ATLANTIC TREATY ASSOCIATION

Atlantic Voices, Volume 3, Issue 9 1

Volume 3 - Issue 9 September 2013

Contents:

Crisis Management in Turkey and the Problem of Escalation:

The Allied Mobile Force From 1970-1991 and the Future of

NATO’s South-Eastern Flank

Dr. Bernd Lemke explores the history surrounding NATO’s Allied Mobile Force and the

importance of its role today. By analyzing the history of NATO’s crisis management on its

south-eastern flank, Dr. Lemke explains the importance of NATO’s response capabilities and

how they have been utilized in the past to protect the Republic of Turkey and other NATO

members by maintaining deterrence against potential military threats. Through a detailed

historical analysis, Dr. Lemke demonstrates the importance of NATO’s deterrence and re-

sponse capabilities today and how these must be maintained in order to protect the Alliance

from ongoing regional upheaval and emerging threats in the 21st century.

Crisis Management in Turkey and the Problem of Escalation

The Allied Mobile Force From 1961-2003 and the Future of NATO’s South-Eastern Flank

With increasing tension and instability

along NATO’s southern borders, no mem-

ber is more exposed to the fallout from the

ongoing civil war in Syria than Turkey.

Having always represented the focal point

of NATO’s response to any upheaval in

the Middle East, Turkey and NATO have

maintained a response capability to ensure

that the security of Turkey and NATO’s

south-eastern flank is maintained.

Having created the Allied Mobile Force

in 1960 to respond to Soviet aggression,

NATO maintained and transformed this

elite unit into the NATO Response Force

in order to ensure a rapid response capa-

bility to the emerging threats of the 21st

century.

This edition takes an in depth look at

the history of NATO’s response capabili-

ties along its south-eastern flank to deter-

mine how NATO can defend its members

and manage the crises sweeping the Middle

East. By: Jason Wiseman

Turkish Chief of Staff Gen. Necdet Ozel (right) during a tour along the border with Syria in Hatay, Turkey (Photo: Associated Press)

Atlantic Voices, Volume 3, Issue 9 2

O n the evening of 11 September 2001, the

North Atlantic Council issued a communiqué

that included an unmistakable comment on the

events of that day: “At this critical moment, the United States

can rely on its 18 Allies in North America and Europe for

assistance and support. NATO solidarity remains the essence

of our Alliance.” These sentences

addressed a core principle which was

and still is essential for the existence

of the Alliance and which also signifi-

cantly contributed to the end of the

Cold War: the common standing of

all the allies for the purposes of de-

terrence and defense against manifest

dangers and threats. This referred

not only to joint operations by their

armed forces, but especially to joint

action and the show of strength in matters of policy, military

policy, planning and organization in the broadest sense.

The importance of Alliance solidarity as a means of

defense – and not only military defense – is as old as NATO

itself. From the very beginning, NATO’s means and ends

were never merely confined to military build-up, prepara-

tions and planning for emergencies. Cohesion between all the

partners was the essential basis for deterrence, the decisive

instrument of the Alliance for preventing a war and contain-

ing Communist aggression in Europe and ultimately around

the world. Alliance solidarity and Alliance coherence were

the outstanding, if not indeed the most important prerequi-

sites for the success of NATO in almost all fields of strategy

and policy. This still holds true today and is most important

for the future of the Alliance.

No one would, however, deny that there have been

radical changes in the basic parameters of NATO’s strategy.

The turnaround of 1989/90 more or less did away with the

strategy of the Cold War (Flexible Response), which had

been in force for more than 20 years. Today, the Alliance has

to act in a global environment with specific military and polit-

ical requirements. The defence of the Alliance territory is no

longer the sole purpose of NATO.

Major confrontations, e.g.

the threat by the Warsaw Pact

against Central Europe has disap-

peared and gave way to new dis-

turbing problems. Geographically,

the crisis areas have moved south.

The Southern / South Eastern Flank

of NATO – always a troubled re-

gion – is the only region of the Alli-

ance that is confronted with actual “hot” military dangers.

Other than, e.g. in the case of Afghanistan, which is

far away from actual NATO-territory, old tasks merge with

new possibilities and scenarios. Iraq, Syria, and in a wider

perspective, Israel and the Arab world remain unstable factors

for NATO’s South Eastern European members. These situa-

tions are further complicated by the crisis in the EU / Euro

area and the still simmering conflict between Greece and

Turkey.

NATO Today: Defence in a Global Environment

The general military situation consists of old patterns

and completely new aspects. The frontiers and actors on

NATO’s side have, more or less, stayed the same. So do – at

least in formal categories – the states beyond. But there are

new important features. Despite the fact that Russia assists

some actors (e.g. Assad) no one can speak today of a bipolar

Crisis Management in Turkey and the Problem of Escalation

The Allied Mobile Force From 1961-2003 and the Future of

NATO’s South-Eastern Flank

Press briefing by NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen (Photo: NATO)

Atlantic Voices, Volume 3, Issue 9 3

world order as in the Cold War. The fringes of NATO in the

South East are no longer potential powder kegs for global nuclear

war and annihilation of mankind but one of many frontiers of se-

curity for the Alliance. From a general global point of view, ten-

sions along the border between China and India, the sea border

between Japan and China, North Korea, or maybe even the US-

Mexico border, are also very prominent and cannot be denied.

