on plot construction and the portrayal of character (papers in poetics 3)

On Plot Construction and the Portrayal of CharacterPoetics Chapter 15 and Associated Texts

(c) 2013 Bart A Mazzetti

sect

1

Note on the order of the text

On the proper placement of Chapter 15 with respect to the constitution of the text cf the following excerpt from my paper lsquoPerfect and Wholersquo Aristotlersquos Poetics on the Structure of the Plot (Papers In Poetics 1) p 5

First of all the proper order of treatment to be observed in the remainder of the Poetics through Chapter 18 is indicated by the conclusion concerning the qualitative parts of tragedy which Aristotle reaches in Chapter 6 (1450a 9-11)

[T]here must therefore be six parts to every tragedy according to which tragedy is of a certain sort and these are plot characters language [10] thought appear-ance and song

As Aristotle goes on to explain first comes plot second is character and third is thought1

One would therefore naturally expect the discussion that follows to conform to this order But if so one can easily see that Chapter 15 being concerned with character coming as it does while the handling of plot is ongoing is out of place2 its natural place being imme-diately after the treatment of the plot has been completed and not somewhere in the middle

POETICS CH 15 REVISED VERSION

1 Poetics ch 15 (1454a 16-29) (tr BAM)

With respect to the characters [ethe] there are four things one should aim at first and foremost that they be good [chrestos]3 Now one will have character [ethos] if as has been said4 by speech or action he make clear what his choice is and a good [character] if a good [choice] But there is [20] [something good to chrestos] in each kind for a woman is5 good and a slave though perhaps of these the one is inferior the other wholly base Second [is] appropriateness [to prepon] for a character is [may be] manly but it is not appropriate to a woman to be either manly or clever Third [that it be] like [ to homoion]6 For this is not the same as making a character [25] good and appropriate in the manner already stated Fourth [that it be] consistent [to homalon] For even if someone inconsistent offer himself for imitation (supposing there to be such a character) still he must be consistently inconsistent

2 Poetics ch 15 (1454b 7-14) (tr BAM) (text moved from below)

1 Cf 1450a 37 ff That language is given third in the initial listing is probably due to a copyistrsquos error2 [footnote omitted]3 For to chrestos as meaning lsquogood of its kindrsquo see further below4 Cf ch 6 (1450b 9-12) ldquoBut character [ecircthos] is that which choice [proairesin] reveals ltthat isgt what sort of thing lthellipgt one [10] chooses or avoids Consequently those speeches have no character in which it is not entirely ltcleargt what the speaker chooses or avoidsrdquo5 Or ldquomay berdquo according to a variant reading6 As Aristotle will go on to explain what is homoios or lsquolikersquo arises from ldquothe assigning of the proper form in making likenessesrdquo things being lsquolikersquo which ldquoagree in formrdquo (cf S Th Ia q 4 art 3 c) that is to say in order to be lsquolikersquo the form the imitator assigns must be the very form of the thing being imitated so that that original is recognizable in which case the portrayal will include any character flaws belonging to its subject

2

But since a tragedy is an imitation of what is better 1 we must imitate good [10] portrait painters for assigning the proper form when making likenesses they depict them more beautiful [than they are] So too the poet imitating those too quick to anger and too slow or those having other such traits of character should make them reasonable too yet good as Agatho and [15] Homer do Achilles who is an example of obstinacy2


Now an example of unnecessary wickedness of character for instance is Menelaus in the Orestes3 but [30] of the unseemly and inappropriate the lament of Odysseus in the Scylla4

and the ltinappropriately clevergt speech of Melanippe5 ltof unlikeness hellipgt6 but of inconsistency Iphigenia at Aulis7 for in no way does the suppliant [earlier in the drama] resemble her later self

4 Poetics ch 15 (1454a 33mdash1454b 9) (tr BAM)

But it is necessary in the characters in exactly the same way as in the construction of the things done [pragmaton sustasei] always to seek what is either necessary or likely [35] so that it be either necessary or likely that such and such a man say or do such and such a thing and that it be either necessary or likely that this happen after that

