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September 17, 1948 Hyderabad Liberation Day – a Misnomer

Capt. Lingala Pandu Ranga Reddy

11 Gorkha Rifles

Plato is dear to me, but dearer still is truth. History is an unending dialogue

between the past and the present. When historical writing becomes scientific and

critical, the nature of history changes, the function of historian is neither to love the

past, nor to condemn the past nor to be free from the past but to master the past in

order to understand its bearing on the present.

The war diary of the Third Battalion of 11 Gorkha Rifles, dated 17th September,

1948 innocuously mentioned that it was in the vanguard of the strike force group of 1

Armoured Division of the expeditionary column of the Indian Army and reached

Patancheru of Medak District at 3.30 p.m.1 This Battalion had suffered two causalities

at Naldurg pass.

Otherwise, 17th September was a peaceful day for the Battalion. The

Commanding Officer of the Battalion Lt. Col. J.N. Ghosh ordered the release of two

large pegs of rum to all the Johnnies (affectionately Gorkha soldiers are called) to

overcome the fatigue of marching from Sholapur to Patancheru. It is interesting to note

that Lt.Gen. Rajender Singhji, General Officer Commanding, Southern Command,

Pune, while ordering the commanders of the five columns, had clearly mentioned that

they were going to Hyderabad to aid and assist the Nizam against the depredations of

Communists and Razakars.2 And it was on 18th September 1948 the 3rd Battalion of the

11 Gorkha Rifles marched upto Secunderabad cantonment without any impediments.

No sooner did the soldiers billet than the officers’ mess started functioning. As officers

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walked groundly, they drank roundly and slept soundly – forgotten the fatigue of seven

days march.

However, motivated alien writers, settler-reporters, self-seeking politicians, rabid

fundamentalists and half-baked historians who were ignoramus of Persian, Urdu and

Arabic languages had twisted the truth to serve their ends for obvious reasons. It was

purely a military intervention and people had no role whatsoever in it. Some writers

depict 17th September 1948 as Hyderabad’s Liberation Day, some others assert that on

17th September Hyderabad state was merged with Indian Union and some more call it

as Victory day of Telangana Armed Struggle. And yet another apocryphal assertion is

(a statement of doubtful authenticity although widely circulated as being true) that it was

the end of Asaf Jahi’s Rule and the beginning of self-rule. Political commentators,

politicians and settler-writers tend to get side-tracked by minutiae, that they often miss

the wood for the trees. The euphoria is not only misleading but also a deliberate

attempt of fudging realities and no one would buy into this charlatan.

The Indian Independence Act of 1947 while granting independence to both India

and Pakistan did not envisage transfer of paramount power. On 15th August 1947 the

suzerainty of the Crown in the United Kingdom over Hyderabad, and all other 563

Princely States, came to an end.3 None of the powers previously exercised by the

Crown was transferred to the Government of the two new dominions i.e., India and

Pakistan. Taking the advantage of this clause, Mir Osman Ali Khan, the VII Nizam

chose to “associate” rather than “accede” to the Indian Union. Both, the Nizam and the

Government of India were adamant on their respective positions and settlement could

not be reached. Legally speaking, the Nizam of Hyderabad was right. Under the

circumstances, an alternative arrangement was devised in the form of Standstill

Agreement and negotiations were undertaken and it was signed on 27-11-1948.

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K.M. MUNSHI AGENT GENERAL:

According to the article IV of the Standstill Agreement the Government of India

appointed K.M. Munshi as Agent General. The reason for his appointment is not far to

seek. A large number of people in the British ruled India were influenced by the

propaganda and they began to believe that the conditions in Hyderabad were really bad

and that it was the duty of all the Hindus to help their brethren in distress. The

Hyderabad State Congress, the Hindu Mahasabha and the Arya Samajists all joined

hands and launched the movement. The direction of the movement was placed at the

hands of K.M. Munshi, Home Minister of Bombay State, who years afterwards on

account of the success achieved by him on this occasion, was selected as the most

appropriate person to fill up the post of the Agent General of India at Hyderabad.

Munshi exhorted thousands of young volunteers from all over the Bombay Presidency,

gave them all the help and encouragement that governmental sources could provide

and supplemented with assistance that could come forth from numberless public

sources, under the inspiration of the government. The task of these volunteers was

simple. They only had to enter the State, wear a garland of flowers, go to a public place

in any town and break the laws or rules of the place in some manner or other. They had

been told they would be well looked after in the jails of the Nizam and the Government

of Bombay would see that they are in no way ill treated. They were also assured that

during their absence their families would be suitably financed and fully taken care of. It

can be attested with ‘on 17th August, 1938 which was the 51st birthday of the Nizam,

8000 satyagrahis who were in prison, were released. It is of utmost interest to note that

out of these, only 1600 belonged to Hyderabad or were ‘Mulkis’ and the rest all came

from other provinces such as Bombay, Central province and Madras, and also some

from the north!’

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He wanted to stay at the Koti Residency, but the Nizam government did not

allow him to do so. He was forced to stay at Deccan House. Close to the ‘Bolaram

Residency’, the British had built a spacious building and named it the ‘Deccan House’.

It used to be the official residence of the Commander of the British troops and had the

traditional grandeur and expanse about it. Munshi, after a few days’ stay at the Bolaram

Residency, chose to shift into the ‘Deccan House’. He soon renamed it ‘Dakshna

Sadan’ – a Sanskrit version of ‘Deccan House’.

Operation Caterpillar

However, both sides did not honour the terms of the Standstill Agreement that

paved the way for a military intercession. It is this military intercession is usually

referred as the “Police Action”. In military parlance, it is known as “Operation Polo”.

But strictly speaking, this operation was termed as “Operation Caterpillar”.4 Originally

the military action was named as Operation Polo’. However, it was renamed as

Operation Caterpillar, in case the earlier code word had become known to the enemy.

In edition to this in the earlier plan, air force was not included, whereas in the revised

plan Indian Air Force fighter planes were used. No country worth it’s name would use

fighter planes against its own people. However India used fighter planes against

Hyderabad. It establishes that Hyderabad was an Independent country.

The negotiations between the Nizam and Government of India finally broke down

in the third week of June, 1948. By the end of July 1948, the 1st Armoured Division had

built up enough rations that a twenty two thousand strong army would require over a

period of sixty combat days, and petrol that would be needed to the army for twenty two

days. However, it was postponed owing to Army’s commitment in Kashmir and

monsoon rains. Pakistan’s President Mohammed Ali Jinnah, a great supporter of the

Nizam, died in the midnight of 11th September, 1948. The Government of India took the

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advantage of discomfiture of Pakistan and immediately ordered Indian Armed forces to

invade Hyderabad State. Apart from Air force, five Indian army columns and eight

Princely States’ armies were sent to Hyderabad. Maj. Gen. J.N.Chowdhary was the

General Officer – Commanding, 1st Armoured division. His column advanced from

Ahmedabad to Hyderabad via Sholapur. Brig. K.N. Varma assumed the command of

1st Armoured Brigade and advanced from Bangalore to Hyderabad. Brig. Apji Ranadhir

Singh commanded 9 Infantry Brigade and advanced from Bezwada (present

Vijayawada), Suryapet and Hyderabad axis. Maj. Gen. Dhar and Brig. Rudra

commanded 4th and 5th columns respectively. The Indian Air force was commanded by

Air Commdr. A.N. Mukherji.5 (Later, he became the Chief of Air Staff of the Indian Air

Force.) The G.O.C. Southern Command while ordering the expeditionary column

commanders said that whichever column reached Hyderabad first, that Commander

would become the Military Governor of Hyderabad state.6 In addition to the regular

troops, the Government of India sent the following Princely states’ troops to Hyderabad:

Gwalior Lancers, Mysore Lancers, Mewar Infantry, Jaipur Infantry, Rajaram Rifles

(Kolhapur), Baroda Infantry, Travancore Infantry and Jodhpur Infantry.7

It is generally believed that Police Action had started on 13th September and

concluded on 17th September 1948. This misconception was largely because of non-

availability of primary sources to the serious writers and historians. As military

documents are usually classified, consequently they were not within the reach of civilian

historians. In addition to that, as the case of Hyderabad was pending in the Security

Council until as late as 2nd September 1979 and attracting international opprobrium, the

Government of India had deliberately kept the matter as a top secret.

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There are many glaring anomalies:

1. What were the subterfuge measures the Government of India took to gain public

sympathy to weaken the Nizam?

2. Why did the Communists confine their activities only to Telangana Region, not

other regions of the Hyderabad state?

3. Why did the Communists confine their activities only to Telangana Region not

entire Nizam’s Dominion?

4. Why did India develop cold feet on the plebiscite?

5. When the Government of India invaded Hyderabad state, it used not only Indian

army divisions, three squadrons of fighter planes of Indian Air force and 8

Princely state armies yet it preferred to call it as a ‘Police Action’. Why was it

so?

6. Why did the Government of India, chose 12th September 1948 as D-day to

invade Hyderabad state?

7. What made the Government of India to inform about the impending march of the

Indian army to Hyderabad state to the High Commissioners of the UK and

Pakistan, and Ambassador of the USA?

8. What made the Government of India to allow the Nizam of Hyderabad to reign

over Hyderabad state even after the Police Action?

9. Why was the Hyderabad State dismembered and effaced?

10. When was Hyderabad State actually merged with Indian Union, de jure and de

facto?

11. Whether the Nizam was a foreigner? Is it apt to refer 17th September as the

Liberation day of Hyderabad?

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While answering the first question, it may be noted that the Hyderabad State

Congress was divided and weak. It could not do much to embarrass the state

authorities, and the Communist activity in Telangana was therefore the only alternative

left to weaken the Nizam regime. The Andhra ministers of composite Madras province

provided Communists with the wherewithal to carry sword and fire. The Government of

India connived at it. Andhra ministers were aware of the fact that the new Andhra state

would not economically be a viable state and not had a city to locate a capital. That’s

why they wanted to dismember Hyderabad state and merge the Telangana region with

them. Most of the Communist leaders were Andhras.8 No sooner did the military

occupy Hyderabad, Neelam Sanjeeva Reddy reached Hyderabad to receive Jawaharlal

Nehru along with Major General J. N. Choudhry.