Despite all the differences between these different frontiers,

NATO and its Allies are affected by them, although, not the least

because of the actual events, the South-Eastern Region is the most

important at the moment.

In the Cold War the tasks of

NATO were purely defensive, i.e. every

effort had to be taken to avoid crises or

defuse them. The Alliance provided a huge

range of instruments for crisis management. In war - that gladly

did not happen – NATO had to wage defensive action. Today

border defence is still a prominent aspect, but now the question

of active engagement – e.g. intervention beyond the borders –

constitutes a real option. One of the instruments that could be

employed are highly mobile and versatile units consisting of spe-

cial or elite troops that are equipped with a range of special weap-

ons and equipment that could be used for defensive as well as

offensive action.

NATO’s Flanks in the Cold War

There is a long history of comparable NATO-troops that

reaches back to the sixties. At the beginning of that decade the

Alliance decided to constitute a small force for crisis manage-

ment: The Allied Mobile Force (AMF).

The AMF was designed and set up in response to the gen-

eral strategic development in the late 1950s. NAC and the Mili-

tary Committee realized that the Alliance could not respond to

local provocations or attempts by the Eastern Bloc to cause disin-

tegration with purely nuclear means as there was always the dan-

ger of nuclear escalation as the Russians caught up with the US in

the nuclear arms race.

As an almost logical consequence, NATO focused increas-

ingly on conventional defense and, subsequently, the situation on

the flanks became increasingly important. The situation there had

been precarious for political and military reasons right from the

beginning of the Cold War. In the north, this was especially

true for Norway and Denmark, which on the one hand were

only able to raise a limited number of forces and on the other

did not want to be bound too much by NATO militarily.

The two countries had even considered alternative solu-

tions for a time, one being the establishment of a neutral Scan-

dinavian military alliance together with Sweden right after the

Second World War. The most dangerous areas here were

Northern Norway (Finmark) and Zealand in the BALTAP-area.

The situation in the south or south-

east was even more threatening since the

two main allies in this region, Turkey and

Greece, were not only relatively weak in

military terms, but also in perpetual con-

flict with each other. The strategic trouble

spots in this region were the northern border in Thrace, Tur-

key’s southern border and Eastern Anatolia. Never was the

enemy to be allowed to gain control over the Bosporus and

Istanbul. Finally, there were concerns regarding the northeast-

ern border of Italy (near Istria), which would have been under

threat if a conflict had arisen over Yugoslavia.

NATO headquarters did not merely see the direct mili-

tary aspects as the main danger, but rather the risk of a weak-

ening of Alliance solidarity, which had not always been stable

due to the continued conflicts of political and military interests

in general. The deterrence of the enemy and the Alliance’s

efforts to strengthen itself were two sides of the same coin.

The Allied Mobile Force as a Tool for Deterrence and

Crisis Management

As the major tool for defence, the NATO Military

Committee considered influencing the enemy rationally and

psychologically by an effective and calculated crisis manage-

ment in an emergency. It was to be made clear to the Warsaw

Pact that the risks of aggression of any kind would far outweigh

the benefits they might yield.

The AMF was considered one of the most important

tools for precisely this purpose. Its main mission was to act as a

front-line deterrence, i.e. the units assigned to the AMF, most-

ly elite units, had to be able to move to their position on one of

the regions of the flank quickly, to act ostentatious and com-

Never was the enemy to be allowed to gain control over the Bosporus and

Istanbul.

Atlantic Voices, Volume 3, Issue 9 4

municate in a dynamic way with the public. It was espe-

cially important that the whole world realized that the

force was multinational and made up of units from power-

ful non-flank-allies (in particular the USA, the UK and the

Federal Republic of Germany). Their core mission was, so

to say, “showing the flag”.

Not only was the military element crucial for the

whole issue, but also the political one. Albeit in peace-

time, the AMF was loudly and clearly conveyed to the

public as a flexible elite force. It was made clear to the

Eastern bloc that if the AMF was deployed, it was in its

capacity as a multilateral task force, and so any such de-

ployment was to be seen as an expression of the will of all

the allies.

The AMF was to a certain degree the most distinct

military manifestation of Article 5 of the North Atlantic

Treaty. A direct mili-

tary attack on one of its

battalions would have

been considered an

attack against NATO

and each of its mem-

bers. This would have

almost automatically

resulted in an Article 5

contingency.

The AMF con-

sisted of a total of six

battalions, which were

assigned and equipped

according to the basic

military and political

perspectives and, above

all, the willingness of the member states. The headquar-

ters of the Allied Mobile Force Land [AMF (L)] were lo-

cated initially in Seckenheim/Palatinate and later collocat-

ed with the headquarters of the 7th US Army in Heidel-

berg. The air support forces consisted of 6 squadrons of

fighter bombers. Three battalions and three squadrons

were assigned to each flank (north or south).

