atlantic voices - humanitarian assistance and crisis management

ATLANTIC TREATY ASSOCIATION

Atlantic Voices, Volume 5, Issue 9 1

- Flora Pidoux

Since the end of the Cold War, NATO

has launched several operations to

contribute to the peace and stability of the

Euro-Atlantic region.

Deployed in June 1999 in accordance

with United Nations Security Council

Resolution 1244, Kosovo Force’s

(KFOR) , in cooperation with the UN and

the EU, continues today to maintain the

stability and peaceful development of the

region, an effort guaranteed by the 4,800

troops from 31 countries still deployed

there. On the maritime front, Operations

Active Endeavour and Ocean Shield aim to

deter terrorism in the Mediterranean and

piracy off the Horn of Africa respectively.

These two operations support the

international effort to secure maritime

routes and prevent the transit of terrorists

and illegal supplies from one region to

another.

These three examples illustrate NATO’s

commitment to contributing to peace and

security using the Alliance’s military

capabilities and cooperation with other

institutions. NATO’s involvement in crisis

management and humanitarian relief will be

explored in this issue, outlining the

Alliance’s role in securing our world

beyond the transatlantic region.

Humanitarian Assistance And Crisis Management

Volume 5 - Issue 9 September 2015

Contents:

NATO’s Disaster Relief Missions: Out-Of-Area And

Out-Of-Mission?

Ms. Flora Pidoux explores how NATO widened their scope of action in terms

of disaster-relief missions, from solely focusing on member countries to

becoming a global actor, through collaborating with regional and international

institutions.

Cooperation Versus Control In NATO’s CIMIC Doctrine

Ms. Grace Rosinski examines the principles within NATO’s Civil-Military

Cooperation (CIMIC) Doctrine in order to identify barriers to effective

cooperation during crisis operations, such as NATO’s culture of control.

NATO’s KFOR Mission in Kosovo

(Photo: Belgrade Center for Security Policy)


By Flora Pidoux

D uring the Cold War, NATO’s first

preoccupation was to contain the USSR.

Ensuring the stability and strength of the

West also followed this logic as it guaranteed the

necessary resources for the ideological confrontation and

military deterrence. This also made the Euro-Atlantic

community a credible ambassador of the democratic,

liberal and capitalist model to the rest of the world.

Many internal elements could, however, threaten this

image: social and political unrest or catastrophes (man-

made or natural). It is thus logical, following the

principle of mutual assistance, that NATO deployed its

forces when its internal security was at risk. The end of

the Cold War shattered NATO’s raison d’être. In order to

stay relevant, the Alliance needed to shift its attention to

the needs of a new era where the Soviet Union was no

longer the focus. NATO’s military expertise and

equipment, combined with the Alliance’s willingness to

take part in the effort, made the Alliance the best actor

to support the humanitarian and disaster relief effort.

This extension of its original scope, however, raises

questions due to its unusual nature.

Widening The Scope Of Action

As a response to natural disasters, NATO developed

relief assistance mechanisms which were enshrined in the

Cooperation for Disaster Assistance in Peacetime

established in 1953. It is in this framework that the

Alliance assisted Belgium and the Netherlands with

military capabilities following storm floods the same

year. The Alliance, however, did not directly come to

the rescue of its member states, but supported them by

assessing the needs, organizing the liaison between the

contributors, and taking care of the dispatch of men and

supplies. This was also the case when the Arno river

flooded Florence and Pisa in 1966. In 1971, the Alliance

was responsible for assessing the assistance needed after

an earthquake hit the South East of Turkey, based on

which the Red Crescent conducted the disaster relief

mission.

The end of the Cold War marked a drastic change in

NATO’s disaster relief involvement as demands of

humanitarian or disaster assistance emerged from non-

member states and international organizations such as the

United Nations (UN) and the Red Cross. Out-of-area

missions came with no surprises when the USSR

disappeared, and 1991 opened the way for NATO to

become a global actor in disaster relief. This demanded

the policy framework to be updated to the new mandates,

including the possibility to deploy forces if requested by a

relevant international organization for a mission outside

of the Alliance’s boundaries. More reforms followed in

1994 to remove the institutional barriers that had

prevented NATO from coming to the rescue of Moldova

which had been severely affected by floods. The countries

of the Partnership for Peace (PfP) were, from then on,

included in the mutual assistance mechanism previously

not applicable to direct requests from non-member

states.

The Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response

Coordination Centre

NATO can be involved in humanitarian and disaster

relief operations in two ways: through the use of military

assets available in the Alliance’s Command and Force

Structures and/or through the Euro-Atlantic Disaster

Response Coordination Centre (EADRCC). The latter is

NATO’s principal civil emergency response mechanism.

NATO’s Disaster Relief Missions: Out-Of-Area And Out-Of-Mission?


“It is active all year round, operational on a 24/7 basis, and

involves NATO’s 28 Allies and all partner countries. The

Centre functions as a clearing-house system for coordinating

both requests and offers of assistance mainly in case of

natural and man-made disasters.” Inaugurated in 1998, it

first came into practice in Kosovo when the United Nations

High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) asked for

humanitarian relief to help with the management of the

displaced populations from the war-torn regions of Albania.

The creation of this body enabled NATO’s military and

civil assets to be requested by international organizations or

non-member states to support them in their disaster- or

humanitarian-relief missions. It must, however, be noted

that the Centre does not act upon the sole request of a state

in distress. For example, Ukraine approached the EADRCC

in 1998 asking for help after a dramatic flood. Instead of

acting unilaterally, the Centre operated in collaboration

with the UNOCHA (United Nations Office for the

Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs),

and acted as a liaison between the

different parties involved in the rescue,

namely the UNOCHA, Euro-Atlantic

Partnership Council (EAPC) capitals and

EAPC Delegations at NATO

Headquarters.

The EADRCC was previously

involved in Albania following the heavy

snowfall and floods at the beginning of

2015, in Bosnia and Herzegovina after a flood in 2014, and

in Pakistan in 2010 to rescue victims of a flood caused by a

heavy monsoon. Ongoing operations include support to the

eradication of Ebola in West Africa upon UNOCHA’s

demand submitted in September 2014; participation in the

response to the internal displaced persons crisis following

Iraq’s relief assistance request; and implication in the Syrian

refugee crisis in Turkey, as demanded by Ankara in 2012

and again in 2014.

Partnerships And Cooperation

By widening its scope of action, NATO developed

new partnerships with organizations working in the

humanitarian and disaster relief sectors. As illustrated

above, NATO and the UN have been working closely

together, the former complementing and backing up the

missions of the latter. The Alliance has been working

particularly close with the United Nations Department of

Humanitarian Affairs (UN-DHA), a partnership defined

by General Assembly resolution 45/221 , which clearly

outlines the need for NATO’s help to UN-DHA’s

Military and Civil Defence Assets (MCDA) projects. This

cooperation institutionalized and widened the use of

military capabilities in humanitarian missions. For

example, Operation Unified Protector, conducted in

2011 in Libya, aimed to enforce a no-fly zone over Libya

as outlined in UN Security Council Resolution 1973, for

which NATO engaged in direct military confrontation to

protect the UN’s work on the

ground. Another example is

Operation Ocean Shield, which

protects, among others, World

Food Programme ships against

piracy in the Gulf of Aden.

NATO’s 2010 Strategic

Concept also clearly details the

range of the Alliance’s

collaboration with the UN,

namely in peacekeeping missions, counter-terrorism,

combatting piracy, and response to climatic and natural

disasters. In addition, the World Health Organization

(WHO) and the International Federation of Red Cross

and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) have become NATO’s

close partners.

Africa is also a focal point of the Euro-Atlantic

alliance, as illustrated by Mission Ocean Shield but also

by the development of strong cooperation with the

African Union exemplified by NATO’s presence in

Training soldiers of the African Union in Darfur (Photo: NATO)


Darfur (AMIS and UNAIMD) and Somalia (AMISOM).

Upon the request of the regional organization, NATO

has been playing an increasing role in the continent,

supporting the mission in Sudan and Somalia, notably

with sea- and air-lift as well as with planning support to

the African Standby Force (ASF) brigades. In 2014, the

AU and NATO signed an agreement establishing the

creation of the NATO liaison office to the African Union

Headquarters in Addis Ababa to ease future cooperation

between the two entities.

In addition to partnerships with institutions and

regional organizations, NATO has been working

directly with states, as in the case of the United States

after Hurricane Katrina destroyed the South East of the

country and in Pakistan in 2010 following a devastating

earthquake which pushed the local government to

directly ask the Alliance for help.

