smuggling into europe transit migrants in greece

7/30/2019 Smuggling Into Europe Transit Migrants in Greece

1/18

Journal of Refugee Studies Vol. 17, No. 2 Oxford University Press 2004; all rights reserved

Smuggling into Europe: Transit Migrants

in Greece1

A S P A S I A P A P A D O P O U L O U

School of Geography, University of Oxford, UK

The paper aims to contribute to our understanding of the overlapping fields of

smuggling and asylum, and address the less studied condition of transit migration.Based on a case study of Kurds in Greece, the paper describes the organization of the

journey and the process of temporary and permanent settlement. Greece is currently

one of the main entry points to Europe for migrants coming from the Middle East.

In the absence of legal entry paths, almost all migrants arrive in Greece illegally.

Many see Greece as the passage to Western Europe, and therefore do not apply

for asylum but remain undocumented in the country for a couple of years. Some

eventually leave the country, while others end up staying permanently. The paper

explores the reasons behind the phenomenon of transit migration and its conse-

quences for the migrants, the country and the EU.

Introduction

Boats loaded with Kurdish, Iraqi, Afghani or Pakistani migrants cross the

Aegean on an almost routine basis. While few of these migrants apply for asylum

in Greece, the majority remain temporarily undocumented, hoping to leave and

settle in a Western European country in the near future. In reality, this condition

of temporary settlement may last for a significant amount of time. The paper

argues that smuggling and transit migration are a result of the poverty of domes-

tic reception infrastructure and the deficiencies in domestic and EU asylumpolicy. Following an outline of the Greek reception policy structures in the first

part, the second part of the paper describes the journey from Iran, Iraq and

Turkey to Greece and the role and type of smuggling used to cross the borders.

The third part analyses the condition of transit migration and permanent set-

tlement of Kurdish refugees. The shift to permanent settlement depends on the

opportunities for asylum and the degree of engagement in socio-economic activ-

ities in the host society during the first couple of years. The final part discusses the

consequences of transit migration for the migrants, the country and the EU.

One of the main aims of this paper is to argue for the importance of politics andpolicy dimensions in determining migration trends (Hammar 1992). To a large

extent, the institutional framework of migration and asylum in the EU member

states is one of control and restriction. This framework affects migration flows,

by leading to an increase of irregular and asylum migration. In turn, the fear of


2/18

irregular migration raises security concerns that direct the development of

ever stricter policies known as the securitization of migration. Since the 1999

European Council meeting in Tampere (1999), which set out the elements for

a common European immigration and asylum policy, intergovernmental coop-eration has not managed to reduce, but only to divert the number of asylum

seekers and irregular migrants elsewhere in the European Union. In other words,

member states have been able to obstruct but not to control migration (Geddes

2001: 35).

Irregular migration encompasses various types of irregular entry, residence

and employment. Incomplete documentation is not just a matter of preference,

but also often a result of institutional deficiencies in the countries of origin and

settlement, and unrealistic government policies that require documents people

sometimes cannot obtain (Ghosh 1998: 67). This is particularly the case forforced migrants, who generally are not able to obtain documents from the

country they are forced to flee. There is also another connection between irregular

migrants and refugees: refugees will take the irregular path when the asylum

application has been rejected and they cannot return home; about 80 per cent of

those rejected stay in Europe because they cannot be sent back home due to

insufficient or missing identification (Nadig 2002: 5). Refugees also become

irregular when they take up irregular employment while the asylum application

is processed; or when they do not apply in the country of first asylum, hoping to

obtain asylum elsewhere.

The term transit migration is used for the phenomenon where migrants come

to a country of destination with the intention of going and staying in another

country (Icduygu 1995: 127). The intentionthat is, the decision to stay tem-

porarily in one country in order to move onis not always clear at the beginning

of the journey, but is affected by the structural context of the first country of

reception (Chatelard 2002b: 24). It is equally affected by the dynamic and

potential of transnational social networks in asylum migration. Migrants usually

stay temporarily in the buffer zone awaiting developments both in the home-

lands, such as the possibility of return, and in the transit countries, such as

obtaining visas or waiting for the outcome of business ventures they havebegun in these places (Wallace et al. 1996: 269). In other words, transit migration

can develop into further emigration or permanent settlement. In a way, tempor-

ary residence in the first host country is a mechanism of negotiation with the

structures of exclusion in Europe. It is a way to overcome restrictive policies by

residing in more than one countrysometimes illegallyand by gaining time

and money until the opportunities allow migration to another, more promising

destination country. In this context, transit and irregular migration need to be

seen not as factual migration types, but as different phases in the migration

process. A number of structural factors also account for this phenomenon.The geographical position, the exclusive asylum policies and lack of experience

in combating illegal migration have transformed Central and Eastern European

countries into a perfect waiting room for migrants (Okolski 2000). Similarly,

Greece, being a new immigration country sharing the features described above,

168 Aspasia Papadopoulou


3/18

is indirectly encouraging migrants to settle temporarily. At the same time, being

in Schengenland (the countries of the European Union which allow free move-

ment across their internal borders), Greece appeals as a potential entry and place

of settlement in Europe.The paper is based on fieldwork conducted in the Greater Athens Area in

20012002. Thisinvolved 50 interviews withKurdish asylum seekers and undocu-

mented migrants living in refugee camps, halls of residence and houses and who

had been in Greece between two months and twelve years. The 35 men and

15 women were mostly aged between 2535, and originated from Iraq and

Turkey, but also Iran (two) and Syria (one). The sample also included twelve

migrants actively engaged in Kurdish political parties (all from Turkey), and

fifteen more who had been party members in Greece or in their homeland in

the past (from Turkey, Iraq and Iran). The interviews were in-depth and semi-structured and covered the whole migration experience, from the homeland and

the reasons of flight, to the journey, arrival and settlement in Athens. They were

first recorded as personal accounts, and subsequently coded and analysed in

themes. Fieldwork also involved 17 structured interviews with government

and NGO officials on migration/asylum policy and reception in Greece, and

analysis of secondary data such as parliamentary proceedings, NGO reports

and briefings, and media information on migration issues. The different sources

were correlated and horizontally analysed in themes relating to the asylum cycle.

