strategic choices: why europe still matters
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Strategic Choices: Why Europe Still MattersBlaine D. HoltPublished online: 10 Jun 2013.
To cite this article: Blaine D. Holt (2013) Strategic Choices: Why Europe Still Matters, American Foreign Policy Interests: TheJournal of the National Committee on American Foreign Policy, 35:3, 160-168
To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10803920.2013.798188
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Strategic Choices: Why Europe Still MattersBlaine D. Holt
ABSTRACT Financial crisis in Europe, China rising, and a rebalancing
United States, against a backdrop of depleted resources, are driving the
‘‘tectonic plates’’ of geopolitics. How the world’s top three economies react
to these momentum shifts will affect or influence all regions. In making this
observation, the article examines the historical context of the three and how
they arrived at the geostrategic crossroads they sit at today. The author
makes the case that U.S. policymakers should take careful note of China’s
economic muscle being flexed on the financially-stricken European conti-
nent and should craft policies that strengthen the U.S.–Europe bond.
KEYWORDS Asia-Pacific; Bretton Woods; defense; economic A2AD; EU;
euro zone; foreign direct investment; The Great Recession; Marshall plan; NATO;
political–economic; rebalancing; SACEUR; transatlantic bond; tripolar
On a chilly February day in 1992, the European Council meeting in
Maastricht, Netherlands, completed the final draft of the Treaty of European
Union, formally creating a new, supra-national structure of sovereign states,
obligated to common economic, legal, and security standards. Its propo-
nents envisioned an enterprise certain to achieve and maintain a sharply
ascendant trajectory—a euro zone even greater than the sum of its parts:
extremely formidable economically, highly influential geopolitically, and,
contrary to a key concern expressed by its many critics, capable of imple-
menting economic reforms and effecting social integration within and
among its 17 member states. The mood was euphoric. After all, the Conti-
nent had survived two brutal world wars and years of nuclear trauma in a
cold war, fracturing geographies and ideologies alike, all in less than a
century. A bright and happy future was at hand. In the heady spirit of
Maastricht, the next few years added several agreements expanding the
union, producing a common currency, and building new structures for
common governance. As the 1990s wore on, Europe developed a new con-
fidence and influence on the world stage, both economically and strategi-
cally. War in the Balkans, the 9=11 attacks, conflicts in Afghanistan and
Iraq, along with persistent financial crises were all in the future, and the past
seemed firmly buried. Nothing describes the early days of the European
Union better than Europe’s anthem: ‘‘Ode to Joy,’’ an orchestral.
Fast forward to 2013. The sunny promises of 1992 have yet to be fulfilled.
Instead, Europe has experienced two decades of conflict and a bruising
collision with an ongoing, and pervasive, financial crisis. On the surface,
the numbers are encouraging: the union’s reporting body, Eurostat, lists
This article not subject to U.S. copyrightlaw.
The views expressed are those of theauthor and do not necessarily reflect theofficial policy or position of the Depart-ment of the Air Force, U.S. EuropeanCommand, the Department of Defense,or the U.S. government.
Blaine D. Holt is a Brigadier General in theUnited States Air Force and is a formerMilitary Fellow at the Council on ForeignRelations.
American Foreign Policy Interests, 35:160–168, 2013ISSN: 1080-3920 print=1533-2128 onlineDOI: 10.1080/10803920.2013.798188
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the Continent as the world’s largest economy with a
population of 500 million from 27 member states
producing a hefty $16.566 trillion (USD) Gross
Domestic Product (GDP).1 Viewed in detail, how-
ever, complexities mount. National loyalties and
ethnic rivalries proved more resilient than the archi-
tects of the union envisioned. Combined with design
flaws in the agreement establishing the euro cur-
rency, now used by 17 countries, fissures are emerg-
ing, conceivably condemning the consortium to
failure. Long term, another vexing and intractable
issue is Europe’s demographic situation. Discounting
immigration, birth rates in Europe have declined
dramatically in the post-war era; the economic and
security implications are alarming. Will the Europe
of the future have the numbers to produce the
wealth to care for a burgeoning population of elderly
citizens while simultaneously providing for robust
security? And, from the perspective of an America
embarking on new policies designed to acknowl-
edge the rising importance of Asia, does it matter?
