recalibrating the anti-isis strategy

8/20/2019 Recalibrating the Anti-ISIS Strategy

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Recalibrating the Anti-ISIS Strategy

The Need for a More Coherent Political Strategy

Hardin Lang, Peter Juul, and Mokhtar Awad July 2015


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Recalibrating theAnti-ISIS StrategyThe Need for a More Coherent Political Strategy

Hardin Lang, Peter Juul, and Mokhtar Awad July 2015


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1 Introduction and summary

4 Assessing the anti-ISIS campaign one year after

the fall of Mosul

8 Recalibrating the anti-ISIS strategy

8 Strengthen political and military coordination within the anti-ISIS coalition

for a long-term campaign

12 Help Iraqis build a political framework to give Sunni Arabs a real stake in the

future of the country

14 Set a clear policy in Syria that integrates training, equipping, and

negotiating efforts

18 Conclusion

19 Methodology

20 About the authors

21 Endnotes

Contents


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1 Center for American Progress | Recalibrating the Anti-ISIS Strategy

Introduction and summary

More han a year afer he Islamic Sae o Iraq and al-Sham, or ISIS, conduced

a blizkrieg akeover o Iraqi and Syrian erriory, he inernaional campaign o

degrade and deea he group has seen mixed resuls. Evens o he pas year have

made clear wha Presiden Barack Obama warned a he ouse: Tis campaign

will be a muli-year effor ha will be complicaed by coninued volailiy across

he Middle Eas. Te nex U.S. presiden will inheri he ISIS hrea. Bu beore he

ransiion o a new adminisraion, he Unied Saes should srenghen is sraegy

by acknowledging and responding o he undamenally poliical naure o hislong-erm regional sruggle.

Las summer, he Obama adminisraion began building a sound policy rame-

work o comba ISIS. Te presiden effecively leveraged U.S. miliary suppor

o encourage Iraqis o usher in a new, more inclusive governmen and assembled

an impressive coaliion o 60 global and regional powers willing o figh ISIS

ogeher.1 Te adminisraion launched argeed miliary operaions and imple-

mened securiy cooperaion iniiaives o build he capaciy o orces in he

region o couner ISIS.2 Tese miliary seps were necessary o sar o arres

he rising ide o ISIS. Moreover, he Obama adminisraion made he correc

decision agains sending large numbers o U.S. ground roops back o Iraq in an

open-ended commimen. While he U.S. miliary is he fines fighing orce in he

world, i canno resolve he undamenal domesic and regional poliical problems

underlying he curren crisis.

Te imporan miliary seps ha are being aken in he U.S.-led effor o deea

ISIS remain hampered by he ailure o ully inegrae he ani-ISIS miliary

sraegy ino wider poliical sraegy. Tis has been demonsraed in an unclear

policy or Syria, weak and ragmened parners on he ground in Iraq, and inad-equae coordinaion among members o he ani-ISIS coaliion. Recen evens

have underscored hese weaknesses and poin o he need o make adjusmens in

sraegy and implemenaion.


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In mid-May, despie miliary progress agains ISIS in cerain pars o Iraq, he

erroris group seized Ramadi, he capial o Anbar Province.3 Across he border

in Syria, ISIS has seized Palmyra in he counry’s wes while suffering sebacks

agains Syrian Kurds o he norh. Equally disurbing, ISIS has gone viral beyond

Syria and Iraq: Affiliaes have suraced in Libya and Yemen; boh Boko Haram in

Nigeria and Ansar Bay al-Maqdis in Egyp have pledged allegiance; and atacksatribued o ISIS ollowers have occurred as ar away as Aghanisan.4 Wihin he

region, U.S. parners in he figh agains ISIS remain fixaed on heir own compei-

ions or power.5

Moreover, many Middle Easern members o he ani-ISIS coaliion view Iran

no ISISas he dominan hrea in he region. Te nuclear alks wih Iran have

heighened ha hrea percepion among many o he key regional players. Te

ac ha Saudi Arabia iniiaed ye anoher miliary campaign in Yemen agains he

Iranian-backed Houhi rebels jus monhs afer he launch o he ani-ISIS coali-

ion campaign highlighs he compeing prioriies o key counries in he region.6 A possible Iran nuclear deal will likely urher deepen he sense o insecuriy ha

many counries in he region eel abou Iran and he desabilizing role i has played

in he region.

Tese divisions and he recen sebacks in Iraq and Syria have led many o ques-

ion he Obama adminisraion’s sraegy o couner ISIS. Some criics quesion

he premise o relying on local and regional parners o lead he figh on he

ground. Insead, hey call or he deploymen o U.S. ground roops back o Iraq

and he region.7 Ohers argue ha he Iraqi sae is no longer viable and ha he

policy should suppor he ragmenaion o Iraq ino Kurdish, Sunni, and Shia

saes.8 Wihou quesion, i is ime o make adjusmens o he sraegy. Bu hou-

sands o American comba roops canno fix he poliical problems o Iraq or he

region, and supporing he ragmenaion o exising naion saes carries as much

or greaer risk o U.S ineress.

o degrade and ulimaely deea ISIS, he Obama adminisraion and is coaliion

parners should ake he ollowing hree major seps o ensure ha heir miliary

campaign and counererrorism effors are beter inegraed in suppor o a wider

poliical sraegy:

• Srenghen poliical and miliary coordinaion wihin he ani-ISIS coaliion o

prepare or a long-erm regional campaign.


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• Help Iraqis build a poliical ramework in which Sunni Arabs have a real sake in

heir counry’s uure.

• Se a clear policy in Syria ha inegraes raining, equipping, and negoiaing

effors o de-escalae he crisis in Syria.

As i moves orward, he Obama adminisraion and he U.S. Congress should

work ogeher o build a new naional consensus on he proper legal auhorizaion

or he use o miliary orce, or AUMF, in his campaign. I has been nearly one

year since he Unied Saes launched airsrikes in Iraq and Syria, bu hese effors

are being conduced under a legal ramework ha was developed more han a

decade ago o figh Al Qaeda and has quesionable relevance o he ask a hand. 9

ISIS has seized on local Sunni Arab grievances and aken advanage o he

regional poliical vacuum ha has emerged since 2011. o ruly deea ISIS, his

vacuum mus be filled wih a new regional ramework ha offers greaer jusice,less corrupion, and more responsive governmens and economic sysems. Te

process o building hose sysems will ake years and will be he overwhelming

responsibiliy o he region. I he Unied Saes has learned one hing in he pas

decade in he Middle Eas, i is ha i canno do hese hings on is own. Bu

wihou any sense o a new poliical order on he horizon, groups such as ISIS

will coninue o exploi he popular grievances among he disempowered o he

region o advance heir own brual ideologies. However, he Obama adminisra-

ion can ake criical seps now o recalibrae is sraegy o beter mobilize and

suppor he region in his endeavor.


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Assessing the anti-ISIS campaign

one year after the fall of Mosul

Recen evens in boh Iraq and Syria give cause or concern. For monhs, he Iraqis

and he coaliion made slow bu seady progress, eroding ISIS conrol in he norh

and cener o he counry. Bu in lae May, he Iraqi Securiy Forces, or ISF, su-

ered a major deea in Ramadi, he capial o Anbar province. Te all o Ramadi

resuled in calls in Washingon or he reinroducion o ens o housands o U.S.

comba roops ino Iraq. Bu hese proposals ignore wha are a hear poliical

problems: Te collapse in Ramadi refleced he weakness o Iraqi securiy insiu-

ions and poliics ha remain largely a zero-sum secarian affair.10

While here is no doub ha Iraqi Prime Miniser Haider al-Abadi has been more

inclusive in his leadership han his predecessor, he coninues o perorm a precari-

ous poliical balancing ac ha limis Sunni paricipaion. Any concessions he

offers o Sunnis are ofen seen as a sligh o he Shia, and progress oward recon-

ciliaion has been slow. Te ne resul is a Sunni Arab populaion ha coninues

o lack a real sake in Iraq’s uure. Lae las year, U.S. officials proposed a naional

guard concep o incorporae local Sunni fighers ino Iraq’s securiy orces,11 bu

his proposal remains salled in Iraq’s parliamen.12 Nor is i clear ha hese mea-

sures go ar enough o ensure Sunni Arabs ha hey will have a subsanive and

secure role in he uure o he counry.13

Wha’s more, coaliion rain-and-equip effors have ye o produce he desired

resuls. While he Deense Deparmen planned o rain and equip as many as

24,000 Iraqi Securiy Forces personnel by all 2015, by mid-June, coaliion roops

had only rained abou 9,000 securiy personnel.14 Afer he all o Ramadi,

Presiden Obama ordered an addiional 450 U.S. roops o Anbar Provincehal

o work wih regular Iraqi Securiy Forces and hal o work wih local Sunni figh-

ers. Tese new advisors could be he firs o a se o wha are ermed “lily pad” bases spread across Iraq o beter advise, rain, and equip Iraqi fighers in he figh

agains ISIS.15


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Tis sae o affairs has led some o argue ha he Iraqi sae is no longer viable and

ha i is ime or he Unied Saes o cu is losses. I’s rue ha he indicaors are

no good: he mos effecive fighing orces in he counry are no conrolled by

he cenral governmen in Baghdad, and he number o Iraqis who believe in heir

counry’s uure is rapidly dwindling. In he end, he orces rending Iraq apar may

prove oo powerul o conain. Iraq may in ac need o decenralize, bu ourighdissoluion would bring only greaer insabiliy and begs he quesion o who

would hen lead he figh o liberae Iraq’s Sunni Arab hearland rom ISIS.