Migration to Greece in the 1990s and the Asylum Policy Framework

Migration to Greece belongs to a broader set of contemporary migration phe-

nomena in Southern Europe in the last twenty years. Greece shares the following

characteristics, known as the South European model of migration: a multi-

plicity and heterogeneity of nationalities; a gender asymmetry in certain flows; an

increasing participation of urban educated persons among legal and illegal

migrants; and a high degree of illegality, due both to the restrictive character

of EU migration policy, but also to the size and strength of informal economies

that can host and sustain large numbers of illegal migrants (King and Black 1997;King 2000; Pugliese 1993; Baldwin-Edwards and Arango 1999). Today, the total

number of foreigners, including regularized labour migrants (about 600,000 in

2001), irregular migrants, refugees, asylum seekers and ethnic Greeks from the

former Soviet Union is estimated to be close to one million (Cavounidis 2002).

The significant majority are Albanians and Eastern European nationalities.

Greece has now more immigrants than any Southern European country in

proportion to its population: between 9 and 11 per cent of the registered

Greek labour force of 4.4 million and 25 per cent of wage and salary earners

are foreigners (Fakiolas 2000: 59).Refugee movements to Greece came in ebbs and flows, with peak times the

early 1990s, the years 19961997, and from 2000 onwards. Regarding nation-

ality, roughly 50 per cent of asylum seekers and refugees during the last decade

have originated from Iraq, Turkey and Iran (UNHCR 2000, 2002). The majority

Transit Migrants in Greece 169


4/18

are said to be Kurds, who came to Greece in three main waves: in 19911992, after

the use of chemical weapons in Halabja, Iraq and the Gulf War; in 19941995

after the escalation of violence in Southeastern Turkey; and in 19961998 due to

the ongoing conflict between Kurdish parties in Northern Iraq. A small numberof Kurdish refugees from Turkey had already arrived in Greece in the late 1970s

to early 1980s. Kurdish migration from Iraq has continued unabated up to the

present, as a result of the social and political instability and economic deprivation

in Northern Iraq. The number of Kurds in Greece is hard to estimate, because of

the constant mobility in and out of the country, but also the absence of statistics

for this particular group: applicants are recorded on the basis of citizenship (Iraq,

Iran, Turkey), while ethnicity (Kurds) is mentioned in the hearing process only.

In general, estimations have ranged from 7,000 to 24,000 in 19971998, and

around 10,00012,000 in 2001.

2

The relatively small annual number of refugees and asylum seekers gives the

impression that the issue in Greece is minor. In 2002, for example, the country

had a refugee population of 18,852, out of which two thirds were new applicants

and people whose application was still pending.3 These numbers do not,

however, reflect the actual size of the refugee population, a large part of

which remains undocumented, sometimes reluctant to apply; nor do they

include the rejected asylum seekers, who often end up staying in the country.

To state the obvious, no reliable data exists on illegal entries. Estimations are

usually based on apprehensions at the moment of border crossing. The number

of migrants arrested for illegal entry in 2001 was 6,800 people (Migration News

Sheet, February 2002, vol. 9, 2). This does not, however, include the cases of

successful entries; instead, the numbers of migrants arrested inside the country

for the same year was 210,000 (Ta Nea, 25 October 2001). Another 114,181 were

arrested between 1 June 2001 and 31 March 2002 (Eleftherotypia, 31 April

2002).

Located at Europes southeastern border, Greece faces a major external and

internal policy challenge to control irregular migration flows to the EU. Migra-

tion management has focused on the one hand on a series of regularization

programmes for resident labour migrants, and on the other on the preventionof irregular migration through reinforced border protection (recruitment of

additional border guards, intensification of sea patrols, penalties for smugglers).4

One of the most important aspects for Greece in the area of migration manage-

ment is cooperation with Turkey, given Turkeys key geographical position in the

map of SouthNorth migration movements. In November 2001, the two coun-

tries signed a Protocol for the readmission of illegal migrants.5 Its implementa-

tion, however, has not been considered successful up to nowat least from the

Greek side. In practice, only very few migrants have been readmitted to Turkey.

According to the Ministry of Public Order, out of 5,600 applications to Turkeyfor readmission in 2002, only 100 were accepted in the first instance, and 34 after

further negotiation (interview, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 8 April 2003). The

readmission protocol has also been criticized for not guaranteeing access to

asylum for persons in need of international protection.6



5/18

Several recent cases of mass arrivals have shown the difficulty of controlling

irregular migration flows, and the ambivalent attitude of the state towards the

nature of these flows. State officials and the public generally share the impres-

sion that most newcomers are labour migrants abusing the asylum system. As aresult, state policy has been an oxymoron of providing humanitarian assistance

and temporary reception facilities to newcomers, but with the aim of deporting

them so as to prevent permanent settlements. Asylum policy is very much based

on a rationale of restriction, as evident in the limited opportunities for gaining

refugee status and the poverty of reception infrastructure. The asylum exam-

ination process is quite long, between 18 months and two years including

appeals, and the recognition rate very low: while in 2000/2001 it ranged between

79 per cent, in 2002 it dropped to 0.3 per cent (1.1 per cent including huma-

nitarian status), the lowest in the last 20 years. In the rest of the EU the rate forthe same year was 21.1 per cent.7 In general, the rationale is to grant asylum to

those that strictly fulfil the 1951 Convention criteria and provide irrefutable

evidence. Due to the circumstances of flight, but also the diversity of reasons for

flight, it is usually very difficult for Kurds to build a case with such evidence.

In addition, and despite waves of refugee arrivals since 1996 (mainly Kurds,

Iraqis, Afghanis), the reception infrastructure remains very poor. With a hand-

ful of refugee camps and reception halls and the allocation of services to the

international and local NGOs, the existing facilities and resources are unable to

cover the housing and welfare needs of the refugee population. Asylum seekers

do not receive a subsidy; however, they are given the right to employment

during the time their case is being examined. In addition, and judging from

interviews, access to asylum is not always easy, as migrants are not well

informed about their procedures and rights. Last but not least, informal depor-

tations of persons, including torture victims, and detention of asylum seekers

have often been reported by human rights groups (NCHR 2001: 6, 2002:

Introduction).