Nevertheless, the amount of effort involved in

ensuring transport and logistical support proved to be so im-

mense that the sophisticated flight plans had to be re-

coordinated again and again. In the event of an emergency,

large volumes of equipment would have needed to be deliv-

ered to the force. Planners had projected a dynamic and pre-

cise schedule of continuous slots of different nations via dif-

ferent multiple air routes. Organizing and executing the

whole enterprise proved to be very expensive and extremely

complicated. It provides a good blueprint for the global oper-

ations of today.

In order to prevent a crisis scenario from getting out

of hand in an emergency, NATO established a range of deter-

rence and stabilization tools. Crisis management procedures

were to be applied to calm down the situation and minimize

tension. For this purpose, NATO developed special Rules of

Engagement so that appropriate action could be taken in each

situation.

The AMF was an

extremely important tool

for lower escalation sce-

narios. Its deployment in

trouble spots - northern

Norway, Denmark, Istria,

northern Greece or the

southern and eastern bor-

ders of Turkey - was

meant to be a clear warn-

ing. The focus remained

on preserving the territo-

rial integrity and political

and military coherence of

NATO in Europe even

under extreme pressure.

Although it was clear that NATO’s main purpose was

to directly defend the territory of its member states, some

partners and staffs realized that there was a much wider per-

spective to be followed. In the beginning of the 1970s, the

Americans took an intense look into the Arab states and espe-

cially the Gulf region that, because of its oil production, was

one of the most strategically important regions in the world.

Planners were increasingly alarmed by wars, insurrection,

Map of AMF contingency plans in case of Soviet aggression (Photo: Bernd Nogli, Copyright: MGFA 06406-02)

Atlantic Voices, Volume 3, Issue 9 5

political quarrels and the growing presence of the Soviet Navy

in global waters.

New Threats: NATO and Arabia

This development made itself felt in NATO’s most

prominent exercise, WINTEX. During the very first Wintex

exercise, previous concentration on

European scenarios were expanded

in a south-eastern direction. Pri-

marily on the initiative of the

American planners, the decisive

trigger for simulated confrontation in Wintex 71 was not

based on an aggravation of the situation in Europe, but on a

crisis in the Middle East.

Political radicalization after the Six-Day War formed

the background of the exercise. One of the consequences was

that the Soviet Union saw this as an opportunity to start mas-

sive political and military commitment. At the same time, the

Americans recognized the weakness of NATO’s whole south-

ern flank. A conflict, e.g. between the Arab states and Israel,

would have caused destabilization in the region, threatening

Turkey and Greece and thus NATO as a whole. Syria and Iraq

were considered to be the likely aggressors.

Despite all these American fears, NATO partners in

the Central Region did not fully appreciate this idea of a crisis

scenario. What followed, were hard discussions. Not least,

German planners believed that possible aggressions on the

part of the Warsaw Pact in Europe were already enough to

deal with, and that the focus should be on them.

They were not able to assert their views at the time,

for the NATO Military Committee approved the Middle East

scenario in June 1969. But the discussions went on.

This tendency continued in NATO’s second series of

major exercises – HILEX which started in 1968. The top

priority of the HILEX series was to exercise crisis manage-

ment tools, ie. the employment of the AMF. The practical

procedures for crisis management were exercised in the

1970s. In the respective scenarios the AMF came into play as

a crucial element, thereby ultimately highlighting its raison

d’être.

On this basis, the planning and the exercises went on.

The main practical business of the AMF was the field exercis-

es, especially the so-called Express series. Until 1990 about

100 Exercises in all contingency areas were held.

In these decades Asia continued to influence NATO.

This led to unforeseen and somewhat grave events. HILEX 9

in 1980 became, and this is not yet

really appreciated today, a water-

shed in the strategic development

of NATO and the history of its

exercises. The exercise coincided

almost exactly with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and

was therefore cancelled as a precautionary step to avoid esca-

lation. There were considerable fears within NATO that the

Soviet Union might be provoked if it became known to the

public that the Alliance was holding a high-level war and crisis

exercise while Soviet units were invading Afghanistan.

The major background here was that the United States

was increasingly drawn into the conflicts in this region. The

US saw the events at the Hindu Kush and the events in the US

embassy in Tehran at the end of 1979 as massive threats to its

interests in the Gulf and beyond. In accordance with the

Carter doctrine, which demanded unconditional resistance

against any aggression by the Eastern bloc in the Gulf, the

Americans insisted that this region was also included in

NATO’s plans. The main document for NATO was the

“South West Asia Impact Study” which in its final version was

published to all NATO partners on 26 June 1980. Albeit at

that point, the strategic perspectives of the Alliance had ex-

panded once and for all – despite criticism from the Central

Europeans.

All of this was fully implemented in HILEX 10 of

1982. The exercise concept was almost identical with HILEX

9, but at the crucial points included a new key element; the

deployment of the Rapid Defense Force (RDF), which later

became the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF),

the predecessor of today’s US Central Command.

The Americans immediately faced fresh criticism when

the plans for the RDF found their way into NATO exercise

plans. The fact that the deployment of the RDF demanded a

considerable share of the US airlift capacities, it therefore

endangered the reinforcement plan for the European theatre.