Duplicity: In a bid to stirrup violence in Hyderabad State, Andhra ministers of Madras

government had no qualms about it and had certain lurid dramas written up and got

them enacted in the border districts of Nalgonda and Warangal. More often than not,

those dramas were punctuated with naughty limericks, and pandered to masses.

That’s why those dramas had a large clientele. One of the dramas which became very

popular was ‘Maa Bhoomi’. After formation of Andhra State in 1953, Andhra

Communists enacted the same ‘Maa Bhoomi’ drama in Andhra districts as well.

However, Government of Andhra State banned the drama. Andhra Communists MLAs

raised the issue of ban in the Andhra Legislative Assembly at Kurnool in 1955. While

replying to the question, N.Sanjeeva Reddy, the then Home Minister of Andhra State

averred that ‘Maa Bhoomi’ was intended to run passions high and set one section of

society against other, thereby create troubles for the Government of Hyderabad. That’s

why, Congress ministers of Madras State patronized those dramas. As this drama had

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potential to paraturate dissensions within society and caused law and order problem,

the fledging Andhra State could not afford it. That’s why it was proscribed. The trouble

is that Andhra ministers find it very easy to strew noble little homilies far and wide but

considerably less easy to follow those homilies themselves.

POLICE RAZAKARS:

Indian government sings paeans of peace when it suits them. However, it has

war like mentality. K.F. Rustumji a senior police officer narrates his experience as

superintendent of police of the neighbouring district of Akola (presently in Maharashtra)

“My task was to collect intelligence and organize raids by specially armed and enlisted

homeguards. In order to gain public sympathy, the Government of India raided

Hyderabad State to establish a border belt free of the Razakars. In the dead of

nights, the Central Province Police in the disguise of the Razakars used to go

upto a distance of 15 miles and spread panic and cause reprisals which were

highlighted by the press as Razakar atrocities.”9 The pseudo Razakars of Central

Province were assisted by the Indian army. The Indian army unabashedly called it as

‘Operation Kabbadi’.” The aim of the operation was geographical encirclement of the

Nizam dominions to start an economic blockade. This operation was named after the

popular Indian game of ‘Kabbadi’ which calls for limited forays into ‘enemy’ territory

and the Indian troops were highly amused. After the police action in a bid to oust the

Nizam’s rule the Government of India brought employees from the neigbhouring states

of India. They plundered Hyderabad State. Maj Gen Chowdary and his team could not

control the wayward “Union officers”. One wrong decision taken at the time was to

disarm the state. All had to surrender weapons. Razakars handed over their weapons

to Andhra led Communists.10 This gave an impetus to the first Telangana Terrorists

Movement organized by the Communists.

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While answering the second question as to why Communists depredations were

confined only to Telangana: The much orchestrated Telangana Armed Struggle is

neither Telangana nor Armed nor even a Struggle. The Nizam ruled 16 districts, not

just Warangal and Nalgonda, which are geographically contiguous to Krishna and

Guntur districts of Andhra region of erstwhile composite Madras province. If the Nizam

rule was so oppressive the armed struggle should have broken out in all the 16 districts.

There were many Deshmukhs and Deshpandes in the 5 districts of Marathwada than

that of Telangana. Maratha Deshmukhs owned vast swathes of land and owing to long

distance from Hyderabad city they were practically semi-autonomous. But there were

no communist forays into this part of Hyderabad state. The reasons are not far to seek.

Five districts of Maratha are rain-shadowed ones and there were no irrigation projects

worth the name and to cap it, Marathas have the traditions of resistance. Why were

Communists movements confined to Warangal and Nalgonda districts only? These two

districts do not form even the entire Telangana. Telangana region comprises of 8

districts viz., 1. Warangal, 2. Nalgonda, 3. Mahaboobnagar, 4. Medak, 5. Altraf Balda

(present Hyderabad and Ranga Reddy district), 6. Nizamabad, 7. Adilabad, 8.

Karimnagar. At that time, Khammam was part of the Warangal district. It was carved

out as a separate district in 1953. It is not an armed because comrades used sticks,

catapults, slingshots whereas women used pestles and chilly powder. It is not a

struggle because more often than not they resorted to arsons and felonies.

The Government of India banned the Communist party in 1940, they made

inroads to Munugala enclave in Nalgonda district. Although Munugala is geographically

located in the dominions of the Nizam, however, it was under the control of Govt. of

India. The Krishna district Collector used to administer it. Owing to distance the

Munugala was almost autonomous and there was no law enforcing machinery.

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Communists took advantage of the vacuum and established themselves. They made

Munugala as their operational base and made inroads into Nalgonda and Warangal

districts. In Nalgonda, for instance, the district headquarters was without railway and

telegraphic communications. In addition to this, the terrain also, with its outlying forests

and lack of communication, was ideally suited for guerilla warfare. The Communists

exploited this to their advantage.

Owing to demographic changes and commercialization of agriculture, there was

tremendous pressure in Andhra area. It was during this time irrigation projects were

built in Hyderabad state. This made them to make inroads into Telangana in the guise

of Communists. In addition to this, in India’s freedom struggle, Brahmins were in

forefront of the movement. Subsequently, Reddys had joined the movement. The

other dominant community from coastal Andhra, the Kamma community was forced to

join the Communist party as it could not be accommodated in the Congress. This

community as a propertied class hardly believes in communism in pure form. Selig

Harrison’s well known thesis is that the main factor determining the strength of the

Communists in Andhra is the caste homogeneity of the Andhra communist leadership.

He argues that “since the founding of Andhra Communist party in 1934, the party

leadership has been the property of a single sub-caste, the Kamma landlords.”

PLEBICITE:

While answering third question, about the plebiscite, one should be clear that :

the Nizam’s ostensible goal was not to accede either to Indian Union or to Pakistan but

his real aim was to be independent. He averred that in pursuance of two – nation theory

India was partitioned: Pakistan to Muslims – truncated India to Hindus. As Hyderabad

State was a plural state it was incident on his part not to join with any communal

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country but to be independent, however, he would ‘associate’ with India. Accordingly,

the Nizam issued a Firmana on 11th June, 1947. This necessitated Congress to be all

the more careful to keep its secular and democratic credential in tact. In a bid to

determine between Hyderabad State and India, the Government of India suggested to a

plebiscite to decide whether Hyderabad should accede to India or remain independent.

Initially the Nizam was not enthusiastic about it however, he consented to it. The

Hyderabad’s administration appealed to migrating Muslims to Pakistan from the parts of

India to settle down in Hyderabad State. The Communists took advantage of

discomfiture of the Nizam and besieged the Hyderabad’s administration to allot land

under the ayacut of Nizamsagar and other tanks to Andhras at free of cost, so that the

migrant Andhras not only politically support the Nizam, but also contribute to the

exchequer through land revenue. Having joined with the Razakars, Communists started

a vigorous campaign for ‘Azad Hyderabad’ in the rural areas of Hyderabad State

especially in Telangana Districts. Having strengthened his position, the Nizam offered

to abide by the will if his people as ascertained by a plebiscite under the general

supervision of any international organization. The Government of India realized the

ground realities and changed its stance towards the plebiscite. It insisted that

Hyderabad should at once accede in substance and leave the decision to be confirmed

by a plebiscite. The Nizam did not agree to it. However, in the bargain fertile lands

under the Nizamsagar fell into the hands of Andhra migrants, there sprang up new

villages: Andhranagaram, Gunturvaripalle, Kammasadanam etc. Had there been a

plebiscite, it could have been touch and go for both, for, in 1952 general election Ravi

Narayan Reddy a Communist leader was polled the highest number of votes in India.

POLICE ACTION:

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While answering the fourth question, it is equally interesting to know as to why

the Government of India called a pure Military Action as a Police Action. The USA in its

war against the Communism in South Korea referred it as Police Action. The Truman

Administration called its intervention to save South Korea from the communism as

‘Police Action’ rather than actual war. Washington wanted to keep Peking (now Beijing)

and Moscow out of the fighting and did not want to intensify the battle either rhetorically

or militarily.11 The Government of India had followed the same analogy during its

military intervention in Hyderabad against the communists and Razakars, which was

contemporaneous to Korean war. Same plea Government of India had put forward

before the UNO.12 Laws are dumb in time of war.

Why 12TH September?

While answering the fifth question, Mohd. Ali Jinnah of Pakistan died on 11th

September 1948 at 11 p.m. The Government of India took the advantage of the

difficulty of Pakistan and resolved to send Armed forces to Hyderabad state. The

Indian Army was ordered to march towards Hyderabad at 13:30 (1.30 p.m.) on 12th

September, 1948. The ‘D’ day 12th September and ‘H’ hour 2000 hrs (8.00 p.m.) the

Indian Army crossed the boundary of Hyderabad State at 8 p.m. on 12th September and

captured Naldurg at 7 a.m. of 13th September. That’s why majority of the people think

that the Army invasion started only on 13th of September. It is interesting to note that

when Jinnah died the Government of India in conformity of the international usage

ordered all the flags to be flown half-mast in the mourning of Jinnah. First armoured

division at Sholapur not only brought down the flags to half-mast, but the troops sent a

small delegation to Major General Choudary to ask for the issue of a special rum ration.

When asked the reason the delegation referred to the depressing weather and

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distressing or rejoicing news about Jinnah!13 Claret is the liquor for boys, port for men,

gin for women, but he who aspires to be a hero – must drink brandy.

Majlis – Ittehadul - Muslimeen (M.I.M.):

MIM was started as an answer to the aggressive Arya Samaj movement. It is most

unfortunate that all the ills of Hyderabad state including present political scenario of

Telangana have largely been caused by settlers from other states, be it Hindus or

Muslims. Arya Samaj was established in Hyderabad state at Beed town in 1880 and

Hyderabad Arya Samaj was founded in 1892. Most of the Arya Samajis were from

Bombay Province and they started mass re-conversion from Islam to Hinduism. This

caused a major clash between Hindus and Muslims. The Nizam’s Government

forbidden Aryas Samaji’s to hold havan kunds.

