atlantic voices vol 4, no 12 (december 2014)

ATLANTIC TREATY ASSOCIATION

Atlantic Voices, Volume 4, Issue 12 1

- Flora Pidoux

This year has been crucial for NATO and

the European Union. Both organizations have

elected their new leaders, paving the way for

a new era. Jens Stoltenberg has become the

new Secretary General of NATO and will

have to deal with ongoing crises like Ukraine,

as well as make sure the new direction

developed during the Wales Summit will be

transformed into concrete action.

On the EU side, Federica Morgherini

replaced Catherine Ashton as High

Representative for Foreign Affairs and

Security Policy. She will have to increase the

credibility and visibility of the EU, making

the Commission a respected actor that counts

on the world stage.

The two organizations will have to work

together as they are implicated in the same

dossiers. The challenge is to offer a common

solution, to avoid the duplication of means

that serve the same end. Both institutions

possess unique and complimentary tools. The

EU is a political organization with economic

and diplomatic means of pressure, and NATO

holds military capabilities. Together, the two

alliances hold a powerful combination of soft

and hard power. It is up to the new leadership

to use these capabilities in the smartest way in

order to achieve their common end goals.

(Source: http://www.acus.org )

NATO-EU Cooperation

Volume 4 - Issue 12 December 2014

Contents:

The EU-NATO Relationship – With New Leadership To

New Impetus?

Ms. Andreeva offers a detailed overview of the cooperation between the Euro-

pean Union and NATO, the obstacles to an effective partnership between the

two organizations as well as the need for the EU to strengthen its security poli-

cies.

The NATO-EU Partnership : Opening A New Chapter After The

Ukraine Crisis

Ms. Zyga’s article focuses on the impact recent crises, and especially the one in

Ukraine, have on the NATO-EU partnership. New threats and challenges de-

mand new forms of cooperation and strategic redefinition.


a political arrangement to define the areas of coopera-

tion, the technicalities and strategies of both organisa-

tions in tackling pending security issues, such as the

increasingly uncertain relations with Russia, terrorism,

non-proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and

general crisis management.

A consolidated EU-NATO relationship would mean

combining military with civilian resources, strategic

thinking with soft power. Together the two organisa-

tions would establish a highly effective security actor,

able to tackle any crisis management task that arises,

not to mention a global actor with a strong internation-

al voice. Attempts to cooperate have been made and

structures have even been put in place to that end. So

what stands in the way? The answer lies in the political

will of the members involved. The fact that most posi-

tions are not shared by all members and in all situations

only makes the challenges to more intricate NATO-EU

relations harder. The lack of common strategic thinking

between the two entities, albeit more to the detriment

of the EU than NATO, mostly affects the international

community that is in need of a strong multi-lateral cri-

sis manager.

Background

The EU-NATO relationship could be broadly divid-

ed into four distinct phases. First, the Cold-War stage

of relations was a non-existent one – the then-

European Coal and Steel Community was limited to

economic cooperation, while defence and military is-

sues were a NATO-only prerogative. Second, the post-

Cold-War stage saw attempts of both organisations to

By Christine Andreeva

T he NATO-EU Declaration on European

Security and Defence Policy from 2002

asserts that the relationship between

the two organisations should be based on “effective

mutual consultation, dialogue, cooperation and trans-

parency” and on “coherent, transparent and mutually

reinforcing development of the military capability

requirements common to the two organisa-

tions” (NATO, 2002). Instead, the EU-NATO rela-

tionship seems to be one of “unstrategic partners” –

characterised by “political impasses, inherent incon-

sistencies, persistent contradictions and underlying

inter-organisational rivalries” (Koops 2010.). The

deficiency of consensus and political will among the

members of both organisations, the insufficiency of

defence spending and the lack of a clear definition of

the role that each is set to play in the global security

environment, are among the main factors behind

these dynamics. In addition, an EU apprehensive of

the US driving all defence-related decision-making,

and a NATO, whose American leadership and non-

EU members dread an emancipated European securi-

ty, make for the absence of strategic thinking in col-

lective security today.

The dialogue between the two entities’ governing

bodies has been omitted on several important occa-

sions and the sharing of capabilities is arguably not a

reality anymore – the non-conclusion of the Berlin

Plus Reverse is merely overshadowed by the fact that

the actual Berlin Plus agreements have not been ap-

plied for a decade. There is an overwhelming need for

TheEU-NATORelationship–WithNew

LeadershipToNewImpetus?


adapt to the new geopolitical realities and security chal-

lenges in Europe and its wider neighbourhood. Third

phase was characterized by ambiguity, as what then be-

came the EU, expressed for the first time ambitions in the

field of foreign policy and security. Despite the positive

development of setting up the Berlin Plus agreements,

the lack of clear definition of the EU-NATO relationship

and, more importantly the lack of delineation of responsi-

bilities, caused confusions and duplications, resulting in a

zero-sum game in terms of power balance between the

two (Koops 2010). Similarly,

the shift of the EU away from

NATO and towards the UN as

a security actor, contributed to

further tension in the relation-

ship.