Ideally, in today’s globalized international com-
munity, a secure and prosperous Europe is certainly
in the best interest of all. However, with operations
in Afghanistan, Libya, and Mali continuing to drain
the Continent’s under-resourced military forces in
an era of falling credit ratings and soaring unemploy-
ment (11.7 percent across the euro zone), the Conti-
nent could well find autonomous international
engagement while maintaining domestic harmony
to be a challenge.2
The timing could not be worse. The United States is
clearly facing a world of new international tensions
and escalations demanding it reexamine priorities,
especially in view of a rising domestic debt and calls
for reducing spending. In short, U.S. willingness and
ability to respond to the European crises on par with
historic bold initiatives like the Marshall Plan or the
Bretton Woods agreements are all but nonexistent.
The U.S. strategy document released last year, ‘‘Sus-
taining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st
Century Defense,’’ acknowledged Europe while call-
ing for a rebalancing toward the Asia-Pacific region:
Europe is home to some of America’s most stalwart alliesand partners, many whom have sacrificed alongside U.S.forces in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere. Europe is ourprincipal partner in seeking global and economic security,and will remain so for the foreseeable future. At the sametime, security and unresolved conflicts persist in partsof Europe and Eurasia, where the United States must
continue to promote regional security and Euro-Atlanticintegration. The United States has enduring interests insupporting peace and prosperity in Europe as well as bol-stering the strength and vitality of NATO, which is criticalto the security of Europe and beyond.3
Europe has been our key and most reliable ally for 70
years—and is irreplaceable. Can and should a United
States facing economic trials and intense budget
shortfalls maintain its leadership and partnership
roles on the Continent? What is important is to con-
sider the dynamic nature of foreign policy and the
modern integration of diplomatic, commercial, and
military spheres of influence. Certainly, a substantial
decline in U.S.–European involvement would engen-
der the type of vacuum that could be viewed as a
strategic opportunity by other powers or regions.
For example, China is emerging as a European stake-
holder with compelling economic interests in the
Continent as its second-most-important trading
partner.4 Might not the malaise in Europe present
the Beijing leadership with strategic options that
mesh well with their vision of a rising China? The
same could be said of Russia, currently involved with
the intricacies of the Cypriot banking debacle. Seen in
that light, today’s Europe could not matter more.
Nonetheless, it is useful to examine the issue from
various points of view before new policies reach a
final Rubicon. With historical, cultural, economic,
and security issues tightly interwoven, getting it right
with Europe is vital.
Modern Europe has one constant, missing from the
Europe of every other era since the fall of Rome—
namely, a partnership with the United States of
America. After a disastrous retreat from the inter-
national stage in 1919, post–World War II America
made a courageous bet that a prosperous Europe,
well-financed for rebuilding, would be well-
positioned to defend against communist aggression.
In the early post-war period, this initiative eclipsed
virtually every other in the national interest as the
Soviet Union sought to consolidate and expand its base
in Eastern Europe. The policy led to seven decades
now almost universally viewed as the Pax Americana.
Throughout, American taxpayers funded military
bases in Western Europe, all under the umbrella of
one of the most successful international alliances in
history, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO). The first NATO secretary, General Lord
Ismay, was pithy in defining the early goals. ‘‘NATO
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was established to keep the Americans in, the Russians
out, and the Germans down.’’5 Today’s NATO, globally
engaged in operations from Kosovo to Afghanistan, is
only a reflection of its humble, yet perilous, beginning.
REBALANCING IN THE TWENTIETH
CENTURY: AMERICA COMESTO EUROPE
The rationale for America’s bold and unpre-
cedented moves after World War II was firmly rooted
in the early years of the twentieth century. America’s
entry into World War I in April 1917 marked a signifi-
cant departure from a sharply limiting foreign policy
and military action supporting American commercial
interests. It took significant aggression delivered by
the German U-boats to persuade President Woodrow
Wilson into entering the killing fields of The Great
War. The Wilsonian school of diplomacy was born
as war ended, and, for the first time, an American
president assumed a world leadership role, specifi-
cally at the Paris Peace Conference, in defining the
peace and in forming new international peace initia-
tives. The new spirit of internationalism was short-
lived as Wilson’s health rapidly declined and the
isolationist Senate formally rejected the cornerstone
of his post-war policy: The League of Nations. The
turning away from Europe was so complete as to
form the entire basis for the next administration’s
campaign for the White House. Warren G. Harding
coasted to a comfortable win with one simple slogan:
‘‘A Return to Normalcy.’’6 U.S. influence in Europe
faded almost immediately after the official signing
of the Treaty of Versailles in 1919. Poorly crafted
and badly implemented, the treaty gradually broke
down over two decades, as the Weimar Republic
gave way to Hitler’s Wermacht, with tanks and men
racing across the Continent in a new type of warfare.
Reluctantly, the United States entered World War II
from a position of almost scandalous weakness.