MIM was formed in 1927 by the cultural and religious organization, in which Dr. Syed

Mehiuddin Quadri of the Urdu department and Habib-ur-Rahman of the Persian

department of Osmania University played crucial roles. Their aims were to promote

Urdu language and they interpreted ‘Urdu’ as a symbol of ‘Dekhan Synthesis’. They

also worked for awakening and rising of the community. However, it was Inayat Ulla

Khan Mushriqui who postulated a lighter version of Dar-ul-Islam. These ideas found

their practical expression in the Khaksar movement in 1931. Bahadur Yar Jung became

a crusader of this movement.

He pioneered Tabligh Movement for conversion of Hindus to Islam and Tanzim

movement for the reconstruction of Islam. All these efforts paved the way for the

establishment of MIM. With Bahadur Yar Jung becoming the president of the MIM, this

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body gained a great stature during the years 1939-40 and even began to challenge the

sovereignty of the Nizam. They raised the slogan of ‘Anal Malik’ (we are the masters).

THE RAZAKARS:

It was during the presidentship of Bahadur Yar Jung that a plan for raising a

corps of volunteers was suggested by one Syed Mohhammad Hasan in September

1940. This gave birth to Razakars. At the inception it was service oriented, however, it

veered towards politics toward the end of Bahadur’s stewardship. He contemplated to

spread its branches in all the districts of the state. The local leader was to be called

Salar and he was to head a branch of 30 volunteers known as Jaish. The organization

was as follows: Taluq head Salar-e-Saghir, District head Salar-e-Khabir, State head

Afsar-e-Ala. Military training was given for those volunteers selected by Afsar-e-Ala.

Their uniform was Khaki trousers, khaki shirt and a black fez headgear. Each volunteer

was armed with a sword and a dagger.

Bahadur Yar Jung while addressing the Jagirdars’ Association in 1939 asserted

that Hyderabad would be a free kingdom and it should start ordinance factories to

manufacture weapons and ammunitions. However, when Lucknow born vakil settled at

Latur (now in Maharashtra) Kasim Razvi took over the reins, it became a loose

organization and posted law and order problem. He was a cowardly, vainglorious

braggart. With Khasim Razvi taking over the presidentship of MIM in 1946, it became a

militant organization. It was when Andhra led Communists, started occupying lands of

Hindu Deshmukhs and Muslim Jagirdars, Muslim Jagirdars appealed to the government

to protect their lands. In the absence of government’s protection, Jagirdars appealed to

Razakars to protect their lands from Communists’ encroachment and in quid pro quo

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they funded them. Precisely for this reason Communists could not occupy single acre of

Muslims. In addition to this the Razakars also resisted the raids, who had entered the

state territories from the surrounding provinces and caused grave damage to life, limb

and property in the border districts. Because of these, the prestige of the Razakars was

enhanced in the eyes of common Muslims. It is not out of place to mention that newly

converted Hindus to Islam and other lumpen elements also joined the Razakars to carry

on arson.

Taking the advantage of law and order some Andhra led Communists in the guise of

Razakars looted private properties. Razakars carried sword and fire wherever they

went. These atrocities were denounced by liberal Urdu newspaper Payam. The

Razakar fanatics murdered him. They also looted Bibinagar village in a day light. It was

castigated by another Urdu daily Imroz and its leader Shoibullah Khan was murdered at

Lingampally cross roads in a broad day light. As usual the venal and malleable police

did not take cognizance of the offence. Khasim Razvi became the Nizam’s

Frankenstein monster. His vitriolic speech “Death with the sword in hand is always

preferable to extinction by a mere stroke of a pen”. He declared “Waters of the Bay of

Bengal would wash the feet of the Nizam”, and also added “we are the grandsons of

Mohammad Ghazni and the sons of Babur. When determined, we shall fly the Asaf Jahi

flag on the Red fort!” Razvi combined fanaticism with charlatanry, and aimed at creating

a theocratic and totalitarian State. The Nizam practically became a prisoner of the

Majlis during the last days of the regime. He was prevented from acceding to the Indian

union in October 1947 and again in June 1948. The Government of India was awaiting

for an opportunity to invade Hyderabad, that fanfaronade provided the needed elbi.

Equally loose talk of Laiq Ali caused irreparable damage to Hyderabad state. Mir Laiq

Ali, an engineer turned Industrialist, became the Prime Minister of Hyderabad. He also

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bragged “if the Indian government takes any action against Hyderabad, one lakh men

are ready to join our Army, we also have 1000 bombers in South Arabia ready to bomb

Bombay”. A

ENTENTE:

Communists declared that Telangana was India’s Manchuria and masters of

Telangana would be masters of India ! Laik Ali, the Prime minister of Hyderabad State

utilized the hostility of the Communist party of India towards the Nehru government. He

began to send feelers to Telangana Communist leaders, representing to them the

advantages of an alliance against their common Indian enemy who was reported to be

preparing for a military intervention. Makhdum Mohiuddin and Ravi Narayan Reddy,

two leading communist figures from Telangana, were underground, were contacted.

Although the Communist ranks were divided on the issue, the deal was struck on 4th

May, 1943, and the Nizam lifted ban on the Communist party in Hyderabad. The

Razakar’s wanted to establish a Muslim oligarchy in the state, the Communists’

purpose was to exploit the turmoil and confusion so that they could spread their

tentacles to the rest of India. Each wanted to use the other for its own ends. Thus, the

tables were turned, and it was India which was now hampered in its fight against the

Communists of the Madras province. The success and stridency of the Communists

were regarded with alarm in Delhi.

QUISLING:

One of the pertinent reasons for the Nizam to align with the Razakars and lift the

ban on the Communists was owing to the cunning role played by Maj.Gen. El Edroos,

Commander-in-Chief of the Nizam Army. He had actually become a quisling. He was

not only in touch with the GOC, Southern Command, Lieutenant General, Rajender

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Singhji but also had surreptitiously passed on the secret information of the Nizam’s

Army such as its strength, deployment and tactics. While Maj. Gen. El Edroos was in

England to purchase weapons for Hyderabad Army, he had already informed

Government of India about the purchases and much worse on the eve of Indian military

invasion, he had passed orders to Hyderabad troops not to fight but to retreat. He

unabashedly wrote in his biography - “knowing the hopeless situation in which the state

was involved and consequent to the move of the troops to different sectors, I had

passed on secret instructions to the various sector commanders, that in case of

hostilities, they were not to offer any resistance to the Indian Army but to

gradually fall back towards Hyderabad or surrender. These instructions were

obeyed… ‘The Police Action’, in accordance with the Indian Army started on 13th of

September, 1948 A.D. The main opposition offered to the columns of the Indian Army

was from the Razakars. Amongst the Hyderabad Armed Forces, the company of the

Pathans was the first to receive blow at Naldurg, as they did not withdraw in time. They

suffered heavy causalities from the Indian Army. Another Infantry company at Tuljapur,

the same area, also suffered casualties but its remnants withdrew to Hyderabad. That

was the total of the resistance put up by the Hyderabad Army to the advancing Indian

columns.”15 The scandal could stand as a paradigm for much of Hyderabad State’s

political life.

Soon after the Independence of India, El Edroos had sent his son to Pakistan to

join Pakistan Air Force in September 1947. Having seen the duplicity of Edroos, his

ADC 2/Lt.Krishna Reddy had no qualms about passing on secret information of

Hyderabad’s Army to K.M.Munshi, Agent-General of India at Hyderabad. Munshi, in

turn, passed on this information to Government of India. Krishna Reddy was none

other than the grandson of Raja Bahadur Venkatrama Reddy, an illustrious Police

Commissioner of Hyderabad and a close confidante of the Nizam. Slavery, they can

18

have any where, it is a weed that grows in every soil. Hyderabad was no exception.

Now you can understand the pusillanimity of Telengana Leaders.

Another renegade soldier was Lt. Col. Himmat Baig the Southern Sector

Commander of the Hyderabad army. Brij Bhatia of the Indian army, who was the Sub-

Area Commander of Sholapur division where the main Indian Army striking force was

concentrated, ostensibly wished to visit Bolaram. His real aim was to reconnoiter the

Sholapur - Hyderabad axis and accordingly informed his wish to hail-fellow-well-met El

Edros. He asked Baig to conduct Bhatia from Naldurg to Hyderabad.16 During their

sojourn Baig not only leaked about the deployment of troops, cryptic code but also

physically shown military installations. In turn, Bhatia passed on this recondite

information to Maj. Gen Chowdhary the column commander.

El Edros writes in his biography “the meeting between Brigadier Bhatia and Lt.

Col. H. Baig that put the wind up Baig, so much so, that, just a few days before the

Police Action, he pretended he was ill with appendicitis and was hospitalized at

Hyderabad, suddenly to get well without an operation immediately after the police

action”. Cowards die many times before their death, the valiant never taste of death but

once.

Advantages of Choudary:

J. N. Choudary was commissioned into the 7th cavalry of the British Army. This

unit was posted to Secundrabad in 1935. Secunderabad and Hyderabad are twin cities.

Twin cities connotes, when two cities are divided or connected by a stretch of water,

called twins cities – Hussain sagar tank connects these two cities. Secunderabad was

the largest military station in India, If one included state forces units. Its purpose was to

hold the army’s mobile reserve and find that first true for overseas operations. This

tradition is still in vogue. When Indian Peace Kipping Force was sent to Srilanka in

1986, the Bison Division of Indian Army which was stationed in Secundrabad became

19

the main striking force. Secundrabad posting facilitated Choudary to fraternize with the

officers of the Nizam’s Army. This gave an inside into the Nizam’s Army. In 1938,

during joint maneuvers between the Hyderabad Cavalry Brigade and its Indian Army

counterpart, as a candidate for the Staff College on an exchange basis, Choudary was

detailed to act as Brigade Major to Brig. Edroos. In those five days it became quite clear

to Choudary that Edroos grasp of soldiering was superficial and what was more, he was

indecisive. He had a good manner at a conference but became very much less sure of

himself in private. But in 1948, when Choudary was editing the plan for the Police

Action against Hyderabad State, this pre-knowledge of EI Edroos’s capacity gave him

considerable confidence.

