reflecting China’s preference to handle relations with ASEAN states on a

bilateral basis). The EAC is therefore likely to be dominated by China over time. This

consideration has been an important factor, accounting for Japanese support for the

establishment of a broader EAS. From the perspective of the future regional security

architecture of the Asia Pacific, the multiple regional structures emerging in East Asia

therefore enable balancing strategies to be adopted, even as there is a conscious effort to build

a regional community and stronger regional institutions.

In the light of my earlier discussion on the emergence of a Beijing Consensus that will

rival the Washington Consensus on the norms and values governing regional organizations

and international society, I would argue that these divergent values lead to very different

institutions. We should therefore recognize that regional institutions function both as

diplomatic instruments capable of mitigating some of the differences that exist between

China and the United States as well as avenues where these different values compete and are

played out. The Chinese emphasis is on an East Asian regionalism that excludes the United

States (which is not part of East Asia) rather than Asia-Pacific regionalism—multi-polarity

rather than multilateralism—and essentially the application of uncontested and standard UN

Charter principles to East Asia. The Chinese focus is on the EAC framework accompanied by

a preference for the management of relations through bilateral linkages. In contrast, the

United States prefers institutions set in the wider Asia-Pacific context (the ARF and APEC

come to mind) and primarily as complementary diplomatic instruments to its system of

bilateral military alliances, especially its core alliance with Japan—institutions that are thus

not expected by Washington to pose a threat to its uni-polarity but rather to consolidate it.

These different values and strategies are present in the very regional institutions currently

19

being established in the Asia Pacific, making the clash of norms and values quite possible. I

would argue that the role of mitigating these differences and shaping a coherent synthesis

could therefore be played by smaller states in the region. This provides ASEAN and Australia

with an opportunity to shape the emerging regional security architecture and to ameliorate the

risks of a clash of cultures or a clash of civilizations.40

Implications for Australia

How will Australia adjust to the profound changes in the Asia-Pacific security architecture?

What role will Australia play in the nascent and evolving regional institutions of the Asia

Pacific? How will Australia adapt to a regional environment with China as the rising power?

From an Australian perspective, ties of history, military alliance relationships, shared norms

and values as well as excellent informal relationships bind Australia and the United States.

However, Australia’s growing trade and economic relationship with China will lead Australia

to minimize the possibility of U.S. conflict with China and to advocate increasing

engagement with China. The EAS, the APEC forum41 and the ARF provide the major points

of Australian access into the process of regional institution building. While some members of

the APT favour substantive cooperation in the APT forum with the EAS serving as a

sounding board and opportunity for the exchange of views, Australia, together with India and

New Zealand, will probably support efforts to expand the role of the EAS beyond a forum for

the exchange of views. However, it is unlikely that the EAS will emerge in the near future as

the key institution for the structuring of regional relationships because China, in particular, is

likely to resist efforts by other members to implement proposals for functional cooperation

within the EAS structure. One approach could be to encourage the EAS to engage in

confidence building by providing an informal opportunity for national leaders to exchange

views and to share frank assessments based on a targeted agenda within an informal setting.

Australia is uniquely placed to play this role because of its active involvement in the

Commonwealth Heads of Government Meetings, which adopt this model and have been

successful in retaining continued active participation of presidents and prime ministers of its

members, even though the Commonwealth is not seen by most of its members as a relevant

or significant institution.

40 See Samuel P. Huntington. The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order , New York: Simon & Schuster, 1997. For contrasting views, see Foreign Affairs Vol. 72, Issue 4, September/October 1993. 41 For information on APEC, see Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation website, www.apecsec.org.sg/

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What about APEC and the ARF? As approximately 70 per cent of Australian trade is

with the APEC economies and APEC members account for eight out of Australia’s ten

leading trade partners, it would appear logical for Australia to have an interest in revitalizing

APEC and creating a linkage between APEC and the ARF. These two regional institutions

could be developed as the key to a strategy designed to engage the United States and China.

Australia’s hosting of the 2007 APEC Leaders’ Meeting provides an opportunity to exercise

leadership in the forum on a range of issues including strengthening the institutionalized

mechanisms for APEC cooperation, developing an agenda for functional cooperation and

trade facilitation.

