atlantic voices - cooperative security & smart defense
TRANSCRIPT
YOUTH ATLANTIC TREATY ASSOCIATION (Supported by ATA)
Atlantic Voices, Volume 6, Issue 05
- Flora Pidoux
How can NATO address new and potent
security challenges with limited financial
means? This is the puzzle the European Allies
have been trying to solve since the
resurgence of direct security threats.
The answer is simple: cooperation.
Cooperative security is a key component of
NATO which has been replaced by crisis
management since the end of the Cold War.
Today, cooperation must be brought back to
the surface, a task which is difficult to
achieve.
NATO members collectively have the
capacity to protect the continent; however,
they are reluctant to share their military
capabilities with their neighbors via a
supranational body, such as the UN or the
EU, which could coordinate the
international effort to fight off terrorism and
other current dangers. The first article will
analyze the efforts of each organization in
regards to cooperative security.
Some cooperative programs have been
put in place, notably through NATO’s Smart
Defence program. The German-Netherlands
cooperation, which will be discussed in the
second article, is proof that international
cooperation can work. There is still a long
way to go before all 28 Allies follow this
example.
Cooperative Security & Smart Defense
Volume 6 - Issue 05 May 2016
Contents:
The Future of the EU’s Pooling & Sharing and NATO’s
Smart Defence
Ms. Christine Andreeva compares the European Union’s and NATO’s
cooperative defense strategies. Each system presents advantages and both share
many similarities, however, it seems counterproductive for both to exist.
Germany and the Netherlands: Leading the Way in
Defence Cooperation
Ms. Marianne Copier details the cooperative efforts implemented by the
Netherlands and Germany, namely the 1 (Germany/Netherlands) Corps, in
order to merge their forces and thus cut down the costs of securing Europe.
Military jackets of soldiers coing from various NATO member states hanging side by side (Photo: 1GNC)
Atlantic Voices, Volume 6, Issue 05 2
By Christine Andreeva
C ollaborative defence engagement,
albeit not a new idea in itself, appeared
in the frameworks of the European
Union (EU) and NATO between 2010-2012, during
the height of the financial crisis. Austerity politics
projected dire budget and investment cuts in the field
of security and defence, making both organisations
realise the necessity to put in place multilateral
collaboration projects and collective capability-
building. These efforts aim to emulate economies of
scale effect and therefore achieve their perceived
benefit of heightened efficiency at lower costs and
streamlined efforts.
What this paper aims to examine is how pooling
and sharing initiatives have performed so far, if there is
an added value to them, and whether these strategic
programmes have managed to impact the political
mind set of perceived national supremacy and
sovereignty in defence matters. Is there a future for at
least one of these initiatives, or do they simply exist to
convey the message of cooperation and convergence?
The European Union’s Pooling & Sharing
The “Ghent Initiative”, instigated by EU member
states, was kicked off in September 2010; the idea of
pooling and sharing (P&S) was already embedded in
the 2003 European Security Strategy, emphasising the
importance of capability development through
avoidance of duplication and better interoperability.
The European Defence Agency (EDA) took upon the
first projects in November 2011 and subsequently set
up a Code of Conduct (CoC), indicating pooling and
sharing procedures, expectations, and stipulating that
the EDA shall report to national authorities once per
year on progress and implementation.
The P&S’s short-term objectives, which set it apart
from simple best practices exchange, include capability-
sharing, interoperability and streamlining of
standardisation, common training exercises, purchase
of expensive large-scale equipment, and better
preparedness and inclusiveness of common operations.
The most ambitious goal of P&S is the mainstreaming of
convergence into national defence planning and
encouragement of common capability development
plans in order to achieve greater conjunction of
capabilities in their full life-cycle. That would,
however, involve convergence of political attitudes,
military perceptions, and national interests too.
The terminology behind the concept indeed implies
a similar shift: pooling refers to setting up multinational
structures where member states contribute capabilities
proportionally to their abilities, focus, and relevant
allocation; sharing refers more to the security tasks at
stake, whereupon it is implied that European threats
and geopolitical issues are shared and should thus be
tackled together, and not just by the members who are
closest geographically.
The added value of P&S in terms of capability
development is that projects pertaining to the initiative
are meant to be largely shielded from budget cuts on
national and EU levels, which would imply some level
of priority of multilateral projects over national ones
(although member states could not be expected to
undermine their priority projects).