Because of prior information about the topography and withdrawal of Hyderabad

army facilitated Maj. Gen. Choudary to reach Hyderabad earlier than that of the two

other column commanders. As he reached earlier he was made military governor of the

Hyderabad State. Gen. Choudary requited the services of El Edros. It is not out of place

to mention that soon after the formal surrendering ceremony Choudary offered a

cigarette to the vanquished Hyderabad’s army commander El Edros. In reality the

surrendered commander should have been put under arrest. As El Edros had helped

the Indian army against the Nizam he was made a local commander and was ordered

to arrest both Kasim Razvi and Liaq Ali and he accomplished it. That is why Choudary

as military governor sought the permission of the government of India to take Edros on

the executive committee of Hyderabad state. However, Sardar Patel turned down the

request and said that it would send wrong signals to people. 17 Having come to know of

the government of India’s views about his non-inclusion, Edros as his wont resorted to

his old game of betrayal and facilitated Liaq Ali to escape from internment to Pakistan.

It is pertinent to mention that had there was any role of people the government of India

could have appointed K.M. Munshi as the Governor of Hyderabad state or any other

20

civilian rather than Maj. Gen. Chowdary. But the age of Chivalry is gone. That of

sophists economists, and calculators have succeeded and the glory of Hyderabad is

extinguished.

Answering the sixth question, the Government of India informed High

commissioners of the U.K. and Pakistan and American Ambassador about the

impending march of Indian Army, and it was only intended to aid and assist the Nizam

against the Communists. The communiqué did not deliberately mention the word

‘Razakars’.18

NATIONAL EMERGENCY

Answering the seventh question, it is travesty of truth and preposterous to say

that after the Police Action, Hyderabad State acceded to the Union and the Nizam’s

authority came to an end. The abolition of Asaf Jahi dynasty immediately in the wake

of military operation would have an unsettling effect on the Muslims. He had a position

not only in Hyderabad state and amongst his co-religionists in the rest of the country

but also a certain prestige abroad. After the abolition of Caliphate in Turkey, Muslims

21

looked him as the Calipha.19 In addition to this, India was accused of military

aggression. Most of the British newspapers roundly condemned India. Questions were

asked in the British House of Commons and even the British Foreign secretary Ernest

Bevin went to the extent of accusing India of developing war like mentality over the

Hyderabad question. V.P. Menon, the Secretary of the state unequivocally said the

Nizam’s firman provided the basis for the authority the Government of India could

exercise in Hyderabad until the new Indian constitution came into vogue.

In a bid to assuage the feelings of comity of nations the Government of India

requested the Nizam to broadcast on radio to the Islamic world about the Hyderabad

States’ relations to the world. It was done on 23rd September 1948 “I have no fear from

the Indian Union. I know, and have always known that the Indian Union is a secular

state. In the very nature of things, Hyderabad State of whose people are Hindus,

cannot possibly become an Islamic State. As in the past centuries, I have no doubt that

my Government, true to its age long traditions, will be able to adjust matters

amicably”.20

Firmana for Merger

It was on 24th November 1949 the Nizam issued a firman accepting the

Constitution framed by the Constituent Assembly of India as the Constitution of

Hyderabad the Government of India interpreted it, though the Nizam had not signed the

Instrument of Accession, the acceptance of the Indian constitution by him was regarded

as tantamount to accession, and Hyderabad thus became integrated with Indian union.

The firmana also added that the decision was subject to ratification by the constituent

assembly of the Hyderabad state. For all intents and purposes Hyderabad became the

562nd princely state to accede to India only on 26th January 1950.21 It is appropriate to

mention that the larger bench of Hon’ble Supreme Court consisting of Kania, Chief

Justice, Fazl Ali, Patanjali Sastri, B.K. Mukherjea, S.R. Das and Chandrasekhara Aiyar,

22

Junior Judges. While dealing Criminal Misc. Petition Nos. 71 to 73 of 1950, Dt. 14-12-

1950 observed that: Constitution of India, Art. 135, Art. 136 – Applicability –

Judgements passed before 26-1-1950 by courts in Nizam’s territory.

‘The territory of the Govt. of H.E.H. the Nizam was never the territory of India,

before 26-1-1950 and, therefore, the judgment and sentence passed by the H.C. of

H.E.H. the Nizam on the 12th, 13th and 14th December 1949, cannot be considered as

judgments and sentence passed by a Court within the territory of India. On that short

ground alone it seems that the petitioners contention must fail’ (1951 Cri.L.J.391

(C.N.119) Supreme Court Criminal Law Journal 1950-2009).

It is pertinent to mention that in the draft constitution, Article 3 was very rigid and

the consent of the concerned state’s assembly was mandatory. It was during this

period the Nizam issued the firmana about the future of Hyderabad state. The founding

fathers were apprehensive of the princely states’ motives. The reason being, no state

will hardly agree to be divested of any area which forms part of it. No princely state’s

assembly would consent for its dismemberment. Hence the representation on behalf of

the representatives of the territory and the consent of the state or ruler of state as the

case may be not necessary.22 That’s why founding fathers of the Indian constitution

made this article very flexible. (Hence, Andhra Pradesh state’s legislative assembly

resolution is not necessary for the introduction of Telangana Statehood Bill in the

Parliament).

It is thus clear the Indian federation is not a federation of indestructible units as

in the U.S.A. The Union of India retains all the power over the states. The case with

which a state can be re-shaped or merged with another by simple legislative process

has no parallel in the history of the federal organizations of the world. Thus our

constitution offers no guarantee to the States against inroads or their territorial integrity.

It seems, thus, it is more convenient constitutionally speaking to create a separate state

23

of Telangana rather providing constitutional safeguards guaranteeing proportional

representation in the state services for the Telangana people.

It is equally interesting to note that when Kasim Razvi, the leader of Razakars

was convicted for 7 years rigorous imprisonment in Bibinagar arson case, he preferred

appeal to the Federal Court of India, that’s how earlier Supreme Court was known as,

the Federal Court of India rejected the appeal on the plea that it was not having

jurisdiction over Hyderabad state. That clearly establishes Hyderabad was an

independent country.

It was the ploy of the Government of India that made the Nizam to appoint M.K.

Vellodi, an I.C.S. officer as the Chief Minister of Hyderabad State in 1949. The Indian

representative, Sir Ramaswamy Mudaliar in the UNO while pleading against the

Hyderabad state’s independence averred that the Hyderabad state adopted democracy

and people elected M.K. Vellodi as the Chief Minister and the Nizam became the

Constitutional head.23 Subsequently, Benegala Narasinga Rao Indian representative

informed the UNO that Hyderabad state was no longer in existence, hence, the

Hyderabad State’s case needed to be dropped. However, the Security Council did not

drop the case as late as 2nd September, 1979. Because of this, Hyderabad state was

trifurcated and Telangana was forcefully merged with Andhra state against all canons of

democracy in 1956. The very name of Hyderabad was an anathema because as a

state or as a city it would enliven the cause of the Nizam in the Security Council. That’s

why attempts were made to change the name of Hyderabad city into Bhagyanagar. If

we say Telangana was merged with Andhra state to become Andhra Pradesh as a

linguistic state we would be denying Telangana its own past, falsifying its history and

betraying its future.

Liberation ?

24

Referring 17th September as the Liberation day is not only incorrect and also

palimsesting the history. Liberation means liberating from foreign yoke or from foreign

rulers. The Nizam was not a foreigner. Hence the question of liberation did not arise. It

is equally incorrect to say that the monarchial rule of Nizam came to an end and

ushered in democracy. Can we afford to equate a military rule with democracy? For that

matter, even the Indian army did not enter Hyderabad City on 17th September 1948.

However, if I am not accused of, sailing close to the wind the military

administration liberated wealth from Hyderabad. There was no participation of

people and much less of politicians. On 17th September at 5.00 p.m. Mir Osman Ali

Khan, the 7th Nizam of Hyderabad, first time visited Radio Deccan and addressed the

people that he had ordered the surrender of Hyderabad army and invited Indian army to

enter Hyderabad city. However, the physical surrender of Hyderabad army took place

only at 16:00 (4 p.m.) on 18th September.24 Curfew was clamped in Hyderabad city on

17th September therefore there is no question of people’s participation much less

inviting invading Indian army. It is not out of place to mention that Jawaharlal Nehru,

the Prime Minister of India, chided K.M. Munshi, Agent General of India in Hyderabad

for his over action and asked him neither to organize any rally nor to receive Indian

army at the outskirts of Hyderabad. It was only military show and civilians should not

be involved. Speaking to the nation over the All India Radio same evening, Jawaharlal

Nehru declared that the future of Hyderabad State would be decided by the people

themselves, though he was convinced that future of Hyderabad lay in ‘the closest

association with India’.25 If Hyderabad state were acceded to the Indian Union on 17th

September, 1948 what made Jawaharlal Nehru to speak the way he did it!

The Nizam chose to take the case before the Security Council. He submitted the

case through a cablegram of Zahir Ahmed, Secretary General of Hyderabad

government, External Affairs, dated 21st August, 1948 and addressed to the President.

25

Curiously enough, the Security Council admitted the case and sent notices to the

Government of India. Meanwhile, Hyderabad Government sent a delegation which was

headed by Moin Nawaz Jung. He presented the case in detail to Security Council and

urged for a quick action to safeguard peace and integrity of Hyderabad. Due to certain

technicalities, immediate action could not be taken by the Security Council and it was

filed on the agenda.26

GREENWICH MEAN TIME (GMT)

Having heard the delegates of India and Hyderabad, Sir Alexander Cadogan, the

President wound up the meeting, to give time to the members to study the situation

carefully and fixed the next hearing for Monday, the 20th September 1948. While

adoption by the Security Council of the application of Hyderabad on its Agenda was a

fundamental measure of success, however, the postponement of further consideration

until the 20th of September presented a very gloomy aspect. The delegation from

Hyderabad was fully conscious of the gravity of the situation and knew that it might be

too late if the matter was deferred until 20th. Hyderabad delegation contacted almost

every member of the Council and pleaded for immediate action. The response was very

heartening. Cadogan consulted to convene a special meeting on Friday the 17th

September at 11.30 GMT. The possibility of a cease-fire resolution by the Security

Council was discussed individually with most of the members and barring Nationalist

China, almost every other member was likely to support it. This was all very

heartwarming, only if Hyderabad could hold the Indian army on the battle front until

then. When sorrows come, they come not single spies, but in battalion.