Australia could encourage APEC and the ARF to focus on non-traditional security

issues such as the impact of international terrorism, trans-national organized crime,

pandemics, natural disasters, climate change, the environment, energy issues, the smuggling

of persons, drugs and goods across international borders, and the consequences of economic

crises such as the 1997–1998 Asian Financial Crisis. Interestingly, while security analysts

call for an expansion of the security agenda within organizations such as the ARF to include

non-traditional or human security issues, these same issues form part of the wider agenda

promoted by trade negotiators through institutions such as APEC. It is noteworthy that APEC

already has directors responsible for non-traditional security issues such as counter-terrorism

and infectious diseases. It has also begun discussions on issues such as supply-chain security,

maritime security, energy and the environment.42 Through its chairmanship, Australia is

poised to lead the way in advancing these new initiatives within APEC as well as proposing

new areas of activity such as APEC cooperation on climate change issues.

There is a significant change in attitudes towards the environment and climate change

in the APEC region, particularly in East Asia, where this issue is no longer seen as an issue of

developed countries versus developing countries but as one that affects the security of their

own citizens. An APEC initiative on the environment and climate change would therefore be

timely. The United States and China are the leading global emitters of carbon dioxide,

followed by Indonesia.43 Carbon dioxide emissions in East Asia will rise rapidly over the

next two decades. The APEC Leaders’ Meeting could promote the adoption of policies aimed

at encouraging the efficient use of energy in the APEC region. However, the Kyoto approach

42 See APEC, “Bangkok Declaration on Partnership for the Future”, Bangkok, Thailand, 21 October 2003, available at www.apecssn.org/data/file/1(10).pdf. 43 If CO2 emissions from peatland are included, Indonesia would be the third largest CO2 emitter globally, as cited by a Wetlands International report on peatland emissions in November 2006, see www.wetlands.org/publication.aspx?ID=d67b5c30-2b07-435c-9366-c20aa597839b

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of prescriptive, legally binding obligations will be resisted in East Asia. An approach which

focuses on changing the norms and obtaining consensual agreements is much more likely to

succeed. This is where an APEC initiative could be effective as it would mark a move away

from the Kyoto model and bring on board China, Indonesia as well as the United States. My

contention is that as APEC’s programme for early, voluntary sectoral liberalization has

stalled, APEC leaders will advance a security agenda at APEC meetings, albeit focusing on

non-traditional security issues, as security discussions provide substance to the annual APEC

Leaders’ Meeting, even though economists criticize the move away from an economic focus.

It should be, however, noted that one defect of APEC as an anchor in the emerging regional

security architecture is the inclusion of Latin American states that are irrelevant to the process

of Asia-Pacific institution building and which are focused on the different concerns and

agenda of the Latin American region.

However, given East Asia’s emerging cooperative security architecture and the

absence of the United States from the key emerging institutions, it would be in the Australian

interest to support a larger role for APEC, especially if Australia seeks to move beyond its

treaty relationship with the United States while maintaining a close association with the

United States. Such a revitalized APEC need not be competitive with the EAS or EAC but

complementary. The overlapping membership of these institutions includes a core that brings

together key hubs in the Asia Pacific. A related initiative would be for an agreement on

meetings at the summit level of members of the ARF once in every three years when APEC

is hosted by an ASEAN member.44 Although the ARF is the primary institution discussing

regional and multilateral security issues, it has been marginalized because it is primarily an

institution serving foreign ministers and has only recently begun to meet at the level of senior

officials in defence ministries . In this context, an important issue is whether APEC should

continue the current moratorium on new members, even as India keeps knocking on the door.

From an Australian perspective, given the emergence of India as a regional and global power,

political support for India’s participation in APEC would be a demonstration of the seismic

shift in regional relationships with the end of the Cold War and the rise of China and India.

Similarly, support for the holding of summit level meetings of the ASEAN-led ARF would

signify Australian support for the creation and upgrading of regional institutions in the Asia

Pacific at a time when the strategic balance in the region is evolving, while reinforcing

Australia’s close ties with ASEAN.

