Philosophy Of Science Take-home Exam

Karl Popper

prepared for Professor Bela Egyedby Shawn Monaghan

this Oct. 23/96

Part 1: The boundary twixt essentialism & instrumentalism

Part 2: Popper's three requirements for the growth of knowledge

Part 1

The boundary twixt essentialism & instrumentalism

Popper's 'third view' is displayed here in precisely the same manner in which

he 'displays' it within chapter 3 (and as it is fleshed-out by the rest of the

book). The manner of display to which I refer is not as a thing in itself,

concepts are hardly so concrete, but as a concept defined by that which it

opposes. In chapter three Popper does not find any need to display his view

positively he merely opposes his view to other important concepts which

define and shape it -- instrumentalism and essentialism.

Popper disagrees with essentialism he wants to assert that there exists no

"ultimate explanation beyond which there is no need of further explanation"

(p 105). He does not wish to assert the nonexistence of truth merely that

we cannot attain the essence of reality. He wants to argue against

essentialism on the primary grounds of obscurantism.

In Popper's view, holding to essentialism as a framework through which one

views the world is only to obscure that world, it hampers the scientists'

search for knowledge and therefore is contrary to a rational science.

Essentialism is a seeking for the ultimate end of science in Popper's view this

goal is unrealisable and can only lead to obscurantism. He clearly labels

himself as a utilitarian in this view and asserts that he cannot possibly deny

a critical cry of 'instrumentalism', "but I am concerned here with a problem of

method which is always a problem of the fitness of means to ends" (footnote

17).

Popper's other important criticism of essentialism comes from the realm of

absolutes and projects us into his (and Kant's) global narrative. Essentialism

posits an ultimate world which we attempt to discover, the world which we

see every day could be considered false and the world of atoms (for

instance) is perhaps the true world. Conversely the Popparian world is one in

which one theory can be wholly different from the world of a seemingly

compatible theory while both are in turn different from the world we see. All

of these worlds have their own relative versimilitude. Combined they are

much more likely to be truth-like than any one of the pictures (theories or

views).

There is no ultimate world to discover in Popper's view, ultimate reality

"collapses with that of ultimate explanation (p115)." In Popper's view

essentialism is naive to believe in an ultimate explanation of the world.

Reality to Popper is much more like a global narrative the world is described

by theory which then is described by a further world which is then described

by a further theory. Each level is a horizon of greater abstraction,

universalization and testability. This conceptualization of Popper's is

evocative of the universal horizons of which Heidegger spoke in answering

(asking) the question of being -- there will always be a further horizon.

In comparison to this conceptualization of reality as a global narrative the

essentialists really appear far too simplistic. When compared to Popper's

narrative their naive, cardinal belief in attaining the basic truths of the world

seems to vanish into the thin air from which they have come. Popper

certainly seems to have set up a satisfactorily complex tapestry with this

global narrative. Unfortunately, complexity does not always correspond with

greater versimilitude. That we can infinitely approach the truth without ever

attaining it, is a marvellously complex paradox. Yet is not complex enough to

seem at least in the final estimation -- almost absurd, unsupported.

Tarski's greatest achievement, and the real significance of his theory for the philosophy of the empirical sciences, is that he rehabilitated the correspondence theory of absolute or objective truth which had become suspect. He vindicated the free use of the intuitive idea of truth as correspondence to the facts. (The view that his theory is applicable only to formalized languages is, I think, mistaken. It is applicable to any consistent and even to a 'natural' language, if only we learn from Tarski's analysis how to dodge its inconsistencies; which means, admittedly, the introduction of some 'artificiality'--or caution--into its use...)(p.223).

Popper's reference to the Tarskian conceptualization of truth is no help to him

in his theory (in fact he states that he was happy to do without it). It does

not seem exceptionally plausible that the fundamental limits Tarski places on

his own theory can so easily be replaced by "caution". His simplification of

Tarski's theory of truth, in order for it to slide easily within his own (already

thoroughly established) system of human knowledge, is as much a crime as

his sweeping judgement of Wittgenstein's picture theory as "surprisingly

naive" (p.223).

