poetry and history (papers in poetics 7)

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POETRY AND HISTORY

Bart A. Mazzetti

Introduction

IN an earlier paper,1 I argued that a proper ordering of the text of the Poetics would require

the placing of the final discrete section of Chapter 9 (cf. 1452a 2-11), on the combinationof incidents most effective for producing pity and fear, at the end of what we know asChapter 7 (following 1452a 11), which is then to be followed by the rest of Chapter 9

minus the second to last discrete section, which concerns episodic plots (cf. 1451b 34-

1452a 1). Let us look at the two passages in the proposed order:

Ch. 9 (1452a 2-11):

But since tragedy is not only the imitation of a perfect action, but also of things

evoking fear and pity, but they become such to the greatest extent when, contrary

to expectation, they are accomplished through each other, . For then they will have more of the

wonderful than if by chance and luck, since even inthings brought about by luck, these seem most wonderful whenever they appear to

have been accomplished as though [10] by design, as, for instance, the statue of

Mitys of Argo killed the man responsible for Mitys death, falling upon him while

he was looking at it; for such things seem not to have happened at random. And sosuch plots of necessity are more beautiful.

Ch. 9 (1451a 361451b 31):

But it is also apparent from what has been said that the task of the poet is to

relate, not what has happened, but the sort of thing that might happenthat is,

what is possible in accordance with likelihood or necessity. For the historian andthe poet differ not by [the one] speaking in verse [and the other] not, [1451b] (for

Herodotus put in verse would be no less a historian in verse than not in verse), but

they differ in this, namely, that the one relates what has happened [5], but the other

the sort of thing that might happen. For this reason, poetry is more philosophicaland more serious than history; for poetry relates rather the universal, whereas

history, the particular. But universal, in fact, is the sort of thing a certain sort of

man happens to say or do according to what is likely or necessary, and [10] poetry

aims at this sort of thing when it assigns names; but particular is what Alcibiades

did or suffered.

1 Perfect and Whole: AristotlesPoetics on the Structure of the Plot, p. 11:

Inasmuch as the remainder of Chapter 9 has to do with the modality of the pragmata composing a

plot; being concerned as it is with the sort of thing that mighthappen in accor-dance with eithernecessity or likelihood (1451a 36), that is, with what happens always and necessarily or for the most

part; whereas the last thing mentioned in Section 7, concerning chance things which seem not to

have happened at random, being things happening per accidens, or for the least part, also concerns

that modality; these being the three ways in which things happen, as Aristotle explains (cf. Metaph.,

XI. 8, 1064b 361065a 2); that block of text would reasonably follow upon this. On the other hand,

as I point out in a note appended to this paper, an additional passage may have stood between the two;

a subject to which I have devoted a treatment of its own.

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But in comedy this has already become clear. For, having constructed plots from

things that are likely, they thus suppose any chance names and do not, like the

composers of iambos, make them about a particular [15] man. But in tragedy they

hold to names that have already occurred. The reason is that the possible is

believable. Things that have not happened, in fact, we are not apt to believe

possible; but it is obvious that what has already happened is possible; for if it were

impossible it would not have happened. Now, although in tragedies one [20] or

two names are more known [or famous], the others are made up; but in certain

[works] none of them [are known,] as in the Antheus of Agathon. For in a likemanner in this [work] the things done as well as the names are made up, and

nevertheless they give pleasure. For this reason, one must not seek to adhereentirely to the traditional stories, which tragedies [25] are about. For it is ridiculous

to seek this out since such known names are known to few, yet they give pleasure

to everyone. So it is clear from these things that a poet [or maker] ought to be the

poet [or maker] of plots rather than of verses, since he is a poet according toimitation, and what he imitates are actions. Therefore, although one fashion things

that have occurred, [30] he is no less a poet; for nothing prevents certain things

that have happened from being the sort of things that are likely to happen, and

according to this he is their poet.

Two other passages in thePoetics are closely related to the foregoing remarks on the wayin which things happen:

Ch. 8 (1451a 16-30):

A plot is not one, as some think, if it is about one man; for many

indeed an infinite numberof things happen to one man, out of some of which no

one thing arises. So also there are many actions of one man out of which no one

action results. For this reason all [20] the poets seem to have erred who have

composed a Heracleid, a Theseid, and such like poems. For they think that since

Heracles was one man, a story about him is one thing. But Homer, just as he excels

in other things, appears to have grasped this point well, whether by art or by

nature. For in [25] making the Odyssey, he did not compose everything that everhappened to him, for example, his being wounded on Parnassus, and his feigned

madness at the gathering of the army, the one thing being done, it being neither

necessary nor likely that the other come about; but he constructed the Odyssey

around one action, of the sort of which we are speaking; and likewise the [30]

Iliad.

Ch. 23 (1459a 1730):

As for the art imitative in narrative and in metre, it is clear that its plots should be

constructed the way they are in tragedies, dramatically, and around one action,

whole and complete, [20] having a beginning, middles, and an end, so that, like

one whole living thing, it may produce its proper pleasureand not be like the

compositions of histories where what is required is an exposition not of one action,

but of one period of time, and whatever happened during it, whether to one man or

to many, of which each [incident] stands to the other just as it happens. For [25] as

the sea-fight at Salamis and the battle with the Carthaginians in Sicily took place at

the same time without tending to the same end; so also in those things which takeplace in successive times, one thing may sometimes happen after another from

which no one end results. But almost all of the poets [30] do this.

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Some remarks on the relation of poetry to history

Having considered the respective claims of the texts just cited, the student of the

Poetics may find the following observations helpful. As we have seen, Aristotle considers

history to consist in the setting forth [or exposition, ekthesis] not of one action, but ofone [period of] time [chronou], and whatever happened during it, whether to one man or to

many, of which each [happening] stands to the other just as it chances [hos etuchen]

(Poetics ch. 23, 1459a 23-24). For manyindeed an infinite numberof things happento one man, out of some of which no one thing arises. So also there are many actions ofone man out of which no one action results (ibid., ch. 8, 1451a 16-19), and the same is

true for things done or suffered by many men. In sum, Aristotle sees the incidents

comprising such a narrative as having an accidental or fortuitous connection. Still, as isclear from Poetics Chapter 9, Aristotle recognized that nothing prevents certain things

that have happened from being the sort of things that are likely to happen; and, one might

add, some will certainly be necessary, these being the three ways in which things mayhappen: for, as Aristotle elsewhere explains:

We say that everything either is always and of necessity (necessity not in the sense

of violence, but that which we appeal to in demonstrations), or is for the most part,

or is neither for the most part, nor always and of necessity, but merely as it

chances; e.g. there might be cold in the dogdays, but this occurs [1065a] neither

always and of necessity, nor for the most part, though it might happen sometimes.

The accidental, then, is what occurs, but not always nor of necessity, nor for the

most part.1

Now certainly things happening always and of necessity (which is the necessary), as well

as those happening for the most part (which is the likely or probable), will form some part

of the subject matter of the historian, but they properly belong to the poetic art, as is clearfrom Poetics Chapter 9. But to the extent that such connections are known to him, the

historian will be able to compose a work that approaches the unified action of a well-

constructed drama or epic poem, and such is the aim of the treatment of history describedby Diodorus Siculus (for which, see below). Why, then, does Aristotle speak solely of theaccidental as the subject matter of history? Presumably because what happens by chance

predominates in it and so gives it its form.

One may therefore recognize history as taking two forms, one in which the connec-

tion between events is primarily fortuitous, and one in which it is for the most part either

likely or necessary. On this point, consider the following remarks:

By the term history we mean here, primarily, narratio. Historical personages,

actions or events are, first of all, things that can be reported or narrated. It is

true that these things may also reveal more or less rational connections that exist

among them, and that the term history also serves to designate the kind of know-

ledge ordained to the discovery of such connections. Taken in this sense, History

tends towards a certain universality and thus towards the estate of a science.

And, in this sense, only significant facts enter into the realm of History: the kind of

facts credited with historical importance. It is not with this second meaning of

history that we are now concerned. Rather, taking the term in its more primitive

sense, we call historical even such thingsnay, such above allas cannot form

1Metaph., 11. 8, 1064b 361065a 2 (tr. W. D. Ross).

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the object of any rationalization: the things that can at best be told, reported,

narrated; in a word, things obscure, ineffable, incommunicable as to their essen-

tial meaning.1

In light of the distinctions Aristotle makes concerning the possible connections betweenevents, we may say that the things which may also reveal more or less rational connec-

tions are those which happen always and of necessity, or those which happen for the most

part, and hence are the sort of thing which are possible in accordance with likelihood ornecessity, for which reason they will possess a kind of universality, and so tend towards

the estate of science; and these will be such as are for the sake of something and are the

result of nature or of deliberate intention, as will be explained further below.