44 See Barry Desker, “Is the ARF Obsolete? Three Moves to Avoid Irrelevance”, IDSS Commentaries (2006).

22

APEC members such as Australia—with an interest in maintaining the momentum of

multilateral WTO trade negotiations—could also push for a renewed emphasis in APEC on

trade liberalization. If the United States and China took the lead in proposing a multilateral

APEC free trade agreement under GATT Article XXIV among countries and customs

territories interested in opening markets across the board, it would help to re-shape the

substance and atmospherics of international trade negotiations. The focus would shift away

from free trade agreements (FTAs) while providing the necessary pressure on the European

Union, the United States and the major developing countries to conclude negotiations in the

current stalled Doha Round of WTO negotiations. Politically, it could be the imaginative

approach necessary to create a new foreign-policy opening between the current global

hegemon, the United States, and the world's rising power, China. Such an alignment would

assist in ensuring the peaceful development of China and prevent the emergence of new great

power conflicts by creating binding interests. If a new concert of interests can be created

between the United States and China, it is possible that China’s emergence, like that of the

United States at the end of the nineteenth century, when Britain was the global hegemon,

could take place within the framework of a rule-based international system willing to

accommodate the emergence of new global powers with shared interests in the maintenance

of global peace and stability.

Implications for CISS

The contours of this analysis provide an indication of some of the advantages arising from the

establishment of the new Centre of International Security Studies (CISS), with its focus on

“real world problems”. The academic discipline of International Relations (IR), which

increasingly focuses on understanding phenomena, has difficulty in addressing the concerns

of the policymaker, which are generally focused on problem solving. Exposure to scholarly

efforts aimed at understanding complicated issues from different perspectives is healthy for

policymakers. It provides an intellectual menu that may enlighten the policymaker and force

him or her to look beyond implicit assumptions. Unfortunately, policymakers tend to view

the current debate among intellectual schools of thought within IR over definitions,

methodologies, epistemologies, etc. as an arid debate unlikely to be helpful in clarifying or

providing solutions to global or regional problems, especially when scholars appear to argue

from within the intellectual traditions of realism, liberalism and constructivism respectively,

as well as other variants such as the post-modernist, feminist, world systems and similar

theoretical schools of thought. From a policymaker’s perspective, depending on the situation

23

that one is in, it is quite possible that the same individual would be realist in some

circumstances, supporting a balance of power between contending states, and an advocate of

international and regional institutions in others and be keenly interested in the development

of norms in the international community which would create the conditions for a stable

peace. CISS and similar efforts to bridge the gap between academic analysis and the policy

world can help by drawing attention to the existence of a corpus of intellectual activity within

the discipline of international relations designed to provide a methodological toolbox

available to policymakers, just as such a centre should tap the mind sets and methodologies

taught in business or engineering schools as well as the experience of practitioners in fields as

diverse as biological and environmental science, public health and energy economics, which

may provide insights helpful in resolving emerging problems.45

The research agenda of CISS and similar institutions must go beyond the analysis of

traditional security issues, which was the focus of research during the Cold War. The risk of

war between states in the Asia Pacific is lower today than it was 30 years ago. Symmetric

force-on-force threats that were feared during the Cold War are less likely now, although

these still exist in the background. Instead, asymmetric threats such as climate change, trans-

national terrorism, trans-national organized crime, pandemics and natural resource shocks

have regularly hit the headlines. Asymmetric threats are the current focus of attention,

especially in the light of the Iraq War experience, SARS and the 2004 tsunami, and will

remain so for the foreseeable future—unless one of the great powers attempts to radically

realign the system. The vagueness of asymmetric threats is, in part, what makes them so

unpredictable and unmanageable.

Research centres such as CISS can play a useful role because in an asymmetric threat

environment, knowledge—not simply power—is the key. In order to mitigate the effects of

these threats, we must first understand them. We already know the basic answers for many

intelligence and national-security problems. They are increased diversity, greater networking

and integration of information and intelligence at the frontlines. Given the kind of multi-

dimensional challenges that states and corporations face today, leaders and decision-makers

require actionable knowledge to operate effectively in a rapidly changing and complex

international environment. They must be prepared to meet a range of conventional and

asymmetric threats. Frankly, this task will not be easy. One of the recurrent aspects of human 45 I stressed the need to close the gap between scholars and policymakers in an earlier article. See Barry Desker, “Creating a Dialogue: Are Scholars from Mars and Policy-Makers from Venus?”, Australian Journal of International Affairs Vol. 59 No. 3 (September 2005), pp. 269–274.