Contributing To World Stability

It must be pointed out that NATO is not acting

outside its borders purely out of self-interest.

Contributing to the security of unstable regions benefits

the Alliance by preventing disasters from having long

term effects (such as terrorism, asylum seekers and

illegal migrations) which could affect the Euro-Atlantic

community. Engaging in disaster relief also reinforces

the Alliance’s soft power, making NATO a helpful and

attractive organization to be a partner of. However, one

must remember that collective defense is the core

purpose of NATO, along with the values it defends,

namely democracy, human rights, freedom and the rule

of law. Acting publicly in a context of emergency has

the potential to expose the stricken countries to these

principles. Participating in disaster relief can also

improve the military’s image and reputation.

Disaster Relief : Is It Their Role?

The debate whether the military should have a role

to play in disaster relief and humanitarian aid is quite

lively. Some believe that those sorts of interventions

should remain in the hands of neutral international

organizations. NATO, a political-military alliance, does

not fit within this definition. The main argument critics

put forward is the lack of neutrality which accompanies

NATO interventions, on the basis that the Alliance acts

out of interest and not out of selflessness, explaining why

they deploy in certain regions and not in others, and tend

to take sides (the case of Kosovo being widely used to

illustrate this issue). As a result, the 28 member states are

being accused of selective exposure. In addition, the

implication of military capabilities for humanitarian

purposes raises the question of their costs, which are

much higher than if civil capabilities were used. In a time

of financial restrictions, the cost of having recourse to

military infrastructures can be heavy for all parties

involved.

The supporters of NATO’s involvement in disaster

relief, however, point to the advantages that military help

can provide during a crisis. First, military capabilities are

often quicker to deploy than civil ones thus shrinking the

response time between the disaster and the rescue.

Second, the military possesses the unique ability to

provide qualitative and quantitative air- and sea-lift that

the civil sector cannot provide. For example, the added

value of helicopters is undeniable as they allow the

routing of supplies, military hospitals and medical

personnel to the heart of the problem when planes or

trucks cannot. Third, in large-scale disasters, it can

happen that the appropriate organizations get

overwhelmed and their capacities overstretched, thus

necessitating other actors to get involved in the rescue

operations. This however raises the question whether the

military should be part of the first rescuers or be involved

much further down the line.

On the question of selective involvement, it must be

noted that only a few member states are able to deploy

their military forces across the globe, which limits the

possibilities for action. Furthermore, it is more likely that


NATO members will contribute with humanitarian relief,

such as military hospitals or water purifying units than tanks.

Moreover, due to the fact that the Alliance acts as a liaison

between the member states and partners, it has proven

more effective for institutions like the UN or the affected

countries to deal with NATO rather than with the individual

contributors. Finally, several initiatives highlight NATO’s

commitments to the core values of humanitarian and

disaster help, that is neutrality, humanity and impartiality,

in accordance with the UN Guidelines on the use of MCDA

in Complex Emergencies and the Oslo Guidelines.

Conclusion

NATO has become an international actor beyond its

geographical scope and original mission. The Alliance

responded to a gap in disaster relief, working hand in hand

with organizations such as the UN, the AU and governments

to come to the rescue of regions and countries facing an

emergency situation and to prevent the long-term effects of

a catastrophe, whether it is a natural disaster or a

humanitarian crisis. NATO brings added value to the table

and complements the capacities of the other actors involved;

the Alliance does have a role to play in disaster relief, and

should be considered as such. It must, however, be ensured

that the interests and needs of the stricken population and

region are being put before geostrategic and political

considerations if NATO wants to be taken seriously.

Now that Russia has made a comeback in the Alliance’s

priorities, the Alliance will have to find the appropriate

balance to remain an important actor in out-of-area and

disaster response as well as to address the resurging threats

coming from the East.

Flora Pidoux is currently Program Assistant at the

Atlantic Treaty Association. Ms. Pidoux recently obtained a

Masters in International Relations at Université Catholique

de Louvain, Belgium. She is particularly interested in

analyzing the long term effects of history on international

relations and politics.