The agreement’s major loophole, however, is that it
The Future of the EU’s Pooling & Sharing and NATO’s Smart Defence
Atlantic Voices, Volume 6, Issue 05 3
is only politically biding and not legally binding which, as
a general rule, precludes progress.
The EDA’s Capability Development Plan
The Capability Development Plan (CDP) was meant
as an overarching strategic tool for capability
development directions, pinpointing capability gaps, and
short/long-term goals of convergence. The major
shortfall that prevents it from promoting further
progress is its foundation on voluntary contributions
from member states, which are not necessarily indicative
of the actual gaps and necessities, but may be
symptomatic of selective information sharing. The CDP
is still based on the Helsinki Headline Goal 2003, which
is outdated.
Progress
By 2015, 59 Pooling & Sharing projects had
commenced, whereupon four member states have been
involved the most (Germany, France, Italy and Sweden),
while several others have been interested in initiating
such ventures (Belgium, Netherlands, Spain, Finland and
Austria). The main focuses of the projects can be divided
into two strands: Armament and Development, and
Operational Capability and Command. While this may
seem encouraging, in reality it means that member states
would rather engage on small-scale tasks in the initial
stages of capability provision and in the facilitation of
standardisation and interoperability. Member states seem
to prefer to help each other in terms of research and
mutual recognition, rather than share troops,
capabilities, and equipment. P&S tends to put a strong
emphasis on civil-military synergies, which are key for
the EU capability development, while Training and
Education is perceived both by the EDA and member
states to have potential for added value and integration.
The most successful project to date has been "air-to-air
refuelling”, while other notable achievements have been
Future Air Systems, GO GREEN (European Armed
Forces), European Air Transport Fleet (EATF),
LAVOSAR, and Remotely Piloted Aircraft System
(RPAS).
NATO’s Smart Defence
NATO’s Smart Defence was set up at the Chicago
Summit of May 2012, although it was first mentioned
by Anders Fogh Rasmussen at the 2011 Munich Security
Conference and was aimed at achieving the goals of
Forces 2020: up-to-date capabilities that are closely
interconnected, homogeneously trained, and
purposefully led and therefore easily deployable for
international operations. In contrast to its EU
counterpart, Smart Defence (SD) aimed from the outset
to also converge future defence planning, by balancing
out national capabilities and aiming to oblige members
to incorporate targets in their national programmes and
coordinate defence budget cuts. In time, this was
expected to provide for the development and
acquisition of those resources that the Alliance needs
most, helping to close capability gaps, and ensuring a
fairer burden- and cost-sharing.
Smart Defence consists of three components:
Prioritisation (top-down alignment of national
capability development to NATO targets);
Cooperation (capability pooling to cut down costs and
enhance interoperability);
Specialisation (allocation of competences, with
narrow focus and direct effect on sovereignty).
Specialisation is a key concern for multilateral
collaborations and convergence as member states are
apprehensive of having to specialise their armies, which
would make them “capable” in a narrower field, with
possible implications on defence markets, competition,
military staff and preparedness. NATO incorporates this
concern in such a way that it is adequately addressed via
targeted initiatives. Specialisation is de facto already
taking place, while NATO's aim with Smart Defence is
Atlantic Voices, Volume 6, Issue 05 4
to systemise and streamline it, focusing on national
strengths and targeting the deepest gaps.
The main issue for SD is once again the insufficient
political will of nations, who are encouraged to lead the
process and designate projects to be involved in.
The long-term vision of SD is the ambition to evolve
from small-scale modest projects to larger, even regional
initiatives, while gradually realigning capability
development to establish a common NATO doctrine.
The NATO Defence Planning Process
In contrast to the young EU counterpart initiative,
NATO’s oversight on strategic capability building is
significantly more mature and engaging. The NATO
Defence Planning Process (NDPP) sets specific national
targets, instead of simply spelling out capability goals;
those targetsare subsequently adapted to member states’
defence programmes and strategies. The NDPP’s main
drawback is considered to be the absence of a binding
linkage to the systematic recommendations of the Allied
Command Transformation (ACT), the body responsible
for setting goals and directions for future capability
development, causing its focus to be more on current or
short-term necessities.