The fourth and ongoing

stage, although seeing more

interactions between the two, also suffers from an obscu-

rity and underlying competition between the EU and

NATO. This has been partly due to the attempts on the

part of the EU to emancipate from NATO as a security

actor, while also owing to the US pivot to Asia and away

from Europe and NATO. The complex geopolitical de-

velopments of the past decade, including the recently de-

teriorated relations with Russia, only complicate the sta-

tus quo even further. The NATO-EU relations are more

than ever in dire need of a re-definition – the security

tasks in Europe and its strategic areas of interest necessi-

tate a clear delineation among the security actors con-

cerned.

NATO has had a fundamental effect on the EU. In the

infant phase of the EU’s CFSP and CSDP, their institu-

tional setup was partly modelled after the Alliance’s own:

the Political and Security Committee of the EU is identi-

cal to the North Atlantic Council, while the European

Union Military Committee and Military Staff are

equivalent to the NATO Military Committee and In-

ternational Military Staff. More importantly however,

NATO laid the basis of a common military culture in

Europe, based on a multilateral cooperation between

participants. The CSDP has since mirrored NATO ac-

tivities and procedures, and has applied lessons learned

from NATO missions. Both have been instrumental in

EU’s attempt of emancipation from NATO, which

reveals the EU’s self-interested approach in this rela-

tionship, arguably in viola-

tion of its own understand-

ing of the principle of effec-

tive multilateralism and

“mutually reinforcing strate-

gic partnership” (Koops

2010; EU, European Securi-

ty Strategy, 2003). Even

more importantly, it shows a lack of strategic thinking

on the EU’s part.

The impact the EU has had on NATO is however

more an intangible one. Although NATO has on more

than one occasion followed suit to EU initiatives, such

as the European Rapid Reaction Force (translated into

a NATO Response Force) and the EU Commission’s

proposal on a Maritime Directive (followed by a

NATO Maritime Security Strategy), still the most im-

portant process to have been duplicated on the part of

NATO is the Eastern European Enlargement. Being

entirely beneficial for the development and democratic

transitions to Central and Eastern European Countries,

it has helped NATO find purpose in the context of ex-

istential questions being posed over it – it developed a

role of a normative agent in terms of the stabilisation

and democratisation of developing countries. (ibid.)

Together the two organisations would es-tablish a highly effective security

actor, able to tackle any crisis management task that arises, not to men-

tion a global actor with a strong international voice.


Berlin Plus

The Berlin Plus Agreements, or the Combined

Joint Force Mechanism, based on “divisible, but

not divided” forces meant that several NATO

structures could be staffed with EU personnel to

be used for crises where NATO was not involved.

The drawback for the EU was that the first choice

remained in NATO’s hands – the Alliance is the

first to decide whether it would get involved in a

crisis or not and only in the latter case could the

EU take action and

use NATO’s capa-

bilities, including

military resources,

thus avoiding un-

necessary duplica-

tions. Ultimately,

however the EU

thought to have

developed enough

of its CSDP to not

need NATO’s as-

sistance for all its

crisis management

initiatives, thus seeing Berlin Plus as an impedi-

ment to its development as a security actor.

One missed opportunity for the EU to impact

NATO was in its only area of comparative ad-

vantage over the Alliance: that of civilian capabili-

ties and post-conflict reconstruction. The proposal

of a Berlin Plus Reverse would have involved pre-

cisely what its name suggests – the EU sharing its

resources in the realm of civilian crisis manage-

ment with NATO. The proposal met strong oppo-

sition, which, understanding the underlying rival-

ries between the two entities is not that difficult to

comprehend. On the EU side, there was the dread of

NATO acquiring also a civilian angle to crisis manage-

ment which would pre-empt the EU’s distinct role as

a crisis manager. From NATO’s point of view, such

an agreement would establish dependence of the Alli-

ance on CSDP capabilities, albeit civilian ones.

Issues Hampering A Closer “Strategic

Partnership”

Lack Of Definition And Delineation Of Re-

sponsibilities

Perhaps one of the

most profound un-

derlying issues in

the EU-NATO rela-

tionship is the in-

herent lack of defi-

nition of both or-

ganisations as secu-

rity actors. Already

at the dawn of the

Cold War, NATO’s

raison d’être was be-

ing questioned, however in the brink of the interven-

tion in the Balkan wars it regained some meaning, as

was the case later with ISAF in Afghanistan. Yet, as

the last troops are now about to be withdrawn from

the latter, it is time for NATO to find a new purpose

to justify its existence in the post-Afghanistan era.

Conversely the EU, or rather CSDP, as a relatively

infant and inexperienced security actor, suffers not

only from overwhelming shortage of military capabili-

ties, but also from a lack of common strategic vision

for its existence, mostly due to the heterogenic per-

ceptions and attitudes by its Member States. The long

-lasting stalemate of EU-NATO relations is mostly to

Jens Stoltenberg, NATO Secretary General and Federica Morgherini, High Repre-

sentative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice-

President of the European Commission meet at the European External Action Summit on

November 4th, 2014 (source: NATO)


same attitudes and dynamics are present on EU level

as well – if anything the Union has been even more

ambivalent, conveying often inconsistent messages. In

the context of this crisis, the EU and NATO will need

to work closer together and define a common posi-

tion towards Russia, or else the “strategic partnership”

will indeed be in peril.

More importantly, the lack of delineationin securi-

ty tasks and crisis management undertakings between

the EU and NATO causes even deeper ambiguity.