Assenova, Margarita; “A Debate on NATO’s Evolution – A Guide”; CSIS; 2003

Becker, Elizabeth; Crisis in the Balkans: the aid; With NATO in charge, relief looks less neutral”; The New York Times, 10 Apr. 1999 Available at: http://www.nytimes.com/1999/04/10/world/crisis-in-the-balkans-the-aid-with-nato-in-charge-relief-looks-less-neutral.html

Hofmann, Charles-Antoine & Hudson, Laura, “Military responses to natural disasters: last resort or inevitable trend?”; Humanitarian Exchange, no.44, Sept. 2009; pp.29-31

Jochems, Maurits; “NATO's growing humanitarian role”; NATO Review; Spring 2006 Available at http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2006/issue1/english/art4.html

Maru, Mehari Taddele, “’Resetting AU-NATO relations: from ad hoc military-technical cooperation to strategic partnership”; Research Paper No. 102, June 2014

Palmeri, Francesco; “A Euro-Atlantic disaster response capability”; NATO Review, Vol. 46, No.3, Automne 1998, pp. 24-28 Available at: http://www.nato.int/docu/review/1998/9803-07.htm

NATO “African Union discusses practical cooperation with NATO”, 19 Feb. 2010 Available at: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_61534.htm?selectedLocale=en

NATO “NATO and the African Union boost their cooperation” 13 May 2014 Available at: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_109824.htm

NATO “NATO Allies and partners assist Bosnia and Herzegovina in flood disaster relief ”; 3. June 2014 Available at: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_110060.htm

NATO, “Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Center (EADRCC)”, Available at: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_117757.htm

NATO Civil Emergency Planning, “NATO’s role in Disaster Assistance”, 2001

Pryce, Paul; “Toward a NATO-African Union Partnership: Structuring Future Engagement”; in Baltic Security and Defence Review, Vol.14 Issue 2 (2012)

22nd OSCE Economic and Environmental Forum “Responding to environmental challenges with a view to promoting cooperation and security in the OSCE area”; “Cooperation in Natural Disaster Management and Prevention Coordination between States and between Military and Civilian Actors - Case Study: NATO’s Involvement in Pakistan Earthquake Relief in 2005” FIRST PREPARATORY MEETING Vienna, 27-28 Jan. 2014 Session IV

About the author

Bibliography


By Grace Rosinski

N ATO first considered an official

policy of civil-military cooperation in

the 1990s. With the end of the Cold

War, the cause of global instability shifted from inter-

state cold and proxy wars to intra-state conflict.

NATO was faced with a choice to either maintain its

traditional mandate of collective defence, and become

irrelevant, or expand its capacity to deal with civil

humanitarian crises. The subsequent development of

several doctrines on civil-military cooperation

(CIMIC) both expanded NATO’s capacity and

maintained the Alliance’s reputation as an important

actor in international crisis response.

NATO’s CIMIC doctrine is closely linked to its

original identity as a politico-military alliance. Other

international organisations, like the United Nations

(UN) and the International Committee of the Red

Cross (ICRC), drafted civil-military policies out of a

normative desire to enhance dialogue and promote

humanitarian principles. In comparison, NATO’s

CIMIC doctrine promotes cooperation with civilian

humanitarian organisations (CHOs) only to the extent

that it benefits the Alliance’s military mission. In

practice, this has resulted in widespread criticism by

Human Rights Watch and the International Coalition

for the Responsibility to Protect, among others. These

organisations argue that NATO’s treatment of civilian

concerns is secondary to strategic interests,

particularly during missions like NATO’s air

campaigns in the Balkans in the late 1990s and Libya in

2011.

Effective civil-military cooperation can benefit a

humanitarian operation. A unity of effort would allow

both NATO and CHOs to play to their strengths to

reach both short- and long-term goals related to

security and socio-economic development. So the

question then becomes, why has CIMIC failed to create

meaningful partnerships between NATO and

international organisations? Scholars in trying to answer

this question have focused on analysing CIMIC in

practice, using case studies to illustrate operational

barriers to cooperation. Some attempts have been made

over the years to improve CIMIC operations, and yet no

real progress has been made towards more effective

civil-military cooperation.

This article argues that NATO’s inability to

overcome functional barriers to successful CIMIC is due

to a pervasive culture of control that underlies all of

NATO’s doctrine and behaviour. Although NATO’s

role expanded beyond traditional politico-military

defence to include humanitarian operations, its

institutional nature is still very much tied to its original

mandate. This article first assesses CIMIC doctrine in

order to understand the policy’s development and role,

before examining the functional and cultural barriers to

effective civil-military cooperation. The obstacles

identified by scholars are used as a starting point, and

reveal a common theme underlying these obstacles in

NATO’s obsession with strategic control.

