7th - copie.pdf

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Chapter I 7th Panzer Division The Ghost Division

Like the 6th Panzer Division, 7th Panzer Division was formed in October 1939 by the conver-sion of one of theWehrmachfs LeichteDivisions to full Panzer Division status.The 7th Panzer Division was a German elite armored formation which participated in the Bat-tle of France. General Erwin Rommel commanded the division, which was nicknamed the"Ghost Division" because of its speed and independent movement, which even the GermanHigh Command had difficulty following. After service in France, the division served mainlyon the Eastern Front, ending its days in the defense of Germany and surrendering to the Bri-tish army northwest of Berlin in 1945.THE 2ND LEICHTE DIVISION WAS OFFICIALLY FORMED ON 10 NOVEMBER1938 AT GERA, TO THESOUTH OFLEIPZIG. DESPITE THE FACT THATGERMANY HAD VERY LITTLE CAVALRY STRENGTH, THECAVALRY ARM WAS THE MOST PRESTIGIOUS IN THE GERMAN ARMED FORCES, AND THE LIGHT DIVI-SIONS HAD BEEN FORMED PRIMARILY AS A SOP TO THE FEW BUT HIGHLY INFLUENTIAL CAVALRY OF -FICERS WHO DOMINATED THE HIGH COMMAND.In 1939, the 2ndLeichteDivision was under the command ofGeneral de KavallerieStumme.At full strength, the division comprised 457 officers and warrant officers leading 11,000 NCOsand men.

Panzer strength

The Division was organized and equipped into a tank-light, infantry-heavy unit. The 6th and7th Kavallerie Schiitzen Regiments each consisted of two battalions of motorized infantry.Other divisional units included a reconnaissance regiment, an artillery regiment, an antitankbattalion, a pioneer or combat engineer battalion, a signals battalion and other service andsupport units.Divisional armoured strength was provided by a single Panzer unit, the 33rd Panzer Battal-ion. This included one motorized signals platoon, one staff platoon, three light panzer compa-


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nies, one motorized reserve platoon, one motorized maintenance platoon, and one light sup-ply column. At the outbreak of war, the Panzer Abteilung had 62 tanks available, mostlyPz.Kpfw Is and IIs, with a few Pz.Kpfw IIIs and IVs becoming operational.The support units included more supply, maintenance and fuel columns, a divisional admin-istration unit, a field bakery, a butcher detachment, various medical and veterinary units, amilitary police troop and a field post office.After the successful completion of the invasion of Poland, Hitler allowed Erwin Rommel to

choose whatever unit he would like to command. Although Rommel had no practical expe-rience in tank warfare, he asked for a Panzer division and on 15 February 1940 he receivedcommand of the 7th Panzer Division. In preparation for the invasion of the low countries, the7th Panzer Division became part of the 15th Panzer Corps under the command of GeneralHoth.

"Ghost Division" / "Phantom Division"

The 7th Panzer Division moved with great speed through France and covered vast distances.During the Battle of France, the 7th Panzer Division earned the name of the Ghost Division(German:"Gespensterdivision") because its rapid movements led to few knowing exactly whe-re the Division was, including the German High Command. Rommel had a "lead from thefront" attitude and often commanded from the turret of a tank, thus becoming a mere com-pany commander, rather than a division commander issuing orders from his headquarters.He expected all his commanders to lead from the front as well. In addition, he would someti-mes deliberately 'lose' communications with the High Command if he felt it necessary. Hisfearless command of the 7th Panzer Division showed his confidence and understanding ofblitzkrieg concepts. The success they experienced and his favor with Hitler prevented any re-percussions from the High Command, some of whom criticized Rommel for being difficult tocontact and locate. Rommel described the French Campaign in his letters to his wife as "alightning Tour de France".

Order of Battle

7th Panzer Division

The division was formed on 10/18/39 using the 2nd Light Division and the assignment of the66th Panzer Battalion and the 25th Panzer Regiment. Starting in February 1940, the 25thPanzer Regiment began equipping its light panzer companies with 17 PzKpfw 38 (t) each.This conversion was not, however, completed by the time of the invasion of France.The 6th and 7th Kavallerieschutzen (Cavalry Rifle) Regiments became Schutzen Regimentson 20 March 1940. The 7th Reconnaissance Regiment was broken into the 7th MotorcycleBattalion and the 37th Reconnaissance Battalion on 1 November 1939. The 25th PanzerRegiment (only Staff and 1st Battalion) were joined by the I/ 23rd Panzer Regiment which be-came the 2/25th Panzer Regiment on 1 April 1940. Oddly, OKH records from this periodshow the 66th Panzer Battalion as if it were the 3/ 25th Panzer Regiment. The division wasorganized and equipped as follows:7th Panzer Division

Divisional Staff (2 HMGs)58th Motorcycle Platoon58th (mot) Mapping Detachment 1/,2/,3/25th Panzer Regiment1 Panzer Signals Platoon1 Light Panzer Staff Platoon1 Regimental Band3 Battalions, each with1 (mot) Staff Company1 Panzer Signals Platoon1 Light Tank Platoon1 Motorcycle Messenger Platoon1 Pioneer Platoon


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1 Machine Gun Platoon (8 HMGs)2 Light Panzer Companies1 Medium Panzer Company 1 (mot) Panzer Maintenance Platoon 1 (mot) Panzer Supply Col-umnTotal tanks: 17 PzBef, 44 PzMk, I, 96 PzMk II, 30 38(T) and 23 PzMk IV7th Schtzen Brigade1/, 2/6th Schtzen Regiment

1 (mot) Signals Platoon2 Battalions, each with1 (mot) Pioneer Platoon (3 LMGs)3 (mot) Companies (3 50mm mortars, 4 HMGs and 18 LMGs ea)1 (mot) Heavy Company2 Infantry Gun Platoons (2 75mm leIG ea)1 Mortar Platoon (6 80mm mortars)1 Panzerabwehr Platoon (3 37mm PAK 36 and 1 LMG)1 (mot) Light Infantry Supply Column1/, 2/7th Schtzen Regimentsame as 6th Schutzen Regiment7th Motorcycle Battalion

2 Motorcycle Companies (3 50mm mortars, 4 HMGs and 8 LMGs)1 (mot) Heavy Company1 Mortar Platoon (6 80mm mortars)1 Panzerabwehr Platoon (3 37mm PAK 36 and 1 LMG)2 Infantry Gun Platoons (2 75mm leIG)1 (mot) Light Infantry Supply Column37th Panzer Reconnaissance Battalion1 (mot) Signals Platoon (2 LMGs)2 Armored Car Companies (10 20mm and 25 LMGs)1 Motorcycle Company (3 50mm mortars, 4 HMGs and 8 LMGs)1 (mot) Heavy Company1 Pioneer Platoon1 Infantry Gun Platoon (2 75mm leIG)1 (mot) Light Reconnaissance Supply Column (3 LMGs)1/, 2/78th (mot) Artillery Regiment1 (mot) Signals Platoon1 (mot) Weather Detachment1st and 2nd (mot) Battalions, each with:1 (mot) Signals Platoon1 (mot) Calibration Detachment3 (mot) Batteries (4 105mm leFH and 2 LMGs ea)42nd Panzerabwehr Battalion1 (mot) Signals Platoon2 (mot) Panzerabwehr Companies (12 37mm PAK 36 and 6 LMGs ea)3rd Btry/59th Flak Battalion (12 20mm guns)83rd (mot) Signals Battalion1 (mot) Panzer Telephone Company (2 LMGs)1 (mot) Panzer Radio Company (6 LMGs)1 (mot) Panzer Light Signals Supply Column58th (mot) Pioneer Battalion1 (half-track) Pioneer Company2 (mot) Pioneer Companies (9 LMGs ea)1 (mot) Brko B1 (mot) Light Pioneer Supply Column85th Supply Troop


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1/,2/,3/, 4/, 5/, 6/58th (mot) Light Supply Columns7/, 8/, 9/, 10/5 8th (mot) Heavy Fuel Columns1/,2/,3/58th Maintenance Companies1/, 2/(mot) Supply PlatoonsAdministration58th (mot) Bakery Company58th (mot) Butcher Company

58th (mot) AdministrationOther1/, 2/58th (mot) Medical Companies1/,2/,3/58th Ambulances58th (mot) Field Post Office58th (mot) Military Police TroopAttached 86th Flak Battalion3 Batteries (12 20mm ea)1.(H)/11th Reconnaissance Staffel

On 1 April 1940 the 3/28th and 4/12th Light Supply Columns became the 2/, 7/58th and the7/58th Heavy Fuel Column was renumbered the 9/5 8th. In addition, the 21 405th and2/12th Light Fuel Columns were merged to form the 10/58th Heavy Fuel Column.

On 12 April 1940 the 25th Panzer Regiment had 24 PzMk I, 51 PzMK II, no PzMk III, 15PzMk IV, and 48 38(t) tanks. At the same time the 66th Panzer Battalion had 13 PzMk I, 21PzMk II, no PzMk III, 7 PzMk IV, and 24 38(t) tanks.On 10 May 1940, the eve of the invasion of France, the organization of the armored portion ofthe division and its panzer inventory were as follows:1/, 2/25th Panzer Regiment1 Regimental Staff Signals Platoon1 Regimental Staff Light Panzer PlatoonEach Battalion had1 Panzer Staff Company1 Medium Panzer Company2 Light Panzer Companies66th Panzer Battalion1 Panzer Staff Company1 Medium Panzer Company2 Light Panzer CompaniesTotal tanks available: 34 PzMk I , 68 PzMk II , 91 38 (t), 24 PzMk IV, 8 PzBefWg 38 (t).In 1940 the division was assigned to be part of the invasion forces scheduled for Operation"Sealion". On 9 August 1940 the division was organized and equipped as follows:(see over)7thPanzerDivision58th Motorcycle Platoon58th (mot) Mapping Detachment25th Panzer Regiment1/25th Panzer Regiment1 Medium Panzer Company2 Light Panzer Companies1 (mot) Munitions Column2/25th Panzer Regiment1 Medium Panzer Company2 Light Panzer Companies1 (mot) Munitions Column66th Panzer Battalion1 Medium Panzer Company2 Light Panzer Companies1 (mot) Munitions Column .


