atlantic voices vol. 2, no. 7

ATLANTIC TREATY ASSOCIATION

Atlantic Voices, Volume 2, Issue 7 1

Volume 2 - Issue 7, July 2012

C ivil wars usually create a profound schism among populations. In the case

of the Libyan civil war, the upshot of the conflict goes beyond the provin-

cial and tribal divisions since the influx of conventional weapons sparked a

new security concern: weapons trafficking. The extent of post-conflict efforts to be made

could be surely compared to the Afghanistan case given that the challenges ahead for the

transitional authorities are substantial. The non-Arab countries, whose help was welcomed

by the Qaddafi opposition, should act very carefully in the aftermath in order not to repeat

mistakes made in the past. Certainly, they possess many national and institutional tools

which could end up being useful. Likewise, Arab countries could also play a significant role

in re-building the country. However, it is up to the current and future Libyan representa-

tives to ask for help should they need it.

The development of the relationship between the West and the southern part of the

Mediterranean area has never really given satisfaction to any of the protagonists, though this

was punctuated by positive outcomes over an extended period. Several reminiscent issues

LIBYA, THE DAY AFTER Future political and security developments and Euro-Atlantic security

July 7th 2012 marks an important date for the

people of Libya. They were called to elect their

General National Council (GNC). The GNC will

now appoint a Prime Minister and cabinet for the

country. This means that the country has started

its long and winding transition path towards de-

mocracy.

The post-Qaddafi transition must ensure an

effective rule of law which translates, among oth-

ers, into democratic security governance. For this

difficult undertaking, however, Libya will need

help from the outside in order to cover the full

picture of security challenges when building up

security authorities. How can Western institu-

tions, above all NATO, EU and OSCE, provide

appropriate support?

Following the political events in Libya and in

the framework of its Mediterranean Program, the

Atlantic Treaty Association (ATA) dedicates the

entire July issue of its monthly publication Atlantic

Voices to the future of Libya from a security angle.

The article by Samir Battiss examines the current

political, economic and security situation in Libya

and draws several scenarios for future security

governance. He thereby especially looks at the

role NATO and EU could play.

Florian Bauernfeind

What future for the Libyan security sector after the end of the Qaddafi regime?

IS

SN

2294-1

274


sustain. From the perspective of the south rim, the interference

of western countries and to some extent the attitude of superior-

ity often displayed by some can rather be perceived as paternalis-

tic. Consequences of such behavior often undermine cooperation

in many areas including democratization, liberalization of the

economy, and effective protection of human rights. A truth to be

told, the western countries have lost their dominant influence in

international affairs, especially over the last two decades, by

being constantly challenged by other actors. Yet it would be

presumptuous to categorize the challengers as a homogenous

group of countries or a whole. Besides, it would be premature to

consider the “emerged powers” as able or as prone to fill in the

vacuum caused by the progressive withdrawal or inability of the

western countries when coping with crises.

The perception of Libya’s security challenges

Political and economic developments

The future political system of Libya remains uncertain because of

diverging views on several aspects. However, the different Lib-

yan groups unanimously recognize that political reforms must

not be “remote-controlled” from outside. Secondly, the future

political system will enshrine the tenants of a traditionalist, fun-

damentally Muslim country, where “lay extremists” (lay progres-

sives) have no real power

even if they are motivated

and strive to be present on

the international media

stage. The Islamist move-

ment is today dominated

by the Libyan equivalent of

the Muslim Brotherhood.

The victory of the Muslim

Brotherhood in Egypt, the

Ennahda party in Tunisia

and the PJD in Morocco

could have represented a trend for what could happen in the

elections in July 2012 initially aiming at setting up a body to

draft a constitution and oversee a referendum on the draft. But

pre-election tensions led the National Transitional Council

(NTC) to rule that the constitutional panel would be elected by

late spring 2013 (election of a Prime Minister and appointment

of a legitimately elected representative government). In the long

run, the traditionalists could feel themselves strengthened and

more influential than local politicians if the legitimate govern-

ment fails to give the Libyans their lost dignity. It certainly took

several decades for the previously named political parties to take

office in their related country because they first had to protect

themselves from autocratic regimes or to be strictly screened.

