The Mind and the Brain

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The Mind and the Brain, The distinction between mind and matter, KNOWLEDGE OF EXTERNAL OBJECTS, MECHANICAL THEORIES OF MATTER, CONSCIOUSNESS


<p>The Mind and the Brain, by Alfred BinetThis eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and withalmost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away orre-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License includedwith this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.orgTitle: The Mind and the Brain Being the Authorised Translation of L'me et le CorpsAuthor: Alfred BinetRelease Date: April 14, 2007 [eBook #21077]Language: English***START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE MIND AND THE BRAIN***E-text prepared by Curtis Weyant, Sankar Viswanathan, and the ProjectGutenberg Online Distributed Proofreading Team ( frompage images generously made available by Digital Case, the Kelvin SmithLibrary, Case Western Reserve University( Images of the original pages are available through Digital Case, the Kelvin Smith Library, Case Western Reserve University. See's Note: References are made to footnotes in other footnotes and index. The footnotes are serially numbered and placed at the end of each chapter. Consequently the references in the footnotes and index have been corrected to indicate the footnote number.International Scientific Series.Volume LXXXIX.(The International Scientific Series)Edited by F. LeggeTHE MIND AND THE BRAINbyALFRED BINETDirecteur du Laboratoire de Psychologie la SorbonneBeing the Authorised Translation of_L'me et le Corps_LondonKegan Paul, Trench, Trbner &amp; Co. LtdDryden House, Gerrard Street, W.1907CONTENTSBOOK ITHE DEFINITION OF MATTERCHAPTER IINTRODUCTIONThe distinction between mind and matter--Knowable nothomogeneous--Criterion employed, enumeration not conceptsCHAPTER IIOUR KNOWLEDGE OF EXTERNAL OBJECTS ONLY SENSATIONModern theories of matter--Outer world only known to us by oursensations--Instances--Mill's approval of proposition, and itsdefects--Nervous system only intermediary between self and outerworld--The great X of Matter--Nervous system does not give us trueimage--Mller's law of specificity of the nerves--The nervous systemitself a sensation--Relations of sensation with the unknowable theaffair of metaphysicsCHAPTER IIITHE MECHANICAL THEORIES OF MATTER ARE ONLY SYMBOLSPhysicists vainly endeavour to reduce the rle ofsensation--Mathematical, energetical, and mechanical theories ofuniverse--Mechanical model formed from sensation--Instance oftuning-fork--No one sensation any right to hegemony over othersCHAPTER IVANSWERS TO SOME OBJECTIONS, AND SUMMARYObjections of spiritualists--Of German authors who contend thatnervous system does give true image--Of metaphysicians--Common groundof objection that nervous system not intermediary--Answer tothis--Summary of preceding chaptersBOOK IITHE DEFINITION OF MINDCHAPTER ITHE DISTINCTION BETWEEN COGNITION AND ITS OBJECTNecessity for inventory of mental phenomena--Objects of cognition andacts of cognition--Definition of consciousnessCHAPTER IIDEFINITION OF SENSATIONSensation defined by experimental psychology--A state ofconsciousness--Considered self-evident by Mill, Renouvier, andHume--Psycho-physical according to Reid and Hamilton--Reasons infavour of last definition--Other opinions examined and refutedCHAPTER IIIDEFINITION OF THE IMAGEPerception and ideation cannot be separated--Perception constituted byaddition of image to sensation--Hallucinations--Objections anticipatedand answeredCHAPTER IVDEFINITION OF THE EMOTIONSContrary opinions as to nature of emotions--Emotion a phenomenon _suigeneris_--Intellectualist theory of emotion supported by Lange andJames--Is emotion only a perception? Is effort?--Question leftunansweredCHAPTER VDEFINITION OF THE CONSCIOUSNESS--THE RELATION SUBJECT-OBJECTCan thoughts be divided into subject and object?--This division cannotapply to the consciousness--Subject of cognition itself anobject--James' opinion examined--Opinion that subject is spiritualsubstance and consciousness its faculty refutedCHAPTER VIDEFINITION OF THE CONSCIOUSNESS--CATEGORIES OF THE UNDERSTANDINGPrinciple of relativity doubted--Tables of categories: Aristotle, Kant,and Renouvier--Kantian idealism--Phenomenism of Berkeley examined andrejected--Argument of _a priorists_--The intelligence only an inactiveconsciousness--Huxley's epiphenomenal consciousness--Is theconsciousness necessary?--Impossibility of answering this questionCHAPTER VIIDEFINITION OF THE CONSCIOUSNESS--THE SEPARABILITY OF THE CONSCIOUSNESSFROM ITS OBJECT--DISCUSSION OF IDEALISMCan the consciousness be separated from its object?--Idealistsconsider the object a modality of the consciousness and thusinseparable, from it--Futility of this doctrine--Object can existwithout consciousnessCHAPTER VIIIDEFINITION OF THE CONSCIOUSNESS--THE SEPARATION OF THE CONSCIOUSNESSFROM ITS OBJECT--THE UNCONSCIOUSCan ideas exist without consciousness?