In his critique of instrumentalism Popper seems to try overly hard to

establish its limits, perhaps he is here wrestling with his own karma. Popper

claims that under instrumentalism Newtonian theory would now be

considered only applicable where its concepts can be applied and thus is

not considered falsified but merely limited in use. Not only is this not

interesting and not saying anything of use, this he claims "is not saying

much". Furthermore, this is not merely not much it is evidence of the

obscurantist tendencies of instrumentalism (p113).

For it is only in searching for refutations that science can hope to learn and to advance. It is only in considering how its various theories stand up to

tests that it can distinguish between better and worse theories and so find a criterion of progress (p.113)

A question comes to mind, in this perhaps too hasty labelling of

instrumentalists’ obscurantist; what precisely is the difference betwixt a

falsified theory (under Popper's view) and a theory which is considered of

limited application (under instrumentalism)? I do not think that Popper

wishes to claim that the instrumentalist cannot tell the difference between

Newton and Einstein, yet he does claim that somehow the instrumentalist is

missing out. Certainly the reasonable instrumentalist would prefer Einstein's

theory to Newton's as it has a wider basis of application, but there seems to

be very little qualitative difference between this and regarding Newton's

theory as falsified. # The difference Popper might contend is within the

criterion of progress. This seems simple enough, Popper has a concept, a

criterion for progress that gives his view an edge that gets beyond

obscurantism. While the instrumentalist merely is able to recognize a theory

that has a wider applicability and this will inevitably lead to opacity unclarity

and thus lead the way from not toward progress. Consider the following

scenario.

In Popper's conceptualization we know if we test two theories each with the

same background knowledge that if one is disproven it should well be that

the only difference is the theory and that because it is the only thing

different from the other theory (grouped with the same background

knowledge) that we are in fact testing the theories and not the background

knowledge. It seems plausible that a theory could readily be falsified merely

because the background knowledge negates its usefulness while its

successor theory claims something wholly different of which our background

knowledge is silent perhaps because it is altogether new (atomic theory) and

yet the first theory could well be closer to the truth and we would never be

the wiser. Instrumentalism would be quite suitable in this sense holding on

to the theory (for application where applicable) despite knowing it to be

'false' (or limited in application). Thus eventually this bit of background

knowledge which limited the spectrum of the old long-falsified theory may be

disproven and voila we have a viable vibrant theory -- unless we subscribe to

Popper's third view in which case we would have rejected it long ago

"knowing" it to be false.

... in the search for knowledge, we are out to find true theories, or at least

theories which are nearer than others to the truth--which correspond better

to the facts; whereas in the search for powerful instruments we are, in many

cases, quite well served by theories which are known to be false (p226).

His second major critique of instrumentalism is that as a way of seeking

knowledge of the world it is not creative enough it would not lead to the 'new

effects' (the creation of new non-natural elements for instance) (p.117).

Not to be content with offering predictions, but to create new situations for new kinds of tests: this is the function of theories which instrumentalism can hardly explain without surrendering its main tenets (p.118).

This would appear to be an excellent, and hard to answer, statement but not

perhaps because it is an excellent critique so much as it does not posit

anything but attitude on the part of the scientist and it claims to narrate the

mind of an instrumentalist. On the contrary it would appear to be all the

more plausible for an instrumentalist to be able to create "new situations"

and generate new tests from entirely artificial phenomena precisely because

they are not required to think that they are discovering the essence of the

world nor are they restricted by the notion that they must be forever heading

closer and closer to the truth. For the instrumentalist any sort of creative

endeavour seems plausible for they are trying to devise a tool for interacting

with the world not trying to ascertain or delimit reality.

The view which Popper holds-forth, to take the place of these first two

(instrumentalism and essentialism), asserts that the scientist aims for a true

description of the world while declaring that this goal may not be attainable.

This view holds, however, that one can at times know reasonably well if a

theory is indeed false. (This brings to mind the story of the man who said in

reply to any argument uttered in his presence, "There is no truth and this is

the only truth I am willing to accept.")