Progress
There are currently 26 multinational SD projects with
six having been finalised. These have gained modest
success and general progress, mainly due to most of the
endeavours being of relatively small-scale and prudent
ambition, largely oriented towards maintenance of
equipment and joint training. Nevertheless, initiatives of
Smart Defence have provided new incentive for NATO’s
ongoing strategic programmes: Missile Defence, Alliance
Ground Surveillance, Air Policing and Intelligence,
Surveillance and Reconnaissance. Furthermore, the topic
has become prominent at NATO Summits, which are
intended to prioritise the importance of SD and give
general direction for its further development. Similarly to
the P&S, most SD projects involve air capabilities such as
Jet aircraft upgrade, Multinational Aviation Training
Centre, pooling maritime patrol aircraft. There have
been, however, efforts to diversify projects with
Multinational cyber defence capability development and
Pooling Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear
(CBRN) capabilities – both absent from P&S projects.
Comparison and Potential
Political Will and Preference
As per NATO’s primacy as a collective security
provider and guarantor, the Alliance is undeniably
perceived by member states as the more appropriate
channel of engagement, due to its mature and manifold
instruments of engagement.
Additionally, the EU’s meagre status as a security actor
does not inspire confidence in its abilities to guide
capability building. The Union needs a stronger security
policy with more effective institutional and legal
frameworks and mechanisms of cooperation, as well as a
firmer and convincing leadership to engage member
states. Alternatively, the EU would be better advised to
stay clear of defence matters, as it is thus far largely
unprepared and ill-equipped to deal with them.
Procedural Elements
The two frameworks are rather similar in structure,
objectives, procedures and implementation. The strategic
advantage of the SD is its binding nature, whereupon
specific national targets are determined and subsequently
implemented by member states. In the context of low
political will, a binding approach in security cooperation is
guaranteed to provide better results in terms of output
and even successful outcome.
Contrary to the EU, NATO has developed a
communication strategy for the initiative of Smart
Defence, which delivers a more convincing narrative.
Special Envoys, one of which is Deputy Secretary-General
Vershbow, have been designated to promote SD, making
Atlantic Voices, Volume 6, Issue 05 5
the venture more attractive to member states and
industry alike, as well as non-members that NATO
occasionally engages with.
CDP vs NDPP
Both planning processes aim for the same end go: to
encourage members to converge capabilities in their
full life-cycle and in the long-term to adjust defence
planning processes to set rather ambitious targets,
which is necessary to achieve progress. CDP focuses
exclusively on European capabilities and gives a clear
idea on their gaps and availabilities. The main difference
between the two capability planning mechanisms is
their binding force: many member states adapt their
national programmes and strategies in accordance with
NATO’s NDPP targets and objectives but not
necessarily following the EU’s CDP. The linking up of
the two processes has been discussed as to avoid the risk
of duplication of capability programmes and excessive
administrative burden. The lack of consensus results in
the logical presumption that members would usually
choose NATO for such engagement.
Stalemates and Recommendations
European states who are members of both
organizations are expected to assume initiative of both
P&S and SD projects, with the argument that they
would intuitively identify gaps and potential for
cooperation. By renouncing exclusive initiative rights
with this bottom-up approach, the EDA risks inactive
tendencies and sluggish progress, as nations would
rarely choose the EU as the platform for security
cooperation, partly for reasons of resentment of EDA
budget scrutiny. Nevertheless, a top-down approach is
also often unproductive: there is bound to be resistance
to a supranational body dictating priorities and targets
in national capability building.
The lack of trust between member states is one of
the most severe issues stalling progress on collaborative
projects. The wide capability gaps and unwillingness of
certain member states to share with the “less capable”
nations cause the latter to dread mutual dependence
and the insecurity of the commitment. Members of
both organisations still do not fully trust each other on
sensitive issues and are apprehensive of the availability
of common resources in times of an operation or crisis,
a fundamental concern that has the potential of being a
constant stalemate if not properly addressed. This
could be institutionally tackled via more binding
commitments imposed by the two overarching
organisations.
Member states also tend to prefer bilateral and
regional constellations, such as the Visegrad Group and
the Weimar Triangle for instance, according to
geographical proximity and comparable size, shared
strategic culture and political interests, etc. This could
be a useful instrument for the EU and NATO, as their
engagement in pooling and sharing could be
encouraged and subsequently used to foster inter-
cluster coordination, to move towards greater
integration.
Bureaucratic burden can drive national authorities
away from cooperation. Strenuous implementation,
red tape, and duplicative administrative tasks are better
kept at a minimum, to avoid discouragement and
interruption of projects.
Financing issues could become counterproductive
in the context of defence budget cuts. The EU's Athena
mechanism and NATO's Framework Nation concept
both translate into "costs lie where they fall", which
means in practice that the member state(s) that
contributes the most troops and capabilities is left with
the bulk of the costs, which provides not only for
financial reluctance, but for risk-based disinclination to
deploying troops.
