atlantic voices vol. 3 no. 4

ATLANTIC TREATY ASSOCIATION

Atlantic Voices, Volume 3, Issue 4 1

Volume 3 - Issue 4 April 2013

Contents:

After Pandora’s Box: Implications of Misgovernance and Contest-

ed Governance in Syria, and What this Means for NATO

Michael Clark and Renad Mansour examine the threat to Middle Eastern and global security

as a consequence of misgoverance in Syria, particularly in the Kurdish regions in the north of

the country. By drawing from similar scenarios in Mali and Libya, they also explore the po-

tential for unrest in Syria to jeopardize transatlantic security.

The Concept of Ungoverned Spaces: Development and

Perspectives

Ilija Djugumanov and Marko Pankovski explore the concept surrounding the term

“ungoverned spaces” and how these areas have become a paramount concern to transatlantic

security in the modern world. Their analysis bears implications for the future of NATO poli-

cy as they examine the various factors contributing to a lack of security in areas around the

world.

Ungoverned Spaces The Threat That Draws Us In

As conflict continues to proliferate across

the Middle East and North Africa, the question

of how to secure ungoverned spaces becomes

increasingly pressing for the future of the

transatlantic community. Mali and Syria pre-

sent just two of the most recent examples of

how ungoverned spaces can become hotbeds

of extremism that lead to widespread instabil-

ity and state failure, posing a direct threat to

Europe and its surrounding partners.

Ungoverned spaces are not a phenomenon

exclusively outside of Europe, and are often

used as a weapon against NATO and its Al-

lies. Such cases necessitate an examination as

to how these spaces remain ungoverned, often

controlled instead by separatist or even terror-

ist forces.

For transatlantic security to remain stable,

it is essential that NATO address these spaces

as part of its future agenda. Since ungoverned

spaces are often the precondition for conflict

that prompts NATO intervention, NATO

must do what it can to address these threats

before they overwhelm the Alliance and its

Partners. –Matt Bowers

Mali rebels have successfully seized much of the ungoverned territory in the north of the country (Photo: The New York Times)


By Michael Clark & Renad Mansour

S ince the first stirrings of protest on 15 March 2011,

the domestic situation in Syria has deteriorated cata-

strophically, with street-

level demonstrations swiftly develop-

ing into overt, armed insurrection,

and with rebellion in certain quarters

escalating to full-blown civil war.

Vast swathes of the country now lie

well outside Damascus’s sphere of

influence; much of the polity has

disintegrated into spaces of weak or

contested governance. While the

exact number of internally displaced

persons is unknown, as of March

2013 over 1 million Syrians had been

forced to flee to neighbouring states.1

In bordering Iraq, Lebanon, Israel,

Jordan and Turkey, there is a risk of

contagion. Since the Syrian Civil War

involves Sunnis, Shi’ites, Kurds,

Christians, and a host of smaller mi-

nority groups, it remains a potential

powder keg at the heart of the re-

gion.

This article analyses the actual and potential ramifica-

tions of the Syrian Civil War for NATO, with particular re-

gard to the notion of ungoverned spaces, or rather spaces of

contested governance and misgovernance. In addition to pre-

senting the issues that such spaces inside Syria pose for the

alliance’s members, this article seeks to address the matter of

contested governance proliferation throughout the Middle

East to assess what this might mean for NATO and suggest

how consideration of these issues might inform future NATO

decision-making. Ultimately, an increased recognition and

awareness of incidences of contested governance and misgov-

ernance, improved information about such incidences, and

the modelling of potential outcomes based on accumulated

data all provide a sound basis for a swift and adaptable NATO

response when alliance members are drawn in.

As has been noted else-

where, the notion of

“ungoverned areas” as spaces

completely lacking in govern-

ance is unsound.2 Areas labelled

as “ungoverned” (in which for-

mal, strong governance has

disintegrated or was never pre-

sent) are in fact better concep-

tualised as alternatively gov-

erned, under-governed, mis-

governed, or of contested gov-

ernance. Localised or informal

governance structures, relying

on substratum tribal rules,

norms, laws and customs, al-

ways emerge. Truly Hobbesian

anarchy is hard to find. This

article focuses primarily on two

types of “ungoverned” spaces that

are of particular relevance to the

Syrian Civil War and to the transatlantic alliance, namely

areas of contested governance and misgovernance.

Defining Contested Governance and

Misgovernance

Given the rarity of absolutely “ungoverned” spaces,

our concern and focus is better directed to those spaces

where state governance structures have been subordinated,

either voluntarily or involuntarily, to other actors.3 Where

control over and performance of governance functions are

ceded voluntarily, we are perhaps better served by talking of

misgovernance, while contested governance would imply an

involuntary surrender of these capacities.