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7th Schtzen Brigade6th Schtzen Regiment1 (mot) Signals Battalion1st and 2nd Battalions, each with1 (mot) Pioneer Platoon (3 LMGs)3 (mot) Schtzen Companies (18 LMGs, 2 HMGs, 3 50mm mortars and 2 80mm mortars ea)1 (mot) Heavy Company


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1 Machine Gun Platoon (6 HMGs)1 Panzerjager Platoon (3 37mm PAK 36 and 1 LMG)2 (mot) Infantry Gun Sections (2 75mm leIG ea)1 (mot) Light Supply Column7th Schtzen Regiment1 (mot) Signals Staff1st and 2nd Battalions, each with

1 (mot) Pioneer Platoon (3 LMGs)3 (mot) Schtzen Companies (18LMGs, 2 HMGs, 3 50mm mortars and 2 80mm mortars ea)1 (mot) Heavy Company1 Machine Gun Platoon (6 HMGs)1 Panzerjager Platoon (3 37mm PAK 36 and 1 LMG)2 (mot) Infantry Gun Sections (2 75mm leIG ea)1 (mot) Light Supply Column1 (mot) Infantry Gun Company (5 150mm sIG)37th Panzer Reconnaissance Battalion2 Armored Car Companies (10 HMGs and 25 LMGs ea)1 Motorcycle Company (3 50mm mortars, 3 HMGs and 18 LMGs)1 (mot) Heavy Company

1 Pioneer Platoon (3 LMGs)1 Mortar Platoon (2 80mm mortars)1 Infantry Gun Section (2 75mm leIG)78th (mot) Artillery Regiment1 (mot) Signals Platoon1 (mot) Weather Detachment1 Regimental Band1st and 2nd Battalions1 (mot) Signals Platoon1 (mot) Calibration Detachment3 (mot) Batteries (4 105mm leFH and 2 LMGs ea)3rd Battalion1 (mot) Signals Platoon1 (mot) Calibration Detachment3 (mot) Batteries (4 150mm sFH and 2 LMGs ea)42nd Panzerjager Battalion1 (mot) Signals Platoon2 (mot) Companies (12 37mm PAK 36 and 6 LMGs ea)58th (mot) Pioneer Battalion2 (mot) Pioneer Companies (9 LMGs ea)1 (mot) Bridging Company2 Pioneer Platoons3 Bridging Sections1 Brko B Bridging Train1 Brko K Bridging Train1 (mot) Light Pioneer Supply Column83rd (mot) Signals Battalion1 (mot) Telephone Company (6 LMGs)1 (mot) Radio Company (2 LMGs)1 (mot) Light Supply Column7th Motorcycle Battalion2 Motorcycle Companies (2 80mm mortars, 3 50mm mortars, 2 HMGs and 18 LMGs ea)1 (mot) Heavy Company1 Pioneer Platoon (3 LMGs)1 Machine Gun Platoon (4 HMGs)


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1 Panzerjager Platoon (3 37mm PAK 36 and 1 LMG)2 Infantry Gun Sections (2 75mm leIG ea)86th (mot) Flak Battalion1 (mot) Signals Platoon1 Battalion Band3 (mot) Flak Companies (12 20mm ea)1 (mot) Light Supply Column

58th Vehicle Battalion8/,9/,10/58th (mot) Heavy Fuel Columns1/,2/,3/58th Maintenance Companies1/, 2/(mot) Supply Platoons58th Munition Battalion1/,2/,3/,4/,5/,6/,7/5 8th (mot) Light Supply ColumnsOther1/, 2/5 8th (mot) Medical Companies1,21,3/5 8th Ambulances58th (mot) Field Post Office58th (mot) Bakery Company58th (mot) Butcher Company

1/, 2/58th (mot) Administration Platoons58th (mot) Military Police TroopThe 3/78th Artillery Regiment was formed from the 2/45th Artillery Regiment on 2 January1941.The 66th Panzer Battalion became the 3/25th Panzer Regiment on 19 February 1941. On22 June 1941, the day of the invasion of Russia, the organization of the armored portion ofthe division and its panzer inventory were as follows:1/, 2, /, 3/25th Panzer Regiment1 Regimental Staff Signals Platoon1 Regimental Staff Light Panzer PlatoonEach Battalion had1 Panzer Staff Company1 Medium Panzer Company3 Light Panzer Companies Total tanks available: 53 PzMkII, 167 38 (t), 30 PzMk IV (kz), 7 38(t), 8 PzBefWg.By 6 September 1941 the tank inventory had been reduced to: 9 PzMk I operational, 37 PzMkII , 62 PzMk III , 14 PzMk IV, 8 PzBefWg .On 15 March 1942 the 3/25th Panzer Regiment was disbanded, reducing the division to only2 panzer battalions. The 37th Reconnaissance Battalion was merged with the 7th MotorcycleBattalion in 1943, to form the 7th Panzer Reconnaissance Battalion. In January 1943 the or-ganization of the armored portion of the division and its panzer inventory were as follows:1/, 2/25th Panzer Regiment1 Regimental Staff Signals Platoon1 Regimental Staff Light Panzer Platoon EachBattalion had1 Panzer Staff Company1 Medium Panzer Company3 Light Panzer Companies Total tanks available: 21 PzMk II , 91 PzMk III (50 lg), 14 PzMk III(75) , 2 PzMk IV (kz) , 18 PzMk IV (lg), 9 PzBefWg.The 296th Army Flak Battalion was assigned to the division in February 1943, as were the re-mains of the now destroyed 27th Panzer Division.In 1943 the division had:1/, 2/6th Panzergrenadier Regiment1/, 2/7th Panzergrenadier Regiment7th Panzer Reconnaissance Battalion1/, 2/25th Panzer Regiment


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1/, 2/, 3/78th Panzer Artillery Regiment296th Army Flak Battalion42nd Panzerjager Battalion83rd Panzer Signals Battalion58th Panzer Pioneer Battalion58th Divisional Support UnitsOn 15 February 1943 the 127th Panzer Battalion, of the 27th Panzer Division, was disbanded

and its remains were incorporated into the 25th Panzer Regiment. This probably occurredwhen the l/25th Panzer Division was sent to Germany to be re-equipped with Panther PzMkVtanks. This left the 2/25th Panzer Regiment, which began with three companies of PanzerPzMk III and one company of Panzer PzMk IV, but was slowly totally re-equipped with Pan-zer PzMk IV tanks. The 2/25th may have been renumbered as the l/25th Panzer Regiment.OKH records show that the division was organized and equipped as follows during 1943:Division Staff1 Division Staff (2 LMGs)58th (mot) Mapping Detachment25th Panzer RegimentRegimental Staff1 Signals Platoon

1 Regimental Band1st Battalion1 Regimental Staff and Staff Company (received 7 PzMk III flame panzers on 18 June 1943)4 Panzer Companies (22 PzMk IV ea)1 Panzer Maintenance Company6th Panzergrenadier Regiment1 Regimental Staff1 Regimental Band1 (mot) Regimental Staff Company1 Signals Platoon1 Panzerjager Platoon (3 50mm PAK 38 and 3 LMGs)1 Motorcycle Platoon (6 LMGs)1st (mot) Battalion3 (mot) Companies (4 HMGs, 18 LMGs, 2 80mm mortars and 3 PzBu39 ea)1 (mot) Heavy Company1 Pioneer Platoon (4 LMGs)1 Panzerjager Platoon (3 LMGs and 3 50mm PAK 38)1 Infantry Gun Platoon (4 75mm leIG)1 Panzerjager Platoon (3 LMGs and 3 sPzBu 41)2nd (half-track) Battalion3 (half-track) Companies (4 HMGs, 34 LMGs, 2 80mm mortars and 3 75mm leIG ea)1 (half-track) Heavy Company1 Pioneer Platoon (4 LMGs)1 Panzerjager Platoon (3 50mm PAK38and 3 LMGs)1 Infantry Gun Platoon (8 LMGs and 4 75mm leIG)1 Panzerjager Platoon (3 LMGs and 3 sPzBu 41)1 Self-Propelled Infantry Gun Company (6 150mm sIG and 7 LMGs)7th Panzergrenadier Regiment1 Regimental Staff1 Regimental Band1 (mot) Regimental Staff Company1 Signals Platoon1 Panzerjager Platoon (3 50mm PAK 38 and 3 LMGs)1 Motorcycle Platoon (6 LMGs)1st and 2nd (mot) Battalions


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same as 1/6th Panzergrenadier Regiment1 Self-Propelled Infantry Gun Company (6 150mm sIG and 7 LMGs)42nd Panzerjager Battalion1 (motZ) Panzerjager Company (75mm PAK 40)1 Self-Propelled Panzerjager Company (14 75mm PAK 40 and 14 LMGs ea)7th Reconnaissance Battalion (early 1943 organization)1 Armored Car Platoon (6 LMGs and 6 75mm guns)

1 Armored Car Company (24 LMGs and 18 20mm guns)2 Motorcycle Companies (2 80mm mortars, 4 HMGs, 18 LMGs and 3 PzBu39 ea)1 (half-track) Reconnaissance Company (2 80mm mortars, 4 HMGs, 56 LMGs and 3 75mmleIG)1 (mot) Heavy Reconnaissance Company1 Pioneer Platoon (4 LMGs)1 Infantry Gun Section (4 75mm leIG)1 Panzerjager Platoon (3 LMGs and 3 75mm PAK 40) 1 Panzerjager Platoon (3 LMGs and 3sPzBu 41)1 (mot) Light Reconnaissance Supply Column (3 LMGs)7th Reconnaissance Battalion (as of 10 July 1943)1 Armored Car Company (24 LMGs and 18 20mm guns)