Some duplication and overlap are to be expected
Atlantic Voices, Volume 6, Issue 05 6
with programmes of such content, involving 22 of the
same member states. Communication and
benchmarking between NATO and the EDA is
instrumental in this respect in order to avoid
duplications and gaps, in projects and capabilities, as
well as to achieve a general alignment of approaches
and objectives, a crucial component in the EU-NATO
Capability Group. Although there have been no
common P&S–SD projects to date they are
recommendable to configure duplication areas, and
might foreseeably be initiated as consequential effect
to an eventual TTIP adoption. Furthermore, each
organisation has six non-overlapping members—
twelve countries in total— who benefit from the
similar programs on two different organisational
levels.
Should the EU and NATO political leaderships
decide to delimitate their security tasks - for example,
the EU could specialise on small-scale crisis
management and post-conflict stabilisation, while
NATO handles the
larger operations - this
would effectively mean
that they could delineate divergent priorities in
capability development and training, thus precluding
duplication, ensuring complementarity and focusing
more on capacity-building.
In order to maximise progress on pooling and
sharing, both the EU and NATO need to establish
clear definitions of targets and successful outcomes, to
involve monitoring and follow-up mechanisms, and to
clarify what types of capabilities and resources could
be subject to cooperation. Such clarifying actions
would help iron out differences in perception and
approach.
Defence planning has largely become an
institutional, instead of a political task. For the EU to
gain a stronger security leverage, the stipulation of an
annual European Council meeting on defence is
recommended, so as to compel heads of state and
governments to regularly discuss security matters, thus
providing adequate leadership and aligning national
approaches. This would also effectively bind foreign and
defence ministers through means of the final declarations
adopted in this constellation.
The EU spends about €190bn on defence per year,
which is still insufficient for Europe to autonomously
defend itself, while the saving gains from P&S are
estimated at €300 million, which could be allocated to
further training or capability development projects. The
EU and NATO leaderships are advised to better present
potential and tangible gains and launch projects financed
through saving gains, in order to provide better
incentive for new initiatives. Regularly taking stock of
lessons learned and positive outcomes of multinational
operations could also inspire confidence and raise
ambition for
engagement.
Defence industry
implications, including
industry disenchantment, market fragmentation and
shrinkage, as well as stalled progress in research and
development, should be seriously addressed as they have
a detrimental effect on Europe's industrial and
technological base.
Potential for Future Development
The fact that there is no up-to-date literature and
assessment of either initiative is indicative of lost
impetus and low ambition. The two initiatives, although
commendable in their approach, have achieved modest
success, having large overlapping goals and similar
projects. This does not, however, mean to imply that
the two cancel each other out or that they deliver no
added value, but it is not surprising that the two
“"Cooperation in defence is still not a natural reflex."
- Jorge Domecq, EDA's Chief Executive
Atlantic Voices, Volume 6, Issue 05 7
initiatives are not performing as well as expected;
nevertheless, this should not be construed as a
discouraging signal. European nations have taken decades
to integrate far simpler policies. One should not
underestimate the so-called “spillover” effect of European
integration; the consolidation of one policy often leads to
that of another.
The issue of perceived supremacy of national
sovereignty in defence remains a stalemate to
collaboration. While the negative economic implications
should intuitively bring states closer together in
integration, they have the opposite effect of making them
look inward and focus on national politics, budgets, and
short-sighted campaign-wining tactics. Channelling
security through multilateral cooperation entails
acknowledging that nations are no longer able to
autonomously guarantee their citizens' security, while a
multinational corps implies a lesser degree of political
recognition and credit. For national authorities this is
difficult to do and so is convincing the public that in times
of austerity and budget cuts military spending should be
increased.
Future opportunity lies within the strategic reviews in
development - the publishing of the EU's Global Strategy
on Foreign and Security Policy (June) and the upcoming
NATO Warsaw Summit (July). Both are occasions for
strategic oversight and recommendations, which could
provide new impetus and incentives for further
engagement in P&S and capability consolidation.
The change of approach in security since the Cold
War entails shifting from a threat-based model to a
capability-based one, implying the necessity of military
capacity-building. The progressively higher number of
terrorist attacks, failed states, regional and international
conflicts, and the high number of European victims they
are producing should point out to European policy-
makers that security is no longer an exclusively national
prerogative – today it affects the citizens of Europe and
the world across borders alike.