The Indian delegation in Paris got the sent of cease-fire and immediately alerted

the Government of India about it. Accordingly Vallabhai Patel asked Munshi, the Agent-

General in Hyderabad, to bamboozle the Nizam on the Radio Deccan. At that time

26

Nizam was a frustrated and lonely man. He was rarely compos-mentis, ever since the

military intervention began. He, at the insistence of Munshi, acquiesced to go to the

Deccan Radio Station and broadcast the message which Munshi had carefully drafted.

Of special significance was reference to the application of Hyderabad before the

Security Council of the UNO, which the Nizam made to announce, he had ordered his

delegates to withdraw the case. Of course with a sense of foreboding he read the note.

While reading, little did the Nizam realize that he was not only reading the death

warrant of the Asaf Jahi dynasty but also four crores of Hindu – Muslim subjects.

Munshi proved to be the nemesis of the Hyderabad state. History is unsympathetic to

failures.

The emergency meeting of the Security Council to discuss the possibility of

cease-fire resolution was scheduled at 11.30 GMT on 17th September 1948, which was

5 ½ hrs behind the Indian standard time (IST). However, the news of surrender of

Hyderabad’s army and the withdrawal of the case before the UNO was broadcasted at

3.00 PM (IST) i.e., two hours before the scheduled meeting of the Security Council. The

All India Radio flashed its message through its external service to the world. This

dampened all enthusiasm of the members of the Council who convened an early

meeting to discuss cease-fire resolution consequently early meeting was called off. The

effect produced by the announcement of the Nizam’s army was prodigious. It was the

most astounding piece of news Hyderabad received since the fall of Golconda in 1687.

In tragic life, God vot, No villain need be; passions spin the plot, We are betrayed by what is false with in

George Meredith

At the same time, Mir Osman Ali Khan should also take his share of blame for

this debacle. He, unlike forbears preferred to wield a pen to that of a sword. Poetry,

perhaps no person can be a poet, or even enjoy poetry, without a certain unsoundness

27

of mind. He, instead of brooding over the issue at the King Koti Palace, could have

stayed with his troops at the borders. Didn’t the King Emperor George V of Britain visit

his troops at the war front during the Second World War ? He could have emulated him.

His presence could certainly have boosted the morale of the soldiers and delayed the

Indian Army’s advance. This could have given ample time to members of the Security

Council to deliberate over the Cease-fire resolution.

The first two rulers of the Asaf Jah dynasty considered four things great’ than all

things: women and horses and power and war. They relentlessly pursued them.

However, it is said to note that after Nizam Ali, the second Nizam, no Asaf Jahi ruler led

the tropes into battle. Other five Nizams were: Sikender Jah (1803-1829), Nasiruddin-

Dula(1829-1857) Afzal-ud-Dula(1857-1869) Mahabub Ali khan (1869-1911) and Osman

Ali Khan (1911-1948-1950). They were not even given military training, let alone

preparing them to lead the troops into battle. They only remembered women and

forgotten horses, power and war Mir Osman Ali Khan, the last Nizam had two son’s

Azam Jah and Moazzam Jah. In the changed circumstances Mir Osman Ali Khan could

have sent his wards to England to be trained Royal Military College, Sandhurst or USA

Military Academy – West Point, rather then sending them to Turkey in quest of wives.

As of now, the British Royal family continues the tradition of sending its wards to the

armed forces for some time. They also see active service in the war front. Had Azzam

Jah and his brother were to be at the borders of Hyderabad, during the Indian military

invasion in September 1948 instead of mourning about Bella Vista and Hill fort

palaces. The Hyderabad army could have fought valiantly and stalled the progress of

the Indian Army for some days. Instead, both the princes looked on beauty and

turned away from duty.

When Moin Nawaz Jung found that Hyderabad was in danger of being

conquered he transferred a large sum of Hyderabad state’s money into a special fund

28

to the Bank of England. This money was meant to meet the expenses of the case of

Hyderabad in the Security Council. This was done in his capacity as Finance Minister,

and as a result of his foresight, India was unable to take over the money. India

instituted a suit (in the name of Government of Hyderabad) in a British court to obtain

the money.27 The claim could have been based upon the premise that conquest gave

title, for title had been acquired in no other way. In such cases, the court relied heavily

upon the advice of the foreign office. Previously precedents indicated that India could

not be regarded as legal successor of the State of Hyderabad unless the British

government had given de jure recognition to the conquest (the case of Haile Selassie v.

Cable and Wireless Ltd.). In any case, a decision to turn over the money to India could

have given legal effect to a transfer of title accomplished by use of force contrary to the

charter of the United Nations. The money has not yet been released. Recently, it is

heard that lineal descendants of Mir Osman Ali Khan have been urging the Government

of India to use its good offices for the release of the money and to be given to them. In

fact, this money belongs to Telangana people, none else.

Nizam’s Pension:

Chief Minister B. Ramakrishna Rao today informed Konda Laxman in the State

Assembly that the Nizam, the Rajpramukh, was not being paid any pension. His Privy

Purse, the Chief Minister said, had been fixed and guaranteed by the government of

29

India under Article 291 was being charged to an paid from the Consolidated Fund of the

Government of India, he said Government had no knowledge, he added, whether the

Nizam contemplated to effect any reduction in his privy purse. The Chief Minister told

the House that the Nizam received Sarf-e-Khas (private jagir) and that amount was

given to the State Government as loan, free of interest, for the execution of the

Tungabhadra project.

Soon after the military intervention Operation Caterpillar (not Polo), However,

euphemistically called Police Action, the Nizam sent a cable to the UNO withdrawing

the case of Hyderabad and the delegation to the Security Council ceased to have any

authority to represent him or Hyderabad state. The Security Council did not accept the

cable and raised the question whether recognition should be given to the Indian

conquest of Hyderabad State and claim to little over Hyderabad. The western media

roundly condemned the military conquest and equated with the Italian conquest of

Ethiopia, Hitler’s conquest of Austria. To cap it all Nawab Jung petitioned to the

Security Council of Its leave to move the International Court of Justice at The Hague

against the military conquest of India. As its wont the UNO admitted the petition of the

Hyderabad delegation. It was during this time Hyderabad State Government – in - exile

was formed in Karachi and urged the UNO to recognize it.

While answering the 10th question, one should not lose the sight of wood while

counting the trees. There was an agreement between the Razakars and the

Communists. The Communists should stop the Indian army at the borders of

Hyderabad state and Razakars to protect Hyderabad city. By seeing the army, both the

communists and Razakars fled away. After the Operation Caterpillar (Police Action),

the Razakars handed over their weapons to the communists in several districts in

Telangana.28 Major General Choudary took one wrong decision to disarm the State

30

(both Nizam’s Army and Police). All had to surrender weapons. That gave an impetus

to the Telangana Armed Struggle organized by the Communists.29 Communists

boasted that Hyderabad was Indian Manchuria. The Communists did not fight

against the Nizam after 1948 but against the Government of India. Incidentally,

communists were the first terrorists in the Independent India.30

Taking advantage of this, the Hyderabad State Congress started border camps

and was helped by the neighbouring states. The Communists and Congress joined

together and styled themselves as ‘United Front’. And under the guise of the ‘United

Front’ the communists along with the Congress workers raised squads among the

villagers and employed them in demolishing custom houses and arson. Congress and

communists looted State Bank of Hyderabad at Umri in Jalna district. The booty was

left with Ramananda Tirth and its accountant was P.V. Narasimha Rao (Prime minister

of India – 1991-96). Ramananda Tirtha used part of the booty to build the Gandhi

Bhavan, presently which houses A.P. Congress Committee at Hyderabad, and the rest

of the booty was unaccounted for. This incident was brought to the notice of Vallabhai

Patel by Janardhan Desai. Commenting about subtle situation, K.M. Munshi observed

in “The End of an Era”, the so called Satyagraha which was conducted by the Congress

was scarcely of the Gandhian variety.31 The conflict in Hyderabad State Congress was

known as Desai and Gosai conflict. Because of the unsavoury reputation of the

Hyderabad State Congress, the Indian National Congress cancelled its affiliation. It is

not out of place to mention that Sarojini Naidu, a prominent Congress leader of the

Indian National Congress was a native of Hyderabad state. However, she did not

associate herself with the Hyderabad state Congress for the following reasons - 1) It

was not recognized by the AICC, 2) It was a pocket organization of Ramananda Tirth,

3) It indulged in loot and arson.

31

HYDERABAD HOLOCAUST:

As Indian army broke through the different fronts it had chosen for attack and

made rapid advance towards its destination and objective, disorder broke out in the

village and towns on the route and spread to other areas. The Nizam’s Police and

revenue officials left their posts of duty and fled to the capital. There was a great

upheaval. It was a communal outbreak on a wide scale, the demonstration of private

and public revenge and the fissiparous tendencies gave a helping hand and collected

as much as they could. It was like a cloud bursting, of pent up emotion, suppressed

hatred, the reaction of the poison preached and practiced for the past twenty years. The

doctrine of the right of conquest and the gospel “I am the King”, its apotheosis in the

form of the Government achieved by Kasim Razvi, the Razakars, the speeches, the

fear, the hate, the longing to see end of things the communal outbreak was more in the

five Marathi speaking districts and witnessed many trouble makers coming from the

neighbouring provinces.

The only detailed report on the large-scale killings, rape and loot or destruction

of property was compiled by Pandit Sundarlal, Moulana Abdulla Misri and Qazi

Muhammad Abdul Ghaffar shortly after the conclusion of military intersession. The

original report is no longer extant. However, only a small portion of the report is

available. The extent of the massacres can be imagined by the admission of

Ramananda Tirth, the Congress Chief, that Muslim losses in life and property far out do

Hindu sufferings before the military operation. It is true that invading troops committed

atrocities. However, it can’t be said with any certitude as to who perpetrated the crimes.

The Indian military as it advanced after taking over towns handed them over to Princely

states troops which were following them. It was those princely state armies and armed

police battalions of Madras Province, United Province and Malabar committed atrocities

and arson. The report clearly indicates the army “lest we might be understood to imply

32

slur on the Indian army, we hasten to record to our considered opinion, that the Indian

army and its officers in Hyderabad generally maintained a high standard of discipline

and sense of duty.”