1 Armored Car (half-track) Company (25 LMGs and 16 20mm guns)1 Motorcycle Company (2 80mm mortars, 4 HMGs, 18 LMGs and 3 PzBu39)1 (half-track) Heavy Reconnaissance Company1 Staff (2 LMGs)1 Infantry Platoon (9 LMGs)1 Pioneer Platoon (1 37mm PAK 36, 6 flamethrowers and 13 LMGs)1 Panzerjager Platoon (3 75mm PAK 40 and 4 LMGs)1 Infantry Gun Section (2 75mm leIG)1 Half-Track Gun Section (8 LMGs and 6 75mm guns)1 (mot) Light Reconnaissance Supply Column (3 LMGs)78th Panzer Artillery Regiment1 Regimental Staff1 Staff Battery (2 LMGs)1st and 2nd Battalions, each with:1 Battalion Staff1 Battalion Staff Battery (6 LMGs)3 (mot) Batteries (3 105mm leFH and 2 LMGs ea)1st (self-propelled) Battalion (as of Aug. 1943)1 Battalion Staff1 Self-Propelled Battalion Staff Battery (2 LMGs)2 Self-Propelled Batteries (6 105mm leFH SdKfz 124 Wespe and 4 LMGs ea)1 Self-Propelled Battery (6 150mm sFH SdKfz 165 Hummel and 4 LMGs)3rd (mot) Battalion1 Battalion Staff1 Battalion Staff Battery (6 LMGs)2 (mot) Batteries (3 150mm sFH and 2 LMGs ea)1 (mot) Battery (3 100mm K 18 guns and 2 LMGs)78th (mot) Observation Battery(2 LMGs)296th Army Flak Battalion1 Staff and (mot) Staff Battery (1 LMG)lst-2nd (motZ) Heavy Flak Batteries (4 88mm, 3 20mm and 2 LMGs ea)3rd (motZ) Light Flak Battery (12 20mm and 2 LMGs)4th Self-Propelled Battery (8 20mm and 2 quad 20mm Flak guns and 4 LMGs)1 (mot) Light (20 ton) Flak Supply Column58th Panzer Pioneer Battalion


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1 Staff (2 LMGs)2 (half-track) Pioneer Companies (25 LMGs, 2 80mm mortars and 3 PzBu39 ea)1 (mot) Pioneer Company (18 LMGs, 3 PzBu39) and 2 80mm mortars ea)1 Briiko K Bridging Column (3 LMGs)1 (mot) Light Pioneer Supply Column (2 LMGs)83rd Panzer Signals Battalion1 Panzer Telephone Company (6 LMGs)

1 Panzer Radio Company (16 LMGs)1 (mot) Light Signals Supply Column (1 LMG)58th Feldersatz Battalion4 Companies58th Supply Troopl-6/58th (mot) (90 ton) Transportation Company (3 LMGs ea)58th (mot) Heavy Fuel Column (2 LMGs)58th (mot) Supply Company (6 LMGs)Truck Park1-3/58th (mot) Maintenance Companies (4 LMGs ea)Other58th (mot) Bakery Company

58th (mot) Butcher Company58th (mot) Administration Platoon1/, 2/58th (mot) Medical Companies (2 LMGs ea)1/, 2/, 3/58th Ambulances58th (mot) Military Police Troop (2 LMGs)58th (mot) Field Post OfficeIn July 1943 the organization of the armored portion of the division and its panzer inventorywere as follows:1/, 2/25th Panzer Regiment1 Regimental Staff Signals Platoon1 Regimental Staff Light Panzer PlatoonEach Battalion had:1 Panzer Staff Company1 Medium Panzer Company2 Light Panzer Companies Total tanks available: 12 PzMkII , 43 PzMk III (lg), 12PzMkIII(75), 1 PzMk IV (kz), 37 PzMk IV (lg), 7 PzBefWg.On 5 May 1944 the 1/25th Panzer Regiment was equipped with Panther tanks. The 2/25thPanzer Regiment continued to be equipped with Panzer PzMk IV tanks. In a major battle on23 January 1945 near Deutsch-Eylau the 25th Panzer Regiment engaged the Russians with20 combat veicles against 200. It was obliterated, only to be quickly rebuilt. On 1 April 1945the 4th Company/11th Panzer Regiment was equipped with infra-red equipment and at-tached to the rebuilt 25th Panzer Regiment. The division refitted on 19 April 1945 and ab-sorbed the Panzer Auffrischungs Verband Krampnitz. Reduced to a kampfgruppe 1, it con-tained a single panzer battalion from the 25th Panzer Regiment with 10 PzMk V Panther and13 PzMk IV tanks.The division was taken into British captivity on 3 May 1945.

Commanding officers

Generalmajor Georg Stumme (18 October 1939 5 February 1940)Generalmajor Erwin Rommel (5 February 194014 February 1941)Generalmajor Hans Freiherr von Funck (15 February 194117 August 1943)Oberst Wolfgang Glsemer (17 August 194320 August 1943)Generalmajor Hasso von Manteuffel (20 August 19431 January 1944)Generalmajor Adelbert Schulz (1 January 194428 January 1944)Oberst Wolfgang Glsemer (28 January 194430 January 1944)Generalmajor Dr. Karl Mauss (30 January 19442 May 1944)


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Generalmajor Gerhard Schmidhuber (2 May 19449 September 1944)Generalmajor Dr. Karl Mauss (9 September 194431 October 1944)Generalmajor Hellmuth Mder (31 October 194430 November 1944)Generalmajor Dr. Karl Mauss (30 November 19445 January 1945)Generalmajor Max Lemke (5 January 194523 January 1945)Generalmajor Dr. Karl Mauss (23 January 1945 25 March 1945)Oberst Hans Christern (26 March 1945 8 May 1945)


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Chapter II Fall Weiss: the invasion of Poland1 September 1939

CHRONOLOGY

193829 September Britain and France agree to German demands that Czechoslovakia cede

the Sudeteniand at the Munich conference, 1-7 October German troops occupy the Sudete-niand in Czechoslovakia193915 MarchGerman army invades the remainder of Czechoslovakia, occupies Bohemia-Mora-via and eventually allows Slovakia to form puppet state22 March Germany seizes port of Memel from Lithuania25 March Hitler orders start of preparations to invade PolandMarch Polish army begins partial mobilisation in response to German diplomatic pressureto cede Pomeranian corridor and allow return of Danzig to Germany31March British government announces its guarantee of Polish security, including maintain-ing the status quo of DanzigMayPolish and French general staff hold meetings in France, during which France pledges

major offensive against Germany two weeks after an invasion23 August German foreign minister Ribbentrop and Soviet foreign minister Molotovannounce German-Soviet non-aggression pact; which includes secret clauses agreeing to thedismemberment of Poland24 August Britain gives written assurances to Poland in the event of war with Germany26 August Hitler planned to start war today, but postpones the attack in wake of Britishsecurity announcement1 SeptemberWar begins at 0400hrs with German battleship Schleswig-Holsteinfiring atPolish garrison on Westerplatte near Danzig2 SeptemberGerman aqVances out of East Prussia force Army Modlin to withdraw to Vis-tula line3 September France and Britain declare war on Germany

5 September Piotrkow falls, and the gateway to Warsaw is opened to German Panzers:in the evening, Armies Lodz, Krakow, Prusy and Poznan ordered to begin retreatbehind the Vistula7 September German tanks reach outskirts of Warsaw, but are thrown back in intensestreet fighting. Marshal Rydz-Smigly decides to shift headquarters from Warsaw toBrzesc-nad-Bugiem9 September Army Poznan launches counter-attack along the Bzura River, catching theGerman 8th Army off guard15 SeptemberArmy Group North reaches northern outskirts of Warsaw, siege resumes16 September Polish forces along the Bzura subjected to massive artillery and air attack;retreat to Warsaw ordered that evening17 September Red Army begins to invade Poland from the east19 September Army Krakow attempts to break out towards Romania through TomaszowLubelski21 September Last units from Bzura counter-offensive finally surrender22 September Encircled by German and Soviet troops, city of Lwow finally surrenders25 September'Black Monday', a massive Luftwaffe attack on Warsaw causes heavy civiliancasualties26 September Southern Warsaw forts captured27 SeptemberWarsaw garrison surrenders29 September Fortified Mocllin garrison surrenders6 OctoberBattlegroup under General Franciszek Kleeberg surrenders after a four-day battlearound Kock; last major Polish unit in the field


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THE BEGINNING OF THE INVASION of Poland saw the 2ndLeichteDivision launching itsattack from the area around Horneck in Silesia. As part of the armoured spearhead of vonReichenau's 10th Army, its mission was to take part in the elimination of Polish forcesaround the key cities of Kielce and Radom. The Division advanced without much in the wayof fighting, reaching Radom by 9 September. However, fighting was harder elsewhere, andthe Division was one of several diverted to deal with a Polish counterattack at Bzura, to thewest of Warsaw.After the battle, the Division advanced towards Modlin, continuing to encircle the south ofthe Polish capital. The Poles capitulated on 27 September 1939, and German units not neededfor occupation duty were ordered home on 1 October.Arriving in Thuringia in mid-October, the 2ndLeichte prepared for radical change. As a re-sult of combat experience in Poland, the Wehrmachthad learned some lessons about whatkind of units were needed in large-scale combat. As a result, the four Leichtedivisions were tobe reorganized as fully-fledged Panzer divisions, to be numbered from 6 to 9. The 2ndLeichteDivision was renamed the 7th Panzer Division on 18 October 1939.The Invasion of Poland, also known as the September Campaign or 1939 Defensive War inPoland and the Poland Campaign (German: Polenfeldzug) or Fall Weiss(Case White) in Ger-

many, was an invasion of Poland by Germany, the Soviet Union, and a small Slovak contin-gent that marked the beginning of World War II in Europe. The German invasion began on 1September 1939, one week after the signing of the MolotovRibbentrop Pact, while the Sovietinvasion commenced on 17 September 1939 following the Molotov-Tg agreement whichterminated the Nomonhan incident on 16 September 1939. The campaign ended on 6 Octo-ber 1939 with Germany and the Soviet Union dividing and annexing the whole of Poland.The morning after the Gleiwitz incident, German forces invaded Poland from the north,south, and west. As the Germans advanced, Polish forces withdrew from their forward basesof operation close to the PolishGerman border to more established lines of defence to theeast. After the mid-September Polish defeat in the Battle of the Bzura, the Germans gained anundisputed advantage. Polish forces then withdrew to the southeast where they prepared fora long defence of the Romanian Bridgehead and awaited expected support and relief from

France and the United Kingdom. The two countries had pacts with Poland and had declaredwar on Germany on 3 September, though in the end their aid to Poland in the Septembercampaign was very limited.The Soviet Red Army's invasion of Eastern Poland on 17 September, in accordance with a se-cret protocol of the MolotovRibbentrop Pact, rendered the Polish plan of defence obsolete.Facing a second front, the Polish government concluded the defence of the Romanian Brid-gehead was no longer feasible and ordered an emergency evacuation of all troops to neutralRomania. On 6 October, following the Polish defeat at the Battle of Kock, German and Sovietforces gained full control over Poland. The success of the invasion marked the end of the Se-cond Polish Republic, though Poland never formally surrendered.On 8 October, after an initial period of military administration, Germany directly annexedwestern Poland and the former Free City of Danzig and placed the remaining block of terri-

tory under the administration of the newly established General Government. The SovietUnion incorporated its newly acquired areas into its constituent Belarusian and Ukrainianrepublics, and immediately started a campaign of sovietization. In the aftermath of the inva-sion, a collective of underground resistance organizations formed the Polish UndergroundState within the territory of the former Polish state. Many of the military exiles that managedto escape Poland subsequently joined the Polish Armed Forces in the West, an armed force lo-yal to the Polish government in exile.