Christine Andreeva concluded a Master’s Degree in
European Integration and Development at the Institute
for European Studies (in cooperation with Vrije
Universiteit Brussel). Ms. Andreeva’s interests lie in the
field of the EU’s external relations, with a particular
focus on European defence policy and counter-
terrorism. Ms. Andreeva completed internships at the
European institutions and for the past one and a half
year has been working at the European Parliament, at
the office of Mr. Georgi Pirinski, MEP.
European Parliament Research Service, (June
2015), State of play of the implementation of EDA’s pooling and
sharing initiatives and its impact on the European Defence Industry,
Brussels: European Parliament.
E u r o p e a n P a r l i a m e n t R e s e a r c h
Service, (December 2013), The cost of Non-Europe in Common
Security and Defence Policy, Brussels: European Parliament.
Mölling, (June 2012), Pooling and Sharing in the EU and
N AT O, B er l in : S t i f t un g W is se n s ch a f t u nd
Politik; [online]; http://www.swp-berlin.org/en/
publications/swp-comments-en/swp-aktuelle-details/
article/europas_verteidigung_pooling_sharing.html ;
(Accessed 1 May 2016)
Dempsey, J.; (June 2014), Why Defense Matters: A New
Narrative for NATO, Carnegie Europe; [online]; http://
carnegieeurope.eu/publications/?fa=55979 (Accessed 2 May
2016)
Pintat, X., (11 April 2013), Smart Defence, Strategic
Defence: Pooling and Sharing from the Start, Report for the
Defence and Security Committee of the NATO PA;
[online]; www.nato-pa.int/shortcut.asp?FILE=3124;
(Accessed 30 April 2016)
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, Smart Defence
(general information page); [online]; http://www.nato.int/
cps/en/natohq/topics_84268.htm(Accessed 30 April 2016);
Brussels: North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
European Defence Agency; Pooling and Sharing (general
information page); [online]; http://www.eda.europa.eu/
what-we-do/eda-priorities/pooling-and-sharing (Accessed
30 April 2016); Brussels: European Defence Agency
About the author
Bibliography
Atlantic Voices, Volume 6, Issue 05 8
A Need to Grow Up
Geopolitics have again regained importance in
Europe over the past few years. In the words of NATO
Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg “we are facing new
threats, new challenges, coming both from the East and
from the South”. Not only is Europe dealing with a
very assertive Russia, the Old Continent also needs to
worry about threats coming from the south, the biggest
being the so-called Islamic State. The strategy for
dealing with the consequent refugee flow to Europe is
causing great divisions among members of the
European Union (EU) and NATO.
However, the realization has come among European
leaders that in today’s globalized world, conflict and
instability anywhere across the globe can directly and
indirectly influence peace and security in NATO and
EU member states. Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria and Mali
are good examples of this. Whereas it used to be
possible to speak of “wars of choice” and “wars of
necessity”, the line between the two is becoming more
and more blurred. The interconnectedness of the
threats means that NATO and EU member states
cannot be selective in their efforts to export peace to
neighbouring areas. It also means that all three of
NATO’s core tasks; collective defence, crisis
management and cooperative security are of utmost
importance. The renewed focus on collective defence
and deterrence must represent a rebalance towards
collective defence and not a shift away from crisis
management and cooperative security.
To be capable of successfully executing these
three core tasks, NATO and the EU need to increase
Germany and the Netherlands: Leading the Way in Defence Cooperation
By Marianne Copier
E uropean security is under threat.
Challenges have arisen along the
Southern and Eastern borders, as well as
within the borders with home-grown terrorism.
Additionally, Europe is still recovering from a financial
and economic crisis, needs to deal with new challenges
such as cyber attacks, and is suffering the consequences
of climate change. European defence is in a deplorable
state after decades of defence budget cuts. Currently
not a single European state can afford to maintain the
full spectrum of defence capabilities needed to address
all of these challenges. It is also unrealistic to believe
that defence budgets will increase so much as to enable
this. Therefore, European countries find themselves
with no other options than to upscale their defence
cooperation. To regain a competitive edge, the money
that is now finally coming available must be spent
effectively, to avoid duplication and meet the
collective defence capability needs.
The threats and challenges are of an international
and interconnected nature and therefore require a
multinational and integrated response. Common sense
dictates that if your adversaries’ strategy is to “divide
and conquer”, your response needs to consist of unity
and solidarity. This makes European defence
cooperation not only a financial necessity, but also the
best strategic choice. Then the question arises how to
give shape to “Smart Defence”, NATO’s cooperative
strategy to enhance capabilities while cutting down the
costs. German-Dutch defence cooperation can serve as
an example.