1 Charles De Koninck, The Nature of Man and His Historical Being, Laval theologique et philosophique,

vol. 5, 1949, n. 2, p. 271.

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Poetry and History According to Aristotle

1. On the relation of poetic imitation to the compositions of history.

Cf. Aristotle,Poetics ch. 8 (1451a 16-35) (tr. B.A.M.):

A plot is not one, as some think, if it is about one man; for manyindeed an infinite numberof things happen to one man, out of some of which no one thing arises [lit. there is no

one thing, ouden estin hen]. So also there are many actions of one man out of which no one

action results [ginetai]. For this reason all [20] the poets seem to have erred who have

composed a Heracleid, a Theseid, and such like poems. For they think that since Heracles

was one man, a story about him is one thing. But Homer, just as he excels in other things,

appears to have grasped this point well, whether by art or by nature. For in [25] making the

Odyssey, he did not compose everything that ever happened to him, for example, his being

wounded on Parnassus, and his feigned madness at the gathering of the army, the one thing

being done, it being neither necessary nor likely that the other come about; but he

constructed the Odyssey around one action, of the sort of which we are speaking; and

likewise the [30]Iliad.1

Accordingly, just as in the other imitative arts, one imitation must be of one thing, so also

the plot, since it is the imitation of an action, must be of one thing, and this a whole, and the

parts of the thing must be so constituted that when some one part is transposed or removed it

makes a difference in the sense that the whole is changed; for what makes [35] no noticeable

difference when it is present or not present is no part of the whole.

Cf. Aristotle,Poetics ch. 23 (1459a 1730) (tr. B.A.M.):

As for the imitative art which is narrative and in verse, it is clear that its plots should be

constructed the way they are in tragedies, dramatically, and around one action, whole and

perfect, [20] having a beginning, middles, and an end, so that, like one whole living thing, it

may produce its proper pleasureand not be like the compositions of histories where what

is required is a setting forth [or exposition, ekthesis] not of one action, but of one [period

of] time, and whatever happened during it, whether to one man or to many, of which each[happening] stands to the other just as it chances [hos etuchen]. For [25] as the sea-fight at

Salamis and the battle with the Carthaginians in Sicily took place at the same time without

tending to the same end; so also in those things which take place in successive times, one

thing may sometimes happen after another from which no one end results. But almost all of

the poets [30] do this.

Cf. Aristotle,Poetics ch. 9 (1451b 1-11) (tr. B.A.M.):

But it is also apparent from what has been said that the job of the poet is to relate, not what

has happened, but the sort of thing that might happenthat is, what is possible in

accordance with likelihood or necessity. For the historian and the poet differ not by [the one]

speaking in verse [and the other] not, [1451b] (for Herodotus put in verse would be no less ahistorian in verse than not in verse), but they differ in this, namely, that the one relates what

has happened [5], but the other the sort of thing that might happen. For this reason, poetry is

1 For when the incidents composing the plot are so constructedthat is to say,some one thing being done, it

is either necessary or likely that the other come aboutthen such a plot will be both continuous and one;

such a consequence making the limits of the prior and subsequent incidents touch, and hence become one and

the same, such that the parts are held together; some such definition being required by Aristotles words at

1452a 14-15: But I call simple an action in which [15] (being, as defined, continuous and one), etc.

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more philosophical and of more serious import than history; for poetry relates rather the

universal, whereas history, the particular.

But universal, in fact, is the sort of thing a certain sort of man happens to say or do

according to what is likely or necessary, and [10] poetry aims at this sort of thing when it

assigns names; but particular is what Alcibiades did or suffered.

Cf. Aristotle,Poetics ch. 9 (1451b 27-32) (tr. B.A.M.):

So it is clear from these things that a poet [or maker] ought to be the poet [or maker] ofplots rather than of verses, since he is a poet according to imitation, and what he imitates are

actions. Therefore, although one fashion things that have occurred, [30] he is no less a poet;

for nothing prevents certain things that have happened from being the sort of things that are

likely to happen, and according to this he is their poet.

Cf. Aristotle,Poetics ch. 10 (1452a 12-21) (tr. B.A.M.):

Of plots, however, some are simple, but others complex; for the actions of which the plots

are the imitations are also such to begin with. But I call simple an action in which [15]

(being, as defined, continuous and one) a change of fortune without reversal or recognition

results; but complex, [one] from which there is a change of fortune involving recognition,

or reversal, or both. These, however, should arise from the very way in which the plot is put

together, so that from what has already taken place [20] it happen that the things mentioned

come about either of necessity or in accordance with likelihood. For it makes a great

difference whether these things1 come about because of these things2 [propter hoc] or

[merely] afterthem [post hoc].

2. That the sea-fight at Salamis and the battle with the Carthaginians in Sicily took place at

the same time (480 b.c).

Cf. Herodotus, The History, VII. 166 (tr. George Rawlinson):

They say too, that the victory of Gelo and Thero in Sicily over Hamilcar the Carthaginianfell out upon the very day that the Hellenes defeated the Persians at Salamis.

3. That these incidents did not tend to the same end because they happened at the same

time by chance.

Cf. Aristotle,Poetics ch. 23 (1459a 2530) (tr. B.A.M.):

For as the sea-fight at Salamis and the battle with the Carthaginians in Sicily took place at

the same time without tending to the same end, so also in those things which take place in

successive times, one thing may sometimes happen after another from which no one end

results. But almost all of the poets do this.3

1Namely, recognition and reversal.

2Namely, the incidents which precede them in time. Aristotles view is that a plot which is continuous and

unified will consist of incidents which do not merelyprecede a recognition or reversal, but whichprecipitate

them.3

In the text just prior to this, Aristotle has noted that the compositions of histories consist of parts of

which each (happening) stands to the other just as it chances (1459a 24) from which it follows that their

connection is fortuitous or by chance.

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4. That these incidents didtend to the same end because they happened at the same time

deliberately.

Cf. Diodorus Siculus,Library 11. 1. 4 (tr. C. H. Oldfather):

[4] And Xerxes, being won over by him 1 and desiring to drive all the Greeks from their

homes, sent an embassy to the Carthaginians to urge them to join him in the undertaking andclosed an agreement with them, to the effect that he would wage war upon the Greeks who

lived in Greece, while the Carthaginians should at the same time gather great armaments and

subdue those Greeks who lived in Sicily and Italy.

5. Some commentators on the foregoing matters.

Cf. Ingram Bywater,Aristotle on the Art of Poetry, Commentary:

[1459]a 23 e(noj xro/nou : comp. b 1 peri\ e(/na xro/non. Aristotles conception of a

history is that it is a sort of chronicle (see on 9, 1451a36) recording all the various

occurrences within a certain period of time, however loose and separate they may have been

in themselves. As an instance of such a disconnected event he cites Gelos defeat of the

Carthaginians in 480; it happened about the same timeHerodotus 7, 166 says on the samedayas the Battle of Salamis, but it obviously had no connexion with that battle, or with the

issue of the Persian War. And the same would have to be said, if it had taken place just

before or after Salamis (e)n toi=j e)fec$j xro/noija 27). In this way Aristotle reasserts the

point on which he has insisted in the earlier chapters (8, 1451 a 27; 10 1452 a 20), that two

events may come in succession without forming part of one single action.

Cf. D. W. Lucas,Aristotle: Poetics, Commentary, pp. 215-216:

59a25 h(/ t e)n Salami=ni . . . ma/xh : for A., as for us, Herodotus was the principal

authority for the Persian Wars. According to Her. 7. 166 the two battles were fought on the

same day. Himera has only slight relevance to Salamis in that Herodotus mentions the

Syracusan claim that Gelon would have come to the help of the Greeks in spite of the disputeabout the supreme command, had it not been for the Carthaginian threat. E. [= Gerald Else]

suggests that A. is here contradicting Ephorus, who alleged (see Diodorus 11. 1. 4) that the

Carthaginians co-operated with the Persians in the timing of their invasion. To establish theinterest of A. in Ephorus E. quotes the interesting verbal parallels between this passage and

the Introductions to Diodorus 16 and 17, though there is the possibility that Diodorus is

himself using Peripatetic doctrine. The priority of Ephorus history to the P. is uncertain.

Ideas occurring in the later part of this chapter make their appearance in Horaces ArsPoetica, transmitted probably through Theophrastus.