There were considerable fears within NATO that the Soviet Union might be provoked.

Atlantic Voices, Volume 3, Issue 9 6

This last question proved to be a fundamentally and particular-

ly serious issue. Furthermore, the RDF units comprised high-

ly mobile and highly specialized elite units (marines, mecha-

nized and airborne units).

The question of the major RDF units and the problems

of the Persian Gulf and the Middle East continued to be con-

troversial and hence remained the focus of consideration.

Fortunately, despite the War between Iran and Iraq until

1988, the situation remained

more or less stable, prevent-

ing the NATO plans from

being put to the test. This

basic strategic situation didn’t

alter until the end of the Cold

War.

Even during the great

changes of 1989/90, there

were still considerable ten-

sions regarding these two

elements: the Eurocentric perspective and the expanded out-

look of the Americans with a view to the Middle East and

even global scenarios. The issue got a new thrust by the 2nd

Gulf War, which almost coincided with German reunifica-

tion.

All of this points to possible theatres of military en-

gagement for the Alliance today. It is certainly possible that a

mission that started as a defensive exercise to guard the Alli-

ance’s frontiers expands to an intervention beyond NATO’s

borders. Especially the southern border of Turkey, which is

an area where the dividing line between Art. 5 and non Art. 5

missions might be blurred. Of course, other contingencies are

possible, e.g. individual action by partner nations with or

without the NATO framework without being attacked

(question of reacting to the employment of poison gas against

civilians in Syria). All of these are pressing topics as the warn-

ings by high ranking military officials in Washington have

publicly cautioned against any military engagement in Syria.

Only After the Cold War: The First Live Mission of

the AMF

There are some general historical examples for NATO

missions in the region, and the AMF is at the core. The only

first “live” operation of the AMF took place in 1991, already

after the end of the East-West conflict. When the situation in

the Gulf region got increasingly difficult after the forcible

occupation of Kuwait, Turkey felt threatened by Iraq and

called for Alliance solidarity.

The decision to carry out

an operation and the way it was

conducted is a very good example

for the conditions under which

multilateral task forces, in particu-

lar those of NATO, had and still

have to operate, and the problems

that have to be overcome.

In December 1990, Turkey

submitted an urgent request via the

NATO chain of command, i.e. via AFSOUTH. As planned,

the supreme decision-making body, the Defence Planning

Committee, had to discuss and decide on the request.

In this case, the position of Germany in particular was

at the center of the controversy. Turkey had hoped to imme-

diately receive a positive response, and maybe even invoke

the mutual defense clause, Article 5 of the North Atlantic

Treaty. To the disappointment of the Turks, the Germans

strictly refused to make final decisions without further con-

sultations. Especially the Americans and the British - who

were already deploying huge numbers of troops to the Gulf

region - wanted to have all the NATO partners on board at

least nominally. Subsequent debates focused on the specific

mission that would be assigned to the AMF.

It was clear from the very beginning that only the air

component of the AMF would be deployed. The three

ground force battalions remained at their home bases. Bonn

also insisted on the wording for the rules of engagement of

the air component being clear and limited. The squadrons

that were to be deployed were assigned a purely demonstra-

The NATO Response Force in training to improve their operational capabilities and response time in new terrain (Photo: NATO)

Atlantic Voices, Volume 3, Issue 9 7

For a time, the reactions at the international level were

tangible. In other countries, above all in the UK, conservative

forces appeared in public and accused the Germans of collective

cowardice. What had already been heard within NATO – criti-

cism of an alleged lack of solidarity and commitment to the Alli-

ance – was now repeated in public. The foreign policy of Hans-

Dietrich Genscher exacerbated this criticism even more.

Genscher had refused to provide forces

or at least military equipment to the Is-

raelis, offering financial resources in-

stead. This policy, which has gone down

in history as “check book diplomacy”,

came under special fire. Various camps

claimed that the Germans had become a

nation of shop-keepers who were only interested in profit, and

in an emergency, would let others do the real dangerous jobs.

Of course, these and other accusations were purposely aggres-

sive and did not do justice to the complexity of the situation.

After the Defence Planning Committee finally had

achieved the necessary compromises in the wording and com-

pleted the preparations, SACEUR issued the activation order

and the deployment began. Since the British and Americans had

already stationed their respective units in the Gulf region, other

allies did their duty. The following units were deployed:

1 Alpha Jet squadron (Germany)

1 F-104 squadron (Italy)

1 Mirage 5 squadron (Belgium)

The German squadron arrived at Erhac on 8 January

1991, where it began deterrence operations. The mission was

successful, although substantial discussions and differences of

opinion about the character of the mission continued.

The squadrons quickly began to carry out extensive train-

ing missions. Attention was paid not only to the demonstrative

effect of the flights, but also to ensure adequate training. It in-

cluded ground attacks.

Meanwhile, considerable practical difficulties arose. The

weather was so adverse at times that sorties had to be cancelled.