When Gen. George C. Marshall assumed command
in 1939, the U.S. Army was seventeenth largest in
the world with just over 200,000 regular soldiers, an
outdated and limited supply of weapons, an aging
officer corps, and an almost nineteenth-century con-
cept of war.7 At the war’s end, the United States
emerged as the sole power with an intact domestic
infrastructure, a vast arsenal of modern weaponry,
an innovative and modern command structure, and,
above all, having learned an indelible lesson about
the costs of unpreparedness in both lives and treasure.
Unlike the war to end all wars, the agreements
ending World War II were carefully crafted with an
eye toward history and the potential folly of human
hubris. The United Nations essentially reincarnated
the old League of Nations, while the Marshall Plan
and the Bretton Woods Agreement dealt with the
post-war economies of all the war powers, enemies
and allies alike. This time, the United States accepted
the role of Great Power and the responsibilities that
come with it; the world slipped easily and seamlessly
from nineteenth-century Pax Britannica to twentieth-
century Pax Americana almost overnight.
Challenges in Berlin and later in the Korean
Peninsula slowed American demobilization under
President Harry Truman and provided the first chal-
lenges to the post-war agreements, while bringing
into sharp relief the new bipolar world. The Cold
War and the hot proxy wars that followed galvanized
containment strategies, such as those found in docu-
ments like NSC-68.8 Through the 1950s, as Western
Europe’s economies prospered, a tense peace held
while 450,000 U.S. soldiers, sailors, marines, and
airmen stood alongside NATO forces to guarantee
stability. European institutions, including the European
Economic Community (EEC), the Western European
Union (WEU), and eventually the present-day
European Union (EU), took root—allowing transat-
lantic commerce to soar.
On a parallel track with German and Italian
democracies, American investment solidified pros-
perity and capitalism. By the 1960s, the publicly
funded security apparatus that included the incred-
ible success of the $13 billion ($115 billion adjusted
for inflation) Marshall Plan, which spanned 1948–
1951, along with the post-fascist development of the
rule of law, attracted U.S. private capital in a sort of
latter-day gold rush.9 A new generation of European
leaders took note of the growing American economic
influence with varying degrees of resentment and
acceptance. One prominent rival of Charles de Gaulle—
Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber—distilled the argument
in an extremely influential 1968 book, The American
Challenge (Le Defi Americain). The author sounded
a clarion call for Europeans to either move to
a more cohesive federal union or succumb to
American dominance.10 ‘‘The evil is not the capacity
of the Americans, but rather the incapacity of the
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Europeans,’’ he wrote in response to the deluge of
U.S. foreign direct investment. Instead of the familiar
historic call (on both sides of the Atlantic) for
isolationism, he advocated decisively for a united
Europe, better positioned to manage the economic
dominance, even aggression, of an American jugger-
naut.11 When asked by the Washington Post why
Europe did not succumb to the America’s devouring
the Continent economically, he answered without
hesitation: ‘‘They listened to my warning. They did
what I told them.’’12 Despite the influx of billions
upon billions in U.S. investment capital, Europe not
only maintained its independence, it united, albeit
somewhat imperfectly, giving birth to a new currency
in the process.
THE COMPLEXITY AND NUANCE
OF VICTORY
At the Malta Summit in December 1989, presidents
Mikhail Gorbachev of Russia and George H. W. Bush
of the United States produced the closing bracket of
the post-war period, declaring in a joint statement
the effective end of the Cold War; two years later,
the Soviet Union was officially dissolved leaving the
United States of America as the sole superpower and
ushering in the international system that exists today.
The success of the U.S.–European alliance has
emerged as a sort of twenty-first-century morality
play, displaying a triumph of success along with the
seeds of potential human failure. The economic
machinations of the decades of EU advances have
resulted in a new sort of rule book integrating Eur-
opean and American economic interests not merely
on the macro level of international government rela-
tions but on multinational corporate levels as well.
Together, the United States and Europe account for
more than 35 percent of the world’s GDP and, despite
the past decade of disruption, should continue to
dominate if the momentum carries through.13
THE PRICE OF THE PRIZE
The price to the United States and the American
people for 70 years of peace, prosperity, and stability
in Europe was dear. On the human level, the begin-
ning was tragic: 416,800 U.S. military personnel killed
in direct action during the war, with thousands more
maimed or injured.14 Literally, hundreds of billions of
U.S. taxpayer dollars (adjusted for inflation) were
dedicated to Europe’s reconstruction after the
war. The American bases that dotted the European
landscape functioned as human trip wires in the
bipolar world of Soviet–American competition—but
the stage was set for a new prosperity. As the twenti-
eth century waned, the uninterrupted trajectory of
ever-increasing prosperity seemed secure. Even the
wars of Yugoslav succession, much more brutal and
important to continental history (at least thus far) than
the Kosovo conflict and Macedonia scare, did little to
interrupt surging economies, buoyed by new tech-
nologies and accelerating productivity, on both sides
of the Atlantic. The real test of the transatlantic
alliance came after the millennium, when terrorists
attacked New York and Washington, D.C. Although
NATO quickly invoked Article V (a provision in the
agreement treating an attack on any one member as
an attack on all), it was apparent the real military
strength (and budgets) lay with the American forces.