Summing up we may say that instrumentalism is unable to account for the importance to pure science of testing severely even the most remote implications of its theories, since it is unable to account for the pure scientist's interest in truth and falsity. In contrast to the highly critical attitude of instrumentalism (like that of applied science) is one of complacency at the success of applications. Thus, it may well be responsible for the recent stagnation in quantum theory. (this was written before the refutation of parity.)

And yet it seems plausible to assert that an instrumentalist would be keen to

discover the limits of applicability of each theory. Thus recognizing that a

theory, which applies over a wider realm is more useful than another which

only applies to a portion of the above-mentioned realm.

Truth as a regulative principle makes a good theory of strength and

complexity but as a final end that exists that we shall never attain, never

even know even if we do -- this is mythological. This seems is a little too

conveniently like instrumentalism with all the good elements of essentialism

all tied together with a pretty string.

One might wish to claim that Popper's own third requirement is far too

obscurantist on the grounds that it could readily cause scientists to believe

their new theory so well proven that they have indeed reached the realm

that is as close as possible to the truth (without actually achieving it). Thus

lulling them into a complacency never dreamed of by the instrumentalists

(one can always devise a better instrument) but this is also the same

complacency he claims labels essentialism obscurantist.

Part 2

Popper's three requirements for the growth of knowledge

These requirements are not just requirements for growth or progress in the

common conceptualization. They are requirements that science must fulfill

to demonstrate a "getting nearer to truth" (p240). As such from the very

start Popper has fundamentally circumscribed these requirements within his

'third view'. From the start it is clear that this is Popper's way to distinguish

and circumscribe his own method, his own narrative of the search for

knowledge. This niche is carved out, as I have shown (above), precisely as if

it were traced along the shadows of the other two views carefully avoiding

the most grotesque features of these (very important) views with which he

formulates his own view through opposition -- always via the negative.

The first requirement is simplicity. A new theory should have a simple

unifying idea. A unification of simple elements (things or concepts) never

connected together in the past. This requirement, by his own admission, is

vague and perhaps dangerous (a sort of infinite regression reverberates

when the intuitive concept 'simple' is analysed). Testability is one definite

corollary of simplicity that Popper plays upon. It is in sink with his message

thus far. It does not seem clear that simplicity in this sense, the sense that

unifies previously unconnected things, is necessarily readily amendable to

testing. Nonetheless, we will carry on with the second requirement.

The new theory should be independently testable as a means of satisfying

us that it avoids the ever uncertain and problematic ad hoc device. This

element of testability is not so simple as explaining that which it was

designed to explain. It must have new results (never before projected) which

are confirmable (testable). This second requirement is loaded with still

more! This new theory must lead to the "prediction" of new phenomena

(never before observed phenomena).

These first two requirements are requirements only formal in nature. They

may be observable without actual testing without the nitty gritty cold hard

facts. They are observable whilst the theory is on the drawing board. These

requirements should be sufficient to ensure new data and new means of

testing data even should the theory become immediately falsified.

It is only the third requirement which is actually applied to the theory 'in

motion' this requirement must be applied empirically. A new theory must

pass new and severe tests. This final requirement is severe enough for

Popper to declare it dispensable, unlike the first two requirements this third

one is not absolutely necessary for the assurance that the theory has an

important contribution to make to the scientific endeavour. The third

requirement is indispensable in quite a different way from the first two. As a

principle of progress this third requirement is indispensable.

As the principle of progress the third requirement must be attained, at least

occasionally, for without it the progress of science and the rationality of

science would surely grind to a halt. This, the rationality and progress of

science, can only be ensured by the third requirement, Popper contends,

because without it we should never be able to distinguish our way through

the "theoretical maze" (p.243). Without occasional corroboration, empirical

corroboration, of at least some element of a new theory we cannot expect to

tread a clear rational path. We cannot expect our theoretical journey to

progress undaunted toward truth. Even a falsified theory may leave behind

in its tatters a gem of corroborated theory a substance to which we can link

our theoretical maze to satisfy us that we have indeed progressed. His

examples include such things as Dirac's anti-particles (which have long since

survived the dissolution of other parts of his theory).