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Map 1 The map shows the beginning of World War II in September 1939 in a wider Europeancontext.

Prelude to the campaign

In 1933, the National-Socialist German Workers' Party, under its leader Adolf Hitler, came topower in Germany. Germany sought to gain back her lost territory in Europe, taken by the

Treaty of Versailles and also to be eventually surrounded by a ring of allied states, satellite orpuppet states. As part of this long term policy, Hitler at first pursued a policy of rapproche-ment with Poland, trying to improve GermanPolish relations, culminating in the GermanPolish Non-Aggression Pact of 1934. Earlier, Hitler's foreign policy worked to weaken ties bet-ween Poland and France, and attempted to manoeuvre Poland into the Anti-Comintern Pact,forming a cooperative front against the Soviet Union. Poland would be granted territory of itsown, to its northeast, but the concessions the Poles were expected to make meant that theirhomeland would become largely dependent on Germany, functioning as little more than aclient state. The Poles feared that their independence would eventually be threatened altoget-her.


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Image: http://www.panzertruppen.org/amazon/books/ww2/2-51.jpgIn addition to gaining Soviet territory, the National-Socialists were interested in establishing


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a new border with Poland because the German exclave of East Prussia was separated fromthe rest of the Reich by the "Polish Corridor". The Corridor constituted land long disputed byPoland and Germany, and inhabited by Polish majority. The Corridor became a part of Po-land after the Treaty of Versailles. Many Germans also wanted the city of Danzig and its envi-rons (together the Free City of Danzig) to be reincorporated into Germany. Danzig was a portcity with German majority. It had been separated from Germany after Versailles and made in-to a nominally independent Free City of Danzig. Hitler sought to reverse these territorial los-

ses, and on many occasions made an appeal to German nationalism, promising to "liberate"the German minority still in the Corridor, as well as Danzig.Poland participated in the partition of Czechoslovakia that followed the Munich Agreement,although they were not part of the agreement. It coerced Czechoslovakia to surrender the re-gion ofeskTn by issuing an ultimatum to that effect on 30 September 1938, which wasaccepted by Czechoslovakia on 1 October.By 1937, Germany began to increase its demands for Danzig, while proposing that a roadwaybe built in order to connect East Prussia with Germany proper, running through the PolishCorridor. Poland rejected this proposal, fearing that after accepting these demands, it wouldbecome increasingly subject to the will of Germany and eventually lose its independence asthe Czechs had. Polish leaders also distrusted Hitler. Furthermore, Germany's collaborationwith anti-Polish Ukrainian nationalists from the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists,

which was seen as an effort to isolate and weaken Poland, weakened Hitler's credibility fromthe Polish point of view. The British were also aware of the situation between Germany andPoland. On 31 March, Poland was backed by a guarantee from Britain and France which sta-ted that Polish territorial integrity would be defended with their support. On the other hand,British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain and his Foreign Secretary, Lord Halifax, still ho-ped to strike a deal with Hitler regarding Danzig (and possibly the Polish Corridor), and Hi-tler hoped for the same. Chamberlain and his supporters believed war could be avoided andhoped Germany would agree to leave the rest of Poland alone. German hegemony over Cen-tral Europe was also at stake.With tensions mounting, Germany turned to aggressive diplomacy as well. On 28 April 1939,it unilaterally withdrew from both the German-Polish Non-Aggression Pact of 1934 and theLondon Naval Agreement of 1935. Talks over Danzig and the Corridor broke down andmonths passed without diplomatic interaction between Germany and Poland. During this in-terim, the Germans learned that France and Britain had failed to secure an alliance with theSoviet Union against Germany, and that the Soviet Union was interested in an alliance withGermany against Poland. Hitler had already issued orders to prepare for a possible "solutionof the Polish problem by military means"a Case White scenario.However, with the surprise signing of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact on 23 August, the de-nouement of secret Nazi-Soviet talks held in Moscow, Germany neutralized the possibility ofSoviet opposition to a campaign against Poland and war became imminent. In fact, the So-viets agreed to aid Germany in the event of France or the UK going to war with Germany overPoland and, in a secret protocol of the pact, the Germans and the Soviets agreed to divideEastern Europe, including Poland, into two spheres of influence; the western of the countrywas to go to Germany and the eastern 2/3 to the Soviet Union.The German assault was originally scheduled to begin at 04:00 on 26 August. However, on25 August, the Polish-British Common Defense Pact was signed as an annex to the Franco-Polish Military Alliance. In this accord, Britain committed itself to the defence of Poland, gua-ranteeing to preserve Polish independence. At the same time, the British and the Poles werehinting to Berlin that they were willing to resume discussionsnot at all how Hitler hoped toframe the conflict. Thus, he wavered and postponed his attack until 1 September, managingto in effect halt the entire invasion "in mid-leap".However, there was one exception: in the night of 256 August, a German sabotage groupwhich had not heard anything about a delay of the invasion made an attack on the JablunkovPass and Mosty railway station in Silesia. On the morning of 26 August, this group was repe-lled by Polish troops.


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Map 2 Planned and actual divisions of Poland, according to the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact,with later adjustments

The German side described all this as an incident "caused by an insane individual"

On 26 August, Hitler tried to dissuade the British and the French from interfering in the up-coming conflict, even pledging that the Wehrmacht forces would be made available to Bri-tain's empire in the future. The negotiations convinced Hitler that there was little chance theWestern Allies would declare war on Germany, and even if they did, because of the lack of "te-rritorial guarantees" to Poland, they would be willing to negotiate a compromise favourableto Germany after its conquest of Poland. Meanwhile, the increased number of overflights byhigh-altitude reconnaissance aircraft and cross border troop movements signaled that warwas imminent.On 29 August, prompted by the British, Germany issued one last diplomatic offer, with FallWeiss"Case White" yet to be rescheduled. That evening, the German government respondedin a communication that it aimed not only for the restoration of Danzig but also the PolishCorridor (which had not previously been part of Hitlers demands) in addition to the safe-guarding of the German minority in Poland. It said that they were willing to commence nego-tiations, but indicated that a Polish representative with the power to sign an agreement hadto arrive in Berlin the next day while in the meantime it would draw up a set of proposals.The British Cabinet was pleased that negotiations had been agreed to but, mindful of howEmil Hacha had been forced to sign his country away under similar circumstances justmonths earlier, regarded the requirement for an immediate arrival of a Polish representativewith full signing powers as an unacceptable ultimatum. On the night of 30/31 August, Ger-man Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop read a 16-point German proposal to the Bri-tish ambassador. When the ambassador requested a copy of the proposals for transmission tothe Polish government Ribbentrop refused on the grounds that the requested Polish repre-sentative had failed to arrive by midnight. When Polish Ambassador Lipski went to see Rib-


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bentrop later on 31 August to indicate that Poland was favorably disposed to negotiations, heannounced that he did not have the full power to sign, and Ribbentrop dismissed him. It wasthen broadcast that Poland had rejected Germany's offer, and negotiations with Poland cameto an end. Hitler issued orders for the invasion to commence soon afterwards.On 29 August, German saboteurs planted a bomb at the railway station in Tarnw and killed21 passengers, leaving 35 wounded.On 30 August, the Polish Navy sent its destroyer flotilla to Britain, executing Operation Pe-

king. On the same day, Marshal of Poland Edward Rydz-migy announced the mobilizationof Polish troops. However, he was pressured into revoking the order by the French, who appa-rently still hoped for a diplomatic settlement, failing to realize that the Germans were fullymobilized and concentrated at the Polish border. During the night of 31 August, the Gleiwitzincident, a false flag attack on the radio station, was staged near the border city of Gleiwitz byGerman units posing as Polish troops, in Upper Silesia as part of the wider Operation Himm-ler. On 31 August 1939, Hitler ordered hostilities against Poland to start at 4:45 the next mor-ning. Because of the prior stoppage, Poland managed to mobilize only 70% of its planned for-ces, and many units were still forming or moving to their designated frontline positions.

Opposing forces

Germany

Germany had a substantial numeric advantage over Poland and had developed a significantmilitary prior to the conflict. TheHeer(army) had some 2.400 tanks organized into sixpan-zer divisions, utilizing a new operational doctrine. It held that these divisions should act incoordination with other elements of the military, punching holes in the enemy line and isola-ting selected units, which would be encircled and destroyed. This would be followed up byless-mobile mechanized infantry and foot soldiers. The Luftwaffe (air force) provided bothtactical and strategic air power, particularly dive bombers that disrupted lines of supply andcommunications. Together, the new methods were nicknamed "Blitzkrieg" (lightning war).Historian Basil Liddell Hart claimed "Poland was a full demonstration of the Blitzkriegtheory." Some other historians, however, disagree.

Aircraft played a major role in the campaign. Bombers also attacked cities, causing huge los-ses amongst the civilian population through terror bombing. The Luftwaffe forces consistedof 1.180 fighters, 290 Ju 87 Stukadive bombers, 1,100 conventional bombers (mainly Hein-kel He 111s and Dornier Do 17s), and an assortment of 550 transport and 350 reconnaissanceaircraft. In total, Germany had close to 4,000 aircraft, most of them modern. A force of 2.315aircraft was assigned to Weiss. Due to its prior participation in the Spanish Civil War, theLuftwaffewas probably the most experienced, best trained and best equipped air force in theworld in 1939.