Years of declining military budgets in Europe, in both
absolute terms and as a percentage of GDP, had taken
a toll on readiness. As the American and European
allies moved into Afghanistan to contain Al Qaeda,
the heavy lifting was relegated to U.S. and British
forces. As the decade wore on, nonmilitary weak-
nesses began to surface. The Great Recession, starting
in the United States in 2008, quickly emerged as a glo-
bal financial crisis—racing through Europe, exposing
massive debts and imploding economies. Europe is in
trouble and is, therefore, vulnerable.
Credit swaps and bundled subprime mortgages
were poorly understood derivative instruments in
the investment banking sector before they became
the kindling that fueled a malignant recession that still
haunts American and European economies. Persistent
and pervasive unemployment on both sides of the
Atlantic is stretching social safety nets and exacerbat-
ing deficits. By 2009, EU authorities were citing non-
compliant member states for overspent budgets and
bad banking practices.15 Clearly, North–South fault
lines could rupture Europe as Greece, Spain, Portugal,
Italy, and Ireland struggle with various forms of
austerity required to trigger European Union bailouts,
more and more of which resemble a draft on the
German checkbook. Will these efforts be successful?
The outlook is not encouraging. For example, in
December 2010, Greek prime minister George
Papandreou admitted that not only does Greek debt
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surpass 4300 billion, the country has a debt-to-GDP
ratio of 113 percent, almost double the 60 percent
limit officially permitted in the euro zone.16 Since
the prime minister’s candid admission, the crisis
has intensified—with the 2013 debt-to-GDP ratio
expected to exceed 135 percent in Greece and, for
the euro zone as a whole, to exceed 95 percent.17
Other economies in Europe’s southern tier are in simi-
lar straits. The seriousness of the situation is not lost
on either the political leadership in Beijing or officials
at the People’s Bank of China, and the State Adminis-
tration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE), where concerns
about their largest debtor country, the United States,
were already high.18 A potentially precarious euro is
certainly ringing alarm bells in China, especially as
the country seeks alternative investments to hedge
against weakening U.S. sovereign debt. Simply put,
a weak European Union is not in China’s best interest.
Given the most conservative estimate of Beijing’s
foreign currency reserves, any strategy employed to
protect Chinese commercial imperatives would be
well-financed. Will this be the new world order?
A CULTURE OF STRATEGY
China’s 5,000 years of history and the legacy of the
pre-Qin dynasty philosophers (770–476 BCE) such as
Guan Tzu, Lao Tzu, Confucius, Mencius, Mozi, Sun
Tzu, and Han Feizi are legendary. To this day, these
masters retain their influence—guiding modern lead-
ers, just as they did in charting strategies for the kings
and counselors of ancient Cathay. Chinese professor
Yan Xuetong argued in his most recent book, Ancient
Chinese Thought, Modern Chinese Power, that the
philosophies springing from Confucianism, Daoism
(Taoism), and Buddhism are valid as a basis on which
to formulate future Chinese thinking on strategy and
international relations.19 And, whether looking at
Sun Tzu’s The Art of War, the ‘‘Unrelenting Strategy’’
of the I Ching, Deng Xiaoping’s ‘‘24 Character Strat-
egy,’’ Hu Jintao’s ‘‘Harmonious Society,’’ or, most
recently, Wang Jisi’s ‘‘March West’’ strategy, it would
be hard to argue that the Chinese do not have a
culture that devises and supports long-term strategies.
In 1953, the first of China’s five-year plans (1st FYP)
mirrored Soviet-style centralized planning. Since
those early days of revolutionary rectitude, the new
China has adopted the same type of flexible pragma-
tism that served the empire so well over millennia.