These factors discourage migrants from applying in the country. As a result,

they tend to remain undocumented in Greece in order to maintain the right to

apply for asylum in another European country (since the 1991 Dublin Conven-tion provides that the country of first asylum in Europe is the one responsible for

the asylum determination process). Others do register with the authorities in

Greece, in order to gain protection from deportation and the right to employ-

ment, and then apply again in the second host country. They play on the chances

of their case being presented later to Greece from that country; 680 such Dublin

Convention requests were addressed to Greece in 2001 and 818 in 2002 (ECRE

2001, 2002). In general, the Greek framework has been criticized for lacking an

effective administrative infrastructure and a coherent state plan for integrated

refugee protection (Sitaropoulos 2000). In addition, it is guided by a rationale ofad hoc, temporary solutions rather than comprehensive planning for refugee

reception. In the policy context described above, the opportunities for legal entry

and stay in Greece are very limited. As a result, the majority of forced migrants

follow the illegal path.



6/18

Smuggling into Greece

The paper is based on the assumption that the migration of the particular ethnic

group is forced, and a result of a broad set of factors, including political

instability, social unrest and economic deprivation in the countries of origin.

The Kurds reasons for flight are not further analysed here; taking the decision to

emigrate is mainly induced by a pressing need to escape. The approach taken is

close to Richmonds (1993) proposition that there is a continuum from reactive

to proactive migration. As will be explained further below, the selection of

destination country is affected by a number of factors. For many, the crucial

issue is the way out from Iraq, Turkey or Iran; the question of destination is raised

at a later stage.

It is almost an established practice for migrants from the Middle East to use

smugglers for the exit and entry into Greece. In this case study, smuggling is asmall-scale organization of movement, where smugglers and drivers (kacakci in

Turkish) are not necessarily familiar with each other and often change as cir-

cumstances demand (Icduygu and Toktas 2002). They may be individually

engaged in a casual business, or be part of a local network of individuals organiz-

ing the border crossings. The Ministry of Public Order reports that 190

such networks involving Greece have been identified in the last two years

(Eleftherotypia, 5 January 2003). According to interviews, the smugglers facil-

itating the trip from Iraq or Iran to Turkey are usually Turks, Kurds, Iraqis and

Turkmens, whereas those working for the trip from Turkey to Greece are Turks,Kurds, Greeks and other Balkan nationalities. The business is quite widespread:

1,100 smugglers were arrested in Turkey in 2001 and another 843 in Greece

between 2001 and 2003 (Turkish Daily News, 1 December 2001; Eleftherotypia,

5 January 2003). Migrants may also participate in the smuggling business for

some additional cash.

According to the UN Protocol against the smuggling of migrants,

Smuggling of migrants shall mean the procurement in order to obtain directly or

indirectly, a financial or a material benefit, of the illegal entry of a person into a

State Party of which the person is not a national or personal resident (Protocol

Against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, Supplementing

the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2000,

Article 3(1), p.2).

While it is obviously a case of exploitation of people for the sake of profit, a

main condition in this operation, and the one distinguishing it from human

trafficking, is that of choice versus coercion (Morrison and Crosland 2001;

Salt and Hoggarth 2000). In this sense, according to interviews, the Kurds

who had paid a kacakci for the crossing did choose this practice as the onlyprofessional way to be transported from the one country to the other. They are

doing their job. We would not be here otherwise was the answer of one of my

informants. In fact, using the smuggling service is mostly a short-term, commer-

cial relationship between the individual offering the service and the migrant



7/18

client paying for it, and is terminated after the crossing. According to interviews,

the kacakci are numerous and well advertised in the local communities in Iraq,

Iran and Turkey. In Greece, they are known in the refugee camps and within the

migrant population, and are easily contacted by mobile phone.Turkey is the first stop on the way from the Middle East to Europe. Migrants

usually concentrate in the border cities of Van, Agri and Hakkari, and from there

to Istanbul, a nodal point in the migration route. They stay in safe houses or in

friends places and work in day jobs in the area, to finance the second part of

the trip. My informants spent from a couple of weeks to one year in Turkey

before coming to Greece. Kurds from Turkey immigrating to Europe join in the

same routes.

There are two main ways to Greece, by land across the GreekTurkish border

and by sea, to the islands of the Eastern Aegean. According to interviews, the feeto Greece is about $1,0001,500. More than 5,000 are estimated to have crossed

the border just between May and July 2002 (Avgi, 10 August 2002). Crossing the

Evros River at the border is quite a perilous route and many have reportedly

drowned in the river. Another danger is the border minefield that is badly sign-

posted and has cost the lives of 64 migrants during the last decade (Kathimerini,

29 August 2002). The kacakci usually leads migrants up to the border and gives

instructions for the paths to follow (like the pateros in the case of Mexican

migration to the US, in Spener 2001: 134136), or accompanies them to the other

side. Some have a specific contact for a safe house in Greece, others hide in

trucks going to Athens. However, not all migrants can afford a smuggler; a

quarter of my informants crossed the river on their own.

The second option is the sea passage. Almost half of my informants came from

Turkey to Greece by boat. Smuggling arrangements are made in Istanbul and the

Turkish coastal cities. For migrants who cannot afford the extra $1,000 for the

trip, there is the option of hiring a small inflatable or motorboat, or even stowing

away in cargo ships. The sea route is no less dangerous: it is estimated that

109 people have drowned in the Aegean between 19922001 (Metrorama,

30 January 2003). Migrants leaving Greece for Western Europe also use the

smuggling service by plane (using fake passports), by road (hiding in trucks)through Albania, or by boat, hiding in the ferries going from Patras to Italy.

The widespread use of smugglers by migrants seeking asylum in Europe lies at

the core of the asylumirregular migration entanglement. The main problem is

the fact that the state seems to be holding the type of entry (illegal) as the criterion

for the categorization of migrants, at least in its conception and policy rationale.