Across he Iraqi border in Syria, he figh agains ISIS coninues o suffer rom

he lack o a wider sraegy o end he civil war. Momenum has shifed back and

orh beween he warring paries repeaedly. Bu wo recen evens sugges ha

he pendulum is swinging away rom he regime o Presiden Bashar al-Assad and

oward orces arrayed agains i. A ew days afer he all o Ramadi, ISIS scored a

significan vicory by capuring he ciy o Palmyra and is hisoric ruinsa sra-

egic boos ha gives ISIS conrol over vial supply roues.16 Tis success ollowedhe capure o he provincial capial o Idlib and mos o he province in norhern

Syria by a rebel coaliion spearheaded by Al Qaeda affiliae Jabha al-Nusraalso

known as he Nusra Fronand backed by Saudi Arabia, urkey, and Qaar.17

Opposiion orces also coninue o push agains Assad on he souhern ron

closer o Damascus.18

Alhough i is ar rom clear ha he all o Palmyra and Idlib mark he beginning o

he end or Assad, long-erm rend lines are no in his avor. Regime manpower is

once again running low,19 and conscripion has eroded Assad’s suppor among his

consiuens.20 Furhermore, Hezbollah’s roughly 5,000 fighers appear deployed o

proec Hezbollah’s ineress in Syriano o help he regime on he ronlines21

and Iran’s Revoluionary Guard Corps soldiers who were deployed o Syria have

reporedly pulled back o Damascus.22 Iraqi Shia miliias wihdrew rom Syria in

he wake o las summer’s ISIS offensive ino Iraq, depriving he Assad regime o

as many as 8,000 fighers, alhough here are recen indicaions ha a significan

number o Iraqi Shia miliia members have reurned o he figh in Syria.23

I remains unclear who will benefi rom Assad’s growing weakness. Vicories

agains Assad in Idlib were he resul o new cooperaion beween Saudi Arabiaand is old rivals Qaar and urkey o build a more poen coaliion o non-ISIS

Syrian rebel groups. Bu he ranks o his coaliion are filled wih Salafis figh-

erssome o whom speak avorably o he aliban as a model and cooperae wih

Jabha al-Nusra, he official Al Qaeda-affiliaed erroris group.24


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Tis progress sands in conras wih he agonizingly slow U.S.-led program o

rain and equip a new Syrian orce o figh ISIS. Te firs Syrians enered he

program only a he beginning o May 2015, wih some 90 recruis saring heir

raining.25 Recruimen is also reporedly proving difficul, wih only 1,500 o

some 6,000 voluneers meeing U.S. sandards or he ani-ISIS orce.26

More promisingly, Syrian Kurdish fighershe People’s Proecion Unis, or

YPGhave made significan gains agains ISIS wih he help o Free Syrian Army

unis and coaliion airpower. Te YPG capured he own o el Abyad in mid-

June, along wih he main supply roue rom ISIS-held erriory o he ouside

world.27 I he YPG holds el Abyad, i will have denied ISIS access o border

crossings wih urkey.

A he regional level, Special Presidenial Envoy Gen. John Allen and his eam

have made imporan progress over he pas eigh monhs in building a coaliion

o more han 60 saes o figh ISIS.28 Coaliion members have mobilized alongfive lines o effor essenial o he ulimae deea o ISIS: building parner capac-

iy; saunching he flow o oreign fighers; sopping ISIS unding and financing;

providing humaniarian relie; and counering ISIS’ public narraive. Each o hese

lines o effor has a working group led by coaliion members. For example, he

Unied Saes, Saudi Arabia, and Ialy chair he error finance working group. 29

Bu conflicing naional ineress in he region have prevened he coaliion rom

ocusing squarely on he ISIS hrea.

Many Sunni Arab members o he coaliionmos noably he Gul monarchies

led by Saudi Arabia seehave seen he specer o growing Iranian regional influ-

ence as a greaer hrea han ISIS. Tey view Syria and Iraq primarily as arenas or

geopoliical compeiion wih wha hey see as a rising Iran. In Syria, his leads

some Gul counries o coninue o prioriize he deea o Assad over effors o

comba ISIS. In Iraq, hese same acors have minimized heir invesmen in he

ace o growing Iranian influence. Sunni communiies on boh sides o he border

find ha hey are caugh in he middle o a regional ug o war. Fear o an Iranian

hand in Yemen led he Saudis o mobilize a parallel coaliion agains Iranian-

backed Houhi rebels; his coaliion is now more han one monh ino a bombing

campaign and seems unlikely o achieve is objecives.

Amid his shadow war, ISIS has expanded is poliical reach beyond Iraq and Syria.

Exising erroris groups Boko Haram in Nigeria and Ansar Bay al-Maqdis in

Egyp have publicly declared allegiance o ISIS. In Libya, ISIS aciliaed he amal-


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gamaion o decaying jihadi groups in Norh Arica.30 ISIS has claimed erroris

atacks in Yemen and Shia communiies in easern Saudi Arabia in recen monhs

and has been blamed or major erroris atacks in Aghanisan as well.31

Te geographic dispersal o he hreas posed by ISIS and oher violen exremis

groups has placed increased srains on he miliary, diplomaic, and inelligenceresources ha he Unied Saes has available o address his problem. Te Unied

Saes and some European allies are providing securiy assisance o help local

governmens batle hese groups, bu hese effors have no been assimilaed ino

he couner-ISIS coaliion ramework. Indeed, i is easy o orge he muliple

coaliion lines o efforrom counering he flow o oreign fighers o disruping

ISIS finances o counering ISIS’ messaging. In many o hese non-miliary areas,

here is a need or he Unied Saes and is parners o ake a more asserive role.

Ensuring ha coaliion’s members are all on he same page and effecively priori-

izing and ollowing hrough on commimens will enable he coaliion o more

effecively comba he hrea posed by ISIS affiliaes, raher han dealing wihhem on a piecemeal and ad hoc basis. Wihou greaer coaliion uniy o poliical

and miliary purpose in boh Iraq and Syria, he campaign agains ISISwhen

combined wih ISIS’ own acionsruns he risk o acceleraing he ragmena-

ion o boh counries. Neiher he Middle Eas nor U.S. ineress in he region can

afford he even greaer desabilizaion his ragmenaion would bring abou.

Across he Middle Eas, ISIS and oher exremis groups have aken advanage

o he poliical and social insabiliy ha has spread across he region since 2011.

Tis broader insabiliy is rooed largely in he lack o poliical legiimacy o many

governmens in he region; governmens ha have proven unable o respond

o he basic demands o heir populaions. As a consequence, large numbers o

people in he region have a srong sense o grievance agains he curren polii-

cal order. ISIS and oher exremis groups exploi his lack o legiimacy. Bu he

alernaive hey offer is a barbaric ideology imposed by orce. Unorunaely, he

realiy is ha ISIS and similar groups brually fill he vacuums ha have emerged

hroughou he region over he pas our years.


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Recalibrating the anti-ISIS strategy

ISIS will only be effecively degraded and deeaed wih he ull acknowledg-

men and coordinaed response o ISIS as a poliical challenge o he region and,

in paricular, o Iraq and Syria. Recognizing he poliical challenge posed by

ISIS requires he paricipaion o leaders in he region and an effecive coaliion

ramework. Bu coaliion members have organized hemselves ino separae eams

fighing differen campaigns in wo arificial heaersIraq and Syria. Teir lines

o operaion remain isolaed rom one anoher and sove-piped. Las summer, ISIS

ore down he borders beween Iraq and Syria, and he challenges in boh coun-ries are inerlinked. Bu he U.S.-led coaliion sraegy has no ye adaped o his

new realiy and insead ofen reas Syria and Iraq as separae challenges.

I is criical ha key regional parners pull more o he campaign’s weigh, bu

hey mus do so in a way ha produces consrucive oucomes as a par o a more

comprehensive effor. And while recen evens on he ground in Iraq and Syria, as

well as he viral spread o he ISIS brand, require adjusmens o he sraegy, he

mos imporan shifs will be aimed a delivering on he non-miliary and poliical

elemens ha have been under-emphasized and under-uilized. In recalibraing

he ani-ISIS sraegy, coaliion members should look o ake he ollowing seps.