The current Five-Year Plan (12 FYP), which sets
a path to 2015 and is a far cry from Marxist purity,20
is an example of China’s current global perspective
and strategic thinking. China’s ambassador to the
European Union, Song Zhe, has made a point of pub-
licly highlighting the great opportunities existing for
European countries in the 12 FYP, arguing China
will look for win-win cooperative initiatives with
Europe. He says China’s objectives of transitioning
to a consumption-driven economy with a robust
high-tech sector in full pursuit of clean energy
solutions open tangible economic opportunities for
Europe. A corresponding surge in Chinese foreign
direct investment (FDI) in Europe and greater access
on the mainland for European companies will also be
a great benefit.21 The flow of capital and trade
between China and the EU provides solid evidence
to back up Ambassador Song’s supportive declara-
tions to financially stressed Europeans. Part of China’s
pivot to Europe can be seen in trade figures. For
example, in 2010, trade in manufactured goods
increased a healthy 30 percent, year-over-year, to
4395 billion.22 In addition, China signaled the stra-
tegic importance of Europe by tripling its outward
FDI to EU countries to 47.4 billion, up from less than
41 million just five years prior.23
On the diplomatic front, the intent of the Chinese
government could not be plainer. In 2010, in reaction
to the euro crisis, both President Hu Jintao and
Premier Wen Jiabao flew to Europe to reassure lead-
ers across the Continent of China’s commitment to
stemming the crisis.24 Unfortunately for Europe’s cen-
tral banking elites, investments from China tend to be
concentrated in potentially lucrative commercial
operations rather than in the declining sovereign debt
of the Continent’s southern tier. Speeches and state-
ments from China’s leaders in Greece and Spain, as
well as written objectives in the new Five-Year Plan,
speak of an organized attempt to double trade by
2015.25 Current trade figures are on target, however,
clearly most activity will be the result of Chinese com-
mercial and industrial investment, along with some
liberalization of internal Chinese markets designed
to increase European exports.26 Clearly, the declining
economies of Europe will benefit from Chinese
actions in their battered GDP and employment stat-
istics. However, European leaders would doubtless
prefer increased bond purchases to commercial
investments.27 In the Rhodium Group’s recent seminal
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study, China Invests in Europe: Patterns, Impacts and
Policy Implications, experts Thilo Hanemann and
Dan Rosen deftly capture the upward bend in the
curve of China’s economic focus on Europe.28 They
expect the momentum for future Chinese investment
in the EU to only increase and urge EU leaders to
develop policies now to maximize the positive
aspects of increased integration, while mitigating
potential adverse aspects.29 Rhodium further postu-
lates: if the current trajectory holds, the amount of
FDI into Europe from China between now and 2020
could be conservatively estimated at between $20B
and $30B annually.30
What type of influence in European economic,
political, and security affairs will such a level of
economic throw-weight bring? Although the study
attempts to answer the question with a balanced
set of best and worst case scenarios, assessing
Chinese economic discourse with the EU overall
warrants caution by decision makers:
In addition to economic implications, we also consider thepolitical impacts of Chinese FDI in Europe. It is naturalthat Chinese officials might threaten to withhold directinvestment if they believed doing so could affectEuropean politics. Based on our analysis, however,Chinese firms are less subject to Beijing’s puppetry thanmany observers believe . . .
. . .That said, there is ample reason to anticipateattempts by Beijing to mix money with politics—theyalready have with Japan over rare earths, and Europe oversupport for crisis stabilization funds.31
What is clear is that Chinese investment and
involvement in Europe represent a way out of the
deepening economic crisis across the Continent.
With a centralized command and control economy,
China is well-positioned to use coercive economic
diplomacy rather than military force as the lever of
choice.32 A chilling reminder of coercive Chinese
political–economic pressure came in 2010, just one
year before the explosive growth in FDI to Europe,
when Chinese dissident Liu Xiaobo was named
a Nobel Prize laureate. Despite clear warnings from
Beijing, the award was presented. China responded
by convincing 18 nations to pull their representatives
from attending the ceremony and punished Norway
in the following months by imposing severe restric-
tions on Norwegian salmon exports to China. The
result: Norway’s market share shrunk by 60 percent,
while the overall demand for salmon in China rose
30 percent.33
ECONOMIC A2AD?