But politics in old as in new democracies is based on the relation-

ship between the leaders and the people yet the basic democra-

cies imply coalitions, disagreement among political allies, and

sooner or later the possibility to opt for a change in power. The

Muslim nationalists are also influential. The Salaafists remain a

minority and should not be compared to the “Al Qaeda in Islamic

Maghreb” (AQIM). The influence of Abdelhakim Belhadj, ini-

tially supported by Qatar, and commanding about 300 men

(“defenders of the faith”) has been greatly overestimated by Al-

Jazeera as well as in the western media because he met Osama

Bin Laden in Afghanistan in the 1980s.

In addition to the religions and tribal factors, it should be

remembered that the cities historically played a role in political

life in Libya by contributing to the self-identification of the peo-

ple. According to Libya experts this factor is decisive and will

have the strongest influence on the future of the country. The

western analysts often seek a transferable “model” but Libya is

neither Iraq, nor Afghanistan, nor Somalia even if we can find

some similarities. Unlike the previous examples, the country has

no problem of religious

sectarianism. The role of

the cities could be more

influential than the com-

monly shared perception

by western media accord-

ing to which the Libyan

political life is only domi-

nated by the tribes. Geo-

graphical data will play a

major for the next stage of

evolution of Libya. As the

recent political declarations show, the division between Tripoli-

tania and Cyrenaica is still very clear and transcends the tribal

sphere of influence.

Political developments are tightly linked to the following

issue: Which groups will control the economic leverage, i.e. oil

and natural resources’ revenues and financial assets abroad?

Libya’s average oil estimates are about twenty years of oil re-

serves (43 billion barrels) and foreign banks hold around $150 bn

of Libyan assets. To date, the NTC has recovered $21 bn from

Libyans celebrating the end of the Qaddafi regime at Martyrs Square in Tripoli


As far as the political system

is concerned, the confederalist con-

stitutional model (Canadian or

Swiss), often discussed within acade-

mia, could provide a starting point

but could not be an end per se. No

western model could ever entirely

catch the local characteristics and

balance of powers. But western mod-

els could provide a basic framework

for equal entitlement to revenues

from natural wealth among different

areas. Meanwhile, they enable the country to embrace the reality

on the ground. At the end, only the Libyans can choose the path

they want to follow. But without a proactive policy approach of

this kind among the allies, rivalry to control oil revenues and

assets will inevitably lead to renewed violence and to the estab-

lishment of a political system different from the one initially

“promised” by the NTC1.

Security developments

The border question

Today, the transitional Libyan central authorities have the sup-

port of the neighboring countries in democracy development.

Foreign troops also take part in this challenge, not directly but

through the training of forces. Well before Operation Unified

Protector, the border between Tripolitania and Tunisia has been

subject to countless crossings by legal and illegal migrants. No

real natural frontier has marked the border, and the ethnic com-

position, language, value systems, and traditions of the two peo-

ples are close. It should be noted that the political relations with

Tunisia remain excellent. It is the only country that Libya has no

visa requirements with. The Cyrenaica

region is contiguous with Egypt, and

here, too, the border is not naturally

defined. Illegal as well as legal crossings

are frequent. Political relations with

Egypt have always been complex but

important and “manageable”. As the Muslim Brotherhood came

to power in Egypt, relations with Libya could become easier

than expected. By contrast, Fezzan's borders with Algeria, Ni-

ger, and Chad are rarely crossed because of the almost total

emptiness of the desert countryside. The control of the border

was de facto delegated to the Tuareg in the southwest and the

the council's sanctions committee, and the UN Security Council

lifted sanctions on Libya's central bank and its offshore subsidiary

bank. Later, the US Treasury Department said it had unblocked

more than $30 bn in Libyan government assets. This was to face

growing demands for wages, medication and reconstruction as

well as inflation. Despite the current difficulties, this country

will remain a robust rentier state in the foreseeable future. Ac-

cording to the expectations of the NATO/European allies of a

democratic regime (regime change was the final end state), the

questions remain whether the revenue will be fairly redistributed

among the population and if some mechanisms will ensure an

appropriate use.

Economically, Libya will face several challenges to overcome

the problems well known by rentier states, namely economic

diversification. As far as the financial assets held by foreign banks

are concerned, there are some risks of political confrontations/

competition within the country – between those who will claim

to be its representatives, and between the financial industries and

the allies. The second spectrum of challenges could be more

difficult for the allies. In accordance with the values they militar-

ily defended, western allies will push for

starting a “democratic” political reform

and for signing the Nuclear Non-

proliferation Treaty. On the other hand,

Libya could be a very profitable market

for their security/military industries.