24

history is the persistence of strategic surprises such as Pearl Harbour, 9/11, the Asian

Financial Crisis and the SARS crisis. The taproots of these intelligence failures are almost

always the lack of information sharing among government agencies as well as business

corporations. It is commonly referred to as “stove piping” or “silos”. Most of us also have

rigid mindsets that can only parochially perceive information with one fixed frame of

cognitive lenses. The risk is greater the longer we are in organizations, as we are socialized

into appropriate corporate moulds.46 One thing is clear: the traditional responses and

mechanisms of national intelligence and security agencies, of corporate strategic intelligence

and planning divisions as well as non-governmental organizations are not enough. CISS and

similar institutions can contribute to improving the process of policymaking and facilitating

problem solving by detecting “faint” signals through networking and linking governmental

and private agencies; encouraging the adoption of a “whole-of-government” and “whole-of-

organization” approach; and fostering shared and informed analysis based on methodological

diversity. This could lead decision-makers to have greater foresight and should reduce the

risk of strategic surprises.

As a graduate teaching programme, a successful centre would have made its mark if it

produced graduates with a multi-disciplinary, policy-oriented and multi-cultural orientation.

It would be part of a new trend towards the establishment of professional schools and centres

of international affairs and security studies, a trend that is more advanced in the United States

but is beginning to make inroads into Europe and East Asia. The S. Rajaratnam School of

International Studies, to which I belong, is part of this new approach aimed at developing a

generation of decision-makers outside academia with an exposure both to academic theories

and experience of the new issues shaping international affairs as well as training academics as

comfortable with the real world as they are with theories of international security.

Just as new regional multilateral institutions are being established at the inter-

governmental level and there has been an explosion in Track 2 diplomacy47 involving

academics, think-tank analysts, journalists and former policymakers, there are new networks

of research institutes and think tanks in the Asia-Pacific region that are examining non-

traditional security (NTS) issues. My own institution leads a consortium of 14 institutions in

Asia aimed at increasing the networking among scholars and analysts working on NTS issues

in the region, promoting capacity building in this field and sharing information and 46 Thomas Quiggan, Seeing the Invisible: National Security Intelligence in an Uncertain Age, Singapore: World Scientific, 2007. 47 For more on Track 2 Diplomacy in the Asian context, see the entry for “Track Two” in David Capie and Paul Evans, The Asia-Pacific Security Lexicon, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2002, pp. 213–216.

25

knowledge so that each of our societies can respond better to emerging non-traditional

security challenges. We also participate actively in the Network of East Asian Think-Tanks

(NEAT), which is a recognized Track 2 institution linked to the APT process, and CSCAP,

which provides analytical support for the ARF and has effective Australian representation. In

the longer run, such networks can help to build epistemic communities with shared values

and shared understandings. The participation of CISS in these networks will provide new

opportunities for Australian engagement with an emerging Asia-Pacific region. Such an

engagement would be critical for Australia’s future security. As I have highlighted in this

analysis, Asia’s security architecture is undergoing profound changes and Australian analysts

should be alert to signals of emerging trends in the region, just as Australian policymakers

and business leaders will have to be agile while navigating the more fluid Asia-Pacific

strategic environment. A willingness to adapt, change and be open to more diverse

approaches will be the key to success in this new environment.

26

IDSS Working Paper Series

1. Vietnam-China Relations Since The End of The Cold War Ang Cheng Guan

(1998)

2. Multilateral Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific Region: Prospects and Possibilities Desmond Ball

(1999)

3. Reordering Asia: “Cooperative Security” or Concert of Powers? Amitav Acharya

(1999)

4. The South China Sea Dispute re-visited Ang Cheng Guan

(1999)

5. Continuity and Change In Malaysian Politics: Assessing the Buildup to the 1999-2000 General Elections Joseph Liow Chin Yong

(1999)

6. ‘Humanitarian Intervention in Kosovo’ as Justified, Executed and Mediated by NATO: Strategic Lessons for Singapore Kumar Ramakrishna

(2000)

7. Taiwan’s Future: Mongolia or Tibet? Chien-peng (C.P.) Chung

(2001)