In military parlance, the types of regional capabili-
ties China is developing in its military are bracketed
under a category dubbed ‘‘Anti-Access Area Denial’’
or A2AD. Weapons in this realm, designed to keep
opposing forces at bay, range from antiship ballistic
missiles (ASBMs) to higher end antisatellite weapons
(ASATs). The concept of A2AD has expanded
beyond its military origins to cover the influencing
of strategic choices using a full range of options,
including military, diplomatic, cultural, economic,
and political. In 2010, Chinese direct investment of
$3 billion equated to approximately 45,000 European
jobs, implying China possesses a potential capacity
for economic A2AD. Clearly, influence of this type
can easily translate into a form of political clout,
possibly affecting Nobel ceremonies, and much
more.34 If the Rhodium estimate proves correct in
predicting a six-to-tenfold investment increase, the
possibilities for China’s maneuvering within the
European Union would increase exponentially. In
short, should Europe fail to mitigate debt and budget
challenges, while simultaneously depending on
Chinese investment for 4-to-5 million jobs, the results
could include a sort of retro-feudalism unimaginable
even 10 years ago. At the very least, Continental
leadership should focus on future policies, carefully
examining both pros and cons. A question emerging
is whether or not greater European access to internal
Chinese markets creates a virtuous circle of exported
goods balanced against an influx of cash into
Europe. Will the resulting profits be reinvested or
repatriated as the business climate directs or will
a gradual decline in sovereign power create a new
sort of proxy or vassal state? In analyzing the current
situation, it is prudent to look at the stated goals
inherent in contemporary Chinese policies:
. Hope for EU support in gaining Market Economy
status in the WTO before 201635
. Overtures to Iceland to gain access to the Arctic
Council to secure access to natural resources
and passage rites36
. Lifting the EU arms embargo in force since the
Tiananmen Square crisis in 198937
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Volkswagen, whose most important market for 60
years was Germany, will sell close to 1 million units
in its home country this year while selling 2.7 million
in China.38 While those concerned with China’s ris-
ing stature and influence in Europe would point to
troublesome anecdotes like these as harbingers of
the irreversible dependency, even further complica-
tions are in store with deeper integration between
China and the EU. For example, significant invest-
ments from the mainland and the resultant capital
at risk in Europe will leave the Chinese with their
own set of vulnerabilities in any long-term economic
strategy. Rhodium Group’s study posits China cannot
expect its economic strategy in Europe to give it
free rein in the Continent’s capitals and the EU’s
governance structures without inadvertently creating
economic levers that European leaders can use:
Greater presence of Chinese firms abroad will also makeBeijing more vulnerable to economic sanctions and otherpolitical pressures—just imagine Beijing’s dilemma in thecurrent Iran crisis if its banks had significant operationsin Europe and the United States. This new situation willgive Europe and the U.S. more opportunities to work withChina on a bilateral and multilateral level.39
For Europe and China, the key to successful
economic integration seems to be rooted in striking
the right balance. Such success could usher in an
age of partnership and prosperity on a grand scale.
If policymakers fail, however, the result of the
world’s number one economy being entirely depen-
dent on the world’s number three economy could be
disastrous. The numbers are just too staggering, with
implications for the entire planet. The old verity,
‘‘Measure twice, cut once’’ is true; effective policy is
paramount.
THE TRANSATLANTIC BOND: ANEVOLVING STRATEGIC
RELATIONSHIP
At World War II’s end, every element of national
power and tremendous, unwavering commitment
from the United States went into the reconstruction
of Europe, creating the largest economic relationship
the world has ever seen. After all, the United States
and Europe generate more than one-third of the
world’s gross domestic product. As Stanford’s Hoover
Fellow, Josef Joffe, put it, ‘‘It is the world’s anchor of
liberal democracy.’’40 Supreme Commander Allied
Forces Europe (SACEUR), Admiral James Stavridis,
affirmed this in his recent appearance before Con-
gress, when he testified: ‘‘one of the most important
reasons the relationship with Europe was so vital
was our shared values.’’41 A myriad of factors, from
globalization and intense competition for resources
to persistent economic crises, have leaders on both
sides of the Atlantic at a crossroads over the future
direction of the relationship. In the political–military
sphere, for all its shortcomings and rising dissatis-
faction in the United States over declining European
defense contributions, NATO, at 64 years old,
remains the world’s most consistent and effective
alliance among nations. Alongside the public and
private economic integration existing for more than
six decades, the transatlantic relationship is unrivaled
in terms of peace, stability, and mutual benefits
among its 28 member nations and beyond to greater
Europe.
As operations wind down in Afghanistan and
NATO comes home, the world should hope for
wisdom from its leaders in managing a traditional
post-war budget drawdown. This year, with NATO
countries struggling to overcome very real financial
challenges, the need for careful apportionment of
scarce resources is even more acute. Will their deci-
sions usher in a new era of prosperity built on new
and exciting industries and technologies or will the
West fade as so many civilizations have over the
millennia? Both sides of the Atlantic will soon know.