After Pandora's Box Implications of Misgovernance and Contested Governance

in Syria, and What this Means for NATO

Assad’s decline has led to an enormous power vacuum in the

misgoverned regions of Syria (Photo: Reuters)


Many Syrian provinces are now areas of contested govern-

ance, zones in which civil conflict impedes the state in its perfor-

mance of its governance functions. In contested areas, the govern-

ance functions normally provided by the state are instead fulfilled

by other actors. This may represent control over the space when

these other actors dominate the provision of security or certain

levels of governance when these other actors provide education,

social services, or assume responsibility for infrastructure.4 Thus,

in areas of contested governance, the state competes with other

actors in the performance of governance functions, while other

actors often compete between themselves.

As has been argued elsewhere,

there is also the possibility that the state

deliberately cedes or ‘softens’ sovereignty

over a given space in order to serve its

interests.5 Such spaces, for example Syrian Kurdistan, are better

described as misgoverned. Here, the state implements its govern-

ance in a manner that, deliberately or not, provides freedom of

action to other actors.6 In the case of Syrian Kurdistan, the Assad

regime's policy of misgovernance has increased the room to ma-

noeuvre for the Democratic Union Party (PYD) and other Kurd-

ish groups in the Kurdistan National Council (KNC). This is a

deliberate act, for reasons that will be outlined below.

In the following section, the problematic issues of contest-

ed governance and misgovernance in Syria will be addressed along

with the implications for NATO, before the threat of contagion

and its ramifications for NATO are assessed in the subsequent

section.

Competing for Governance

In early 2012, a Syrian friend of the authors, Nazir7, decid-

ed to leave his family home in Idlib province, northern Syria, and

seek a future in Lebanon. By early 2013, his visa had expired and

he was obligated to return to his homeland. As he had not yet

completed his military service, he is due to be called up on his

return. Nazir now faces a terrible dilemma. If he refuses to fulfil

his duty of military service, he will be a deserter; in today's Syria,

'deserter' is synonymous with 'rebel'. On the other hand, if he

fulfils his duty, he might shortly be involved in the bloody scenes

being reported around the world. Either choice has potentially

fatal implications for his family, because Idlib province is an area

of contested governance.

Idlib province is a hotspot of the Syrian Civil War.

Hilltops, towns and villages have been repeatedly taken and

lost by both sides in the conflict, although as of early 2013, the

rebels appear to have made and consolidated major advances.

His family, previously on good terms with the representatives

of the regime in the local town, has already suffered from the

success of the rebels, having been stripped of land and build-

ings. With the governance of the area contested, Nazir's pre-

dicament becomes impossible; his decision-making is impaired

by the complexity and uncertainty of the situation and the con-

sequent unpredictability of where govern-

ance will lie, either in the short- or long-

term. Nazir is caught in a Catch-22.

It has been astutely observed that,

in reference to the issue of ungoverned

spaces, the fundamental questions are – or

should be – more about the mode of governance than its ex-

tent; that is to say, the core questions are who is governing, how

are they governing, and what are the consequences of this mode

of governance?8 Such a perspective has been upheld,9 particu-

larly in regard to the establishment of “safe havens.”10 In the

case of spaces of contested governance, this core problem - how

the space is governed and by whom – takes on added signifi-

cance. By definition, in such areas it is frequently unclear who

is governing; often, even when the identity of the dominant

actor is established, the manner in which governance is being

implemented and its consequences remain opaque.

There are thus two fundamental issues for NATO with

respect to spaces of contested governance. The first is the po-

tential for a space to be governed in a manner that provides a

“safe haven” to groups seeking to harm member states, or in-

deed when a space is ceded to such a group. The second con-

cerns the uncertainty over who is accountable within a given

area. Linked to this are issues of communication, diplomacy

and strategy.

The most pressing issue in Syria for the transatlantic

alliance concerns the potential for the establishment of so-

called ‘safe havens’. Safe havens are areas in which ‘illicit’ ac-

tors are able to establish themselves, consolidate, plan, organ-

ize, fundraise, recruit, train, and operate.11 ‘Illicit’ actors refer

to those groups harbouring hostile intentions towards any

NATO member state, as was the case for al-Qaeda

The most pressing issue in Syria for the transatlantic alliance concerns the po-

tential for the establishment of so-called ‘safe havens’


in Afghanistan. More recently, we have seen contested

spaces develop into ‘safe havens’ for al-Qaeda in the Is-

lamic Maghreb (AQIM) in northern Mali, as well as al-

Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in Yemen.

It has been contended that the concept of

‘ungoverned’ ‘safe havens’ is somewhat self-

contradictory, in the sense that such chaotic milieus are as

problematic for illicit actors as for any other actor.12 This

notion notwithstanding, in Syria, the phenomenon is one

of contested governance, rather than 'ungovernance’.