Government of India needed regular army battalions which had participated in

the Police Action for Kashmir operations. As there was international opprobrium against

military invasion against Hyderabad State, the Government of India took steps to use

police against the Communists, accordingly it appointed V. Monappa a senior civil

servant to deal with them. He was assisted by N. Nanjappa a police officer from Madras

Province. It was those armed police battalions under the command of above officers

crushed the Communists without any compunctions. As there was milieu many lumpun

elements took advantage and looted Muslim properties. According to Akhtar Hasan, a

member of Progressive Writers’ Association and editor of the Urdu daily, Payam has

this to point out. “ No doubt the Razakars indulged in a lot of goondaism and has

oppressed other communities, but I have to say this, that in comparison to whatever the

Razakars did, the wrongs perpetuated on the community in the course of Police Action

and thereafter was ten times graver, for which documentary proof is available. After a

few months Nehru sent Sundarlalji and Qazi Abdul Ghaffar to Hyderabad particularly

towards Osmanabad and other areas where indescribable crimes were committed. The

report that Sundarlalji submitted about the situation here never saw the light of the day.

I read a few excerpts of it. It is terrible and a heart rendering report. When Sarojini

Naidu who was the Governor of U.P. heard of the tragedy of her Hyderabad after the

Police Action, it is said she wept. There are excerpts of taped interviews of Akhtar

Hasan done before his death, it is translated from Urdu to English by M.O. Faruqi,

which appeared in Deccan Chronicle, English Daily on 15-08-1997 Page 6”. It is

interesting to note that V.P. Menon the Secretary of the States of Government of India

33

confessed on page 376 of his Story of Integration of Indian States “The number of dead

was a little over eight hundred.”129 By a strange coincidence, 376 is a figure well known

in India. It is the number of the sections of the Indian Penal Code which punishes rape.

Jawaharlal Nehru, meanwhile permitted himself a brief escape from the

vicissitudes of Delhi life. On October 5th 1948 he flew to the home of his lady of love

Edwina Mountbatten. Lady Edwina used to cuckold with Nehru with a tacit approval of

Dickie. He also took this opportunity to allay opprobrium of England against the

invasion of Hyderabad. Accordingly Nehru requested Dickie to put in a good word to

King Emperor in this regard, as a quid pro quo, India would become the member of

Common Wealth. Mountbatten had taken great care to make sure this came about,

writing a letter to the King to introduce his ‘great friend Nehru’ and enclosing a full

briefing on how the latter’s invasion of Hyderabad had liberated the grateful Nizam from

the thrall of fanatics: Razakars and Communists. He also added “Don’t forget that

whereas Jinnah lost no chance of insulting the Crown – Nehru has gone out of his way

to be courteous about it.32

The Mountbatten’s other daughter, Pamela agreed: “I’ve often asked whether I

think Nehru and my mother were in love. The answer undoubtedly is yes, they were”.

Despite his life long insistence that Indian freedom demanded a total rejection of all ties

to Britain, Jawahar was soon to agree to Keep India in the Common Wealth. This

controversial decision was widely described as the ‘Great Betrayal’ with India, and as

‘The Most Extraordinary Volte-Face My Brother Made” by Nehru’s own sister, Betty

Hutheesing.33 Little did she know that was a political expediency.

In conclusion, the Police Action was mainly against the Communists and

Razakars. It was a small rap on the knuckles to get the Nizam into line. As

Government of India referred the military intervention as the Police Action, the Ministry

of Defence refused to meet the expenses of Rs. 7.5 crores. The Government of India

34

asked the Ministry of Home Affairs to make the good. The Home Ministry also refused

to pay the costs as the Police was not at all involved. Curiously enough, it was the

Ministry of Health that paid the expenses. That’s how Government of India functions.

Another valid point to counter the view that the Hyderabad state was not merged

with the Indian Union on 17th September 1948, is Jawaharlal Nehru the Vice-President

(Before 26th January 1950 as he borne this designation) visited Hyderabad on 29-12-

1948. Prominent non-party Muslims of Hyderabad submitted a memorandum to him at

Hyderabad in which they demanded the admission of Hyderabad State to the Indian

Union. Responding to the Memorandum Nehru declared “Hyderabad is geographically

an integral part of India and the fate of its people invariably linked with that of the

People of India” .34

Another important thing that is to be noted is that the Mint of Government of

Hyderabad issued currency in the name of H.E.H. the Nizam as late as 1952. It was

commonly known as Osmania Sikka (OS – Halli). It was an accepted legal tender.

This currency was in circulation along with the Indian currency (IG – Kaldar) in

Hyderabad. If the Nizam was deposed on 17th September 1948, how could the

Government of Hyderabad not only minted coins but also printed Rs.5, Rs.10 and

Rs.100 notes in his name as late as 1952.

POLITICAL PENSIONS:

It is interesting to note that as all political parties were not having any role

whatsoever in the police action they had rightly kept aloof from it, until Indira Gandhi

Prime Minister of India declared to introduce political pensions in 1972. It was from that

year, all political parties especially Communists had started eulogizing it as a freedom

struggle and started claiming political pensions. Especially agitprop writers became

very busy to strut their wares at every conceivable place. Since there was a split in the

35

Congress Party Indira Gandhi’s minority Government depended on the support of the

left parties. It was during this time the Naxalite movement started in Srikakulam District

of Andhra Pradesh. It was denounced by Andhra communists. They averred that they

had already experimented this type of militant movement in Telangana, however, they

could not achieve much. Government of India wanted this sort of statement from the

Communists against the Naxalites. Consequently, she connived at the ruse. It is equally

interesting to note that the left parties had celebrated 1972 as the silver jubilee year of

the so called Telangana Armed Struggle. And in this year only Communist Leaders like

Puchchalapally Sundaraiah (Sundara Ram Reddy), Ravi Narayana Reddy, Arutla

Ramchandra Reddy, Baswapunnaiah, Chanda Rajeshwar Rao and many others

published their political autobiographies. If we relay on those dates which Communists

claim that they fought in the years 1948-51. That means they did not struggle against

the Nizam, but against the Government of India.

Another important thing is that all the Hindu convicts who were incarcerated

during 1944 to 1951 for any crime got political pensions. Of course, the Government of

Andhra Pradesh as its wont had not considered the claims of even the genuine Muslims

who fought against the atrocities of the Razakars and jailed during this period. Andhra

Communists leaders left them high and dry.

The author had requested the Government of India to specify the exact date on

which the Hyderabad state was merged with Indian Union. The Ministry of Defence

vide their letter No. 2191 Q H dt. 19-10-2004 informed him that it was on 26th January

1950 Hyderabad state was merged with Indian Union. It is appropriate to mention that

the larger bench of Hon’ble Supreme Court consisting of Kania, Chief Justice, Fazl Ali,

Patanjali Sastri, B.K.Mukherjea, S.R.Das and Chandrasekhara Aiyar, Junior Judges.

While dealing Criminal Misc. Petition Nos. 71 to 73 of 1950, Dt.14-12-1950 observed

36

that Constitution of India, Art.135, Art.136 – Applicability – Judgements passed before

26-1-1950 by Courts in Nizam’s territory.

‘Under the words used in Art. 136 the Courts which passed judgments or sentence must be Courts within the territory of India. The territory of the Govt. of H.E.H. the Nizam was never the territory of India before 26-1-1950 and, therefore, the judgment and sentence passed by the High court of H.E.H. the Nizam on the 12th, 13th and 14th December 1949, cannot be considered as judgments and sentence ‘passed by a Court within the territory of India’, and as such they do not fall within the class of judgments against which special leave to appeal to the S.C. can be asked for under Art. 136. It is also obvious that such judgments are not covered under Art. 135, Constitution of India. The S.C. has, therefore, no jurisdiction to entertain the petitions for special leave to appeal against such judgments of the High Court of Hyderabad under Art. 136’. ‘The territory of the Govt. of H.E.H. the Nizam was never the territory of India, before 26-1-1950 and, therefore, the judgment and sentence passed by the H.C. of H.E.H. the Nizam on the 12th, 13th and 14th December 1949, cannot be considered as judgments and sentence passed by a Court within the territory of India. On that short ground alone it seems that the petitioners contention must fail’ (1951 Cri.L.J.391 (C.N.119) Supreme Court Criminal Law Journal 1950-2009)

The author had also urged the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India whether it

extended its jurisdiction over the Hyderabad state soon after the Police Action to which

the court said emphatically “no” vide its Lr. No. Dy. No. 382/RTI/08-9/SCI dated: 04-10-

2008. Then what is the fun of celebrating 17th September as the Liberation Day or

Accession Day. It was the Nizam who had inaugurated the Constitution of India as the

head of Hyderabad State. On 26th January 1950 sequel to it, Hyderabad State had

become B-state of the Indian Union and he became lifetime Raj Pramukh contrary to

the Article 156 of the Indian Constitution, which stipulates 5 years term to the Governor/

Raj Pramukh. This departure was largely made to placate the international opprobrium

and to keep the Nizam in good humour. Kindly remember that it was done with the

knowledge of Sardar Vallabhai Patel. The Nizam continued to be the Raj Pramukh of

37

Hyderabad State till the formation of Andhra Pradesh on 1-11-1956. Even after this,

Jawaharlal Nehru offered him to become the Governor of Andhra Pradesh as per the

terms of agreement of 25-1-1950 between the Government of India and him. However,

the Nizam politely declined the offer.35 if you have tears, prepare to shed them now.

If at all anybody has to celebrate 17th September, it should be the Indian army

regiments which had participated in the Operation Caterpillar (Police Action), as the

author was commissioned into 11 Gorkha Rifles, he should have a large tot of rum,

certainly not others! Of course, I have made it a rule never to drink by daylight and

never to refuse a drink after dark.

References:

1. Regimental History of 11 Gorkha Rifles, 11 Gorkha Rifles Regimental Press, Dehradun (A restricted document).

2. Prasad, Dr. S. N. Operation Polo – The Police action against Hyderabad 1948. Historical

section, Ministry of Defence, Government of India, Delhi, 1972.