Too aggressive an attitude could push the Libyan leaders to seek

new providers of modern technologies (nuclear power stations,

sophisticated weapons); a more “understanding” behavior which

would take local characteristics into consideration might allow

them to compete for major contracts (oil, arms, civilian tech-

nologies).

Political relations with Egypt have always been complex but important

and “manageable”.

Rocket-propelled grenade heads held at National Transitional Council HQ in Abu Sleen


Tubu in the southeast. Border control and keeping the traditional

forms of land tenure were part of the deal with the previous

regime in the 1980s to achieve a fully unified Libya. After the

military operation and the collapse of Col. Qaddafi’s regime, the

control over the borders is more important because of the com-

bination of several factors. First, the disappearance of thousands

of small arms and light weapons – caches in the south were dis-

covered by the transitional authorities. Moreover, there is the

political-diplomatic aspect, mainly regarding the attitude of Al-

geria during the operation and its reluctance to recognize the

NTC as representative of the Libyan people. The Algerian au-

thorities were opposed to the intervention close to their terri-

tory and are suspected to still host Qaddafi’s family members. In

the south, Mali and Niger periodically face Tuareg rebellions.

The question of border control is, however, directly linked

to the state of the security sector in the aftermath of the civil

war.

The (re)-construction of the security sector

Since the army no longer exists, there is a risk that the new Lib-

yan authorities will limit their security activities to law and or-

der, the control of the coastal area, the cities and the oil fields.

Even if the transitional leaders seem determined to fight AQIM

and the “foreign” incursions, the lack of security instruments

would in practice mean abandoning a part of the deep South to

the Tuareg and AQIM.

The former Libyan rebels – lately

renamed the ‘National Liberation Army’

by the NTC (May 2011) – consisted of

roughly 17,000 troops. They used to

consist of two groups: defectors from the

Libyan armed forces and volunteers with no military experience.

It is hard to know exactly how many of these groups have spon-

taneously disbanded after the conflict and returned home.

Islamist fighters, while present to a very small extent (and

needed for their military skills), did not play a significant role.

Current transitional authorities face substantial challenges in

trying to provide a secured environment necessary for recon-

struction and political reform. A quick look at the previous cases

in Africa or elsewhere teaches us that post-conflict security is

invariably a much more complex undertaking than security re-

form in relative peace. It depends on many factors like the to-

pography, geography and the size of the population. The agreed

upon ration for security provisions is around 13 troops per 1,000

inhabitants. As far as the Libyan situation is concerned, there are

two opposing views whose posture depends on the nature of the

threat. On the one hand, to physically monitor the country’s

borders as a whole in order to counter threats from outside, an

oversized army is required. First estimates would lead to the

recruitment and training of 100,000 military personnel. First of

all, this would mean absorbing as many fighters as possible from

the militia forces, at the risk of creating an ineffective military

and endangering the stability of the government authorities. The

second scenario takes into consideration an environment where

Libya is not facing any outside danger and is unable to keep effec-

tive control over its around 4,500 km land borders and the

1,770 km coastline. In this context, some would argue in favor

of maintaining small but well trained armed forces (25,000 to

50,000 men). Moreover, close cooperation with local internal

security forces would also allow to fulfill the law and order mis-

sions and to protect the oil fields and the strategic facilities and

infrastructures.

But the Libyan army of tomorrow is far from being created

in the current élite offices in Tripoli and in western capitals. The

new elected government of the post-Qaddafi Libya will have no

choice but to build an entirely new military force. Rather than

simply merging rebel and regime forces, a third way should be

explored. A Demobilization-Disarmament-Reintegration (DDR)

program takes several months or years to be negotiated and to be

implemented, and decades to achieve its

goal. Demobilization alone without assis-

tance in financial or educational terms

and without the creation of alternatives

on the labor market has proven to be a

recipe for disaster.

NATO and European nations as “hammer” to fix the security “nail”?

Threats and risks are commonly perceived according to a na-

tion’s background. As Abraham Maslow stated: “If you only have

a hammer, you tend to see every problem as a nail.” For multilat-

eral institutions such as NATO, combating global security

threats will continue to be the rationale behind their actions. The

lessons learned from previous interventions have suggested that

building a comprehensive security system is vital. NATO’s assis-

tance in creating sound armed forces seems to be appropriate

given the organization purpose and the onward challenges. Nev-

ertheless, a positive outcome will depend on close cooperation

Post-conflict security is invariably a much more complex undertaking than

security reform in relative peace.


tent, with partners in Africa in general.