However, it remains the case that, whether spaces are

governed in a manner that provides a “safe haven” to illicit

actors, or are actually ceded to such a group, the estab-

lishment of a “safe haven” requires support from both local

power brokers and the local populace. Indeed, the most

robust, resilient, and, therefore, threatening partnerships

are to be found where there are ethnic, linguistic, cultural

and/or political ties and similarities between the group

and the surrounding population.13

Given the reportedly augmenting success of Jabhat

al-Nusra, a faction of al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI)14, in Syria,

and consequently its cementing dominance over swathes

of territory, there is

initial cause for con-

cern. There remains

an apparently strong

level of support from

within the local popu-

lation15, and a genuine

potential for areas

under its governance

to be either directly

subordinated to AQI

control or at least to

harbour and sustain

AQ-oriented groups espousing sentiments hostile to

NATO member states. Effectively, if control and perfor-

mance of governance functions in parts of Syria are ceded

to organisations like Jabhat al-Nusra, there is a real risk

that a situation analogous to that in Afghanistan that bred

the 9/11 attacks will arise.

It is at this point that the second issue, namely uncer-

tainty over accountability, must be addressed. The problem

with spaces of contested governance is that, in the event of a

hostile act (for example a rocket attack on Turkey or a suicide

bombing of the embassy of a NATO member state), it is not

immediately clear who bears responsibility. Where and to

whom must communication be directed? This problem is

amplified when the contest over governance is not restricted

to government and rebels, but is taking place even between

sub-state actors–a real possibility in Syria given the evident

disagreements between Jabhat al-Nusra and the secular oppo-

sition over visions for the future. Not only does uncertainty

over the source of governance impede effective diplomacy,

but it also has certain strategic ramifications. If an attack on a

NATO member state is launched from a space of contested

governance, the water is muddied as to possible courses of

action. Just as is the case for our friend Nazir, effective deci-

sion-making is impaired by the confusion of contested gov-

ernance.

Misgovernance as a Weapon

As previously defined, misgovernance can be used as a

deliberate political tool to challenge the stability and security

of the transatlantic members. Perhaps the single most devas-

tating incident on NATO

territory since the for-

mation of the organization

was the 9/11 attacks in

New York, Washington,

and Pennsylvania. Misgov-

ernance played a role in

this, insofar as the Taliban

regime in Afghanistan,

characterized by a relation-

ship between its leader,

Mullah Omar, and the lead-

er of AQ, Osama bin Laden.

The regime granted a part of its territory to AQ for opera-

tions and planning. When the Taliban effectively took control

of Jalalabad in the late 1990s, the group made the decision to

keep the al-Qaeda leadership, which had settled in Afghani-

stan since exile from Sudan in 1996, intact.

Bashar al-Assad’s decision to grant Syrian Kurds autonomy has invigorated the

pan-Kurdish movement (Photo: Today’s Zaman)


Although the relationship between Mullah Omar and bin Lad-

en is often over-stressed, at the very least the two shared a

similar worldview and rejected American presence in Islamic

lands. This was further catalysed with the death of Mullah

Rabbani, who was an opponent, albeit a marginalized one, to

granting al-Qaeda sovereignty on Afghani territory. It was

Omar’s refusal to extradite bin Laden

following the 9/11 attacks that ulti-

mately triggered the US-led invasion

and crippled both parties. For Omar,

misgovernance was a political tool to

solidify his own standing within the Taliban and also to threat-

en regional (i.e. Iran, Iraq) and international (i.e. NATO

countries) ambitions that conflicted with Afghani national

interests. In this case, a transatlantic response was required,

directly drawing NATO into an armed conflict when the

United States invoked Article 5 of the Charter.

Another recent example of misgovernance as a weap-

on was when Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s granted the

Kurdish population autonomy over their areas along the bor-

der with Turkey. Since then, there has been a tacit agreement

between Assad and the Kurds of Syria, who are free to act as

long as they channel their opposition, politically and militari-

ly, against Ankara, not Damascus.16 Assad compromised a

portion of territory, not for benevolently considered minority

rights, but rather for a strategically calculated opportunity to

retaliate against Turkey’s support for the Syrian opposition.

The newfound autonomous region has invited the Kurdistan

Workers’ Party (PKK) back into Syria.

A brief history explains this move. Abdullah Ocalan,

head of the PKK, fled Turkey in 1979 and established political

offices and military bases in Syria, where the group was able

to grow and menace Turkish stability by launching and plan-

ning attacks protected by their Syrian safe haven. Misgovern-

ance during this period ended when a peace deal, exiling

Ocalan from Syria, was signed between Ankara and Damascus

in 1998. As part of this bargain, the Ba’athist government

regained governance over its territory and the threat to Tur-

key was eradicated. Nonetheless, the decades-long presence

of a Turkish Kurd nationalist group in Syria galvanized its

own Kurdish population, who share close links with Turkish

Kurds, such as the Kirmanji dialect, historical trade and inter-

marriages. The Democratic Union Party (PYD) was thus es-

tablished as an off-shoot of the PKK in 2003, and Ocalan re-

mained the figurehead of this movement.