Poland

Between 1936 and 1939, Poland invested heavily in the Central Industrial Region. Prepara-tions for a defensive war with Germany were ongoing for many years, but most plans assu-med fighting would not begin before 1942. To raise funds for industrial development, Polandsold much of the modern equipment it produced. In 1936, a National Defence Fund was setup to collect funds necessary for strengthening the Polish Armed forces. The Polish Army hadapproximately a million soldiers, but less than half were mobilized by 1 September. Lateco-mers sustained significant casualties when public transport became targets of the Luftwaffe.The Polish military had fewer armored forces than the Germans, and these units, dispersedwithin the infantry, were unable to effectively engage the enemy.Experiences in the Polish-Soviet War shaped Polish Army organizational and operationaldoctrine. Unlike the trench warfare of World War I, the Polish-Soviet War was a conflict inwhich the cavalry's mobility played a decisive role.


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Map 3 Operations in Poland

Image http://www.panzertruppen.org/amazon/books/ww2/3-2.jpg


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Poland acknowledged the benefits of mobility but was unable to invest heavily in many of theexpensive, unproven inventions since then. In spite of this, Polish cavalry brigades were usedas a mobile mounted infantry and had some successes against both German infantry and ca-valry.The Polish Air Force (Lotnictwo Wojskowe) was at a severe disadvantage against the GermanLuftwaffe, although it was not destroyed on the ground early on, as is commonly believed.The Polish Air Force lacked modern fighters, but its pilots were among the world's best trai-

ned, as proven a year later in the Battle of Britain, in which the Poles played a major part.Overall, the Germans enjoyed numerical and qualitative aircraft superiority. Poland had onlyabout 600 aircraft, of which only 37 P-37 obombers were modern and comparable to itsGerman counterparts. The Polish Air Force had roughly 185 PZL P.11 and some 95 PZL P.7fighters, 175 PZL.23KaraBs, 35KaraAs, and by September, over 100 PZL.37s were produ-ced. However, for the September Campaign, only some 70% of those aircraft were mobilized.Only 36 PZL.37s were deployed. All those aircraft were of indigenous Polish design, with thebombers being more modern than fighters, according to the LudomiRayski air force expan-sion plan, which relied on a strong bomber force. The Polish fighters were a generation olderthan their German counterparts; the PZL P.11 fighterproduced in the early 1930shad atop speed of only 365 km/h (227 mph), far less than German bombers. To compensate, thepilots relied on its maneuverability and high diving speed.

The tank force consisted of two armored brigades, four independent tank battalions and so-me 30 companies of TKS tankettes attached to infantry divisions and cavalry brigades. Astandard tank of the Polish Army during the invasion of 1939 was the 7TP light tank. It wasthe first tank in the world to be equipped with a diesel engine and 360Gundlach periscope.The 7TP was significantly better armed than its most common opponents, the German Pan-zerI and II, but only 140 tanks were produced between 1935 and the outbreak of the war. Po-land had also a few relatively modern imported designs, such as 50 Renault R35 tanks and 38Vickers E tanks.The Polish Navy was a small fleet of destroyers, submarins ad smaller support vessels. MostPolish surface units followed Operation Peking, leaving Polish ports on 20 August and esca-ping by way of the North Sea to join with the British Royal Navy. Submarine forces participa-ted in Operation Worek, with the goal of engaging and damaging German shipping in the Bal-tic Sea, but they had much less success. In addition, many merchant marine ships joined theBritish merchant fleet and took part in wartime convoys.

Details of the campaign

German plan

The September Campaign was devised by General Franz Halder, chief of the general staff,and directed by General Walther von Brauchitsch, the commander in chief of the upcomingcampaign. It called for the start of hostilities before a declaration of war, and pursued a doc-trine of mass encirclement and destruction of enemy forces. The infantryfar from comple-tely mechanized but fitted with fast moving artillery and logistic supportwas to be suppor-

ted byPanzersand small numbers of truck-mounted infantry (the Schtzen regiments, fore-runners of thepanzergrenadiers) to assist the rapid movement of troops and concentrate onlocalized parts of the enemy front, eventually isolating segments of the enemy, surrounding,and destroying them. The pre-war "armored idea" (which an American journalist in 1939dubbed Blitzkrieg)which was advocated by some generals, including Heinz Guderianwould have had the armor punching holes in the enemy's front and ranging deep into rearareas; in actuality, the campaign in Poland would be fought along more traditional lines. Thisstemmed from conservatism on the part of the German high command, who mainly restric-ted the role of armor and mechanized forces to supporting the conventional infantry divi-sions.Poland's terrain was well suited for mobile operations when the weather cooperated; thecountry had flat plains with long frontiers totalling almost 5,600 km (3,500 mi), Poland's


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long border with Germany on the west and northfacing East Prussiaextended 2,000 km(1,200 mi).

Illustration 1: German Panzer units in Poland were equiped mainly with light tanks like thePzKpfw II, seen here armed with a 20mm cannon.

Those had been lengthened by another 300 km (190 mi) on the southern side in the after-math of the Munich Agreement of 1938. The German incorporation of Bohemia and Moraviaand creation of the German puppet state of Slovakia meant that Poland's southern flank wasexposed.German planners intended to fully exploit their long border with the great enveloping ma-noeuver ofFall Weiss. German units were to invade Poland from three directions:

A main attack over the western Polish border. This was to be carried out by Army GroupSouth commanded by General Gerd von Rundstedt, attacking from German Silesia andfrom the Moravian and Slovak border: General Johannes Blaskowitz's 8th Army was todrive eastward against d; General Wilhelm List's 14th Army was to push on towardKrakw and to turn the Poles' Carpathian flank; and General Walter von Reichenau's 10thArmy, in the centre with Army Group South's armor, was to deliver the decisive blow witha northeastward thrust into the heart of Poland.A second route of attack from northern Prussia. General Fedor von Bock commandedArmy Group North, comprising General Georg von Kchler's 3rd Army, which was to stri-ke southward from East Prussia, and General Gnther von Kluge's 4th Army, which was toattack eastward across the base of the Polish Corridor.A tertiary attack by part of Army Group South's allied Slovak units from Slovakia.From within Poland, the German minority would assist by engaging in diversion and sabo-tage operations throughVolksdeutscher Selbstschutzunits prepared before the war.

All three assaults were to converge on Warsaw, while the main Polish army was to be encir-cled and destroyed west of the Vistula.Fall Weisswas initiated on 1 September 1939, and wasthe first operation of World War II in Europe.

Polish defence plan.

The Polish political determination to deploy forces directly at the German-Polish border, ba-sed on the Polish-British Common Defense Pact, shaped the country's defence plan, "PlanWest". Poland's most valuable natural resources, industry and population were located alongthe western border in Eastern Upper Silesia. Polish policy centred on their protection espe-


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cially since many politicians feared that if Poland were to retreat from the regions disputed byGermany, Britain and France would sign a separate peace treaty with Germany similar to theMunich Agreement of 1938. The fact that none of Poland's allies had specifically guaranteedPolish borders or territorial integrity certainly did not help in easing Polish concerns. For the-se reasons, Poland disregarded French advice to deploy the bulk of their forces behind the na-tural barriers such as the Vistula and San rivers, even though some Polish generals supportedit as a better strategy. The West Plan did permit the Polish armies to retreat inside the

country, but it was supposed to be a slow retreat behind prepared positions and was intendedto give the armed forces time to complete its mobilization and execute a general counteroffen-sive with the support of the Western Allies.The Polish General Staff had not begun elaborating the "West" defence plan until 4 March1939. It was assumed that the Polish Army, fighting in the initial phase of the war alone,would be compelled to defend the western regions of the country. The plan of operations tookinto account, first of all, the numerical and material superiority of the enemy and, conse-quently, assumed the defensive character of Polish operations. The Polish intentions were:the defence of the western regions judged as indispensable for waging the war, the taking ad-vantage of the propitious conditions for counterblows by reserve units, the avoidance of beingsmashed before the beginning of Allied operations in the West and the making of decisionsdepending of the existing situation. The operational plan had not been elaborated in detail

and concerned only the first stage of operations.The British and French estimated that Poland should be able to defend itself for two to threemonths, while Poland estimated it could do so for at least six months. Poland drafted its esti-mates based upon the expectation that the Western Allies honor their treaty obligations andquickly start an offensive of their own. In addition, the French and British expected the warto develop into trench warfare much like World War I. The Polish government was not noti-fied of this strategy and based all of its defence plans on promises of quick relief by their Wes-tern allies.Polish forces were stretched thinly along the Polish-German border and lacked compact de-fence lines and good defence positions along disadvantageous terrain. This strategy also leftsupply lines poorly protected. One-third of Poland's forces were massed in or near the PolishCorridor, making them vulnerable to a double envelopment from East Prussia and the west.Another third were concentrated in the north-central part of the country, between the majorcities ofdand Warsaw. The forward positioning of Polish forces vastly increased the diffi-culty of carrying out strategic maneuvers, compounded by inadequate mobility, as Polishunits often lacked the ability to retreat from their defensive positions as they were being ove-rrun by more mobile German mechanized formations.As the prospect of conflict increased, the British government pressed Marshal Edward Rydz-migy to evacuate the most modern elements of the Polish Navy from the Baltic Sea. In theevent of war the Polish military leaders realized that the ships which remained in the Balticwere likely to be quickly sunk by the Germans. Furthermore, the Danish straits were well wit-hin operating range of the GermanKriegsmarineandLuftwaffe, so there was little chance ofan evacuation plan succeeding if implemented after hostilities began. Four days after the sig-ning of the Polish-British Common Defense Pact, three destroyers of the Polish Navy execu-ted the Peking Plan and consequently evacuated to Great Britain.Although the Polish military had prepared for conflict, the civilian population remained lar-gely unprepared. Polish pre-war propaganda emphasized that any German invasion would beeasily repelled. Consequently, Polish defeats during the German invasion came as a shock tothe civilian population. Lacking training for such a disaster, the civilian population panickedand retreated east, spreading chaos, lowering troop morale and making road transportationfor Polish troops very difficult.