European countries could also mobilize two additional secu-

rity tools: the Civilian Response Team (CRT) and the European

Gendarmerie Force (EGF). The CRT concept has been devel-

oped under the Civilian Headline Goal 2008 in order to enhance

the EU’s rapidly deployable capability for civilian crisis manage-

ment.2 The idea of

a CRT refers to

the readiness for

d e p l o y m e n t

within five days

on request of the

Secretary Gen-

eral/High Repre-

sentative, the

Political and Secu-

rity Committee or

the Council and to

a stay in the field

for up to three

months. Acting as a bridging mechanism in the first phase of a

mission, its objectives include: assessment and fact-finding mis-

sions; the rapid establishment of an initial presence in the field

after a Joint Action and support of the deployment of a civilian

crisis management operation; reinforcement of existing EU

mechanisms for crisis management, notably in assistance of an

EU Special Representative; and finally, logistical support. Fol-

lowing the approval of the CRT concept document by the Coun-

cil on 18 July 2005, further work was undertaken in order for

the recommendations to materialize. Such a civilian crisis man-

agement rapid reaction capability consists of troops flexible in

terms of both size and structure, made-up of national experts pre

-selected through national timetables in accordance with agreed

criteria and procedures. Completed by

2007, the pool of 100 European experts

brings an added value through the CRTs’

potential to offer reliable, trained exper-

tise that can be mobilized at very short

notice. Although such a new tool should

not be seen as an end or ‘definitive solution’ to the EU’s capaci-

ties gap in civilian crisis management, civilian response teams

aim to increase the rapid reaction capacity, and they also contrib-

ute to the adequacy and effectiveness of the EU’s crisis response,

as well as to its coherence with other actors. The objectives of

with the next legitimate Libyan representatives.

Short term objective: Set up new Libyan security forces

The newly elected representatives should initially be the sole

decision-makers for setting up security forces. This implies to

disbanding militias and an effective DDR process. The recruit-

ment should in-

clude all factions

including the for-

mer Qaddafi-

supporters as part

of the reconcilia-

tion process. As a

series of gradual

changes, the mili-

t a r y se rv i ce s

should be the first

to go through this

process which

ultimately could

be a stepping stone in achieving peace among civilians later on.

Efforts may be reinforced through the assistance of NATO mem-

ber states which could provide technical services. NATO mem-

bers have gained experience in military training drawn from the

missions in Iraq and Afghanistan. As a result, the prospective

Operational Mentor and Liaison Team-Libya, a NATO initiative,

could respond timely to the local needs after careful appreciation

of Libya’s own set of security issues and cultural differences.

Such a group of instructors could consist of experienced person-

nel, not only from NATO Allies but also from the partner coun-

tries which could be selected on cultural and reputation basis. In

reference to Libyan needs and aspirations, some Arab nations

participating in the Mediterranean Dialogue (Algeria, Egypt,

Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco and Tuni-

sia) and in the Istanbul Cooperation Ini-

tiative (Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait and the

United Arab Emirates) could join the

multinational effort by providing instruc-

tors. The newly trained armed forces

would be responsible not only for the protection of Libya from

internal and external threats but also of its people. From a re-

gional point of view, the allies’ participation could be directed

toward reaching a consensus on a more global strategy with re-

gard to relations with neighboring countries, and, to some ex-

NATO members have gained experience in military training drawn from the missions in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Revolutionary soldiers


the CRT capacity include a wide range of missions. They should

allow the EU to perform assessment and fact-finding missions in

a crisis or impending crisis situation and, when appropriate,

provide input for the development of a

crisis management concept before the

adoption of an EU Council Joint Action

and facilitate action in the framework of

EU Commission instruments. The CRT

concept document also seeks the setting-

up of an early operational presence on the ground to support EU

political structures in defining a concrete process in order to

turn a fuzzy political concept into a measurable and tangible

mission. At this stage, CRTs play a key role not only in the op-

erationalization of civilian crisis management in the planning

phase, but also in providing timely reinforcement of existing EU

mechanisms in charge of conflict prevention, mediation, stabili-

zation and confidence-building measures including monitoring,

and early identification of needs on the ground. In this way, a

timely deployment of crisis response tools can directly affect

trust and confidence among stakeholders inside the country and

thus facilitate the imple-

mentation of civilian

crisis management in

cooperation with other

actors, both local and

multinational, both mili-

tary and civilian.