1. Strengthen political and military coordination within the anti-

ISIS coalition for a long-term campaign

Te sheer breadh o he couner-ISIS coaliion membership is impressive. Te

five coaliion working groups mee on a regular basis and mos have developed

merics o evaluae progress. Bu coaliion members have ye o harness he ull

measure o heir collecive resources. In order o do so, hey mus ake he ollow-ing seps.


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Unify the campaign into a single theater

Te Unied Saes and is parners have divided he figh agains ISIS ino muliple

heaers based on he various naional ineress o he coaliion’s members. Te

Unied Saes, Canada, and Jordan are he only counries o have conduced air

srikes agains ISIS in boh Iraq and Syriaalhough he Briish governmen ispublicly mulling he expansion o is miliary operaions o Syria as well.32 Arab

parners have hi ISIS arges in Syria bu no Iraq, while radiional U.S. allies

rom Europe and Asia have hi ISIS in Iraq bu no Syria.

On he ground, he siuaion is reversed; he Unied Saes and parners rom

Europe and Asia have prioriized working wih and building up Iraqi ground

orces in parallel wih Iranian effors. In Syria, urkey and parner naions rom

he Gul have ocused on bringing pressure o bear agains he Assad regime by

mobilizing a coaliion o largely Salafi jihadi fighers. U.S. effors on he ground in

Syria wai or he Penagon rain-and-equip program o arrive. Meanwhile, ISISmaneuvers in a single geographic heaer unencumbered by he poliical and dip-

lomaic consideraions wih which he coaliion mus conend.

o properly conron ISIS, he U.S.-led coaliion should break he sovepipe and

engage ISIS-conrolled erriory as a single heaer a a regional level. In Iraq,

his will require he Gul saes o sep up heir effors o suppor boh he Iraqi

governmen and local Sunni Arabs o figh back agains ISIS. In Syria, he Unied

Saes, urkey, and he Gul saes should inegrae heir effors o boh rain and

suppor a Syrian opposiion ha excludes he wors acors. As he Penagon’s

rain-and-equip program begins o field fighers, he later should be deployed in

coordinaion wih operaions rom he air and on he ground on he Iraqi side o

he border agains ISIS o he exen possible.

Follow through with regional partners to bolster regional ownership

and responsibility

Firs and oremos, ISIS is a challenge o he region and a sympom o he en-

sions racking he Middle Eas. Te Unied Saes can organize and help lead heresponse, bu he region mus own he soluion. Te Obama adminisraion

regularly convenes regional acors, bu ollow-hrough has been lacking a imes.

In February 2015, he Whie House successully convened leading parners a

a major summi or a discussion o how o conron he long-erm challenge o


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violen exremism.33 While he summi was well atended, he dialogue ofen

appeared unehered rom he urgen exremis hrea o he momen, ISIS, and

he global coaliion assembled o conron i. Regional parners privaely com-

plained ha hey had litle idea abou wha hey were supposed o do nex.

Establish a framework to combat ISIS affiliates

When conroning ISIS affiliaes ouside Syria and Iraq, he Unied Saes and

is coaliion parners should work wih local parners o comba affiliaes such as

Boko Haram. In some casesmos noably Libya viable local parners wih

sufficien capaciy do no exis. Bu in ohers, here are parners ha can work o

conain and deea ISIS affiliaes. So ar, hese effors have been ad hoc, bu he

Unied Saes can develop a broader sraegic ramework or fighing ISIS affiliaes

by assising local parners.

Te Unied Saes and is coaliion parners should creae geographic areas o

responsibiliy or combaing ISIS affiliaes. Appoining lead counries or specific

problem areasakin o counry leads or he coaliion’s five working groups

could help creae a more cohesive sraegy o figh ISIS and is affiliaes. A he

same ime, he coaliion should prepare or he possible emergence o new ISIS

affiliaes. Inelligence agencies should coordinae o assess where he nex ISIS

affiliae is likely o urn up o aid policymakers in developing coningency plans

and anicipaory responses. Te coaliion and he inelligence communiy mus

have he means o assess wheher an ISIS affiliae is a rue securiy hrea or simply

a criminal gang in search o recogniion or legiimacy.

Mobilize the anti-ISIS coalition donors to adequately fund humanitarian

relief operations

Te civil wars in Iraq and Syria have resuled in 13.3 million people being dis-

placed; 9.4 million o hem have been inernally displaced. Te later accoun or

nearly one-quarer o he oal global inernally displaced persons populaion.34

Syrian reugees equal one-quarer o he overall populaion o Lebanon.35

Buunding remains in shor supply, and since 2012, humaniarian relie effors have

allen some $9.85 billion shor o U.N. requiremens.36 Te Unied Saes is by ar

he larges donor, spending nearly $3.7 billion on Syria’s humaniarian crisis. By

conras, he six energy-rich saes o he Gul Cooperaion Council have conrib-

ued a combined $2.03 billion o humaniarian relie effors.37


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Te couner-ISIS coaliion should mobilize is members o help overcome donor

aigue. A he regional level, Gul saes wih a sake in he securiy o counries

such as Jordan and Lebanon should be encouraged o inves more in humaniarian

relie effors. In Syria, jus more han one-quarer o he budge or he U.N. sra-

egic response plan has been unded.38 Donors should also find ways o suppor

smaller, more nimble local Syrian relie organizaions ha can access communiiesin conflic.39 In Iraq, coaliion donor counries should be able o close he rela-

ively smaller gap o $481 million or he U.N. Iraq sraegic response plan.40

Empower Gen. Allen or another senior leaders to have authority for U.S. and

coalition efforts

I coaliion members are o inegrae heir effors, he Unied Saes mus lead

by example. Gen. Allen leads he inernaional coaliion rom he U.S. Sae

Deparmen. A he Penagon, Cenral Command is charged wih he miliaryeffor in Iraq, and Maj. Gen. Michael Nagaa, who is in charge o special opera-

ions o Cenral Command, is asked wih he effor o rain and equip naionalis

Syrian opposiion fighers.41 I he Unied Saes is ruly leading a coaliion in a war

agains ISIS, i is ime or he U.S. governmen o organize isel accordingly by

appoining a single commander o lead he effor. Only hen can he Unied Saes

expec oher coaliion members o ruly synchronize heir effors behind a unified

campaign plan.

Use the counter-ISIS coalition to start discussing a more sustainable regional

security cooperation framework for the Middle East

Te shor-erm imperaives o combaing ISIS in Iraq and Syria open up space o

discuss a poenial long-erm regional securiy ramework. A recen proposal by

Egyp and backed by key Gul saes o creae an inegraed Arab sabilizaion orce

demonsraes ha acors in he region are willingin heory a leaso do more

o advance heir own ineress insead o relying on he Unied Saes. Te Unied

Saes should use he ramework o he couner-ISIS coaliion o explore opporu-

niies o work wih such a orce o produce longer-erm sabiliy in he region.


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2. Help Iraqis build a political framework to give Sunni Arabs a real

stake in the future of the country

Te miliary campaign in Iraq has made imporan inroads agains ISIS and

infliced heavy casualies among is ranks. Te Iraqi miliary effor has also su-

ered some significan sebacks, mos recenly in Ramadi, and raised secarianconcerns over he role o Iranian-sponsored Shia miliia. Bu perhaps he cam-

paign’s bigges ailure o dae is poliical. Effors o bea ISIS on he batlefield

mus empower Sunni Arabs and mus be accompanied by measures ha give hem

a real sake in Iraq’s uure.

Arm the Sunni Arab tribes

Any successul effor o deea ISIS in Anbar province will empower willing Sunni

Arab ribes and local armed groups o once again push Al Qaeda ou o Iraq’ssuccessors. Te Unied Saes should increase is assisance o hese local Sunni

groups. Te Iraqi governmen has made imporan progress in aciliaing he flow

o weapons and oher resources o he Kurdish peshmerga in he norh. Baghdad

now needs o play he same role or local Sunni Arab orces in wesern Iraq. Te

Unied Saes migh also consider proposals rom some in Iraq’s Sunni commu-

niy o orm join commitees o aciliae he disbursal o weapons.42 Tese join

commitees would include represenaives rom he cenral governmen, regional

governmen, ribes, and members o he U.S.-led coaliion, and hey would work

in each o he Iraqi provinces where ISIS is conesing conrol. Already, hal o

he 450 addiional roops ha Presiden Obama has ordered o Iraq are slaed o

work wih local Sunni orces in Anbar Province, as well as Iraqi miliary roops.

Some 500 Sunni ribal fighers have already repored o he new lily pad base a Al

aqaddum or raining alongside 300 provincial police recruis.43 I successul, his

new effor could be replicaed elsewhere in Iraq.