8. Asia-Pacific Diplomacies: Reading Discontinuity in Late-Modern Diplomatic Practice Tan See Seng

(2001)

9. Framing “South Asia”: Whose Imagined Region? Sinderpal Singh

(2001)

10. Explaining Indonesia's Relations with Singapore During the New Order Period: The Case of Regime Maintenance and Foreign Policy Terence Lee Chek Liang

(2001)

11. Human Security: Discourse, Statecraft, Emancipation Tan See Seng

(2001)

12. Globalization and its Implications for Southeast Asian Security: A Vietnamese Perspective Nguyen Phuong Binh

(2001)

13. Framework for Autonomy in Southeast Asia’s Plural Societies Miriam Coronel Ferrer

(2001)

14. Burma: Protracted Conflict, Governance and Non-Traditional Security Issues Ananda Rajah

(2001)

15. Natural Resources Management and Environmental Security in Southeast Asia: Case Study of Clean Water Supplies in Singapore Kog Yue Choong

(2001)

16. Crisis and Transformation: ASEAN in the New Era Etel Solingen

(2001)

17. Human Security: East Versus West? Amitav Acharya

(2001)

18. Asian Developing Countries and the Next Round of WTO Negotiations Barry Desker

(2001)

19. Multilateralism, Neo-liberalism and Security in Asia: The Role of the Asia Pacific Economic Co-operation Forum Ian Taylor

(2001)

20. Humanitarian Intervention and Peacekeeping as Issues for Asia-Pacific Security Derek McDougall

(2001)

21. Comprehensive Security: The South Asian Case S.D. Muni

(2002)

22. The Evolution of China’s Maritime Combat Doctrines and Models: 1949-2001 You Ji

(2002)

23. The Concept of Security Before and After September 11 a. The Contested Concept of Security Steve Smith b. Security and Security Studies After September 11: Some Preliminary Reflections Amitav Acharya

(2002)

24. Democratisation In South Korea And Taiwan: The Effect Of Social Division On Inter-Korean and Cross-Strait Relations Chien-peng (C.P.) Chung

(2002)

25. Understanding Financial Globalisation Andrew Walter

(2002)

26. 911, American Praetorian Unilateralism and the Impact on State-Society Relations in Southeast Asia Kumar Ramakrishna

(2002)

27. Great Power Politics in Contemporary East Asia: Negotiating Multipolarity or Hegemony? Tan See Seng

(2002)

28. What Fear Hath Wrought: Missile Hysteria and The Writing of “America” Tan See Seng

(2002)

29. International Responses to Terrorism: The Limits and Possibilities of Legal Control of Terrorism by Regional Arrangement with Particular Reference to ASEAN Ong Yen Nee

(2002)

30. Reconceptualizing the PLA Navy in Post – Mao China: Functions, Warfare, Arms, and Organization Nan Li

(2002)

31. Attempting Developmental Regionalism Through AFTA: The Domestics Politics – Domestic Capital Nexus Helen E S Nesadurai

(2002)

32. 11 September and China: Opportunities, Challenges, and Warfighting Nan Li

(2002)

33. Islam and Society in Southeast Asia after September 11 Barry Desker

(2002)

34. Hegemonic Constraints: The Implications of September 11 For American Power Evelyn Goh

(2002)

35. Not Yet All Aboard…But Already All At Sea Over Container Security Initiative Irvin Lim

(2002)

36. Financial Liberalization and Prudential Regulation in East Asia: Still Perverse? Andrew Walter

(2002)

37. Indonesia and The Washington Consensus Premjith Sadasivan

(2002)

38. The Political Economy of FDI Location: Why Don’t Political Checks and Balances and Treaty Constraints Matter? Andrew Walter

(2002)

39. The Securitization of Transnational Crime in ASEAN Ralf Emmers

(2002)

40. Liquidity Support and The Financial Crisis: The Indonesian Experience J Soedradjad Djiwandono

(2002)

41. A UK Perspective on Defence Equipment Acquisition David Kirkpatrick

(2003)

42. Regionalisation of Peace in Asia: Experiences and Prospects of ASEAN, ARF and UN Partnership Mely C. Anthony

(2003)