1 Cf ch 25 (61b 12-14) ldquoAnd things of the kind that Zeuxis painted are impossible but better for the pattern must surpass [the true]rdquo In addition to treating the problem of the impossible here note also that the next point made concerns that of the blabera or morally harmful which also comes under the problem of the irrational as I explain further below2 Since the portrait must be lsquogoodrsquo as well as lsquolikersquo and since tragedy is an imitation of those who are better than we are it must have a goodness that is also bettermdashyet (as noted above) one that does not exclude cer-tain traits of character that are failings those namely that are found in the noble or elevated such as being too quick to anger which render them inconsistent Hence if a critic were to fault a poet for making his char-acters heroic when men typically are not one might reply that such a portrait is lsquolikersquo the original since it is proper to tragedy and epic to represent men who are better than we are Similarly he will portray characters with titanic failings without being worthy of censure as to be obstinate belongs to Achilles Cf Ingram By-water Aristotle On the Art of Poetry A Revised Text with Critical Introduction Translation and Com-mentary (Oxford 1909) p 231 on 1454b 8

hellipAt this point Aristotle returns to the subject of h)=qh hellipHe shows that the corresponding difficulty has been solved in a sister art that of the portrait-painter who without sacrificing the likeness makes a man look handsomer than he is (o(moiouj poiou=ntej kalliouj grafousin) so that if the painter can do this there is no reason why the literary artist also should not be able to represent a tragic personage truthfully with any infirmities of character which form part of the received idea of him (o)rgilouj kai r(qumouj kai ta=lla ta toiau=ta e)xontaj e)pi tw=n h)qiw=n b 12) and at the same time as a good man (e)piekei=j b 13)

Hence he will have a goodness that is better than that of most men3 On this example see further below4 Cf Malcolm Heath Aristotle Poetics (London 1996 [Penguin Classics]) n 61 p 54 ldquoA dithyramb (also mentioned at 61b32) by Timotheus (48a15 and n 9) which portrayed Odysseus lamenting the loss of his comrades eaten by the monster Scylla (cf Odyssey 12234-59)rdquo5 Here the requirement that character be good is at issue For Melanippe see further below6 hellipthe portrayal of Socrates by those other than Plato ldquoFor thus we deride most of those except Plato who have written the Apology of Socrates as not preserving the Socratic manner in their compositionrdquo (Proclus Commentaries of Proclus on the Timaeus of Plato [1829 Vol 1] Translated by Thomas Taylor p 54) As one may see from my treatment of the dialogue-form the foregoing passage is clearly indebted to Aristotle7 Cf Malcolm Heath op cit n 63 p 54 ldquoIn Euripidesrsquo Iphigeneia in Aulis Iphigeneiarsquos first reaction on learning that she is to be sacrificed to Artemis to secure the Greek armyrsquos passage to Troy is to plead for her life (1211-52) but later she patriotically embraces her fate (1368-1401)rdquo

3

It is clear then that the resolution of plots should happen from the plot itself [1454b] and not ltfrom the charactergt1 as in the Medea by a contrivance and in the ltIphigeneia at Aulisgt2 the things surrounding the departure of the ships Rather a contrivance should be used for things outside the drama either for whatever has happened before and which it is beyond the power of men to know or such things as are to come after [5] and require foretelling and reporting for the power to see all things we grant to the gods as their due But there should be nothing irrational in ltthe complication ofgt the incidents but if there is it should be outside the tragedy like that in the Oedipus of Sophocles3

ltintervening passage moved abovegt4

5 Poetics ch 15 (1454b 15-18) (tr BAM)

One then should look out for these things and in addition to them impressions on the senses that go beyond those necessarily attendant on the poetic art5 for with respect to them quite often there is occasion for making a mistake But enough has been said about these things in our published discourses6

sect

NB On the poetrsquos aiming at a sensational effect cf N J Richardson ldquoAristotlersquos Reading of Homer and its Backgroundrdquo in Robert Lamberton and John J Keaney (edd) Homerrsquos Ancient Readers The Hermeneutics of Greek Epicrsquos Earliest Exegetes Princeton 1992) p 39