Phase 1: German invasion

Following several German-staged incidents (like the Gleiwitz incident, a part of OperationHimmler), which German propaganda used as an excuse to claim that German forces were


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acting in self-defence, the first regular act of war took place on 1 September 1939, at 04:40,when theLuftwaffeattacked the Polish town of Wielu, destroying 75% of the city and killingclose to 1.200 people, most of them civilians. This invasion subsequently began World WarII. Five minutes later, the old German pre-dreadnought battleship Schleswig-Holstein ope-ned fire on the Polish military transit depot at Westerplatte in the Free City of Danzig on theBaltic Sea. At 08:00, German troopsstill without a formal declaration of war issuedatta-cked near the Polish town of Mokra. The Battle of the Border had begun. Later that day, the

Germans attacked on Poland's western, southern and northern borders, while German air-craft began raids on Polish cities. The main axis of attack led eastwards from Germany properthrough the western Polish border. Supporting attacks came from East Prussia in the north,and a co-operative German-Slovak tertiary attack by units (Field Army "Bernolk") from Ger-man-allied Slovakia in the south. All three assaults converged on the Polish capital of War-saw.The Allied governments declared war on Germany on 3 September; however, they failed toprovide any meaningful support. The German-French border saw only a few minor skirmis-hes, although the majority of German forces, including 85% of their armoured forces, wereengaged in Poland. Despite some Polish successes in minor border battles, German technical,operational and numerical superiority forced the Polish armies to retreat from the borders to-wards Warsaw and Lww. TheLuftwaffegained air superiority early in the campaign. By des-

troying communications, the Luftwaffeincreased the pace of the advance which overran Po-lish airstrips and early warning sites, causing logistical problems for the Poles. Many PolishAir Force units ran low on supplies, 98 of their number withdrew into then-neutral Romania.The Polish initial strength of 400 was reduced to just 54 by 14 September and air oppositionvirtually ceased.By 3 September, when Gnther von Kluge in the north had reached the Vistula river (some10 km (6.2 mi) from the German border at that time) and Georg von Kchler was approa-ching the Narew River, Walther von Reichenau's armor was already beyond the Warta river;two days later, his left wing was well to the rear ofdand his right wing at the town of Kiel-ce. By 8 September, one of his armored corpshaving advanced 225 km (140 mi) in the firstweek of the campaignreached the outskirts of Warsaw. Light divisions on Reichenau's rightwere on the Vistula between Warsaw and the town of Sandomierz by 9 September whileListin the southwas on the San River above and below the town of Przemyl. At the sametime, Guderian led his 3rd Army tanks across the Narew, attacking the line of the Bug River,already encircling Warsaw. All the German armies made progress in fulfilling their parts oftheFall Weissplan. The Polish armies were splitting up into uncoordinated fragments, someof which were retreating while others were launching disjointed attacks on the nearest Ger-man columns..Polish forces abandoned the regions of Pomerelia (the Polish Corridor), Greater Poland andPolish Upper Silesia in the first week. The Polish plan for border defence was proven a dismalfailure. The German advance as a whole was not slowed. On 10 September, the Polish com-mander-in-chiefMarshal Edward Rydz-migyordered a general retreat to the southeast,towards the so-called Romanian Bridgehead. Meanwhile, the Germans were tightening theirencirclement of the Polish forces west of the Vistula (in the darea and, still farther west,around Pozna) and also penetrating deeply into eastern Poland. Warsawunder heavy ae-rial bombardment since the first hours of the warwas attacked on 9 September and was putunder siege on 13 September. Around that time, advanced German forces also reached thecity of Lww, a major metropolis in eastern Poland. 1,150 German aircraft bombed Warsawon 24 September.The Polish defensive plan called for a strategy of encirclement: they were to allow the Ger-mans to advance in between two Polish Army groups in the line between Berlin and Warsaw-Lodz, at which point Armia Prusy would move in and repulse the German spearhead, trap-ping them. In order for this to happen, Armia Prusy needed to be fully mobilized by 3 Sep-tember.


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Map 4: Campaign in Poland 1939

http://www.panzertruppen.org/amazon/books/ww2/map3.jpg

However, Polish military planners failed to foresee the speed of the German advance and pre-dicted that Armia Prusy would need to be fully mobilized by 16 September, by which time itwas too late.The largest battle during this campaignthe Battle of Bzuratook place near the Bzura riverwest of Warsaw and lasted 919 September. Polish armies Pozna and Pomorze, retreatingfrom the border area of the Polish Corridor, attacked the flank of the advancing German 8thArmy, but the counterattack failed after initial success. After the defeat, Poland lost its abilityto take the initiative and counterattack on a large scale. German air power was instrumentalduring the battle. The Luftwaffe's offensive broke what remained of Polish resistance in an"awesome demonstration of air power". The Luftwaffe quickly destroyed the bridges acrossthe Bzura River. Afterward, the Polish forces were trapped out in the open, and were attackedby wave after wave ofStukas, dropping 50 kg (110 lb) "light bombs" which caused huge num-bers of casualties. The Polish anti-aircraft batteries ran out of ammunition and retreated tothe forests, but were then "smoked out" by the Heinkel He 111 and Dornier Do 17s dropping100 kg (220 lb) incendiaries. TheLuftwaffeleft the army with the task of mopping up survi-vors. The Stukageschwadersalone dropped 388 t (428 short tons) of bombs during this bat-tle.The Polish government (of President Ignacy Mocicki) and the high command (of MarshalEdward Rydz-migy) left Warsaw in the first days of the campaign and headed southeast,reaching Lublin on 6 September. From there, it moved on 9 September to Kremenez, and on13 September to Zaleshiki on the Romanian border. Rydz-migy ordered the Polish forces toretreat in the same direction, behind the Vistula and San rivers, beginning the preparations


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and columns of refugees along the roads to wreak havoc, disrupt communications, and targetPolish morale. Apart from the victims of battles, the German forces (both SS and the regularWehrmacht) murdered several thousand Polish civilians.


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Map 5 The race for Warsaw, 7 September 1939

http://www.panzertruppen.org/amazon/books/ww2/map4.jpgDuring Operation Tannenberg, nearly 20,000 Poles were shot at 760 mass execution sites bytheEinsatzgruppen.The Polish Campaign was the first action by Adolf Hitler in his attempt to create Lebens-raum, or living space, for the ethnic German people. The German retaliation against the op-posing Polish civilians quickly turned into an atrocity. The German retaliation quickly turnedinto irregular warfare against innocent Polish men, women, and children. The brutality thatthe German army carried out on the civilians was justifiable in their eyes. Many historians ha-ve studied the reasoning behind this brutality and have found that Nazi propaganda could beone of the factors. Nazi propaganda worked to manipulate the German people into believingthat the Jewish and other ethnic people were the enemyAltogether, the civilian losses of Polish population amounted to about 150.000200.000 whi-le German civilian losses amounted to roughly 3.250 (including 2.000 who died fighting Po-lish troops as members of a fifth column).

Aftermath

Poland was divided among Germany, the Soviet Union, and Slovakia. Lithuania received the

city of Wilno and its environs on 28 October 1939 from the Soviet Union. On 8 and 13 Sep-tember 1939, the German military districts of "Posen" (Poznan)commanded by General Al-fred von Vollard-Bockelbergand "Westpreuen" (West Prussia)commanded by GeneralWalter Heitzwere established in conquered Greater Poland and Pomerelia, respectively. Ba-sed on laws of 21 May 1935 and 1 June 1938, the German Wehrmachtshared its administrati-ve powers with civilian "chief civil administrators" (Chefs der Zivilverwaltung, CdZ). Germandictator Adolf Hitler appointed Arthur Greiser to become the CdZ of the Posen military dis-trict, and Danzig'sGauleiterAlbert Forster to become the CdZ of the West Prussian militarydistrict. On 3 October, the military districts "Lodz" and "Krakau" (Cracow) were set up undercommand ofGeneralobersten (Colonel-Generals)) Gerd von Rundstedt and Wilhelm List,and Hitler appointed Hans Frank and Arthur Seyss-Inquart as civil heads, respectively. At thesame time, Frank was appointed "supreme chief administrator" for all occupied territories.

On 28 September, another secret German-Soviet protocol modified the arrangements of Au-gust: all of Lithuania was shifted to the Soviet sphere of influence; in exchange, the dividingline in Poland was moved in Germany's favour, eastwards towards the Bug River. On 8 Octo-ber, Germany formally annexed the western parts of Poland with Greiser and Forster asReichsstatthalter, while the south-central parts were administered as the General Govern-ment led by Frank.Even though water barriers separated most of the spheres of interest, the Soviet and Germantroops met on numerous occasions. The most remarkable event of this kind occurred atBrest-Litovsk on 22 September. The German 19th Panzer Corpscommanded by GeneralHeinz Guderianhad occupied the city, which lay within the Soviet sphere of interest. Whenthe Soviet 29th Tank Brigadecommander by S. M. Krivosheinapproached, the comman-ders negotiated that the German troops would withdraw and the Soviet troops would enter

the city saluting each other. At Brest-Litovsk, Soviet and German commanders held a jointvictory parade before German forces withdrew westward behind a new demarcation line. Justthree days earlier, however, the parties had a more hostile encounter near Lwow (Lviv, Lem-berg), when the German 137th Gebirgsjgerregimenter (mountain infantry regiment) atta-cked a reconnaissance detachment of the Soviet 24th Tank Brigade; after a few casualties onboth sides, the parties turned to negotiations. The German troops left the area, and the RedArmy troops entered Lvov on 22 September.The MolotovRibbentrop pact and the invasion of Poland marked the beginning of a periodduring which the government of the Soviet Union increasingly tried to convince itself that theactions of Germany were reasonable, and were not developments to be worried about, despiteevidence to the contrary. On 7 September 1939, just a few days after France and Britain joi-