When Ankara decided to begin supporting the Syrian

opposition, militarily and financially,

Assad reverted to an unconventional but

effective weapon: misgovernance. That

is, a tit-for-tat retaliation against Tur-

key’s destabilizing support for the Free

Syrian Army by reestablishing PKK bases

in Syria vis-à-vis the newfound autonomy granted to groups

like the PYD. Indeed, as soon as the central government re-

treated from the al-Jazira province and cities like Qamishli (al

-Hasakah), PKK flags and portraits of Ocalan re-emerged.

Now that the Syrian Kurds have had their first feel of

autonomy, they have successfully repelled both government

and Free Syrian Army (FSA) troops from entering their terri-

tory. This stint of misgovernance has increasingly become

irreversible, in that the Kurds of Syria have become an estab-

lished regional player almost overnight, striking at Ankara’a

traditional pan-Kurdish anxieties. Abdul Basit-Sieda, a Syrian

Kurd and the head of the Syrian National Council at the time,

stated that the onus is now on Turkey to “go further and

move forward” on the Kurdish issue.17 The danger lies here.

Turkey has been forced to address its own Kurdish minority

problem, not on its own terms, but rather, as a consequence

of the destabilizing effect that Syrian Kurd autonomy has had.

In other words, Ankara has been drawn into addressing issues

stemming from misgovernance. “What’s the difference if

Assad goes?” questioned head of the PYD’s External Rela-

tions, Alan Semo, who also expressed the group’s concerns

that the “Syrian opposition are already denying the Kurds, and

they are not even in power yet...there might be another civil

war, if the new regime does not respect the rights of the

Kurds.”18 This is when misgoverannce leads to contested gov-

ernance. The scope of this section, however, is to merely

suggest that the autonomy, which has been granted to Syrian

Kurds and has been a deliberate attack on Turkey’s sovereign-

ty and security, has opened a Pandora’s box to the point

that Ankara, and other transatlantic governments for that

Assad compromised a portion of territo-ry ... for a strategically calculated oppor-tunity to retaliate against Turkey’s sup-

port for the Syrian opposition.


matter, will have to grow accustomed to Kurdish sovereigns

along the border.

The threat of misgovernance is often a result of antag-

onized relations, as the two examples above demonstrate.

However, it led to two very different trajectories. In the first

case, misgovernance resulted in a direct attack on a NATO

country. In the second

case, while a few skir-

mishes erupted initially,

Turkey was able to

neutralize the threat vis-

à-vis its relationship

with Iraqi Kurds. It

helped establish a Kur-

distan National Con-

gress, which incorpo-

rated the PYD along

with 15 other Syrian

Kurdish groups, which

convened in Erbil, Iraq

under Iraqi Kurdish President Massoud Barzani in January

2012. This was Turkey’s attempt to address the threat of

misgovernance in Syria. As a result, the PYD has condemned,

at least rhetorically, the use of violence by the PKK. Turkey,

on the other hand, has been drawn into negotiating a long-

term solution with its own Kurdish population. As part of

these talks, Ocalan has begun a process of calling off PKK

violence and Turkey is in the process of legitimizing the

Kurdish leadership.19

The Threat of Contagion

There is a threat of contagion throughout the Middle

East, stemming from spaces of contested governance. We

have already seen the first symptoms of contested governance

along the Iraqi border with Syria, where an attack on Syrian

soldiers seeking temporary respite in Iraq was coordinated

and implemented on both sides of the border.20 There is a risk

that such actions erode Iraq's control over its border region,

and opens the way for AQI to move in, establishing de facto

control over a cross-border zone, akin to the Taliban in cer-

tain areas in the Afghan-Pakistani borderlands. This risk is not

limited to Iraq; indeed, in bordering Lebanon, Jordan, Israel

and Turkey, there is a genuine potential that this trend may

be followed elsewhere. In particular, Lebanon gives cause for

concern; from the outset of the civil war, both the govern-

ment and the opposition have attempted to extend the con-

flict to Lebanon. We have seen skirmishes in Tripoli between

black-flagged Salafists and resident Alawites, and roadblocks

and escalating tensions in Sidon between local Salafists and

Hezbollah. Increasingly, Hezbollah fighters appear to be in-

volved in the conflict on

both sides of the border;

the party has stated that it

considers the stability of

Lebanon irrevocably tied

to the future of Syria.21

The potential for all-out

war between Jabhat al-

Nusra and Hezbollah,

should the former move

into an area that the latter

considers to be within its

sphere of operations, is

great. The porous border is already becoming a space of con-

tested governance; should the regime fall, this is likely to be

exacerbated.

Furthermore, there is a threat that the forces that have

established and consolidated themselves in spaces of contested

governance will go on to cause or take advantage of similar

conditions elsewhere in the wider Arab world (Mali, fighters

from Syria moving on after Iraq, Afghan, etc.). This is based

on precedent since weak governance and domestic unrest is a

recipe for global jihadist infiltration; witness the presence of

AQI, itself a product of the ability of AQ from Afghanistan

and elsewhere to infiltrate themselves into Iraq. It is not a

stretch of the imagination to suppose that AQS (al-Qaeda in

Syria) will move on to the next conflict zone in the Arab

world.