--No consciousness without anobject--Can the consciousness die?--Enfeeblement of consciousness howaccounted for--Doubling of consciousness in hysterics--Relations ofphysiological phenomena to consciousness--Consciousness cannot becomeunconscious and yet existCHAPTER IXDEFINITIONS OF PSYCHOLOGYDifficulty of defining psychology--Definition by substance--Psychology notthe science of the soul--Definition by enumeration: its error--Definitionby method contradicts idea of consciousness--Externospection andintrospection sometimes confused--Definition by content--Facts cannot bedivided into those of consciousness and of unconsciousness--Descartes'definition of psychology insufficient--"Within and without" simileunanalogous--Definition by point of view--Inconsistencies of Ebbinghaus'contention--W. James' teleological theory--Definition by the peculiarnature of mental laws only one possible: why?BOOK IIITHE UNION OF THE SOUL AND THE BODYCHAPTER ITHE MIND HAS AN INCOMPLETE LIFEProblem of union of mind and body stated--Axiom of heterogeneity mustbe rejected--Phenomena of consciousness incomplete--Aristotle's_relatum_ and _correlatum_ applied to the terms mind and matterCHAPTER IISPIRITUALISM AND IDEALISMSpiritualist view that death cuts link between soul andbody--Explanation of link fatal to system--Consciousness cannotexercise functions without objects of cognition--Idealism akaleidoscopic system--Four affirmations of idealism: theirinconsistency--Advantages of historical methodCHAPTER IIIMATERIALISM AND PARALLELISMMaterialism oldest doctrine of all: many patristic authors leantowards it--Modern form of, receives impulse from advance of physicalscience--Karl Vogt's comparison of secretions of brain with that ofkidneys--All materialist doctrines opposed to principle ofheterogeneity--Modern materialism would make object generateconsciousness--Materialists cannot demonstrate how molecularvibrations can be transformed into objects--Parallelism avoids issueby declaring mind to be function of brain--Parallelists declarephysical and psychical life to be two parallel currents--Bain'ssupport of this--Objections to: most important that it postulatesconsciousness as a complete wholeCHAPTER IVMODERN THEORIESBerkeley's idealism revived by Bergson, though with differentstandpoint--Admirable nature of Bergson's exposition--Fallacy of, partassigned to sensory nerves--Conscious sensations must be subsequent toexcitement of sensory nerves and dependent on their integrityCHAPTER VCONCLUSIONAuthor's own theory only a hypothesis--Important conditions forsolution of problem--Manifestations of consciousness conditioned bybrain, but this last unconscious--Consciousness perceives onlyexternal object--Specificity of nerves not absolute--Why repeatedexcitements of nerve tend to become unconscious--Formation of habitand "instinct"--Resemblance to and distinction of this fromparallelism--Advantages of new theoryCHAPTER VIRECAPITULATIONDescription of matter--Definition of mind--Objections to,answered--Incomplete existence of mind--Other theories--Nervous systemmust add its own effect to that of its excitantBOOK ITHE DEFINITION OF MATTERTHE MIND AND THE BRAIN[1]CHAPTER IINTRODUCTIONThis book is a prolonged effort to establish a distinction betweenwhat is called mind and what is called matter. Nothing is more simplethan to realise this distinction when you do not go deeply into it;nothing is more difficult when you analyse it a little. At firstsight, it seems impossible to confuse things so far apart as a thoughtand a block of stone; but on reflection this great contrast vanishes,and other differences have to be sought which are less apparent and ofwhich one has not hitherto dreamed.First let us say how the question presents itself to us. The factwhich we must take as a starting point, for it is independent ofevery kind of theory, is that there exists something which is"knowable." Not only science, but ordinary life and our everydayconversation, imply that there are things that we know. It is withregard to these things that we have to ask ourselves if some belong towhat we call the mind and others to what we call matter.Let us suppose, by way of hypothesis, the knowable to be entirely andabsolutely homogeneous. In that case we should be obliged to set asidethe question as one already decided. Where everything is homogeneous,there is no distinction to be drawn. But this hypothesis is, as we allknow, falsified by observation. The whole body of the knowable isformed from an agglomeration of extremely varied elements, amongstwhich it is easy to distinguish a large number of divisions. Thingsmay be classified according to their colour, their shape, theirweight, the pleasure they give us, their quality of being alive ordead, and so on; one much given to classification would only betroubled by the number of possible distinctions.Since so many divisions are possible, at which shall we stop and say:this is the one which corresponds exactly to the opposition of mindand matter? The choice is not easy