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ned the war against Germany, Stalin explained to a colleague that the war was to the advanta-ge of the Soviet Union, as follows:A war is on between two groups of capitalist countries... for the redivision of the world, forthe domination of the world! We see nothing wrong in their having a good hard fight andweakening each other... Hitler, without understanding it or desiring it, is shaking and under-mining the capitalist system... We can manoeuvre, pit one side against the other to set themfighting with each other as fiercely as possible... The annihilation of Poland would mean one

fewer bourgeois fascist state to contend with! What would be the harm if as a result of therout of Poland we were to extend the socialist system onto new territories and populations?About 65.000 Polish troops were killed in the fighting, with 420.000 others being capturedby the Germans and 240.000 more by the Soviets (for a total of 660.000 prisoners). Up to120.000 Polish troops escaped to neutral Romania (through the Romanian Bridgehead andHungary), and another 20.000 to Latvia and Lithuania, with the majority eventually makingtheir way to France or Britain. Most of the Polish Navy succeeded in evacuating to Britain aswell. German personnel losses were less than their enemies (~16.000 KIA).None of the parties to the conflictGermany, the Western Allies or the Soviet Unionexpec-ted that the German invasion of Poland would lead to a war that would surpass World War Iin its scale and cost. It would be months before Hitler would see the futility of his peace nego-tiation attempts with the United Kingdom and France, but the culmination of combined Eu-

ropean and Pacific conflicts would result in what was truly a "world war". Thus, what was notseen by most politicians and generals in 1939 is clear from the historical perspective: The Po-lish September Campaign marked the beginning of the Second World War in Europe, whichcombined with the Japanese invasion of China in 1937 and the Pacific War in 1941, formedthe cataclysm known as World War II.The invasion of Poland led Britain and France to declare war on Germany on 3 September.However, they did little to affect the outcome of the September Campaign. No declaration ofwar was issued by Britain and France against the Soviet Union. This lack of direct help ledmany Poles to believe that they had been betrayed by their Western allies.On 23 May 1939, Hitler explained to his officers that the object of the aggression was notDanzig, but the need to obtain GermanLebensraumand details of this concept would be la-ter formulated in the infamous Generalplan Ost. The invasion decimated urban residentialareas, civilians soon became indistinguishable from combatants, and the forthcoming Ger-man occupation (both on the annexed territories and in the General Government) was one ofthe most brutal episodes of World War II, resulting in between 5.47 million and 5.67 millionPolish deaths (about 20% of the country's "total" population, and over 90% of its Jewish mi-nority)including the mass murder of 3 million Polish citizens (mainly Jews as part of the fi-nal solution) in extermination camps like Auschwitz, in concentration camps, and in nume-rous ad hoc massacres, where civilians were rounded up, taken to a nearby forest, machine-gunned, and then buried, whether they were dead or not.According to the Polish Institute of National Remembrance, Soviet occupation between 1939and 1941 resulted in the death of 150,000 and deportation of 320,000 of Polish citizens,when all who were deemed dangerous to the Soviet regime were subject to sovietization, for-ced resettlement, imprisonment in labor camps (the Gulags) or murdered, like the Polish offi-cers in the Katyn massacre.

Misconceptions

There are several common misconceptions regarding the Polish September Campaign.The Polish Army fought German tanks with horse-mounted cavalry wielding lances andswords.

In 1939, only 10% of the Polish army was made up of cavalry units. Polish cavalry never char-ged German tanks or entrenched infantry or artillery, but usually acted as mobile infantry (li-ke dragoons) and reconnaissance units and executed cavalry charges only in rare situationsagainst foot soldiers. Other armies (including German and Soviet) also fielded and extensi-


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vely used elite horse cavalry units at that time. Polish cavalry consisted of eleven brigades, asemphasized by its military doctrine, equipped with anti tank rifles "UR" and light artillerysuch as the highly effective Bofors 37 mm anti-tank gun. The myth originated from war co-rrespondents reports of the Battle of Krojanty, where a Polish cavalry brigade was fired uponin ambush by hidden armored vehicles, after it had mounted a sabre-charge against Germaninfantry.

The Polish Air Force was destroyed on the ground in the first days of the war .

The Polish Air Force, though numerically inferior, had been moved from air bases to small ca-mouflaged airfields shortly before the war. Only some trainers and auxiliary aircraft were des-troyed on the ground. The Polish Air Force, significantly outnumbered and with its fightersoutmatched by more advanced German fighters, remained active up to the second week ofthe campaign, inflicting significant damage on the Luftwaffe. TheLuftwaffelost, to all opera-tional causes, 285 aircraft, with 279 more damaged beyond repair, while the Poles lost 333aircraft.

Poland offered little resistance and surrendered quickly.In the first few days, Germany sustained very heavy losses: Poland cost the Germans an enti-re armored division, thousands of soldiers, and 25% of its air strength. As for duration, theSeptember Campaign lasted only about one week less than the Battle of France in 1940, eventhough the Anglo-French forces were much closer to parity with the Germans in numerical

strength and equipment. Furthermore, the Polish Army was preparing the Romanian Brid-gehead, which would have prolonged Polish defence, but this plan was cancelled due to theSoviet invasion of Poland on 17 September 1939. Poland also never officially surrendered tothe Germans. Under German occupation, the Polish army continued to fight underground, asArmia Krajowa and forest partisansLeni. The Polish resistance movement in World War IIin German-occupied Poland was one of the largest resistance movements in all of occupiedEurope.

Blitzkrieg was first used in Poland.It is often assumed that blitzkrieg is the strategy that Germany first used in Poland. Manyearly post-war histories, such as Barrie Pitt's in The Second World War (BPC Publishing1966), attribute German victory to "enormous development in military technique which occu-rred between 1918 and 1940", citing that "Germany, who translated (British inter-war) theo-ries into actioncalled the resultBlitzkrieg." This idea has been repudiated by some authors.Matthew Cooper writes: "Throughout the Polish Campaign, the employment of the mechani-zed units revealed the idea that they were intended solely to ease the advance and to supportthe activities of the infantry. Thus, any strategic exploitation of the armoured idea was still-born. The paralysis of command and the breakdown of morale were not made the ultimateaim of the German ground and air forces, and were only incidental by-products of the tra-ditional manoeuvers of rapid encirclement and of the supporting activities of the flying arti-llery of the Luftwaffe, both of which had as their purpose the physical destruction of theenemy troops. Such was theVernichtungsgedankeof the Polish campaign." Vernichtungsge-dankewas a strategy dating back to Frederick the Great, and was applied in the Polish Cam-paign little changed from the French campaigns in 1870 or 1914. The use of tanks "left muchto be desired...Fear of enemy action against the flanks of the advance, fear which was to proveso disastrous to German prospects in the west in 1940 and in the Soviet Union in 1941, waspresent from the beginning of the war." John Ellis, writing in Brute Force asserted that"there is considerable justice in Matthew Cooper's assertion that the panzerdivisions werenot given the kind ofstrategic(emphasis in original) mission that was to characterize authen-tic armouredblitzkrieg, and were almost always closely subordinated to the various mass in-fantry armies." Zaloga and Madej, inThe Polish Campaign 1939, also address the subject ofmythical interpretations ofBlitzkrieg and the importance of other arms in the campaign."Whilst Western accounts of the September campaign have stressed the shock value of thepanzersand Stuka attacks, they have tended to underestimate the punishing effect of Ger-man artillery(emphasis added) on Polish units. Mobile and available in significant quantity,artillery shattered as many units as any other branch of the Wehrmacht."


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Chapter III Battle of France

CHRONOLOGY

1935 Hitler announces creation of Luftwaffe, which already has 1,000 front-line aircraft.1936 Hitler speeds up manufacture of light and medium bombers.1937Germany has 39 divisions in her army. March 1938 Anschluss:annexation of Austria. .

October Repossession of Sudetenland. January 1939 German Army strength now 51 divi-sions.March Invasion of Czechoslovakia.MayGermany signs Pact of Steel with Italy.August Germany signs Non-Aggression Pact with Russia.1 September Invasion of Poland.3 SeptemberBritain and France declare war on Germany; on mobilization Germany fieldsmore than 100 divisions.10 September British Expeditionary Force established in Northern France.10 JanuaryGerman courier carrying plans for invasion of Holland and Belgium arrestedon Belgian territory.FebruaryGerman Plan 'Sichehchnitfeventually emerges, giving main attack to von Run-

dstedt (45 divisions including 7 panzer divisions) through Ardennes on front Dinant to Se-dan; von Bock in the north (with 29 divisions including 3 panzer divisions) to draw and holdthe Allies; von Leeb (19 divisions) in the south opposite the Maginot Line to prevent Frenchreinforcements moving up.March Gamelin adopts Dyle-Breda Plan to strengthen the Allied left flank.9 April Germany invades Norway.9 MayChamberlain resigns British premiership. German 'tourists' cross frontiers ready toseize road junctions. Hitler orders assault on France to open overnight.10 MaySpecially trained troops in gliders land on Belgian forts at Eben Emael. German ad-vance starts before dawn, with paratroops attacking bridge across Maas estuary. Luft-waffe opens offensive deep into France. British Expeditionary Force and French cavalry moveto Dyle Line. French Cavalry in centre advance. Allied air effort frustrated by orders 'to avoid

built-up areas'. Churchill takes up British premiership.11 MayIn the centre, Guderian reaches River Semois and crosses during the night. In thenorth, Prioux with French cavalry has difficulty in reaching new positions. Georgesmakes plans to move reinforcements behind Sedan, but it is already too late. Meanwhilethe Dutch air force is virtually impotent.12 MayIn the north the Germans reach Zuider Zee, and the French are forced to withdrawto cover Antwerp. Belgians pull back. In the centre, Rommel reaches Houx before night andcrosses the Meuse. D'Astier draws attention to the German advance between Dinant andBouillon. Guderian reaches east bank of Meuse at Sedan.13 MayRommel increases pressure at Houx and crosses at Dinant. Boucher orders Frenchcounterattacks, which fail. Stuka support around Sedan terrifies French. The Grossdeutsch-land Regiment crosses near Gaulier and reaches la Marfee heights. 10 Panzer divi-

sion's assault engineers eventually cross near Wadelincourt. Panic and false reports spreadamong, French troops and refugees pour southwards.14 MayColonel Balck reaches Chehery with 1 Rifle Regiment. Reinhardt's corps, held fortwo days, finally forces a partial crossing at Montherme. In the Netherlands, Prioux's cavalrystand ground against the panzers but withdraw at night after heavy losses. Georges at last ac-cepts the fact of German success at Sedan. Rommel reaches Onhaye. German infan-try divisions cross at Nouzonville at the third attempt. French attacks with tanks nearBulson fail. Guderian wheels westward, leaving 10 Panzer Division and the Grossdeutsch-land regiment to hold the flank. French 3 Armoured Division attack is cancelled. Huntzigerand Corap make wrong appreciation and open the way for German advance. Fierce air battleover Sedan with very heavy RAF losses. Rotterdam bombed by Germans during cease-fire ne-


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gotiations. Netherlands capitulates.15 May Rommel continues advance towards Philippeville. 6 Panzer Division at Month-erme manages to cross in strength. At Stonne fierce fighting eventually leaves GermanGrossdeutschland in command. 1 and 2 Panzer Divisions finally break through Touchon'sforce. Corap is removed and replaced by Giraud.16 MayGuderian's panzers advance 40 miles in the day. French 2 Armoured Divisionstill scattered. Rommel breaks through remnants of XI Corps and makes for Le Cateau.

