Document ofThe World Bank

FOR OFFICLAL USE ONLY

Report No: 24323

IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT(IDA-27910; IDA-2791 1)

ONA

CREDIT

IN THE AMOUNT OF SDR 111.2 MILLION (US$152.0 MILLION EQUIVALENT)

TO THE

PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF BANGLADESH

FOR A

RIVER BANK PROTECTION PROJECT

June 20, 2002

Rural Development Sector UnitSouth Asia Region

This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance oftheir official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.

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CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS(Exchange Rate Effective)

Currency Unit = Bangladesh Taka (Tk)At Appraisal (April 1995) Tk 1.00 = US$ 0.0248

US$ 1.00 = Tk 40.25

ICR (June 2002) US$1.00 = Tk 57.45

FISCAL YEAR

July 1 June 30

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ADP Annual Development Program (GOB)BBS Bangladesh Bureau of StatisticsBRE Brahmaputra Right EmbankmentBWDB Bangladesh Water Development BoardCEGIS Centre for Environmental and Geographic Information SystemCIDA Canadian International Development AgencyDPHE Department of Public Health EngineeringEIA Environmental Impact AssessmentEMP Environmental Management PlanFAP Flood Action PlanFCDI Flood Control Drainage and IrrigationFDR Flood Damage RehabilitationFIDIC Federation Internationale Des Ingenieurs-ConseilsFPCO Flood Plan Coordination OrganizaitionGOB Government of BangladeshGRC Grievance Redress CommitteeICB International Competitive BiddingIDA International Development AssociationIPOE Independent Panel of ExpertsJMBA Jamuna Multi-Purpose Bridge AuthorityLGED Local Government Engineering DepartmentMIS Management Information SystemMOWR Ministry of Water ResourcesNCB National Competitive BiddingNPV Net Present ValueNWMP National Water Management PlanO&M Operation and MaintenanceOED Operations Evaluation DepartmentPEM Policy Entitlement MatrixPPAR Project Performance Audit ReportPMRU Project Management and Resettlement UnitPSR Project Status ReportQAG Quality Assurance GroupRAC Regional Accounting CentreRAP Resettlement Action Plan

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

RBPP River Bank Protection ProjectSAR Staff Appraisal ReportSCF Standard Conversion FactorSDR Special Drawing RightWARPO Water Resources Planning OrganizationWBS Work Breakdown structureWFP World Food ProgrammeWMIP Water Management Improvement Project (Proposed)WPAG Water Policy Advisory Group

Vice President: , Mieko NishimizuCountry Manager/Director: Frederick Thomas Temple

Sector Manager/lDirector: Constance A. BernardTask Team Leader/Task Manager: , S.A.M. Rafiguzzaman and Ohn Myint

This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only inthe performance of their official duties. Its contents may not be otherwise disclosedwithout World Bank authorization.

BANGLADESHRiver Bank Protection Project

CONTENTS

Page No.1. Project Data 12. Principal Performance Ratings 13. Assessment of Development Objective and Design, and of Quality at Entry 24. Achievement of Objective and Outputs 45. Major Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcome 86. Sustainability 97. Bank and Borrower Performance 108. Lessons Learned 129. Partner Comments 1310. Additional Information 13Annex 1. Key Performance Indicators/Log Frame Matrix 14Annex 2. Project Costs and Financing 17Annex 3. Economic Costs and Benefits 19Annex 4. Bank Inputs 26Annex 5. Ratings for Achievement of Objectives/Outputs of Components 28Annex 6. Ratings of Bank and Borrower Perfonnance 29Annex 7. List of Supporting Documents 30Annex 8. Borrowers Contribution to the ICR 31

Map: IBRD 31953: Bangladesh - River Bank Protection Project (Including Emergency FloodRecovery Area)

['roject ID: P009545 Project Name: River Bank Protection7'eam Leader: S. A. M. Rafiquzzaman TL Unit: SASRD

IAR Type: Core ICR Report Date: June 19, 2002

1.. Project Data

Name: River Bank Protection L/C/TFNumber: IDA-27910;IDA-27911

Country/Department: BANGLADESH Region: South Asia RegionalOffice

Sector/subsector: MV - Pre-Investment / Portfolio Development; VM -

Natural Resources Management

KEY DATESOriginal Revised/Actual

PCD: 04/27/1990 Effective: 06/20/1996 06/20/1996Appraisal: 01/09/1995 MTR:Approval: 12/05/1995 Closing: 12/31/2000 12/31/2001

Borrower/lInplementing Agency: Government of Bangladesh (GOB)/Bangladesh Water Development Board(BWDB) and Water Resources Planning Organization (WARPO)

Other Partners:

STAFF Current At Appraisal>'ice President: Mieko Nishimizu D. Joseph WoodC'ountry Manager: Frederick Thomas Temple Paul IsenmanSector Manager: Constance A. Bernard Ridwan Ali7Team Leader at ICR: S.A.M. Rafiquzzaman and Ohn Keith Pitman

MyintICR Primary Author: Christopher Konecki

(FAO-TCIP)

2.. Principal Performance Ratings

(FlS=Highly Satisfactory, S=Satisfactory, U=Unsatisfactoiy, HL=Highly Likely, L=Likely, UN=Unlikely, HUN=HighlyUalikely, HU=Highly Unsatis&ctory, H=High, SU=Substantial, M=Modest, N=Negligible)

Outcome: S

Sustainability: L

Institutional Development Impact: M

Bank Performance: S

Borrower Performance: S

QAG (if available) ICRQuality at Entry: S

Project at Risk at Any Time: No

3. Assessment of Development Objective and Design, and of Quality at Entry

3.1 Original Objective:

The principal project objective was to prevent the erosion of riparian land at two locations on thewest bank of the Brahmaputra by the construction and maintenance of improved river-bank protectionworks that would: (a) protect Sirajganj town's built-up and semi-urban areas from major damage andcumulative destruction; and (b) prevent the merger of the Brahmaputra and Bangali Rivers in the vicinity ofSariakandi and consequential increased regional flooding. A further objective was to assist GOB indeveloping permanent institutions for improved water sector planning, preserving the institutional capacitydeveloped under Flood Action Plan (FAP) and maling multidisciplinary planning part of Bangladesh'snornal water sector planning processes. A smnall component would assist Bangladesh Water DevelopmentBoard's (BWDB) efforts to improve its accounting and management information systems.

The project objectives were consistent with both the Government of Bangladesh (GOB) objectivesof land resource conservation and disaster mitigation, as reflected in the Five Year Development Plan andIDA's Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) goals and sector priorities. To help Bangladesh achieve itsoverarching goal of a substantial reduction in poverty within a generation, IDA's CAS (December 2000)accords pnority to accelerating sustained rural development To this end, IDA's country assistanceprogram includes support for essential rural infrastructure, including defensive infiastructure for disastermitigation, and institutional reforms in the water sector to promote decentralized, participatory approachesto water resources management. The project objectives addressed the need to enhance the functionality ofthe existing Brahmnaputra Right Embanknent (BRE) flood management infrastructure to mitigate theenvironmental and economic impacts of flooding; and to address the associated institutional strengtheningneeds in implementing agencies under the Ministry of Water Resources (MOWR).

3.2 Revised Objective:

Following the major floods in 1998, a Supplementary Credit was approved in April 1999,supporting a third project objective to: (a) facilitate resumption of agricultural and economic activitiesdisrupted by the floods through repair and reconstruction of flood damaged water control, drainage andirrigation infrastructure, which were damaged by the floods; and (b) prepare a program to extend riverbank protection works to other critical areas along Bangladesh's river system. The objective to improve theaccounting information system was dropped from the project, when it was decided by GOB that thisactivity would be financed separately by CIDA, in a parallel operation to this project.

3.3 Original Components:

The project design incorporated the following components:

(a) Rehabilitation and construction of river-bank protection works at two sites on theBrahmnaputra River's west bank, including retirement and realignment of about 8 km ofthe Brahmaputra Right Embankment to link the river-bank protection works at Sariakandiand Mathurapara;

(b) Land acquisition and a program of resettlement for people displaced by project works;

(c) Technical assistance for implementation supervision and maintenance of works constructedunder the project,

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(d) Establishment and initial funding of a specialized O&M Unit in BWDB to maintain theriverbank protection works constructed under the project, and procurement of vehicles andequipment for the O&M Unit;

(e) Institution building technical assistance to Water Resources Planning Organization(WARPO) to integrate the FAP within the framework of national water planning, producea national water management plan and a portfolio of investment projects for the mediumand long-tern, and upgrade integrated water sector planning capability; and

(f) Institutional capacity building technical assistance to BWDB to improve the operation ofthe new regional accounting centers (which includes training), and provision of equipmentand transport to improve supervision capability in the field and intemal communications.

The six components had two main thrusts: (i) construction and maintenance of river training worksand associated institutional strengthening of BWDB; and (ii) development of a National WaterManagement Plan and associated institutional strengthening of WARPO. Both BWDB and WARPO were

supported by appropriate internationally recruited technical assistance. The components, taken as a whole,were directly relevant to the achievement of project objectives. Project design drew heavily on the conceptsdeveloped through the Brahmaputra River Training Studies (BRTS) under the Flood Action Plan (FAP)study program; and the findings of the Project Perfornance Audit Report (PPAR) prepared by OED on theDrainage and Flood Control Project (Cr.864-BD), which closed in 1984.

3.4 Revised Components:

An. additional component was added to address the objectives introduced under the 1999Supplemental Credit, involving: (i) rehabilitating flood control, drainage irrigation and erosion controlfacilities at some 40 sites across the country (US$21 million); (ii) undertaking remedial measures forprotection works at Sirajganj site which were damaged during the last high flow season (US$14.9 million);(iii) financing the gap due to depreciation of the US dollar against the SDR since Credit approval (US$7.1nillion); and (iv) preparing a longer term plan for river bank protection and designing a follow-up riverhbmk protection project to protect critical sites vulnerable to erosion (US$2 million) and to reduce damageswhich may be caused by floods in future.

3.5 Quality at Entry:

Quality at entry of the overall project design is rated as satisfactory. The design addressed theneed for linking investments in defensive infrastructure with institutional reforms and capacity building inthe water sector. The project design took into account the special needs of a complex social-physicalenlvironment, identified potential social and environmental impacts and risks, and incorporated specificrmitigating and enforcement mechanisms to ensure that the Bank's Resettlement and Environment safeguardpolicies were followed. Recommendations of the Flood Action Plan (FAP) were acknowledged in the designof project's institution building technical assistance for WARPO and BWDB. The preparation activitieswere well managed and comprehensive, relying on past Bangladesh project knowledge base, and the latestadlvances in river training technical analysis and design. In addition, advance procurement actions, prior tonegotiation, for major civil works contracts including supervision consultancy were well managed,facilitating expedient implementation when the credit became effective.

The Resettlement Action Plan (RAP) and Environmental Inpact Assessment (EIA) were preparedirL accordance with the applicable World Bank safeguard policies. The project was justifiably placed in theenlvironmental screening category "B" with social and environmental impacts deternined to be site specific,

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with few, if any, being irreversible.

The EIA proposed appropriate mitigating measures against potentially adverse constructionimpacts, and these were successfully implemented. Specific clauses were included in the civil workscontracts to ensure EIA conditions were enforceable for timely scheduling of in-river works and materialdeposition activities. Civil works contracts included adequate provisions to ensure that affected watersupply and sanitation services were repaired; drainage congestion was mininmized; and potential waterborne infection from construction material borrow-pit areas was reduced by chemical treatment.Management of EIA mitigating measures deployment was assured through a comprehensive EnvironmentalMonitoring and Action Plan developed for the project. The decision to further assesses the biodiversity(fisheries) impacts and mitigation needs resulted in the integration of a fish-pass within the six-kilometerlink embankment near the Mathurapara "hard-point" (groyne).

The Resettlement Action Plan (RAP) was to be implemented by the project's Resettlement Unit andprovision was made for compensation at current market prices and for the inclusion of persons withoutlegal land titles who were nevertheless affected by the project (e.g. squatters, employees of displacedbusinesses, etc.). Accountability and transparency in RAP implementation were strengthened by good locallevel consultation, an effective information campaign and a grievance redress procedure, drawing on theearlier Jamuna Bridge project experience.

4. Achievement of Objective and Outputs

4.1 Outcome/achievement of objective:

The achievement of development objectives is rated as satisfactory. The first objective was fullyachieved. River bank protection works constructed under the project are now preventing land loss andsettlements/property destruction with consequential reduction of regional flooding. Since the 1998 floods,these works have successfully provided flood protection for Sirajganj town and prevented the merger ofBrahmaputra/Jamuna with the Bangali River at Sariakandi, protecting against expanded flooding inadjacent areas and associated property damage. The second development objective of improved watersector planning and water resources management was substantially achieved with the successfulpreparation of a National Water Management Plan (NWMP) and the associated institutional developmentand capacity building of WARPO. The first part of the third objective to facilitate resumption ofagricultural and economic activity in 39 flood control, drainage and irrigation (FCDI) schemes, after repairof flood damaged water control infrastructure, was also achieved. Completion of the emergency repairs inthose schemes has restored the functional infrastructure and facilitated the opportunity for affectedcommunities to resume and maintain agricultural production and commercial activities in the adjacent landsand immediate hinterlands.

