atlantic voices vol.2, no.10

ATLANTIC TREATY ASSOCIATION

Atlantic Voices, Volume 2, Issue 10 1

Volume 2 - Issue 10, October 2012

Contents:

Global Pulse: Why the Arctic Matters: Care More, Worry Less

Jason Wiseman examines the issues surrounding global efforts to sustain a cooperative

framework among nations with a stake in the Arctic Circle. He argues that Canada, with the

assistance of NATO, should take the diplomatic lead and work to prevent conflicts.

Arctic Security: All Quiet on the Northern Front

Djan Sauerborn and Bastian Matteo Scianna examine the claims that climate change in the

Arctic will lead to an economic “gold rush” in which various countries come into conflict

over Arctic resources. The authors conclude that the risk of such conflicts is overstated, and

that most disputes in the area have a high probability of being resolved peacefully.

The Canadian Arctic Dossier

Amina Abdullayeva presents an overview of the various disputes between Canada and other

actors over Arctic territory. She concludes that Canada should attempt to resolve these

conflicts through diplomatic skill and scientific evidence rather than force.

ARCTIC CLIMATE CHANGE

THE IMPLICATIONS FOR GLOBAL SECURITY

Recently, there has been a lot of discussion about

the implications of Arctic climate change for global

security. Analysts are concerned that competition

over newly accessible natural resources could lead to

conflicts. The five states bordering the Arctic Ocean,

known as the “Arctic Five” nations - Canada, Russia,

the United States, Denmark, and Norway - are all

highly interested in these resources, as are other

entities including the EU and China.

Despite the potential for conflict, the changes in

the Arctic also present certain opportunities. As the

Bering Strait is increasingly less blocked by ice, espe-

cially in summer, travel time between Asia and Eu-

rope can be reduced through this northern

“shortcut.” This has the potential to reduce costs and

increase trade.

The role of the international community, includ-

ing NATO, should be to ensure that disputes over

Arctic resources can be resolved peacefully. One of

the key organizations is the Arctic Council, an inter-

governmental forum which consists of the “Arctic

Five” plus Finland, Iceland, and Sweden. In May

2011, the Council members signed their first binding

agreement, the International Search and Rescue

Treaty. The Council should build on this positive first

step and continue to promote cooperative measures.-

Linda Benesch

As Arctic ice melts, ships have a easier time passing through (Photo: SeaNews)

IS

SN

2294-1

274


As one of the most important emerging challenges for sever-

al NATO members in the 21st century, the Arctic Circle has

become a critical issue for the future of the northern hemi-

sphere. Overview

Although it is a massive area overlapping the nautical borders

of several states, the Arctic is also a highly regulated area making

legal and political questions simpler than expected.

For starters, the Arctic Circle

is a sea surrounded by a landmass

(not vice-versa) and is thus regu-

lated by UN Laws of the Sea

(UNCLOS). Under international

law, this means that all states own

up to 200 nautical miles off their

own coasts. Thus, Canada, Den-

mark and Norway each own the

fish, minerals, oil and gas within

200 nautical miles of their north-

ernmost landmasses. In addition,

each state can claim an extra 150

miles if they can scientifically

prove that the seabed is connected

to the continental slope within

their own 200 nautical mile range.

According to a US geological

survey, the Arctic region holds

roughly one fourth of the world’s undis-

covered oil and natural gas, 84% of which lies beneath the ocean

floor. Oil companies already involved in the region include:

ConocoPhillips, Statoil, ExxonMobil, BP, Imperial Oil, Chevron

and Royal Dutch Shell. Due to the potential richness of this re-

gion, it is safe to assume that each state will claim the extra 150

nautical miles if possible.

Second, in an effort to avoid political tensions, each country

in the area founded and joined the Arctic Council in 1996 to

establish a forum where issues can be discussed and resolved.

This Council is made up of eight members: Canada, US, Nor-

way, Denmark, Russia, Iceland, Sweden and Finland but has

both permanent and ad-hoc observer states that includes France,

Great Britain, Germany, China and several others.

For the eight member states, each country is obligated to

submit its claim in the Arctic with-

in 10 years of ratifying UNCLOS.

This ensures that each state

acknowledges the framework and

is bound by international law to

resolve any disputes through the

forum.

Third, as the ice caps continue to

melt the Arctic takes on a whole

new meaning. Transit.

With the opening of the Arctic

Passage Way, the need to rely on

these routes is much reduced. So

much so that the Arctic Passage

Way will save roughly 40% of the

distance, fuel costs and carbon

footprint for all sea traders using

this new transit route.

Challenges

There are several issues that have arisen in the arctic that

have complicated the framework for cooperation.

First, as a resource rich and strategically important area,

Russia views the Arctic as the solution to their socio-economic

problems and are dead set on being the dominant player in this

Why The Arctic Matters: Care More, Worry Less

By Jason Wiseman

GLOBAL PULSEGLOBAL PULSEGLOBAL PULSE

The Arctic Circle (Photo: Wikimedia)


region. Because of this, Russia has begun a major drilling and

expansion program in the area which has made fellow Arctic

states weary of developing their own Arctic borders too much

out of fear of provoking Russia.

Having recently established the world’s northernmost port

in Dudinka, while also planning on establishing an Arctic brigade

on the border with Norway, Russia is heavily invested in devel-

oping this area and occasionally sends submarines around the

Arctic to remind its neighbours that it is not to be ignored.

Second, Canada has a territorial dispute with Denmark at the

top of the world on a little rock called Hans Island. This issue is

yet to be resolved.