Furthermore, “Showing the Flag”, for some reason, proved to be

difficult. Here, the very limited performance of the Iraqi Air

tive mission and explicitly not included in the air defense of the

responsible 6th ATAF. Training flights were only allowed to be

conducted north of a 40 km zone along the Turkish-Iraqi bor-

der. This area was defined according to a similar zone estab-

lished along the inner-German border during the Cold War:

The Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ). Combat aircrafts

were not allowed to use it as a training area in peacetime in

order to avoid incidents. Furthermore,

the AMF units were fundamentally giv-

en permission to fire only in self-

defense.

The Germans acted primarily for

political reasons. German reunification

had only just been achieved and the concerns of the Eastern

European states had to be taken into consideration. The Soviet

Army, with over three hundred thousand soldiers, was still in

Germany until 1994. A real taste of danger was supplied on

13th January 1991 when the Russian Army attacked civilian

protesters in Lithuania with Infantry and even tanks. The result

of this Bloody Sunday in Vilnius was hundreds of injured and

dead, raising tensions throughout the Euro-Atlantic.

Furthermore, the historical burdens (historical signifi-

cance of the Second World War) were still too much at the

fore. Considerable political consequences for the German gov-

ernment were to be expected in case of any direct participa-

tion of German units in a war. In case of high losses the situa-

tion would have become even graver.

In fact, internal turmoil was not far off. As the Gulf

War drew nearer, the number of conscientious objections

soared, and there were even some in the task forces earmarked

in southern Turkey. More than 50 members of Surface to Air

Missile Wing 36, among them temporary-career volunteers in

addition to conscripts, refused to do military service under the

German conscription law. The AMF Air was less affected by

this, but was still automatically in the focus.

Pilots of the German AMF contingent spoke very pen-

sively about the operation in public. Der Spiegel magazine

wrote repeatedly and with relish that “fear” was the prevalent

feeling among the German personnel - and in German living

rooms.

This policy, which has gone down in history as “check book diplomacy”, came

under special fire.

Atlantic Voices, Volume 3, Issue 9 8

units were soon defeated by the coalition forces in the Gulf.

The AMF started to withdraw in March.

It could be said that in the end, the first “live” opera-

tion of German combat units was a successful, albeit rather

rugged premiere.

From the Allied Mobile Force (AMF) to the NATO

Response Force (NRF)

After these events, NATO’s strategy and the image of

war began to change considerably.

At first, the AMF wasn’t too affected by new perspec-

tives. On the contrary, it was initially upgraded, and plans

were made to extend it to Division size.

As a result, exercises continued to be

held, such as “Arctic Express” in 1994.

In the mid-1990s, however, the

final stage of its history began. The gen-

eral setting was the development of

NATO’s strategy after 1990 in connec-

tion with the fundamental changes in the

Alliance’s command structure. The

strategy papers of 1991, 1999 and 2006,

as well as the deployment of NATO

forces in Operation “Allied Force” against Yugoslavia, are

distinct milestones on the road to a considerable extension of

both the mission and theatres of operations. The decisive

change came about between the papers of 1991 and 1999.

The East-West conflict, which had left distinct traces in the

strategic concept of 1991, lost more and more of its im-

portance and was replaced by a more global perspective.

In the late 1990s, however, the AMF had become

obsolete in its specific structure at that time. This was in part

due to an increasing lack of tactical capabilities and in part to

the considerable innovations in the field of information tech-

nology.

Regardless of all the innovations that had been made

since 1990, the equipment and the manning of the AMF had

basically retained its old Cold War character that was charac-

terized by its relatively limited mission profile, i.e. Defense

of static choke points on the NATO Flanks. And then there

were the old problems of multilateralism. In the Cold War,

Defense played a major role. NATO’s aircraft could hardly be

detected as they operated out of the 40 km air defense identi-

fication zone. When the NATO aircraft only slightly turned

further to the north, they disappeared from the Iraqi screens.

This issue was one of the basic problems of the AMF

since its creation. On the one hand, politicians and diplomats

feared that the situation would escalate and that the conse-

quences were unforeseeable – dangers which continue to

exist to this day, albeit in a different form. On the other

hand, you cannot deter if you do not make your presence felt.

Therefore the operation remained a balancing act between

deterring the enemy and being afraid of what reaction might

follow.

The specific condi-

tions under which the sol-

diers had to execute their

mission were rather difficult

at first. The logistical struc-

tures had to be set up step-by

-step; the considerable dis-

tances that had to be covered

repeatedly hindered pro-

gress. It was noted that the

forces complained about a lack of support from the Host Na-

tion. Much had to be provided via the long transportation

routes from Germany. The commander of the German forc-

es, a lieutenant colonel, also had a full time job with receiving

members of the public and politicians. In addition to Turkish

President Özal, the force was visited by the SACEUR, Gen-

eral Galvin, the German Minister of Defense, Gerhard Stol-

tenberg, the German Parliamentary Commissioner for the

Armed Forces, Alfred Biehle, and many other dignitaries.

The press did not remain idle either and caused a number of

considerable problems. A TV team from the Saarländischer

Rundfunk broadcasting station entered the quarters without

permission and conducted interviews. The team was only

allowed to continue after a formal declaration to cease and

desist had been issued.