The EGF initiative

gathers five full members

(France, Italy, The Neth-

erlands, Portugal, and

Spain), two partner states

(Poland, Lithuania) and

one observer (Turkey).

These nations aim to put

at the disposal a convinc-

ing and operational in-

strument for crisis management, first and foremost under EU

command, but also other security organizations, such as NATO,

UN, OSCE, or ad hoc coalitions. Their “gendarmerie” assets

seek to contribute to the crisis management capability in sensi-

tive post-conflict areas.3 This concept is globally known under its

French version as “gendarmerie” but it has been nationally

adapted in several European states taking into consideration

some specific and local characteristics. Defined as a “force organ-

ized along military lines, providing basic law enforcement and

safety in a not yet fully stabilized environment”, the American

concept of “constabulary forces” would be

what comes close to the concept. From a

European perspective, such forces are

seen as “militarized police forces”. In-

deed, besides the basic training

(involving law enforcement and investi-

gation techniques), they also receive military training with a

focus on non-lethal use of force to enable them to respond to

potential violence through negotiations and conflict manage-

ment. On the request of Libyan leaders, the EGF co-operation

programs could provide an appropriate training in international

rule of law to forces to promote better governance. The local

forces’ mandate could include conducting criminal investigation

tasks, performing security and public order missions, conducting

public surveillance, traffic regulations, border policing and

criminal intelligence, covering detection of offences, tracing of

offenders, and their transfer to the appropriate judicial authori-

ties. Some of the identi-

fied internal threats in

Libya entail attacks on

the infrastructure used

for the exploitation of its

crude oil to undermine

its economy. Protecting

the energy-related facili-

ties appears to be crucial

for success in the recon-

struction of the country.

The lessons learned from

the NATO Training Mis-

sion-Iraq (NTM-I) could

lead the Libyan authori-

ties to be interested in

the specific program

dedicated to train oil police forces. Indeed, among the various

offers of police training, NATO or EU using the EGF assets

could instruct local forces in oil-policing which consists in pre-

venting attacks from land and sea terrorists and smugglers on the

main critical refineries and the coverage of some 21,000 km of

oil and gas pipelines.4

From a technical aspect, NATO or EU members should

Protecting the energy-related facilities appears to be crucial for success in the

reconstruction of the country.

EU High Representative Catherine Ashton visiting Benghazi in 2011 (Photo: Euro-pean Commission)


possible to achieve this goal in an acceptable atmosphere.

In the long term: reintegrate Libya into the regional politi-

cal landscape

Geographically, Libya is located at the crossroads between the

Maghreb and the Mashrek regions and is considered, together

with Morocco and Egypt, as a strategic location. In the long run,

and if the Libyan authorities wish so, the participation in regional

political forums could improve its security situation. Certainly,

the security issues and their implications are different for each

country. In parallel to the basic post-conflict efforts, newly

elected Libyan leaders should anticipate the re-appearance of the

country in several Euro-Mediterranean arenas. These could help

or accelerate the improvement of its security. In several cases

Libyan leaders would only have to renew the previously negoti-

ated commitments. In others, they would have to formally apply

for membership of targeted programs because these could meet

their expectations.

Since the beginning of the Hel-

sinki process and the conclusion of the

Final Act in 1975, the security in the

Mediterranean area has been considered

directly connected to the security of the

European continent and vice versa. Libya as well as Lebanon and

Syria have taken part in the OSCE meetings. However, they

never took a step further, beyond the informal discussions,

unlike countries such as Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Morocco