Third, due to the high volume of Rare Earth Elements (REE)

in the Arctic, China has become a very interested party in the

region. Since 97% of the worlds REE are currently exported by

China, resources in the Arctic have forced Beijing to pay close

attention to this region. Having already signed energy agree-

ments with Iceland, China has used its economic influence to get

a proxy seat at the Arctic Council. What

kind of role Chinese investment and

political influence will play is largely

dependent on the future of US-China

relations.

Fourth, Russia, China and the EU are

all weary of the NATO card being played by anyone in the re-

gion. This has led to a suppression of security dialogue and am-

biguous communication between Arctic member states.

Fifth, environmental disasters cannot be ruled out. Since it’s

an iced environment, prevention and emergency response are

even more difficult. The ability to clean up an oil spill or per-

form a rescue mission on a sea of ice requires a high level of pro-

fessional training and operational capability that is yet to be real-

ized by any of the Arctic states.

Sixth, states are currently unable to agree on how best to

deal with threats such as eco-terrorism, “COD Wars” or the

potential for Greenland to “Break Away” from Denmark. Con-

tingency plans must be crafted for all these scenarios. Failure to

do so can polarize the Arctic Council due to each state’s own

national interests and domestic pressures, causing a rift through-

out the Council that can eventually lead to a massive disruption

in Arctic dialogue and cooperation.

Seventh, people live in this area. Depending on where you

draw the boundary, almost four million people inhabit the Arctic

today. This includes indigenous peoples and recent arrivals. De-

spite having Permanent Participant status at the Arctic Council,

the role they will play in the future of the Arctic is uncertain.

Finally, as Arctic states compete to strengthen their hand,

they will need to invest more heavily in vessels and equipment,

something everyone but Russia seems reluctant to do. As of

now, Russia leads the world with 25 icebreakers, with Finland in

second place with 9, while Canada is third with only 6 icebreak-

ers. Many of which desperately need to be refurbished.

According to the US Congressional Research Service, the

Americans need at least $3 billion in additional vessels and

equipment just to provide basic services along their coastline.

Without a sufficient amount of functioning icebreakers, we will

all have to rely on Russia’s generosity to clear the paths for

trade.

Conclusion

It is critical that NATO members adhere to the established

framework and continue in their efforts to sustain a cooperative

framework amongst Arctic nations. The current lack of Canadian

-Russian cooperation, US investment and

formulated EU policy are all major obsta-

cles to resolving any problems.

Since the US role is small and the eco-

nomic pressures facing the EU will con-

tinue for the foreseeable future, Canada

is in the best position to lead diplomatic efforts and ensure that

the Arctic be adequately shared while avoiding any potential

danger of conflict. For the future of NATO’s Arctic policy, its

members must encourage Canada to take the diplomatic lead to

ensure that policy remains focused and conflicts are prevented.

NATO must assist in this effort by encouraging and support-

ing its Arctic members by taking small measures such as joint

scientific and environmental projects or joint coastal training of

search and rescue missions, to help ease the tension and build

trust between all Arctic players. Failure to do so undercuts

NATO’s potential as a stabilizing force and incentivizes states to

disregard the institutional framework set forth by the Arctic

Council.

Jason Wiseman is the Program Assistant for the Atlantic Trea-

ty Association and a Senior Research Analyst with the Atlantic

Council of Canada. He holds an MA in Government with a Spe-

cialization in Counter-Terrorism and Homeland Security and a

BAH in Political Science. .

For the future of NATO’s Arctic Policy, its members must encourage Canada to

take the diplomatic lead


by Bastian Matteo Scianna and Djan Sauerborn

W hen Russia planted a flag on the ground of

the Arctic in August 2007 numerous articles

followed that described a upcoming

“scramble for the Arctic”, a new geopolitical hotspot with conflicts

being waged in the high north. Climate change has an effect on this

region and will continuously transform its economic and political

character. Yet, the often openly postulated panic does not match the

realities on the ground.

An Arctic “Gold Rush”?

Climate change has turned into an overarching global phenome-

non and one area that will be visibly affected in its entirety is the

Arctic. Man-made global warming differs in intensity across the

globe. The Polar Regions are experiencing the greatest temperature

increase and are often considered to be a global “early warning sys-

tem”. The repercussions of an increasingly ice free Arctic has already

altered the daily life of the indigenous populations within the region,

as traditional lifestyles can no longer be pursued and patterns of life

have had to be changed accordingly. Additionally, if ice on Green-

land breaks off from the landmass, this will cause sea levels to rise.

Thus, the local effects in the Arctic will turn into a global concern.

Yet, ironically, the Arctic has gained more attention in

recent years because the consequences of climate change also bear

possibilities for a “race towards resources.” New sea trade lanes and

geopolitical concerns led many to fear a “Gold Rush” in the high

north.

A US geological survey found that the Arctic contains

around 30% of global unexplored gas and 13% of the unexplored

oil, with most of it in off-shore regions. This led to claims that the

Arctic has the potential of turning into the backbone of 21st century

oil producing. However, estimates vary greatly and all numbers

have to be read with caution. Predictions about easy access to these

resources have proven to be incorrect, and even with rising oil pric-

es the costs of exploiting oil and gas in the Arctic remain too high to

be economically feasible. Unlike gold, oil needs large investments,

infrastructure and companies. Additionally, the costs for transport

to distant locations remain too high, with gas prices rising. There-

fore, the Iceland based expert Professor Valur Ingimundarson wrote

in a report for the European Parliament that the complexity of prob-

lems facing beneficial exploration of natural resources in the Arctic

is further enhanced by the rough climate in the high north which

makes other, more easily accessible, resource locations more attrac-

tive. Fishing grounds and agriculture are also affected. While the

former introduces new possibilities for exploitation and possible

quarrels and fishing rights, the latter influences the very way of life

for the population in the Arctic.