43. The WTO In 2003: Structural Shifts, State-Of-Play And Prospects For The Doha Round Razeen Sally

(2003)

44. Seeking Security In The Dragon’s Shadow: China and Southeast Asia In The Emerging Asian Order Amitav Acharya

(2003)

45. Deconstructing Political Islam In Malaysia: UMNO’S Response To PAS’ Religio-Political Dialectic Joseph Liow

(2003)

46. The War On Terror And The Future of Indonesian Democracy Tatik S. Hafidz

(2003)

47. Examining The Role of Foreign Assistance in Security Sector Reforms: The Indonesian Case Eduardo Lachica

(2003)

48. Sovereignty and The Politics of Identity in International Relations Adrian Kuah

(2003)

49. Deconstructing Jihad; Southeast Asia Contexts Patricia Martinez

(2003)

50. The Correlates of Nationalism in Beijing Public Opinion Alastair Iain Johnston

(2003)

51. In Search of Suitable Positions’ in the Asia Pacific: Negotiating the US-China Relationship and Regional Security Evelyn Goh

(2003)

52. American Unilaterism, Foreign Economic Policy and the ‘Securitisation’ of Globalisation Richard Higgott

(2003)

53. Fireball on the Water: Naval Force Protection-Projection, Coast Guarding, Customs Border Security & Multilateral Cooperation in Rolling Back the Global Waves of Terror from the Sea Irvin Lim

(2003)

54. Revisiting Responses To Power Preponderance: Going Beyond The Balancing-Bandwagoning Dichotomy Chong Ja Ian

(2003)

55. Pre-emption and Prevention: An Ethical and Legal Critique of the Bush Doctrine and Anticipatory Use of Force In Defence of the State Malcolm Brailey

(2003)

56. The Indo-Chinese Enlargement of ASEAN: Implications for Regional Economic Integration Helen E S Nesadurai

(2003)

57. The Advent of a New Way of War: Theory and Practice of Effects Based Operation Joshua Ho

(2003)

58. Critical Mass: Weighing in on Force Transformation & Speed Kills Post-Operation Iraqi Freedom Irvin Lim

(2004)

59. Force Modernisation Trends in Southeast Asia Andrew Tan

(2004)

60. Testing Alternative Responses to Power Preponderance: Buffering, Binding, Bonding and Beleaguering in the Real World Chong Ja Ian

(2004)

61. Outlook on the Indonesian Parliamentary Election 2004 Irman G. Lanti

(2004)

62. Globalization and Non-Traditional Security Issues: A Study of Human and Drug Trafficking in East Asia Ralf Emmers

(2004)

63. Outlook for Malaysia’s 11th General Election Joseph Liow

(2004)

64. Not Many Jobs Take a Whole Army: Special Operations Forces and The Revolution in Military Affairs. Malcolm Brailey

(2004)

65. Technological Globalisation and Regional Security in East Asia J.D. Kenneth Boutin

(2004)

66. UAVs/UCAVS – Missions, Challenges, and Strategic Implications for Small and Medium Powers Manjeet Singh Pardesi

(2004)

67. Singapore’s Reaction to Rising China: Deep Engagement and Strategic Adjustment Evelyn Goh

(2004)

68. The Shifting Of Maritime Power And The Implications For Maritime Security In East Asia Joshua Ho

(2004)

69. China In The Mekong River Basin: The Regional Security Implications of Resource Development On The Lancang Jiang Evelyn Goh

(2004)

70. Examining the Defence Industrialization-Economic Growth Relationship: The Case of Singapore Adrian Kuah and Bernard Loo

(2004)

71. “Constructing” The Jemaah Islamiyah Terrorist: A Preliminary Inquiry Kumar Ramakrishna

(2004)

72. Malaysia and The United States: Rejecting Dominance, Embracing Engagement Helen E S Nesadurai

(2004)

73. The Indonesian Military as a Professional Organization: Criteria and Ramifications for Reform John Bradford

(2005)

74. Martime Terrorism in Southeast Asia: A Risk Assessment Catherine Zara Raymond

(2005)

75. Southeast Asian Maritime Security In The Age Of Terror: Threats, Opportunity, And Charting The Course Forward John Bradford

(2005)