Cf. Gerald F. Else,Aristotles Poetics: The Argument, Chapter 23, 59a22-30, pp. 575-576:

One time is such a vague expression that one expects some explanation of it. And indeedthe following sentence (w(/sper ga\r ktl.) does tell us something. It shows that the term is

elastic and can cover shorter or longer periods; forkata\ tou\j au)tou\j xro/nouj implies

contemporaneity, if not simultaneity, while e)n toi=j e)fech=j xro/noij appears to

embrace a longer span. But again Aristotles language is deplorably vague. Herodotus

reports (7. 166) a Sicilian tradition that the battles of Salamis and Himera took place on the

same day. Is that what Aristotle is referring to? If so, why does he substitute something so

1I.e. Mardonius the Persian, a cousin of Xerxes (cf. 11. 1. 3).

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inexact as kata\ tou\j au)tou\j xro/nouj for Herodotuss precise th=j au)th=j h(me/rhj?

Moreover Herodotus makes nothing of the coincidence, whereas Aristotles phrase ou)de\n

pro\j to\ au)to\ suntei/nousai te/loj makes us suspect that he is speaking against

somebody who did make something of it. Under these circumstances it is natural to think of

Ephorus, for Ephorus did assert a causal connection between the attack of the Persians on

Greece and that of the Carthaginians on Sicily, namely that Xerxes proposed to Carthage an

alliance and a simultaneous preparation and attack. Diodorus 11. 1. 4: o( de\ Ce/rchjpeisqei\j au)tw=? kai\ boulo/menoj pa/ntaj tou\j (/Ellhnaj a)nasta/touj poih=sai,

diepresbeu/sato pro\j Karxhdoni/ouj peri\ koinopragi/aj kai\ sune/qeto pro\jau)tou/j, w(/ste au)to\n me\n e)pi\ tou\j th\n (Ella/da katoikou=ntaj (/Ellhnajstrateu/ein, Karxhdoni/ouj de\ toi=j au)toi=j xro/noij mega/laj paraskeua/sasqaiduna/meij kai\ katapolemh=sai tw=n (Ellh/nwn tou\j peri\ Sikeli/an kai\ )Itali/anoi)kou=ntaj. ibid. 20. 1 Karxhdo/nioi ga\r sunteqeime/noi pro\j Pe/rsaj toi=j au)toi=j

kairoi=j kata\ th\n Sikeli/an (/Ellhnaj: .16 Here we find not only a verbal parallel but a

satisfactory background of meaning for Aristotles broad phrase kata\ tou\j au)tou\j

xro/nouj; for in Diodoruss account toi=j au)toi=j xro/noij (kairoi=j) refers to thewhole joint plan of campaign: the preparations (according to Diodorus [i.e., Ephorus], 11. 1.

5, they took three years) were to be synchronized as well as the attack.

Thus Ephorus presented the perils of Greece in 480 as the result of a world-wide,

coordinated pincer movement aimed at all the Greeks simultaneously: pro\j to\ au)to\

suntei/nousai te/loj.17 I suggest that this is what Aristotle refers to, and that for some

reason not known to us he has taken this occasion to register a dissent against Ephorus

combination.18

16 Schol. Pind. P. 1. 146b (= FGrHist70F186) gives the same account, but with less detailand without the significant phrase toi=j au)toi=j xro/noij.17 [Note omitted]18 That he is replying to E. is stated as a fact by R. Hackforth, CAH4. 378.

6. Diodorus Siculus on the nature of systematic historical treatises as treating of a complete

action.

Cf. Diodorus Siculus,Library 16. 1. 1-3 (ed. & tr. C. H. Oldfather):

I.[1] In all systematic historical treatises it behooves the historian to include in his books

actions of states or of kings which are complete in themselves from beginning to end; for in

this manner I conceive history to be most easy to remember and most intelligible to the

reader.

[2] Now incomplete actions, the conclusion of which is unconnected with the beginning,

interrupt the interest of the curious reader, whereas if the actions embrace a continuity of

development culminating naturally, the narrative of events will achieve a well-rounded

perfection. Whenever the natural pattern of events itself harmonizes with the task of the

historian, from that point on he must not deviate at all from this principle.

[3] Consequently, now that I have reached the actions of Philip son of Amyntas, I shall

endeavour to include the deeds performed by this king within the compass of the present

Book. For Philip was king over the Macedonians for twenty-four years, and having startedfrom the most insignificant beginnings built up his kingdom to be the greatest of the

dominions in Europe, and having taken over Macedonia when she was a slave to the

Illyrians, made her mistress of many powerful tribes and states.

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Cf. Diodorus Siculus,Library 17. 1. 1-2 (ed. & tr. C. H. Oldfather):

I.[1] The preceding book, which was the sixteenth of the Histories, began with the

coronation of Philip the son of Amyntas and included his whole career down to his death,

together with those events connected with other kings, peoples and cities which occurred in

the years of his reign, twenty-four in number.

[2] In this book we shall continue the systematic narrative beginning with the accession of

Alexander, and include both the history of this king down to his death as well ascontemporary events in the known parts of the world. This is the best method, I think, of

ensuring that events will be remembered, for thus the material is arranged topically, and eachstory is told without interruption.

7. On the historical method outlined by Diodorus and its relation to Aristotles remarks on

the practice of historians in comparison to that of (artistically correct) epic poets.

Cf. Gerald F. Else,Aristotles Poetics: The Argument, Chapter 23, 59a22-30, pp. 577-578:

Another parallel, this time with e)n toi=j e)fech=j xro/noij, makes it arguable that

Aristotle has Ephorus in mind here too. The prologue to the 16th book of Diodorus makes an

elaborate and self-conscious proclamation of method, which unfortunately we shall have to

quote at length:

e)n pa/saij me\n tai=j i(storikai=j pragmatei/ai kaqh/kei tou\j suggrafei=jperilamba/nein e)n tai=j bi/bloij h)\ po/lewn [= peri\ plei/ouj!] h)\ basile/wn [= peri\e)/na] pra/ceij au)totelei=j a)p a)rxh=j me/xri tou= te/louj: ou(/twj ga\r ma/listadialamba/nomen th\n i(stori/an eu)mnhmo/neuton kai\ safh= gene/sqai toi=ja)naginw/skousin. (2) ai( me\n ga\r h(mitelei=j pra/ceij ou)k e)/xousai sunexe\jtai=j a)rxai=j to\ pe/raj mesolabou=si th\n e)piqumi/an tw=nfilanagnwstou/ntwn, ai( de\ to\ th=j dihgh/sewj sunexe\j perilamba/nousai me/xrith=j teleuth=j a)phrtisme/nhn th\n tw=n pra/cewn e)/xousin a)paggeli/an... (3)dio/per kai\ h(mei=j paro/ntej e)pi\ ta\j Fili/ppou tou= )Amu/ntou pra/ceij

peiraso/meqa tou/tw? tw=? basilei= ta\ praxqe/nta perilabei=n e)n tau/th? th=?bi/blw?.

In the prooemium to book 17 the idea and its execution are alluded to again: h( me\n pro\tau/thj bu/bloj, ou)=sa th=j o(/lhj sunta/cewj e(ckaideka/th, th\n a)rxh\n e)/sxena)po\ th=j Fili/ppou tou= )Amu/ntou basilei/aj: perielh/fqhsan d e)n au)th=?pra/ceij ai( me\n tou= Fili/ppou pa=sai me/xri th=j teleuth=j, ai( de\ tw=n a)/llwnbasile/wn te kai\ e)qnw=n kai\ po/lewn o(/sai gego/nasi kata\ tou\j th=j basilei/aj

tau/thj xro/nouj.

Laquer has shown21 that at least the first of these proeemia (that of 17 may be a rchauffe

by Diodorus out of the other) is from Ephorus, and22 that it contains a self-justification by

Ephorus of his new principle of arrangement, against the annalistic principle of Thucydides

(and, we can add, of the continuators of Thucydides: Xenophon, Oxyrhynchus historian,Theopompus). For Ephorus did consciously adopt a new principle, not absolutely

disregarding chronology but subordinating it to a thematic treatment of history, giving each

book so far as possible a single main theme as well as a separate preface.23

The idea that Aristotle is referring to Ephorus thematic method, through which larger

sequences of events could be told continuously, gives for the first time some point to e)n

toi=j e)fech=j xro/noij, and to the antithesis between it and kata\ tou\j au)tou\j

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xro/nouj. The burden of Aristotles critique is then not so much that Ephorus method is

wrong as that no historiographical method, whether synchronistic (annalistic) or thematic,

can get around the arbitrariness of chronology. History musttell all that happened in a given

time, to one man or many. Whether that time is the relatively short frame of a year (or

Thucydides winters and summers) or the long one of a great war25 or of a great mans

career,26 the historian must still relate many events that have no causal connection with each

other.