With the Arctic ice melting rapidly, new sea lanes might

become a reality sooner rather than later. The speed of trade could

be enhanced and geopolitical hotspots such as the Suez Canal, the

Gulf of Aden or the Strait of Malacca could be circumvented. The

new route would also save fuel, thus reducing costs. However,

there are also obstacles to an increase in Arctic shipping. Protecting

trade littoral waters, and the environment are paramount for a po-

tential success story. Charles Emmerson (The Future History of the

Arctic, 2011, p.185) states that a less icy Arctic may see more

storms. Ice variability may pose too many risks and could lead to

time delays regarding the shipment of sensitive cargo. Emmerson

concludes that “large-scale trans-Arctic shipping is a decade or more

away.” The shifting dynamics of the Northeastern and the North-

west Passage have the potential to spur tensions between Norway

and Russia and the US and Canada, respectively.

In summary, the exploitation of resources and an economi-

cally feasible transport to the customers remain medium-term goals.

There is no easy way to access the resource rich Arctic. Additional-

ly, the great majority of resources were found to be situated in the

Arctic Security: All Quiet on the Northern Front

The Polar Regions are Experiencing the Greatest Temperature Increases Due to Climate Change (Photo: CBC)


as a result of global warming. The changes would be too small to be

worth the diplomatic and political costs of reopening discussions.

Maritime borders in the Arctic will probably remain as they

are.”(2011, p.116)

There is a second tool used to mediate between the Arctic

Five - the Arctic Council set up by the Ottawa Declaration in 1996.

It combines several initiatives of peace, fostering dialogues and sus-

tainable development in the Arctic. The initiative goes back to Gor-

bachev’s call for a “peaceful Arctic” and bundles all Arctic states in a

flexible forum. Whilst meeting every two years at the ministerial

level, there are also numerous permanent bodies who mainly tackle

environmental concerns and development. Besides indigenous

groups, a great variety of stakeholders can benefit from and take

part in this process of knowledge creation. The Council formulates

guidelines and recommendations and can thus function as a forum

for dialogue and exchange of knowledge and interests. It should not

be dissolved prima facie as a “paper tiger”

just because it does not possess binding

authority. It remains however a matter of

fact that neither the UN organs nor the

Arctic Council has any legal authority in

settling disputes. Unsurprisingly, this

often leads to insecurity.

Certain parties, especially non Arctic Five states, occasion-

ally call for a more binding legal framework and list the Antarctica

treaty as an example. However, the Arctic is different as no one

owns it and it is a sea surrounded by land not vice versa. Additional-

ly, there is no support by any of the Arctic Five for such a treaty and

such a complex multilateral task could take very long and would

constitute an effort no one is willing to accept. Nonetheless, with

decreasing ice coverage and more trade in the Arctic, it will gradual-

ly become more difficult for the Arctic states to prevent initiatives

aimed at generating greater internationalization and reluctance to

accept an Arctic Five mare nostrum with climate change in this partic-

Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) of the states and not in “disputed”

territory.

Who Owns What? UNCLOS and the Arctic Council

Given the numerous resources spread over such a vast territory,

a number of countries raise claims and have interests. There are

mainly three forms of mediation: the UN, the Arctic Council and

several bi- and multilateral treaties. Generally, the Arctic states

consist of the “Arctic Five” being Canada, Denmark, Norway, Rus-

sia, and USA. Additionally the Arctic states are usually considered

to include Finland, Sweden and Iceland, but the indigenous popula-

tion has very little accurate representation. The Arctic Five held

meetings which ended in declarations to respectfully and peacefully

solve disputes (Ilulissat Declaration 2008), yet led to outspoken

frustration by Finland, Sweden and Iceland. However, only the

Arctic Five can legally claim rights on Arctic territory which still

leaves us with the pressing question of: “who owns what” in the

Arctic?

The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea

(UNCLOS) serves as a legal framework where states have submitted

claims since 1982, for example regarding seabeds that go beyond

their exclusive zones of 200 nautical miles. UNCLOS is generally

accepted as arbiter, even though the US did not sign the convention.

Yet, beyond the seabed, states can also claim that their continental

shelf forms a natural extension and thus is their territory. Different

court responsibilities and regulations of international law make it

very difficult to create a binding character. Thus, maritime border

disputes and land questions are inter-

twined. Time also plays a role as states

only have 10 years after signing UN-

CLOS to submit their claims. Making

such a claim involves a lot of documents

and research material which is expensive.

For this reasons, countries such as Canada and the US have pooled

resources and strengthened cooperation. Disputes do not necessarily

lead to tensions or conflicts. The will for cooperation was demon-

strated in the case of Norway and Russia in the Barents Sea. A con-

flict between the US and Canada over the Beaufort Sea also seems

highly unlikely.

So beyond the aspect of uncertainty and overlapping legal

frameworks, there is a modus vivendi and customary law approaches

to settle different interests. As Charles Emmerson stated in his “The

Future History of the Arctic”: “Coastal states in the Arctic are un-

likely to accept a redrawing of their maritime borders, even if some

areas of land, say in northern Siberia or Alaska, become submerged

Disputes Do Not Necessarily Lead to Ten-sions or Conflicts. The will for

cooperation was demonstrated in the case of Norway and Russia in the Barents Sea.