The second part of the third development objective--the preparation of a program to extendriverbank protection works to other critical areas along Bangladesh river system-was postponed byBWDB on the recommendation of the Bank. It was considered that more time was needed before this workcould be undertaken, to ensure that future strategy and investment options take into account outcomes fromthe recently completed pilot project on River Bank Protection and River Training (FAP2 1/22 -

kfw/Germany funded) and the recommendations of the NWMP which at that time was still being prepared.The FAP pilot examined options for erosion protection and river training works, while NWMP has set outa water sector investment program for the 2001- 2025 period, based on a development strategy approvedby Government after a process involving extensive stakeholder participation. GOB is now following-up therecommendations of NWMP and FAP pilot in their proposed erosion protection programs; and

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subsequently, the Bank proposes to undertake a study on the technical and social dimensions of rivermanagement during FY03, to have a better understanding of the problems and the issues involved.

Institutional development and strengthening was common to all components and proposedoutcomes were largely achieved. This is evidenced by the fact that considerable momentum wasestablished by MOWR, through BWDB and WARPO, in extending the water resources policy agenda inlatter stages of the project. The National Water Management Development Strategy has been approved andthe NWMP', which effectively operationalizes the National, Water Policy, is in the final stage of approvalby the National Water Resources Council. Complementing these, the Bangladesh Water Act which williacilitate implementation of the NWMP has been drafted. WARPO, equipped with national water resourcesdatabase and some of the core-trained staff, is now better placed to carry out its mandated role.

An important complementary project outcome warrants mention, concerning the positive impactthat project investments at Sirajganj is having on the Jamuna Bridge investment. The project river traininginfrastructure, when considered in conjunction with works at the Jamuna Bridge some 6 km downstream ofSirajganj, now provide a more secured integrated river training arrangement to mitigate river relatedimpacts at the Bridge works (Section 6.1).

t Draft National Water Management Plan (NWMP) has been reviewed and cleared by the Executive Committee of NationalWater Resources Council on February 2, 2002. The draft is expected to be formally approved soon by the National WaterItesources Council.

4.2 Outputs by components:

River Bank Protection Works. Construction of these protection works is rated as satisfactory,with the finished product being of superior technical quality. Activities at both sites were substantiallycomplete by June 1998, when the major floods occurred. Portion of the works at Sirajganj were severelydamaged during the floods, requiring remedial measures and rebuilding of a 320 meter failed section of the2,500 meter revetment works. Construction was finally completed in June 1999, about a 12-month delaylrom the original schedule. Completion of the works at Sariakandi-Mathurapara where flood damage wasinuch less, was delayed by three months, ana these were finalized by the end of September 1998. Nodamage has occurred to any project structure in the three floods subsequent to the major one in 1998. Themninor associated civil works procured under NCB, consisting of the BRE retirement link embankment andlish-pass (about 2% of total civil works cost), were completed satisfactorily and are operational. Factorswhich affected construction, moderately in ICB and more so in NCB contracts, included a short six monthworking season dictated by the monsoon flooding, and compounded by the need to complete all landacquisition and resettlement actions prior to start of work.

Land Acquisition and Resettlement. This socially and economically important aspect of projectimplementation was rated as satisfactory, achieving its objectives and outcomes despite difficulties atsttart-up. Implementation of all planned activities has been substantially completed, adhering to thecomprehensive Resettlement Action Plan (RAP) and Environmental Management Plan (EMP) aspects andcriteria. Land Acquisition totaled some 120 ha (vs. 96 ha in the $AR), relocating 421 homesteads (vs. 370in the SAR), and involving 2,080 Project Affected Persons (vs. 1828 in the SAR). All land acquisition andresettlement activities have been substantially completed, except for 67 households at Sariakandi who havebeen relocated to resettlement plots, for which land ownership titles are yet to be transferred. Thisoutstanding issue is yet to be resolved by the BWDB, but relates to unwillingness of the settlers to take thelitle rather than fault on the part of BWDB.

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Supervision reports and Quality Assurance Group (QAG) evaluations indicate that implementationof the RAP and EMP was largely successful. The project provided compensation to replace property andassets in line with the provisions of the policy entitlement matrix, complemented by support for localcommunity organizations in developing alternative livelihood opportunities. Project Management andResettlement Unit and Grievance Committees were established promptly and these ensured effectiveimplementation of this aspect of the project. The RAP almost represented a full-fledged social developmentprogram in itself; and provided considerably enhanced benefits over and above the normal provisions ofGOB policy on Resettlement and Rehabilitation (R&R). The implementation of the RAP provided anexcellent hands-on training opportunity for institutional development and capacity building in BWDB.

TechnicalAssistancefor Construction Supervision. Design of the protection works was fundedunder an earlier IDA project (Second Small Scale FCDI Project, Cr. 1870-BD) and the supervisioncontract was awarded on a single-source basis to a consortium of main firms involved in the design work.Notwithstanding the problems caused by the 1998 floods, the performance of construction supervision TAwas Satisfactory, as it provided much-needed major project-management capacity strengthening andbuilding at GOB/BWDB in hands-on, learning-by-doing setting for major construction management andO&M unit formation. The failed portion of the Sirajganj protection works involved major cost increases(about 30%/o or US$15.6 million), to finance repairs and additional supervision costs and assess liability.The matter was investigated by an Independent Panel of Experts (IPOE) appointed by BWDB. The panelconcluded that the Consultants' design of river-bank protection works was deficient and, therefore, theConsultants were professionally liable. The consultants disagreed with the independent panel's conclusionand argued that the causes of failure were the extreme conditions beyond the agreed design parameters,caused by the magnitude of the one-in-one-hundred year floods. Based on the opinion of an intemalcommittee formed by BWDB, MOWR/BWDB later accepted the consultants' clarifications and absolvedthem from any fault related to the design, supervision and management of the construction. At the requestof the Bank, MOWR has, however, now agreed to appoint a second independent panel to review the entirematter and reconcile the different conclusions of the independent panel and the subsequent BWDB internalcommittee, and complete the process during 2002.

Riverbank Protection Works O&M Unit. The project supported the establishment of aspecialized O&M Unit in BWDB to monitor the conditions and performance of the riverbank protectionworks constructed under the project, and plan annual maintenance needs; organize routine and preventivemaintenance work; and maintain a stockpile of repair materials (mainly concrete blocks and geo-textilebags). The specialized Unit was established in 1998 and although there were initial delays, by the end ofthe project it was properly staffed and equipment for monitoring and maintenance has been procured. TheUnit is functioning satisfactorily and is carrying out survey and monitoring of the completed worksthroughout the year. As planned, BWDB has outsourced provision of necessary long-term technicalsupport requirements by engaging two specialized agencies, the Centre for Environmental and GeographicInformation System (CEGIS) for prediction of possible bank line movement in the particular river reachesrelevant to the project works, and the Surface Water Modeling Centre (SWMC) for pre/post-monsoonassessment of morphological changes in the riverbed. Any maintenance work required will be tendered tonational contractors. As this is specialized work for most contractors and timing is usually a crucial factorwhen substantive work needs to be done, BWDB is maintaining a stockpile of repair materials and willlease specialized equipment procured under the project (tugboat, work barges and crane) to facilitate aquick response by contractors.

Strengthening and Institutional Capacity Building in WARPO and preparation of theNational Water Management Plan (NWMP). This component included three main activities:institutional strengthening of WARPO; establishment of a national water resources database (NWRD);

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and, preparation of the NWMP. Overall implementation outputs for the most part is rated as satisfactory.The outputs from component activities were achieved. The combined activities strengthened the watermanagement planning capacity within the country and have facilitated the steady transition to a morecomprehensive and integrated approach to water sector development This new integrated approach wasinitiated under FAP and the 1995 Bangladesh Water and Flood Management Strategy continued it to somedegree. But the major advances have been made under this project during both preparation andinplementation, culminating in the emergence of the National Water Policy in January 1999, the NationalWater Development Strategy in June 2001, and finally, in December 2001, the National WaterManagement Plan. A dral Bangladesh Water Act, an essential instrument for facilitating theimnplementation of the management plan, was also prepared in 2001.

Overall, the performance of TA is considered as generally satisfactory. Management of TAinputs would have benefited from optimization of work plans and more efficient and effective resourcesdeployment An Independent Panel of Experts (IPOE) consisting of national and intemational consultantswas appointed to advise WARPO on technical matters associated with the preparation of NWMP. Thepotential benefits of the panel's advice was limited by the fact that there was no clear leadership of thep:mel, leading to an unfocused approach in their interactions with WARPO.and the TA team helpingprepare the NWMP. Also, the multiplicity of TA tearns (e.g. NWMP consultants, IPOEs and WPAG)pased a major challenge to WARPO in terms of coordination and reconciling the conflicting views.

Flood Rehabilitation Works. Despite the problem of misprocurement on a proportion of smallvalue post-review contracts, the output from implementation of this component is still regarded assatisfactory. The works comprised rehabilitation, repair and re-construction of Flood Control Drainageanid Irrigation (FCDI) infrastructure in 39 BWDB schemes dispersed throughout the country.Rehabilitation and repairs were arranged through 321 separate and small contracts, of which 309 were inthe range of US$2,000 to US$200,000, (with an average value of about US$67,000) and were thereforenot subject to the Bank's prior review. Repairs undertaken under these contracts were of a generallys£1tisfactory quality, but a significantly unsatisfactory aspect of the implementation was the non-complianceby BWDB with the Bank's NCB guidelines, resulting in misprocurement being declared for 67 contracts ofthe 309 post-review contracts, and constituting around 13% of the total cost of the flood repair component.Limited technical capacity of field level BWDB staff to manage the NCB, and their lack of appreciation ofBank's stringent procurement guidelines led to inappropriate procurement practices including collusivebidding, unacceptable errors and inordinate delays. Under the Supplemental Credit, additional TA wasarranged (financed by AUSAID during preparation, but IDA during implementation) to assist in theimplementation of the emergency post flood repairs program. The supervision consultant's procurementguidance was not effective due to the number and dispersion of small contracts. It is worth mentioning herethat this procurement exercise was BWDB's first experience with the Bank's standard bidding documentsfcr NCB on contracts under Tkl 1.00 million. Neither BWDB staff, nor particularly the small contractorsinvolved, found the new document fornats and increased procedural requirements easy to handle, and thisno doubt contributed to the procurement problem that resulted.

4.3 Net Present Value/Economic rate of return:

The project economic analysis was done only on the riverbank protection works and was based ona hypothetical assumption regarding the year the benefits of the project commenced - these benefits beingidentified as the damage avoided by preventing riverbank erosion. Since the original earth embanlkment ofthe BRE was already in place and the project objective was to ensure that breaches would not occur infuture, estimation of benefits depend on assumptions about when the breaches would be likely to occur andwhen the actual construction of the protection works would be advanced enough to begin providing

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enhanced protection against this breaching. The SAR accordingly makes (in addition to the baselineanalysis) three calculations of ERR depending on a hypothetical tuning of when the project benefits arelikely to commence (a 1, 2 or 3-year delay). The ICR, in its analysis, assumes the project benefits asstarting only when construction is completed, a situation equivalent to the SAR's two year's delay scenario.On this basis, the ICR estimate of ERR for the two sub-components together is about 16%, which iscomparable to the SAR estimate.

4.4 Financial rate of return:

Not calculated.

4.5 Institutional development impact:

The institutional development impact of the project at Credit Closing is rated as modest, althoughthe impact is envisaged to evolve further over time. In case of river training works, BWDB hasdemonstrated their enhanced appreciation of the importance of proper O&M aspects and is now betterorganized for monitoring and maintenance activities. The BWDB's specialized O&M Unit is establishedwith improved, equipment and operational capacity. Staff have been trained on the job, a draft O&Mmanual prepared to improve regular performance; and planning functions introduced to prepare annualprograms and budgets. Where technical capacities are not available in-house, specialized aspects ofmonitoring functions have been outsourced to experts in the private sector. The impact with respect toWARPO has however been less, with only limited skills in integrated water management being transferredfrom the TA team preparing the NWMP to the core staff of WARPO. In its present form and with itspresent legal status, WARPO cannot provide sufficient incentives to attract staff of the needed technicalcalibre to perform its mandated function as an inter-ministerial water resource planning organization. It isrecognized that this project did not adequately address this very difficult issue. Both the Netherlands andADB are now actively considering projects to strengthen WARPO to enable it to carryout its mandatedfunctions more effectively.

5. Major Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcome

5.1 Factors outside the control of government or implementing agency:

The extreme 1998 monsoon flooding was the most significant factor affecting the projectimplementation. This flood was of a 1/100 year magnitude which caused extensive damage to the rivertraining works under construction, increasing civil works costs substantially and delaying completion.

5.2 Factors generally subject to government control:

The main issues related to (i) delayed sanctioning of employment of qualified staff by WARPOand BWDB's specialized O&M Unit in the early stages of the project; and (ii) delay in GOB approval ofthe draft NWMP largely due to inaction during the period immediately preceding and following the 2001general elections. The NWMP was approved in February 2002 after the Credit closed.