21

Hermes 46 (1911) 161-206, esp. 196-200.22Ibid. 321-354, esp. 339-342.23 [note omitted]25 The Persian War appears to have come in Ephorus tenth book, though the matter is not

certain.26 What has been said about Ephorus could be also applies, mutatis mutandis, to

TheopompusPhillipica, in which o(/sa sune/bh peri\ e(/na was taken as the frameworkfor the history of the whole period. But again there are no specific indications of a reference

to Theopompus.

8. Luck and chance in relation to history.

With respect to the question of a connection between the sea-fight at Salamis and the battlewith the Carthaginians in Sicily, the texts of Herodotus and Diodorus present no difficulty.

If we assume that Aristotle was aware of Ephorus claim, he may have accepted Herodo-tus account as the most authoritative, and then it would provide a well-known example of

simultaneous events having no relation to one another. On the other hand, the view of

Ephorus, namely, that the attacks were coordinated, would have provided the student ofpoetics with an example of simultaneous events that did tend to the same end, but this

would be for the sake of something as the result of thought. For as Aristotle explains when

examining luck and chance:

Of things which come to be, some come to be for the sake of something and some do not. Of

the former, some [come to be] according to choice, and some not according to choice; butboth sorts are among those which are for the sake of [20] something. Whence it is clear that,

even in those which are beyond the necessary and what is for the most part, there are some

about which that for the sake of which can be present. Whatever could be done by thought

or by nature is for the sake of something. Such things, then, when they come to be

accidentally, we say are by luck. For just as what is exists either in virtue of itself or

accidentally, so also can it [25] be a cause. For example, the art of house-building is the

cause of the house in virtue of itself, but accidentally, white or musical is. What is a cause in

virtue of itself, therefore, is determinate, but what is so accidentally is indeterminate, for

infinite things may chance to be in one thing. As was said, therefore, when this comes to be

among things which are [30] for the sake of something, then it is said to be by chance and by

luck.1

In the foregoing text, Aristotle explains that when the sort of thing done for the sake of

something as a result of nature or thought happens by accident, it is said to be by luck.

For, in the words of St. Thomas Aquinas (In II Phys., lect. 8, n. 10), luck is an accidentalcause in things which come to be for the sake of a willed end and for the least part

(fortuna est causa per accidens in his quae fiunt secundum propositum propter finem in

minori parte, tr. Michael A. Augros). More explicitly, luck is an accidental cause in

1Phys., II. 5, 196b 18-30 (tr. R. Glen Coughlin)

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something which acts on account of an end proposed by reason, and of other things, on

account of which it does not act, which are nonetheless the kinds of things sought oravoided on account of an end proposed by reason, and which come about by it for the least

part (Michael A. Augros, Unpublished Paper). But the simultaneous occurrence of the

battles at Salamis and Himera is of this sort, since it is something that could have beendone for the sake of something as a result of thought but was not (and this among those

things which are for the least part). Consequently, just as the art of the house-builder is the

per se cause of the house, but the white or the musical the incidental orper accidens causeinsofar as the house-builder happens to be white or musical (here what is accidental beingconjoined to the cause), so also the per se cause of the sea-fight at Salamis happening on

the day that it did (let us say that it is the Athenian commander Themistocles) is also the

incidental cause of the battle with the Carthaginians in Sicily because the per se causecould have intended this result, even though he did not; the two events merely happening

to occur on the same day (in this case the accidental being conjoined to the effect). And so

their happening at the same time, or co-incidence, is said to be by luck, and it isAristotles view that the recording of such a fact is proper to, as well as typical of, history;

whereas their being due to deliberate intention would make a good story, and so be

appropriate to the poetic art.

9. What Aristotle understands by coincidence:

Regarding such things as are typical of history, they are, as Aristotle says, things nottend[ing] to the same end, whereas adaptation to an end is found in events that happen

by nature or as the result of thought (Aristotle, Metaph., 11. 8, 1065a 25-26, tr. W. D.

Ross); for things are either the result of coincidence or for an end (Aristotle, Phys., II. 8,19a 3, tr. Hardie & Gaye).

Now according to Aristotle (cf. Phys., IV. 10, 218a 25-29), coincidence in time

means being neither prior nor posterior, but to be in one and the same now. Hence, acoincidence is the temporal property of two things happening at the same time.1 Again, a

coincidence is the happening of two things at the same time when the one is not due to the

other.2 Again, Aristotle maintains that a coincidence is what does not take place according

to a universal or general rule, and so is neither a token nor a cause of that with which itcoincides or vice versa3that is to say, it is the taking place of two things at the same time

by chance; a thing being by chance when, in things which come to be for the sake of

something simply, they come to be not for the sake of what happens, the cause of whichis extrinsic4, a form of which is luck. Thus to say that luck is a thing contrary to rule is

correct. For rule applies to what is always true or true for the most part, whereas luck

belongs to a third type of event;5 the third type being what happens for the least part, oris just as it chances (hos etuchen), i.e. the accidental; for [t]he accidentalis what

occurs, but not always nor of necessity, nor for the most part.6

10. On the likelihood of the unlikely and the necessity of the unnecessary.

1WordNet 1.6, 1997 Princeton University.

2Cf.Post. An., I. 4 (73b 10-15), on which see further below.

3Cf. On Prophesying by Dreams, ch. 1 (462b 33463a 2), also cited further below.

4Phys., II. 6 (197b 19-22) (tr. R. Glen Coughlin).

5Ibid., II. 5 (197a 17-19) (tr. Hardie & Gaye, slightly rev. B.A.M.).

6Metaph., XI. 8 (1064a 3) (tr. W. D. Ross).

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It should be clear from the foregoing considerations that, just as Aristotle did not banishthe necessary or likely from the compositions of history, so, too, he does not forbid the

portrayal of the accidental in works of the poetic art, for the reason that even the unlikely

may come under the rationale of the likely. The reason why this should be so may begathered from the following observations:

Like Aristotle, Bohm is concerned initially with the fortuitous, i.e. with chance in human

actions. Aristotle had observed that we are exposed to fortune, good or bad, because our

knowledge of the circumstances amidst which we act is limited. It is therefore only natural

that there be fortuitous events. The root of fortune is ignorance and the inevitable limitations

due to it in our practical actions. Consequently, the relative frequency of individually unpre-

dictable events will be nothing but a function of our lack of knowledge in the practical order.

The fact that the latter could never be wholly removed provides in the end the very basis of ameasure of predictability. Our ignorance in our actions is just as much a constant as our

knowledge is; little wonder that the effects of these correlative constants should acquire a

numerical value. That is why, conversely, the approximate number of predictable accidents

over a long week-end in these United States, say, does not at all suppress the indeterminationon the part of whoever incurs the accident. It is necessary that there be fortuitous events; but

that does not make any of these particular events necessary.1

Now to say that [o]ur ignorance in our actions is just as much a constant as our know-

ledge is, and [t]he fact that the latter [i.e. our ignorance] could never be wholly removedprovides in the end the very basis of a measure of predictability, warrants our judging that

even what is unlikely has a likelihood of happening; for to reckon the predictability of

something happening is tantamount to reckoning its likelihood. Moreover, [i]t is neces-sary that there be fortuitous events. For further elaboration of this matter, consider also

the following remarks by C. S. Lewis:2

It will be noticed that most of my examples of presentational realism, though I did not select

them for that purpose, occur in the telling of stories which are not themselves at all realistic

in the sense of being probable or even possible. This should clear up once and for all a veryelementary confusion which I have sometimes detected between realism of presentation and

what I call realism of content.

A fiction is realistic in content when it is probable or true to life. We see realism of

content, isolated from the slightest realism of presentation and therefore chemically pure,

in a work like Constants Adolphe. There a passion, and the sort of passion that is not very

rare in the real world, is pursued through all its windings to its death. We never doubt that

this is just what might happen. But while there is much to be felt and analysed, there is

nothing to be seen or heard or touched. There are no close-ups, no details. There are no

minor characters and even no places worthy of the name. Except in one short passage, for a

special purpose, there is no weather and no countryside. So in Racine, given the situation, allis probable, even inevitable. The realism of content is great, but there is no realism of

presentation. We do not know what any one looked like, wore, or ate. Everyone speaks inthe same style. There are almost no manners.

No one that I know of has indeed laid down in so many words that a fiction cannot be fit

for adult and civilised reading unless it represents life as we have all found it to be, or

probably shall find it to be, in experience. But some such assumption seems to lurk tacitly in

1Charles De Koninck, The Nature of Possibility,Laval theologique et philosophique. Volume 19, number2 (November 1963) (p. 284-292).2An Experiment in Criticism (Cambridge, 1967), pp. 58-61.