Both entities pursue almost identical interests and

carry out “similar, albeit uncoordinated initia-

tives” (Koops 2010). This is on one side a factor for

intensive “mutually reinforcing” cooperation, while

on the other hand creates the risk of rivalry and re-

sulting duplications. Still, geopolitically, the interests

of the EU and NATO do not completely overlap –

e.g. while it would be difficult to commit European

states to interventions outside of the Neighbourhood,

it is hardly difficult to imagine that an EU-led plat-

form would make a much better interlocutor with

MENA countries than a US-led NATO platform.

It would be easier to attribute to the EU a more

civilian/normative power, while NATO remains re-

sponsible for collective defence through hard power.

Since the two organisations have different goals and

approaches in security and crisis management, it

should be easy to identify the more appropriate chan-

nel for action in a given crisis, provided that relations

are sufficiently well-defined and a clear delineation of

responsibilities are put in place. Yet this would be an

ideal, ergo unfeasible scenario, as both the EU and

NATO have rather ambitious aspirations for their

global roles as security providers.

the detriment of the EU, as it is a relatively new secu-

rity provider, composed of undecided partners, many

of which still prefer to allocate the bulk of their ef-

fort, both in terms of commitment and capabilities,

to NATO, as opposed to the CSDP. That deadlock in

the EU security structures however, makes the CSDP

an unreliable partner, reluctant to take charge in cir-

cumstances requiring partner-convergence in crisis

response. Therefore, the self-determination of CSDP

might actually come from task allocation talks with

NATO. With 22 overlapping members, it would

seem simple and self-evident that the tasks in security

provision need to be defined between the two. In-

stead of repeating the same mantra of a “strategic re-

lationship”, which is continuously being reflected up-

on, the two organisations should actually sit together

and define that relationship.

The unfortunate crisis in Ukraine and deteriorat-

ing relations with Russia offer only two potential op-

portunities – that of the EU asserting itself as a global

actor (as the situation is one that very much concerns

Europe itself); and of NATO reaffirming its raison

d’être in its post-Afghanistan era. Instead, the very

different and non-consolidated positions that the EU

and NATO convey only contribute to further ambi-

guity of not only Europe, but also the Western world

as a side in this dormant conflict. While NATO has

attempted to be assertive in its position towards Rus-

sia, no conclusive position has been articulated –

commitment has been expressed towards Central and

Eastern European Countries, yet no concrete action

has been taken to that end, which offers reason for

frustration to those member states. This is partly due

to the ambivalent reactions towards Russia expressed

by some of the Western European States, fearing that

any decisive reaction, especially the deployment of

forces, would escalate the situation excessively. The


The EU As A Security Actor?

As was pointed out above, the European Union

is still a rather infant global actor. Several futile

attempts to bring more focus to foreign and securi-

ty policy at EU level have resulted in frustration of

those looking for further integration in this do-

main, which subsequently lead to regional and bi-

lateral deals on defence throughout Europe (e.g.

the Franco-British military cooperation, the Nor-

dic Defence Cooperation, defence cooperation in

the Visegrad group, etc.). Yet, what is considera-

bly worse is that the EU suffers an overwhelming

expectations-capability gap, which makes the Un-

ion seem less and less as an adequate and reliable

security actor. The EU should rather reconsider its

role in crisis management and focus on civilian and

civ-mil missions, while building up capabilities.

Though, for the EU to transform into a military actor,

it would have to establish permanent forces, a military

academy and official headquarters, for which the

CSDP is not ready at this point in time.

Even further, contributing to the absence of coor-

dinated and sufficiently institutionalised exchange be-

tween the two organisations is the nonexistence of a

congregated European voice in foreign relations.

While in other international organisations the EU is

represented by the converged and convincing voice of

the Commission, this is not the case with NATO.

Even with the overlap of 22 members between the

two entities, those members have not yet managed to

consolidate their positions and preferences on the way

to handle security and defence issues, causing incon-

sistencies in their positions expressed not only in the

framework of the EU and NATO themselves, but also

internationally. Hence, the proposals of establishing a

Working Together for Peace and Security— International Organizations Membership Overlap

(Source: NATO)


European pillar in NATO have been strongly opposed

not only by the US, but also indeed by several EU

member states. Such an initiative being materialised

would not only mean that there would be a stronger

European influence on NATO activities, certainly to

the detriment of non-EU NATO members (thus vio-

lating the third of the three D’s – non-discrimination

of such members), but it would also pose an existen-

tialist question over NATO. (Koops 2010)

The claims made by the new leadership of more

focused and strategic thinking in foreign and security

policy is nothing unheard of in the past decade, yet

one might argue that now is the time for the EU to

start pulling its own weight in terms of defence in its

neighbourhood, which should involve a clearer and

more effective cooperation with NATO. Alternative-

ly, if these claims turn into empty promises with no

real effect, it might be that the Union becomes

trapped in its image of being nothing but an economic

entity.

Balancing Out American NATO Leadership

And European Global Governance Ambitions

The attempted emancipation of EU’s security ac-

tivities from NATO was one of the unspoken factors

that contributed to the tensions between the two or-

ganisations. Even though the CSDP formation was

largely influenced by the US in an attempt to push

Europe into pulling its own weight in terms of securi-

ty of the continent, the actual EU initiatives to build

its own capabilities and image as a defence and mili-

tary actor were hardly appreciated in Washington.