5.3 Factors generally subject to implementing agency control:

BWDB made effective and expedient decisions to repairing damaged portions of FCDI schemesafter the 1998 floods, but did not adequately control procurement processing of NCB contracts resulting inunacceptable bidding practices including collusion at some BWDB field offices and a significant numberof cases of misprocurement. In WARPO, the slow provision of adequate office facilities and logistics forthe TA team working on the NWMP caused significant implementation delays early in the project In

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addition, frequent movement of some senior personnel in WARPO early in the project period adverselyaffected management and planning effectiveness.

'.4 Costs andfinancing:

The original total project cost was US$156.0 million equivalent and this was increased toU`S$192.0 million after the 1998 floods to finance emergency repairs through the Supplemental Credit.Final project costs are estimated at US$192.0 million, in line with the original combined project costestimates.

Out of the combined credit amount of SDR 111.2 million, as of June 16, 2002, SDR 107.1 millionhad been disbursed; SDR 2.2 million cancelled due to misprocurement; the balance of SDR 1.9 million willbe fully disbursed.

6. Sustainability

6.1 Rationale for sustainability rating:

The long-term sustainability of the project is rated as ULkely. The civil works for the riverbankprotection structures have been completed to a relatively high construction standard, and all structures atthe two project sites, Sariakandi-Mathurapara and Sirajganj, have performed satisfactorily from a technicalsustainability viewpoint, in the last three flood periods. During the devastating floods in 1998, the 2,500 mlong Sirajganj "hard-point", was severely damaged over a -320 m section. Following extensive repairs, theworks are stable and reportedly secure with a 50-year design life. The revetment work integrity ismonitored regularly and remedial actions taken as needed by the special O&M Unit of BWDB. This Unitwas formed in 1998 and is functioning with necessary core staff and equipment. The Unit carries outmonitoring and maintenance activities in collaboration with private sector specialized agencies, the SurfaceWVlater Modeling Centre (SWMC) and Centre for Environmental and Geographic Information System(-EGIS).

Sustainability of the river tramiing aspect of the project depends, however, only partially on theproper maintenance of the protection works at Sirajganj and Sariakandi-Mathurapara. These were twop)iority sites selected from more than 20 sites identified in the Brahmaputra River Training Study as beingstrategically important in the effort to limit the west-ward migration of the river. In designing the project, itwas envisaged that protection works would be required at other sites in time, and that this should be done ina phased manner as and when needed, with due consideration of the economic, social and environmentalissues involved. Sustainability therefore will depend on the ability of BWDB through its specialized O&MUnit with support from EGIS and SWMC, to monitor river movetnents, identify areas of the river at risk ofsubstantive erosion, and take mitigation measures. It also depends on the availability of financing forfiuture necessary river training works and for this, GOB will be relying on donor support to supplement itsown resources. In this regard, the Government intends to examine options for full or partial cost recovery.Siince the integrity of Jamuna Bridge is linked to that of Sirajganj protection works, the potential exists forsharing its maintenance cost with the Jarnuna Multipurpose Bridge Authority (JMBA), or for BWDB tohand over the maintenance responsibility to JMBA, which already performs regular river monitoringupstream of Sirajganj.

The repairs to the FCDI schemes affected by the 1998 flood were completed successfully byBWDB, but consistent O&M support for these schemes is needed if this investrnent is to be sustained.Based on past experience, GOB budget support is uncertain for this activity and alternate means are neededto supplement the O&M funding. GOB intends, through use of the "Guidelines for Participatory Water

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Management" approved in April 2001, to encourage community participation in management of FCDIschemes, including contribution to O&M costs. If properly implemented, this community-based approachcould contribute effectively to longer-term operational sustainability of these schemes.

Likely sustainability of institutional strengthening outputs in water sector planning is signaled byGOB's adoption of key policy instruments, the NWMP and the proposed Bangladesh Water Act WARPOhas prepared a 5-year work plan, which includes NWMP follow-up studies, screening of water sectorinvestments, annual updating of National Water Resources Database (NWRDB), and the updating of theNWMP. But in its present form, WARPO is unlikely to be able to manage these functions withoutcontinuing external support

6.2 Transition arrangement to regular operations:

All project activities have been undertaken by BWDB and WARPO as part of their day-to-dayfunctions, but with substantive TA support. Further TA support will be needed particularly with respect tothe river protection O&M and water resource planning. GOB expects to secure this support throughongoing and future projects in the sector, including the twining arrangement with the Netherlands.

7. Bank and Borrower Performance

Bank7.1 Lending:

Bank's performance during the project preparation is considered satisfactory. The project wasprepared comprehensively by an experienced team. It was consistent with GOB strategic priorities of theFive-Year Development Plan as well as with IDA's Country Assistance Strategy and sector priorities.Project preparation and appraisal responded to the complex social, environmental, technical, engineering,and economic viability issues associated with attempts at river trining and integrated water resourcemanagement Preparation efforts recognized the need for implementing agencies to have selective technicalassistance when necessary; and insistence on advance procurement actions meant that civil works werecompleted on time and within budget.

7.2 Supervision:

Bank performance in project supervision is rated as satisfactory. The Bank's supervision teamexperience, skill mix and continuity were appropriate. The project review teams were responsive to clientconcerns and issues at critical points of physical works implementation. Financial management specialistswere included later as the Bank added these staff positions. The supervision was cost effective consideringtotal size and demands for conformance to the Bank's internal quality assurance guidelines and safeguardspolicies related to Environment, Land Acquisition and Resettlement The approach by Bank supervisionteams of facilitating implementation rather than directing it made an important contribution to projectoutcomes by BWBD's and WARPO's taking full ownership of project activities.

7.3 Overall Bankperformance:

Based on the above, the Bank's overall performance is rated as satisfactory.

Borrower7.4 Preparation:

The Borrower's performance during project preparation is rated as satisfactory. The deferral of

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appraisal from late-1992 to mid-1995, during which time long-standing institutional issues at BWDB wereaddressed and arrangements were filized with CIDA for modernization of BWDB Accounting System,provided sufficient time for a higher level dialogue to secure GOB's commitment to the project Thepreparation ensured that the key elements required for physical works implementation - engineering design,land acquisition, procurement of contractors, and procurement of supervision consultants - weresubstantially completed before the Credit became effective.

7.5 Government implementation performance:

GOB's performance during implemnentation can be considered sah'sfactory. Project ownership wasgenerally good and consistent. Matters pertaining to emergency repair response and resolution ofcontractual issues with major works construction, repair and re-design were handled reasonably expedientlyand effectively. Institutional development activities in BWDB and WARPO received less priority from theGovernment but gained considerable recognition during the course of the project. The GOB providedsupport and strong commitment to the development of water resources sector policy instruments such as theNWMP and draft Bangladesh Water Act.

7.6 Implementing Agency:

The performance of the implementing agencies was mostly satisfactory during implementation.

WARPO management of the NWMP consultants at the initial stages was not adequately focusedon intended goals and objectives - with insufficient monitoring and TA resource management controls.However, management improved significantly over time, and particularly in the last 18 months of theproject, when WARPO finally asserted full oJiership of the NWMP preparation.

BWDB's performance in implementing the river training component was satisfactory in terms ofprocurement management of the civil works contracts and the supervisory consultants. Decisive action waslaken to initiate emergency repairs to the flood damaged Sirajgong protection works and to form anindependent panel to investigate the failure. The subsequent overturning of this panel's conclusions by anintemal committee of BWDB, later endorsed by MOWR, was, however, somewhat questionable, and is stilllo be resolved. However, BWDB's performance in managing the river training component, wasovershadowed later by improper practices identified in contracting of small Flood Damage Repair works.The experience in this project confirms that BWDB's procurement management capacity needsstrengthening, including procurement perfornance tracking on a regular basis. Instead of split of worksinto a large number of small packages, the contract packages should have been larger in size for ease ofmanagement and to ensure proper checks and balances are in place. In addition, provision for periodic andannual procurement audit may be built into any future project design.

The project's financial management performance was satisfactory, although for flood damagesrehabilitation contracts, the payment and accounting procedure was apparently complicated by centralizedprocessing for all the small contrats scattered over the entire country, rather than in the jurisdictions wherethese works were located. Having adequately trained staff at the RACs would also have helped to avoid thecomplications and delays with withdrawal applications for this component. Annual audits were carried outregularly by the Foreign Aided Project Audit Directorate (FAPAD) and Audit reports were submittedraostly on schedule. The observations of the auditors were responded to by the project authority timely andconsistently, and resolved through tripartite meetings held among MOWR, FAPAD & BWDB. However,918 audit observations still remain unresolved, although many of these are of a trivial nature, and the keyaudit findings on procurement indicate lack of understanding of procurement policy/procedures in large

contracts on the auditor's part. The Ministry of Water Resources has agreed to pursue resolution of theseobservations following standard Government policies. The legal covenants under the Credit were generallyin compliance.

7.7 Overall Borrowerperfiornance:

Based on the above, the performance of the borrower overall is rated satisfactory.

8. Lessons Learned

General Lessons

* Use of Independent Panels of Experts (IPOE) will be effective only when the implementingagencies (IAs) and the IPOE clearly understand the TORs and the lAs adequately managethe panel's outputs.

* To ensure cost-effectiveness, and maximize the benefit of technical assistance, it must bepro-actively managed by the contracting project agency, from day one of the consultants'assignment. Without good management, TA inputs ini the early stages of the assignmnenttend to be squandered, often resulting in reduced and delayed delivery of TA inputs.

* Whenever possible, payment terms of TA contracts should be linked in some way tomeasurable contract outputs, rather than relying solely on time-based payments (orthrough a judicious combination of both) to reduce potential cost overruns and the chanceof delayed outputs.

* ICB and FIDIC procedures are highly advantageous when undertaking civil works indifficult physical situations (such as riverbank protection). The ability to react quickly andeffectively to emergency situations, such as the 1998 floods, is greatly enhanced if thecontract manager can operate in an independent professional manner, unconstrained byunnecessary outside interests.

BWDB Specific Lessons

* Procurement management capacity of BWDB needs strengthening, including procurementperformance tracking on a regular basis. Fragmentation of works into a large number ofsmall packages must be avoided and a core group of professionals should be developedwithin the implementing agency to supervise all procurement matters. In addition,mandatory provision for periodic and annual procurement audit should be built into thefuture project designs.

* The institutional arrangements for financial management within the BWDB and the impactof ongoing CIDA-assisted TA project to strengthen financial management capacity shouldbe assessed thoroughly in the context of BWDB's institutional reform program to ensurethat adequate intemal controls are put in place and operated properly.

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9. Partner Comments

(a) Borrower/implementing agency:

GOB/BWDB/WARPO endorsed the conclusions of the ICR with the one exception of the flooddamage rehabilitation misprocurement, where BWDB felt the Bank has been "rigid and focused onprocedure rather than objective". BWDB argued that it was not the limited procurement managementcapacity of BWDB field staff that caused the problem, but rather it was a combination of "(i) contractorsamd BWDB staff long held association with GOB procedures in processing tenders which is different from'DA guidelines; (ii) lack of dissemination of knowledge about IDA guidelines (for NCB contracts underTIkl.0 million) through workshops and seminars for BWDB field offices and contractors; (iii) lack ofconfidence (and English skills) on the part of small contractors to complete tender documents in fear ofbeing non-responsive, and consequently taking the help of others to do this; and, (vi) provision of droppinglenders in one place rather than a number of places, which encouraged collusive bidding and some otherl adverse) social factors".

[A full project assessment by the Borrower is in Annex 8]

cb) Cofinanciers:N4ot Applicable

l'c) Other partners (NGOs/private sector):N.ot Applicable

ILO. Additional Information

The Borrower's assessment of project implementation is attached at Annex 8.

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Annex 1. Key Performance Indicators/Log Frame Matrix

Outcome I Impact Indicators:~~~~~~~~~I - ;- __5!_S_'j- j ,;Jt s|1-2,:e^

-ndlc-atorlMatrx ProjectedInlast PSR ctal..as m.

DO 1: Target area protected from flood due Achieved -an evaluaton repon is prepared byto river erosion on a sustainable basis the Bonfower to qualifylquantify targets.

(a) Erosion bosses prevented at Saroakand- (a) Erosion loss prevented through the (a) achieved-supported and quantified byMathurapara and Sirajganj over an area of construction of lmpinoved river training works GOB evaluation report as issued Inabout 78,000 ha, benefiting a popubtion of at those locatons since Nov 1998/June December 2001.about 125,500 from 1999. 1999.

(b) Regional flood damages behind the (b) Regcnal flood damages behind BRE has (b) achieved-physical works completed underBrahmaputra Right Embankment (BRE) In been minimLzed since 2000 through the project provide the planned protedion toKarotoa-BangaUl rivers system covering an preventing possible merger of the prevent the merger of the rivers, Brahmaputraarea of about 300.000 ha, due to I kely Brahmaputra and the Bangall. wih Bengal.merger of the Bangal and Brahmaputrarivers prevented from 1999.

D02: Govemment capacity built to update Achieved-WARPO Is firmly founded. GOBmulti- sectoral Natonal Water Management high-level support needed to re-organtze andPlan (NWMP) in a participatory manner on a formfalze its status for Inter-agency funcions.regular basis.