Thus, the fact that many among the stowaways and those irregularly crossing the

border are in need of international protection is overshadowed by the suspicion

about their illegal action. In fact, it is a vicious circle where intensification of

border controls leads refugees to resort to illegal alternatives, which in turn leadsto the securitization of migration. As Crisp (1999) suggests, therefore, it is neces-

sary to distinguish between means and motivation to prevent a persons claim to

refugee status from being reduced because of illegal entry. This point does

not dismiss the fact that smuggling is a crime; it is a form of severe economic



8/18

exploitation for the migrants and their families, both in the homeland and in the

new destination countries, as well as a threat to human security. The receiving

country is also a victim of smuggling because of the challenge to the states

sovereign right to control its borders (Nadig 2002). This argument is more asuggestion to consider that, unfortunately, smuggling has become for most

migrants the only way out of political and financial desperation in their home-

lands and, at the same time, the only way in, in the absence of other legal entry

paths into Europe. The restrictive entry criteria and the extreme difficulties of the

asylum process in Europe have driven people to the smuggled entry route (Koser

2001).

With regard to the countries of destination, the UK, Sweden, Germany and

France were the most popular among the Kurds I interviewed, followed by

Canada, Switzerland, the Netherlands and Australia. A shared impressionamong the Kurds was that these countries, particularly the UK, Sweden and

Germany, are more generous in granting asylum and social benefits to refugees.

This perception is based on rumours and information from smugglers and other

migrants resident there. For half of my sample, the choice of destination was

based on this kind of information. In other words, the main criterion for settle-

ment is the type of asylum policies offered (Koser 1997: 600601). Some migrants

had more than one choice, depending on the smuggling opportunities, and a few

others did not have a particular country in mind. In fact, for many migrants the

destination was Europe, understood as a broad space of safety, protection and

opportunities. Return was rarely seen as an option, due to the current political

and socio-economic situation in the countries of origin.

As observed in migration studies, social networks assist in the migration

process by providing information and resources to potential migrants and new-

comers (Massey et al. 1987; Crisp 1999; Koser 1997; Boyd 1989). Indeed, Kurds

with ties in Greece or other countries had been well informed before emigration

about reception facilities, the asylum process, welfare provisions and meeting

points in Athens. In fact, one fifth of the sample came because of existing family

or social ties in Greece. Yet, more informants had no social or family ties in

Greece and arrived completely unprepared. In addition, five chose Greece ran-domly, without any prior information or planning. Still, the choice of destination

is based as much on the location of networks as it is on asylum policy criteria.

Transit Migration

The majority of my informants came to Greece because of its geographical

proximity to the Middle East. For some people, especially victims of violence

and persecution, the main question is personal security and protection. Thus, the

fact that Greece is a European, democratic and safe country is a sufficientcriterion for settlement, despite the asylum policy problems they face after

arrival. For others, Greece is seen as the waiting room, the place to stay for

a couple of years in order to pay off the debt to the smugglers and finance the

second trip. This is also the dominant impression in the public and policy



9/18

discourse and has become a standard argument against the need to develop a

reception infrastructure. In fact, this is a Janus-faced situation: it is exactly

because of the absence of reception infrastructure that the migrants in Greece

remain in transit. Most of them would actually consider staying in Greece,should the chances for asylum and settlement become more promising.

Nevertheless, and while the term transit country is used as a justification for

shifting the question of reception to the destination countries, an increasing

number of migrants end up staying in Greece for more than a couple of years. It is

important to explain the condition of being in transit before addressing its

consequences for the migrants, the country and the region.

Once in Greece, refugees find shelter in refugee camps and halls and friends

places. In the case of the Kurds, Athens and Patras, Greeces western port, are the

main points of concentration: Athens, for the presence of NGOs, authorities andrefugee camps, and Patras for the opportunity to stow away in ferries connecting

Greece to Italy. The first couple of months can be very difficult, as refugees

have to rely on their own efforts to contact the authorities and NGOs, find

accommodation, work and assistance. The asylum seekers I interviewed stayed

in refugee camps and reception halls, or in shared flats, warehouses and empty

lots in downgraded city areas, together with undocumented migrants. Most men

in my sample worked in day jobs in the informal economy. Women, on the other

hand, did not work and usually stayed at home.

Being in transit is a period of vulnerability, insecurity and socio-economic

marginalization. Accommodation and employment are uncertain and subject to

constant changes, while socialization is restricted to the refugee camp environ-

ment or friends in shared houses. Undocumented migrants live with the constant

threat of deportation, and registered asylum seekers with the constant anxiety

about the outcome of the asylum application. This transitional period can be

quite prolonged, stressful, and frustrating, especially for the unemployed. In

reality, this is an invisible population living on the margins, with no obligations

and no rights. Survival depends on individual efforts and informal networking

with the local population and NGOs. Permanent settlement or further emigra-

tion are subject to the following conditions: the progress of the asylum applica-tion, the type of employment, the prospects for proper housing in the near future

and the degree of socialization during these two to three years of waiting. In fact,

the length of stay is not a determinant factor. While some of my informants

stayed in Greece contrary to their initial plans, others, who had hoped to settle in

Greece, decided to leave after two or more years time. Other informants felt that,

since they had started a life in Greece, they were not willing to move to another

country. In other words, the period of being in transit is a process rather than a

status, where the question of protection and the degree of engaging socially and

economically in the host country will determine the decision for settlement.During this period of time, social and family networks provide significant

assistance. In fact, refugees seemed more engaged in ties with the homeland

and other destination countries, than with the place where they were staying.

Many of my informants in the camps were not interested in socializing with other



10/18

camp residents, and even less with locals and migrants outside the camp, and

knew very little about the city and Greek society. They also had no interest in

learning the language, even though they worked in the local market. Instead, they

kept regular phone contact with their friends in Germany, Sweden and England.It is a situation of living neither here nor there and engaging in transnational

fields and practices. A similar situation of permanent temporariness has been

observed in the case of Salvadoran migrants in the US (Bailey et al. 2002).