From the EU’s point of view, however, delegating

all security tasks to a US-led NATO is hardly ideal –

this was arguably the main reason for establishing the

CSDP. Nonetheless, with the US pivoting to strategic

interests in the Asia-Pacific and away from Europe,

the American leadership of NATO is less and less a

relevant concept, as the US has become uninterested

in being involved in conflicts in the European Neigh-

bourhood and the Middle East.

Heterogeneity Of Positions And Lack Of Com-

mon Threat Perception

When it comes to the appropriateness of channels

of security provision, the heterogeneity of opinions

among the overlapping members of the two entities is

largely the cause for inconsistencies in the positions

and activities of both organisations. To further com-

plicate matters, there is no shared perception of

threats, which makes it close to impossible to reach

consensus on common action in the unanimity-based

decision-making bodies of both organisations. An

overarching definition of a common threat must be

defined at both EU and NATO levels, as the under-

standings of such are widely divergent across member

states.

Low Defence Spending And Lack Of Pooling

And Sharing/Smart Defence

On both EU and NATO turf there is significant

shortage of military and defence spending. The only

NATO members to spend above 2% of GDP on the

Alliance’s defence are the US, the UK, Greece and

Estonia, while the situation is even more discouraging

on the EU level.

What further deteriorates the situation is the lack

of political will to share resources through Pooling

and Sharing (in EU jargon) or Smart Defence (in

NATO terms). Several member states of both organi-

sations perceive such close cooperation as giving up

control over military capabilities and having no say in

the approach to various crises. The inability to consol-

idate the European defence industry and to a degree

the European armed forces, combined with continued


low defence spending, will in time damage the Euro-

pean technological and military base to such an extent

that it would no longer be competitive in global

terms. (Dempsey 2014)

Another problem that arises in this context is du-

plication. While NATO has much more military re-

sources, the EU has a comparable advantage in civilian

capabilities, which should provide a perfect setting for

successful cooperation, it has happened that both or-

ganisations operate within the same crisis, yet para-

doxically instead of coordinating their activities, they

duplicated in some and left other uncovered (i.e.

AMIS Darfur/ EUFOR Chad).

If the EU NATO member states could collectively

come up with at least some 40% of NATO defence

spending, then that would at least partly alleviate

American frustrations over continuously being the

ones to cover the bulk of the expenses in interven-

tions and crisis management. It would also grant Eu-

ropeans the right to dictate more assertively NATO’s

strategic interests, thus rendering them more autono-

mous in security terms and not less as is the common

misconception.

Cyprus Issue

The unsettled issues and tensions between Cyprus

and Turkey over the latter’s occupation of Northern

Cyprus have been hampering effective EU-NATO

high level consultations for more than a decade. Cy-

prus vetoes Turkey’s participation in the European

Defence Agency (EDA) and other EU defence struc-

tures, while Turkey responds by hindering Cyprus’

use of NATO facilities and its participation in the

Partnership for Peace (PFP). As a consequence, high-

level meetings between the EU and NATO on PSC-

NAC level are being obstructed. In fact, an argument

might be made that Turkey should be entitled to some

form of membership to the EDA, as it took part of the

structures of the Western European Union, including

the Western European Armaments Group – WEAG,

which was eventually transformed into the EDA , thus

leaving Turkey out of the structures.

Recommendations And Prospects

Should the EU and NATO decide to move forward

with their relationship and face global challenges

through a comprehensive approach, they will have to

consider a renewal of the commitments made under

Berlin Plus – if the EU was to assume leadership of

any large military mission, it would need to have

more military and intelligence resources at disposal.

Alternatively, the two platforms may decide to allo-

cate tasks , the EU covering civilian, assistance, train-

ing and border control operations, while NATO re-

serves the exclusive right to intervene in any large

military operations agreed upon by the partners.

It has become clear that the US is no longer inter-

ested in maintaining the security of Europe’s Neigh-

bourhood, meaning that either through its EU-based

organisation, the CSDP, or through cooperation with

its international partners, Europe will have to find a

way to take care of its own Neighbourhood. This will

require a hands-on approach, and in the face of a mul-

titude of issues and crises in the East and South, it will

also require a stronger security and defence focus,

through allocating increased budgetary resources to

defence and military capabilities. The perception of

security and defence in Europe needs to be reformed

– rather than perceiving a strong defence policy as the

first step to warfare, Europeans should realize that in

the face of growing insecurity on the international

scene, it is only smart to step up and make sure that


the continent is completely prepared for any scenario that

might be; even if it is simply for the sake of deterrence.

On a more technical note, it seems like granting Tur-

key some form of EDA membership, even with condi-

tions, might alleviate the political tension in the Greece-

Cyprus-Turkey triangle which currently renders common

EU-NATO endeavours, to a large degree, unproductive.

Furthermore, the election of Cypriot President Nicos

Anastasiades may make the Cypriot reunification cause

somewhat more attainable (Engelen 2014). Although it is

certainly not the only impediment before effective EU-

NATO cooperation, it would most definitely remove

another barrier to formal political consultation between

the two entities.