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the background of much criticism and literary discussion. We feel it in the widespread

neglect or disparagement of the romantic, the idyllic, and the fantastic, and the readiness to

stigmatise instances of these as escapism. We feel it when books are praised for being

comments on, or reflections (or more deplorably slices) of Life. We notice also that

truth to life is held to have a claim on literature that overrides all other considerations.

But when we say The sort of thing that happens, do we mean the sort of thing that

usually or often happens, the sort of thing that is typical of the human lot? Or do we mean

The sort of thing that might conceivably happen or that, by a thousandth chance, may have

happened once? For there is a great difference in this respect between the OedipusTyrannus orGreat Expectations on the one hand, andMiddlemarch orWar and Peace on the

other.

Another point related to the foregoing concerns, not the likelihood of the unlikely,

but the necessity of the unnecessary, a matter on which the following remarks of C. S.

Lewis are also illuminating.1Speaking of that very large class of stories (which) turn on

fulfilled prophecies, Lewis observes that

In most of them the very steps taken to prevent the fulfillment of the prophecy actually bring

it about. It is foretold that Oedipus will kill his father and marry his mother. In order to

prevent this from happening he is exposed on the mountain and that exposure, by leading to

his rescue and thus to his life among strangers in ignorance of his real parentage, renders

possible both disasters. Such stories produce (at least in me) a feeling of awe, coupled with a

certain sort of bewilderment such as one often feels in looking at a complex pattern of lines

that pass over and under one another. One sees, yet does not quite see, the regularity. And is

there not good occasion for both awe and bewilderment? We have just had set before ourimagination something that has always baffled the intellect; we have seen how destiny and

free will can be combined, even how free will is the modus operandi of destiny. The story

does what no theorem can quite do. It may not be like real life in the superficial sense: but

it sets before us an image of what reality may well be like at some more central region.

Now the misfortunes that befall Oedipus are in one way of his own making rather than

necessitated; but, when referred to a higher cause such as destiny, they can be seen to be

inescapable even though due to free will. To see how this may be so, consider the follow-ing remarks comparing the causality due to God with that due to an author:

Gods causality, like His existence, has no mode. Hence, although His causality is infallible

(His will cannot fail), He is neither a necessary nor a contingent cause, nor something

between these but above and beyond them. But how can a cause be neither necessary nor

contingent? Arent these contradictory, and hence without a middle? The problem is that ifGods causality is necessary, it seems that all His effects (including our choices) must be

necessary, and that if it is contingent, then His will is avoidable and therefore He can be

frustrated, as if He were not in control of His creatures. Either the result is avoidable or it is

not, either the cause can be frustrated or it can not. Now we want to say that all things are the

result of Gods causality, and that Gods causality can never be frustrated, and yet some ofthe things He causes (e.g. chance events and human choices) are contingent, i.e. not

necessary. Is the answer that God produces necessary things by necessary causes, and

contingent things by contingent causes? St Thomas considers this answer and dumps it (I

Q19 A8 body).

1On Stories [1947], in On Stories and Other Essays on Literature, ed. Walter Hooper (New York, 1966),

pp. 14-15.

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God brings about a result that is unavoidable through an avoidable cause. This would save

Gods unavoidable causality, and the avoidability of natural causes. But how can something

brought about through an avoidable cause, even a secondary one, be unavoidable? How can

a conclusion brought about through an avoidable premise be unavoidable? The saying a

chain is so strong as its weakest link comes to mind. But this is to consider Gods causality

along with that of any other creature, as if they were of the same kind; i.e. as if he depended

on secondary causes as his instruments, as one link in a chain depends on all the others. The

author of a book is not a cause of a characters actions the same way another character is.

What falls outside of Gods plan in one order falls back into it in a higher order, e.g. adamned soul has fallen out of Gods plan in his own order toward God, but as a part of the

universe, he contributes to the universes order toward God by exhibiting in the universe

Gods justice.1

In another place, the same thinker elaborates further on this matter:

In the question on fate in the Summa, St. Thomas talks about how the per accidens can be

put in a judgment and so can be brought about deliberately, e.g. a gravedigger finds

treasure. God is the only thing that can be a per se cause of what comes about by chance,

since chance is something infinite, and since He alone gives things their natures and inclina-

tions; they cannot be ordered naturally to each other, since that would not be by chance but

by nature, but the motions following upon their natures can be directed together by whatinclines them both. See p. 274 of The Nature of Man and His Historical Being: the ab-

solutely universal causality of God, as well as His properly divine wisdom, appear most

strikingly in the intrinsic contingency and the inherent absurdity of the world: for only God

is the determinate, per se cause of that, too, which in itself is contingent. No creature can be

the per se cause of what is either casual or fortuitous. 2

Hence, just as God can bring about a result that is unavoidable through an avoidable cause,

seeing that He alone gives things their natures and inclinations, and the motions following

upon them can be directed together by what inclines them both, so too can the poet or anyother story-teller, as Shakespeare brings it about that Hamlet accidentally overhears a

conversation necessary to further the action of the plot through a series of circumstancesthat might have fallen out otherwise.Granted, then, that it is necessary that certain unnecessary things take place, it does

not follow that just any such confluence of incidents is permissible in a work of imitation.

As is clear from the foregoing considerations, for such a thing to be in accordance with therules of the poetic art, a coincidence of such events must tend to the same end;3 and this

will be due not to the causality of any secondary agent represented by the poet or story-

teller (for from this limited perspective such causality is purely haphazard), but by theagency of the first or highest cause, such as Aristotle touches on in the case of divination.

For just as God unavoidably causes an avoidable cause to bring about an unavoidable

result by giving it not just its existence, but also its mode of existence, thereby inclining

two or more things to the same end; so too may the poet or storyteller proceed, who causese.g. Oedipus to do by chance the very things he was fated to do, as a result of which we

1Michael A. Augros, Unpublished Paper.

2Michael A. Augros, Unpublished Paper.

3Of course, to come under the end of the poetic art, even the confluence of unlikely events must tend to the

same end, inasmuch as the poet brings it about that these things happen in the way that they do in order to

achieve a desired effect.

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have seen how destiny and free will can be combined, even how free will is the modus

operandi of destiny (C.S. Lewis).Aristotle himself in the following remarks comes near to recognizing the godlike

causality of the poet:

But since tragedy is not only the imitation of a perfect action, but also of things

evoking fear and pity, but they become such to the greatest extent when, contrary

to expectation, they are accomplished through each other, . For then they will have more of the

wonderful than if by chance and luck, since even in

things brought about by luck, these seem most wonderful whenever they appear to

have been accomplished as though [10] by design, as, for instance, the statue of

Mitys of Argo killed the man responsible for Mitys death, falling upon him while

he was looking at it; for such things seem not to have happened at random. And so

such plots of necessity are more beautiful. (Poetics ch. 9, 1452a 2-11)

Aristotle says that some things brought about by luck appear to have been accomplished as

though by design [hsper epitdes phainetai gegonenai], design being the crucial term

here.

We observe, then, how history, when referred to the causality of the first cause, can

be necessary even when accidental.

N.B. For further elaborations on this matter, see my separate treatment ON

PROVIDENCE.

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Summary Accounts

1. Definitions.

HISTORIA (INQUIRY, RESEARCH, HISTORY). (1) What is learned byinquiry (= research); (2) what is learned by inquiry into what has happened (ta geno-

mena); (3) (a) the setting forth of what has been learned by inquiry into what has hap-

pened; that is (b) the setting forth or showing forth of what has happened (Aulus Gellius,

Noctes Atticae V.18.6); 1 or again (c) the narration of what has happened (Isidore ofSeville,Etymologiae, I, Cap. XLI,De Historia, n. 1);2 or otherwise, (4) a setting forth [or

exposition, ekthesis] not of one action, but of one [period of] time, and whateverhappened during it, whether to one man or to many, of which each [happening] stands to

the other just as it chances [hos etuchen] (Aristotle,Poet. 23, 1459a 19-24);3 or again, (5)

the telling of the singular (cf. Aristotle, Poet. 9, 1451b 8)4 or of what is one in number; in

an extended sense, (6) what has happened (rather than the tellingof what has happened); oragain, history is (7) the treatment of a subject in a certain summation or summary form, not

arriving at a final investigation of everything which pertains to the subject treated (cf. St.

Thomas Aquinas,In I De Anima, lect. 1, n. 6). (See further my paper On History.)