Atlantic Voices, Volume 6, Issue 05 9
their defence capacities. More specifically, the European
members need to do so, as they are not carrying their
equal share of the burden, even though they are the ones
surrounded by conflict zones. Unfortunately, they have
much to achieve, especially after decades of declining
defence budgets. At the Wales Summit, steps in the
right direction were made but more needs to be done.
Simply increasing defence budgets is a good first step,
but will not suffice; the money needs to be spent wisely
to generate more force. This requires more effective
European defence cooperation. Or as Dutch Defence
Minister Jeanine Hennis-Plasschaert recently remarked:
“Europe has to grow up”.
History of German-Dutch Defence Cooperation
When in 1991 the Dutch and German defence
ministers, Relus ter Beek and Gerhard Stoltenberg, laid
the foundations for the 1 (German/Netherlands) Corps
(1GNC), Europe was in a totally different
place. The Cold War had just ended and it
was time to cash in on the peace dividend.
Defence budgets started to decline, resulting
in troop reductions. It was this trend that
prompted the Dutch and German defence
ministers to merge some of their national
corps to establish a binational one. It was the
first time in European history that two
existing corps headquarters amalgamated.
On 30 August 1995 the 1GNC, was ready for action. Its
tasks included defending NATO territory as unit of the
NATO Main Defence Forces; conducting peace
operations, operations under the auspices of the United
Nations, as well as humanitarian missions; and carrying
out national tasks, such as disaster relief during floods.
The Commander of the Corps is alternatingly Dutch or
German, for two to three years. Other key positions,
such as the Deputy-Commander and the Chief of Staff,
change simultaneously. The Corps is based in the
German city of Münster, where the Peace of Westphalia
was concluded in 1648, and which played an important
role in the history of both states.
When set up, the joint initiative was heralded as
testifying to the “shared will to reinforce the European
pillar of the NATO alliance” and “the intertwined
destiny of two neighbors”. Yet, it was also met with
scepticism, as the following quote from The New York
Times (September 12th, 1995) demonstrates: “And, since
only national parliaments can decide to send troops
outside NATO's boundaries, it is unlikely that German
and Dutch troops will ever be sent into action together
in the localized conflicts that have supplanted the
Warsaw Pact as the foe.” In hindsight, Defence Ministers
Ter Beek and Stoltenberg were proven right by history.
First of all, since its inauguration, the 1GNC’s mission
included defending NATO territory as a unit of the
NATO Main Defence Forces. In 2002, the
Corps was certified to act as a High
Readiness Force Headquarters. And since
2014, the Corps is engaged in the
enhancement of the NATO Response Force
(NRF), for which it assumes the Land
Component Command for half a year every
three years. When the Netherlands,
Germany and Norway took the interim lead
of the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force
(VJTF) in 2015, the 1GNC was in the vanguard of the
land operation. The Corps is thus doing its share in
“reinforcing the European pillar of the NATO alliance”.
Second, regarding the doubt that the Corps would ever
be deployed outside NATO’s boundaries, it is worth
noting that it has taken part in the International Security
Assistance Force for Afghanistan (ISAF) in 2003, 2009,
and 2013. Last but not least, the pioneering work of the
1GNC is paying off now that only 25 years later
European defence cooperation has become an absolute
Emblem of the 1GNC Headquarters
(Image: 1GNC)
Atlantic Voices, Volume 6, Issue 05 10
necessity.
Enhancing European Defence Capabilities
Through Cooperation and Integration
For decades now, there has been talk of a
European army. It never came into existence, for
multiple reasons - states not wanting to loose
sovereignty over their armed forced being the
primary one. Although there is a clear need for more
European defence cooperation, now is not the time to
discuss a European army. In fact, with current levels
of anti-EU sentiment all across Europe, doing so
would be counterproductive. Europe is, however, in
dire need of
initiatives that
increase its overall
defence
capabilities.
Whereas a
European army is a
step too far,
regional defence
cooperation has a
better chance of
getting popular
support. Dutch-
German initiatives can again lead the way. Building on
the trust relationship that they have built up over 25
years, the Dutch and German armed forces have
initiated several new forms of cooperation recently.
Importantly, these have enabled both countries to
maintain or gain defence capabilities.