(a) Government capacity progressively (a) substantially achieved iWroved GOB-WARPO updates the national water strengthened So far, 27 professional capaciy -WARPO made 5-YearWork Planmanagement plan periodically (possibly every poskion fiHed In against a total of 37. to coordinate, monitor and regulady updatefive years), beginning from 2002. the NWMP

(bj The preparation of NWMP commenced (b) achieved NWMP approved by GOB withfrom March 15,1998. The Draft Final stakeholder inputs In February 2002. HRDevelopment Stategy Report has been capacity was somewhat improved atissued in March 2001 and draft final NWMP WARPO.prepared by November 2001.

DO 3: Fadcitate reumption of agrculture and Agdcuture and econonic activities, disrupted Achieved-Protected lands, improved faclitieseconomic actvites disrupted by the 1998 by 1998 floods, resumed in the affected in 39 schemes and established sense offloods areas of 39 BWDB scshemes. secudty Is promoting increased economic

ac-1t.

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Output Indicators:

Indicator/Matrix ProJected In last PSR ActuaVLaest EstimateD)O 1:Output IndIcator 1.1: Improved iver training SubstantUally completed by November 1998. Achieved-all physical works and assodatedwvork completed at three locations FuDy completed induding repairs to damages safeguard programs fuDy Implemented as(Sadakandi, Mathurapara and SraiganD as at Sirajgarq by June 1999. planned.per design standards.

DO I Link embankment completed. Fish pass Achieved-all aspects of the physicalOutput Indicator 1.2: LInk embankment completed and commissioned. improvements plans have been implementedbetween Kalitola and Mathurapam hnduding a acoording to project plansfish -pass constructed as per designstandards by June 1999.DIO 1 Operational due to current arrangement with Achieved-BWDB spedal O&M UnitOutput Indicator 1.3: BWDBs Spedaized a full time Executive Engineer since estabished and functioning weD under theOperation and Maintenance Unit established December 1999. The Unit is carrying out project. Continued routne budget support isat SiraJgarl with dear Temis of Reference routine surveys and montodring by Its own needed from GOB to provide successfulCrOR). team, whie the annual surveys and analys sewvce delivery.

through speciaRzed agences like EGIS andSWMC under annual contracts. Theprocurement of core maintenance equipmentconsists of two contract padkages -so farone of the contract has been awarded.

DO01 Substantially Achieved -the processingCutput Indicator 1.4(a): 986 EntUled Persons 1.4 (a) Coompensaton and Rehabilitation of con6inues by GOB to resolve 3.5%( EPs) compensated and 399 households EPs at Kaliftola, Saiakandi, Mathurapara and outstanding claims (67 total to providercdocated as per RAP Siraigonj: Intended PEM reparations under items (a).

0) 1843 (98.50%) EPs out of 1865 (b), (c) and (d) lIsted in the adjacent column.compensated; and

(b) 840 EPs compensated and 72 (id aD 351 HHs out of 353 have-beenhouseholds relocated In link embankmentarea by March 31, 1999 (b) Compensaton and RehabUbtation of EPs

for Kalitola -Mathurapara ink embankment

() Total 2102 EPs. out of 2123compensated; and

(il) al 63 entMed HHs relocated(c) Compensation and Rehabitatn of

(c) EPs for fish-pass site:

() Total 434 EPs out of 461 compensated;and

(ii) all 6 entiled HHs relocated

(d) Compensaton and Rehablittion of EPsfor marginal dyke site:

0) Total 273 EPs out of 279 compensated;and

(ii) the one entitled HHs relocatedDO 2: Achieved 4NWMP and National Water.Output Indicator 2.1: National Water Resources data base were delivered withinMa3nagement Plan ( NWMP) prepared reasonable timeRness of the indicatveintegrating muRti-sectoral needs in a milestones/schieduespartcipatory manner by March 2001:

I ea) Incepton report issued in June 1998;(a) Inception report by June 19998

(b) Report on 'Issues for the NWMP issued(bi Issues for the NVMP by March 1999; In May 1999;

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(c) Draft Final Development Strategy Report(c) Dev Strategy by March 2001: issued in March 2001. The report has been

accepted In the Exeacive Committee ofNational Water Resoures Councl(ECNWRC).

(d) Draft NWMP Issued in July2001 for (d) Draft NWMP issued In July2001 forreview and comments; and review and comments.

(e) final NWMP issued by November 2001. (e) draft Final NWMP Issued by November2001.

DO 2 Water Resoures Plaming Orgarizabon Substanially Achleved Intended outputs.Output Indbator 2.2: Water Resouces (WARPO) re-organized and fuly staffed for Falow-on planned by GOB (with GoN) forPlanning Organization (WARPO) oomprehensive water sector planning and more strengthening and capacity bulding tore-orgarized and fuly staffed for future updating, beginning from 2002. fully operabonarize WARPO and 5-Year Plancomprehensive water sedor planning and indudes NWMP updating as normal adivity.future updating, beginning from 2002.DO 3: The overall physical progress of repair/ Achieved Procurement irreguladties haveOutput Indicator 3.1: Flood control, drainage rehabiDltaon works in 39 subprojects is about been investgated and cancelation of aboutand tirgatbon infrastructure in 39 subprojects 95%. Repair works under 259 contracts are US$2.0 milion is proposed from the Creditrepaired and rehabilitated by June 2001. fully complete, out of total 321. Most of the Misprocurement acoounted for about 2% of

remaing works are expected to be total project Investment costcompleted by November 30, 2001.

End of project

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Annex 2. Project Costs and Financing

lroject Cost by Component (in US$ million equivalent)Appraisal Actual/Latest Percentage ofEstimate Estimate Appraisal

Project Cost By Component. US$ million US$ million1. River Bank Protection 126.70 156.60 1242.National Water Planning / Institutional Building and 7.90 9.40 119Strengthening3. 1998 Flood Emergency Rehabilitation Work 0.00 26.004. Preparation of RBPP II 0.00

rotal Baseline Cost 134.60 192.00Physical Contingencies 16.20 0.00 0Price Contingencies 5.20 0.00

Total Project Costs 156.00 192.00Total Financing Required 156.00 192.00

Ref: MOP (March 22,1999), Schedule A, Page I of 2.

FProject Costs by Procurement Arrangements (Appraisal Estimate) (US$ million equivalent) __._.

Expenditure Category!ICB Procurement MethodExpenditure Category ICB NCB Other2 N.B.F. Total Cost

11. Works 120.20 3.70 3.80 0.00 127.70(99.80) (2.20) (0.80) (0.00) (102.80)

2. Goods 8.90 0.40 0.10 0.00 9.40(3.90) (0.10) (0.00) (0.00) (4.00)

3. Services 0.00 0.00 13.60 0.00 13.60(0.00) (0.00) (13.60) (0.00) (13.60)

41. Miscellaneous 0.00 0.00 0.20 0.00 0.20

Overseas Training (0.00) (0.00) (0.20) (0.00) (0.20)5. Miscellaneous 0.00 0.00 5.10 0.00 5.10- GOB Project Management (0.00) (0.00) (1.30) (0.00) (1.30)6. Miscellaneous 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00

______________________ (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)Total 129.10 4.10 22.80 0.00 156.00

_ (103.70) (2.30) (15.90) (0.00) (121.90)Ref: SAR (November 10, 1995), Page 29, Table 2.3

17 -

Project Costs by Procurement Arrangements (Actual/Latest Estimate) (US$ million equival nt)

Procurement Method.Exenditure Category ICB NC Oth 2 N.B.F. Total Cost

1. Works 131.02 42.47 0.00 0.00 173.49

(124.85) (11.77) (0.00) (0.00) (136.62)2. Goods 2.02 1.51 0.00 0.00 3.53

(1.17) (0.93) (0.00) (0.00) (2.10)3. Services 0.00 0.00 14.98 0.00 14.98

(0.00) (0.00) (10.48) (0.00) (10.48)4. Miscellaneous 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00

Overseas Training (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)

5. Miscellaneous 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00- GOB Project Management (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)

6. Miscellaneous 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)

Total 133.04 43.98 14.98 0.00 192.00

_ (126.02) (12.70) (10.48) (0.00) (149.20)Ref: SAP Procurement Summary Report and MOP (March 22,1999), Schedule B, Page I of 2.. IDAfinancing has been adjusted for about US$2.80 million, cancelled due to misprocurement (see Section 5.4).

" Figures in parenthesis are the amounts to be financed by the IDA Credit. All costs include contingencies.2 Includes civil works and goods to be procured through national shopping, consulting services, services of contracted staff

of the project management office, training, technical assistance services, and incremental operating costs related to (i)managing the project, and (ii) re-lending project funds to local govemment units.

Project Financing by Component (n USmillion equivalent)nnt (in US$ n Percentage of Appraisal

Component Appraisal Estimate Actual/Latest Estimate -

. A WGovt CoF. Bank Giom CoF. Bank Govt. CoF.1. Rlver Bank Protecdon 114.50 32.90 128.70 7.02 112.4 21.32.Natlonal Water Planning 7.40 1.20 7.80 1.60 105.4 133.3/ Institutdonal Building andStrengthening3.1998 Flood Emergency 12.70 34.18RehabDitation Work4. Preparation of RBPP II 0.00 0.00Total 121.90 34.10 149.20 42.80 122.4 125.5

Ref: MOP (March 22,1999), Schedule A, Page 2 of 2.The IDA Credit for RBPP increased to SDR 111.2 million (US$ 166.9 million in 1995 terms and US$ 152million in 1999 terms). The conversion considered financial adjustment for the fluctuating SDRtUS$exchange rates. Full amount of US$149.20 million, available balance after canceling about US$2.8 milliondue to misprocurement, is estimated to be disbursed (Section 5.4).

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Annex 3. Economic Costs and Benefits

River Bank Protection ProjectProject ID: P009545 IDA Credit 27910/27911

Economic Evaluation

1. The ICR Mission re-evaluated the project economics on the basis of the latest project data atproject completion and data available from the National Water Management Plan (NWM) economic,tudies, an impact survey -carried out by EGIS in October-November 2001 and recent national economic:statistics. As in the SAR, separate analysis were undertaken for the two largest project activities in costterms, the Sariakandi /Mathurapara and Sirajganj river bank protection works sub-projects. Other than the3AR, the Tables 1-19 cited in Annex 3 are referenced as the ICR Mission Economic Analysis Tables in

Annex 7. Together these account for about 78% of the total project costs. Based on Tables 1, 2 and 19i'ound in the ICR Mission Economic Analysis Tables (ref. Annex 7), the results of the analysis are shownas follows (SAR values in brackets, 1996 taken as Year 1);

Proiect Portion EIRR NPV a, 12% (1998/99 prices)% (Tk million) (US$ million)

Sariakandi/Mathurapara 15.2 504 10.4

(35) (1615) (21.6)

Sirajganj 16.6 448 9.2

(45) (869) (40.6)

Total 15.8 952 19.6(39) (248) (62.2)

:!. As far as possible, the re-analysis followed the methodology and approach adopted in the SARXnalysis. There are, however, significant differences between the two analyses, as follows:

* The final cost of the Sirajganj sub-project is some 30% above appraisal estimates(US$86.4M as compared to the US$66.2M in SAR Annex 6), due mainly to the Tk. 755million cost (Tk. 719M base cost plus, for economic analysis purposes, 5% for engineeringand administration and miscellaneous costs; the dollar equivalent at the 1998/99 exchangerate is US$15.6M) of the works required to repair the damage to the Sirajganj hard pointwhich occurred in the 1998 flood.

* Costs and benefits have been updated to a 1998/99 constant price basis, using BangladeshBureau of Statistics (BBS) national indices and the crop economic prices and net retumscalculated in the NWMP detailed economic studies. The BBS 1998/99 Annual StatisticalYearbook is the latest one available.

* Values of the land, property and infrastructure assets protected by the two sub-projectshave been updated on the basis of the EGIS current asset price data collected from the twosub-project benefit areas in October-November 2001; these were then converted onto a1998/99 price basis.

* The areas of crop protected from flooding by the Sariakandi/Mathurapara sub-projecthave been changed from the SAR figures on the basis of estimates provided by theDepartment of Agricultural.Extension (DAE).

* In converting values from financial to economnic prices the revised Standard Conversion

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Factor (SCF) and other input and output conversion factors developed in March 1998 forwater resource projects by Q. Shahabuddin and I.A. Syed were applied, as for the NWMPstudies. Differences between the 1998 factors and the factors applied in the SAR analysisare comparatively small.For both sub-projects the benefits have been assumed to start in project year 3, incomparison with the Year 1 start assumed in the SAR. With construction commencing in1996, Year 3 was 1998, an exceptionally high flood year. By June 1998 both sub-projectswere virtually complete, and provided valuable protection, and thus benefits, in the July toSeptember 1998 flood period. Although the Sirajganj hard point suffered serious damage,it was still able to fulfil its protection function. Without it, erosion damage to Sirajganjcould have been severe. In the 1996 and 1997 flood seasons, however, construction wasinsufficiently far advanced to provide effective protection.