The general duty and leisure conditions vastly im-

proved after a few weeks. No further necessities arose.

The crisis was short-lived since the Iraqi combat

Four U.S. Air Force F-16 Fighting Falcons line up at Aviano Air Base, before taking off on NATO Operation Allied Force missions

on May 21, 1999. (Photo: US DoD)

Atlantic Voices, Volume 3, Issue 9 9

rectly next to the front door of NATO. In which direction

NATO will go is still to be seen and has to be discussed.

Without any doubt the region around the Eastern

Mediterranean and the Gulf will be major theatres for years,

maybe for decades. It could well be that NATO as an alliance

will operate just the defensive part, leaving possible offensive

steps to individual Western countries, e.g. the US, the UK or

France, not excluding assistance by smaller states. The last

twenty years provided some examples for coordinated action

(e.g. “Coalition of the Willing” or engagement of individual

nations in Operation Unified

Protector against Libya in

2011).

There is also a history

behind these options. Despite

the major confrontation of the

two blocs especially along the German border and the con-

centration of huge forces in this area, there were elements of

strategic mobility in the Cold War. Almost all major NATO

partners have flexible intervention forces to be employed out

-of-area. These include:

US: Rapid Defence Joint Task Force (Gulf)

UK: UK Mobile Force (Center and Flanks in NATO)

France: Force d’Intervention Rapide – FAR

(In and out of NATO)

Italy: Forza di Intervento Rapido – FIR (i.e. out-of-area)

(Standing military e.g. US Marines, not included)

NATO always has been very flexible in dealing with

delicate questions such as out-of-area missions. Its special

decision making instruments enable it to find a common plan

of action while simultaneously tolerating dissenters without

marginalizing them. Unlike in the EU, for example, where

every important decision has to be confirmed through the

expressly positive confirmation of all the individual states,

within NATO the possibility exists for partners to remain

discretely in the background. This is ensured through a quasi

ex-negativo decision machinery (“Silence Procedure”). The

representatives of the individual members are not explicitly

asked to vote in favor of a decision, but are given merely the

option to exercise a veto. In other words, each nation of the

Alliance has the possibility, in case it has serious doubts about

the AMF only had a minimal permanent headquarters for the

land component and no command element at all for the air

component. For exercises, command organization posts often

had to be manned with reserve personnel who did not always

have adequate capabilities, even as far as language skills were

concerned. Even more problematic, most of the communica-

tion equipment and reporting channels of the AMF were ob-

solete as the new millennium grew nearer. One of the main

goals – more dynamic, efficient and flexible structures – fell

out of reach.

NATO therefore decid-

ed in favor of making a com-

pletely fresh start. It proved to

be considerably less expensive

to establish an entirely new

force, which was fully inte-

grated into the new overall concept of NATO from the out-

set. On 12 August 2002, the Defense Planning Committee

adopted a formal decision to disband the AMF as a stand alone

unit and replace it with the NATO Response Force (NRF). It

had become apparent that the rigid structures of the Cold

War were finally a thing of the past despite all the dynamiza-

tion they had begun to show since the 1970s.

Nevertheless, the AMF is an important historical fore-

runner of a flexible and deployable task force such as the

NRF. During the Cold War, there were even proposals to

build the AMF on world-wide lines like the NRF. As early as

in the 1960s, General Cadorna from Italy called for the AMF

to be topped up to the size of a division and made globally

deployable. Furthermore, he suggested that civilian and disas-

ter relief missions be added to the mission spectrum alongside

combat missions.

Actual Threats and Options

What about the south-eastern flank of NATO today?

The former contingency areas of the AMF, especially in the

South-Eastern Region, are still hot spots of global conflict.

Europe and Asia Minor are still the main defense platforms

apart from North America, for everything NATO is doing.

But, unlike the Cold War, the basis is not any longer solely a

defensive fortress, but - maybe - a springboard for global

missions. One of the most urgent crisis areas is situated di-

Without any doubt the region around the Eastern Mediterranean and the Gulf will be major theatres

for years, maybe for decades.

Atlantic Voices, Volume 3, Issue 9 10

any type of mission, to individually weigh in the seriousness of

its grievance. If the conditions are such that they cannot be toler-

ated, a formal letter expressly stating opposition can be submit-

ted (“Breaking the Silence”). The matter then has to be renegoti-

ated. Where less serious concerns

are involved, however, the nation

can also refrain from any opposition,

abstain from any expression and thus

pave the way for a decision. It is

then still at liberty to decide in what

way it wishes to commit itself in

practical terms later. It is then a

national task to suitably propagate

this balancing act both at home and

abroad.

In practical terms, NATO’s military hardware is run by

the individual nations under the roof of a common military head-

quarters and chains of command. So it was possible to execute

strike missions in Libya even if some members of the Alliance

refused to play an active role.

But history also shows that too much flexible pragmatism

can lead to erosion. All members, therefore, must take a cau-

tious and critical look on all actions at any time.