76. Deducing India’s Grand Strategy of Regional Hegemony from Historical and Conceptual Perspectives Manjeet Singh Pardesi

(2005)

77. Towards Better Peace Processes: A Comparative Study of Attempts to Broker Peace with MNLF and GAM S P Harish

(2005)

78. Multilateralism, Sovereignty and Normative Change in World Politics Amitav Acharya

(2005)

79. The State and Religious Institutions in Muslim Societies Riaz Hassan

(2005)

80. On Being Religious: Patterns of Religious Commitment in Muslim Societies Riaz Hassan

(2005)

81. The Security of Regional Sea Lanes Joshua Ho

(2005)

82. Civil-Military Relationship and Reform in the Defence Industry Arthur S Ding

(2005)

83. How Bargaining Alters Outcomes: Bilateral Trade Negotiations and Bargaining Strategies Deborah Elms

(2005)

84. Great Powers and Southeast Asian Regional Security Strategies: Omni-enmeshment, Balancing and Hierarchical Order Evelyn Goh

(2005)

85. Global Jihad, Sectarianism and The Madrassahs in Pakistan Ali Riaz

(2005)

86. Autobiography, Politics and Ideology in Sayyid Qutb’s Reading of the Qur’an Umej Bhatia

(2005)

87. Maritime Disputes in the South China Sea: Strategic and Diplomatic Status Quo Ralf Emmers

(2005)

88. China’s Political Commissars and Commanders: Trends & Dynamics Srikanth Kondapalli

(2005)

89. Piracy in Southeast Asia New Trends, Issues and Responses Catherine Zara Raymond

(2005)

90. Geopolitics, Grand Strategy and the Bush Doctrine Simon Dalby

(2005)

91. Local Elections and Democracy in Indonesia: The Case of the Riau Archipelago Nankyung Choi

(2005)

92. The Impact of RMA on Conventional Deterrence: A Theoretical Analysis Manjeet Singh Pardesi

(2005)

93 Africa and the Challenge of Globalisation Jeffrey Herbst

(2005)

94 The East Asian Experience: The Poverty of 'Picking Winners Barry Desker and Deborah Elms

(2005)

95 Bandung And The Political Economy Of North-South Relations: Sowing The Seeds For Revisioning International Society Helen E S Nesadurai

(2005)

96 Re-conceptualising the Military-Industrial Complex: A General Systems Theory Approach Adrian Kuah

(2005)

97 Food Security and the Threat From Within: Rice Policy Reforms in the Philippines Bruce Tolentino

(2006)

98 Non-Traditional Security Issues: Securitisation of Transnational Crime in Asia James Laki

(2006)

99 Securitizing/Desecuritizing the Filipinos’ ‘Outward Migration Issue’in the Philippines’ Relations with Other Asian Governments José N. Franco, Jr.

(2006)

100 Securitization Of Illegal Migration of Bangladeshis To India Josy Joseph

(2006)

101 Environmental Management and Conflict in Southeast Asia – Land Reclamation and its Political Impact Kog Yue-Choong

(2006)

102 Securitizing border-crossing: The case of marginalized stateless minorities in the Thai-Burma Borderlands Mika Toyota

(2006)

103 The Incidence of Corruption in India: Is the Neglect of Governance Endangering Human Security in South Asia?Shabnam Mallick and Rajarshi Sen

(2006)

104 The LTTE’s Online Network and its Implications for Regional Security Shyam Tekwani

(2006)

105 The Korean War June-October 1950: Inchon and Stalin In The “Trigger Vs Justification” Debate Tan Kwoh Jack

(2006)

106 International Regime Building in Southeast Asia: ASEAN Cooperation against the Illicit Trafficking and Abuse of Drugs Ralf Emmers

(2006)

107 Changing Conflict Identities: The case of the Southern Thailand Discord S P Harish

(2006)

108 Myanmar and the Argument for Engagement: A Clash of Contending Moralities? Christopher B Roberts

(2006)

109 TEMPORAL DOMINANCE Military Transformation and the Time Dimension of Strategy Edwin Seah

(2006)

110 Globalization and Military-Industrial Transformation in South Asia: An Historical Perspective Emrys Chew

(2006)

111 UNCLOS and its Limitations as the Foundation for a Regional Maritime Security Regime Sam Bateman

(2006)