NATO Troops in Norway (Photo: Wikimedia)


ular region having global effects.

Beyond the group of states mentioned one has to consider

more players involved. The EU and China share a great interest in

the possibility of new resources and shipping lanes and were there-

fore always interested in influencing the Arctic Council and attaining

an observatory status. The problem of the indigenous people cannot

be highlighted enough. The Arctic Council solves some of the disad-

vantages they face. As it is often the case the weakest lobby group is

hit by the consequences the hardest. Globally operating companies

such as Exxon and Shell and environmentalists such as Greenpeace

are also important groups who pursue their own interests.

A “Great Game” in the High North?

Together with the fear of a new “Gold Rush” and the hardships

in governing the Arctic, there is a perceived threat of a militariza-

tion of the Arctic. During the Cold War this marked the shortest

possible way for the US and the Soviet Union to attack each other

directly. Thus, countries like Iceland had a

strategic role for NATO. Today the prob-

lem remains that the Arctic Five remain

skeptical about outside interference by

other organizations, such as the EU, NATO

or states like China, yet can be truly prag-

matic and cooperative when it comes to eradicating diverging inter-

ests.

Russian muscle flexing rhetoric and repeated “public rela-

tions” statements on the importance of the Arctic for the Russian

energy sector should not be overstated, as they often have domestic

policy motivation. Moscow showed remarkable willingness to coop-

erate with the Arc-

tic states and negoti-

ate disputes. A clear

lack of environmen-

tal concern marks a

contrast to this

positive develop-

ment. Nevertheless,

Russia strictly op-

poses the involve-

ment of any other

organization or

states in Arctic

affairs and it should

not come as a sur-

prise that Russia is very keen on shifting its focus to the Arctic re-

gion. As a nation dependant on energy exports, the ice cannot melt

fast enough for Moscow. This strategic train of thought also unveils

itself in the Russian Federation’s State policy “In the Arctic until

2020 and beyond”. This program is aimed at training and equipping

specifically trained “Arctic warriors”. A closer look unravels the fact

that these Special Forces would mainly be used to protect the north-

ern regions of Russia. Most of the Russian air fleet is not capable of

operating in the Arctic region. Surveillance and reconnaissance

flights have, however, been on the rise since 2007 as have Ship Sub-

mersible ballistic Nuclear (SSBN) missions. Russia’s biggest asset is

the high end ice breaker fleet and the experience of navigating

through the Arctic.

The increasing role played by non-state actors and the resulting

security concerns make the protection of the new coastal waters

more important and the Kremlin is not alone in acquiring new

equipment and technologies. Yet, Russia has the know-how but

lacks the complete port folio, especially regarding finances and tech-

nology.

In his background paper “Military

Capabilities in the Arctic”, Siemon T.

Wezeman summarizes and analyzed the

repertoire of Arctic States and found that

even though all other Arctic Five states are

NATO members, their stance on NATO involvement and the secu-

rity concerns differ. Canada is very skeptical about using the NATO

-Russia forum to negotiate, where the European states have Russian

interests “next door” and often feel neglected and unsupported as

the NATO “front line” states in this respect. Canada and Norway

invested in new coast guard ships and shifted some interest to

“Arctic security”

whereas the US and

Denmark do not see

any benefits in such a

policy. Especially

Washington did not

get influenced by the

“ A r c t i c f e v e r ”

whereas Copenhagen

has to fear a Green-

landic strive for

independence with

increasing resource

richness. A SIPRI

report by Kristofer

Bergh thus highlights the need for a closer alignment of US and

The Arctic Five remain skeptical about outside interference , yet can be truly

pragmatic when it comes to eradicating diverging interests

The Canadian Rangers (Photo: Canadian National Defense)


position, Denmark profits from multiple different geostrategic bases

and outposts. Thus, when looking at recent developments one has

to put this in context. It might be true that the Canadian rangers

have been strengthened, that the Russians set up brigades of Arctic

military personnel and that Norwegian military units have been

shifted further north, but these are all steps implemented to patrol

and protect the borders that are and NOT the borders that should

be. Further, given the size and scope of these steps one cannot iden-

tify any form of aggressive militarization. Additionally, the US, as

the greatest military power, is pursuing a wait-and-see strategy as

Washington could increase Arctic forces rapidly if the need should

arise.

Conclusion

The economic gold rush is not likely to happen under current

circumstances. Additionally, the resources do mainly not lie in dis-

puted territory. Economic exploitation will still take decades to be

fully effective and economically reasonable. Everyone seems willing

to settle and to negotiate disputes or confronting interests. Even

though the international organizations and

councils in place are far from perfect they

constitute an effective and flexible tool for

negotiation. Stewardship is needed as well

as a balance between national egoisms and

global solutions for global concerns. It is an

imperative to find equilibrium between legal rights, states interests

and accountability for their actions.

The increase of Arctic military capabilities by some nations

does not mark militarization or a military build-up. A conflict would

only become a realistic scenario if the Arctic were to get enmeshed

in other disputes or if rigid nationalistic momentum prevailed over

pragmatic cooperation.

Clashing interests may only delay this process and no imme-

diate threat of an escalation or militarization in the region is foresee-

able or realistic. The demand for security and stability amongst the

actors will surely not melt as rapidly as the ice. So for the moment

all is quiet on the Northern Front.

Canadian interests for an improved standing and leading example for

Arctic stewardship.