Are transit migrants then transnational? Al-Ali et al. (2001) argue that forced

migrants, especially newcomers, cannot be described as transmigrants, because

they are not continuously engaged in the life of their homeland. The insecurity

about their legal status and survival in the host country prevents them from doing

anything that would jeopardize this status. Moreover, travelling and return, a

prerequisite for the development of transnational communities, is impeded by thesituation in the homelands. Forced migration, however, often leads to forced

transnationalism, as refugees continue catering for the financial and material

needs of family members in the homeland (Al-Ali et al. 2001: 582591). Trans-

national networking becomes for asylum seekers and irregular migrants a ques-

tion of survival: these connections help to overcome economic difficulties for the

journey and settlement, and create a sphere of communication with fellows in

other countries (Chatelard 2002a). And smuggling networks are also engaged in

these transnational practices. In the case of the Kurds, these activities have a

bridging function between numerous locations, through regular exchange of

information, resources and travelling: they may not return to their homeland, but

they visit friends in other destination countries, and often stay there for a sig-

nificant amount of time. Family, relatives and friends at home give their savings

and sell their property to assist with the travel fees. Migrants in Western Europe

send money to those waiting at home or in the transit country. In turn, those in

Greece take up part-time jobs to pay off their relatives or friends; the capital,

instead of being invested in one country, circulates between homeland, transit

and destination country. What Faist (2000) describes as the bridging effects of

transnational linkages are here active in the transit period and continuation

of the journeya case also observed among Iraqi transit migrants in Jordan(Chatelard 2002a).

What this networking signifies is not living in two places simultaneouslyas

transnationalism is usually explainedbut living in a state of limbo. Whereas

Al-Ali (2002) claims these to be emerging transnational practices, I would rather

describe them as emerging transborder practices that expand beyond the bipolar

homelanddestination country relation: the countries of origin, the transit coun-

try and other destination countries. Whether these practices will crystallize in

stronger engagement in the homeland and the host society remains to be seen. On

the other hand, the Kurds that are actively engaged in Kurdish political parties doparticipate in a sphere of transnational actitivities that operate in both the home-

land and the host society. Participation in Diaspora politics is for them the reason

and the means for migrating: the journey, arrival, accommodation and daily life

have been arranged through political ties. Even more, membership in homeland



11/18

parties is often the purpose for settlement in Greece. In other words, political ties

create a transnational sphere in the sense that practices feed in and are part of

both locations.

Settlement and Integration

Still, some undocumented migrants and asylum seekers do settle permanently in

Greece. From an institutional perspective, Greek reception structures do not

seem to encourage permanent settlement at the moment, for they do not provide

an infrastructure for integration from its initial phase. Migrant participation is

left to depend on employment, knowledge of the language, and informal

networking with Greek NGOs and locals.

The structure of the Greek labour marketgrowth of the tertiary sector,seasonality and a well-established informal economyactually displays an

increasing demand for flexible, low-cost and unskilled labour. In addition,

there is a labour shortage because of the concentration of natives in small-

scale manufacturing (usually family businesses), self-employment and the public

sector (Fakiolas 2000). As in the rest of Southern Europe, migrants in Greece are

recruited in sectors such as agriculture, tourism, construction and domestic and

other services with a high degree of informality. Asylum seekers, recognized

refugees, undocumented migrants and registered labour migrants are all

recruited in the same niches and with the same degree of irregularity. My inform-

ants also worked in day jobs in construction, or short-term jobs in restaurants

and small manufacturing enterprises. Two Kurds, who had been in Greece for

almost a decade, owned a shop. In reality, employment seems to be the key to

integration in Greece, since migrant participation is understood as participa-

tion in the labour market. In relation to Soysals renowned typology of migrant

membership regimes, the Greek case is closer to the liberal type of membership,

where migrants are incorporated in the receiving country as workers (Soysal

1994).8 The liberal perception was also evident in the latest regularization pro-

cesses (1998 and 2001) that attached the migrants right to stay (residence permit)

to the work permit.In the same context of informality, relations with the host population can

sometimes become a promising source of social capital. Among the Kurds inter-

viewed, it was those who had ties with Greeks who had more stable jobs and were

feeling more integrated in Greeceeven if migrant participation still fits into

class boundaries of a Greek/dominant versus a migrant/marginal social stratum.

In addition, judging from three cases, Kurdish men married to Greek women

managed to overcome even nationality-based class boundaries. Almost all Kurds

interviewed, who had spent more than a year in Greece, stated that they felt a

sense of affinity with the culture, the mentality, the strength of family ties and thecharacter of socio-economic structures in Greece. A comparison with North

European receiving countries reveals a striking contrast; in Finland, Middle

Eastern migrants found social interaction with locals hard to attain (Valtonen

1998). In England, Kurds found themselves withdrawing into a cultural enclave



12/18

(Griffiths 2002). The affinity that Kurds, and Middle Eastern migrants in general,

feel with Greek society supports not only socialization with locals, but also

access to the labour market. A similar case of easy relations with the locals

and employment in the informal economy was observed among refugees fromthe Former Yugoslavia in Italy (Korac 2001). This factor was even mentioned as

a motivation to stay in Greece, despite bureaucratic difficulties and welfare

deficiencies. Needless to stress, informal relations may be a positive asset

for the success of integration programmes, but cannot replace the need for

institutional developments.

Another factor contributing to the good relations between Greeks and Kurds

is the Greek experience of refugeeness (Hirschon 1998) in the 1920s, with the

arrival of ethnic Greek refugees from Asia Minor, and their successful integra-

tion in what turned out to be a remarkably ethnically homogeneous state(Kitromilides 1989). In a country with a refugee past, collective memory has

nurtured feelings of sympathy and solidarity towards displaced persons (Voutira

2003). This is made evident in the considerable humanitarian support that local

communities provide to shipwrecked migrants reaching Greek shores and the

generosity of private donations in the refugee camps, confirmed by social workers

I interviewed. And what is more, like many of todays Kurdish refugees, it was

Turkey that the Greek populations of Asia minor were forced to flee from some

eighty years ago. It is remarkable how the people of the Athenian neighbourhood

of Nea Smyrni, now second and third generation of the 1920s refugees, have been

supporting the undocumented Kurds in their area (Nea Smyrni Municipality

2002). In addition, Greeks have shared during the 1990s a sense of special solid-

arity with this ethnic group that went beyond the scope of humanitarian

assistance to the tolerance of Kurdish political mobilization. Nevertheless, the

receptive attitude towards refugees in general, and the Kurds in particular, has

not prevented the rise of xenophobic trends, usually stemming from the discourse

of security and border protection from irregular migration.