Contested governance may also spread through the

displacement of peoples; a de facto partition of Syria into areas

held by one or many opposition groups and areas remaining

loyal to the Ba'athist regime would conceivably see the move-

ment of Alawites and their allies to the coast or around Da-

mascus while Christians would likely relocate to Lebanon or

seek refugee status in Europe.

Jabhat al-Nusra poses a significant threat to Syrian and Mediterranean stability

(Photo: Christian Science Monitor)


absence of viable options for pre-emptive action, NATO and its

member states must focus on improving their ability for rapid

response and adaptability to a range of different outcomes. Both

contested governance and misgovernance within a space must be

recognized as potential threats to alliance members.

Michael Clark is currently undertaking doctoral research at

the University of Cambridge, focusing on the formulation and

development of foreign policy towards the

Lebanese Hezbollah and the Iraqi al-Ahrar

Bloc. He has studied at the University of

Damascus and the American University of

Beirut.

Renad Mansour is a PhD Candidate in

Politics and International Relations at the University of Cam-

bridge and an Assistant Research Director at the Iraq Institute

for Strategic Studies (IIST) in Beirut, Lebanon. He has lived and

worked throughout the Middle East, including Iraq, Lebanon,

Syria, and Iran.

Bibliography

1“Press release: UNHCR Chief: Syria refugees reach one million” UNHCR. 5 March 2013. Accessed 6 March 2013.

2Robert Lamb, “Ungoverned areas and threats from safe havens: Final report of the ungov-erned areas project,” Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (2008); Anne Clunan and Harold Trinkunas, “Ungoverned spaces? Alternatives to state authority in an era of softened sovereignty,” International Studies Association (2008); Stewart Patrick, “Are ‘ungoverned spaces’ a threat?” Council for Foreign Relations. 11 Jan. 2010. Accessed 1 Feb. 2013; Yvan Guichaoua, “Mali: The fallacy of ungoverned spaces” University of East Anglia. 12 Feb. 2013.

3Clunan & Trinkunas, 5.

4Lamb, 19.

5Clunan & Trinkunas, 14.

6Lamb, 19.

7For security and anonymity, we have given the pseudonym ‘Nazir’ to our Syrian friend.

8ibid., 20.

9Clunan & Trinkunas.

10Patrick, 5.

11Lamb, 15.

12Patrick, 2.

13ibid.

14“Press release: Terrorist designations of the al-Nusrah Front as an alias for al-Qa'ida in Iraq,” U.S. Department of State. 11 December 2012. Accessed 13 March 2013.

15See the demonstrations of support for Jabhat al-Nusra following the US designation of the group as a terrorist organisation and a faction of AQI, both at grass-roots level and by a number of other opposition groups.

16Escobar, Pepe, “Could a State for Greater Kurdistan be on the Horizon” Al Jazeera English. 02 November 2012. Accessed 2 November 2012.

17Author interview with Abdul Basit Sieda (24 August 2012).

18Author interview with Alan Semo (23 August 2012).

19AFP, “Jailed PKK Leader Confirms Ceasefire Call on Thursday,” Al-Arabiya English. 18 March 2013. Accessed 18 March 2013.

20Duraid Adnan and Rick Gladstone, “Massacre of Syrian soldiers in Iraq raises risk of widening conflict,” New York Times. 4 March 2013. Accessed 14 March 2013.

21Hezbollah, an-nas al-herufi lil-wathiqa as-siyasiya li-hezb Allah (Hezbollah, 2009), 130.

22“Nato forces needed in Mali, says AU's Thomas Boni Yayi,” BBC. 9 January 2013. Ac-cessed 13 March 2013.

Sovereignty and Governance in Mali

It is perhaps useful to consider Mali as a potentially

analogous precedent for Syria. As has been observed, civil con-

flict in northern Mali between the Bamako government and

Tuareg separatists (a situation of contested governance) pro-

voked the utilisation of misgovernance as a weapon by the gov-

ernment. The softening of sovereignty and provision of space

to groups at odds with the separatists merely exacerbated the

contest over governance in the area. Events in Libya bolstered

the separatists, enabling them to massive-

ly enhance their recruitment capacity and

access to advanced weaponry, resulting in

their ability to launch an insurgent cam-

paign resulting in the seizure of large

swathes of the north of the country.

However, this only resulted in many of the vanquished groups

transferring allegiance to AQIM and retaking the disputed ter-

ritory. Ultimately, this drew in France, an alliance member.