Reportedly the EU and

NATO coordinate relatively

well on a technical level on the

ground, which would imply

that the “strategic partnership”

is more difficult on a political

and strategic level than it is in

practice. It seems logical then

that a clear definition and de-

lineation of responsibilities needs to be elaborated at least

on paper for the clearer cooperation between the two

security actors.

The search for a post-Afghanistan narrative for NATO

will become all the more challenging the longer it lasts

and will be all the more costly to NATO’s relevance as a

global actor. Arguably, the Ukraine crisis has not rede-

fined NATO’s raison d’être, due to the failure in address-

ing Russia unanimously and convincingly. The Alliance

needs to re-establish a sense of solidarity and consensus

across its members, which should begin from the clear

definition of a common threat perception, to be comple-

mented by situation and capability analysis whenever a

situation is indeed determined to represent a common

threat (Dempsey 2014).

On the EU side, at this point, there are two feasible

scenarios for the advancement of defence coordination.

If NATO develops more as a global organisation, thus

engaging a number of countries outside Europe and

North America, who share the same values of democ-

racy and peacekeeping, there could indeed be a Euro-

pean pillar established, which would allow for a more

consolidated position coming from those countries.

Alternatively, through Permanent Structured Coopera-

tion, or another security platform, the fast-track EU

countries in the field of defence, could cooperate to

the end of developing common capabilities so that they

can tackle security challeng-

es independently, without

over-relying on or duplicat-

ing NATO tasks, albeit still

remaining at the Alliance’s

disposal for joint action.

That would, however, cre-

ate a multi-track Europe in

the field of defence, which

will contribute to deepening divisions and tensions be-

tween member states.

The two organisations are in dire need of new stra-

tegic leadership to provide them with a new vision and

sense of commitment. Recently, as there has been

change of leadership in both EU and NATO, a number

of bilateral meetings have already been carried out be-

tween the two leaders with promises of further coop-

eration in the context of the increasingly complicated

security environment in Europe and the wider neigh-

bourhood. Only time will tell if those promises are to

be realized, but as the EU’s new High Representative

has expressed the ambition to undertake a different

It has become clear that the US is no long-er interested in maintaining the security of Europe’s Neighbourhood, meaning that either through its EU-based organisation, the CSDP, or through cooperation with its

international partners, Europe will have to find a way to take care of its own Neigh-

bourhood.


approach in the field of foreign and security policies,

altogether with a new view on Neighbourhood policy

(including the drafting of a new European Security

Strategy by June 2015), it seems like now is the time

for the organisations to define their approach towards

each other.

Conclusion

NATO and the CSDP need to complement each

other in the circumstances of growing insecurity, es-

pecially in the European Neighbourhood. The argu-

ment of a zero-sum relationship between the two has

no substance to it, as they each have what the other

one needs. With the US gradually becoming disen-

chanted with NATO engagement, it follows that the

organisation will lose in strategic leadership, and its

geopolitical interests might lose clarity and focus. The

EU, through its defence platform CSDP, has in fact

the opposite – the areas of interest are largely clear to

all partners, and the steps to undertake for further

strengthening the platform are mostly clear, yet there

is an overwhelming lack of political will and more

importantly a colossal shortage of military capabilities

- something that is much less manifested in NATO.

The repetitive resort to coalitions of the willing in

the presence of two self-declared security actors is a

very negative signal of the state of collective security

in Europe and its allies. The lack of political will to

reach consensus on most pressing and strategic issues

conveys a message of disunity and implies the fragility

of international commitments, which might even

come to be redundant if these attitudes were to con-

tinue. It appears that the “mutually reinforcing” rela-

tionship between NATO and the EU is more a chal-

lenge than a given, yet both entities need to be up to

the task, especially when Europe’s security is at stake.

Christine Andreeva concluded a Master’s Degree

on European Integration and Development with the

Institute for European Studies (in cooperation with

Vrije Universiteit Brussel). Ms Andreeva’s interests

lie in the field of the EU’s external relations, with a

particular focus on European defence and she has con-

tributed several articles to this domain. Ms Andreeva

has completed two internships at the European insti-

tutions and is currently working at the office of Mr.

Georgi Pirinski, MEP.

Cirakli, M 2014, ‘EU-NATO Relations: Quo Vadis?’, UACES, Ideas on Europe Platform ; viewed 02 December, http://mustafacirakli.ideasoneurope.eu/2014/06/16/eu-nato-relations-quo-vadis/ . Daadler, I 2014, ‘How the three past ages of NATO add up to its future’, Europe’s World, Autumn 2014 Issue. Dempsey, J 2014, ‘Why Defense Matters: A new Narra-tive for NATO’, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, viewed 29 November 2014, http://carnegieendowment.org/files/why_defense_matters1.pdf Duke, S 2008, ‘The Future of EU-NATO Relations: a case of Mutual Irrelevance Through Competition?’, Journal of European Integration, vol. 30, no. 1, pp. 27 – 43. Engelen, K 2014, ‘The Reunification of Cyprus and its Influence on NATO-EU Relations’, June, viewed 23 No-vember 2014, academia.edu database, https://www.academia.edu/7143257/The_Reunification_of_Cyprus_and_its_Influence_on_NATO_EU_Relations European Commission 2003, A Secure Europe in a Better World – European Security Strategy, no. 78367, 20 December 2003, viewed 20 November 2014, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf Koops, J 2010, ‘Unstrateigc Partners: NATO’s relations with the European Union’, in: W Kremp and Berthold Meyer (eds.), Entangling Alliance: 60 Jahre NATO. Geschich-te, Gegenwart, Zukunft, Trier: Wissenschaftsverlag, pp. 41 – 78 Kamp, K-H 2013, ‘NATO-EU Cooperation – Forget it!’, Carnegie Europe, 30 October, viewed 23 November 2014, http://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/?fa=53458 NATO 2002, EU-NATO Declaration on ESDP, 16 December 2002, viewed 29 November 2014, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_19544.htm Ricci, M 2014, ‘The CSDP and NATO, friends, competi-tors or both?’, Nouvelle Europe [en ligne], 17 January 2014, viewed 29 November 2014, http://www.nouvelle-europe.eu/node/1781