At the time of my fieldwork, the Kurdish families and singles I interviewed

were settled in flats in various middle-class and downgraded Athenian boroughs

with Greek or mixed population (mainly, Dafni, Nea Smyrni, Neos Kosmos,Egaleo, Zografou and Patissia). Black observed a similar distribution of the

Kurds in Athens in 1991 (Black 1992: 16). Thus, one could argue that social

networks have sustained a concentration of families in particular areas. Relations

between Kurds were usually formed during the journey and at the place of arrival

(i.e. reception camps), or based on locality ties (town/area of origin) and political

affiliations. As Wahlbeck also observed in the case of Kurds in England, inter-

personal relations are the continuation of the types of social and political

relations the Kurds had in their countries of origin (1998: 140141). In Greece,

these ties offered psychological and material support, but they did not generateemployment, which was assisted more by NGOs or relations with locals. Local

migrant ties were not a strong resource for permanent settlement and integration

for a number of additional reasons: the short history of Kurdish migration to

Greece, the high mobility of this population in and out of the country, and the



13/18

maintenance of ethnic and political divisions among Kurds transferred to the

host society. The main divisions were between Kurds from Turkey and the rest

(from Iraq or Iran), between Kurds from the same country affiliated with rival

Kurdish parties, and more generally, between politicized and non-politicizedKurds. In fact, the negative environment of political divisions, the pressure

exercised by the parties on individuals, and the absence of refugee issues from

the parties agenda has discouraged migrants from engaging in homeland

politics. For most Kurds, homeland politics are seen as an impediment to inte-

gration (Papadopoulou 2004).

In a nutshell, the permanent settlement of Kurds in Greece is based on a high

degree of informality in the types of employment and in development of social

relations with the local population. Migrants that manage to engage in these

types of socioeconomic structures develop avenues for survival that are never-theless only partly assisted by the institutional structures (asylum and NGO

provisions). As one informant put it:

. . . Its just a matter of how you feel here, how much you care that the state does not

give you anything, that you will have to find a job and a house and survive on your

own. Ifyou get used to that, you stay, if not, you go. Also, if you have started a life here,

well, then you stay.

Transit Migration and its Consequences

The integration of refugees in Greece is more an issue of domestic rather than

European policy. Generally speaking, immigrants and refugees in Europe still

meet nationally bounded education, employment, welfare and political systems

(Joppke 1999: 279). The transit condition of undocumented migrants and asylum

seekers in Greece, on the other hand, is a problematic issue with consequences for

the migrants, the country and the EU.

For the migrants, being in transit is a period of harsh living conditions,

constant uncertainty and marginalization. This prolonged situation is counter-

productive in the process of smooth social and economic integration. The firstcouple of years are a precious time for establishing connections and access to

resources, familiarizing oneself with the authorities and the local structures and

finding ways to match peoples skills to the demands of the labour market.

Instead this time is wasted, because, in the absence of a reception programme,

migrants are not given the opportunity for access to resources, but are immedi-

ately pushed to the margins of social strata. In addition, since the majority of

refugees use smugglers to come to Europe (Morrison and Crosland 2001), they

are collectively treated as illegals and very often prevented from access to asylum.

Needless to stress, the lack of protection and the dangers involved in irregulartravelling pose a serious human security threat (Graham and Poku 2000).

For the state, tolerating this situation raises moral and ethical issues about the

provision of protection to displaced persons and the regulation of irregular

migration flows. Even more, it poses an internal security threat, because the



14/18

presence of an irregular population reinforces intolerance and xenophobic trends

towards migrants in the country in general. The existence of irregular and transit

migration in the country is impeding the development of a comprehensive

integration policy for the existing migrant populations. Besides, tolerating illegalentries becomes an issue of national security and can affect foreign relations with

the neighbouring countries; irregular migration from Turkey over to Greece

could, for example, burden bilateral relations in the future (Tsardanidis and

Guerra 2000: 334).

For the EU, the presence of transit migrants in one member state results in

further irregular or asylum migration flows to other countries. Many among

those that remain undocumented in Greece, and for that matter also in other

countries of the EU periphery, become asylum seekers in Western Europe a few

years later. The movement of migrants from one member state to another isusually based on differences in reception conditions. In other words, this situa-

tion is a result of the divergence among national asylum systems and the fact that

member states have been working with the principle of the lowest common

denominator, that of intergovernmental cooperation, to achieve harmonization

of migration and asylum policy up to now. The known impediments are problems

of coordination, and the role of national histories in moral and normative per-

ceptions of migrant participation. However, immigration and asylum issues have

now become de facto common European issues. In a way, the migrants who come

to Europe see the European Union as an integrated space more than the member

states do. Acknowledging the level of state interdependence and need for uniform

policies should not be seen as a challenge to state sovereignty, but as a means to

strengthen the border control and reception capacity of each member state

separately. It would also enhance the credibility and the value of refugee protec-

tion by preventing asylum abuses by non-genuine refugee claimants.

Conclusion

The aim of this paper has been to contribute through empirical findings to the

understanding of the relation between asylum and irregularity in the process ofentry through smuggling and residence in a European country. Using smugglers

is a common practice for forced migrants coming from the Middle East to

Europe. By no means does this explanation legitimize smuggling operations,

or approve of those who make money out of peoples desperation to leave

their country. Instead, the explanation suggests that the root of the problem

of illegal crossing is not the illegal practice, but the absence of legal entry alter-

nativesand this is where the focus of policy developments needs to be placed.

The phenomenon of Kurds living in transit in Greece is explained as a result of

the restrictive domestic policy framework and the absence of a uniform asylumsystem among member states that would prevent asylum shopping and the

consequent situation of refugees in orbit. Discouraged by the poverty of recep-

tion provisions and the asylum system, Kurds remain in Greece in a condition of

semi-protection and socio-economic marginalization, hoping to seek asylum in



15/18

another EU country in the near future. This period is characterized by intensified

transnational networking with Kurds in the homeland and other destination

countries. On the other hand, this period is crucial for determining the place

of permanent residence. The shift from temporary to permanent settlementdepends on the opportunities for asylum, employment, housing and development

of social relations with the local population and NGOs. For those who stay in

Greece, permanent settlement and integration are based on a high degree of

informality in economic and social activities.

The presence of transit migration in Greece is a good example of the degree

of state interdependence in immigration and asylum issues: migrants are mov-

ing between member states according to the types of rights, protection and

opportunities available. The transit condition of refugees is not a domestic, but

a common European issue, given that migrants themselves seek asylum inEurope. Irregular and asylum migration, temporary and permanent settlement

need to be seen as different phases in the migration process. EU states now

face two major challenges: first, to provide better protection to refugees on the

basis of need rather than on the basis of which country it is easier to reach

through smuggling. And second, to understand and incorporate responsibility

sharing as the key to strengthen their own border protection and reception

capacity.