112 Freedom and Control Networks in Military Environments Paul T Mitchell

(2006)

113 Rewriting Indonesian History The Future in Indonesia’s Past Kwa Chong Guan

(2006)

114 Twelver Shi’ite Islam: Conceptual and Practical Aspects Christoph Marcinkowski

(2006)

115 Islam, State and Modernity : Muslim Political Discourse in Late 19th and Early 20th century India Iqbal Singh Sevea

(2006)

116 ‘Voice of the Malayan Revolution’: The Communist Party of Malaya’s Struggle for Hearts and Minds in the ‘Second Malayan Emergency’ (1969-1975) Ong Wei Chong

(2006)

117 “From Counter-Society to Counter-State: Jemaah Islamiyah According to PUPJI” Elena Pavlova

(2006)

118 The Terrorist Threat to Singapore’s Land Transportation Infrastructure: A Preliminary Enquiry Adam Dolnik

(2006)

119 The Many Faces of Political Islam Mohammed Ayoob

(2006)

120 Facets of Shi’ite Islam in Contemporary Southeast Asia (I): Thailand and Indonesia Christoph Marcinkowski

(2006)

121 Facets of Shi’ite Islam in Contemporary Southeast Asia (II): Malaysia and Singapore Christoph Marcinkowski

(2006)

122 Towards a History of Malaysian Ulama Mohamed Nawab

(2007)

123 Islam and Violence in Malaysia Ahmad Fauzi Abdul Hamid

(2007)

124 Between Greater Iran and Shi’ite Crescent: Some Thoughts on the Nature of Iran’s Ambitions in the Middle East Christoph Marcinkowski

(2007)

125 Thinking Ahead: Shi’ite Islam in Iraq and its Seminaries (hawzah ‘ilmiyyah) Christoph Marcinkowski

(2007)

126 The China Syndrome: Chinese Military Modernization and the Rearming of Southeast Asia Richard A. Bitzinger

(2007)

127 Contested Capitalism: Financial Politics and Implications for China Richard Carney

(2007)

128 Sentinels of Afghan Democracy: The Afghan National Army Samuel Chan

(2007)

129 The De-escalation of the Spratly Dispute in Sino-Southeast Asian Relations Ralf Emmers

(2007)

130 War, Peace or Neutrality:An Overview of Islamic Polity’s Basis of Inter-State Relations Muhammad Haniff Hassan

(2007)

131 Mission Not So Impossible: The AMM and the Transition from Conflict to Peace in Aceh, 2005–2006 Kirsten E. Schulze

(2007)

132 Comprehensive Security and Resilience in Southeast Asia: ASEAN’s Approach to Terrorism and Sea Piracy Ralf Emmers

(2007)

133 The Ulama in Pakistani Politics Mohamed Nawab

(2007)

134 China’s Proactive Engagement in Asia: Economics, Politics and Interactions Li Mingjiang

(2007)

135 The PLA’s Role in China’s Regional Security Strategy Qi Dapeng

(2007)

136 War As They Knew It: Revolutionary War and Counterinsurgency in Southeast Asia Ong Wei Chong

(2007)

137 Indonesia’s Direct Local Elections: Background and Institutional Framework Nankyung Choi

(2007)

138 Contextualizing Political Islam for Minority Muslims Muhammad Haniff bin Hassan

(2007)

139 Ngruki Revisited: Modernity and Its Discontents at the Pondok Pesantren al-Mukmin of Ngruki, Surakarta Farish A. Noor

(2007)

140 Globalization: Implications of and for the Modern / Post-modern Navies of the Asia Pacific Geoffrey Till

(2007)

141 Comprehensive Maritime Domain Awareness: An Idea Whose Time Has Come? Irvin Lim Fang Jau

(2007)

142 Sulawesi: Aspirations of Local Muslims Rohaiza Ahmad Asi

(2007)

143 Islamic Militancy, Sharia, and Democratic Consolidation in Post-Suharto Indonesia Noorhaidi Hasan

(2007)

144 Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon: The Indian Ocean and The Maritime Balance of Power in Historical Perspective Emrys Chew

(2007)

145 New Security Dimensions in the Asia Pacific Barry Desker

(2007)