or Tunisia. In addition, Libya has been excluded from this proc-

ess or had excluded itself from such discussions for most of the

time due to Muammar Qaddafi’s support for international crimi-

nal groups. A bilateral agreement could be signed with the

OSCE which would provide a wide spectrum of political and

security tools to its partner as mentioned in the decision 571

adopted by the Permanent Council. The issues discussed are

mainly related to human security, e.g. tolerance and nondis-

crimination, migration and migrants’ human rights, including in

countries of destination, water management, desertification, and

anti-terrorism measures. The long-term and comprehensive

approach adopted by the OSCE implies that the discussions and

the activities in these areas aim to instill into the partner states a

more democratic vision of their political development. How-

ever, the implementation of the moral commitments is on a

voluntary basis; therefore, the OSCE should review its modus

operandi and first ask the newly elected government how the

continue to supply Libyan authorities with ground surveillance

intelligence while aiming to have the national coastguards and

the border police forces fully operational in the interim. On the

other hand, the OSCE and the EU could provide civilian person-

nel for technical assistance in the development and implementa-

tion of national strategies and action plans, based on the vision of

the Libyan authorities and their commitments. Such assistance

could be composed of inter alia: training plans and programs

through the sharing of good practices including new technologies

and national know-how, confidence-building by promoting and

facilitating interagency, bilateral and multilateral cooperation in

the Mediterranean neighborhood in the field of border security

and management, drafting of national border strategies, specific

theoretical and practical training of border personnel (including

border guards and customs), or on the spot monitoring, patrol-

ling and mentoring exercises. Moreover, the OSCE and the UN,

thanks to their long-standing and concrete experience, could

cooperate to make some assets available

for a DDR process. DDR programs

should be demand-driven, and the na-

tional authorities should demonstrate

leadership and commitment to the proc-

ess. The more precise and concrete the

programs are, the clearer the measures to be taken will be. Con-

sequently, it would be easier to implement them. The frame-

work offered by both the UN and the OSCE has already demon-

strated that dialogue and inclusiveness are crucial to building

capacity of local and national institutions. The OSCE Office for

Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), upon

request of the Libyan transitional leadership, could provide ex-

pertise and advice on drafting an electoral code thus ensuring

that the elections process complies with international standards.

The first step would consist of a meeting between a team of in-

ternational and local experts, representatives of the informal

groups as well as representatives of all official political parties.

The coordination of actions and trust not only among na-

tional actors but also between national and international/

regional partners is critical for success. According to western

standards, the result of a DDR process should give priority to

demilitarizing above all the mindsets which dominate the Libyan

population since a large number of small arms-light weapons

have overflowed the country during the previous months of con-

flict. But the traditional and strongly family-based structures,

together with an ancestral culture of negotiation, should make it

In the long run, Libya’s participation in regional political forums could

improve its security situation.


Civil Defense agency thanks to a close cooperation with the Euro

-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Center (EADRCC)

and the International Civil Defense Organization; confidence-

building and strategic-level training of Libyan high-ranking mili-

tary and civilians through the so-called

“NATO Regional Cooperation Course”

at the NATO Defense College (NDC).

With regard to the European

initiatives, the Libyan leaders have the

opportunity to tap into these forums. In

terms of socio-economic development, the EU, under the lead-

ership of the Commission and the Council, has defined specific

strategies towards each Southern Mediterranean partner. From

the very beginning, the European Communities, and then the

European Union have recognized that certain interests are shared

by both rims of the mare nostrum. Political stability and economic

development were the main goals to be achieved by both the

European institutions and the national political leaders. Under

the influence of the southern European members, a process was

launched in the early 1990s towards fourteen countries of the

Mediterranean area including Libya. As common policy of the

EU under the direction of both the European Commission and

the Council of the EU, the “Barcelona Process”, later called

“European Neighborhood Policy” (ENP), covers three major

aspects of regional security that also convey the European con-

cerns and beliefs. The first dimension called “Political and Secu-

rity Dialogue” was set up to create a peaceful and stable area

through the implementation of principles of rule of law, democ-

racy and human rights. The second one, the “Economic and Fi-

nancial Partnership”, consists of progressively establishing a free-

trade zone characterized by shared economic opportunities

through sustainable and balanced socio-economic development.

Finally, the “Social, Cultural and Human

Partnership” should contribute to promot-

ing “understanding and intercultural dia-

logue between cultures, religions and

people, and facilitating exchanges be-

tween civil society and ordinary citizens,

particularly women and young people”. The results were not

necessarily those expected and quite uneven because of several

major factors: a lack of coordination between the European insti-

tutions, the overlapping with national initiatives and the misjudg-

ment of the diversity of expectations and perceptions among the

organization could provide support.

This is all the more the case as this organization has largely

lost its relevance since the EU and NATO developed their own

approaches to this critical region. Indeed, in 1994, NATO under

the influence of the US and its allies from

the southern region, have come to focus

much more on the Mediterranean area.