About the author

Bibliography


By Ioanna-Nikoletta Zyga

O fficial texts and communiqués describe

the EU-NATO relationship as a genuine

strategic partnership. Allied Heads of

State and Government reaffirmed the EU’s importance as

a partner for NATO at the Alliance’s recent Wales Sum-

mit and underlined that “The two organizations share

common values and strategic interests. In a spirit of full

mutual openness, transparency, complementarity, and

respect for the autonomy and institutional integrity of

both NATO and the EU, and as agreed by the two organi-

zations, we will continue to work side-by-side in crisis

management operations, broaden political consultations,

and promote complementarity of the two organizations

to enhance common security and stability.” In Wales,

NATO leaders also recognized that the current strategic

environment has highlighted the need for further

strengthening strategic partnership between NATO and

the EU For their part, at the Defense Council of Decem-

ber 2013, EU Leaders agreed that “the Common Security

and Defence Policy (CSDP) will continue to develop in

full complementarity with NATO in the agreed frame-

work of the strategic partnership between the EU and

NATO and in compliance with the decision-making au-

tonomy and procedures of each.” Not long after assuming

their posts, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg

and EU’s High Representative for Foreign and Security

Policy Federica Morgherini noted the importance of the

NATO-EU partnership at a joint press point in early No-

vember. In the words of NATO’s new Secretary General,

“The EU is an essential and a strong partner of NATO.

We share the same values, we share many common mem-

bers, and we also share common challenges. To the

East, and to the South”.

In practice, NATO and the EU do work together

on issues of common interest; they hold political con-

sultations, cooperate in the Balkans and Afghanistan as

well as on capabilities through their Smart Defense and

Pooling and Sharing initiatives, and they are fighting

piracy off the coast of the African Horn. However,

despite the rhetoric of cooperation and the practical

achievements, the EU-NATO partnership has not

reached its full potential.

Recent security developments, particularly the bla-

tant invasion of Ukraine, the prolonged civil war in

Syria and now the terror threat of ISIS in Iraq (and be-

yond) demonstrate the need for stronger cooperation

between NATO and the EU. The Ukraine crisis, in

particular, has brought security to the forefront of the

strategic discussion both for NATO and the EU. It

marked NATO’s return to its roots, that is to say the

renewed centrality of Article 5 and Collective Defense

over its other two core tasks, cooperative security and

crisis management. The crisis also brought violent con-

flict right into EU’s backyard and forced the EU to re-

assess its policies.

These developments have once again underscored

the mission and purpose of NATO and the EU. Simul-

taneously, they are also evidence of the effects of leav-

ing a leadership vacuum in addressing global conflicts

and they underscore the need for strong transatlantic

cooperation as the world continues to look to the West

for leadership in addressing global concerns. In today’s

security landscape, strengthening cooperation be-

TheNATO-EUPartnership:OpeningANew

ChapterAfterTheUkraineCrisis


tween NATO and the EU is a strategic imperative.

Why Work Together?

There are compelling reasons for NATO and the

EU to work more closely. First, member states of the

two institutions face the same threats. The EU’s Eu-

ropean Security Strategy and NATO’s Strategic Con-

cept identify a strikingly similar threat of security

challenges. Second, today, and following subsequent

enlargement rounds from both NATO and the EU,

the membership overlap of NATO and the EU is sig-

nificant; both institutions seek to safeguard the securi-

ty interests of 22 common member states. Third, the

rapidly changing security environment calls for great-

er cooperation between the EU and NATO. The new

challenges are diverse, un-

predictable, and intercon-

nected. Security threats such

as global terrorism and Is-

lamic extremism, cyber war-

fare, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction,

problems related to energy security, climate change,

illegal movements of capital, and maritime piracy-

challenges that were once labeled emerging- are today

part and parcel of our security landscape. Further, the

nature of combat has changed. Hybrid warfare is in-

creasing, as exemplified by Russia’s use of the “little

green men” in Ukraine. These wide-ranging challeng-

es are difficult to counter with traditional military

strategy. A comprehensive approach -a civil-military

approach- to tackle them is necessary. In the words of

former NATO Secretary General, Jaap De Hoop

Scheffer, “There is no stronger civil player than the

European Union. And there is no stronger military

alliance than NATO”.

What is more, the challenging security context in

which the two institutions operate is at present

marked by the crisis in Ukraine, in light of which,

reinforcing EU-NATO ties has gained new urgency.