At the time of writing, it is still unclear as to whether NATO

will eventually become involved in some way, depending on

the efficacy of the African Union mission.22

In certain senses, Mali could conceivably become a

repeat of pre-9/11 Afghanistan; cycles of contested govern-

ance and misgovernance spiralling until the effects are felt by

alliance members. The danger for NATO or many alliance

members is that Syria might follow suit.

Conclusion

Civil conflicts are, by definition, incidences of contest-

ed governance, and very often involve the usage of misgovern-

ance as a weapon; such alternative forms of governance in-

crease uncertainty over outcomes and thus reduce the poten-

tial for good decision-making, both for those individuals within

a given space and for external actors. As has been seen above,

there are a number of potential issues for the transatlantic alli-

ance inherent in contested governance and misgovernance. For

an external actor such as NATO, the adverse effect on decision

-making is cause for concern; it can only be counteracted by

vastly increased data collection, with particular respect to the

details on the ground, and by modelling as many potential

scenarios as possible. In a context of uncertainty, and in the

In certain senses, Mali could conceivably become a repeat of

pre-9/11 Afghanistan…

About the authors


taining its relations with internal or external actors. Thus,

the state has the exclusive position to legally exercise

force.

It is clear that the values of the modern state con-

cept are constantly changing and that some of them could

even be redefined. However, for the purpose of this arti-

cle, the aforementioned values will serve as the accepted

points of reference.

A t t h e

beginning of the

twentieth centu-

ry, states devel-

oped various

technologies to

exert their sover-

eignty across the

entirety of their

territory. Not

every state, how-

ever, employed

the benefits of

these advance-

ments, such as

surveillance abili-

ties.

The process of globalization brought about numer-

ous changes in international relations in regards to the sta-

tus and concept of the state, particularly after the Second

World War. Non-state actors such as transnational organi-

zations, nongovernmental organizations, and multinational

corporations emerged as new players in the international

sphere alongside states. These non-state organizations be-

gan to consolidate power and exert their influence on state

policy, in many cases questioning the traditional right of

state sovereignty over its territory and population. Some

organizations and multinational corporations often operate

with more resources than many developing countries com-

bined. This allows them to impact the flow of global fi-

nance, directly effecting people around the world and un-

By Ilija Djugumanov & Marko Pankovski

T he concept of modern statehood is characterized

by four main dimensions that have emerged over

time: territory, sovereignty, population and le-

gitimacy. The rise of the modern state as a dominant form

of organization in international relations consequently

shaped the interactions between these values. In different

stages of the development of the state concept, these val-

ues had different

meaning and signifi-

cance. Thus, states in

some periods lacked

the capability to man-

age all four compo-

nents at once, so those

that had larger territo-

ries and populations

struggled to exercise

sovereignty and legiti-

macy in the entirety of

their officially pro-

claimed state areas.

This was often the case

because states had no

mechanisms to be physically present throughout their ter-

ritories and therefore prioritized strategically important

areas, leaving other physical and nonphysical spaces largely

ungoverned at the state level for political reasons. As such,

these states would often collaborate with local power

structures, conceding some degree of their governance

over these areas. In such circumstances, states were forced

to carefully calculate which values of the state concept

should be most paramount in these areas.

Monopoly on the use of force presents another issue

that is critical to the modern state concept. Max Webber

developed this theory in the beginning of the twentieth

century as a basic characteristic which defines the state. In

order to preserve the aforementioned values, the state

must have physical strength in order to be capable of main-

Russian Peacekeepers in Transnistria (Photo: Timpul.md)

The Concept of Ungoverned Spaces Development and Perspectives


Simply put, “ungoverned spaces” are those spaces in

which the officially recognized institutions of the state can-

not exercise their full sovereignty. Commonly, the term

“ungoverned spaces” is understood to encompass govern-

ance in both the physical (territory, institutions) and non-

physical (cyberspace, banking) realms. In this article the

term “ungoverned space” will be used for a broader expla-

nation that includes both physical and nonphysical govern-

ance.

The first derivative of this term will be “ungoverned

areas”, according to the framework used by Robert D.

Lamb, while a second derivative, “safe haven”, will be used

to explain real and final situations of space for operational

activity. To this effect, Kennet J. Menkhaus adds that un-

governed spaces are not representative of anarchical socie-

ty and should not be regarded as such. Thus, Menkhaus

states that ungoverned spaces are characterized by their

hybrid systems of governance, which include various fac-

tors like traditional authorities’ combinations, customary

law, civic and religious

groups, business interests,

neighborhood watch groups,

private security forces, and

tribal self-defence units. An-

other concept that is im-

portant in this direction is the rise of mediated state ar-

rangements when authority is ceded to local unofficial ac-

tors.

In a briefing at the Portuguese National Defense

Institute in Lisbon, Teresa Whelan argues that ungoverned

spaces can be characterized by additional equally important

components: “competing governance”; “exploitation of

legal principles”; and an “opaque area of activity”. These

three concepts shed new light on how the policy makers

should categorize the ungoverned spaces and act accord-

ingly.