As already mentioned, NATO has, at least internally, not

only been dealing with the security of the Arabian peninsula

since 1991, but rather since 1970. Both then and now, the states

of continental Europe are concerned and uneasy about commit-

ting themselves in this region despite the changes in the strategic

setting.

There are reasons for this. One is that the whole region is

a tinderbox that can easily explode. Each step can be one too

many. On the other hand, doing nothing provides no guarantee

that the situation will remain stable. The Alliance needs flexible

Crisis Management that integrates all possible means, ranging

from diplomatic communication and demonstrative action to the

employment of military power.

Surely, it is not really to be expected that Syria will at-

tack NATO at the Southern border of Turkey on a large scale.

But there are a lot of elements in the area that can’t really be

judged: the different opposition groups in Syria, radical Islam-

ists, Kurdish militant groups etc. Huge masses of refugees live in

the border area. They are vulnerable targets for everyone

who wants to destabilize the region further and give a blow to

Turkey’s prestige as a regional power. And with Turkey

NATO would be in the focus as well. It would probably suf-

fice to occupy some square miles of

Turkish territory to undermine the

credibility of NATO defense. This

is a further aspect that hasn’t

changed since 1990. NATO, and

the West in general, has to avoid

the impression of powerlessness,

otherwise it would lose prestige and

strategic acceptance.

In a direct confrontation, no

matter on what scale, every effort

must be taken to clear the situation. The question of whether

or not NATO would be drawn into the conflict would be on

the agenda immediately. If the Turks asked for NATO assis-

tance, it could be necessary to deploy a rapid reaction force

with highly capable troops such as the AMF or the NRF.

The Domestic Dimension

The position of Turkey is not an easy one. While An-

kara is involved in the Arabian Peninsula, it is constantly

afraid of destabilization. This is one of the main reasons why

Ankara asked for the deployment of Patriot Air-Defense mis-

siles at the beginning of 2013 for its southern border. The

situation in Syria had considerably deteriorated. After NATO

had resolved to send rocket units to Turkey, Germany decid-

ed to contribute. As in the Cold War, the Alliance demon-

strated solidarity by deployment of military units. However,

given recent events and the escalation of conflict in Syria,

nobody knows what might happen next.

In the region, the domestic situation plays a considera-

ble role as well. This has not changed to this day and still af-

fects specific actions such as Turkey’s announcement of the

deployment of German units in 2012/2013 before the perti-

nent decision had even been made. Resulting from the do-

mestic controversy over this issue not only in Turkey, but in

all NATO member countries, Ankara relies heavily on NATO

and maneuvers between submitting requests, exerting pres-

sure and emphasizing its function as a geostrategic bridge.

US Patriot battery under NATO Command overlooking the city of Gaziantep (Turkey) (Photo: NATO)

Atlantic Voices, Volume 3, Issue 9 11

for that very reason that NATO still has its mission. The co-

herence of NATO remains a key aspect of our security, espe-

cially at this present time. At the moment, it is a regional

Alliance with global problems. Maybe, in some distant future,

it will be a global Alliance with regional problems. But no-

body knows if this will happen.

Dr. Bernd Lemke served his country with distinction in the

German Air Force from 1984-1985. He holds a PhD in

military history and specializes in German and British history.

Since 2001, Dr. Lemke has been an accomplished researcher

at the Bundeswehr Center for Military History and Social

Sciences in Germany.

This Article is based on the following articles:

1. Bernd Lemke, „Abschreckung, Provokation oder Nonvaleur?“ Die Allied Mobile Force (AMF) in den Wintex- und Hilex-Übungen 1970 – 1985, in Wege zur Wiedervereinigung, Die beiden deutschen Staaten in ihren Bündnissen, ed Oliver Bange und Bernd Lemke (Munich: Oldenbourg 2013), 311 – 334. (Deterrence, provocation of bluff? The Allied Mobile Force in the WINTEX- and HILEX-exercise 1970 -1985).

2. Bernd Lemke, Die deutsche Luftwaffe und die Allied Mobile Force 1961 - 1991, in: Gneisenau Blätter 11(2012), "Sicherheitspolitik und Luftwaffe seit 1956", S. 49 - 56, download unter: http://www.gneisenau-gesellschaft.de/downloads/gneisenau_band_11.pdf. (The German Air Force and the Allied Mobile Force 1961 – 1991).

3. Sean Maloney, “Fire Brigade or Tocsin?” NATO’s ACE Mobile Force, Flexible Response and the Cold War, in: The Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol.27, No.4, December 2004, 585 – 613, download, URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1362369042000314529.

4. Götz Steinle, Allied Mobile Force, in: Truppenpraxis 2/1991, S. 121 – 125.

5. Bernd Lemke, „Abschreckung oder Provokation? Die Allied Mobile Force (AMF) und ihre Übungen 1960 – 1989“, in Military Power Revue der Schweizer Armee, Nr. 2/2010, S. 49 – 63. (Deterrence or provocation? The Allied Mobile Force and its exercises 1960 – 1989).