Hold the government in Baghdad accountable for its commitments

Prime Miniser Abadi has been a welcome change o his predecessor and, as heCener or American Progress has argued, coninues o deserve U.S. suppor.44

Abadi’s governmen has commited isel o aking imporan seps o give Iraq’s

Sunni communiies a sake in power-sharing wihin he ramework o an inclusive

Iraqi naional governmen. Tese seps include laws o esablish a naional guard


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and o repeal elemens o de-Baahificaion lawsedics aimed a Saddam-era

pary members. Drafs o hese laws have been suck in he Iraqi parliamen.

However, Abadi’s governmen has ailed o pay he local police in major ciies such

as Ramadi. Te Iraqi governmen needs o mee is obligaions i i is o be par o

he soluion and no par o he problem.

Te Penagon has announced ha i is considering he deploymen o addiional

advisors o esablish lily pads o suppor or Iraqi orces in sraegic locaions

ouside Baghdad.45 Te Unied Saes should make i clear ha hese addiional

deploymens will be linked o meeing specific benchmarks regarding de-Baahifi-

caion, he ormaion o he naional guard, and oher seps o reach ou o Iraqi’s

Sunni Arab communiies.

Leverage U.S. airpower and other critical support to get the right sectarian

mix in the Anbar counteroffensive

Te deea o Iraqi Securiy Forces in Ramadi is in danger o eroding key lessons

learned rom he batle or ikri. During he later, Shia miliia suppored by Iran

were unable o deea ISIS. I wasn’ unil he Unied Saes leveraged requess or

airpower ha he ide urned and pu Prime Miniser Abadi and he ISF emporarily

back in he driver’s sea in ikri. As a resul, Iranian-backed Shia miliias pulled ou

as he Iraqi miliarybacked by coaliion airpowersuccessully reook he ciy.

Te realiy may be ha he Shia miliia is a necessary par o he miliary orce ha

reakes Ramadi, bu he ISF and Sunni Arab fighers mus play a leadership and

ronline role in any liberaion effor. As i sands now, oo many Sunni Arabs see

ISIS as heir only champions. Te wrong secarian mix will doom a counero-

ensive o long-erm poliical disaser. o ensure agains ha oucome, he Unied

Saes should coninue o condiion he provision o airpower and oher essenial

miliary suppor on ISF leadership in he figh on he ground.

Mobilize the Gulf states to support the Sunni Arabs

Some Gul counries appear willing o provide ribes and oher Sunni Arab com-

muniies wih he means o deend hemselves. In an imporan and welcome sep,

Saudi Arabia is moving o reopen is embassy in Baghdad.46 Tis assisance should

be channeled hrough he cenral governmen, and he ramework o he couner-


17/27


ISIS coaliion as direc regional suppor o he ribes would likely urher under-

cu relaions beween Baghdad and he Gul capials. Te Unied Saes should

srongly advise he Iraqi governmen o accep his assisance, since poliical and

maerial suppor rom he Gul could play an imporan role in empowering Iraq’s

Sunni Arabs o ake on ISIS.

U.S. diplomas should make he case ha ailing o assis he Iraqi governmen

and Iraqi Sunni Arabs agains ISIS only gives Iran more opporuniies o exend

is influence in Iraq. Te bes way or Gul saes concerned abou Iran’s influence

in Iraq is o no isolae Baghdad, bu o engage i and he Sunni Arab communiies

fighing ISIS. Te more secure he Iraqi governmen is he less likely i is o rely on

Iranian suppor.

Push for greater decentralization in governance

Going orward, Iraq’s Sunni Arabs mus be reassured ha hey will no be sub-

jeced o he whims o a Shia Islamis-dominaed governmen in Baghdad. Iraq’s

naional guard concep is a good firs sep, bu i is unlikely o be sufficien. Some

orm o decenralizaion ha gives Sunni Arab-majoriy provinces greaer say over

local issues may help ease he poliical reinegraion o Sunni Arabs. Many o hese

areas have already been effecively cu off rom Baghdad’s conrol by he conflic

wih ISIS, and i may be wise o ormalize his decenralizaion.

3. Set a clear policy in Syria that integrates training, equipping, and

negotiating efforts

Te lack o a clear Syria policy is he weakes link in he Obama adminisraion’s

effor o degrade ISIS. Te Syrian civil war has creaed he vacuum in which he

erroris organizaion and oher exremis orces have hrived. I is hard o see how

ISIS can be deeaed in he long run i he Syrian civil war coninues o rage wih

no conceivable end on he horizon. An effecive sraegy would see he Unied

Saes and is coaliion parners use heir ani-ISIS effors as leverage agains he

Assad regime o de-escalae he conflic as a whole.


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Revise and accelerate the train-and-equip program and build command

and control

Te Obama adminisraion should adjus is sraegy in execuing he rain-and-

equip program or Syrian rebels. Slow progress has been accompanied by a lack o

clariy as o how he opposiion orce will execue is saed objecives agains ISIS.Te curren program calls or a orce o 15,000 roops o be rained over a period

o hree years.47 For many criics, he program is a case o oo litle, oo lae. Tis

concern is no wihou meri: only 180 recruis have sared raining so ar. 48 I he

program is o succeed, wo new seps should be considered.

Firs, a larger and aser raining effor may be necessary. Te program mus also pri-

oriize he creaion o an effecive U.S.-rained, Syrian-saffed command and conrol

srucure or he new opposiion orce. Te Unied Kingdom has already joined he

effor, and oher coaliion members should be encouraged o do so as well.

Second, new ani-ISIS orces mus also be linked wih some orm o local Syrian

poliical opposiion in he communiies where hese orces will operae. Wihou

hese ies, he legiimacy o he new orce will suffer in he eyes o he local popu-

laion. As CAP noed in a 2014 repor, he ormal opposiion in exile is now oo

removed rom evens on he ground o play his role. Vigorous oureach o he

nework o aciviss who remain in counry should be underaken in advance o

deploying he new orce, and he new orce should be rained o reach ou o local

leaders in he areas hey operae. Planning should begin now o help sabilize com-

muniies evenually liberaed rom ISIS.

Better coordination with regional partners

Righ now, he Unied Saes, urkey, Saudi Arabia, and Qaar are working a

cross-purposes when i comes o Syria. Tese regional saes are once again mobi-

lizing heir own radical proxy fighers agains he Assad regime wih litle commi-

men o conroning ISIS or consideraion o he long-erm consequences. A more

ocused U.S. invesmen in he Syrian opposiion should give he Unied Saes a

sronger voice o demand greaer uniy o effor rom he Gul saes and urkey.49

Te Unied Saes should use he ramework o a more inegraed couner-ISIS

coaliion o leverage his increased suppor ino agreed upon prioriies or par-

ners on he ground in Syria.


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In addiion, boh Jordan and urkey have alked recenly abou esablishing sae

zones on he ground in norhern and souhern Syria.50 Boh poenial operaions

will likely require U.S. air suppor o deer he Assad regime rom inerering wih

hem, which will in urn require greaer coordinaion beween he Unied Saes

and Jordan and urkey. Tis coordinaion will likely prove easier wih Jordan,

since is rumored incursion appears more in sync wih American sraegic objec-ives in Syria. Bu i will probably be more difficul wih urkey because is objec-

ive in esablishing a sae zone is o couner wha Ankara sees as Syrian Kurdish

ambiionshe same Syrian Kurds ha have proven o be he mos effecive

opponens o ISIS on he ground in Syria.51

Prepare for the limited use of airpower against the Assad regime to protect

anti-ISIS forces

Te Obama adminisraion has been relucan o use airpower agains he Assadregime or good reasons. Bu he decision o rain and equip Syrian opposiion

unis changes he calculus. Syrian Presiden Assad has specifically said ha he

will atack a new U.S.-rained ani-ISIS orce once inroduced ono he batle-

field.52 Tese unis will hereore no only need o conron ISIS, bu also deend

hemselves rom he Assad regime. Te Unied Saes and coaliion allies should

suppor hese ani-ISIS orces rom he air agains he Assad regime as hey ake

he field.

Tis suppor should be provided o opposiion orces deployed agains ISIS, and

American and oher coaliion aircraf should be prepared o deend hemselves i

engaged by Assad regime orces. Such measures would no differ appreciably rom

wha he coaliion was prepared o do in sel-deense when i firs hi ISIS arges

in Syria in Sepember 2014.53 I he Unied Saes is unwilling o deend hese

unis, i begs he quesion o why hey are being rained in he firs place.

Revive diplomatic efforts to de-escalate Syria’s civil war

Effors o bring an end o he Syrian civil war hrough inernaional diplomacyhave proven ruiless hus ar. However, here are signs ha Presiden Assad’s long-

erm posiion may no be as srong as previously hough. A credible hrea by he

U.S.-led coaliion o use airpower agains he regime o deend newly rained and

equipped Syrian unis offers he bes remaining opporuniy o persuade Assad

and his backers o reurn o he negoiaing able.