Furthermore, Lamb’s theoretical framework is es-

sential due to the significant contribution he made to the

way the concept of “ungoverned areas” are understood.

Lamb argues that there are almost no ungoverned areas,

but there are areas that are governed in a different way.

This distinction is important because it illustrates a new

non

dermining the position of state governance over sectors of

its territory and population.

The definition of state sovereignty changed signifi-

cantly with the end of the Cold War as new actors

emerged and influenced the creation of states that were

often divided, small, and fragile. Such was the case in the

countries that gained or restored their independence from

the collapse of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, whose

governments lacked the capabilities to address the needs of

their respective populations. These countries quickly en-

countered a rise of ethnic nationalism on the local level

which was incompatible with the concept of the previous

federation state. In this case, even though the physical

space was governed with the army and police forces, it

eventually became ungoverned and turned against the sov-

ereignty of the previously recognized state. Many of these

new states lacked the human and material resources to

govern the entirety of their territory. Thus, the interna-

tional community had to cope with various new security

concerns arising from the

fragility and turmoil within

these new, states. According

to Clunan and Trinkunas, this

resulted in a “major expan-

sion of the United Nations’

peacekeeping role, significant changes in the attitude of the

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) towards out-

of-area missions, and the mobilization of the transnational

civil society to address emerging and festering crises”.

The period after the Cold War allowed many non-

state actors the opportunity to infiltrate the physical and

nonphysical sovereignty of states. This included interna-

tional governmental and nongovernmental organizations,

as well as multinational enterprises. However, the empha-

sis in this article will be placed on ungoverned space which

is used by non-state actors in order to threaten national

and international security. The continued process of sof-

tening state sovereignty often results in a constant trans-

fer of power and resources to non-state actors. These ac-

tors are becoming serious threats to international security

as they routinely exploit fragile countries by undermining

their ability to govern their own territory and using this

space as a base from which to operate, recruit, settle and

orchestrate hostile activities.

“Ungoverned spaces” are those spaces in which the officially recognized institutions of the state cannot exercise their full sovereignty


non-government-centric perspective on the concept of

ungoverned spaces, and allows for many actors to contrib-

ute to the management of ungoverned space. This dimin-

ishes the uniqueness of states as a factor in discussion and

collaboration as new

factors come into

play. For practical,

legal, and diplomatic

reasons, Lamb still

proposes the state as

a main subject for

discussion when

dealing with ungov-

erned areas, but

suggests that some-

times it is useful to

avoid the state in

order to ascertain

more favorable re-

sults. This approach

is a vital lifeline

when the official state institutions have no capacity or will-

ingness to deal with the ungoverned areas in their own

borders.

Scholars have discussed various approaches regard-

ing collaboration with non-state actors. According to

Lamb, outside actors should practice collaboration with

the official authorities but this policy should not be used in

every situation. In this manner, Lamb recognizes dynamics

in which pursuing the government can be counterproduc-

tive and the efficiency in these scenarios of acting directly

with local or alternative authorities or factors. Conversely,

Whelan argues for a more state-oriented approach in terms

of the increased determination of the state to return to a

satisfactory level of sovereignty.

Another common characteristic of ungoverned

spaces is that they are often connected to “fragile” or

“failed” states. This notion can be discussed from two per-

spectives. One is the term “ungoverned space” as a syno-

nym for “safe haven” in the physical sense. If the term

“ungoverned space” is oriented to cover both physical and

nonphysical spaces, however, then it cannot be automati-

cally connected to a fragile or failed state since illicit activi-

ties such as illegal financial transactions and cyber warfare

are rarely connected to a specific state entity .

Considerations

Even though most concepts and methods of action

regarding the solution of the “ungoverned spaces” problem

are oriented towards

relationships with the

actors, it is necessary

to address alternative

concepts regarding

this obvious threat to

international securi-

ty.

Determining

what constitutes a

failed state is a criti-

cal feature in this

context. The concept

of ungoverned spaces

sees failed states from

a contemporary per-

spective rather than

exploring the reasons for this failure. When discussing the

ungoverned spaces concept and its relation to fragile and

failed states, a comprehensive analysis of why the state is in

such a condition is necessary. One important step towards

this goal is to abandon the western modern state perspec-

tive on the fragile and failed states. This will allow the in-

ternational community to better understand the ongoing

conditions in FFCS, which will be highly beneficial to poli-

cy makers. This analysis should cover all social, economic,

and political factors alongside security. Moreover, external

factors for state failure must be considered alongside inter-

nal ones. Interventions based on internal factors have failed

many times, and military involvement can easily lead to

spillover effects of violence in the broader region, naturally

resulting in new ungoverned areas. Accordingly, it is im-

portant to comprehensively research:

- The key factors of state failure;

- Contemporary formal and informal actors;

- Internal and external factors.