3. Copeland, Ian, The Princess of India the Endgame of Empire. 1917 – 47, Cambridge University, 1997.

4. Dr. S. N. Prasad Op.cite, p 46

5. Ibid. p. 104

6. Ibid. p. 110

7. Ibid. p. 205

8. Dr. Rajendra Prasad, Correspondence and select documents Vol. 9, P. 362

9. V.N. Narayana & Jyoti Sabhrawal (ed) India At 50 Bliss of Hope and Burden of Reality: K.F.

Rustomji Policing: Best Times, Worst Times, Delhi – 2001 p 183

10. Ibid. p. 187

11. Winchester S. Truman’s Doctrine – New York, 1982 p 162 12. Khalidi, Omar, Hyderabad, After the fall of Hyderabad, Historical Society, Wi Chita, 1988.

13. D.N. Prasad Op.cit

14. Ibid. p. 104

15. El Edroos Syed Ahmed and L.R. Naik, Hyderabad of “The Seven Loaves”, Hyderabad 1994, pp 140-142

16. Ibid. p. 105

38

17. Sardar Vallabhai Patel, Correspondence Vol. 9 P. 62

18. D.N. Prasad Op.cit

19. Menon V.P. The Story of the Integration of the Indian States, Orient Longman, Calcutta, 1961

20. Kessings Contemporary Archives p 9606

21. Ibid

22. Shiva Rao (ed) Select Constitutional Assembly Debates, New Delhi - 1952

23. Op.cit Dr. S.N. Prasad

24. Chaudhuri, J.N. Maj. Gen. Armed Division in Operation Polo (A restricted document) p 29

25. Dr.D.N. Prasad Op.cit

26. U.N. Doc. S/986, Security Council, Official Records, 3rd year, Supp., September 1948, p 5

27. Mir Liaq Ali, Tragedy of Hyderabad, Pakistan Co-operative Book Society ;td., Karachi, 1950

27a. Dr.D.N. Prasad Op.cit. p. 101

28. ‘The Times’ (English daily – London) 20-9-1948

29. K.F. Rustomji Op.cit – Policing: Best Times, Worst Time.

30. Ibid

31. K.M. Munshi, The End of an Era, Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, Bombay, 1954

32. Alexvon Tunzelmann – Indian Summer, Simon Sehuster – UK Ltd, 2007, p 338

33. Hutheesing, We Nehrus, pp 237-8 DM to King George VI, 10th October 1948, MP: MBI / F42

34. Kessings Contemporary Archives p 9606

35. Yazdani, Zubaida, The Seventh Nizam – The Fallen Empire, Cambridge University, Press Cambridge, 1985.

Voice of Telangana

501, Shanti Soudha Apartments, Erramanzil Colony,

Hyderabad – 500082 Telephone No.- 040-23390918

39

ANNEXURE – I STANDSTILL AGREEMENT

Agreement made this Twenty-ninth of November Nineteen Hundred and Forty-seven between the Dominion of India and

the Nizam of Hyderabad and Berar.

WHEREAS it is the aim and policy of the Dominion of India and the Nizam of Hyderabad and Berar to work together in

close association and amity for the mutual benefit of both, but a final agreement as to the form and nature of the relationship

between them has not yet been reached;

AND WHEREAS it is to the advantage of both parties that existing agreements and administrative arrangements in

matters of common concern should, pending such final agreement as aforesaid, be continured:

NOW THEREFORE, it is hereby agreed as follows:

Article – 1: Until new agreements in this behalf are made, all agreements and administrative arrangements as to the

matter of common concern, including External Affairs, Defence and Communications, which were existing between the Crown and

the Nizam immediately before the 15th August 1947 shall, in so far as may be appropriate, continue as between the Dominion of

India (or any party thereof) and the Nizam.

Nothing herein contained shall impose any obligation or confer any right on the Dominion:

(i) to send troops to assist the Nizam in the maintenance of internal order, or

(ii) to station troops in Hyderabad territory except in time of war and with the consent of the Nizam which will not be

reasonably withheld, any troops so stationed to be withdrawn from Hyderabad territory within 6 months of the termination

of hostilities.

Article – 2: The Government of India and the Nizam agree for the better execution of the purposes of this Agreement to

appoint Agents in Hyderabad and Delhi respectively, and to give every facility to them for the discharge of their functions.

Article – 3:

(i) Nothing herein contained shall include or introduce paramountcy functions or create any paramountcy relationship.

(ii) Nothing herein contained and nothing done in favour hereof shall be deemed to create in favour of either party and right

continuing after the date of termination of this agreement, and nothing herein contained and nothing done in pursuance

hereof shall be deemed to derogate from any right which but for this agreement, would have been exercisable by either

party to it after the date of termination hereof.

Article – 4: Any dispute arising out of this agreement or out of agreements or arrangements hereby continued shall be

referred to the arbitration of two arbitrators, one appointed by each of the parties, and an umpire appointed by those arbitrators.

Article – 5: This Agreement shall come into force at once and shall remain in force for a period of one year.

In confirmation whereof the Governor-General of India and the Nizam of Hyderabad and Berar have appended their

signatures.

MIR OSMAN ALI KHAN, Nizam of Hyderabad and Berar,

MOUNTBATTEN OF BURMA Governor-General of India

40

ANNEXURE - II 1951 Cri. L. J. 391 (C.N.119)

SUPREME COURT

(From : Hyderabad)

KANIA. CJ. FAZL ALI PATANJALI SASTRI, B. K. MUKHERJEA, S.R. DAS AND CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR, JJ.

Criminal Misc. petition Nos. 71 to 73 of 1950, D/- 14-12-1950.

Janardhan Reddy and others, Petitioners v. The State.

(A) Constitution of India, Art. 136 – Retrospectivity.

Prima facie every legislation is prospective and there is no reason to depart from this rule of interpretation in the case of

Art. 136 of the Constitution. Even without the use of the word ‘hereafter’ the Article conveys the same meaning. (Para 7)

(B) Constitution of India, Art. 135, Art. 136 – Applicability – Judgments passed before 26-1-1950 by Courts in Nizam’s territory.

Under th words used in Art. 136 the Courts which passed judgments of sentence must be courts within the territory of

India. The territory of the Govt. of H.E.H. the Nizam was never the territory of India before 26-1-1950 and, therefore, the judgment

and sentence passed by the High court of H.E.H. the Nizam on the 12th, 13th and 14th December 1949, cannot be considered as

judgments and sentence ‘passed by a Court within the territory of India’, and as such they do not fall within the class of judgments

against which special leave to appeal to the S.C. can be asked for under Art. 136. It is also obvious that such judgments are not

covered under Art. 135, Constitution of India. The S.C. has, therefore, no jurisdiction to entertain the petitions for special leave to

appeal against such judgments of the High Court of Hyderabad under Art. 136. (Paras 7, 8, 9)

(C) Supreme Court – Powers of – Relief not granted by Constitution – Whether can be granted.

An omission to provide for a relief in the Constitution cannot be remedied by the S.C. and assumption of jurisdiction

which is not warranted by the clear words of Art. 134, 135 or 136 of the Constitution will be tantamount to making legislation by the

S.C. which it is never its function to do. (Para 9)

Shri D.N. Pritt, Senior Advocate, (Shri K.B. Asthana, Shri Danial Latifi, Bhawa Shiv Charan Singh and Shri A.S.r. Chari,

Advocates, with him), Instructed by Shri I.N. Shroff, Agent, for Petitioner; Shri M.C. Setalvad, Attorney General for India and Shri

Rama Raja Iyer, Advocate – General, Hyderabad (Shri G.N. Joshi, Advocate, with them), instructed by Shri P.A.Mehta, Agent, for

the State.

Judgement

In our opinion, the contention of the Attorney – General on this point is correct. There appears no reason why in the

present case the normal mode of interpreting a legislation as prospective only should be departed from. It was contended by Mr.

Pritt that the interpretation sought to be put by the State on Art. 136 will require the insertion of the word ‘hereafter’ in the clause, for

which there was no justification. We are unable to accept this contention because prima facie, every legislation is prospective and

even without the use of the word ‘hereafter’ the language of Art. 136 conveys the same meaning. It should be noticed in this case

that before 26-1-1950 the Govt. of H.E.H. the Nizam was an independent State in the sense that no Ct. in India or the Judicial

Committee of the P.C. in London had any jurisdiction over the decision of the Hyderabad State Cts. To give the S.C. of India

jurisdiction over the decisions of Cts. of such a State, one requires specific provisions or provisions which necessarily confer

41

jurisdiction to deal, on appeal, with the decisions of such Cts. it is common ground that there is no express provision of that kind.

There appear to us also no such necessary circumstances which on reasonable construction should be treated as impliedly giving

such right of appeal. Indeed the words “territory of India” lead to a contrary conclusion. Under the words used in Art. 136 the Cts.

which passed judgments or sentence must be Cts. within the territory of India. The territory of the Govt. of H.E.H. the Nizam was

never the territory of India, before 26-1-1950 and, therefore, the judgment and sentence passed by the H.C. of H.E.H. the Nizam on

the 12th, 13th and 14th Decr. 1949, cannot be considered as judgments and sentence ‘passed by a Court within the territory of India.

On that short ground along it seems that the petnrs.’ contention must fail.

It was argued by Mr. Pritt on behalf of the petnrs. that if such construction were put, the territory of the Province of

Bombay also may be excluded from the operation of Art. 136. The answer however is that a right to file an appeal from the

judgments of the H.C. at Bombay in both civil and criminal matters existed under the Civil P.C., Criminal P.C. and the Letters Patent

of the H.C. before 26-1-1950. Such right of appeal to the Judicial Committee of the P.C. which previously existed, was transferred

to the F.C. by the appropriate legislation and eventually by Art. 135 to the S.C. Therefore by the interpretation, which we think is the

proper interpretation of Art. 136, Const. Ind. The right of appeal from the judgment of the Bombay H.C. is not taken away. It is true

that having regard to the words used in Art. 136 which can bear a wider meaning a right to apply for leave to appeal to the S.C. is

given in respect of decisions not only of H. Cts. but of other tribunals also. That larger right, if it did not exist before 26-1-1950, can

be legitimately construed as newly conferred by Art. 136 and such construction does not give rise to any anomaly. In our opinion,

therefore, as the judgments were pronounced and sentences were passed in all these matters before us by the H.C. of Hyderabad,

which was in the territory of H.E.H. the Nizam and which territory was not the territory of India before 26-1-1950, and as those

judgments were passed before the Constitution came into force they do not fall within the class of judgments against which special

leave to appeal to the S. Ct. can be asked for under Art. 136. It is obvious that such judgments are not covered under Art. 135

Const. Ind.