Canada has made it quite clear in the recent years that its

arctic claims should be taken seriously. In 2010 Foreign Affairs Min-

ister Lawrence Cannon made this abundantly transparent during his

visit to Moscow, basically stating that Canada’s “Arctic Sovereignty”

was a priority. Both Russia and Canada claim the 1,800 kilometer

submarine Lomonosov range, between Canada’s Ellesmere Island

and Russia’s new Siberian Islands which both countries see as a po-

tential source for large fuel deposits. Canada has not only found a

new sense of confidence, but also has the technical and organization-

al clout to back its aspirations. From an operational standpoint,

Canada is able to act flexibly and swiftly due its four secondary air-

craft bases in northern Canada. The 1.5 billion Canadian dollar

project “Joint Uninhabited Surveillance and Target Acquisition Sys-

tem” (JUSTAS) for maritime and Arctic patrol, is another indicator

for Canada’s commitment. Besides five large and six small icebreak-

ers and fifteen major surface warships and four conventional subma-

rines, the numbers of the Canadian Rangers, a lightly equipped,

highly professional paramilitary unit have

increased from 4,100 in 2008 to 5,000 in

2010. Canada is well prepared, but the

question remains for what exactly?

The Arctic region is at best a low

profile security concern for the US. It was

not mentioned in a 2012 report on security priorities of the 21st

century. Although the US has the most capabilities of all five actors

it has hardly any troops specifically trained for Arctic missions. It has

less high end Ice breakers than Russia and the Navy only had one

experimental vessel, the MV Susitna, which was eventually sidelined

and reused for civilian purposes only. The SSB’,s however, do regu-

larly patrol the arctic waters. The trend at the moment is investing

in civilian ice breakers which are deployed to the region for scien-

tific purposes.

The focus of Norway’s Arctic strategy lies in balancing Rus-

sia’s influence. The nature of relations between Moscow and Oslo

has improved over the course of the last years. Cooperation is on

the rise in the European Arctic Area and military joint exercises

between Norway and Russia have been held repeatedly. The fact

that the Norwegian chief of defense has called for shutting down one

of the two battalions of the “Brigade Nord” is a clear indication for

the diminishing fear of Russian aggression.

Denmark has forged the Arctic Military command between

Greenland and the Faroe Island as a result of the adoption of a spe-

cial Arctic Strategy adopted in 2011. Due to Greenland’s favorable

The demand for security and stability amongst the actors will surely not melt

as rapidly as the ice.

Djan Sauerborn is currently pursuing a Master's Degree in Political Science

of South Asia and Anthropology at the Heidelberg University. His main interests

are ethnic and civil conflict, civil-military relations, EU-South Asia relations.

Bastian Matteo Scianna is pursuing his MA/MSc in International and

World History at Columbia University and the LSE and Political Science. He

focuses on European military history, the development of strategic thought and

current European defense policy.

About the authors


by Amina Abdullayeva

N o action is taken until a crisis hits, and the Arctic has

been no exception to this rule. Climate change brings

with it unexpected developments, and suddenly we

find that a large swath of the ocean that used to be permanently un-

der ice has turned into a source of major international disagreements.

Canada, being among the five nations with an Arctic coast-

line, is anxious to prove irrevocably its rights to the Arctic territory

that it considers its national property. To that end, Ottawa has been

undertaking various projects, mostly military in nature, to assert its

sovereignty in the Far North. For example, Canada has embarked

upon the largest shipbuilding program in its history, which will in-

clude a $25 billion (CAD) order on warships. Some observers argue

that these and other recent defence expenditures are not justified by

Canada’s commitments in Afghanistan and other parts of the world,

but by its policy of increasing militarisation in the Arctic.

This article explores Canada’s Arctic policy by first setting

the stage and explaining the background of the issues. Next, Canada’s

Arctic disputes are listed, followed by an examination of their signifi-

cance. Finally, mechanisms of resolving these disputes are discussed.

Background

Before the rise in global temperature, the Arctic was regarded as

“a massive quantity of ice and no one had particular pretensions to

it,” says Russian energy expert Ser-

gey Pikin. Climate change has trans-

formed the situation – not only

drastically, but also rapidly. This is

because the results of global warm-

ing in the Arctic are far more dra-

matic than elsewhere due to the

sharper angle at which the sun’s rays

strike the polar region during summer

and because the retreating sea ice is turning into open water, which

absorbs far more solar radiation. This dynamic is creating a vicious

melting cycle. According to Jacinthe Lacroix, senior science adviser

for Environment Canada, the ice in Canada's Arctic has shrunk 32%

since the 1960s. In addition, global warming has raised the tempera-

ture in Canada’s northern archipelago by 1.2 degrees over the last

century - twice the average rate the temperature is rising worldwide.

Each year the ice shrinks by approximately 70,000 km2, the equivalent

of Lake Superior.

Whereas exact boundaries in the Far North were not of great

concern before, it is becoming increasingly important to delineate

Arctic territory clearly. The United Nations Convention on the Law of

the Sea (UNCLOS), which came into effect in 1994, is the mechanism

used for this purpose. Countries that ratified the Convention can file

claims to parts of the world seas, in this case the Arctic Ocean, to the

UN Commission that will then evaluate them based on a scientific

method. According to UNCLOS, a country is entitled to 200 nautical

miles of Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) off its coastline, in which it

controls the rights to marine resources. However, if a state can prove

that its continental shelf extends beyond its EEZ, it gets the right to the

seabed and the minerals that come with it for as long as its continental

shelf extends, but not the waters above that shelf outside of the EEZ.