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Beore ha hrea is issued, however, he Unied Saes should sar laying he nec-

essary diplomaic groundwork or i o be successul. Washingon has o make clear

o is regional parnersmos noably Saudi Arabia, urkey, and Qaarha i

remains commited o a negoiaed setlemen o he civil war. Similarly, he Unied

Saes should also reassure Iran and Russia ha i is no seeking o remove Presiden

Assad by orce. Trough his process, he Unied Saes should aim o re-esablish aconac group o inernaional sakeholders involved in he Syrian conflic.


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Conclusion

Te campaign o couner ISIS will be a muli-year effor. As he anniversary o

he firs year o his effor approaches his summer, i is ime or he Unied Saes

o make adjusmens o beter inegrae he poliical and miliary elemens o is

overall sraegy. Noneheless, he overarching ramework or is sraegy, which has

a regional and inernaional coaliion a is core, is he correc one.

Rushing housands o U.S. roops o one paricular corner o Iraq or anoher o

comba ISIS will no resolve wha are ulimaely poliical problems in Iraq, Syria,and he region as a whole. Insead, he Unied Saes should ake seps o produce

a more srucured regional response o his hrea. I should adjus is effors in

Iraq in ligh o he pas ew monhs o experience and coninue o seek o work

wih he cenral governmen in Baghdad. Bu a he same ime, he Unied Saes

should also develop a range o new coningency plans i he Iraqi governmen alls

shor in is effors o couner ISIS and build a new, inclusive poliical order.

Syria is he weakes link in he ani-ISIS sraegy, and he Unied Saes needs

o bring ogeher he differen componens o is effor in a more inegraed

ashion. U.S. airsrikes agains ISIS, is rain-and-equip program, and is diplo-

maic plans o achieve a poliical setlemen o he civil war in Syria should all be

closely coordinaed.

Ulimaely, he hrea posed by ISIS will be deeaed only when a new poliical

ramework and order is presened in he regionone ha offers greaer jusice,

less corrupion, and more responsive governmens and economic sysems. Te

process o building hose sysems will ake years, and he burden or doing so will

be on he region. I he Unied Saes has learned one hing in he pas decade in

he Middle Eas, i’s ha i canno do hese hings alone. Bu wihou any senseo a new poliical order in he region on he horizon, groups such as ISIS will

coninue o exploi he popular grievances among he region’s disempowered o

advance heir own murderous ideology.


22/27


Methodology

Tis repor is based on Cener or American Progress inerviews wih U.S. officials

involved in he ani-ISIS campaign and field inerviews. CAP researchers con-

duced field inerviews wih Syrian rebels, poliical opposiion members, Assad

regime loyaliss, Iraqi governmen officials, and Sunni and Kurdish officials in

urkey, Lebanon, and Iraq.


23/27


About the authors

Hardin Lang is a Senior Fellow a he Cener or American Progress, where he

ocuses on U.S. naional securiy and mulilaeral affairs, Middle Eas policy, and

he role o Islamiss in he region. He comes o CAP wih 18 years o experience

in peacekeeping, peacebuilding, and sabilizaion, including a 12-year career wihhe Unied Naions. Mos recenly, Lang was a senior ellow in he inernaional

securiy program a he Cener or Sraegic and Inernaional Sudies.

Mokhtar Awad is a Research Associae wih he Naional Securiy and

Inernaional Policy eam a he Cener or American Progress. His work ocuses

on Islamis groups, Middle Easern poliics, and U.S. oreign policy oward he

region. Prior o joining CAP, he was a junior ellow in he Middle Eas Program a

he Carnegie Endowmen or Inernaional Peace. He has been published in Foreign

Policy , Te Washington Post , and is he auhor o “Te Salafi Dawa o Alexandria:

Te Poliics o A Religious Movemen,” in Current rends in Islamist Ideology.

Peter Juul is a Policy Analys a he Cener or American Progress wih a ocus

on U.S. policy in he Middle Eas and Souh Asia. A seven year CAP veeran, Juul

holds an undergraduae degree in inernaional relaions and poliical science rom

Carleon College in his naive Minnesoa and a maser’s degree in securiy sudies

rom he School o Foreign Service a Georgeown Universiy. He is he co-auhor

o Serving America’s Veerans, a reerence book on veeran’s affairs, and has pub-

lished commenary in Aviation Week and Space echnology, Newsweek, U.S. News

and World Report , he Atlanta Journal-Constitution , and he Foreign Policy blog

nework. He has also appeared on radio and elevision news programs, including

Alhurra and Al Jazeera English.


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Endnotes

1 U.S. Department of State, “Special Presidential Envoy forthe Global Coalition to Counter ISIL,” available at http://www.state.gov/s/seci/ (last accessed July 2015).

2 The Center for American Progress recommended manyof these steps in reports last summer. For details, seeBrian Katulis, Hardin Lang, and Vikram Singh, “On theBrink: Managing the ISIS Threat in Iraq” (Washington:Center for American Progress, 2014), available athttps://www.americanprogress.org/issues/security/report/2014/06/17/91993/on-the-brink/; Brian Katulis,Hardin Lang, and Vikram Singh, “Defeating ISIS: AnIntegrated Strategy to Advance Middle East Stability”(Washington: Center for American Progress, 2014),available at https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/security/report/2014/09/10/96739/ defeating-isis-an-integrated-strategy-to-advance-middle-east-stability/.

3 Eric Schmitt and Helene Cooper, “ISIS Fighters SeizedAdvantage in Iraq Attack by Striking During Sand-storm,” The New York Times, May 18, 2015, available athttp://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/19/world/middlee-ast/isis-fighters-seized-advantage-in-iraq-attack-by-striking-during-sandstorm.html.

4 Matt Schiavenza, “Afghanistan’s Growing War WithISIS,” The Atlantic, April 18, 2015, available at http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/04/afghanistans-growing-war-with-isis/390870/.

5 Brian Katulis and Peter Juul, “U.S. Middle East Policy ata Time of Regional Fragmentation and Competition”(Washington: Center for American Progress, 2014),available at https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/security/report/2014/06/16/91809/u-s-middle-east-policy-at-a-time-of-regional-fragmentation-and-com-petition/.

6 Jeremy M. Sharp, “Yemen: Civil War and Regional Inter-vention” (Washington: Congressional Research Service,2015), available at http://fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/R43960.pdf.

7 Kimberly Kagan, Frederick W. Kagan, and Jessica D.Lewis, “A Strategy to Defeat the Islamic State,” Middle

East Security Report 23, September 2014, available athttp://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Defeating%20ISIS_0.pdf.

8 Michael J. Totten, “Let Iraq Die: A Case for Partition,”World Affairs Journal, March/April 2015, available athttp://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/let-iraq-die-case-partition.

9 Ken Gude, “Understanding Authorizations for the Useof Military Force” (Washington: Center for AmericanProgress, 2014), available at https://www.american-progress.org/issues/security/report/2014/09/24/97748/understanding-authorizations-for-the-use-of-military-force/.

10 Hugh Naylor, “Fall of Ramadi reflects failure of Iraq’sstrategy against ISIS, analysts say,” The Washing-ton Post , May 19, 2015, available at https://www.

washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/fall-of-ramadi-reflects-failure-of-iraqs-strategy-against-islam-ic-state-analysts-say/2015/05/19/1dc45a5a-fda3-11e4-8c77-bf274685e1df_story.html.

11 Mark Pomerleau, “The plan to train and equip theIraqi national guard,” The Hill , December 16, 2014,available at http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/defense/227234-the-plan-to-train-and-equip-the-iraqi-national-guard.

12 Ned Parker, “Iraqi cabinet approves draft law to set upnational guard,” Reuters , February 3, 2015, availableat http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/02/03/us-mideast-crisis-iraq-guard-idUSKBN0L70ZT20150203; Raed El-Hamed, “The Challenges of MobilizingSunni Tribes in Iraq,” Sada , March 17, 2015, avail-able at http://carnegieendowment.org/sada/index.cfm?fa=show&article=59401&solr_hilite=.

13 Yaroslav Trofimov, “After Minority Rule, Iraq’s SunnisRefuse M inority Role,” The Wall Street Journal , April 9,2015, available at http://www.wsj.com/articles/iraqs-sunnis-dont-accept-minority-role-1428571127.

14 U.S. Secretary of Defense Ash Carter, “Statement onU.S. Policy and Strategy in the M iddle East beforethe House Armed Services Committee,” Press release,U.S. Department of Defense, June 17, 2015, avail-able at http://www.defense.gov/Speeches/Speech.aspx?SpeechID=1949.