In our opinion, this Ct. has, therefore, no jurisdiction to entertain these petns. for special leave to appeal against such

judgments of the H.C. of Hyderabad under Art. 136 of the Constitution. Cases like those of the petrs. are thus not covered by Art.

134, 135 or 136 and therefore the S.C. in the present state of the legislation is unable to render any assistance to them. An

omission to provide for such relief in the Constitution cannot be remedied by the S.C. and assumption of jurisdiction which is not

warranted by the clear words of Arts. 134, 135 or 136 will be tantamount to making legislation by the S.C. which it is never its

function to do.

The petns. under the circumstances, are rejected.

Petitions rejected

42

ANNEXURE - III

FROM THE SUNDARLAL REPORT

CONFIDENTIAL

To:

(1) The Honourable the Prime Minister, Government of India, New Delhi

(2) The Honourable the States Minister, Government of India, New Delhi

Sir,

We were asked by the Government of India to proceed to Hyderabad State on a goodwill mission. After completing our

task there we now beg to submit our report.

(1) The delegation consisting of Pandit Sundarlal, Kazi Abdul Ghaffar and Moualana Abdulla Misri arrived at Hyderabad on

the 29th of November and returned to Delhi on the 21st of December 1948. During this period we toured through 9 out of the 16

districts of the state, visiting 7 district headquarters, 21 towns and 23 important villages. In addition we interviewed over 500 people

from 109 such villages as we did not visit.

Further 31 public meetings at various places and 27 private gatherings of Hindus, Muslims, Congressmen, Official

Members of Jamiat Ulma and of the Ittahadul Muslimeen, the staffs and students of some Educational Institutions, Members of the

Progressive Writers Association and of the Hindustani Parchar Sabha, etc., were addressed by members of the delegation.

Amongst important men and officials interviewed by us may be mentioned H.E.H. the Nizam, H.E. the Prince of Berar,

Major General Choudhri, Mr. Bakhlo, the Chief Civil Administrator, Swami Ramanand Tirtha, Dr. Makote, Messrs Ramchander Rao,

Ramachari, K. Vadya, Venkat Rao and Abul Hassan Sayed Ali, Nawab Ali Yawar Jung, Nawab Zain Yar Jung, Raja Dhonde Raj,

Moulana Abu Yousuf, Moulvi Abdul Khair, and Moulvi Hameed uddin Qamar Farooqi.

At all these meetings and interviews the main problem discussed was that of the creation and maintenance of cordial

relations between the communities. Appeals were made to the people forget the past and to work unremittingly for the

establishment of peace and harmony amongst themselves. The aim and policy of the Indian Union was also explained and special

emphasis was laid on the objective which was the establishment of a secular government for the people of Hyderabad, in which all

of them irrespective of religion, caste or creed will enjoy equal freedom and civil rights and will have equal opportunities for

development and progress. It was made perfectly clear that the military administration had been charged with the duty of

implementing that policy. We clarified our position, whenever opportunity presented itself saying that ours was not a Commission of

investigation or Inquiry into events proceeding or following the police action and that ours was merely a goodwill mission charged

with the task of restoring better communal relations. All the same, we feel it our duty to bring to your notice what we saw and

gathered in our tourings, as it has, in our opinion, an importance all its own.

(2) Hyderabad State has 16 districts, comprising nearly 22,000 villages. Out of them only three districts remained practically,

though not wholly, free of communal trouble which affected the state first during the activities of the Razakars and then during the

reprisals that followed the collapse of that organization. In another four districts the trouble had been more serious but nothing like

the havoc that overtook the remaining eight. Out of these again the worst sufferers have been the districts of Osmanabad,

43

Gulbarga, Bidar and Nanded, in which four the number of people killed during and after the police action was not less, if not more

than 18,000. In the other four districts viz. Aurangabad, Bir, Nalgunda and Medak those who lost their lives numbered at least 5

thousand.

We can say at a very conservative estimate that in the whole state at least 27 thousand to 40 thousand people lost their

lives during and after the police action. We were informed by the authorities that those eight were the most affected districts and

needed most the good offices of our delegation. We, therefore, concentrated on these succeeded, we might say, to some extent at

least, in dispelling the atmosphere of mutual hostility and district.

It is significant fact that out of these eight the four worst affected districts (Osmanabad, Gulbarga, Bidar and Nanded) had

been the main strongholds of Razakars and the people of these four districts had been the worst sufferers at the hands of the

Razakars. In the town of Latur, the home of Kasim Razvi – which had been a big business centre, with rich Kuchhi Muslim

merchants, the killing continued for over twenty days. Out of a population of about ten thousand Muslims there we found barely

three thousand still in the town. Over a thousand had been killed and the rest had run away with little else besides their lives and

completely ruined financially.

(3) Almost everywhere in the affected areas communal frenzy did not exhaust itself in murder, alone in which some places

even women and children were not spared. Rape, abduction of women (sometimes out of the state to Indian towns such as

Sholapur and Nagpur) loot, arson, desecration of mosques, forcible conversions, seizure of houses and lands, followed or

accompanied the killing. Tens of crores worth of property was looted or destroyed. The sufferers were Muslims who formed a

hopeless minority in rural areas. The perpetrators of these atrocities were not limited to those who had suffered at the hands of

Razakars, not to the non-Muslims of Hyderabad state. These latter were aided and abetted by individuals and bands of people, with

and without arms, from across the border, who had infiltrated through in the wake of the Indian Army. We found definite indications

that a number of armed and trained men belonging to a well known Hindu communal organization from Sholapur and other Indian

towns as also some local and outside communists participated in these riots and in some cases actually led the rioters.

(4) Duty also compels us to add that we had absolutely unimpeachable evidence to the effect that there were instances in

which men belonging to the Indian Army and also to the local police took part in looting and even other crimes. During our tour we

gathered, at not a few places, that soldiers encouraged persuaded and in a few cases even compelled the Hindu mob to loot

Muslim shops and houses. At one district town the present Hindu head of the administration told us that there was a general loot of

Muslim shops by the military. In another district a Munsif house, among others was looted by soldiers and a Tahsildar’s wife

molested. Complaints of molestation and abduction of girls, against Sikh soldiers particularly, were bya no means rare. We were

generally told that at many places out of the looted property cash, gold and silver was taken away by military while other articles fell

to the share of the mob. Unfortunately there was a certain element in the army which was not free from communal feelings probably

because some of them could not forget the atrocities committed elsewhere on their own kith and kin.

Lest we might be understood to imply a slur on the Indian Army we hasten to record our considered opinion that the

Indian Army and its officers in Hyderabad generally maintained a high standard of discipline and sense of duty. In General Choudhri

we found a man without any tinge of communal prejudice, a firm disciplinarian and thorough gentleman.

44

We were given by Muslims instances in which Hindus had defended and given protections to their Muslim neighbours,

men and women even at the cost of their own lives. In some professions the fellow feeling was particularly marked. For instance at

places Hindu weavers defended Muslim weavers against Hindu and protected them often at a very heavy cost (including loss of

life) to themselves. Many Hindus helped in the recovery of abducted Muslim women.

(5) This communal trouble followed close upon the heels of the police action and the consequent collapse of the Razakar

organization, which had stood in the Muslim mind, as an effective barrier against the establishment of responsible government

which was synonymous, to the average Hyderabadi Muslim, with Hindu Raj, because it would be based on the will of the Hindu

majority. Muslim masses were generally slow to realize that their sufferings were the inevitable repercussions of the atrocities

committed on the Hindus only, a few days before, by the Razakars. The Razakars movement had the sympathy of a good number

of Muslimans in Hyderabad. Such of them as dared publicly to oppose that madness paid heavily for their temerity, so much so that

one of them fell before the bullet of an assassin. Like the Razakars the perpetrators of crimes against the Muslims encouraged the

belief that they had the backing of the authorities…..

Before closing we must gratefully acknowledge the valuable help and willing cooperation given to us by the Military

Administration in Hyderabad, Government officials in the districts we visited, by public workers and prominent citizens and lastly by

our two Secretaries Messrs Furrukh Sayer and P.P. Ambulkar.

45

Mir Osman Ali Khan – the VII Nizam

46

Princely States

47

Indian Army invasion in Sept. 1948

48

Relaying Broadcast of Nizam’s speech on 17th Sept. 1948

49

Indian Army entering into Hyderabad City on 18th Sept. 1948

Surrender of Razakars

50

Confiscated weapons

51

Rs.1000/- note with Telugu, Marathi, Kannada and Urdu

52

Nawab Bahadur Yar Jung Kazim Razvi

Liaq Ali

53

54

55

56

57

Pleasure time - Jawaharlal Nehru with Lady Mountbatten

58

59

60

M.K. VELLODI

61

September 17, 1948 Hyderabad Liberation Day – a Misnomer

The Research Paper Presented at the Sixty – Ninth Session

28 – 30 December, 2008

of

INDIAN HISTORY CONGRESS

Held at Kannur University, Kannur, Kerala

By

Dr. (Capt.) LINGALA PANDU RANGA REDDY (Retd.) M.A. (History – Gold Medalist – Osmania University)

M.Phil. (First class First – Annamalai University) Ph.D. (Osmania University)

11 Gorkha Rifles

(The Regiment which won the last Victoria Cross for India in the battle of Kohima)

(Stalled Japanese advance into India) in 1944.

This Regiment participated in:

OP “Polo” (Hyderabad – Police Action) 1948 Ops against Communists in Telangana 1948-51 Deployed in Hyderabad, Karimnagar and Warangal districts

during Telangana Agitation 1969 – Author was Coy Comdr at Warangal.

62

September 17, 1948 Hyderabad Liberation Day – a Misnomer Author: Capt. Lingala Pandu Ranga Reddy (Retd.) Copy Right: Voice of Telangana Printing courtesy of Sri K.M. Arifuddin Secretary Global & Madina Group of Institutions Hyderabad