There is currently no unified set of multilateral norms and

agreements that govern the Arctic. The fast pace of the global warming

is forcing the states implicated in this region into action now, and any

decisions made by the Arctic powers today will have a long-lasting

influence in the coming years.

Canada’s Arctic Disputes

Canada has unresolved territorial disputes with three other arctic

nations. They range from the big question of the ownership of the

Beaufort Sea to the small but potentially highly consequential disagree-

ment over Hans Island. The former issue

is between Canada and the US, while the

latter involves Denmark. Canada also

needs to agree with Russia over certain

continental ridges. The biggest question,

that virtually pits Canada against the rest

of the world, is the status of the North-

west Passage.

Canada vs. the World

The Northwest Passage is a sea route that connects the Atlantic and the

Pacific Oceans by passing through the Canadian Arctic Archipelago.

Seafarers and explorers dreamed for centuries of discovering this fabled

passage that would serve as a shortcut to the riches of the Orient. Many

lives were lost in the pursuit of this seaway, but when it was finally

discovered, it became obvious that it would be unusable to the shipping

industry, as most of it was permanently covered in ice with only small

Northwest Passage Routes (Photo: Wikipedia)

The Canadian Arctic Dossier


Canada uses the 1825 St. Petersburg Treaty between the British and

Russian Empires, while the US asserts the principle of equidistance in

determining the boundary. In practice this means that Canada

“contends that the maritime boundary should follow the land bound-

ary along the 141st meridian out 200 miles,” essentially extending

the land boundary between Yukon and Alaska out to the ocean in a

straight line. The US, on the other hand, relies on the principle of

equidistance, which draws the boundary along a median line equidis-

tant from the shores of both Canada and the US.

As the two sides use different methods of measuring their

Arctic maritime boundary, the dispute –not surprisingly – remains

unresolved. In the meantime, the disputed area is a wedge the size of

Lake Ontario, or approximately 21,000 km2. Ironically, beyond the

200 mile EEZ, “the Canadian line is better for the US - and the US

line better for Canada”.

Canada vs. Denmark

One of the smallest disputes in the Arc-

tic is the question of Hans Island. It is literally

the smallest issue, because the island has an area

of only 1.3 km2. There are no reserves of any

valuable minerals either. It is just a tiny island

between Canada’s Ellesmere Island and Den-

mark’s Greenland.

Both countries have a strong claim to it, and

each has tried to assert its own sovereignty over the island via official

visits over the years. Each time a Canadian politician or squad of

soldiers lands on the island, the Danish side issues an official state-

ment of protest and vice versa.

Recently there have been reports that the two sides are pre-

pared to reach a settlement whereby the island would be split into

two - almost exactly in half, but these reports are as of yet uncon-

firmed by either government. It can be politically embarrassing to

acknowledge a compromise when each side had been signalling re-

lentless determination.

Canada vs. Russia

This argument is over stretches of the Arctic Ocean as deter-

mined by the geology of the Lomonosov Ridge, a long trench run-

ning along the floor of the Arctic Ocean from Siberia to Ellesmere

Island. Whoever can prove that the ridge is an extension of their

continental shelf will earn the right to claim the ocean floor and all

the minerals trapped in it, although not the waters over the seabed

itself.

It turns out that there are two scientific ways to measure

continental shelf, which is where the problems arise. “The juridical

definition of continental shelf is broad in scope, as it does not differ-

parts navigable for a few summer months. However, with the advent

of global warming scientists are now predicting that it will be fully

navigable in the coming decades. The Northwest Passage is roughly

7000 kilometres shorter than the current shipping route through the

Panama Canal, which equals about two weeks of travel time. This

translates into millions and even billions of dollars in savings for the

shipping industry, as well as large potential gains for governments

controlling the passage, and constitutes one of the primary reasons for

Canada’s claim to it.

The problem is that many countries – notably the US – be-

lieve that the Northwest Passage is an international strait. A waterway

that connects one area of high seas to another is considered an interna-

tional strait, and the proponents of this argument claim that the

Northwest Passage qualifies as such because it links the Davis Strait

with the Beaufort Strait, both of which are

part of high seas. To be clear, this does

not question Canada’s territorial rights

over the passage, but challenges the no-

tion that Ottawa can decide which vessels

could pass through. In case of internal

waters, it is at the discretion of the con-

cerned government to open or close pas-

sage for any vessel; but if the Northwest

Passage is acknowledged as an international water-

way, Canada’s permission will not be necessary.

There have been several instances when the US sent its sub-

marines or icebreakers through the Passage without asking Ottawa for

permission. The most serious case occurred in 1985, when the US

Coast Guard icebreaker “Polar Sea” travelled through the passage

without notifying the Canadian government. It was considered a di-

rect challenge to Canadian sovereignty and caused a diplomatic row,

which resulted in the signing of the Arctic Co-operation Agreement in

1988 by Prime Minister Brian Mulroney and President Ronald

Reagan. According to this agreement, the US promised never to send

vessels through the Northwest Passage without Canada’s consent; in

return, Canada promised always to grant its consent. In addition,

Canada reserves the right to send an accompanying vessel with the one

it lets through.

Apart from that agreement, which was a diplomatic way to

overcome an embarrassing incident, no formal treaty has been reached

as to the status of the Northwest Passage. It remains a murky issue to

this day, but time is running out.

Canada vs. the US

The dispute between the US and Canada revolves around the delimita-

tion lines that divide the Beaufort Sea between the two countries.