It is obvious that the numerous ungoverned spaces of the world pose a threat to international peace and secu-rity. Along with the aforementioned problems that arise in

Kosovo presents another case of an ungoverned space that the transatlantic community

must address (Photo: European Commission)


application. The constant flux of the state convolutes the

meaning and scope of the term “ungoverned spaces”. Re-

cent works by some US Defence Department policy mak-

ers gave a sound theoretical basis for the term, which re-

sulted in additional publications on this subject. Even

though the meaning, level of coverage, and optimal usage

of the term vary from one

article to another, it is im-

portant that the concept of

“ungoverned areas” is start-

ing to take its own shape in

the focus of more and more

scholars and policy makers throughout the world.

Mr. Ilija Djugumanov is president of the Youth of the

Euro – Atlantic Council of Macedonia (YATA Macedonia)

and vice-president for Public Diplomacy of YATA Interna-

tional. He is now preparing his thesis at his MA studies on

International Relations – Conflict Resolution, at a program

by the University of Goteborg, Sweden.

Mr. Marko Pankovski holds a Bachelor of Arts in De-

fendology at the Institute for Security, Defence and Peace

at Ss. Cyril and Methodius University of Skopje.

Bibliography

H.H., Gerth, Mills C. Wright, and Weber Max, ed. s.v. "From Max Weber: essays in sociology." (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946), 77 Anne L. Cunnan and Harold. A. Trinkunas, “Conceptualizing Ungov-erned Spaces: Territorial Statehood, Contested Authority and Softened Sovereignty.” In Ungoverned Spaces: Alternatives to State Authorities in an Era of Softened Sovereignty, edited by Anne L. Cunnan and Harold A. Trinkunas (Stanford: Stanford University Press), 22 Lamb, Robert D., “Ungoverned Areas and Threats from Safe Havens”, Final report of Ungoverned Areas prepared for the Under Secretary of Defence for Policy, Department of Defence, Washington D.C., January 2008, 4-10 Menkhaus, Kenet J., “Constraints and Opportunities in Ungoverned Spaces.” In Denial of Sanctuary: Understanding Terrorist Safe Havens, edited by Michael A. Innes (Westport, Connecticut/London: Praeger Security International, 2007), 69-70 Whelan, Teresa, “African’s Ungoverned Space” (paper presented at the Portuguese National Defense Institute in Lisbon, Portugal, May 24, 2006), 66 Robert D. Lamb, “Ungoverned areas and Threats from Safe Havens”, Final report of Ungoverned Areas prepared for the Under Secretary of Defence for Policy, Department of Defence, Washington D.C., January 2008, 4 Whelan, Teresa, “African’s Ungoverned Space” (paper presented at the Portuguese National Defense Institute in Lisbon, Portugal, May 24, 2006), 66-67

dealing with ungoverned areas, one additional problem is

that such security concerns are not explicitly regulated

within the United Nations Charter. This situation allows

the included non-state actors to use the concept of equal

sovereignty of the states in the international order as a

shield for creating safe heavens. The slow pace of UN Se-

curity Council procedures often

serves to benefit these groups, as

they have time to change their

position as soon as some ungov-

erned space becomes a topic of

intervention discussions in the

UNSC. Furthermore, UNSC resolutions often allow only a

limited range of actions, which prevents the use of full

operational capabilities in order to successfully and effi-

ciently deal with threats arising from ungoverned areas. An

additional issue that arises here is the state-centric concept

of the UN resolutions, which proved impractical in the

case of Afghanistan when the participants in the ISAF mis-

sion had to operate on Pakistani territory, resulting in con-

cerns of the mission’s legality. Borderless threats present a

phenomenon that should be analyzed and integrated ac-

cordingly into international law. Dealing with such threats

often requires actions in two or more countries, which in

some cases can prove problematic in regards to the norms

of international law.

As aforementioned, ungoverned spaces cover physi-

cal and nonphysical aspects of sovereignty. Flows of fi-

nance and information cannot be strictly related to geo-

graphic and political values that result in additional chal-

lenges for the international actors to deal with. The gov-

ernance of this nonphysical space is even more interde-

pendent and is an obligation of every concerned national or

multinational actor. Governing these areas is almost equal-

ly as important as governing conventional physical areas.

Financial and informational flows and developments are

closely related to the development of hostile non-state

actors and the level of their operational capacities. The

capability to govern such nonphysical areas will largely

increase the chances of managing their actions on the

ground and influencing their development.

In conclusion, it should be stated that even though

ungoverned spaces and their relations with FCTS are rela-

tively old, the term “ungoverned spaces” is still fluid in its

About the authors

UNSC resolutions often allow only a limited range of actions, which prevents the use of full operational

capabilities in order to successfully and efficiently deal with threats arising from ungoverned areas

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atlantic voices vol. 3 no. 4

Documents

concept of ungoverned

term ungoverned spaces

spaces of weak

ungoverned territory

transatlantic security

nato intervention

nato michael clark

global security