The Development of Civil-Military Cooperation

Militarism and humanitarianism have always

Cooperation Versus Control

In NATO’s CIMIC Doctrine


co-existed in conflict zones, but military actors and

CHOs view civil-military cooperation from opposing

perspectives. For international humanitarian

organisations (IHOs), coordination should work in

support of humanitarian action, i.e. the military restores

order so that CHOs can promote development. From a

military perspective, the goal is to enhance operational

effectiveness. NATO and individual states hope that by

integrating civilian tasks into military strategy,

commanders would have better control over the

mission. Forces would have the autonomy to overcome

logistical ‘barriers’ and be involved in development that

would win the ‘hearts and minds’ of local populations.

Tension therefore rests in deciding what the nature of

civil-military cooperation should be. As Antonio Donini

asked, “Should the humanitarians be better equipped by

the international community to do their job or should

the military be trained to take on tasks other than war or

security?”

The differences in perspective prevented the

development of a universal doctrine. Instead,

international actors developed institutionally-specific

frameworks based on their interests and mandates.

While all institutions once used ‘CIMIC’ to refer to any

civil-military interactions, the term now specifically

refers to NATO’s civil-military doctrine, as codified in

the 2001 Military Policy on Civil-Military Cooperation

(MC 411/1) and the 2003 Civil-Military Cooperation

(CIMIC) Doctrine (AJP-9). Other actors renamed their

approaches in order to distinguish their policies from

NATO’s. For example, the UN uses the term ‘Civil-

Military Co-ordination’ (CMCoord).

NATO’s CIMIC policy was influenced by the failure

of IHOs during humanitarian crises in the early 1990s,

namely Rwanda, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Somalia. For

example, the 1999 Strategic Concept (SC-99), the

foundation for the AJP-9 CIMIC doctrine, was written

in reaction to the UN’s security failures during the

Bosnia crisis and the 1995 Srebrenica massacre. It is

perhaps no wonder that successful civil-military

cooperation is undermined by an obsession with

control, considering that CIMIC was born from a

moment of institutional superiority, in which NATO

strategy had the ability to correct against the failure of

international organisations.

NATO’s CIMIC Doctrine

In NATO policy, CIMIC is defined as “the co-

ordination and co-operation, in support of the mission,

between the NATO Commander and civil actors […].”

Even as NATO’s mandate expanded to include Crisis

Responses Operations (CROs) and peacekeeping, its

focus stayed on the political-military mission.

The foundation of NATO’s CIMIC policy is formed

by two documents: the 2011 Military Policy on Civil-

Military Cooperation (MC 411/1) and the 2003 Civil-

Military Cooperation (CIMIC) Doctrine (AJP-9). An

earlier New Strategic Concept (SC-99) recognised that

“interaction between Alliance forces and the civil

environment (both governmental and non-

governmental) […] is crucial to the success of

operations”, but MC 411/1 and AJP-9 actually codified

CIMIC’s operational nature. Both documents highlight

the benefits of moving beyond the traditional military

mandate to engage with civilian organisations:

“NATO operations are required to account of social,

political, cultural, religious, economic, environmental,

and humanitarian factors when planning and

conducting military operations.” (MC 411/1)

“The immediate purpose of CIMIC is to establish and

maintain the full co-operation of the NATO commander

and the civilian authorities, organisations, agencies and


population within a commander’s area of operations in

order to allow him to fulfil his mission.” (AJP-9)

The CIMIC Doctrine (AJP-9) is based on eleven

principles, five that govern military direction and six

that govern the civil-military relationship. The

military principles include: (1) mission primacy; (2)

command direction, or the goal of maintaining

military effectiveness without creating unnecessary

civil hardship; (3) economy, or avoiding overuse of

military assets on civilian tasks; (4) prioritisation and

concentration; and (5) legal obligations and

humanitarian considerations.

Six principles govern the civil-military

relationship, namely: (1) cultural awareness; (2)

common goals; (3) shared responsibility; (4) consent;

(5) transparency; and (6) communication. Taken

alone, these principles reflect a doctrine based on

respect, collaboration, and burden-sharing, at least in

theory. However, when considered alongside the five

military principles above, it becomes harder to

believe that these six principles of respect would

survive on the ground, during a crisis, in the face of

mission supremacy.