Hans Island (Photo: Wikipedia)


Another security issue is not environmental, but human. If

the Passage becomes fully navigable, chances are that not only com-

mercial vessels, but various groups with malevolent intentions can

also take advantage of this route. Such groups could be comprised of

pirates, or terrorists, for example. Although a distant and unrealistic

proposition for the moment, it is probably not more remote or un-

likely than Arctic ice melting at a rate no one had envisioned fifteen

years ago. If temperatures rise enough for the Northwest Passage to

become a profitable and preferred sea route, it is possible that smug-

glers, traffickers, or even pirates will try to take advantage of the

business going through here. Once again, if that happens, Canada will

be the country most exposed to risk. Having the Northwest Passage

as its internal waters would give it the right to close it to any vessel it

chooses, but without that power it would have no control over who

goes through.

The second issue concerns economic interests. It is no secret

that the Arctic has large amounts of minerals and fossil fuels that

were previously unreachable. It is not known exactly how much

there is, but interestingly, most Eng-

lish-language sources state that Arctic

energy reserves are roughly one-

quarter of the world’s supply, while

the Russian-language sources pre-

dominantly claim it is one-third. The

higher estimate on the Russian side

betrays their hope for more, which

has to do with the fact that the energy

sector comprises 18.5% of the Rus-

sian GDP, compared to 6.9% in Can-

ada. Since Russia relies so much on its

energy sector, it will try hard to make

large gains in the Arctic. This is where the Lomonosov Ridge ac-

quires a price tag.

In fact, none of the Arctic disputes are purely symbolic, despite the

word “sovereignty” being used more often than any other.

While the issue with Russia is about economic power, the

question of the Northwest Passage, as explained above, can seriously

undermine Canadian security. The wedge in the Beaufort Sea claimed

by both the US and Canada is also potentially very rich in minerals,

while Hans Island – worthless on its own – is important for Canada

to be able to show that it can get what it claims. If it loses that, it may

be difficult to reach favourable agreements in the other, more im-

portant, disputes.

entiate between the different types of continental margins.” Of

course, each country prefers the measurement that will give it more

territory. Those are the measurements they will put into their claims

to UNCLOS. Matters get even more muddled because these claims

are confidential, thus, no one knows exactly what the others will

write in their claims, turning it into a guessing game. One thing that

is certain is Canada’s obligation to submit its claims to UNCLOS

before the 2013 deadline.

The Stakes

As the ice melts in the Arctic, Canada has both economic and securi-

ty interests at stake. Security is mainly an issue with the Northwest

Passage, while the disputes over the Beaufort Sea, Hans Island, and

the Lomonosov Ridge are about potential economic gains or losses.

If Canada loses the Northwest Passage to the international

community the government will not be able to enforce Canadian

laws and regulations over it. As the environment of the region is

fragile, any accident could disrupt it dramatically. If an oil tanker, for

example, causes an accident

while crossing the Passage,

Canada will be the one to clean

up and pay the highest price –

both literally for the clean-up

costs and in terms of the health

of its natural environment and

people who live in the North.

We saw, for example, the

disastrous results of oil spills in

the much safer waters of the

Gulf of Mexico. According to

World Wildlife Fund Canada,

an oil spill in the Arctic would be “impossible to clean up.” “[T]here

is a lot more capacity to respond to an oil spill in the Gulf; there is no

capacity in the Arctic – there is not even a harbour on the Arctic

slope of Alaska, which could be a staging base to respond to a spill.”

Besides, the waters of the Northwest Passage are practically

uncharted, which makes sailing in them dangerous even when the ice

has melted. Therefore, if Canada had more control over this seaway

as part of its internal waters, it would have the right to impose tight-

er regulations on vessels passing through in order to ensure the safety

of its land and people.

“If an oil tanker causes an accident...Canada will pay the highest price (Photo: Wikipedia)


About the author Amina Abdullayeva

Amina Abdullayeva is a Security Analyst with the Atlantic Council of Canada

focusing on the European Union, Russia and the former USSR. She holds a

Master’s Degree from the University of Toronto – Centre for European, Russian,

Eurasian Studies.

these countries do not have an Arctic coastline, they would like to

be included, even if only as observers, in the decision-making pro-

cess concerning such a large and important part of the world.

Canada has the upper hand here, being the founding mem-

ber of the Arctic Council, which was created by the decree of the

1996 Ottawa Declaration. In addition, Canada will resume chair-

manship of the Council in 2013 for two years, which it can use to

achieve peaceful resolution of the remaining disputes. However, it

needs to approach its future chairmanship with the right mindset and

concrete goals. Diplomacy must take priority over

populist rhetoric.

Conclusion

Considering what is at stake - the security and

prosperity of Canada, as well as the health of its Northern environ-

ment - the government should base its Arctic strategy not on flashy

demonstrations of force and military capability, but on a flexible

approach firmly rooted in legitimate international agreements and

backed by scientific proof. The Arctic Council should continue to be

the forum to discuss all Arctic issues and UNCLOS should be the

tool to lay territorial claims. It should be reformed, if the current

version causes confusion, but this multinational institutional frame-

work should not be discarded at any cost. It is important, because it

bestows legitimacy on state actions in the Arctic, and also because it

makes bilateral agreements possible. Without the overarching

framework provided by UNCLOS, countries would not be able to

centre their negotiations on any accepted basis. Therefore, Canada

has a unique opportunity coming up: the timeline of the fast-melting

ice overlaps with the schedule of Canada’s chairmanship of the Arc-

tic Council. This is an important moment in history, and decisions

taken in the next few years will have a profound impact on the fu-

ture of the region. Canada must use its international reputation,

legitimacy and diplomatic skill to achieve the best results.