Given the realities of diminishing military resources,
the challenge ahead for policymakers on both sides
of the Atlantic will be to define a new way of preser-
ving and enhancing the transatlantic relationship—
with the values of SACEUR as the anchor. These
imperatives are not to stem or negate a rising China,
however, they do acknowledge the United States,
EU, and China as the world’s largest economies
and each will pursue what it perceives to be in its
best interest. Formulating multilateral and bilateral
policies among the three and maintaining a balance
among them are vital to all nations from an economic
and security standpoint. Scholars at the European
China Research and Advice Network (ECRAN), Bates
Gill and Andrew Small, boldly state in their study,
Untapped Trilateralism: Common Economic and
Security Interests of the European Union, the United
States and China, we now live in a ‘‘tripolar world.’’42
However, even though the big three account for
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more than 54 percent of global GDP, they stop well
short of urging a trilateral body.43 To tackle common
economic and security interests, convergent or
divergent, ECRAN advises that bilateral and existing
multilateral structures would be the most efficacious
means.44 Avoiding a formal trilateral structure,
ECRAN argues, provides more flexibility and trans-
parency to get at competitive and collaborative agen-
das. Whether or not current U.S. and European
military structures need further adjustment to meet
the challenges of a tripolar world, is solely in the
domain of political leaders in North American and
European capitals.
CONCLUSION
Europe still matters and very likely always will. As
defense budgets decrease and military forces are
repurposed globally, the debate about U.S. commit-
ment to Europe will continue on both sides of
the Atlantic. And, while those arguments ensue, the
reality remains China is on a rising vector and the
Asia-Pacific region continues to grow in importance.
The current economic problems on both sides of
the Atlantic dictate the old formulas no longer apply.
New ideas about the best deployment of resources in
Europe, whether diplomatic, economic, or military,
need to enter the debate. The goal of sustaining the
vibrant transatlantic relationship and the ready NATO
alliance needs urgent attention in North America and
Europe. The door is now open. In a recent New York
Times op-ed, former senior director of the National
Security Council Hans Binnendijk reports on a new
directive from the Defense Department to review
U.S. military strategy in response to budget reduc-
tions resulting from deficit reduction and seques-
tration.45 He predicts by the end of the review the
United States will call for one of two directions. The
State Department and Defense Department will coor-
dinate and support either ‘‘Offshore Balancing,’’
which would involve a withdrawal of forces from
Europe and the Middle East. Alternatively, the United
States might pursue a path called ‘‘Forward Partner-
ing’’ developed at National Defense University. This
would emphasize U.S. forward-force deployments
to enable partners to be interoperable with U.S.
forces while being primarily responsible for security
in their regions.46 However, military strategy has
traditionally been one element in a multilayered
approach to U.S. foreign policy. Whatever military
force decisions come out of future strategies, diplo-
macy as well as public and private economic plans
will need to be integrated to optimize U.S. outcomes
in Europe. If we are indeed waking up to a tripolar
world order, then recognition of Europe as a block,
making up the world’s largest economy and liberal
democratic values congruent with those of the United
States, will be to the benefit of China and the rest of
the global community of nations. The time has come
to make strategic choices.
Notes
1. European Union, Eurostat, http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/tgm/refreshTableAction.do?tab=table&plugin=1&init=1&pcode=tec00001&language=en.
2. Benjamin Fox, ‘‘Unemployment Now the Main Problem inthe Eurozone,’’ euobserver.com, February 25, 2013, http://euobserver.com/economic/119170.
3. U.S. Department of Defense, ‘‘Sustaining U.S. Global Leader-ship: Priorities for 21st Century Defense,’’ January 2012,2–3, http://www.defense.gov/news/Defense_Strategic_Gui-dance.pdf.
4. Frederic Lerias, Mattias Levin, Myriam Sochacki, and Rein-hilde Veugelers, China, the EU and the World: Growing inHarmony (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications ofthe European Communities, 2007).
5. Quoted in Geoffrey Roberts, Stalin’s Wars: From World Warto Cold War, 1939–1953 (New Haven, CT: Yale UniversityPress, 2006), 358.
6. Encyclopedia Brittanica, Harding: Return to Normalcy,speech, 1920, http://www.britannica.com/presidents/article-9116882.
7. John Nelson II, ‘‘General George C. Marshall: StrategicLeadership and the Challenges of Reconstituting the Army,1939–41,’’ February 1993, Strategic Studies Institute, http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/summary.cfm?q=358.
8. James S. Lay, Jr., National Security Council–68 (NSC-68),April 12, 1950, Harry S. Truman Library & Museum, http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/coldwar/documents/pdf/10-1.pdf.
9. Michael S. H. Heng, The Great Recession: History, Ideology,Hubris and Nemesis (New York: World Scientific, 2010), 128.