15 Peter Baker, Helene Cooper, and Michael R. Gordon,“Obama Looks at Adding Bases and Troops in Iraq, toFight ISIS,” The New York Times, June 11, 2015, availableat http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/12/world/mid-dleeast/iraq-isis-us-military-bases-martin-e-dempsey.html.

16 Dominique Soguel, “Islamic State seizes ancient Pal-myra for strategic boost in eastern Syria,” The ChristianScience Monitor , Mary 21, 2015, available at http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2015/0521/Islamic-State-seizes-ancient-Palmyra-for-strategic-boost-in-eastern-Syria-video.

17 Anne Barnard and Hwaida Saad, “Islamists SeizeControl of Syrian City in Northwest,” The New YorkTimes, April 25, 2015, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/26/world/middleeast/islamist-militants-capture-syrian-town.html; Desmond Butler, “TurkeyOfficials Confirm Pact With Saudi Arabia To HelpRebels Fighting Syria’s Assad,” The World Post, May7, 2015, available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/05/07/turkey-saudi-arabia-syria-rebels-pact_n_7232750.html.

18 Tom Perry, “Southern Syria rebels set collision coursewith al Qaeda,” Reuters , April 14, 2015, available athttp://www.reuters.com/article/2015/04/14/us-mid-east-crisis-syria-south-idUSKBN0N511N20150414.

19 Hugh Naylor, “Desperate for Soldiers, Assad’s Govern-ment Imposes Harsh Recruitment Measures,” The Wash-ington Post, December 28, 2014, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/des-perate-for-soldiers-assads-government-imposes-harsh-recruitment-measures/2014/12/28/62f99194-6d1d-4bd6-a862-b3ab46c6b33b_story.html; ChristopherKozak, “The Assad Regime Under Stress: Conscriptionand Protest among Alawite and Minority Populations inSyria,” Institute for the Study of War Syria Updates, De-cember 15, 2014, available at http://iswsyria.blogspot.com/2014/12/the-assad-regime-under-stress.html.

20 Hugh Naylor, “Some Alawites are beginning to ques-tion their support for Syria’s Assad,” The WashingtonPost, November 12, 2014, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/some-alawites-are-beginning-to-question-their-support-for-syrias-assad/2014/11/11/ee302b0c-aac0-4f17-a220-cddcd49b52db_story.html; Kozak, “The Assad RegimeUnder Stress.”

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22 NOW Lebanon, “IRGC pulls back in Syria,” April 15,

2014, available at https://now.mmedia.me/lb/en/NewsReports/565123-iran-revolutionary-guards-reportedly-pull-back-in-syria.

23 Maria Abi-Habib, “Shiite Militias Decamping From Syriato Fight in Iraq,” The Wall Street Journal, June 17, 2014,available at http://www.wsj.com/articles/shiite-militias-decamping-from-syria-to-fight-in-iraq-1403051977;Sam Dagher, “Syria’s Allies Are Stretched by WideningWar,” The Wall Street Journal, July 14, 2014, available athttp://www.wsj.com/articles/syrias-allies-are-stretched-by-widening-war-1405383402; Philip Smyth, “IraqiShiite Foreign Fighters on the Rise Again in Syria,”Washington Institute for Near East Policy, May 29,2015, available at http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/iraqi-shiite-foreign-fighters-on-the-rise-again-in-syria.

24 Hassan Hassan, “Jabhat Al Nusra leader reveals his true

colors,” The National (UAE), June 8, 2015, available athttp://www.thenational.ae/opinion/comment/jabhat-al-nusra-leader-reveals-his-true-colours.

25 Tom Vanden Brook, “Pentagon training and equip-ping Syrians to fight ISIL,”USA Today, May 7, 2015,available at http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2015/05/07/syria-isil-pentagon/70947638/.

26 “U.S. wants to train Syrian rebels – but volunteers arescarce,” CBS News, June 29, 2015, available at http://www.cbsnews.com/news/us-wants-to-train-syrian-rebels-but-volunteers-are-scarce/.

27 BBC News, “Islamic State Conflict: Syrian Kurds ‘seize Tal Abyad,’” June 15, 2015, available at http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-33132809; Sylvia Westall,“Islamic State scores up gains and losses in Syrian fight-ing,” Reuters , June 30, 2015, available at http://www.

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28 U.S. Department of State, “Special Presidential Envoy forthe Global Coalition to Counter ISIL.”

29 U.S. State Department, “Establishment of theCounter-ISIL Finance Group in Rome, Italy,” March20, 2015, available at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2015/03/239592.htm.

30 Benoît Faucon and Matt Bradley, “Islamic State GainedStrength in Libya by Co-Opting Local Jihadists,” The WallStreet Journal, February 17, 2015, available at http://www.wsj.com/articles/islamic-state-gained-strength-in-libya-by-co-opting-local-jihadists-1424217492.

31 Declan Walsh, “Allure of ISIS for Pakistanis Is on the Rise,”The New York Times, November 21, 2014, available at

http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/22/world/asia/isis-pakistan-militants-taliban-jihad.html; Kristina Wong,“Pentagon acknowledges ISIS spread to Afghanistanamid US troop drawdown,” The Hill, February 12, 2015,available at http://thehill.com/policy/defense/232588-pentagon-isis-nascent-in-afghanistan; CBS News, “ISISclaims increasing stake in Yemen carnage,” March 23,2015, available at http://www.cbsnews.com/news/isis-yemen-carnage-houthi-rebels-advance-in-aqap-

territory-toward-hadi/; Noah Rayman, “ISIS Claims Rolein Yemen Attack, But Doubts Persist,” Time, March 20,2015, available at http://time.com/3752683/yemen-suicide-bomber-isis-al-qaeda/.

32 BBC News, “Consider Syria IS strikes, defense secretaryurges MPs,” July 3, 2015, available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-33358267.

33 White House, “Fact Sheet: The White House Summit onCountering Violent Extremism,” Press release, February18, 2015, available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/

the-press-office/2015/02/18/fact-sheet-white-house-summit-countering-violent-extremism.

34 Patrick Boehler and Sergio Paçanha, “The GlobalStruggle to Respond to the Worst Refugee Crisis in Gen-erations,” The New York Times, June 8, 2015, availableat http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/06/09/world/migrants-global-refugee-crisis-mediterranean-ukraine-syria-rohingya-malaysia-iraq.html.

35 Svein Erik Stave and Solveig Hillesund, “Impact of Syrianrefugees on th e Jordanian labour market,” InternationalLabour Organization, 2015, available at http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---arabstates/---ro-beirut/documents/publication/wcms_364162.pdf .

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accessed July 2015); Financial Tracking Service, “TotalFunding to the Syrian Crisis 2014,” available at https://fts.unocha.org/pageloader.aspx?page=special-syriancrisis&year=2014 (last accessed July 2015);Financial Tracking Service, “Total Funding to theSyrian Crisis 2013,” available at https://fts.unocha.org/pageloader.aspx?page=special-syriancrisis&year=2013(last accessed July 2015); Financial Tracking Service,“Total Funding to the Syrian Crisis 2012,” available athttps://fts.unocha.org/pageloader.aspx?page=special-syriancrisis&year=2012 (last accessed July 2015).

37 Financial Tracking Service, “Donor funding 2012 to2015,” June 10, 2015, available at https://fts.unocha.org/pageloader.aspx?page=search-reporting_display&CQ=cq260115191009dOLEaWyOry.

38 Financial Tracking Service, “Total Funding to the SyrianCrisis 2014.”

39 Thanassis Cambanis, “Syria’s Humanitarians Are GoingBroke,” Foreign Policy , June 29, 2015, available at https://foreignpolicy.com/2015/06/29/syria-lebanon-refugees-basmeh-zeitooneh/.

40 Financial Tracking Service, “Iraq 2015,” available athttps://fts.unocha.org/pageloader.aspx?page=emerg-emergencyDetails&appealID=1097 (last accessed July2015).

41 NBC News, “Meet General Nagata, the Man Leadingthe Mission to Defeat ISIS,” January 5, 2015, availableat http://www.nbcnews.com/news/asian-america/meet-general-nagata-man-leading-mission-defeat-isis-n276996.

42 Yerevan Saeed, “Ramadi fall strengthens Sunni leader’scall for direct arms supplies,” Rudaw , May 19, 2015,

available at http://rudaw.net/mobile/english/inter-view/19052015.