Functionally, trained CIMIC staff are integrated

into the NATO mission command hierarchy, at all

levels beneath operational control (OPCON). CIMIC

staff perform three core functions during a mission:

(1) act as civil-military liaison; (2) support the civil

environment, whether through the provision of

resources or ‘gap-filling’ activities; and (3) support

the force. These functions are performed to varying

degrees at the pre-operational, operational, and

transitional stages of a CRO.

NATO’s culture of control is clearly reflected in

CIMIC’s institutional structure. CIMIC staff only

establish relationships with CHOs; it is ultimately the

decision of the mission Commander whether to

integrate civilian considerations into operations. While

AJP-9 and MC 411/1 assert the necessity of a multi-

faceted approach to peace missions, the extent to

which this is carried out in practice varies. Ultimate

authority always rests at the top strategic level, a stage

of the hierarchy that civilian organisations can not

penetrate.

Barriers to Cooperation

NATO’s de jure CIMIC policy respects the

complexity of modern crises and recognises a need to

work with a variety of actors. Unfortunately, the spirit

of cooperation is not fully reflected in the way CIMIC

functions on the ground. Academics have broadly

defined three barriers to CIMIC’s operational success:

institutional differences, differences in mission, and

differences in skill. A brief look at these barriers

illustrates the nature of civil-military relations, and

begins to expose NATO’s obsession with control.

Institutional Differences

NATO’s institutional design reflects its original

mandate to provide collective defence: its structure is

top-down and hierarchical, missions reflect the

collective political interests of its member states, and

strategy is executed through the use of force. In

contrast, civilian organisations tend to be more

participatory organisations that value the consent and

involvement of local populations. CHOs are not driven

by political interests, but aim to eliminate all suffering

equally while upholding the four humanitarian

principles of humanity, impartiality, neutrality, and

independence.

The institutional differences themselves are not a

barrier to cooperation. Rather, these differences have

become a barrier due to the way NATO structures


interaction with CHOs. While CIMIC staff do liaise

with civilian staff in the spirit of collaboration, the

concerns of CHOs are only integrated in NATO’s

command structure at the operational level, after

strategic decision have already been made. The result

is that CHOs feel isolated from NATO’s policy making

and as if their input is a secondary concern.

Differences in Mission

Another tension underlying CIMIC operations is

that NATO is ultimately a political organisation, while

CHOs are resolutely apolitical. NATO’s missions are

defined by national commanders, and its very

existence depends on the agreement of political actors.

From a military perspective, humanitarian support is a

means to an end, a way of winning the support of local

populations. For CHOs, humanitarianism is both the

means and the end. The danger is that CIMIC might

undermine humanitarian action by blurring the line

between aid worker and soldier, and in turn confuse

the motivations of each group. Unless clear CIMIC

protocols for burden-sharing are established, CHOs

will continue to resist military involvement in civilian

missions.

Differences in Skill

The final barrier is NATO’s failure to recognise its

weaknesses. CHOs have a comparative advantage in

civilian capacity building and long term development,

as they are unencumbered by political mandates and

can better reach local communities. NATO itself is

advantaged by its military nature and experience

tackling traditional security problems. When NATO

steps outside its natural skill set without proper civil-

military coordination, it risks antagonizing CHOs.

During the KFOR mission in Kosovo, NATO

coordinated the movement of refugees as if they were

a commodity, planning the relocation based on

logistical concerns like timeframe and transportation

cost. CHOs widely criticized this approach for ignoring

the social, economic, and personal issues that affect

refugees.

The above issues could all be overcome through

practical changes to CIMIC’s operational role. Official

CIMIC doctrine is barely two decades old, so a functional

issue is that NATO has more experience with traditional

military missions than with humanitarian development.

While some progress has been made, like efforts during

the ISAF mission in Afghanistan to inspire more bottom-

up coordination, the quality of cooperation between

NATO and CHOs has generally remained the same.

Overcoming this will require a fundamental re-definition

of NATO’s role in the post-Cold War world.