3. Sub-project benefits comprise the avoidance of the losses (erosion) of land, property andinfrastructure, crop production and employment, which would otherwise occur if the riverbank protectionworks had not been undertaken (i.e. in the 'without project' (WOP) situation). The basic aim is thus topreserve/protect the sub-project areas' existing physical asset base rather than to change it. In thesecircumstances benefit monitoring has little relevance; implementation of the works has prevented thedamage and losses that would otherwise occur and would provide the only reliable basis for quantifjingbenefits, using actual observations and measured data rather than predictions and hypotheses. Updating bythe ICR of the SAR physical parameters on the basis of observed data from project impact monitoring inthe implementation period is therefore not feasible. For the ICR re-analysis the SAR physical parametershave thus been used.

4. An important qualification to the ICR re-analysis is that, as in the SAR, account has not beentaken of possible benefits of the RBPP to the Jamuna Multi-purpose Bridge (JMB). The Sirajganjhardpoint is only some 6km upstream of the western end of the bridge, and the JMB Authority is alreadymaintaining the riverbank protection works from the bridge up to the downstream end of the Sirajganjhardpoint. Without the hardpoint, the Jamuna could possibly break through its right bank at Sirajganj andbypass the bridge. If so, the hardpoint had had to be constructed anyway, as part of the JMB Project, andits economic justification would be assured by the fact that it would be essential for the bridge's integrity.

5. Tables 1 and 2 in the economic analysis reference document (ref. Annex7-ICR Mission EconomicAnalysis Tables) summarize the economic analyses of the Sariakandi/Mathurapara and Sirajganjsub-projects and Table 3 to 18 show the supporting detailed calculations. For comparison purposes thesections below describe the re-analysis, following the same headings as the SAR as far as possible.

A. Proiect Benefits

6. As stated in SAR Annex 8: Economic Analysis, the project benefits are the damages and avoidedby preventing riverbank erosion. These damages arise out of land loss to erosion and local and regionalflooding as a result of breaches of the BRE (Brahmaputra Right Embankment) and of a merger of theBangali and Brahmaputra rivers. Erosion losses include the agricultural production foregone fromdestruction of agricultural and urban land and the loss of private property and public infrastructure onflooded land. The flood damages consist of: (a) total loss of crops, livestock, property and infrastructurenear a BRE breach at a given location; (b) partial damage to crops, property and infrastructure in theflooded area behind a BRE breach; (c) partial damage to crops, property and infrastructure in theincremental area of about l0O,OOOha of the Karatoa-Bangali-Ichimati river system floodplain, which would

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be subject to flooding hazards due to perennial augmentation of Bangali river flow when the Bangali riverchannel would become a distributary river of the Brahmaputra; and (d) savings in construction costs oflocal BRE retirements at locations where potential BRE breaches are prevented by the project.

7. In addition to possible JMB benefits, certain other benefits could not be quantified because of lackof data. The crop, property and infrastructure damage that might be caused by deeper flooding of the200,000ha area of the Karatoa-Bangali-Ichimati rivers' floodplain, presently vulnerable to periodicflooding, was not quantified. The losses due to disruptions of road and rail traffic during flooding of thetransportation network could not be calculated, nor could the losses attributable to disincentives to privateinvestment in and around the flooded area. Benefits from the new fish pass in the BRE in theSariakandi/Mathurapara sub-project and from the 25ha of new land created at Sirajganj would be too smallto significantly affect overall benefit values.

8. Though non-quantifiable in economic terms, social benefits would be high. Bank erosion causessevere distress and social disruption, as dwellings, agricultural and urban land and other assets are sweptaway and the local inhabitants are forced to relocate. Avoidance of such adverse social impacts can beregarded as a major benefit of the project.

B. Erosion Prevention Benefits

9. Land Losses: Based on the SAR assumptions, in the WOP situation 50% of the urban land inSirajganj would be lost in the first five years of benefits, together with the built-up area (Upazila HQ) ofSariakandi. Thereafter the land losses would be predominantly rural. The SAR benefit values have beenadjusted on the basis of the EGIS field survey data and the conversion from 1994 prices (the presumedSAR price basis) to a 1998/99-price basis. Allowance has not been made for the value of the additionalland accreted elsewhere as a result of the WOP crosion, because accreted land is worth so much less thaneroded land, being completely undeveloped. Land values are based on market (financial) prices, adjusted bythe SCF (Standard Conversion Factor).

10. Property and Infrastructure Losses: The property and infrastructure benefits given in Table 4 ofSAR Annex 8, increased by 24.8% to take account of the rise in construction costs between 1994 and1998/99, as reported in the BBS Construction Cost Index (Building), and adjusted by the slightly differenteconomic conversion factors applied in this ICR. Following the SAR assumptions, losses would be highestin the first five benefit years (Years 3 to 7). Immediately thereafter they would be much lower, but wouldgrow at a rate of 5% per annum (in real terms) until the end of the analysis period (Year 30). Since theearly 1990s Bangladesh's economic growth rate has averaged around 5%, and expectations are that thiswill increase somewhat in the future. As the economy grows, so will the stock of property, infrastructureand other assets at risk from erosion and flooding. No such increase has been assumed for agriculturalbenefits. Comparison of crop returns per hectare between the SAR estimates, which date originally fromthe early 1990s, and the NWMP values applied in this ICR, show a 14% reduction in economic returns perhectare. This is presumably a result of worsening terms of trade for agriculture within the Bangladesheconomy. Under these circumstances it would be imprudent to predict increasing net agricultural returnsover time.

11. Employment Losses: Destruction of buildings through erosion would cause a temporary loss ofemployment. The ICR valuation of the benefits from preventing such employment losses has followed thatof the SAR, but with a 26% increase to 1998/99 price levels, based on the change in the BBS BangladeshNominal Wage Index between 1994/95 and 1998/99, and the application of the revised SCF of 0.90.

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C. BRE Breach Losses Avoided

12. As described in the SAR, the benefits in the form of damage avoidance from BRE breaches consistof the damages near the breach caused by sudden flooding, and damages beyond the breach where there isdeep and prolonged inundation. Near the breach damages consist of crops, livestock, property andinfrastructure lost or destroyed when the breach occurs, and reduction of soil productivity for several yearsdue to sand deposition as the flood recedes. Each damage near the breach was evaluated separately, asdescribed in the SAR. Regional flood damage evaluation is described in Section D, together with theevaluation of regional flood damages caused by a merger of the Brahmaputra and Bangali rivers.

13. Without the project, it would be impossible to retire the BRE at Sariakandi/ Mathuraparafollowing its imminent breach in the first benefit year. Any retirement would be subject to an immediatebreach by ongoing erosion, as the Bangali River, in effect, acts as a physical boundary for any retirementSince resources would not be wasted on retirements, the BRE's hinterland would be subject to regularannual flooding from the open breach. This would continue for several years until the land between theBangali and the Brahmaputra would be eroded and a merger occurs, resulting in exacerbated regionalflooding in subsequent years. At Sirajganj, the BRE was assumed to be breached in the first benefit year,causing severe damage to the town. Since the BRE would have to be retired behind the town, the townwould be exposed to regular annual flooding. For the agricultural areas of Sirajganj, it was assumed thatbreaches would occur at intervals in the 30-year analysis period.

14. These various assumptions have been adopted for the ICR, but with the values in Table 6 of SARAnnex 8 being increased by the 24.8% rise in the Construction Cost Index and the livestock values beingincreased on the basis of the EGIS survey data.

15. Crop Losses: In the severely affected areas near a breach, a total WOP loss of one year's cropwas assumed in the SAR, with 320ha and lOOha being affected at Sariakandi/Mathurapara and Sirajganjrespectively. Partial crop losses due to reduced output resulting from sand deposition near the breacheswould occur. In the analysis the SAR values were applied, but with the SAR benefits (crop losses avoided)per hectare being reduced by 14%, the ratio between the recalculated crop net economic returns in and theequivalent figure in Table 10 of SAR Annex 8.

16. Livestock Losses: Significant losses of livestock normally occur in areas severely affected by aBRE breach. The livestock numbers applied are the SAR figures and the values per head are from theEGIS field survey, deflated to 1998/99 price levels.

17. Property and Infrastructure Losses: Property and infrastructure losses resulting from a BREbreach are the SAR values in Table 6 of SAR Annex 8, adjusted by the change in the Construction CostIndex.

18. Losses due to BRE Retirements at Sirajganj: In the SAR the project was assumed to save thecosts of five BRE retirements at Sirajganj over a 30 year period, assuming that those retirements wouldoccur without the project. About 2.5 km of embankment would be constructed each year for a period ofthree years following each breach. An area between 150 ha and 60 ha was expected to remain unprotectedeach year as a result of each retirement Flooding on the river side of the BRE would cause the average neteconomic return in this area to be substantially reduced, as the cropping pattern would shift to lower-value

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crops and cropping intensity would fall. The SAR benefit estimates have been revised on the same basis asthe various benefits discussed above.

D. Reaional Flood Losses Prevented

19. Breaching of the BRE at Sariakandi/Mathurapara and Sirajganj causes augmentation of flooding inthe Karatoa-Bangali-Ichimati river system. The maximum impact would be caused by breaches atSariakandi, which result in deeper regional flooding in the above floodplain as well as incremental floodingof areas normally protected by the BRE. This impact was expected to be an annual occurrence, because theexpected breach at Sariakandi would not be repaired. After about five years, when erosion has resulted in amerger of the Bangali and Brahmaputra rivers, deeper regional flooding and a larger incremental areainundated would result.

20. Crop Damage: In order to derive a probability distribution of the incremental area flooded,detailed mathematical modeling work was carried out in the Brahmaputra River Training Studies in the1990s. The areas assumed to be flooded in different flood events and flood return periods are those shownin Table 8 of SAR Annex 8

21. Production Losses Caused by Cropping Pattern Changes: Another possible production loss isthe effect of flooding on cropping systems. Most of the agricultural flood control benefits of the BRE resultfrom expansion of HYV transplanted Aman paddy in the monsoon season, replacing flood-tolerant but lowyielding broadcast Aman or a mixture of broadcast Aus and Aman. With continued flooding, farmerswould revert to the lower-yielding cropping pattern. The ICR benefit calculations have been based on thecrop areas provided by DAE and crop economic data from the NWMP economics studies.

22. Property and Infrastructure Damage Avoided: Floods of the magnitude of those of 1987 and1988 can cause extensive damage to property and infrastructure, although the effects of flooding in mostyears are minimal. For the ICR analysis the SAR financial damage value of Tk226/ha was adjusted onto a1998/99 price basis using the Construction Cost Index and was then converted to economic values bymeans of the SCF of 0.90.

E. Canital and O&M Costs

23. Capital Cost of Project Works: The final capital costs of the two sub-projects are based on theexpenditures actually incurred, expressed in 1998/99 US dollars; these were converted to local currencyvalues at the prevailing 1998/99 exchange rate of Tk 48.5/US$. Total costs at financial prices wereUS$55.5M (Tk.3,308M) for Sariakandi/Mathurapara and US$86.4M (Tk 4,190M) for Sirajganj, the totalfor the riverbank protection component as a whole thus being US$141.9M (Tk 7,498M) in 1998/99 prices.This compares with the total of US$146.8M (a base cost of US$126.7M plus 15.9% physical and pricecontingencies) or Tk 5,895M, which can be derived from SAR Table 2.1; the latter figures are at 1994/95prices and exchange rates, so are not directly comparable. However, using the Bangladesh GDP Deflator totake account of Taka inflation since 1994/95, the 1998/99 equivalent of the SAR Taka cost of Tk 5,895M-would be Tk 7,123M. On this basis the final Taka capital cost of Tk 7,498M is only 5% above appraisalestimates. The Sariakandi/Mathurapara costs were incurred over three years whereas Sirajganj costs wereincurred over four years, because the repairs were not completed until 1999. The above figures are at

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financial prices. They were converted to econonic prices using the conversion factors adopted in theNWMP.

24. O&M Costs: It is not possible to predict the precise level and timing of future O&M costs,because of uncertainties concerning possible future flood damage and the repairs that would be required.For analysis purposes the assumption made is that average O&M costs per annum are normally equivalentto 1% of capital costs but that in every tenth year (Years 10, 20 and 30) major repairs and othermaintenance work will be required, total O&M costs in that year being equivalent to 50/oof the capital cost

F. Economic Analysis

25. The analytical summary and detailed computations are presented in Tables 1, 2 and 3 to 18 of theICR Economic Analysis Tables, referenced in Annex 7. The results of the ICR analysis summaized inparagraph 1 of this Annex.3 are discussed in the followirg paragraphs.

26. The re-estimated EIRRs of 17% for Sirajganj, 15% for Sariakandi/Mathurapara and 16% for thetwo sub-projects together are much lower than the respective SAR figures of 45%, 35% and 39%. Thesame is true of the re-estimated net present values (NPVs) of US$9M, US$lOM and US$20M incomparison with the considerably higher SAR NPVs of US$21.6M, US$40.6M and US$62.2M. The mainreasons for the lower ICR returns are the assunption that benefits would start two years later, the costincrease at Sirajganj and the reduction in agricultural benefit values since appraisal. SAR crop prices andreturns were based on values prevailing in thc early 1990s. Since that time the terms of trade have movedagainst the crop sector and, in particular, paddy prices have stagnated or fallen, as Bangladesh has reachedand then maintained virtual self-sufficiency in rice. At present there appears to be little reason for thissituation to change in the near future. The two-year delay assumed for benefits in this ICR analysis alsohas a very marked impact on economic performance. For example, taking the SAR cost and return figures,a two-year benefit delay reduces the overall SAR EIRR from 39%/o to 17%.