In June 2014, the Dutch Airmobile Brigade,
consisting of 2000 military personnel, became part of
the German Rapid Forces Divison (Division Schnelle
Kräfte). The unit was placed under German
command; a first in the history of the Dutch armed
forces. Even more important in terms of enhancing
capabilities, was the 2015 agreement that allowed the
Netherlands to regain some of its tank capabilities, that
were lost in 2011 due to cutbacks. In 2015, the Royal
Netherlands Army 43 Mechanized Brigade was
reinforced by the German 414 Panzer Battalion, before
it was integrated into the 1st Panzer Division. It is
thanks to this collaboration that the Dutch armed forces
can maintain the know-how in operating this weapon
system and even have tanks at its disposal once again.
Germany and the Netherlands are now also exploring
opportunities for strengthening ties in the area of ground
-based air and missile defence.
Even more recently, in
February 2016, Dutch
Defence Minister Hennis
-Plasschaert and her
German colleague Ursula
von der Leyen signed an
agreement that foresees
far-reaching naval
cooperation, including
the “full integration of
the German Naval Force
Protection Battalion into
the Royal Netherlands
Marine Corps”, which will be the first time that German
armed forces are placed under foreign command. The
deal also includes the joint use of the largest and newest
ship in the Royal Netherlands Navy, the logistical
support ship HNLMS Karel Doorman, which ‘can be
used as a supply vessel but also for transporting heavy
weapons and for the sea-based support of complex
landing operations with helicopters’. Due to financial
constraints, the Netherlands decided to use the ship only
as a supply vessel. Germany on the other hand was in
need of transport capability. Thus, collaborations such as
these allow both countries to ‘maintain, expand, and
Lieutenant General Volker Halbauer (DEU) is relieved of his duties as Commander 1
(German/Netherlands) Corps by Lieutenant General Michiel van der Laan (NL) on 17 April
2016 (Photo: Facebook/ German /Netherlands Corps )
Atlantic Voices, Volume 6, Issue 05 11
rebuild their military capabilities and operational
knowledge’.
Concluding Remarks
Europe’s current security landscape faces many
threats. To be able to ensure the European and
Transatlantic security, the European member states of
NATO and the EU have to step up to strengthen their
defence capacities. This means increasing defence
budgets, as was pledged in Wales. That, however, will
not be enough. The best chance Europe has to reach the
necessary capabilities to face the security challenges of
the 21st century is through enhanced defence
cooperation. From the rhetoric of the European
leaders, it would appear that they are aware of the
necessity of defence cooperation. From their actions,
the same conclusion cannot always be drawn. Now is
the time to undertake serious efforts to strengthen
European defence capabilities, and thereby Alliance
capacities, because if not now, it could very well come
too late. Since establishing a European army is not a
viable option, other forms of cooperation need to be
found, be it regional, binational or multinational.
Defence cooperation initiatives already in place, such as
between the Dutch and the Germans, demonstrate the
potential for such collaborations to make Europe
stronger. However, whereas common threats and the
necessity to work together can develop almost
overnight, the level of trust required for effective
defence cooperation can take years to build. Europe
cannot afford to waste any more time.
Marianne Copier holds a MA in International
Relations from Utrecht University. She has worked for
the Netherlands Atlantic Association since 2013 and in
November 2015, she became YATA Vice-President for
Communication.
Coelmont, Jo. “Message to – and from – the European political leadership: Agreeing to disagree on strategy is a luxury the EU can no longer afford”, Egmont Royal Institute for International Relations, Security Policy Brief no.71, May 2015
Cowell, Alan. “After 50 Years, a German-Dutch Military Partnership”, The New York Times, 1995 (September 12)
Dutch Ministry of Defence. “Division Schnelle Kräfte”: https://www.defensie.nl/english/topics/international-cooperation/contents/other-countries/division-schnelle-krafte
Dutch Ministry of Defence. “Dutch tank history ends with a bang”, 2011 (May 26): https://www.defensie.nl/english/latest/news/2011/05/26/dutch-tank-history-ends-with-a-bang
European Parliament, Directorate-General for External policies, Policy Department. “State of play of the implementation of EDA’s pooling and sharing initiatives and its impact on the European defence industry”, 2015
Fiorenze, Nicholas, “Dutch mechanized brigade to be integrated into German panzer division” in HIS Jane’s Defence Weekly, 2015 (September 18)
Headquarters 1 (German/Netherlands) Corps. “History”: http://1gnc.org/history/
Speech of Dutch Defence Minister Jeanine Hennis-Plasschaert at the seminar “Europe’s security and Defence; what next?”, March 11, 2016 in Paris: https://w w w . r i j k s o v e r h e i d . n l / d o c u m e n t e n /toespraken/2016/03/11/toespraak-van-minister-hennis-plasschaert-bij-het-seminar-europe-s-security-and-defence-what-next-engels
Jans, Karlijn. “The Netherlands and Germany as European Defense Pioneers” in The Huffington Post, 2016 (February 20)
North Atlantic Treaty Organization Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe. “Fact Sheet NATO Response Force (NRF)”: https://www.shape.nato.int/page349011837
The White House. “Remarks by President Obama and NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg after Bilateral Meeting” on May 26, 2016: https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/05/26/remarks-president-obama-and-nato-secretary-general-jens-stoltenberg-afte
The Netherlands EU Presidency 2016. “Germany and the Netherlands step up their military cooperation”: http://english.eu2016.nl/latest/news/2016/02/04/germany-and-the-netherlands-step-up-their-military-cooperation
About the author
Bibliography
This publication is co-sponsored by the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization
Atlantic Voices is always seeking new material. If you are a young
researcher, a subject expert or a professional and feel you have a valuable
contribution to make to the debate, then please get in touch.