17 MayGuderian's advance is halted by the High Command but finally allowed a 'reconnais-sance in force'. De Gaulle attacks with 4 Armoured Division, reaching Montcornet, butturns back at nightfall.18 MayPanzers ordered to continue advance. Rommel takes Cambrai with scratchforce. Refugees hamper all movement on roads.19 MayDe Gaulle makes abortive attack with tanks and infantry towards Crecy. D'Astierfails to hold off Stukas. Weygand replaces Gamelin. Panzers in line for final advance about 50miles from the sea.20 May Royal Sussex Regiment fight to the end at Amiens, and Panzers wipe out twoBritish Territorial Army divisions. Part of 2 Panzer Division reaches the sea nearNoyelles. Ironside persuades French to take part in joint attack with BEF towards Amiens on21 May.

21 MayFrench fail to produce troops or air support for joint attack. Two British columns oftanks and infantry fight a fierce action south of Arras but are eventually forced to retire.22 MayPanzers drive for the Channel ports. French (Altmayer) attack makes initial successbut is eventually halted. Gort still without orders.23 May Decision by Gort to save BEF.24 MayReynaud complains to Churchill over British withdrawal. Hitler orders panzers tohalt at Aa Canal, giving BEF vital time.26 MayGerman tanks again advance on Dunkirk.27 MayEvacuation of BEF starts.28 MayBelgium surrenders.29 MayFrench join in evacuation.4 June BEF and French evacuation ends.5-22 JuneBetween the sea and the Meuse, Germany launches a fresh attack with 104 fullymanned divisions against the French, who now have only 60 divisions and very weak air cov-er. Although the French fight with great courage, the Germans take Paris on 14 June and havereached a line from Bordeaux to the Swiss frontier by the time the armistice is signed on 22June.

Battle

In the Second World War, the Battle of France, also known as the Fall of France, was the suc-cessful German invasion of France and the Low Countries, beginning on 10 May 1940, defea-ting primarily French forces. The battle consisted of two main operations. In the first, FallGelb(Case Yellow), German armoured units pushed through the Ardennes to cut off and su-

rround the Allied units that had advanced into Belgium. When British and adjacent Frenchforces were pushed back to the sea by the highly mobile and well organised German opera-tion, the British government decided to evacuate the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) aswell as several French divisions at Dunkirk in Operation Dynamo.With France left to fend for itself after the British evacuation, Germany launched a secondoperation, Fall Rot (Case Red), which was commenced on 5 June. Initially the depletedFrench forces put up stiff resistance, but German air superiority gradually overwhelmedFrench artillery positions. German forces outflanked the Maginot Line and pushed deeper in-to France as French forces began to collapse. German forces arrived in an undefended Parison 14 June and their commanders met with French officials who were ready to stop thefights. Chief among these was Marshal Philippe Ptain who, contrary to the wishes of manyFrenchmen, announced he would seek an armistice.


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Map 5 Evolution of the Manstein Plan


On 22 June, 2an armistice was signed between France and Germany, which resulted in a divi-sion of France whereby Germany would occupy the north and west (and also keep nearly twomillions French soldiers as prisoners in Germany), Italy would control a small Italian occupa-tion zone in the southeast, and an unoccupied zone, the zone libre, would be governed by thenewly formed Vichy government led by Marshal Ptain. France remained under Axis occupa-tion until the liberation of the country after the Allied landings in 1944.Following the invasion of Poland in September 1939 (which started the Second World War inEurope), a period of inaction called the Phony War ("Sitzkrieg" or "Drle de guerre") set inbetween the major powers. Adolf Hitler had hoped that France and Britain would acquiescein his conquest and quickly make peace. On 6 October, he may have made some type of peaceoffer to both Western Powers. Even before they had time to respond, on 9 October, he alsoformulated a new military policy in case their reply was negative: Fhrer-Anweisung N6, or"Fhrer-Directive Number 6".

German strategy

Hitler had always fostered dreams about major military campaigns to defeat the Western Eu-ropean nations as a preliminary step to the conquest of territory in Eastern Europe, thus avoi-ding a two-front war. However, these intentions were absent from Fhrer-Directive N6. Thisplan was firmly based on the seemingly more realistic assumption that Germany's militarystrength would still have to be built up for several more years and that for the moment only li-mited objectives could be envisaged. They were aimed at improving Germany's ability to sur-vive a long, protracted war in the West. Hitler ordered a conquest of the Low Countries to beexecuted at the shortest possible notice. This would stop France from occupying them first,


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and prevent Allied air power from threatening the vital German Ruhr Area. It would also pro-vide the basis for a long-term air and sea campaign against Britain. There was no mention intheFhrer-Directive of any immediate consecutive attack to conquer the whole of France, alt-hough as much as possible of the border areas in northern France should be occupied.While writing the directive, Hitler had also assumed that such an attack could be initiatedwithin a period of at most a few weeks, but the very day he issued it he was disabused of thisillusion. It transpired that he had been misinformed about the true state of Germany's forces.

The motorised units had to recover, repairing the damage to their vehicles incurred in the Po-lish campaign, and ammunition stocks were largely depleted.

German armed forces structure

The overall command for all the German armed forces was the Oberkommando der Wehr-macht (usually contracted to OKW). This was sometimes used by Hitler as an alternativearmy planning staff, but the direction of the offensive on the western front was the responsi-bility of the Oberkommando des Heeres or OKH, the Army supreme command. The com-mander in chief of the Army was General Walther von Brauchitsch, but the main responsibi-lity for planning belonged to the Chief of Staff, Franz Halder.Under OKW, the other service commands were the Oberkommando der Luftwaffe or OKL,led by Hitler's close political colleague Hermann Gring, and the Oberkommando der Mari-neor OKM, led by Admiral Erich Raeder.

Similarity to Schlieffen Plan

On 10 October 1939, the British refused Hitler's offer of peace; on 12 October, the French didthe same. Franz Halder, the chief of staff of the Army ( Generalstabschef des Heeres), presen-ted the first plan for Fall Gelb("Case Yellow") on 19 October. This was the pre-war codenameof plans for a campaign in the Low Countries: the Aufmarschanweisung N1, Fall Gelb ("De-ployment Instruction No. 1, Case Yellow"). Halder's plan has often been compared to theSchlieffen Plan, which the Germans attempted to execute in 1914 in the opening phase of theFirst World War. It was similar in that both plans entailed an advance through the middle ofBelgium, but while the intention of the Schlieffen Plan was to gain a decisive victory by execu-

ting a rapid encirclement of the French Army, Aufmarschanweisung N1envisioned a frontalattack, sacrificing a projected half million German soldiers to attain the limited goal of thro-wing the Allies back to the River Somme. Germany's strength for 1940 would then be spent;only in 1942 could the main attack against France begin.Hitler was disappointed with Halder's plan and initially reacted by deciding that the Germanarmy should attack early, ready or not, in the hope that Allied unpreparedness might bringabout an easy victory. This led to a series of postponements, as commanders repeatedly per-suaded Hitler to delay the attack for a few days or weeks to remedy some critical defect in thepreparations, or to wait for better weather. Hitler also tried to alter the plan which he foundunsatisfactory, without clearly understanding how it could be improved. This mainly resultedin a dispersion of effort; although the main axis would remain in central Belgium, secondaryattacks would be undertaken on the flanks. Hitler made such a suggestion on 11 November.

On 29 October, Halder let a second operational plan, Aufmarschanweisung N2, Fall Gelb,reflect these changes by featuring a secondary attack on the Netherlands.Hitler was not alone in disliking Halder's plan. General Gerd von Rundstedt, the commanderof Army Group A, also disagreed with it. Von Rundstedt recognised that it did not adhere tothe classic principles of the Bewegungskrieg("manoeuvre warfare") which had guided Ger-man strategy since the 19th century. A breakthrough would have to be accomplished thatwould result in the encirclement and destruction of the main body of Allied forces. The mostpractical place to achieve this would be in the region of Sedan, which lay in the sector of vonRundstedt's Army Group. On 21 October, von Rundstedt agreed with his chief of staff, Gene-ralleutnantErich von Manstein, that an alternative operational plan had to be arranged thatwould reflect these basic ideas, making Army Group A as strong as possible at the expense ofArmy Group B to the north.


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Map 6 : Campaign in France


Manstein Plan

Overview of the Plan

Developed by German Generalleutnant Erich von Manstein, the plan greatly modified the ori-ginal 1939 versions by Franz Halder of the invasion plan known asFall Gelb. One way to lookat the Manstein Plan was that it was the German Army's answer to the French Army's DylePlan. Originally, inAufmarschanweisung N1, Fall Gelb, the German Army planned to pushthe Allied forces back through central Belgium to the Somme river, in northern France, notunlike the first phase of the famous Schlieffen Plan of the First World War. However, on 10


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January 1940, the Mechelen Incident took place: a German aircraft carrying documents con-taining parts of the operational plans of Fall Gelb crashed in Belgium, thus promptinganother review of the invasion plan. While Fall Gelb was revised by Halder, not fundamen-tally changing it in Aufmarschanweisung N3, Fall Gelb, Von Manstein was able to convinceHitler in a personal meeting on 17 February that the Wehrmachtshould attack through theArdennes forest, followed by a strategic drive to the coast.

Details of the PlanVon Manstein, chief of staff of Army Group A, had originally formulated his plan in October1939 in Koblenz on instigation of his superior General Gerd von Rundstedt, who rejected Hal-der's plan, both because of professional jealousy and because it wouldn't lead to a decisive vic-tory over France. Von Manstein's first thoughts were rather traditional, envisaging a swingfrom Sedan to the north to obliterate the Allied armies in a classical Kesselschlachtor annihi-lation battle. When discussing his intentions with Lieutenant-General Heinz Guderian, com-mander of Germany's elite armoured corps, the latter proposed to turn it into a more "Fulleri-te" strategy by avoiding the main body of the Allied armies and swiftly advancing with the ar-moured divisions to The Channel instead, to cause a collapse of the enemy by catching himoff guard and cutting off his supply lines. It was thus Guderian who introduced the true"Blitzkrieg" elements to the plan, while Von Manstein had at first many objections againstthis aspect, especially fearing the long open flank created by such an advance. Guderian ma-naged to convince him that the danger of a French counterattack from the south could beaverted by a simultaneous secondary spoi

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