27. Nevertheless, both sub-projects are still economically viable, with EIRRs above the 12%Bangladesh opportunity cost of capital. One risk to their future performance is, however, that ofmaintenance costs being higher than predicted as a result of higher than expected erosion, scour and otherdamage to the bank protection works. In the three monsoon seasons since completion of the works in 1999no major damage has occurre. If, however, it were to become a problem in the future, with the averageannual O&M cost throughout the project life rising threefold, from the 'base case' average of TK 75 M at1998/99 prices in most years to as much as 3% of capital costs, or Tk 225M (US$4.6M), per annum, theoverall EIRR would still be a satisfactory 12.0%.

29. With the rapid urban and economic development now taking place in and around Sirajganj, dueespecially to the improved transport communications resulting from the opening of the Jamuna Bridge in1998, and the high degree of vulnerability to erosion of this stretch of the river bank, the risk of Sirajganjbenefits being much lower than assumed in the analysis is small. Apart from a certain amount ofagricultural land loss, virtually all the Sirajganj benefits are non-agricultural. These are easier to predictwith some confidence than are the likely losses from flooding in the 'without project' situation. Most of theSariakandi/Mathurapara benefits, on the other hand, are agricultural, largely from the prevention of thedamage from the increased regional flooding which is assumed to result if the sub-project were not builtand a possible merger of the Brahmaputra and the Bangali rivers were not thereby prevented.

30. As explained in SAR Annex 8, estimation of the flood damage (and thus the benefits from avoiding

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such damage) resulting from such a merger required detailing modeling work and a number of assumptionsto be made concerning flood i equency, timing, depth and duration and the effects of flooding on cropyields and cropping patterns. -The resultant benefit estimate is thus unavoidably prone to uncertainty. Inrecognition of this problem, sensitivity tests were done with Sariakandi/Mathurapara regional flood damageavoidance benefits 20% and 40% below the base case level. The EIRRs would then fall to 12.5% and9.5%.

31. An analysis was also made of what the Sirajganj EIRR would have been if the 1998 flood damagehad not occurred and the subsequent major repairs had not been necessary. In this case the EIRR wouldhave been some 5% higher, at 21%.

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Annex 4. Bank Inputs

(a) Missions:Stage of Project Cycle No. of Persons and Specialty Performance Rating,

(e.g. 2 Economists, 1 FMS, etc.) Implementation DevelopmentMonth/Year Count Specialty Progress Objective

Identification/PreparationFY90 I IEFY91 4 WRS, IEs, SSFY92 7 WRS, lEs, EC, OP, SS, AG

Appraisal/Negotiation07/92/ Appraisal 7 WRS, TEs, EC, OP, SSFY94/Appraisal 13 WRS, lEs, EC, OP, SSFY95/ Appraisal 13 WRS, EEs, EC, OP, SS, EVFY96/Appraisal 6 EC, lEs, OP,08/95/ Negotiation 10 AGs, lEs, OP, SS

Supervision05/96/ PSR#I I IE (Initial Summary) S S05/96/ PSR#2 I lE (Update) S S09/96/ PSR#3 7 WRS, [Es, EC, SS, FMS S S02/97/ PSR#4 3 IEs, SS. S S06/97/ PSR#5 I IE ( Update only) S S08/97/ PSR#6 4 IE, SS and FMSs. S S04/98/ PSR#7 6 [Es, SS, PR, FMSs. S S08/98/ PSR#8 5 [Es, SS, EC, FMS. S S11/98/ PSR#9 4 LEs, EC, FA. S S06/99/ PSR#10 I IE (Follow-up review) S S01/2000/ PSR#I 1 6 [Es, SS, PR, FMSs. S S06/2000/ PSR#12 9 WRS, EV, IES, SS, PR, FMSs, S S

TA.10/2000/ PSR#13 I E ( Update only) S S

12/2000/ PSR#14 8 AG, EC, IES, SS, PR, FMSs. S S

06/01/ PSR#15 1 E (Update only) S S07/01/ PSR#16 6 AG, IE, SS, I PR, FMSs. S S

ICR11/2001 3 WRS, EC of FAO/CPO), IE S S

(WB)

AG - Agriculturist, DB - Disbursement, EC - Economist, EO - Ecologist, EV -Environment, FA -Financial Analyst, FMS -FinancialManagement Specialist, IE - Irrigation Engineer, LC - Legal Counsel, OP - Operations, PR - Procurement, SS - SocialScientist, TA - Team Assistant,WRS - Water Resources Specialist

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(b) Staff:

Stage of Project Cycle ActualLataest Estimate__No. Staff weeks US$ ('000)

Identification/Preparation 63 178Appraisal/Negotiation 178 463Supervision 307 574ICR 9 44Total 557 1259

Staff Weeks and costs are as of May 31, 2602.

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Annex 5. Ratings for Achievement of Objectives/Outputs of Components

(H=High, SU=Substantial, M=Modest, N=Negligible, NA=Not Applicable)Rating

O Macro policies O H OSUOM O N O NAF Sector Policies OH *SUOM QN O NAO Physical O H *SUOM O N O NAO Financial O H OSU*M O N O NAO Institutional Development 0 H O SUO M 0 N 0 NAOEnvironmental O H * SU O M O N O NA

SocialFS Poverty Reduction O H OSUOM O N O NAOGender OH OSUOM ON *NAO Other (Please specify) OH *SUOM ON O NASocial impacts related to resettlement and

RAP, EMP and PEMF Private sector development 0 H O SUO M 0 N 0 NAO Public sector management 0 H O SU O M 0 N 0 NA

OOther (Please specify) O H OSUOM O N * NA

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Annex 6. Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance

(HS=Highly Satisfactory, S=Satisfactory, U=Unsatisfactory, HUU=Highly Unsatisfactory)

6.1 Bank performance Rating

0 Lending OHSOS Ou OHUF Supervision OHS OS O u O HUZ Overall OHS OS OU OHU

6.2 Borrowerperformance Rating

iZ Preparation OHS OS O u O HUI Government implementation performance O HS 0 S 0 U 0 HUIZ Implementation agency performance O HS Os 0 U 0 HU1 Overall OHS OS 0 u O HU

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Annex 7. List of Supporting Documents

1. Supervision Reports, including Form 590 and PSR from 1996-20012. QAG Reports on Supervision Quality (1998, 2000)3. Project Staff Appraisal Report dated November 10, 19954. Development Credit Agreement dated December 21, 1995 and subsequent amendments.5. Memorandum of the President of IDA to the Executive Directors (November 13, 1995)6. Memorandum of the President of IDA to the Executive Directors (March 22, 1999)7. BWDB's Implementation Completion Report - Flood Damage Rehabilitation component (December

2001)8. BWDB's Implementation Completion Report - River Training component (March 2002).9. WARPO's Implementation Completion Report for NWMP component (March 2002)

10. ICR Mission Economic Analysis Tables 1-19.

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Additional Annex 8.Summary of Borrower's Contribution to the ICR (BWDB Works)

Background:

1. River bank erosion is a persistent hazard faced by the landowners, cultivators, and populationliving adjacent to rivers. Such erosion leads to collapse of the river bank over stretches of several hundredmeters at a time. Along the Brahmaputra River, these erosion rates average about 100 meters each year,but sometimes increase to as high as 800 meters in a year of high floods. Such erosion has significanteconomic and social impacts. Fertile land is lost; and buildings, major bridges, embankments, ferryterminals for riverbank towns and other essential infrastructure are damaged, often resulting in landlessnessand impoverishment for thousands of households.

2. The 1998 floods were of unprecedented magnitude and durationr, which inundated two thirds of thecountry, affected some 30 million people and caused over 1,100 deaths. They also severely damaged anestimated 15,000 kilometers of roads, 14,000 schools, hundreds of bridges and culverts and close to500,000 homes. Damage of flood control, drainage and irrigation infrastructure as assessed by theConsultants is also enormous - about 2986 km of embankment, 1031 nos. water control structures, 186 kmof erosion protection works. The floods had a substantiaUy adverse impact on economic growth in 1998/99.

Project Objective

3. The project's principal objective was to prevent the erosion of riparian land at two locations on thewest bank of the Brahmaputra by the construction and maintenance of improved river-bank protectionworks which would: (a) protect Sirajganj town's built-up and semi-urban areas from major damage andcumulative destruction; and (b) prevent the merger of the Brahmaputra and Bangali Rivers in the vicinity ofSariakandi and consequential increased regional flooding.

4. Additional objectives being supported by the Supplementaiy Credit were to assist in: (a)resumption of agricultural and economic activities disrupted by the 1998 floods through repair andre-construction of flood damaged water control, drainage and irrigation infrastructure; and (b) preparationof a program to extend river bank protection works to other critical areas along Bangladesh's river system.

'Project Component with Costs

.5. Projects components and their costs are shown in the following Table under Original and Revisedc.olumns. This includes NWMF Component:

Si. Components Amount in USs en uivalentNo. Original Revised

1. River Traininig/Civil Works 133,100,000 143,900,0002 River Training/Operation & Maintenance 12,300,000 9,200,0003 River Training/Resettlement 2,100,000 1,500,000

National Water Plan/NWMP and WORPO Strengthening 8,500,000 9,400,0005 Floods Rehab./Flood Damage Repairs 26,000,0006 River Training/Consultants Services For Preparation Of Follow-Up ProjectVTA 2,000,000

Total (US$) 156,000,000 192,000,000

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Implementation Arrangements

6. River Training. Component: The responsibility for civil works construction and O&M activitieswas with BWDB's Additional Director General (former Member) Inplementation and Additional DirectorGeneral (O&M) respectively. A project Director, with the rank of the Project Director/Additional ChiefEngineer established a project Office at Bogra for the entire project period. Two Executive Engineersassigned to the construction sites at Sariakandi and Sirajganj assisted the Project Director/Chief Engineer.Executive responsibilities for establishment and subsequent operation of the O&M Unit for river bankprotection works was with the Chief Engineer, North-Western Zone at Rajshahi. The supervision of O&MUnit was delegated to the Superintending Engineer at Bogra O&M Circle. The Unit's management wasunder the Executive Engineer BRE (Specialized) O&M Division located at Sirajganj. The DeputyDirector (Resettlement) within the Project Management and Resettlement Unit (PMRU) was responsible formanaging the resettlement and rehabilitation program. The cental PMRU was located at Bogra with twosite offices at Sariakandi and Sirajganj. For RAP implementation, the implementation consultants and theirassociate NGO assisted the PMRU.

7. Flood Rehabilitation Component: For rehabilitation of schemes damaged by 1998 floods, theDirector, PMU- Cluster Project, BWDB (former Superintending Engineer, Monitoring -1, BWDB) wasresponsible for monitoring and coordinating the activities under the overall guidance of the AdditionalDirector General (former Member Operation and Maintenance) of BWDB. The Executive Engineers whohave jurisdiction over the BWDB Divisions in which the schemes are located carried out the rehabilitationof schemes.

Implementation Experiences:

8. River Training Component: The implementation of the physical works under this component canbe considered satisfactory. All of the physical components were substantially completed by June 1998.Compared to the contractually stipulated completion dates, this was about five months ahead of schedule.Considering that the Brahmaputra is a braided and turbulent river with very large seasonal fluctuations inwater levels, it is remarkable that the construction of the revetment works could be completed in twoconstruction seasons. The technical difficulty of executing the physical components of the project wasfurther compounded by a very short working season (about 6 months) and by very tight contractualcompletion dates.

9. One of the key success factors in implementing the major civil works of the project was that thedesign, engineering, most of the land acquisition, procurement of contractors, and selection of supervisionconsultant had been substantially completed by Credit effectiveness. Furthermore, InternationalCompetitive Bidding (ICB) together with the application of strict pre-qualification (PQ) criteria succeededin attracting highly qualified international contractors to the bidding process. This enabled GOB to procureinternationally experienced contractors to execute the civil works contracts.

10. Although the construction schedule was tight, the overall construction quality of the two contractsis close to international standards and far superior to the usual standards achieved in Bangladesh. Theriding quality of the dredge fill earthwork and concrete blocks is excellent. There were a number ofconstruction-related issues that arose during implementation such as: (a) underwater subsoil problemswhich led to slope failures in the river training works; (c) redesign of Sirajganj protection works; (d) 1998flood damage to the completed river training works at Sirajganj. All of the construction related issues weresuccessfully resolved.

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11. Resettlement Action and Environmental Management Plans. The implementation of the socialand environmental components of the project can be deemed satisfactory despite few initial teethingproblems. To implement this component about 120 hectares of land were acquired, of which 37.70hectares are government owned (khas). In total 3236 persons were affected to varying degrees in terms ofloss of land and income by its implementation and 3209 of them (99.1%) has been fully compensated. Intotal 421 Homestead were affected and all of those have been relocated. It must also be stressed that it wasthe first time that BWDB has implemented the RAP for such a project. Therefore, the implementation ofthe RAP broke new ground and was a learning experience for all parties involved. This was largelysuccessful, but that there have been significant implementations difficulties, concerns have also been raisedrelated to governance issues.