43 Michael R. Gordon and Eric Schmitt, “Iraqi Forces PlanOffensive to Retake Ramadi From ISIS,” The New YorkTimes, July 6, 2015, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/07/world/middleeast/iraqi-forces-plan-offensive-to-retake-ramadi-from-isis.html.

http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/29/world/middleeast/an-eroding-syrian-army-points-to-strain.htmlhttp://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/29/world/middleeast/an-eroding-syrian-army-points-to-strain.htmlhttp://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/29/world/middleeast/an-eroding-syrian-army-points-to-strain.htmlhttp://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2015/0312/Syria-as-Vietnam-Why-the-war-could-be-making-Hezbollah-stronger.-videohttp://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2015/0312/Syria-as-Vietnam-Why-the-war-could-be-making-Hezbollah-stronger.-videohttp://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2015/0312/Syria-as-Vietnam-Why-the-war-could-be-making-Hezbollah-stronger.-videohttps://now.mmedia.me/lb/en/NewsReports/565123-iran-revolutionary-guards-reportedly-pull-back-in-syriahttps://now.mmedia.me/lb/en/NewsReports/565123-iran-revolutionary-guards-reportedly-pull-back-in-syriahttps://now.mmedia.me/lb/en/NewsReports/565123-iran-revolutionary-guards-reportedly-pull-back-in-syriahttp://www.wsj.com/articles/shiite-militias-decamping-from-syria-to-fight-in-iraq-1403051977http://www.wsj.com/articles/shiite-militias-decamping-from-syria-to-fight-in-iraq-1403051977http://www.wsj.com/articles/syrias-allies-are-stretched-by-widening-war-1405383402http://www.wsj.com/articles/syrias-allies-are-stretched-by-widening-war-1405383402http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/iraqi-shiite-foreign-fighters-on-the-rise-again-in-syriahttp://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/iraqi-shiite-foreign-fighters-on-the-rise-again-in-syriahttp://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/iraqi-shiite-foreign-fighters-on-the-rise-again-in-syriahttp://www.cbsnews.com/news/us-wants-to-train-syrian-rebels-but-volunteers-are-scarce/http://www.cbsnews.com/news/us-wants-to-train-syrian-rebels-but-volunteers-are-scarce/http://www.cbsnews.com/news/us-wants-to-train-syrian-rebels-but-volunteers-are-scarce/http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-33132809http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-33132809http://www.wsj.com/articles/islamic-state-gained-strength-in-libya-by-co-opting-local-jihadists-1424217492http://www.wsj.com/articles/islamic-state-gained-strength-in-libya-by-co-opting-local-jihadists-1424217492http://www.wsj.com/articles/islamic-state-gained-strength-in-libya-by-co-opting-local-jihadists-1424217492http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/22/world/asia/isis-pakistan-militants-taliban-jihad.htmlhttp://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/22/world/asia/isis-pakistan-militants-taliban-jihad.htmlhttp://thehill.com/policy/defense/232588-pentagon-isis-nascent-in-afghanistanhttp://thehill.com/policy/defense/232588-pentagon-isis-nascent-in-afghanistanhttp://www.cbsnews.com/news/isis-yemen-carnage-houthi-rebels-advance-in-aqap-territory-toward-hadi/http://www.cbsnews.com/news/isis-yemen-carnage-houthi-rebels-advance-in-aqap-territory-toward-hadi/http://www.cbsnews.com/news/isis-yemen-carnage-houthi-rebels-advance-in-aqap-territory-toward-hadi/http://time.com/3752683/yemen-suicide-bomber-isis-al-qaeda/http://time.com/3752683/yemen-suicide-bomber-isis-al-qaeda/http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-33358267http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-33358267http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/06/09/world/migrants-global-refugee-crisis-mediterranean-ukraine-syria-rohingya-malaysia-iraq.htmlhttp://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/06/09/world/migrants-global-refugee-crisis-mediterranean-ukraine-syria-rohingya-malaysia-iraq.htmlhttp://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/06/09/world/migrants-global-refugee-crisis-mediterranean-ukraine-syria-rohingya-malaysia-iraq.htmlhttps://fts.unocha.org/pageloader.aspx?page=special-syriancrisishttps://fts.unocha.org/pageloader.aspx?page=special-syriancrisishttps://fts.unocha.org/pageloader.aspx?page=special-syriancrisis&year=2014https://fts.unocha.org/pageloader.aspx?page=special-syriancrisis&year=2014https://fts.unocha.org/pageloader.aspx?page=special-syriancrisis&year=2014https://fts.unocha.org/pageloader.aspx?page=special-syriancrisis&year=2013https://fts.unocha.org/pageloader.aspx?page=special-syriancrisis&year=2013https://fts.unocha.org/pageloader.aspx?page=special-syriancrisis&year=2012https://fts.unocha.org/pageloader.aspx?page=special-syriancrisis&year=2012https://fts.unocha.org/pageloader.aspx?page=search-reporting_display&CQ=cq260115191009dOLEaWyOryhttps://fts.unocha.org/pageloader.aspx?page=search-reporting_display&CQ=cq260115191009dOLEaWyOryhttps://fts.unocha.org/pageloader.aspx?page=search-reporting_display&CQ=cq260115191009dOLEaWyOryhttps://fts.unocha.org/pageloader.aspx?page=emerg-emergencyDetails&appealID=1097https://fts.unocha.org/pageloader.aspx?page=emerg-emergencyDetails&appealID=1097https://fts.unocha.org/pageloader.aspx?page=emerg-emergencyDetails&appealID=1097https://fts.unocha.org/pageloader.aspx?page=emerg-emergencyDetails&appealID=1097https://fts.unocha.org/pageloader.aspx?page=search-reporting_display&CQ=cq260115191009dOLEaWyOryhttps://fts.unocha.org/pageloader.aspx?page=search-reporting_display&CQ=cq260115191009dOLEaWyOryhttps://fts.unocha.org/pageloader.aspx?page=search-reporting_display&CQ=cq260115191009dOLEaWyOryhttps://fts.unocha.org/pageloader.aspx?page=special-syriancrisis&year=2012https://fts.unocha.org/pageloader.aspx?page=special-syriancrisis&year=2012https://fts.unocha.org/pageloader.aspx?page=special-syriancrisis&year=2013https://fts.unocha.org/pageloader.aspx?page=special-syriancrisis&year=2013https://fts.unocha.org/pageloader.aspx?page=special-syriancrisis&year=2014https://fts.unocha.org/pageloader.aspx?page=special-syriancrisis&year=2014https://fts.unocha.org/pageloader.aspx?page=special-syriancrisis&year=2014https://fts.unocha.org/pageloader.aspx?page=special-syriancrisishttps://fts.unocha.org/pageloader.aspx?page=special-syriancrisishttp://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/06/09/world/migrants-global-refugee-crisis-mediterranean-ukraine-syria-rohingya-malaysia-iraq.htmlhttp://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/06/09/world/migrants-global-refugee-crisis-mediterranean-ukraine-syria-rohingya-malaysia-iraq.htmlhttp://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/06/09/world/migrants-global-refugee-crisis-mediterranean-ukraine-syria-rohingya-malaysia-iraq.htmlhttp://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-33358267http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-33358267http://time.com/3752683/yemen-suicide-bomber-isis-al-qaeda/http://time.com/3752683/yemen-suicide-bomber-isis-al-qaeda/http://www.cbsnews.com/news/isis-yemen-carnage-houthi-rebels-advance-in-aqap-territory-toward-hadi/http://www.cbsnews.com/news/isis-yemen-carnage-houthi-rebels-advance-in-aqap-territory-toward-hadi/http://www.cbsnews.com/news/isis-yemen-carnage-houthi-rebels-advance-in-aqap-territory-toward-hadi/http://thehill.com/policy/defense/232588-pentagon-isis-nascent-in-afghanistanhttp://thehill.com/policy/defense/232588-pentagon-isis-nascent-in-afghanistanhttp://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/22/world/asia/isis-pakistan-militants-taliban-jihad.htmlhttp://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/22/world/asia/isis-pakistan-militants-taliban-jihad.htmlhttp://www.wsj.com/articles/islamic-state-gained-strength-in-libya-by-co-opting-local-jihadists-1424217492http://www.wsj.com/articles/islamic-state-gained-strength-in-libya-by-co-opting-local-jihadists-1424217492http://www.wsj.com/articles/islamic-state-gained-strength-in-libya-by-co-opting-local-jihadists-1424217492http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-33132809http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-33132809http://www.cbsnews.com/news/us-wants-to-train-syrian-rebels-but-volunteers-are-scarce/http://www.cbsnews.com/news/us-wants-to-train-syrian-rebels-but-volunteers-are-scarce/http://www.cbsnews.com/news/us-wants-to-train-syrian-rebels-but-volunteers-are-scarce/http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/iraqi-shiite-foreign-fighters-on-the-rise-again-in-syriahttp://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/iraqi-shiite-foreign-fighters-on-the-rise-again-in-syriahttp://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/iraqi-shiite-foreign-fighters-on-the-rise-again-in-syriahttp://www.wsj.com/articles/syrias-allies-are-stretched-by-widening-war-1405383402http://www.wsj.com/articles/syrias-allies-are-stretched-by-widening-war-1405383402http://www.wsj.com/articles/shiite-militias-decamping-from-syria-to-fight-in-iraq-1403051977http://www.wsj.com/articles/shiite-militias-decamping-from-syria-to-fight-in-iraq-1403051977https://now.mmedia.me/lb/en/NewsReports/565123-iran-revolutionary-guards-reportedly-pull-back-in-syriahttps://now.mmedia.me/lb/en/NewsReports/565123-iran-revolutionary-guards-reportedly-pull-back-in-syriahttps://now.mmedia.me/lb/en/NewsReports/565123-iran-revolutionary-guards-reportedly-pull-back-in-syriahttp://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2015/0312/Syria-as-Vietnam-Why-the-war-could-be-making-Hezbollah-stronger.-videohttp://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2015/0312/Syria-as-Vietnam-Why-the-war-could-be-making-Hezbollah-stronger.-videohttp://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2015/0312/Syria-as-Vietnam-Why-the-war-could-be-making-Hezbollah-stronger.-videohttp://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/29/world/middleeast/an-eroding-syrian-army-points-to-strain.htmlhttp://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/29/world/middleeast/an-eroding-syrian-army-points-to-strain.htmlhttp://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/29/world/middleeast/an-eroding-syrian-army-points-to-strain.html