The assessment of the risks and threats

resulting from the socio-economic prob-

lems of the Southern Mediterranean and

Middle East were quite accurate. The Alliance with its own

Mediterranean initiative seeks to develop a security dialogue

with non‐member riparian states. However, sensitive political

issues have tended to be excluded from this dialogue. On the

other hand, NATO has defined a precise role in the area in order

to avoid duplication with parallel initiatives undertaken by the

former WEU, the EU and some Allies’ national policies (namely

France). To date, seven countries of the Mediterranean region

are involved through bilateral agreements: Algeria, Egypt, Israel,

Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia. According to the non-

discrimination principle, Libya is implicitly offered the same

basis for cooperation with NATO as others. Upon request of the

Libyan leadership, the Allies would adopt a tailored approach to

meet its specific needs. As for the framework of a negotiated

Individual Cooperation Program (ICP), the Alliance would es-

sentially provide “military service” which consists of collabora-

tive activities such as military education, training and doctrine,

defense policy and strategy, defense investment, civil emergency

planning, public diplomacy, crisis management, armaments, and

intelligence activities. Over fifteen years, a wide range of mecha-

nisms have been used and tailored which could definitely be

useful for the region in the wake of security challenges: a tailored

Operational Capabilities Concept

(OCC) which aims to improve the abil-

ity to contribute effectively to NATO-

led crisis response operations through

achieving interoperability; the access to

a trust fund mechanism that currently

includes ongoing substantial projects; the enhancement of its

civil preparedness through a Civil Emergency Planning (CEP)

action plan in order to prevent damages and to protect the popu-

lation and the critical infrastructures following either natural

disasters or high-level criminal attacks; the creation of a Libyan

Libya is implicitly offered the same basis for cooperation with

NATO as others.

The uneven EU initiatives were not always fully supported by the major

European players.


leaders of the five members of the Union du Maghreb Arabe and

from the Mediterranean countries (France, Italy, Portugal,

Spain, and Malta). At a ministerial level, the 5+5 Mediterranean

group deals with several topics, namely within the ‘Barcelona

Process’: defense, energy security, immigration, education,

transportation, etc. The newly elected Libyan authorities will

have to decide whether they want to renew their commitment to

this informal process or not. Despite the participants repeatedly

stating that this process does not duplicate other initiatives, it is

quite difficult to

maintain. It

seems to be a

result that re-

flects a balance

of power be-

tween some

European coun-

tries, and the

u n s a t i s f y i n g

cooperation as

well as the con-

tinuous rivalry

between the

Southern Mediterranean countries.

Conclusion

The first general elections in Libya led the designation of the

General National Congress (GNC) which will not have as duties

to draft a new constitution as initially announced. The 200 mem-

bers will soon appoint a panel of 60 personalities to that pur-

pose. Certainly, the way of conducting relations with the “new

Libya” as with other countries should be reviewed. After centu-

ries of influencing international affairs, the members of the At-

lantic Alliance have lost their hegemony to a certain degree.

They still have the ability to persuade but the preventive inter-

vention in order to protect the Libyan people against Qaddafi’s

violent repression, namely in Benghazi, has shown that it re-

quires specific circumstances. This display of influence remains

exceptional and is not an end in itself. NATO officials’ self-

proclaimed success is only justifiable from a military standpoint.

The political aspect is not to be underestimated since Libya has

historically succumbed to instability. The Euro-Atlantic powers

southern partners. Despite the detailed action plan for each

country drafted by the European Commission and the newly

established European External Action Service, North African

countries were still perceived as threats (e.g. migration, terror-

ism, drug- and arms-trafficking) than as real partners. As a re-

sult, the European partners tended to give priority to the hard

security dimension (joint border control, national initiatives for

heavy arms supply to security services) turning a blind eye to the

use of financial aid (misappropriation of European funds, corrup-

tion, predatory

behavior of the

local élite, etc.).

International

observers state

that some of the

leading European

countries yielded

to the “migration

threat” and to

some leaders’

blackmailing. The

latest Joint Com-

munication by the

High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Secu-

rity Policy and the European Commission (November 2011)

confirms the latter. It does not change the mindset according to

which the European bureaucratic apparatus as a “philanthropic

entity” could not act without analyzing the current events in

Libya and in its neighborhood in terms of “aid”. Likewise, the

latest initiative – the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) – has

become a hollow shell because of the “unified” vision that it im-

plies. Neither the initial qualification of “Mediterranean Union”

nor the approved final version under German pressure do match

the reality.