12. To mitigate the environmental impacts of the project, an EMP was developed for implementationduring the life of the project. Some of the social/environental mitigation measures identified in the EMAPand implemented under the project were: (a) reduction of construction related impacts; by usingenvironmental friendly constructions materials (b) fisheries mitigation through a fish-pass in the 6 km linkembankment at Mathurapara; (c) health and sanitation (d) establishment of a riverside park for recreationalfacilities along Sirajganj Hard Point's free space and (e) Tree planted along the river side over the earthenembankment of hard point and over the link B'tE.

13. Flood Rehabilitation Component: The project was originally scheduled to be implemented in twophases: (i) emergency works to be completed before 1999 monsoon; and (ii) rehabilitation of other works toits pre-1998 flood condition. But the phases were not taken into consideration during implementation, asall the works were felt necessary to be executed as early as possible. The supervision consultantscommenced their services on March 15,1999. Overall 100% progress was achieved by December 31, 2001and repairs completed in all 39 schemes.

Major factors affecting the Project Implementation

14. River Training Component: Implementation of the major civil works components was impededdue to the following main reasons:

1998 Flood: The works at Sariakandi & Mathurapara (Contract Bl) was completed by the Contractor byJune 1998 and were handed over to BWDB in phases between July to September. The Hard Point atSirajganj (Contract B2) scheduled to be completed by November 1998 were nearing completion whendamage occurred to the revetment during the 1998 floods. However, the repairs were completedsuccessfully by June 1999. Had there been no flood damage during 1998 flood, the work could becompleted as scheduled.

15. Flood Rehabilitation Component: The project implementation was hampered initially in thetbendering process. Introduction of NCB documents by World Bank could not be followed properly by'BWDB, which resulted in re-tendering and in some cases led to mis-procurement of some packages.

16. Very Small Size of Contracts: In most cases, the contract sizes were very small as is the practicewith BWDB resulting in 321 nos. of contracts. The average contract value was only about Tk. 3.6 million(US$66,800) and more than 96% of the contract value was less than Tk.10.0 million (US $200,000). Thecontract administration of this huge number of contracts was a difficult task including their implementationand monitoring. Justification for small contracts may be that the BWDB projects are labor intensive andnot located in a contiguous way.

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17. Payment to the Contractor Although the works were scattered all over the country, the paymentswere made through a single pay office, located in one place at Bogra and that too not in a central location.Payment procedure was also very cumbersome. Bills prepared in the field were to be certified by BWDBand Consultant Then those were sent to Regional Accounting Centre (RAC) at Bogra for payment of GOBshare and advising Bangladesh Bank for payment from Special Account Then, RAC prepared and sent thereimbursement application to Executive Engineer (EE) of the respective Divisions, EE to Consultants,Consultants to PD, RBPP and lastly, PD, RBPP to the World Bank. All these offices are located atdifferent places.

Outcome of the Project:

18. River Training Component lhe construction of improved river training works atSariakandi-Mathurapara and Sirajganj helped to prevent losses from river erosion since 1998, which wasalmost an regular phenomena in the past before these improved river-bank protection works were builtThe completion of the protective works in 1998 has prevented the merger of Bangali and Brahmaputrarivers in the vicinity of Sariakandi and regional flood damages behind the Brahmaputra Right Embankment(BRE) in the Karotoa-Bangali rivers system. Construction of fish-pass structure also served the purposeto mitigate declining flood plain fisheries behind the Brahmaputra Right Embankment (BRE) throughseasonal fish migration. The project has produced positive impact on the area in term of growth inagricultural production, income and employment opportunity.

19. Flood Rehabilitation Component: From technical point of view, performances of the restorationworks are found to be satisfactory except for a few locations, such as Chandpur, Kumarkhali, Bagerhat,and Manu. Bank protection works of Chandpur Irrigation Scheme (all 12 contract packages) includingsubstantial emergency works have failed completely. Economic impact of the repair works has beenassessed in 6 representative schemes out of total 39. The pre-project conditions have been restored in allthe sub-projects. Flood protection goal of the concerned areas have been achieved. Homestead, crops andproperties are safe and commercial activities have been restored.

Sustainability:

20. River Training Component. Under BWDB's river training component, the protection works at twolocations (so called "hard points" at Sariakandi-Mathurapara and Sirajganj) have been fully completed to ahigh constructions standard by international contractors. All these works were substantially completed byJune 1998. The exceptional 1998 floods tested the completed works, and all, excepting Sirajganj hardpoint, have performed well from a technical point of view. The completed revetment work at Sirajganj wasseverely damaged for a substantial length (about 320 m, 11 % of total length) during the monsoon floods inAugust and September 1998. The damages were repaired in 1999, and since then no failure has occurred.The integrity of the revetment work is regularly monitored and remedial actions are taken when needed.

21. The sustainability of a project of this type depends on the proper monitoring and maintenance ofthe infrastructures. BWDB's Specialized O&M Unit has been established in 1998 and is functional withnecessary core equipment for monitoring and maintenance. During the project implementation period, theUnit satisfactorily carried out Monitoring & Maintenance (M&M) activities in collaboration with privatesector specialized agencies like Surface Water Modeling Centre (SWMC) and Environmental andGeographic Information System (EGIS). BWDB has prepared an Operation Plan and decided to contractout monitoring of the changes in the river plan form and its morphology in the vicinity of "hard points" tosuitable organization under annual frame contract. The Government is committed to provide necessarysupport and budget for monitoring & maintenance (M&M) for its sustainability.

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22. The improved river training works, completed under this project is sustainable in its present entity.But for it its long-term sustainability, stabilization of the entire stretch of Brahmaputra right bank (about220 km from Chilmari to Hurasagar) needs to be taken up in phases. BWDB completed BrahmaputraRiver Training Study (BRTS, May 1993) under IDA Cr. 1870-BD and this project has implemented threepriority locations, out of 27 identified sites. In addition, China-Bangladesh Joint Expert Study (1991)Study recommended total confinement of the river from the outset. Ongoing pilot project - Active FloodPlain Management (FAP21/22) has experimented on various approach including low cost ones. Therefore,in the light of Development Strategy under National Water Management Plan (June 2001), a long-termplan will have to be developed and implemented in phases.

23. Flood Rehabilitation Component: Under BWDB's flood rehabilitation component, the repairswere undertaken in 39 schemes, affected by 1998 flood and are expected to be fully completed by'November 2001. The government provides fund from its revenue budget for their maintenance, which inmost of the years cover 3040%/o of its actual needs. Given this budget situation, the Government/BWDB isirying to find alternate means of managing the schemes in a better way. Since 1999, the government withthe assistance from World Food Program (WFP) is working towards better organizing the preventivemaintenance in selected BWDB schemes with declining scarce resources under Rural DevelopmentProgram. This program will continue till 2003. Meanwhile, the Govermnent has approved "the Guidelinesior Participatory Water Management (April 2001)" and BWDB intends to apply it for improved servicedlelivery on the ground involving the User's representatives in operation and maintenance of the schemes.]3WDB intends to pursue these aspects of operation and maintenance under the proposed WaterMIanagement Improvement Project (WMIIP), currently under preparation.

EZ.valuation of Consultant's performances

24. River Training Component. The objectives of consultants' services were primarily to assist GOBend BWDB to implement the project as efficiently and effectively as possible. A team of Construction',upervision Consultant (CSC) was designated as 'Engineer' was selected to supervise the two major civilworks contracts including imnplementation of Resettlement Action Plan (RAP). The Consultants sitesupervision team consisted of international experts and local engineers & staff. One third of the localengineering personnel were seconded to the Consultant's supervision team from BWDB for training andsupervision of works & quality assurance with 'Lien' from the GoB. The supervision consultant played acritical role in providing the necessary coordination in ensuring that the civil works were being executed tothe appropriate specifications and within the stipulated contractual time frame. The consultant support toEtWDB in managing all contractual related matters and in implementing the RAP, and EMP were ingeneral very satisfactory. Their timely role in diagnosing the causes of failure of 1998 flood damage toSirajganj Revetment was very effective and the repair work done on the CSC furnished and BWDBapproved design in a minimum possible time.

25. Flood Rehabilitation Componentr Consultant's overall performance is satisfactory. Their mainn-sponsibilities and accomplishments are: (i) review of 1998 Flood Damage Assessment of InfrastructureReport; (ii) preparation of quality assurance and environmental management plans; (iii) review of thedesigns prepared by the BWDB Design Office and suggested modification wherever necessary; (iv)assisting BWDB in overall monitoring and quality assurance of the works through inspection and checks ata regular interval; (v) review and recommending proposal for variation of works wherever necessary; (vi)preparation of monthly progress reports on the basis of progress of individual event of a contract packageirn a methodical way through computerized program; (vii) certification of contractor's invoices andwithdrawal applications, and (viii) preparing draft Project Implementation Completion Report.

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Evaluation of Bank's Performance

26. River Training Component: The World Banks task team played a vital role in facilitating theimplementation of the project successfully. The Bank's supervision of the project was adequate andappropriate. The Bank staff supervised all the components of the project regularly. The team, comprisingstaff from different discipline, visited and reviewed the progress of works. In the process, the team.pro-actively identified various implementation issues and assisted in resolving those. They advised theconcerned officials of GoB and CSC to implement the work as per IDA standard procedures. The Bankstaff periodically visited the project sites and discussed implementation with the BWDB officials, localadministration and stakeholders, which helped in smooth execution of the works. Bank's SupervisionMission also visited the project sites regularly as per planned schedules.

27. In addition to the two large ICB contracts, rest of the contract packages was executed underNational Competitive Bidding following IDA standard bidding document. As the IDA guidelines weredifferent from GoB guidelines in some respects and both the BWDB officials and contractor were not wellacquainted with those, the procurement activities could not progress as planned. As a consequence, somecontract packages were declared mis-procurement on the ground of apprehend collusion and in some casesprocedural deviation. A case in point is contract Packages 20/A and 21 for survey equipment, which weredeclared misprocurement simply for BWDB's disagreement for not awarding the contract with adjustedprice for delay in award. IDA was requested to review the decisions on the misprocurement, but IDA wasrigid and maintained their earlier position. The IDA approach was focused more on the process than thegoal of the project, such as sustainable arrangement for Operation and Maintenance.

28. Disbursement: In general, the withdrawal applications as well as the direct payments werehandled mostly in time. Response from the Bank regarding withdrawal application & other financialaspects was satisfactory.

29. Flood Rehabilitation Component. Bank's involvement in the initial stage was much intense asprevailing bidding procedure of BWDB was replaced by the introduction of National Competitive Bidding(NCB) by the Bank. This required a number of formal and informal meetings with BWDB and MOWRThe Bank undertook prior review of twelve contracts above the threshold value of US$200,000 and ex-postreview of the sample contracts for the remaining ones. A number of contract packages were found toconsistent with IDA guidelines and those contracts were declared mis-procured. The Eight contracts weredeclared as misprocurement and the contract amount involved is Tk. 28,094,298 (US$497,244.0equivalent). Based on further assessment by an independent audit team (Chartered Accountants Firm),engaged by the Bank, another 59 contracts for an amount of about Tk.133,106,654.0 have again beendeclared mis-procured.

Evaluation of Borrower's Performance

30. River Training Component: The government handled the project implementation efficiently. Thecontracts were finalized within reasonable time. The Construction Supervision Consultants (CSC) was alsoengaged within reasonable time. As per provision in the project (SAR, para 2.25), BWDB Engineers andother technical staff were seconded to the Construction Supervision Team. They were part of CSC's teamand actively participating in supervision and quality assurance activities. The senior engineers acquiredknowledge about contract administration under FIDIC which will be helpful in implementation of largeconstruction contracts. The BWDB/MOWR responded very quickly to repair the damage of 1998 flood,where about 320m stretch of revetment in Sirajganj collapsed. GoB approached the IDA for financing and

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finalized the design with the help of committee and repaired the damage within shortest possible time.

.31. BWDB tried to make payment to the contractors timely so that work continued unhindered. Inspite of constraint on GoB resources, counterpart funds were made available mostly on time. Besides,Govt. tired to resolve all issues related to implementation timely and complies with all the Credit covenants.

32. Flood Rehabilitation Component: BWDB started the work in right earnest at the beginning of theproject. Tendering process for most of the packages was started before the Consultants were on board, butit faltered in the beginning due to the introduction of the World Bank's trial edition of Standard BiddingDocument (SBD) for National Competitive Bidding (NCB). Since the requirements in this newlyintroduced SBD were far more stringent than the government bidding documents, both the BWDB officialsand the bidders faced difficulties in working with these documents and that too in an emergency situation.All the repairs have been fully completed by December 31, 2001.