The Ukraine crisis constitutes the most serious shock

to the European security system since the end of the

Cold War took place. Russia’s annexation of Crimea

signaled a shift away from the fundamental premise

upon which Euro-Atlantic security has been based.

The West no longer sees Russia as a partner. Rather,

Russia is viewed as a potential adversary. Russia’s ac-

tions in Ukraine pose a challenge to European securi-

ty, to the vision of a Europe “whole, free and at

peace” and to the global order. NATO allies and EU

member states remain committed to this vision. So

far, the two institutions have managed to take a uni-

fied stance vis-à-vis Russia’s aggression in Ukraine.

Acting in unison with

each other is required not

only in the face of ongo-

ing pressure from Russia

(and ISIS), but in order to

effectively manage future crises as well.

The declining defense budgets across Europe due

to the financial crisis should also be added to the list of

reasons favoring cooperation between the two institu-

tions. Stagnating or shrinking defense budgets dictate

for greater cooperation and avoidance of unnecessary

duplication efforts. Member states of NATO and the

EU cannot afford to waste precious resources on

overlapping responsibilities.

Finally, the fact that the United States is refocusing

its foreign policy toward the Asia-Pacific region at a

time when the EU is encircled by crises should also

serve as incentive for closer cooperation. The US re-

balancing has sparked calls from both the US and Eu-

ropean countries for Europe to start paying more at-

tention to its security and defense needs, and rightful-

ly so. The operations in Mali and Libya exposed sig-

Russia’s actions in Ukraine pose a chal-lenge to European security, to the vision of a Europe “whole, free and at peace” and to

the global order.


nificant shortfalls in a range of European capabilities and

highlighted the limits of Europe's military power. The EU

should take its own security in its own hands. An EU that

is stronger militarily would certainly be beneficial for

NATO as U.S. political priorities have changed.

Undoubtedly, closer cooperation between NATO and

the EU is more needed than ever. The two institutions

should capitalize on the current momentum created by

security developments in their strategic landscape and

strengthen the quality of their relations. The recent

change of leadership in NATO and the EU also provides

new impetus for cooperation over European security be-

tween the two. Europe’s newly elected President of the

European Council, Donald Tusk, is an Atlanticist and be-

lieves in EU integration, especially for security reasons.

New NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg has

stressed the need for increased collaboration right from

the beginning of his tenure, stating that he will personally

“strive for an even closer cooperation between NATO

and the European Union” especially as they cover much of

the “same geographical area.” For her part, the new EU

High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Poli-

cy Federica Morgherini has also signaled her intention for

closer EU-NATO ties by stating that “cooperation should

improve” at a press conference right on her second day in

office. The political will seems to be there.

Obstacles To Demonstrating The Partnership’s

Full Potential

The participation problem is probably cited by analysts

as the single largest obstacle for closer relations between

NATO and the EU, such as the example of Turkey who

blocks the admission of Cyprus into NATO.

Furthermore, differing memberships of NATO and

the EU also hamper cooperation between the two organi-

zations, mostly in practical terms, such as the exchange of

information or the format meetings should

have. Simultaneously, neutral member states of the EU

continue to be wary of close co-operation between the

EU and NATO.

Dividing lines among EU member states with re-

gards to the role the EU should play in foreign and se-

curity policy also create problems in the NATO-EU

relationship. Some EU nations view the EU-NATO

partnership as a zero sum game. Atlanticist countries

within the EU are strong advocates of a strong NATO,

and view the development of the CSDP with skepti-

cism as they fear that the CSDP will weaken NATO

and the transatlantic bond it represents. Others argue

that the EU needs to stop being a “military worm” and

serve as a credible security provider for its member

states. Further, some European member countries see

NATO as a US dominated institution which is used to

serve American interests which are not always aligned

with European ones. As such, these member states

want the EU to develop an independent military arm

and a more autonomous defense identity.

The fact that the CSDP itself constitutes a work in

progress, as EU member states have different security

goals, different geographic focuses, different percep-

tions of whether EU needs a stronger military arm or

not, different approaches to the use of force has also

had an impact on the development of EU-NATO ties.

Finally, inter-institutional competition is also per-

ceived as an obstacle to improving relations between

the two institutions. According to this argument, the

EU considers itself a superior institution whose mem-

bers genuinely invest in integration and represents the

future while NATO is seen as being a relic of the past.

The Road Ahead

In order for NATO and the EU to achieve the stra

tegic partnership the 21st century needs, the two insti-

tutions need to work on a new roadmap for coopera-


tion. NATO and the EU could start with a joint

review to identify common threats and set their

level of ambition regarding cooperation in mutu-

ally agreed areas. After that, the two organizations

should proceed with identifying those areas where

they offer complementary institutional skill sets.

This requires a frank review of capabilities,

wherein each organization is willing to engage in

an open discussion about their respective

strengths and weaknesses. This in turn will ensure

that the strengths of each institution will be opti-

mized for a comprehensive approach to security

and defense cooperation, capitalizing on the

unique political, civil, and military capabilities of

the two.