10. J.-J. Servan-Schreiber, The American Challenge (New York:Atheneum, 1968).
11. Martin Douglas, ‘‘J.-J. Servan-Schreiber, French Man of Ideas,Dies at 82,’’NewYork Times, November 8, 2006, http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9F05E4DF1E3FF93BA35752C1A9609C8B63.
12. Ibid.13. International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook
Database, September 2011, http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2011/02/weodata/index.aspx.
14. National World War II Museum, Military Deaths for UnitedStates, http://www.nationalww2museum.org/learn/education/for-students/ww2-history/ww2-by-the-numbers/world-wide-deaths.html.
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15. BBC News, ‘‘Timeline: The Unfolding Eurozone Crisis,’’ June13, 2012, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-13856580.
16. Ibid.17. Christian Odendahl and William Oman, ‘‘Greece Outlook:
Recession Slows; Further OSI Conditional on Reform,’’Roubini Global Economics, March 26, 2013; ChristianOdendahl and William Oman, ‘‘Eurozone Outlook: Bad in2013; Better in 2014, but with Downside Political Risks,’’Roubini Global Economics, March 27, 2013.
18. Wieland Wagner, ‘‘China Expands Its Influence in Europe,’’December 14, 2010, Spiegel Online, http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/capitalizing-on-the-euro-crisis-china-expands-its-influence-in-europe-a-734323.html.
19. Yan Xuetong, Ancient Chinese Thought, Modern ChinesePower (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011).
20. Robert Ash, Robin Porter, and Tim Summers, ‘‘China, the EUand China’s Twelfth Five-Year Programme,’’ ChathamHouse,Europe China Research and Advice Network, 2012, 11, http://www.chathamhouse.org/publications/papers/view/182630.
21. Ibid., 72.22. Ibid., 71.23. Thilo Hanemann and Daniel Rosen, ‘‘China Invests in Europe:
Patterns, Impacts and Policy Implications,’’ Rhodium Group,2012, 3, http://rhg.com/events/china-invests-in-europe-patterns-impacts-and-policy-issues.
24. Wagner, ‘‘Capitalizing on the Euro Crisis: China Expands ItsInfluence in Europe.’’
25. Ibid. Also, Ash and Summers, ‘‘China, the EU and China’sTwelfth Five-Year Programme.’’
26. Ibid.27. Ibid.28. Hanemann and Rosen, ‘‘China Invests in Europe: Patterns,
Impacts and Policy Implications.’’29. Ibid., 7.30. Ibid., 5.31. Ibid., 6.32. Bonnie Glaser, ‘‘China’s Coercive Economic Diplomacy:
A New and Worrying Trend,’’ Center for Strategic and
International Studies, August 6, 2012, http://csis.org/publication/chinas-coercive-economic-diplomacy-new-and-worrying-trend.
33. Ibid.34. Hanemann and Rosen, ‘‘China Invests in Europe: Patterns,
Impacts and Policy Implications.’’35. ‘‘Wagner, Capitalizing on the Euro Crisis.’’36. Thomas Pickering and Einar Benediktsson, ‘‘China Knocks on
Iceland’s Door,’’ New York Times, March 12, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/13/opinion/china-knocks-on-icelands-door.html?_r=0.
37. Louise Armitstead, ‘‘China’s Wen Jiabao Demands Lift to EUArms Embargo,’’ Telegraph, September 20, 2012, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/china-business/9556509/Chinas-Wen-Jiabao-demands-EU-lift-arms-embargo.html.
38. Liza Lin, ‘‘For VW, the Path to Global Dominance LeadsThrough China,’’ Bloomberg Businessweek, November 25,2012, http://www.businessweek.com/news/2012-11-25/for-vw-the-path-to-global-dominance-leads-through-china.
39. Hanemann and Rosen, ‘‘China Invest in Europe,’’ 59.40. Josef Joffe, ‘‘The Turn Away from Europe,’’ Atlantic Council,
November 5, 2012, http://www.acus.org/?q=natosource/turn-away-europe.
41. James Stavridis, Statement to the House Armed ServicesCommittee, USEUCOM, March 15, 2013, http://www.eucom.mil/mission/background/posture-statement.
42. Bates Gill and Andrew Small, ‘‘Untapped Trilateralism:Common Economic and Security Interests of the EuropeanUnion, the United States and China,’’ Chatham House,November 2012, 7.
43. International Monetary Fund, World Economic OutlookDatabase.
44. Gill and Small, ‘‘Untapped Trilateralism,’’ 12.45. Hans Binnedijk, ‘‘Rethinking U.S. Security Strategy,’’ New
York Times, March 24, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/25/opinion/global/rethinking-us-security-strategy.html.
46. Ibid.
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