'13. The quality management aspects during execution of civil works have improved. Failure to maketimely payment to the contractors, BWDB found it difficult to exercise their control over time related toconstruction administration and the imposition of liquidated damages in accordance to the contract clauseclue to non completion of work in time.

lKey Lessons Learned

34. River Training Component: Key lessons among others from this project component are thefollowing:

Quality at entry. The RBPP is a clear example of a well-designed and very thoroughly prepared project,which was ready for implementation. Project planning and preparation were intensive and lengthy. Theproject preparation took about two years from 1991 to 1992 and the initial appraisal was made in 1992,vvhich was updated in 1995. This ensured that the project was at a very high state of implementationreadiness once it became effective. For example, before IDA Board presentation, two major civil worksbids and consultant services proposals had been received and evaluated, giving accurate cost estimates forthe project. By effectiveness, all of the construction and consultant contracts for the project had beensigned. This high state of procurement and engineering readiness was achieved despite the fact thatbecause of the changing morphology of the Brahmaputra River, the final location of the "hard points" attvo locations (Sariakandi and Mathurapara) had to be adjusted in late 1995.

Social & environmental components. The preparation and more importantly implementation of the socialand environmental components of large civil works projects must be given the same attention as thepreparation of the physical components. In the case of the RBPP the real needs, in terms of resources, toinplement the social and environmental components of the project was not appreciated until well intoproject implementation.

International Competitive Bidding (ICB). Because of ICB, GOB was able to procure, in a cost effectivemanner, intemationally experienced contractors to execute technically challenging civil works contracts.F.owever, ICB alone, without a strict PQ process, would not have resulted in the procurement of thesuitably qualified contractor at the lowest possible price to execute the works. Thus the lesson learnedfirom implementing the RBPP is that a combination of ICB together with a very strict PQ process producesthe best results.

Supervision consultant as the 'Engineer. In the case of the RBPP the role of the supervision consultant

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as the empowered Engineer worked well. The Engineer was given the necessary powers and independenceto operate as the engineer and this reduced payment delays and potential problems with the contractors.Thus for a large complex project like the RBPP the role of the supervision consultant as the engineer can beeffective if properly managed.

Transfer of Technology. For large project like RBPP, provision for secondment of staff from theimplementing agency to the consultant's team should be continued as a part of technology transfer.

35. Flood Rehabilitation Component. Key lessons among others from this project component are thefollowing:

Consultant's Role. Review of design by Consultant leads to bmplacency for both Consultant and BWDBDesign Office. Consultant's responsibility needs to be increased

Size of Contract Packages. Fragmentation of works into uuiall packages is to be avoided even if it isscattered, but situated within a reasonable distance. This will not necessarily affect the labor-intensivenature of the work very much. Contract administration, construction monitoring and supervision willimprove considerably by this.

Summary of Borrower's Contribuffon to the ICR (WARPO - Strengthening of Water SectorPlanning)

1. The 1964 EPWAPDA Water Master Plan proposed a major programme of investments to controlBangladesh's rivers and develop large-scale Flood Control and Drainage (FCD) and surface waterirrigation projects. In contrast, the World Bank's 1972 Land and Water Resources sector study downplayedmajor FCD and surface water irrigation, instead recommending that emphasis be given to public investrnentin minor irrigation (low lift pumps and deep tube wells) and small scale FCD projects. From 1983 to 1991,UNDP-supported national water resources planning was done by Master Plan Organization (MPO).National Water Plan Phase-I was published in 1986 while Phase-IH was published in 1991. In 1992 MPOwas transformed into Water Resources Planning Organization (WARPO) with the mandate of macro-levelplanning of water resources of the country.

2. After catastrophic flood of 1987 and 1988, the international community helped Bangladesh inpreparing a comprehensive and coordinated action plan against flood. The resulting works is known asFlood Action Plan (FAP) and the organization responsible for implementing and administering the works istermed as Flood Plan Coordination Organization (FPCO). FAP comprises eleven major components (fiveregional planning studies; four studies focusing on specific programs - the Brahmaputra Right BankEmbankment, the Coastal Embankment, Dhaka Urban Protection, Secondary Cities Protection; two studiesfocusing on non-structural programs- flood forecasting and flood preparedness) and sixteen supportingstudies and pilot activities. As a follow-up action of FAP, Government of Bangladesh (GoB) preparedBangladesh Water and Flood Management Strategy (BWFMS) in September, 1995 which sets twoimmediate tasks - a National Water Policy and a National Water Management Plan.

3. The Govemment undertook the preparation of National Water Management Plan (NWMP) inmid-March, 1998 under a loan agreement between GoB and IDA (World Bank). National Water Policywas prepared and published by GoB in January, 1999. WARPO was the implementing agency of the task.The preparation of NWMP was completed in November 2001. The components of the National Water

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Management Plan Project (NWMPP) was (i) Preparation of NWMP, (ii) Strengthening of WARPO, and(iii) Establishment of a National Water Resources Database (NWRD).

4. Cost of NWMP: (a) 5.72 million SDR as per development credit agreement (DCA) (IDAcontribution) (b) 0.30 million US$ from Canadian grant (c) 0.19 million US$ from the Netherlands and (d)Taka 131.74 lakh from GoB. The NWMP is being implemented under the direct supervision of WaterResources Planning Organization (WARPO). Ministry of Water Resources (MoWR), Government of thePeople's Republic of Bangladesh (GoB) is responsible for top supervision of the job. Moreover, WorldBank on behalf of IDA, is also advising on the implementation of the component as one of the member ofthe Tripatriate Team (the other two members are MoWR and the Consultants). From time to time IDA isalso fielding peer reviewer and Review Mission to monitor the progress of the component.

5. A Consultants Team consisting of M/S Halcrow and Partners in association with Mott MacDonald, DHI, Natural Resources Consulting Engineers Inc BETS, EPC, HCL, ECA, Proshika, ASODwith assistance and support from SWMC, EGIS and BIDS is responsible for implementation of the threetasks of the NWMPP. The Consultants team has subcontracted part of their job to Surface WaterModelling Centre (SWMC) and Environmental and Geographic Information System Support Project forWater Sector Planning (EGIS). Furthermore, MoWR has appointed International and National WaterPolicy Advisory Group (WPAG) and Independent Panel of Experts (IPoE) to -review the outputs of thecomponent and to advice both the MoWR and WARPO on the formulation of NWMP. MoWR has alsoconstituted a "Contact Group" taking experts members from the Government/Autonomous Agencies toadvice WARPO on the NWMP formulation. A high power Steering Committed has been formed to guidethe NWMPP taking members from different Ministries of the Government, head/representative of theAgencies/University/World Bank. This Committee is the highest body to decide on technical matter ofNWMPP.

6. Supreme authority to take decision on NWMP is the Executive Committee of National WaterResources Council (ECNWRC) and National Water Resources Council (NWRC). ECNWRC is headed bythe Ministry of Water Resources and NWRC is headed by the Prime Minister of the Government of thePeople's Republic of Bangladesh.

7. The outputs of NWMPP are: The Inception Report, Issues for the NWMP Report, Topic Papers(Reports) - 15 Nos., Draft Development Strategy Reports (11 Volumes), Draft Development StrategyReports (2 Volumes), Development Strategy of NWMP (Report), Draft National Water Management Plan.The draft NWMP was recommended by the Executive Committee of National Water Resources Council,(ECNWRC) meeting on 2nd February, 2002. National Water Resources Council (NWRC) is the finalauthority to approve NWMP and hopefully, NWRC will approve it.

B. Institutional Strengthening of WARPO: 42 officials, from MoWR (10), Ministry of Planning (7),:[MED (2), JRC (I) and WARPO (22) received study tour/training on IWRM under the Projects. Besides,local training for WARPO officials was also arranged under the project Working atmosphere in WARPOlis now very good with improved computer facilities, office accommodation, library facilities and WARPOweb-site. An updated EIA guideline has been prepared together with the guidelines for the participatorywater management at national level. A Five Year Work Plan for WARPO has also been prepared. WARPOis also maintaining an excellent database for the water sector of the country.

19. Following Factors affected implementation of the NWMPP:

(a) Implementation arrangement of the Project: WARPO was responsible for overall

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implementation of the project under the guidance of Ministry of Water Resources. Theproject was monitored guided and advised by IPOE, WPAG, Steering Committee,Contract Group and Tripartite Team.

(b) Ganges Water Treaty: Based on the recommendations of the International Seminar heldin March, 1998 in Dhaka and to hamess the available water secured by the Ganges WaterTreaty signed between Bangladesh and India in December, 1996, the NWMP Project hasto accommodate special studies on OGDA.

(c) Modification on the outputs of the Projects: In agreement with IPoEs, WPAGs,Tripatriate Team, the Outputs (Reports) have been changed as:

Inception Report - Unchanged

Option Report - Changed to : Issues of NWMPTopic Paper (TPs)Draft Development Strategy

(DDS) ReportDevelopment Strategy Report

National Water Resources Plan - Unchanged

The changes in outputs affected both time and resources of the project.

10. The key element of sustainability of the project is continuation of the capacity of WARPO that hasbeen achieved during NWMP project implementation phase. By this time, WARPO has adopted a five yearwork plan (2002-2006) that will help to uphold and further improve the capacity building of WARPO. Thiswill also ensure and equip WARPO to take the responsibility of updating NWMP in future (consideringphysical, financial and institutional aspects). The main constraint WARPO cunrently faces is lack ofpermanent office. However, future prospects for WARPO are encouraging provided the above constraintovercomes.

11. Traditionally, the Consultants have worked independently (without interacting with WARPOprofessionals). WARPO and the Consultants jointly developed a mechanism to share views (amongWARPO professional and Consultants) on different NWMP issues which was later dropped due to timeand financial constraints. In absence of a mechanism to interact with the Consultants during planformulation stage, divergence of opinion came on some issues between the Consultants and WARPO. Fourinternational and five national IPoEs worked under the Project. Of them, one intemational IPoE wasfinanced by CIDA while another by GoN. ToR of the jobs of the IPoEs were formulated in a very brief andgeneral terms; specific way of providing inputs to the process by the IPoE members were not there. As aresult, their services could not be utilized as per desired level.

12. Major part of the cost of NWMPP came from the loan agreement (IDA Credit No. 2791-BD)between IDA and GoB. Performance of the Bank (IDA/World Bank) was excellent in respect of release offund and response of the Bank on amendment of Credit agreement from the Borrowers side. But theresponse of the Bank on management of the Project was, somehow, slow; clearance of the Bank on theproposed 2nd Amendment of Contract of Consultancy Services between WARPO and the consortium ofConsultants took unusual lengthy time. Moreover, concept of involving IPoEs and WPAGs on planningprocess suggested by the Bank was proven not very effective.

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13. On behalf of GoB, WARPO was entrusted for the management of the Project. The Project startedon 15th March, 1998 and completed on 30th November, 2001. During this period, Director General (DG)of the Organization has been changed twice; 1st time on 10-03-1999 and 2nd time on 17-09-2000. Forproject duration of forty four and half months, changing the top manager after twelve months of project'scommencement and again repeating the same on 30th month of commencement did not create favorableenvironment for the project. A project manager from beginning to the end of the project could result betterDUtpUt from the project. ToR of the project; though prepared by WARPO and vetted by World Bank andapproved by the MoWR; did not provide the scope of interacting GoB personals (WARPO Professionals)with the Consultants on the issues of NWM. The process was initiated but the Consultants, after a fewmeetings, disagreed to continue it on the ground that this process is not allowing them to workindependently with their professional standard and time and resources is also not enough for the process.

14. The following lessons, learnt from the experience of this project, will guide WARPO/GoB in futurefor similar projects: (i) ToR of the study should contain provision for interaction with GoB project;oersonals and the Consultants on each important phase/issues of the project so that GoB's views arereflected in project documents; (ii) All professionals including top manager working in the project must not'be transferred out of the project unless the Authority is compelled to do so; (iii) Concept of IPoE/WPAG'sinvolvement in project should be reviewed seriously because of their general (not specific) level ofperformance; and (iv) Emphasis should be put to recruit as much as possible the national experts in state ofinternal experts.

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89' 90° 91° 92'

BANGLADESH

*\P,l :5\.ai>< RIVER BANK PROTECTION PROJECT(INCLUDING EMERGENCY FLOOD RECOVERY AREA)

-26- /Tho 9=)'l N S \1 LOCATION OF APPRAISED SUBPROJECTS 26-

1998 FLOOD INUNDATION AREAS (AS OF SEPTEMBER 10, 1998):

RongP ). SEVERE FLOODING (MORE THAN 50 cm. ABOVE DANGER LEVEL)

MODERATE FLOODING (UP TO 50 cm. ABOVE DANGER LEVEL)

\ z r r>.m > l < ~~~~~~~~ 60 1 | ~~NORMAL FLOODING (WI.THIN 50 cm. Of DANGER LEVEL)

n >4; ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~23'

ndk NO FLOODING~~~~~~~~- 0Bndr~

cnyoiCerm~~~~~~~~~:rmanonshown~~~~ouce Floo Foeatn and Warnin Cete ,6OWDBz \\\\ ,Wn* i DHK

X 4 =~~~~~~~~ | ' O , ~~~~~~~~~~DISTRICT CAPITALS 7

% 8 : :_____ I___________ DIVISION BOUNDARIES 3

z5 0 25 50Miles ' INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARIESE Bay of Bengal 9 9p° 911 92 \\ n

KushIi Ma kain~~~9' 91 9'

IMAGING

Report No.: 24323Type: ICR