This advantage in epic is linked to its narrative mode because events do not have to be enacted visually and also gives greater scope to ldquothe marvellousrdquo (to qaumaston) as in the pursuit of Hector (which would be impossible on the stage) Here Aristotle picks up the criticisms by earlier readers (Pindar Thucydides etc) of the tendency of epic poetry to exaggeration but makes a special poetic virtue of this He links it with Homerrsquos exceptional skill in creating plausible fictions which is based on the accumulation of enough realistic circumstantial detail to make his fantasies credible again (presumably) a particular feature of the more leisurely descriptive and narrative mode of epic as opposed to tragedy

In fact Aristotle recognizes that Homer uses all the above-mentioned means to evoke won-der and not just the paralogism On this point cf [Plutarch] Essay on the Life and Poetry of Homer ed JJ Keaney amp Robert Lamberton (Atlanta 1996) (tr rev BAM) n 6 pp 69-70

1 That lsquocharacterrsquo was mentioned here is indicated by Richard Jankorsquos note ad loc ldquoThe Arabic reads lsquocharacter itselfrsquo but this is clearly a mistakerdquo (Aristotlersquos Poetics I [Indianapolis-Cambridge 1987] p 111)2 For this reading see my note below It should be noted that while it may not be possible to discover from the available evidence the precise incident Aristotle has in mind here his immediate point is clear3 Cf the example given above of ldquoOedipusrsquo not knowing how Laius diedrdquo Note how the foregoing argument moves from what is impossible in the portrayal of character taken in reference to the resolution of plots to what is irrational in the makeup of the incidents taken in reference to their complication albeit the latter word has fallen out of the text4 NB Note how the removal of the passage concerning the making of likenesses (for which cf n 2 above) clears the way for a seamless transition to Aristotlersquos final point on the aim of the poetic art as such5 On this matter see my note following this excerpt6 Presumably in his dialogue On Poets

4

In general he [Homer] cultivates a narration of things [diegesis ton pragmaton] unexpected and fabulous [or surprising and mythical paradoxos kai muthodes] in order to fill his audience with anxiety and wonder [agonias kai thaumatos] and make the listenerrsquos experience deeply moving [ekplektikon] This seems to be why he has said some things that are highly improbable [para to eikos] since credibility [to pithanon] does not always follow when a narrative has been endowed with the [69-70] unexpected and the exalted [paradoxos kai epermenon] For this reason he not only el-evates events and removes them from the habitual [tes sunetheias] but does the same with words It is clear to everyone that that which is new and outside the realm of the everyday [kaina kai exo tou procheirou] evokes wonder and captivates the imagination of the listener Even in these fabulous passages [en tois muthedesi logois] if one considers carefully and not superficially the specific things he said it becomes clear that he was adept at every kind of wisdom and skill and provides the starting points and so to speak the seeds of all kinds of discourse and action for those who come after him not only for the poets but for writers of prose as well

sect

NB I now proceed to my explanatory notes

5

1 The requirement that character be chrestos or lsquogood of its kindrsquo

Cf D S Margoliouth The Poetics of Aristotle Translated from the Greek into English and from Arabic into Latin with a revised text introduction commentary glossary and onomasticon (London New York Toronto 1911) pp 33-36