In this way Popper hopes to achieve a series of corroborated background

theories which we can, with reasonable certainty, cling. Thus he also helps

us on the path of separating our modern theories from the background

knowledge which it is feared can treacherously destroy a viable new theory

without our knowledge (for how can we separate ourselves from our

background knowledge in avoidance?). This final requirement is a weapon,

just as the second and first requirements are weapons against the demon

known as ad hoc, it is meant to dislodge that which it seems Popper fears the

most -- that science is not progress but ad hoc(ery) incarnate. It would seem

that if not ad hoc a new theory would be verified in this third requirement.

The other major consideration of importance in Popper's third requirement

comes it would seem from attitude. If we do not consider that each of our

new theories is indeed an attempt to find the truth then we are reduced to

the level of instrumentalists stepping from one lifeless tool to the next. This

third requirement is fundamental to the attitude that we are indeed seeking

an explanation of the world through our theories. This is where Popper

begins his attempt to link his theory of progress with something more

concrete something less psychological, he wants to assert that there is

something logical or methodological to his third requirement.

Successful predictions must be obtainable from a true theory. Of course here

we must allow Popper's underlying premise that a theory can indeed be true.

Successful predictions would then be considered a necessary condition of a

theory which we posit to be true. Since we can never actually know that a

theory is true (for truth we can only approach) we cannot assert successful

predictions as sufficient conditions of veracity. If truth is indeed accepted as

regulative (if truth is considered a fundamental formal rule to the game of

science) then we must accept that it is a necessary condition that this third

requirement hold true for new theories.

The argument from falsity-content and truth-content. If our aim here is to

approach higher levels of versimilitude then we must reduce the falsity-

content of our theories while increasing the truth-content. This argument

seems applicable only in cases in which a theory makes new predictions

which the old one was not capable of making wherein the old theory has not

been previously falsified. A theory is said to have greater truth-content

("true consequences") than the one which it replaces if it has more verified

content. Likewise the old theory can be said to have a higher falsity-content

("false consequences") as it does not make true predictions where the new

theory does (p.246).

If our new theories do not pass independent tests (the third requirement)

and then become part of our background knowledge we would have a great

loss of rationality. If our background knowledge becomes too filled with this

sort of problematic theory, we will lose a great deal of explanatory power

from our theories.

The only arguments I feel confident I can make are those about which I feel

the least reserved. Though I fear that my arguments are not as powerful as

Popper's I do not also fear that his arguments are unanswerable. What if a

theory is designed through the manner which Popper describes as ad hoc?

That is, if we connect an ad hoc theory "with any testable but not yet tested

fantastic ad hoc prediction" and it becomes verified according to his third

requirement (p.244). If it is severely tested and passes that test, then it is no

longer considered ad hoc by his negative definition of ad hoc. If a theory

passes all of his three requirements no matter the source, then it is by

definition a verified theory in Popper's eyes. What this then says to me

about the whole game of verificationism is that it is inevitable that it shall fail

absurdities will always crawl up because we can never know if the truth is

something we have attained. Whereas, we can only be fairly certain about

the falsity of a theory and we can never know the veracity of a theory we

perhaps should be silent on.

My second statement on the topic of ad hoc(ery) is only to seek a

consistency of a small order in his work and his philosophy. His own theory

could easily succumb to jibes of ad hoc(ery) taking a bit of instrumentalism a

smidgeon of essentialism (carefully excluding its obscurantist elements) and

at the end adding a dash of verificationism if for no other reason than to just

distinguish himself from instrumentalism:

I admit there may be a whiff of verificationism here; but this seems to me a case where we have to put up with it, if we do not want a whiff of some form of instrumentalism that takes theories to be mere instruments of exploration (footnote 31 p248).

Clearly 'ad hoc' is not absent from Popper's vocabulary but perhaps his need

to assert the means beyond the ends are all the blinders required to avoid

realization of this self-inflicted device. Why should it be that this is an

important critique of Popper's work? Simply because his system of progress

for science does not seem to apply in the least to his own theories. He wants

his theory to play a regulative role for the seeking of knowledge but it is not

clear that it is any different from Plato’s myth of the republic (some are born

of gold others silver, and bronze). I am not here contemplating a battle with

Plato, merely with the viability of using myths within an important truth-

seeking philosophy.