Dispute Resolution Mechanisms

There are three ways a country can choose to pursue dispute resolu-

tion in the Arctic: bilateral, multilateral, and institutional.

The bilateral method is the best, because often a dispute is just be-

tween two states, so they can reasonably negotiate a settlement.

Moreover, it was the method officially adopted by the five Arctic

nations in the 2008 Ilulissat Declaration. It proved to be very effective

when in 2010 Russia and Norway surprised the world by settling their

40-year-old dispute over the Barents Sea. While Russia has a reputa-

tion as a difficult partner, it can be surprisingly

cooperative when it is in its interests. As Russia

is heavily dependent on Arctic energy re-

sources, it was in its interest to resolve the

Barents dispute as soon as possible and start

exploration. Canada should keep that in mind when dealing with Rus-

sia over the Lomonosov Ridge.

Instead, Canada tends to overreact to certain Russian actions

in the Arctic. For example, Moscow lowered its flag to the Arctic

seabed in 2007, and in June 2011 symbolically sailed two koch boats

(an ancient wooden boat used by early Russia explorers) in the Arctic

Ocean. These actions caused a stir in Canada with angry official state-

ments condemning Russia’s “flag planting antics.” According to Mi-

chael Byers, an international law professor from the University of

British Columbia and an outspoken expert on Arctic issues, “everyone

else is sorting out their differences, we really are the laggards.”

In this situation a multilateral and institutional framework can

be helpful. When Canada-Russia relations became particularly tense,

Norway offered to mediate, based on its recent success with Russia

over the Barents Sea. Such cooperation should be expected to happen

more and more, because there are only five countries in the Arctic

and it is easier to agree in smaller groups. Also, nothing can be re-

solved by resorting to military action, and all the implicated actors

know that. It is clear that talking with each other and cooperating is

the only way to move forward, even if they are ultimately competing

against each other for a bigger piece of valuable territory.

Finally, multilateral cooperation is possible within a clear

institutional framework, where norms and rules are understood by all.

This is why the Arctic Council and UNCLOS are so important. Alt-

hough the Arctic Council is merely an advisory body, it is the only one

created specifically for the Arctic and it is taken seriously. This is

evident by the fact that six non-Arctic nations - France, Germany, the

Netherlands, Poland, Spain, and UK - have a permanent observer

status. Even China is showing strong interest in joining. Although

Canada chairmanship of the Arctic Council must archive

diplomatic success.

Atlantic Voices is the monthly publication of the Atlantic Treaty Asso-

ciation. It aims to inform the debate on key issues that affect the North

Atlantic Treaty Organization, its goals and its future. The work pub-

lished in Atlantic Voices is written by young professionals and researchers.

The Atlantic Treaty Association (ATA) is an international non-

governmental organization based in Brussels working to facilitate global

networks and the sharing of knowledge on transatlantic cooperation and

security. By convening political, diplomatic and military leaders with

academics, media representatives and young professionals, the ATA

promotes the values set forth in the North Atlantic Treaty: Democracy,

Freedom, Liberty, Peace, Security and Rule of Law. The ATA

membership extends to 37 countries from North America to the Caucasus

throughout Europe. In 1996, the Youth Atlantic Treaty Association

(YATA) was created to specifially include to the successor generation in

our work.

Since 1954, the ATA has advanced the public’s knowledge and

understanding of the importance of joint efforts to transatlantic security

through its international programs, such as the Central and South Eastern

European Security Forum, the Ukraine Dialogue and its Educational

Platform.

In 2011, the ATA adopted a new set of strategic goals that reflects the

constantly evolving dynamics of international cooperation. These goals

include:

◊ the establishment of new and competitive programs on

international security issues.

◊ the development of research initiatives and security-related events

for its members.

◊ the expansion of ATA’s international network of experts to

countries in Northern Africa and Asia.

The ATA is realizing these goals through new programs, more policy

activism and greater emphasis on joint research initiatives.

These programs will also aid in the establishment of a network of

international policy experts and professionals engaged in a dialogue with

NATO.

Atlantic Voices is always seeking new material. If you are a young

researcher, subject expert or professional and feel you have a valu-

able contribution to make to the debate, then please get in touch.

We are looking for papers, essays, and book reviews on issues of

importance to the NATO Alliance. Further enquiries can also be

directed to the ATA Secretariat at the address listed below.

Editor: Linda Benesch

The views expressed in these articles are entirely those of the author. They do not necessarily represent the views of the Atlantic Treaty Association, its members, affiliates or staff. mages should not be reproduced without permission from sources listed, and remain the sole property of those sources.

ATA Programs More information on ATA programs are available online

On 13th, 14th and 15th September, the German Youth Atlan-

tic Association visited Brussels for briefings at NATO and ATA.

15 German students and young professionals attended the brief-

ings.

On October 29th, the ATA is hosting a panel on the ‘US Presi-

dential Candidates’ Foreign Policies and their views on NATO’.

Speakers include the Director of Gallup Europe and Representa-

tives from the Democratic and Republican Parties.

On November 13th, the ATA is organizing a Brainstorming

Debate with EPC’Ideas Factory-Europe on the future of Transat-

lantic relations at the Residence Palace in Brussels. The brainstorm

will contribute to refreshing ideas on the future relations between

Europe and North America.

Join the ATA Mediterranean Debates, an

online platform to spur debate on Mediter-

ranean Security Issues among young

emerging leaders from the region.

atlantic voices vol.2, no.10

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