Clause 3[1] gives very little trouble when we have learned the meaning of a)kolouqei=n which is not explained at all [33-34] in Liddell and Scott and is unsatisfactorily glossed by Bonitz It is a technicality of logic meaning ldquoto come after in the order of thoughtrdquo ie to be the genus of a species1 or the species of an individual2 ldquoOf these species only is character regularly the genusrdquo is an intelligible expression Its meaning is ldquoonly thus can character be regularly classifiedrdquo Of any character we may say that it is relatively good or bad but not necessarily anything else But is this true It is if we accept the doctrine of the Categories the Ethics and the Politics The authorrsquos comment on it later in this book is ldquoeven a woman or a slave may be good although women are inferior beings and slaves generally worthlessrdquo The doctrine of ldquoprivationrdquo is expressed by the formula he only is blind who was intended by nature to see He only is miserly who was intended to be generous unchaste who was intended to be chaste low-minded who was intended to be high-minded But according to the Politics the capacity for complete virtue is to be found only in the ruler of the state [1260a 17] the capacity diminishes the farther people are removed from the top If the proper sphere of courage is war [Nic Ethics 1115a 30] then those who do not fight cannot be divided into comparatively courageous and cowardly Those who have no ldquohonourrdquo

1 Defined in Sophistici Elenchi 181 a 23 24 e)sti ditte h( tw+=n e)pomenwn akolouqhsij h) gar w(j t= merei to kaqolou oi)=on a)nqrwp z=on ldquoeither as general to particular eg animal to manrdquo (The other is based on the Law of Contradiction) This use pervades the logic eg Topics 113 b 31 t$= a)ndreia a)reth a)kolouqe=i ldquocourage is a virtuerdquo 128 b 4 o(j genouj tou= a)ei a)kolouthou=ntoj Numerous cases of it and e(pesqai in Prior Analytics 43 b 44a2 De Generatione Animalium 768 b 13 pa=sin a)kolouqei= tou=to (to a)nqropoj) toi=j kaq e(kaston ldquoMan is the species of all the individualsrdquo [34-35]

cannot be classified chaste or unchaste those who have no property cannot be comparatively liberal or miserly Hence by the time we get to the bottom of the state the capacity for one virtue after another has been eliminated but even so there is comparative goodness and

1 Cf p 30 of this work

In another class of cases the need of the teacherrsquos help is no less real but only the careful reader will feel it These are cases in which we have a series of propositions that are apparently untrue or un-meaning What sensemdashto take a paragraph near the commencement of the Poetics (sect 2)mdashwill the fol-lowing convey to the ordinary reader of Greekmdash

e)pei de mimou=ntai oi( mimoumenoi prattontaja)nagce de toutouj h) spoudaiouj h) faulouj ei)=naita gar h)qh sxedon a)ei toutoij a)xolouthei= monoijxaxia gar xai a)ret$= ta h)qh diaferousi pantejh)toi beltionaj xtl

We begin with a plain and honest amateur translation

ldquo (1) Now since the imitators imitate men in actionand these must be either virtuous or vicious menfor character almost always follows these only [= clause 3]for all men differ in character by vice and virtuerdquo

6

badness because the humblest member of the state has a function to fulfil and virtue is what makes him fulfil it well The fourth clause gives the reason for the last proposition and means neither that every personrsquos character is good or bad nor that no two personsrsquo characters are equally good or bad but that where there is difference of character it is a question of relative goodness and badness And from this the previous proposition follows If the difference between (say) cameras is in size the only classification of them is into comparatively large and small ie a trichotomy by standard The theory involved is that a genus has one ultimate differentia only which is stated in the Physics [189a 13] If for ldquocharacterrdquo we substitute the literal rendering ldquoin their moral qualitiesrdquo or ldquoin any moral qualityrdquo this assertion will seem less hazardous for in comparing A with B we should say A is (perhaps) less courageous than B but more just And so we are told that a courageous woman would make a cowardly man but a chaste man a loose woman The moral qualities have however relative importance [Topics 117a 35] whence it is possible to sum up and assert that a woman is worse than a man But just as a definition of hardness can be given viz what has been quoted above so there is a definition of moral virtue viz choosing according to right reason in matters of pleasure and pain The extent to which that is requisite is determined by onersquos place in society [35-36] whence as has been seen potential virtue varies with social position The true principle of classification is to find the contrariety of the genus [Topics 143a 35 Metaphysics 1037b 20] And this must be that wherein members of the genus qua members of it differ [Metaphysics 1038a 15] This then is the problem which this sentence solves (emphasis added)