NATO’s Culture of Control

The three barriers outlined above all contain a

common theme: a resistance on the part of NATO to

adapt its structure or strategy. NATO’s institutional

obsession with control is appropriate for a traditional

military alliance, but impractical for the aim of effective

civil-military cooperation. When NATO’s CIMIC policy

was introduced, new roles were merely inserted into the

existing hierarchical command structure, while the old

institutional culture remained. The effect of NATO’s

culture of control on civil-military relations is obvious

when you examine three key feature of CIMIC policy:

the principle of mission supremacy, the definition of

CIMIC as a tactical doctrine, and the role of member

states in CIMIC operations.

Mission Supremacy

A commitment to the mission above all else is made

incredibly clear in NATO’s CIMIC policies. Mission

supremacy is listed as the first principle governing the

military direction of CIMIC. In the same document, AJP-


NATO’s culture of control does create more

substantial obstacles to cooperation than the

operational barriers previously identified in the

literature. However, overcoming them would not

require the impossible task of stripping all member

states and commanders from political and military

influence. Instead, gradual changes could be made, like

expanding CIMIC beyond the tactical level to be

considered at the strategic planning stages. Hans-

Jürgen Kasselman, the former Director of the CIMIC

Centre of Excellence, agrees that such change is

possible but recognises that it might take generations

for mind-sets to change.

Conclusion

When NATO redefined its mission after the end of

the Cold War, it failed to simultaneously reshape its

organisational culture. CIMIC policy documents and

SC-99 emphasise the importance of accounting for the

many facets of international crises, and yet NATO’s

structure, including its integration of CIMIC, is still

built around politico-military interests. Even if changes

are made to the operational culture and the above

obstacles, the value of NATO’s civil-military

operations will continue to be undermined by the

Alliance’s desire to maintain unity of command.

Some might argue that NATO has no reason to

correct its culture of control, as it is in its interest to

act with autonomy during international missions.

However, improved cooperation would not only

benefit CHOs, but would also help NATO better fulfil

its military mandate. The theoretical benefits of

CIMIC, like achieving a state of operational

comparative advantage, could become the lived

experience.

This article is not a total condemnation of NATO’s

CIMIC policy. For every criticism laid against NATO

9, the purpose of coordination and cooperation is heavily

conditioned to be only “in support of the mission”. In MC

411/1, CIMIC’s immediate purpose is to support the

commander in his mission. While mission supremacy

may be an operational necessity in military operations, it

damages civil-military cooperation by making CHOs feel

as if their concerns and expertise matter less. Ironically,

in so doing, NATO is undermining several of its own

CIMIC principles, namely communication and shared

responsibility.

CIMIC as a Tactical Doctrine

The definition of CIMIC as a tactical consideration,

and not a strategic concern, relates to NATO’s

commitment to mission supremacy. Missions aims are

established at the joint command level, and CIMIC

personnel then liaise with the commander within the

predetermined mission framework. Under this command

framework, NATO not only casts humanitarianism as a

secondary concern, but also risks contributing to

suffering.

The Role of Member States

CIMIC capability can sit both with NATO command

and with individual nations; member states have their

own CIMIC policies, which are largely identical to

NATO doctrine, but do allow individual states to direct

CIMIC along the lines of national interest. The harm here

is that ‘humanitarian response’ can be used to hide

political action, and in turn cast doubt on all

humanitarian projects in the area. The principles of

humanitarianism, particularly impartiality and neutrality,

are also risked. During the KFOR mission in Kosovo, for

example, the German unit selectively re-settled refugees,

relocating those that had been placed in Germany out of

national self-interest. This sort of manipulation of civilian

tasks discourages cooperation, as CHOs do not want to

risk their own legitimacy.


by human rights organisation, there is a

counterexample of successful CIMIC. Policies of civil

-military cooperation, including CIMIC, have

incredible practical and normative benefits. They

help structure humanitarian interventions while

making the international community their purpose.

The aim of this article was to present a new lens

through which to analyse the merits and pitfalls of

NATO’s CIMIC policy, so that better

recommendations can be made and the international

community, including NATO, can confront

international crises as effectively as possible.

Grace Rosinski received her Masters with

Distinction in International and European Politics

from the University of Edinburgh in 2014. Her MSc

dissertation, “‘Normative Power Europe’: From

Theory to Method”, assessed the normative nature of

the European Union’s international development

policy. Previously, Grace graduated with Honors

from Northeastern University in Boston, where she

studied International Affairs and History. Her

research interests include nationalism, supranational

governance, and EU politics.

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