In sum, history (historia) is the setting forth or exposition (ekthesis) of what has beenlearned by inquiry (historia)5 about what has happened (ta genomena); a story in this

sense being the narration of things occurring either at the same time or in successive times,

where the connection between the incidents is merely fortuitous. In other words, it is a

narration of singulars (diegesis hekaston), being the relating of (apangellia) the particular,or what is one in number (arithmoi hen). Again, history is the setting forth or narration of

things that have taken place, either to one man or to many men, following upon their

research, such a narration consisting ofpragmata, things done or incidents, that haveeither taken place at the same time without tending to the same end, or in successive times

and from which no one end results (cf. Poetics 23, 1459a 29-30), such things consisting of

the accidental, which is what occurs, but not always nor of necessity, nor for the most

part (Meta., 11. 8 1064b 36-38, tr. W. D. Ross).

Whereas poetry is the imitation of an action that is one, history is the setting forth, not of

one action but of one [period of] time (action being understood as the way in which onegoes through life or fares, whether well or badly, whereas time is the number of

motion according to the before and after [Phys., IV. 11, 219b 2-3]).

1gestarum vel expositionem vel demonstrationem.

2narratio rei gestae.

3For manyindeed an infinite numberof things happen to one man, out of some of which no one thing

arises. So also there are many actions of one man out of which no one action results (ibid., ch. 8, 1451a 16-19), and the same is true for things done or suffered by many men: out of many of their actions and passions

that is, the things they do and sufferno one thing arises or results, as, for example, the sea-fight at

Salamis and the battle with the Carthaginians in Sicily took place at the same time without tending to the

same end; so also in those things which take place in successive times, one thing may sometimes happenafter another from which no one end results (ibid., 1459a 29-30).4apangellia hekaston.

5Excepting, of course, those instances where the historian has witnessed the events in question; otherwise, he

is reliant on indirect evidence such as the testimony or others, written records, or physical remains, and the

like.

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2. The definition of history according to Aristotle in sum.

History consists in the setting forth [or exposition, ekthesis] not of one action, but of one

[period of] time, and whatever happened during it, whether to one man or to many, of

which each [happening] stands to the other just as it chances [hos etuchen] (Poetics ch.23, 1459a 23-24). For manyindeed an infinite numberof things happen to one man,

out of some of which no one thing arises. So also there are many actions of one man out of

which no one action results (ibid., ch. 8, 1451a 16-19), and the same is true for thingsdone or suffered by many men: out of many of their actions and passionsthat is, thethings they do and sufferno one thing arises or results, as, for example, the sea-fight at

Salamis and the battle with the Carthaginians in Sicily took place at the same time without

tending to the same end; so also in those things which take place in successive times, onething may sometimes happen after another from which no one end results (ibid., 1459a

29-30).

3. The relation between history and poetry in sum.

History relates what has happened which, for the most part, is accidental; yet it mayinclude the sort of thing that might happen and is possible in accordance with necessity or

likelihood, if what happened happens to be of this sort.

Poetry relates the sort of thing that might happen and is possible in accordance withnecessity or likelihood; yet it may include what has happened insofar as this comes under

the rationale of what is possible. For although one fashion things that have occurred, he is

no less a poet; for nothing prevents certain things that have happened from being the sortof things that are likely to happen, and according to this he is their poet (Poetics ch. 9,

1451b 29-32).

Whereas poetry embraces what happens both necessarily as well as with likelihood, it

excludes what is unlikely and thus accidental except insofar as it is likely even that many

things happen contrary to what is likely (ibid., ch. 18, 1456a 23-25). Hence, for the

accidental to come under the necessary or likely, the confluence of such events must tendto the same end, their coming together being justifiable either by an appeal to the limi-

tations of human knowledge, the root of fortune [being] ignorance and the inevitable

limitations due to it in our practical actions (Charles De Koninck, The Nature ofPossibility, for which, see further below), as well as to the causality of the author as first

cause, insofar as he brings about a result that is unavoidable through an avoidable cause,

seeing that, in this order, the poet or storyteller imitates the causality of God by givingthings their natures and inclinations, as well as by directing together the motions following

upon them, since He is what inclines them both (a point also elaborated on below).

One may therefore recognize history as taking two forms, one in which the connection

between events is primarily fortuitous, and one in which it is for the most part either likely

or necessary. On this point, consider the following remarks:

By the term history we mean here, primarily, narratio. Historical personages, actions or

events are, first of all, things that can be reported or narrated. It is true that these things

may also reveal more or less rational connections that exist among them, and that the term

history also serves to designate the kind of knowledge ordained to the discovery of such

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connections. Taken in this sense, History tends towards a certain universality and thus

towards the estate of a science. And, in this sense, only significant facts enter into the

realm of History: the kind of facts credited with historical importance. It is not with this

second meaning of history that we are now concerned. Rather, taking the term in its more

primitive sense, we call historical even such thingsnay, such above allas cannot form

the object of any rationalization: the things that can at best be told, reported, narrated;

in a word, things obscure, ineffable, income-municable as to their essential meaning.1

In light of the distinctions Aristotle makes concerning the possible connections betweenevents, we may say that the things which may also reveal more or less rational connec-

tions are those which happen always and of necessity, or those which happen for the most

part, and hence are the sort of thing which are possible according to likelihood ornecessity, for which reason they will possess a kind of universality, and so tend towards

the estate of science; and these will be such as are for the sake of something and are the

result of nature or of deliberate intention, as will be explained further below.

As we have derived the most complete definition of history from the Poetics of

Aristotle, it will be instructive to look more closely at his teaching on the matter,

assembling his various pronouncements into a coherent whole, supplemented by various

other works relevant to the same subject.

4. Alternatives pertaining to history.

Something can happen or not happen.

If something happens, it can happen by chance or not by chance.

If it does not happen by chance, then it happens for an end, and this is what is by necessityor according to what is likely.

Something can be done or it can be undergone (one can do or suffer, act or be acted upon).

The setting forth or exposition of what is done or suffered can

concern one man (= biography) or many men (= historiography)

deal with what takes place in one [period of] time or what takes place in successive timesembody a sequence of events that is post hoc or one that is propter hoc.

Hence, the work of history may take the form ofannals (the ordering principle is chronological, the sequence of events being post hoc) or

a treatise (the ordering principle is causal, the sequence of events being propter hoc).

The former is history in the primitive sense: a setting forth of what has happened; thelatter, history in the philosophical sense: tracing out links of causation (e.g. Aristotles

Constitutions vs. certain books ofThe Politics).

Two things can happen at the same time without tending to the same end.

Likewise, one thing can follow upon another from which no one end results.

1Charles De Koninck, The Nature of Man and His Historical Being, Laval theologique et philosophique,

vol. 5, 1949, n. 2, p. 271.

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Aristotles examples of things happening hos etuchen (just as it chances):cold in the dogdays

much rain during the dogdays

burning heat during the wintertwo events happening at the same time or in successive times, such as the sea-fight at

Salamis and the battle with the Carthaginians in Sicily, which took place at the same time.

Aristotles examples of things happening at the same time by chance:the occurrence of an eclipse of the sun while someone is taking a walk (On Prophesying

by Dreams, ch. 1, 462b 34463a 1)

while he was walking it lightened (Post. An.. I. 4, 73b 10-15)for as the sea-fight at Salamis and the battle with the Carthaginians in Sicily took place at

the same time (Poet. 23, 1459a 2530).

5. On the necessary, the likely, and the accidental.

what cannot not be (= what cannot have itself otherwise)the necessary (what is always and of necessity)

what can not be (= what can have itself otherwise)

the likely or probable (what is for the most part)

the accidental (the unlikely or improbable) (what is for the least part)

6. In sum.

We say that everything either is

(1) always and of necessity (necessity not in the sense of violence, but that which we

appeal to in demonstrations), or is(2) for the most part, or is

(3) neither for the most part, nor always and of necessity, but merely as it chances; e.g.there might be cold in the dogdays, but this occurs neither always and of necessity, nor forthe most part, though it might happen sometimes.

The accidental, then, is what occurs, but not always nor of necessity, nor for the most

part.

In short, things can have themselves:

(1) always and of necessity (the necessary = to anangkaion)

(2) for the most part (the likely = to eikos)

(3) neither always of necessity or for the most part but merely as it chances (hosetuchen) (the accidental = to sumbebekos)

(1) & (2) = what happens according to a universal or general rule

(3) includes what happens by coincidence

7. Some divisions.

the necessary: what cannot not be (what cannot have itself otherwise)

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the contingent: what can not be (what can have itself otherwise)

the likely or probable: what happens for the most partthe accidental (the unlikely or improbable): what happens for the least part

that which has aper se causethings happening always and of necessity

things happening for the most part

that which has noper se cause, but a potentially infinite number ofper accidens causesthings happening for the least part

what is possibleas coming under the poetic art

what happens always and of necessity

what happens for the most partas coming under the purview of history

what happens for the least part

the necessary: what is possible of necessity

the likely: what is possible according to likelihood

the accidental: what is possible according to chance (or what happens to be the case)

8. Aristotles definition of the likely and analogous definitions of the necessary and the

accidental.