6. Bernd Lemke, „Globale Probleme einer regionalen Allianz: die NATO und die Frage militärischen Engagements außerhalb der Bündnisgrenzen bis 1989“ in Sicherheit und Frieden (S+F), 27.Jg. 2009, H.1, S. 24 – 30. (Global problem of a regional alliance: NATO and the question of military engagement out of area until 1989).

7. Copyright for the map: “Zentrum für Militärgeschichte und Sozialwissenschaft (ZMSBw) / Bundeswehr Center for Military History and Social Sciences (CMHSOSC), former Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt (MGFA). Map was designed by Bernd Nogli.” (Copyright: MGFA 06406-02).

This situation, as discomforting as it is, contrasts in some way

with the domestic landscape in the member states further west.

The setting in Germany towards global engagement has not real-

ly changed since the end of the Cold War. As in 1991, the

2012/2013 mission has broad parliamentary backing despite the

criticism from the Left. The public thinks somewhat differently.

The general feeling is usually circumscribed with the term

“friendly indifference” towards the role of the Bundeswehr in

global missions in general and skepticism against individual mis-

sions. According to a survey by Infratest/Dimap 2011, 66 per-

cent of those polled are against the prolongation of the mission in

Afghanistan.

This again is nothing new. For more than 60 years,

NATO has experienced the discrepancy between Alliance soli-

darity and domestic sensibilities, and the situation will likely

remain so. This is a basic feature and one that places extremely

high demands on anyone in a position of responsibility. It is part

of the life of a democratic alliance. What we can say, is that

NATO in its historical depth has provided many examples and

models for the present.

The Future of NATO

One fundamental question about the future of NATO as

an alliance was raised after the end of the Cold War, and is still

asked today. Has NATO outlived itself? It is a basic feature of

Western democracies that success does not automatically trans-

late into a guarantee for continued existence. As early as in the

late 1960s, in the midst of the Cold War, some people had

praised the increase in security thanks to NATO, but expressed

doubts about whether the Alliance was still necessary. Due to its

success, it has rendered itself superfluous in the eyes of many. It

is clear that the European states in particular would never have

been able to defend themselves if they had been isolated ele-

ments. In the early 1990s, there was no longer a danger from the

East. Scholars wondered whether an alliance is kept together by

external threats and falls apart as soon as these threats cease to

exist. In 1992, the American political scientist Francis Fukuyama

published his book “The End of History”. In it, he noted that

Western democracy had gained a universal victory and conclud-

ed that extensive defense efforts would in fact become superflu-

ous.

Unfortunately, this utopia did not materialize, and it is

About the author

This publication is coThis publication is coThis publication is co---sponsored by the sponsored by the sponsored by the

North Atlantic Treaty OrganizationNorth Atlantic Treaty OrganizationNorth Atlantic Treaty Organization

Atlantic Voices is the monthly publication of the Atlantic Treaty Associa-

tion. It aims to inform the debate on key issues that affect the North Atlantic

Treaty Organization, its goals and its future. The work published in Atlantic

Voices is written by young professionals and researchers.

The Atlantic Treaty Association (ATA) is an international non-

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networks and the sharing of knowledge on transatlantic cooperation and

security. By convening political, diplomatic and military leaders with

academics, media representatives and young professionals, the ATA promotes

the values set forth in the North Atlantic Treaty: Democracy, Freedom,

Liberty, Peace, Security and Rule of Law. The ATA membership extends to 37

countries from North America to the Caucasus throughout Europe. In 1996,

the Youth Atlantic Treaty Association (YATA) was created to specifially

include to the successor generation in our work.

Since 1954, the ATA has advanced the public’s knowledge and

understanding of the importance of joint efforts to transatlantic security

through its international programs, such as the Central and South Eastern

European Security Forum, the Ukraine Dialogue and its Educational Platform.

In 2011, the ATA adopted a new set of strategic goals that reflects the

constantly evolving dynamics of international cooperation. These goals include:

◊ the establishment of new and competitive programs on international

security issues.

◊ the development of research initiatives and security-related events for

its members.

◊ the expansion of ATA’s international network of experts to countries in

Northern Africa and Asia.

The ATA is realizing these goals through new programs, more policy

activism and greater emphasis on joint research initiatives.

These programs will also aid in the establishment of a network of

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The views expressed in this article are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the Atlantic Treaty Association, its members, affiliates or staff.

Atlantic Voices is always seeking new material. If you are a young

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Editor: Jason Wiseman

ATA Programs

From 6-7 September, the Latvian Transatlantic Organiza-

tion (LATO) will be hosting the Young Diplomacy Professionals

Forum (YDPF) alongside its annual Riga Conference. This years

forum will feature 60 participants from over 35 countries that will

engage in a series of intensive workshops and debates to enhance

their overall skills in political engagement.

From 19-22 Sep-

tember, the Czech Euro-

Atlantic Council will host

its annual flagship event,

NATO Days, in Ostrava,

Czech Republic. This event

will host a series of demonstrations featuring some of the latest in

cutting edge military technology.

On 24 October, the Bundeswehr Center for Military History and

Social Sciences will host a workshop on NATO-flanks open to the

public. If you are interested in participating please write an email

to: Bernd1Lemke@bundeswehr.org