Acknowledgements

I would like to express my sincere gratitude to the Greek State Scholarships

Foundation and the Economic and Social Research Council, UK, for their

generous financial assistance during the writing of my DPhil thesis. My thanks

also to Dr Ali Rogers and Constantin Kourkoulas for their valuable support and

comments on this paper.

1. The present paper is based on the authors DPhil thesis: Asylum, Transit Migration

and the Politics of Reception: the Case of Kurds in Greece (20002004). An earlierversion of this paper was presented at the conference on Poverty, International

Migration and Asylum, UNU-WIDER, Helsinki, 2728 September 2002.

2. The first figure mentioned in interviews and in Ta Nea 5 January 1998, the second by

the then Minister of Public Order, G. Romeos, Parliamentary Proceedings, Session

109. (04/04/1997), pp. 54134. The third in Triandafyllidou, A. et al. (2001), p. 50,

Table 3.1.

3. 7,000 Convention Refugees, 6,188 registered asylum seekers and 5,664 new applicants

in 2002, UNHCR Branch Office, Athens, based on Ministry of Public Order (MPO)

data, www.unhcr.gr/basics/o4.htm

4. Land border control bodies were created with PD 310/1998, amended by PD 112/

1999. Article 55 (amended) of law 2910/2001 on the illegal transportation of migrants

into Greece introduces stricter punishment for smugglers (imprisonment, high penal-

ties and vessel confiscation), and foresees the provision of temporary residence per-

mits and protection from deportation to smuggled migrants.



16/18

5. Protocol for the Implementation of Article 8 of the Agreement between the Govern-

ment of the Hellenic Republic and the Government of the Republic of Turkey on

Combating Crime, Especially Terrorism, Organized Crime, Trafficking and Illegal

Migration signed on 07/11/2001, and voted on 20/06/2002 (Law 3030/2002).6. UNHCR Comments on the Protocol, UNHCR Branch Office, Athens, November

2001,Amnesty International,Greek Delegation,Press Conference,26/11/2001,Athens

and National Committee for Human Rights (NCHR) Annual Report 2002,

pp. 9192.

7. UNHCR, Report on refugee recognition rates in the EU: Greece rockbottoms the

ranks, Press Release 43/03, 12/09/2003. Due to the slow processing of applications,

the calculation of recognition rates is problematic; refugee and humanitarian status

are usually granted to applicants whose case is still in the backlog (from the previous

year).

8. The membership regimes in Soysals typology are: the corporatist (migrants incor-porated through strong welfare regimes), the liberal (labour market participation), the

statist (civic participation/assimilation) and the fragmented (migrants incorporated as

individuals and through primordial structures).

AL-ALI, N. (2002) Trans- or a-national? Bosnian Refugees in the UK and the Netherlands, in

Al-Ali, N. and Koser, K. (eds.) New Approaches to Migration? Transnational Communities and the

Transformation of Home, London: Routledge.

AL-ALI, N., BLACK, R. and KOSER, K. (2001) The Limits to Transnationalism: Bosnian and

Eritrean Refugees in Europe as Emerging Transnational Communities, Ethnic and Racial Studies,

24(4): 578600.

BAILEY, A., WRIGHT, R., MOUNTZ, A. and MIYARES, I. (2002) (Re)producing Salvadoran

Transnational Geographies, Annals of the Association of American Geographers, 92(1): 125144.

BALDWIN-EDWARDS, M. and ARANGO, J. (1999) Immigrants in the Informal Economy in

Southern Europe, London: Frank Cass.

BLACK, R. (1992) Livelihood and Vulnerability of Foreign Refugees in Greece, Department of

Geography, Kings College, London, Occasional Paper 33.

BOYD, M. (1989) Family and Personal Networks in International Migration: Recent Developments

and New Agendas, International Migration Review, 23(3): 638662.

CAVOUNIDIS, J. (2002) Migration in Southern Europe and the Case of Greece, International

Migration, 40(1): 4568.

CHATELARD, G. (2002a) Jordan as a Transit Country: Semi-Protectionist Immigration Policies

and their Effects on Iraqi Forced Migrants, UNHCR New Issues in Refugee Research, Working

Paper 61.

(2002b) Iraqi Forced Migrants in Jordan: Conditions, Religious Networks, and the Smuggling

Business, EUI/RSCAS, Working Paper 50.

CRISP, J. (1999) Policy Challenges and New Diasporas: Migrant Networks and their Impacts on

Asylum Flows and Regimes, Transnational Communities Working Papers, WPTC-99-05,

www.transcomm.ox.ac.uk

ECRE (2001) Country Report: Greece.

(2002) Country Report: Greece.

FAIST, T. (2000) The Volumes and Dynamics of International Migration and Transnational Social

Spaces, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

FAKIOLAS, R. (2000) Migration and Unregistered Labour in the Greek Economy, in Lazaridis, G.,

King, R. and Tsardanidis, D. (eds.) Eldorado or Fortress? Migration in Southern Europe, London:

Macmillan.

GEDDES, A. (2001) International Migration and State Sovereignty in an Integrating Europe,

International Migration, 39(6): 2139.



17/18

GHOSH, B. (1998) Huddled Masses and Uncertain Shores: Insights into Irregular Migration, Den

Haag/Boston/London: Martinus Nijhoff.

GRAHAM, T. D. and POKU, N. (2000) Migration, Globalisation and Human Security, London:

Routledge.

GRIFFITHS, D. J. (2002) Somali and Kurdish Refugees in London; New Identities in the Diaspora,

London: Ashgate.

HAMMAR, T. (1992) Laws and Policies Regulating Population Movements: a European Perspec-

tive, in Kritz, M., Zlotnik, H., and Lim L. L. International Migration Systems: A Global Approach,

Oxford: Clarendon Press.

HIRSCHON, R. (1998) Heirs of the Greek Catastrophe: The Social Life of Asia Minor Refugees in

Piraeus, New York, Oxford: Berghahn Books.

ICDUYGU, A. (1995) Transit Migrants and Turkey, Bogazici Journal, Review of Social, Economic

and Administrative Studies 10(12): 127142.