to make; for we shall see thatcertain authors put the distinction between the physical and themental in one thing, others in another. Thus there have been a verylarge number of distinctions proposed, and their number is muchgreater than is generally thought. Since we propose to make ourselvesjudges of these distinctions, since, in fact, we shall reject most ofthem in order to suggest entirely new ones, it must be supposed thatwe shall do so by means of a criterion. Otherwise, we should only beacting fantastically. We should be saying peremptorily, "In my opinionthis is mental," and there would be no more ground for discussionthan, if the assertion were "I prefer the Romanticists to theClassicists," or "I consider prose superior to poetry."The criterion which I have employed, and which I did not analyse untilthe unconscious use I had made of it revealed its existence to me, isbased on the two following rules:--1. _A Rule of Method._--The distinction between mind and matter mustnot only apply to the whole of the knowable, but must be the deepestwhich can divide the knowable, and must further be one of a permanentcharacter. _A priori_, there is nothing to prove the existence of sucha distinction; it must be sought for and, when found, closelyexamined.2. _An Indication of the Direction in which the Search must beMade._--Taking into account the position already taken up by themajority of philosophers, the manifestation of mind, if it exists,must be looked for in the domain of facts dealt with by psychology,and the manifestation of matter in the domain explored by physicists.I do not conceal from myself that there may be much that is arbitraryin my own criterion; but this does not seem to me possible to avoid.We must therefore appeal to psychology, and ask whether it iscognisant of any phenomenon offering a violent, lasting, andineffaceable contrast with all the rest of the knowable._The Method of Concepts and the Method of Enumeration._--Many authorsare already engaged in this research, and employ a method which Iconsider very bad and very dangerous--the method of concepts. Thisconsists in looking at real and concrete phenomena in their mostabstract form. For example, in studying the mind, they use this word"mind" as a general idea which is supposed to contain all thecharacteristics of psychical phenomena; but they do not wait toenumerate these characteristics or to realise them, and they remainsatisfied with the extremely vague idea springing from an unanalysedconcept. Consequently they use the word "mind" with the imprudence ofa banker who should discount a trade bill without ascertainingwhether the payment of that particular piece of paper had beenprovided for. This amounts to saying that the discussion ofphilosophical problems takes especially a verbal aspect; and the morecomplex the phenomena a concept thus handled, contains, the moredangerous it is. A concept of the colour red has but a very simplecontent, and by using it, this content can be very clearlyrepresented. But how can the immense meaning of the word "mind" berealised every time that it is used? For example, to define mind andto separate it from the rest of the knowable which is called matter,the general mode of reasoning is as follows: all the knowable which isapparent to our senses is essentially reduced to motion; "mind," thatsomething which lives, feels, and judges, is reduced to "thought." Tounderstand the difference between matter and mind, it is necessary toask one's self whether there exists any analogy in nature betweenmotion and thought. Now this analogy does not exist, and what wecomprehend, on the contrary, is their absolute opposition. Thought isnot a movement, and has nothing in common with a movement. A movementis never anything else but a displacement, a transfer, a change ofplace undergone by a particle of matter. What relation of similarityexists between this geometrical fact and a desire, an emotion, asensation of bitterness? Far from being identical, these two factsare as distinct as any facts can be, and their distinction is so deepthat it should be raised to the height of a principle, the principleof heterogeneity.This is almost exactly the reasoning that numbers of philosophers haverepeated for several years without giving proof of much originality.This is what I term the metaphysics of concept, for it is aspeculation which consists in juggling with abstract ideas. The momentthat a philosopher opposes thought to movement, I ask myself underwhat form he can think of a "thought," I suppose he must verypoetically and very vaguely represent to himself something light andsubtle which contrasts with the weight and grossness of materialbodies. And thus our philosopher is punished in the sinning part; hiscontempt of the earthly has led him into an abuse of abstractreasoning, and this abuse has made him the dupe of a very navephysical metaphor.At bottom I have not much faith in the nobility of many of ourabstract ideas. In a former psychological study[2] I ha...</p>