A comprehensive strategic dialogue regarding

the threats and challenges facing the two institu-

tions today is also very much needed. A step to

achieve this would be through strengthening the

links between the EU’s Situation Center and

NATO’s Situation Center. NATO and the EU

should also work together on monitoring and as-

sessing strategic security developments and infor-

mation sharing to raise strategic awareness on is-

sues such as cyber security, energy security and

terrorism.

Prior to that, and at a time when destabiliza-

tion hovers around Europe’s periphery, the EU

should update its Security Strategy of 2003 to take

into account recent strategic developments and

risks, identify its strategic objectives and priori-

ties, formulate its strategic vision and set its level

of ambition as a security provider. For its part,

NATO must find the right balance between its

three core tasks: At Wales, Allied leaders agreed

that NATO will in part shift its attention to terri-

torial defense in response to the Ukraine crisis.

Yet, in today’s unpredictable security environment

where security challenges transcend geography

NATO cannot afford to become inward-focused.

NATO must be adaptive to the evolving security envi-

ronment, and this can only be accomplished by work-

ing with and engaging partner countries to counter

new and diverse threats. In addition to increasing co-

operative security, NATO should not shy away from

preparing to confront the next crisis. The Alliance has

both the means and institutional knowledge to re-

spond effectively in a crisis. Both of these capabilities

must continue to be cultivated, with increased train-

ing, planning, and cooperation.

Particularly in light of the crisis in Ukraine, the EU

and NATO should increase political consultations re-

garding recent developments in the post-Soviet space,

a region of strategic uncertainty. As Russia is pursuing

post-Soviet integration in Eurasia, other countries,

particularly those of South Caucasus and Central Asia

might be used as power play between the two sides.

These countries are vulnerable to Russia’s manipula-

tion who wants to regain predominance over the for-

mer Soviet space through means like military pres-

ence and manipulation of ethnic conflicts. The EU and

NATO could devise a concerted approach vis-à-vis

the region to shape the future orientation of these

countries and help them build resilience against po-

tential hybrid warfare with an emphasis on security

sector reforms.

In the operational domain, NATO and the EU al-

ready closely cooperate in maritime operations off the

Gulf of Aden. EU Atalanta and NATO Ocean Shield

operate side by side, which allows for the develop-

ment of a strategic culture between the two institu-

tions. Both NATO and the EU will continue to be

actively involved in this domain for the foreseeable

future, and strengthening cooperation in the field of

planning and training is required.


When it comes to capabilities, more coordination

on policy planning and capability development is nec-

essary. In the area of rapid Reaction Force Planning,

joint exercises to develop interoperability and con-

structive cooperation between EU battle groups and

NATO’s Response Force should take place.

Conclusion

The crisis in Ukraine greatly demonstrates the fra-

gility and volatility of today’s strategic landscape in

which threats increase in number and complexity,

asymmetric challenges emerge and the risk of sym-

metric threats is growing. At the same time, the de-

velopments in Ukraine pose a fundamental challenge

to the post-Cold War order in Europe and bring the

change of borders by force and territorial conflict

back to Europe.

Enhanced trans-Atlantic security cooperation is

requisite to tackle today’s challenges which can

emerge not only from our increasingly insecure and

unstable neighborhood but also stem from beyond

NATO’s or EU’s borders. In the security environ-

ment of the 21st century just military forces do not

suffice. The case for a comprehensive approach, a

combination of all relevant military and civilian assets

is now stronger than ever. In this ever-changing

world, the transatlantic relationship constitutes a

source of stability and deepened security cooperation

is critical if the West is to maintain the ability to be

both reactive and proactive in responding to global

threats. The EU and NATO represent two sides of

the same strategic coin and the developments in

Ukraine should serve as a catalyst for the two organi-

zations to strengthen their cooperation.

In an era of tight defence budgets, an arc of uncer-

tainty and instability in our neighborhood and the

challenge posed by a newly assertive Russia, there is

new impetus for stronger cooperation between

NATO and the EU. It is now time to harness the two

institutions’ relative strengths in a pragmatic way to

address the security challenges facing their members.

Ioanna-Nikoletta Zyga works as a foreign policy

advisor at the European Parliament. She has previou-

sly worked at the Cooperation and Regional Security

Division of NATO's International Military Staff

NATO, “Active Engagement, Modern Defence. Strategic concept for the Defence and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization,” 19-20 November 2010, http://www.nato.int/strategic-concept/pdf/Strat_Concept_web_en.pdf, 28. NATO, “Wales Summit Declaration Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Wales,” 5 September 2014, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_112964.htm?mode=pressrelease. European Council, European Council Conclusions, 18 September 2013, ) https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/140214.pdf, 2. NATO, Doorstep statement by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg upon arrival at European Union Foreign Affairs Council, 18 November 2014, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_114859.htm. NATO, NATO Secretary General, Jaap De Hoop Scheffer, “NATO and the EU: Time for a New Chapter,” 29 January 2007, http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2007/s070129b.html. NATO, “Press conference by incoming NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg,” 2 October 2014, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_113488.htm?selectedLocale=en. Andrew Rettman, “Who is Tusk and what does he mean for the EU,” http://euobserver.com/institutional/125427, EU observer, 01 September 2014. EEAS, “Remarks by High Representative Federica Moghe-rini following her meeting with NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg,” 5 November 2014, http://www.eeas.europa.eu/statements-eeas/2014/141105_03_en.htm.

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