The likely (to eikos) is that which comes about for the most part, not withoutqualification, as some define it, but in those things that happen to have themselves

other than they are, that which so stands to the likely as the universal to the

particular. (Aristotle,Rhet., I. 2, 1357a 35-39, tr. B.A.M.)

The necessary is that which comes about always and of necessity, not withoutqualification, as some define it, but in those things which cannot have themselves

other than they are, that which so stands to the necessary as the universal to theparticular. (worded by B.A.M.)

The accidental is that which comes about for the least part, not without

qualification, as some define it, but in those things which can have themselves

other than they are, that which so stands to the accidental as the universal to theparticular. (worded by B.A.M.)

9. On the several senses of necessary according to Aristotle.

A thing cannot have itself other than it is(1) due to itself

(2) due to something external(a) a moving cause (violence)

(b) a final cause or end (hypothetical necessity)

(Cf.Meta. V. 5, 1015a 34 ff.)

10. Some definitions.

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COINCIDENCE. (1) According to Aristotle (cf. Phys., IV. 10, 218a 25-29),coincidence in time means being neither prior nor posterior, but to be in one and the

same now; (2) hence, a coincidence is the temporal property of two things happening at

the same time (WordNet 1.6, 1997 Princeton University); (3) again, a coincidence isthe happening of two things at the same time when the one is not due to the other (cf.

Aristotle, Post. An., I. 4, 73b 10-15, definition implied by Aristotle but worded by

B.A.M.); (4) again, as is clear from Aristotle, On Prophesying by Dreams, ch. 1, acoincidence is the taking place of two things at the same time by chance (definitionimplied by Aristotle but worded by B.A.M.); a coincidence being what does not take place

according to a universal or general rule and so is neither a token nor a cause of that with

which it coincides or vice versa (cf. Aristotle, ibid., ch. 1, 462b 33463a 2).

BY CHANCE. A thing is said to be by chance when, in things which come to be

for the sake of something simply, they come to be not for the sake of what happens, thecause of which is extrinsic (Aristotle,Phys., II. 6, 197b 19-22, tr. R. Glen Coughlin).

BY LUCK. A thing is said to be by luck when it is an accidental cause in thingswhich are for the least part, for the sake of something {sc. by deliberate intention}, [and]

according to chance (Aristotle,Phys., II. 5, 197a 5-6, tr. R. Glen Coughlin).

THE ACCIDENTAL (TO SUMBEBEKOS). The accidental, then, is what occurs,but not always nor of necessity, nor for the most part (Aristotle, Meta., 11. 8, 1065a 2, tr.

W. D. Ross).

THE LIKELY OR PROBABLE. (A LIKELIHOOD OR PROBABILITY;

TO EIKOS). (1) The likely is that which comes about for the most part or happens

usually, not simply speaking, but, in those things that happen to have themselves other thanthey are [i.e. in contingent matter], that which so stands to the thing that is likely as the

universal to the particular (Aristotle, Rhet., I, 2, 1357a 351357b 1, tr. B.A.M.); (2) in

logic, a generally accepted premise, for that which people know to happen or not to

happen, or to be or not to be, usually in a particular way, is a probability: e.g., that theenvious are malevolent or that those who are loved are affectionate (Aristotle, Prior An.,

II. 27, 701 3-7, tr. A. J. Jenkinson).

THE NECESSARY (TO ANANGKAION). (1) (a) That without which, as a

condition, a thing cannot live (Aristotle,Meta., V. 5, 1015a 20, tr. W. D. Ross); (b) the

conditions without which good cannot be or come to be, or without which we cannot getrid or be freed of evil (ibid., 1015a 23-24); (2) the compulsory and compulsion, i.e. that

which impedes and tends to hinder, contrary to impulse and purpose (ibid., 1015a 26-27);

(3) we say that that which cannot be otherwise is necessarily as it is ( ibid., 1015a 34), i.e.necessity is that because of which a thing cannot be otherwise (ibid., 1015b 2).

THE NECESSARY SIGN (TO TEKMERION). I call those signs necessary from

which a logical syllogism can be constructed, wherefore such a sign is called tekmerion;for when people think that their arguments are irrefutable, they think that they are bringing

forward a tekmerion, something as it were proved and concluded; for in the old language

tekmar and peras have the same meaning (Aristotle, Rhet., I. 2, 1357b 6-10, tr. J. H.Freese. slightly rev. B.A.M.)

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THE FOURTH MEANING OF PER SE (KATH AUTO). Moreover, in anotherway, what belongs due to itself to each thing is per se, but what does not [belong] due to it

is accidental. For example, if lightening flashes when one walks, it is an accident, for it did

not flash due to walking, but we say that this just happened. But if [something belongs]due to a thing, [this is] per se. For example, if something, having its throat cut, dies, and

through having its throat cut, [this is per se], because it is due to the throat being cut, but it

did not just happen to die while having its throat cut (Aristotle, Post. An.. I. 4, 73b 10-15,tr. R. Glen Coughlin).

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11. Supplement:In VI Metaphysicorum, Lectio III, nn 1191 1222.

1191. After the Philosopher determines about being per accidens, here he excludes a certain

opinion through which being per accidens is wholly destroyed. For some laid it down thatwhatever comes to be in the world has some per se cause; and others [laid it down] that if

any cause be laid down, it is necessary for its effect to follow. From which it would follow

that, by the connection of causes, all things would happen of necessity, and nothing would

be in things per accidens. And so the Philosopher intends to destroy this opinion. And he

does three things about this. First he destroys the foregoing opinion [553]. Second he drawsa conclusion from the foregoing, at [554]. Third he puts forward a question which is

occasioned by the foregoing, at [555]. Therefore he says first that it will be clear from the

following things that [some] principles and causes of the generation and corruption of other

things are themselves generable and corruptible, that is, it [sometimes] happens that [such a

cause] is generated or corrupted without [causing] generation or corruption, that is, without a

generation or corruption of something following. For it is not necessary that if the generation

or corruption of something which is a cause of the generation or corruption of another thing,

that the generation or corruption of the effect will follow of necessity. For some causes are

agents for the most part, and so things being laid down, still the effect can be impeded by

accident, as on account of the indisposition of matter, or on account of running into a

contrary agent, or on account of something of this sort.

1192. Yet it is to be known that Avicenna, in his Metaphysics, proves that no effect is

possible in comparison to its cause, but only necessary. For [otherwise], if the cause be laid

down, it is possible for the effect to be laid down or not to be laid down, and [since] that

which is in ability, as such, is reduced into act by some actual being, it will therefore be

necessary that something other than the cause makes the actual effect to follow. And

therefore the cause would not be enough. But this seems contrary to what the Philosopher

says here.

1193. But it must be known that Avicenna ought to be understood as supposing that no

impediment to the cause comes along. For it is necessary that the cause being laid down, the

effect will follow, unless there be an impediment, which sometimes happens to be per

accidens. And so the Philosopher says that it is not necessary for generation or corruption tofollow if the causes of generation or corruption be laid down.

1194. For if what was said were not true, it would follow that all things will be of necessity.

Yet with what was said (that the cause being laid down it is necessary for the effect to

follow), another proposition is also laid down, namely that for anything which comes to be

or is corrupted it is necessary that there be some per se cause and not an accidental cause.

For from these two propositions it follows that all things are of necessity. Which is proved

thus.

1195. For if it were asked about something whether it will be in the future or not, it follows

from the foregoing that one [of the possibilities] is of necessity true. For if everything which

comes to be has a per se cause of its being made, which [cause], when laid down, [makes it]

necessary that the thing come to be, it follows that the thing about which it is asked whetherit will be in the future will come to be if its cause be laid down, and that it will not come to

be if [its cause] not be [laid down]. And likewise it is necessary to say that that cause will be

in the future, if something else which is its cause will be in the future.

1196. But it remains that however much future time is taken, either 100 years to come, or

1000 years to come, is limited, beginning from the present Now up to that end. But since the

generation of a cause precedes in time the generation of the effect, it is necessary that in

proceeding from effect to cause we take away some [part] of the future time, and approach

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more and more to the present. But everything limited is used up in subtracting any certain

amount from itself, and so it follows that proceeding from an effect to a cause, and again

from that cause to its cause, and so on, the whole future time is subtracted, since it is limited,

and so one comes to the Now.