On chrestos as meaning ldquogood of its kindrdquo cf Girardianlectionarynet Proper 9A1

Matthew 1116-19 25-30

Exegetical Notes

1 1130 ndash ldquoFor my yoke is easyrdquo The Greek word for ldquoeasyrdquo is chrestos (one letter different than Christ) It appears six additional places in the New Testament and in the NRSV is variously translated as ldquoThe old [wine] is goodrdquo (Luke 539) ldquofor [God] is kind to the ungrateful and the wickedrdquo (Luke 635) ldquoDo you not realize that Godrsquos kindness is meant to lead you to repentancerdquo (Rom 24) ldquoBad company ruins good moralsrdquo (1 Cor 1533) ldquobe kind to one anotherrdquo (Eph 432) ldquotasted that the Lord is goodrdquo (1 Pet 23) In short everywhere else it is translated as either good or kind

From the Friberg Lexicon

with a basic meaning being well adapted to fulfill a purpose ie useful suitable excellent (1) of things good easy pleasant of requirements easy (MT 30) comparative better more pleasant (LU 539) morally upright suitable good (1C 1533) of value superior better (LU 539) (2) of persons kind obliging benevolent (EP 432) of God gracious good (1P 23) (3) neuter as a substantive to chreston kindness (RO 24)

The TDNT article on chrestos (9483ff) distinguishes it from agathos good in that the former is always relational Agathos can stand for ldquothe goodrdquo in an ideal or formal sense while chrestos is always comparative ldquogood of its kindrdquo In the context of Matt 1130 then Jesusrsquo yoke does not represent the ideal good it is good in comparison to other yokes

1 (httpgirardianlectionarynetyear_aproper_9ahtm [91410]) Last revised June 20 2005

7

On Aristotlersquos example of the portrayal of Melanippe cf Seth Benardete and Michael Davis Aristotle ndash ldquoOn Poeticsrdquo (South Bend 2002) footnote 95

This seems to allude to Euripidesrsquo Melanippe the Wise fragment 484 (Nauck) lsquoThe tale is not mine but from my mother Sky and Earth were once one shape but when they separated from one another they gave birth to all things and put them into the light ndash trees birds the beasts the sea supports and the race of mortalsrsquo Another possibility is fragment 506 (Nauck) which may be from the same play but with Melanippe speaking lsquoDo you imagine that injustices leap with wings to the gods and then someone writes them down in the leaves of the table of Zeus and Zeus on inspecting them passes judgment [justice] on mortals Not even the whole sky would suffice were Zeus to write up the mistakes of mortals any more than he could by inspection send the penalty to each but Justice [Dikecirc] is somewhere hereabouts if you want to lookrsquo

On the objectionable portrayal of the gods cf Gerard Nadaff ldquoAllegory and the Origins and Development of Philosophy From the Presocratics to the Enlightenmentrdquo Canadian Philosophical Association Presidential Address delivered at York University May 29 20061

We are all familiar with Xenophanesrsquo (c 570-470BC) scathing remarks with regard to Homer and Hesiodrsquos portrayal of the traditional gods lsquoHomer and Hesiod have attributed to the gods every kind of behavior that among men is the object of reproach stealing adultery and cheating each otherrsquo (DK21B11) This remark was the first known salvo in what Plato later calls the ancient quarrel between philosophy and poetry (Republic 607b5) The criticism Xenophanes directed against the two Greek icons and their crass anthropo-morphism centres on the idea that if the gods do indeed behave this way then there is no reason to worship them Indeed their portrayal of the gods is socially irresponsible for it fosters social disharmony and civil strife