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44 Hardin Lang and Peter Juul, “Helping Prime MinisterAbadi Beat ISIS and Hold Iraq Together,” Centerfor American Progress, April 13, 2015, available athttps://www.americanprogress.org/issues/security/news/2015/04/13/110930/helping-prime-minister-abadi-beat-isis-and-hold-iraq-together/.

45 Baker, Cooper, and Gordon, “Obama Looks at AddingBases and Troops in I raq, to Fight ISIS.”

46 Yara Bayoumy, “Saudi Arabia to reopen Baghdad em-bassy after 25-year chill,” Reuters , January 3, 2015, avail-

able at http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/01/03/us-saudi-iraq-idUSKBN0KC06S20150103.

47 Dasha Afanasieva, Warren Strobel, and Phil Stewart,“Set to begin, U.S. plan for Syrian rebels already miredin doubt,” Reuters , April 27, 2015, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/04/27/us-syria-crisis-usa-insight-idUSKBN0NI0BZ20150427; UK Ministry ofDefence, “UK troops to train moderate Syrian opposi-tion,” March 26, 2015, available at https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-troops-to-train-moderate-syrian-opposition; Sebnem Arsu, “Turkey Will Help TrainModerate Syrian Rebels, Diplomat Says,” The New YorkTimes, January 5, 2015, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/06/world/europe/turkey-will-help-train-moderate-syrian-rebels-diplomat-says.html.

48 Dan Lamothe, “Here’s how badly the Pentagon effort totrain Syrian rebels is lagging,” The Washington Post, June

18, 2015, available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2015/06/18/heres-how-badly-the-pentagon-effort-to-train-syrian-rebels-is-lagging/; Hardin Lang and others, “Supporting theSyrian Opposition” (Washington: Center for AmericanProgress, 2014), available at https://www.american-progress.org/issues/security/report/2014/09/12/96990/supporting-the-syrian-opposition/.

49 The Soufan Group, “Al-Qaeda’s Long Game in Syria,” May28, 2015, available at http://soufangroup.com/tsg-intelbrief-al-qaedas-long-game-in-syria/.

50 Sam Jones, Roula Khalaf, and Erika Solomon, “Jordan toset up buffer zone in southern Syria,” Financial Times,June 29, 2015, available at http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/ead1961a-1e38-11e5-ab0f-6bb9974f25d0.html#axzz3eZGzNJSR; Reuters, “Report: Turkey consid-ering invasion of Syria to establish buffer zone,” Haaretz ,June 29, 2015, available at http://www.haaretz.com/news/world/1.663515.

51 Thomas Seibert, “Turkey Plans to Invade Syria, Butto Stop the Kurds, Not ISIS,” The Daily Beast, June 28,2015, available at http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/06/28/turkey-plans-to-send-troops-into-syria-widening-the-war.html.

52 Foreign Affairs, “Syria’s President Speaks,” March/April2015, available at https://www.foreignaffairs.com/interviews/2015-01-25/syrias-president-speaks.

53 Amy McCullough, “With the Raptors Over Syria,” AirForce Magazine, February 2015, available at http://www.airforcemag.com/MagazineArchive/Pages/2015/Febru-ary%202015/With-the-Raptors-Over-Syria.aspx.

http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/04/27/us-syria-crisis-usa-insight-idUSKBN0NI0BZ20150427http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/04/27/us-syria-crisis-usa-insight-idUSKBN0NI0BZ20150427http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/04/27/us-syria-crisis-usa-insight-idUSKBN0NI0BZ20150427https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-troops-to-train-moderate-syrian-oppositionhttps://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-troops-to-train-moderate-syrian-oppositionhttps://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-troops-to-train-moderate-syrian-oppositionhttp://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/06/world/europe/turkey-will-help-train-moderate-syrian-rebels-diplomat-says.htmlhttp://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/06/world/europe/turkey-will-help-train-moderate-syrian-rebels-diplomat-says.htmlhttp://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/06/world/europe/turkey-will-help-train-moderate-syrian-rebels-diplomat-says.htmlhttps://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2015/06/18/heres-how-badly-the-pentagon-effort-to-train-syrian-rebels-is-lagging/https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2015/06/18/heres-how-badly-the-pentagon-effort-to-train-syrian-rebels-is-lagging/https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2015/06/18/heres-how-badly-the-pentagon-effort-to-train-syrian-rebels-is-lagging/https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2015/06/18/heres-how-badly-the-pentagon-effort-to-train-syrian-rebels-is-lagging/http://soufangroup.com/tsg-intelbrief-al-qaedas-long-game-in-syria/http://soufangroup.com/tsg-intelbrief-al-qaedas-long-game-in-syria/http://www.haaretz.com/news/world/1.663515http://www.haaretz.com/news/world/1.663515http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/06/28/turkey-plans-to-send-troops-into-syria-widening-the-war.htmlhttp://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/06/28/turkey-plans-to-send-troops-into-syria-widening-the-war.htmlhttp://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/06/28/turkey-plans-to-send-troops-into-syria-widening-the-war.htmlhttp://www.airforcemag.com/MagazineArchive/Pages/2015/February%202015/With-the-Raptors-Over-Syria.aspxhttp://www.airforcemag.com/MagazineArchive/Pages/2015/February%202015/With-the-Raptors-Over-Syria.aspxhttp://www.airforcemag.com/MagazineArchive/Pages/2015/February%202015/With-the-Raptors-Over-Syria.aspxhttp://www.airforcemag.com/MagazineArchive/Pages/2015/February%202015/With-the-Raptors-Over-Syria.aspxhttp://www.airforcemag.com/MagazineArchive/Pages/2015/February%202015/With-the-Raptors-Over-Syria.aspxhttp://www.airforcemag.com/MagazineArchive/Pages/2015/February%202015/With-the-Raptors-Over-Syria.aspxhttp://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/06/28/turkey-plans-to-send-troops-into-syria-widening-the-war.htmlhttp://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/06/28/turkey-plans-to-send-troops-into-syria-widening-the-war.htmlhttp://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/06/28/turkey-plans-to-send-troops-into-syria-widening-the-war.htmlhttp://www.haaretz.com/news/world/1.663515http://www.haaretz.com/news/world/1.663515http://soufangroup.com/tsg-intelbrief-al-qaedas-long-game-in-syria/http://soufangroup.com/tsg-intelbrief-al-qaedas-long-game-in-syria/https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2015/06/18/heres-how-badly-the-pentagon-effort-to-train-syrian-rebels-is-lagging/https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2015/06/18/heres-how-badly-the-pentagon-effort-to-train-syrian-rebels-is-lagging/https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2015/06/18/heres-how-badly-the-pentagon-effort-to-train-syrian-rebels-is-lagging/https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2015/06/18/heres-how-badly-the-pentagon-effort-to-train-syrian-rebels-is-lagging/http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/06/world/europe/turkey-will-help-train-moderate-syrian-rebels-diplomat-says.htmlhttp://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/06/world/europe/turkey-will-help-train-moderate-syrian-rebels-diplomat-says.htmlhttp://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/06/world/europe/turkey-will-help-train-moderate-syrian-rebels-diplomat-says.htmlhttps://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-troops-to-train-moderate-syrian-oppositionhttps://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-troops-to-train-moderate-syrian-oppositionhttps://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-troops-to-train-moderate-syrian-oppositionhttp://www.reuters.com/article/2015/04/27/us-syria-crisis-usa-insight-idUSKBN0NI0BZ20150427http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/04/27/us-syria-crisis-usa-insight-idUSKBN0NI0BZ20150427http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/04/27/us-syria-crisis-usa-insight-idUSKBN0NI0BZ20150427


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