We are looking for papers, essays, and book reviews on issues of
importance to the NATO Alliance. For details of how to submit your
work please see our website at: http://atahq.org/atlantic-voices/
Editor: Flora Pidoux
ATA Programs On May 31st, representatives from national ATA chapters will attend
a series of briefings at NATO Headquarters as part of the ATA-NATO
Alignment Meeting. The focus of this edition will be on the upcoming
Warsaw Summit.
The Bulgarian Euro-Atlantic Youth Club will welcome young people
for their Third NATO Summer School – a one-week international
seminar focusing on current “NATO challenges and concerns on the eve
of 2016 Summit” - from May 30th to June 5th in Smolyan. This year’s
seminar will focus on NATO’s priority actions directed at the Alliance’s
adaptation to the new security environment. Specifically, key topics will
comprise the current challenges in the Black Sea region, cyber security,
maritime security, Smart Defence and planning for the future in times of
austerity, NATO’s role as a global security actor, NATO-Russia
relations, women’s role in peace and security, war against terrorism, and
NATO transparency and reforms.
On June 9th, the Lithuanian Atlantic Treaty Association (LATA)
together with the NATO Public Diplomacy Division, the Friedrich Ebert
Fund and the Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Vilnius will host the
international conference "Militarization of Kaliningrad and its impact on
the Baltic Sea Region security development” in the Palace of the Grand
Dukes of Lithuania in Vilnius. The event is dedicated to the upcoming
NATO Warsaw Summit and LATA‘s 20th anniversary.
Images should not be reproduced without permission from sources listed, and remain the sole property of those sources. Unless otherwise stated, all images are the property of NATO.
Atlantic Voices is the monthly publication of the Atlantic Treaty Associa-
tion. It aims to inform the debate on key issues that affect the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization, its goals and its future. The work published in Atlantic
Voices is written by young professionals and researchers.
The Atlantic Treaty Association (ATA) is an international non-
governmental organization based in Brussels working to facilitate global net-
works and the sharing of knowledge on transatlantic cooperation and security.
By convening political, diplomatic and military leaders with academics, media
representatives and young professionals, the ATA promotes the values set
forth in the North Atlantic Treaty: Democracy, Freedom, Liberty, Peace,
Security and Rule of Law. The ATA membership extends to 37 countries from
North America to the Caucasus throughout Europe. In 1996, the Youth Atlan-
tic Treaty Association (YATA) was created to specifially include to the succes-
sor generation in our work.
Since 1954, the ATA has advanced the public’s knowledge and understan-
ding of the importance of joint efforts to transatlantic security through its inter-
national programs, such as the Central and South Eastern European Security
Forum, the Ukraine Dialogue and its Educational Platform.
In 2011, the ATA adopted a new set of strategic goals that reflects the
constantly evolving dynamics of international cooperation. These goals include:
the establishment of new and competitive programs on international
security issues.
the development of research initiatives and security-related events for
its members.
the expansion of ATA’s international network of experts to countries in
Northern Africa and Asia.
The ATA is realizing these goals through new programs, more policy acti-
vism and greater emphasis on joint research initiatives.
These programs will also aid in the establishment of a network of internati-
onal policy experts and professionals engaged in a dialogue with NATO.
The views expressed in this article are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the Atlantic Treaty Association, its members, affiliates or staff.