ICDUYGU, A. and TOKTAS, S. (2002) How do Smuggling and Trafficking Operate via Irregular

Border-Crossings in the Middle East? Evidence fromFieldwork in Turkey, International Migration

40(6): 2554.IOSIFIDES, T. (1997) Immigrants in the Athens Labour Market: A Comparative Survey of

Albanians, Egyptians and Filipinos, in King, R. and Black, R. (eds.) Southern Europe and the

New Immigrations, Brighton: Sussex Academic Press.

JOPPKE, C. (1999) Immigration and the Nation-State: The United States, Germany and Great Britain,

Oxford: Oxford University Press.

KING, R. and BLACK, R. (eds.) (1997) Southern Europe and the New Immigrations, Brighton: Sussex

Academic Press.

KING, R. (2000) Southern Europe in the Changing Global Map of Migration, in King, R.,

Lazaridis, G. and Tsardanidis, C. (eds.) Eldorado or Fortress? Migration in Southern Europe,

Basingstoke: Macmillan.

KITROMILIDES, P. (1989) Imagined Communities and the Origins of the National Question in theBalkans, in Blinkhorn, M. and Veremis, T. (eds.) Modern Greece: Nationalism and Nationality,

London: Sage, Athens: ELIAMEP.

KORAC, M. (2001) Dilemmas of Integration: Two Policy Contexts and Refugee Strategies for Inte-

gration, Final Report, A Comparative Study of the Integration Experiences of Refugees from

Former Yugoslavia in Rome and Amsterdam, Refugee Studies Centre, Oxford University,

www.rsc.ox.ac.uk/indexrsp.html

KOSER, K. (1997) Social Networks and the Asylum Cycle: The Case of Iranians in the Netherlands,

International Migration Review, 31(3): 591613.

(2001), New Approaches to Asylum? International Migration, 39(6): 85101.

MASSEY, D., ALARCON, R., DURAND, D. and GONZALEZ, H. (1987) Return to Aztlan: The

Social Process of International Migration from Western Mexico, Berkeley: University of CaliforniaPress.

MORRISON, J. and CROSLAND, B. (2001) The Trafficking and Smuggling of Refugees: the End

Game in European Asylum Policy? New Issues in Refugee Research, UNHCR Working Paper 39.

NADIG, A. (2002) Human Smuggling, National Security and Refugee Protection, Journal of

Refugee Studies 15(1): 125.

NCHR (National Committee for Human Rights in Greece) (2001) Annual Report.

(2002) Annual Report.

NEA SMYRNI MUNICIPALITY (2002) Report-Proposal for Solutions to the Problems of the

Homeless Kurdish Refugees in the Municipality of Nea Smyrni, Social Policy Office, Athens

22 May, unpublished, in Greek.

OKOLSKI, M. (2000) Recent Trends and Major Issues in International Migration: Central andEastern European Perspectives, International Social Science Journal (ISSJ, Unesco), 165/2000:

329341.

PAPADOPOULOU, A. (2004) Give us Asylum and Help us Leave the Country! Kurdish Asylum

Seekers in Greece and the Politics of Reception, forthcoming in Immigrants and Minorities.



18/18

PUGLIESE, E. (1993) Restructuring of the Labour Market and the Role of Third World Migrations

in Europe, Society and Space 11: 513522.

RICHMOND, A. (1993) Reactive Migration: Sociological Perspectives on Refugee Movements,

Journal of Refugee Studies 6(1): 624.

SALT, J. and HOGGARTH, J. (2000) Migrant Trafficking and Human Smuggling in Europe: A

Review of Evidence, in Laczko F. and Thompson D. (eds.), Migrant Trafficking and Human

Smuggling in Europe, Geneva: International Organization for Migration.

SITAROPOULOS, N. (2000) Modern Greek Asylum Policy and Practice in the Context of the

Relevant European Developments, Journal of Refugee Studies 13(1): 105115.

SOYSAL, Y. N. (1994) Limits of Citizenship: Migrants and Postnational Membership in Europe,

Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

SPENER, D. (2001) Smuggling Migrants through South Texas: Challenges Posed by Operation Rio

Grande, in Kyle, D. and Koslowski, R. (eds.) Global HumanSmuggling: Comparative Perspectives,

London/Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press.

TRIANDAFYLLIDOU, A. et al. (2001) Migration Pathways: A Historic, Demographic and Policy

Review of Four European Countries, Report for the Project Does Implementation Matter?Informal Administration Practices and Shifting Immigrant Strategies in Four Member States

(IAPASIS), European University Institute, RSCAS, Florence.

TSARDANIDIS, C. and GUERRA, S. (2000)The EU MediterraneanStates, the Migration Issue and

the Threat from the South, in King, R., Lazaridis, G. and Tsardanidis, C. (eds.) Eldorado or

Fortress? Migration in Southern Europe, Basingstoke: Macmillan.

UNHCR (2000) Statistics, Greece 19902000, Athens: UNHCR Branch Office.

(2002), Annual Statistical Report for 2001: Refugees and Others of Concern to the UNHCR.

Athens: UNHCR Branch Office.

VALTONEN, K. (1998) Resettlement of Middle Eastern Refugees in Finland: The Elusiveness of

Integration, Journal of Refugee Studies 11(1): 3860.

VOUTIRA, E. (2003) Refugees: Whose Term is it Anyway? Emic and Etic Constructions ofRefugees in Modern Greek, in van Selm, J., Kamanga, K., Morrison, J., Nadig, A., Vrzina, S.

and van Willigen, L., The Refugee Convention at Fifty: A View from Forced Migration Studies,

Lexington Books: USA.

WAHLBECK, O. (1998) Kurdish Diasporas; A Comparative Study of Kurdish Refugee Communities,

Centre for Research in Ethnic Relations: University of Warwick.

WALLACE, C., CHMOULIAR, O. and SIDORENKO, E. (1996) The Eastern Frontier of Western

Europe: Mobility in the Buffer Zone, New Community, 22(2): 259285.

Newspapers:

Avgi

Eleftherotypia

Kathimerini

Ta Nea

Turkish Daily News

MS received January 2003; revised MS received November 2003


smuggling into europe transit migrants in greece

Documents