The uneven EU initiatives were not always fully supported

by the major European players either. Indeed, even if they were

officially designed to be complementary, the EU hard security

actions towards the Southern Mediterranean rim were chal-

lenged by the French program named “5+5” process (dialogue

5+5). Originally proposed by the French President François

Mitterrand in the early 1980s, but only endorsed in 1990 by the

Italian President Bettino Craxi, and the Spanish Prime Minister

Felipe González, these informal meetings bring together political

Writings on a wall in Tripoli


questions among the Allies about burden-sharing and the Alli-

ance’s cohesion and the risk of a de facto two-tier Alliance, the

consensus rule within the North Atlantic Council, the coordina-

tion between the Alliance and the EU, the development of ap-

propriate capabilities, and the coordination between NATO

activities and those of other international organizations. The

short term mission in Libya is now over but the Allies, acting in

coordination with other multilateral institutions, should be ready

to respond to a potential Libyan request, if necessary.

1 The first move into this direction is the change operated in June

2012 when following tensions within the NTC, its members

decided to adjust the mandate of the General National Congress.

2 Council of the European Union: “Civilian Headline Goal 2008 -

Multifunctional Civilian Crisis Management Resources in an

Integrated Format - Civilian Response Team”, General Secre-

tariat Document, DG IX, 10462/05 OA-SB/BL, Brussels, 2005.

3 Treaty between the Kingdom of Spain, the French Republic,

the Italian Republic, the Kingdom of The Netherlands and the

Portuguese Republic, establishing the European Gendarmerie

Force (EUROGENDFOR), 2006.

4 Gaub, Florence: “Building a New Military? The NATO Training

Mission-Iraq”, NATO Defense College Research Paper, no 67, April

2011.

The views expressed in this article are entirely those of the

author. They do not necessarily represent the views of the Atlantic

Treaty Association, its members, affiliates or staff.

have a clear vision of what the new Libya should look like: de-

mocratized, a liberalized economy, an effective protection of

human rights, etc. But there are challenging powers (e.g.

Qatar’s financial support of religious movements, ancestral tribal

composition of the population) affecting the Libyan society and

the emerging leaders. According to the reactions of western

leaders, the newly elected GNC seems to satisfy those wishes. 80

seats were allocated only to political parties: 39 seats won by the

Alliance of National Forces (NFA) led by Mahmoud Jibril; 17 for

Justice and Reconstruction (PJR) associated to the Muslim

Brotherhood movement; finally, a multitude of small groups

share the remaining 24 seats; 120 seats were reserved for inde-

pendent candidates. But, again, the ideological spectrum is quite

narrow, religion is entirely part of Libyan life and culture. More-

over, like in all parliamentarian regimes, the next step is to agree

on shaping alliances and coalitions between independents and

political parties. In order to gain influence, allies should act very

carefully; they should not repeat some mistakes which could be

used as justification for authoritative outcomes, e.g. sultanistic

centralized regimes. As this short paper has shown, the allies

have many means to help the Libyan central government. These

means cover a large part of the security spectrum. But a new

mindset would consist of recognizing that it is up to the legiti-

mate Libyan government to request joining the different pro-

grams or to renew/to decline previous commitments. Mean-

while, even if NATO is capable of deploying powerful forces in

large numbers, and of using them to enable entry where neces-

sary, it is not its role to commit to nation-building missions.

NATO itself fully depends on the contribution of its members

and other international organizations. It has no real capabilities

for civil implementation and/or low-end peace enforcement

missions. As demonstrated, several initiatives are in competition

to perform the myriad of non-military functions essential for the

success of any nation-building operation. However, unlike the

1990s’ events in Central and Eastern Europe, the events of 2011

in the Middle East/Northern Africa region take place in a funda-

mentally different historical, cultural area with specific strategic

factors at play. To date, it has been sufficient to focus diplomacy

on the top governmental leadership; from now on, the western

countries’ – common or national – strategy should also focus on

a broader cultural, sectarian, ethnic and tribal civil society, far

from their traditional mindset.

The experience in Afghanistan as well as the Libyan case raise

About the author

Samir Battiss

Dr Samir Battiss is currently lecturer at the Department of

Political Science of the Quebec University in Montreal

(Canada) and associate researcher at the Research Center

for International Relations of the National School of Public

Administration (Montreal, Canada).

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atlantic voices vol. 2, no. 7

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