1197. And this is clear in this example. If every effect has a per se cause from which it

follows of necessity, it must be that someone will die of necessity either through infirmity or

through violence, if he leaves his house. For having left his house he finds the cause of his

death to be either by violence (as if when leaving the house he is found by robbers and ismurdered) or by infirmity (as if when going from the house he gets a fever from the heat and

dies). And in the same way it will be of necessity that he should leave the house to drawwater if he is thirsty. For thirst is found to be the cause for leaving the house to draw water.

Likewise by the same argument it will be of necessity that he should thirst if something else

will be which is the cause of thirst. And so thus proceeding from effect to cause, one must

come to what is now, that is, into the present, or into something done, i.e. into somethingpast. As if we should say that there will be thirst if he eats hot or salty things, which make

thirst. But this (namely that he eat or not eat salty things) is in the present. And so it follows

that the aforesaid future thing, namely that he will die (or not die) will be of necessity.

1198. For since each true conditional is necessary, it must be that when the antecedent is laid

down, the consequent must of necessity be laid down. Just as this is true: If Socrates runs,he moves, and so laying down that he runs, it will be necessary that he moves when he runs.

But if any effect has a per se cause, from which it follows of necessity, it must be that the

conditional is true whose antecedent is the cause and whose consequent is the effect. And

although between the cause, which is now and present, and the effect, which will be in the

future, there are sometimes many middles (of which each is an effect with respect to the

preceding and a cause with respect to the following), yet it follows from the first to the last

that the conditional is true whose antecedent is in the present and whose consequent is

sometime in the future. So here, if the man eats salty things, he will be murdered. But theantecedent is laid down by what is present, and therefore it will of necessity be murdered.

And so all other future things will be necessary whose causes, proximate or remote, are

present.

1199. And there is a like argument if one proceeds from effects to causes, if one should

reduce future effects to some cause not present, because what is already past is in a certain

way. But I say this insofar as it is done or past. For although the life of Caesar is not now in

the present, yet it is in the past. For it is true that Caesar lived. And so now it is [possible] to

lay down as true the antecedent of a conditional in whose antecedent there is a past cause,

and in whose consequent there is a future cause. And so it will follow, since all future effects

must reduce into such present or past causes, that all future things will happen of necessity,

just as we say that Someone living will die is absolutely necessary because it follows of

necessity from something already done, namely that two contraries are mixed in the same

body. For this conditional is true: If a body is composed of contraries, it will corrupt.

1200. But it is impossible that all future things should happen of necessity. Therefore thetwo things from which this would follow are impossible, namely that every effect has a per

se cause, and that if the cause is laid down it is necessary to lay down the effect. What wasjust said would follow from these things, (i.e.) there would be some cause already laid down

for every future effect, just as there are already certain causes laid down for the corruption of

an animal. But that this man should die through infirmity or violence does not yet have a

cause laid down from which it would follow of necessity.

1201. Then ... at [554] he draws a conclusion from the foregoing, saying that from the fact

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that not everything which comes to be has a per se cause, it is clear that in the case of future

contingent things, the reduction of a future effect to a per se cause goes back to some

principle, which principle is not reduced to some other principle as to something per se, but

it will be ... a chance cause, and of the chance cause there will not be another cause; as was

already said, a being per accidens does not have a cause or a generation. For example, that a

man should be murdered by robbers has a per se cause, because he was wounded by them,

and this also has a per se cause, because he was found by the robbers; but this has no cause

except per accidens. For the fact that he who conducts business, in going to conduct

business, runs into robbers, is per accidens, as is clear from the foregoing. Whence it is notnecessary to lay down some cause of it. For a being per accidens, as was said above, does

not have a generation, and so it is not necessary to seek a per se cause of its generation.

1202. Then ... [555] he puts forward a question occasioned by the things said. For he said

immediately above that the causes of beings per accidens are reduced to a certain principle,

for which it is not [possible] to lay down another cause. And so he inquires about thisreduction (or ANAGOGE, which is the same thing) to what sort of principle and cause it

owes its coming into being, that is, to which genus of causes or of principles: namely

whether to some first cause which is a cause as matter, or to one which is a cause as an end

for the sake of which something comes to be, or to one which is a cause as a mover. But he

leaves out the formal cause, because the question here is about the cause of the generation of

things which come to be per accidens, and in a generation, the form has no causality exceptby way of an end. For the end and the form in a generation coincide and are the same in

number. But he does not here solve this question he put forward, but presupposes its solution

from what was determined in the second book of the Physics. For there he showed that

fortune and chance, which are the causes of things which come to be by accident, are

reduced to the genus of efficient cause. Therefore he concludes from the premises that we

should leave off speaking about being per accidens, about which it has been sufficiently

determined what can be determined about it.

1203. Now one should notice that those things which the Philosopher treats here seem to

remove certain things which belong to the philosophy laid down by others, namely FATE

and PROVIDENCE. For the Philosopher would have it that not all things which come to be

are reduced to some per se cause, from which they follow of necessity, since otherwise itwould follow that everything would be of necessity, and nothing would be per accidens in

things. But those who lay down [the existence of] fate say that contingent things, which

come to be and seem to be per accidens, are reducible to some power of a heavenly body,

through whose action those things which, considered according to themselves, seem to come

to be per accidens, since a certain order is produced. And likewise those who lay down [the

existence of] providence [say] that the things which it acts upon are ordered by the order of

providence.

1204. From either position two things seem to follow which are contrary to the things which

the Philosopher determined here. The first of these is this: in things nothing comes to be per

accidens nor by luck nor by chance. For things which according to some order are not per

accidens. For they are either always or for the most part. And the second is that all thingscome to be of necessity. For if all things come to be of necessity whose cause is laid down

either in the present, or is already laid down in the past (as the argument of the Philosopherproceeds), then, since the cause of those things which are under providence or fate is laid

down in the present and was already laid down in the past (because providence is immutable

and eternal, and the motion of the heavens is also invariable), it seems to follow that all

things which are under providence or fate, happen of necessity. And so if all things whichare acted on come under fate and providence, it will follow that all things will come to be of

necessity. Therefore it seems that according to the intention of the Philosopher it is not

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[possible] to lay down [the existence of] either providence or fate.

1205. But to the evidence of these things it is to be considered that as much as a cause is

higher, by so much is its causality extended to more things. For the higher cause has a higher

effect of its own [proprium causatum altius] which is more common and found in more

things. Just as in artificial things it is clear that the political art, which is above the military

art, extends itself to the whole state of the community. But the military art [extends] only to

those who are contained in the military order. And an ordination which is in effects from

some cause extends as far as the causality of that cause extends. For every per se cause hasdeterminate effects, which it produces according to some ordination. And so it is manifest

that effects related to some lower cause might seem to have no order, but coincide with eachother per accidens, which [effects], if referred to a higher common cause, are found to be

ordained, and not conjoined per accidens, but from one per se cause they are produced

together.

1206. Just as the blooming of this plant and that plant, if referred to some particular power

which is in this plant or in that plant, seems not to have any order (it seems to be per

accidens that this plant blooms as that plant blooms). And so, because the cause of the power

of this plant extends to its own blooming, and not to the blooming of another, it is indeed a

cause of this plant blooming, but not [of this plant blooming] together with another. But if

[the blooming] is referred to the power of a heavenly body, which is a common cause, this isfound not to be per accidens that this plant blooms as that plant blooms, but to be ordained

by some first cause ordaining this, which moves both plants together to blooming.

1207. There is found in things three grades of causes. The first is an incorruptible and

immutable cause (namely the divine cause), under this the second is an incorruptible but

mutable cause (namely a heavenly body), and under this the third are corruptible and

mutable causes. So the causes existing in the third grade are particular, and determined to

their own effects according to each species. For fire generates fire, and man generates man,and plants generate plants.

1208. But the cause in the second grade is in one way universal, and in one way particular. It

is particular because it extends to some determinate genus of beings, namely to those whichare produced in being through motion, for it is both a moving cause and moved. But it is

universal, because its causality does not extend only to one species of mobile things, but to

all things which are altered and generated and corrupted. For that which is first moved, must

consequently be the cause of all movable things.

1209. But the cause in the first grade is simply universal: for its own effect is being. Whence

whatever is, and in whatever what that it is, is properly contained under the causality and

ordination of that cause.

1210. So if we reduce those things which are contingent to proximate causes only, we will

find many things coming to be per accidens. E.g. on account of two causes running into each

other, neither of which is contained under the other, as when robbers run into me without myintention. For this running into is cau

poetry and history (papers in poetics 7)

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