Cf also Robert Guay ldquoStudy Guide Republic Book IIrdquo True and false lies2

There are a number of arguments that Socrates makes in criticism of poetry One set of argu-ments tries to establish that the traditional stories about the gods for example those by Homer are false The other set of arguments tries to establish that the traditional stories should not be told even if they were true (He also argues that the traditional stories are ldquonot consistent with one anotherrdquo (380c) but that is not a property of any particular poem) Some stories give ldquoa bad image of what the gods and heroes are like the way a painter does whose picture is not at all like the things hersquos trying to paintrdquo (337d-e) Just as an image can imitate its subject-matter accurately or inaccurately so stories paint accurate and inaccurate pictures of gods and heroes [= failing to be lsquolikersquo (BAM)] How gods and heroes are depicted is centrally important of course because they are the moral exemplars the ones that everyone aspires to be like Socrates argues that it must be false to depict gods as doing harm ldquosince a god is good he is not the cause of everything that happens to human beings but only of good onesrdquo (379c) Socrates also argues that it must be false to depict the gods as ldquowilling to be false either in word or deed by presenting an illusionrdquo (382a) Not only do the good gods not cause harm they also never tell a lie3

1 (httpwwwacpcpacapublicationspresidential-addresses2006-in-english [21307])2 (httpastrotempleedu~rguayrepub2pdf - Supplemental Result [51104])3 It should be noted that in Poetics ch 25 Aristotle defends the poetrsquos right to tell such stories by appealing to the rationale that although it is neither true nor better to say so ldquoyet lsquoso they sayrsquo such as the things men say about the gods as in the view of Xenophanesrdquo (cf 1460b 36mdash1461a 1 tr BAM)

8

Stories can also be defective in terms of the effects that they produce Poetry becomes dangerous when it convinces someone that ldquoin committing the worst crimes hersquos doing nothing out of the ordinaryrdquo [3-4] (378b) by contrast says Socrates ldquowersquore to persuade our people that no citizen has ever hated another and that itrsquos impious to do sordquo (378c) This desired effect of poetry becomes important when it comes to distinguishing between a true falsehood and an imitation of it in words A true falsehood is not a kind of statement but ldquoignorance in the soul of someone who has been told a falsehoodrdquo (382b) Care for the soul is introduced as primarily important what one is told only derivatively so We know this to be the case because verbal falsehoods can sometimes be beneficial they can be a ldquouseful drugrdquo for curing peoplersquos souls It may even turn out that lies of the derivative sense are necessary for the establishment of a just city (emphasis added)

On objectionable portrayals in general cf Helene P Foley Female Acts in Greek Tragedy (Princeton 2001) p 13

In Aristophanesrsquo Frogs the poet Aeschylus complains that Euripides has made tragedy democratic by allowing his women and slaves to talk as well as the master of the house (949-52) Plutarch (De Audiendis Poetis 28a) objects to the highly rhetorical accusations made by Euripidesrsquo Phaedra and Helen (in Trojan Women) and the Christian writer Origen reports that Euripides was mocked for endowing barbarian women and slave girls with philo-sophical opinions (Contra Celsum 73634-36 see Aristotle Poetics 61454a31-33 [= the inconsistency of Iphigeneia] discussed in III1) Plato complains of the dangers of the theatrical impersonation of social inferiors such as women and slaves and of feminine emotions (Republic 10605c10 -e6) (emphasis added)

That the morally harmful is also unseemly and therefore irrational is evident from the fol-lowing text Cf Aristotle Nic Eth IV 6 (1123a 32-33) (tr H G Apostle rev BAM)

Now these habits1 are vices but they do not carry censure [oneide] with them because they are neither harmful [blabera] to others nor very unseemly [or indecent aschemones]

Hence those vices which are worthy of censure are blabera or aschemones and so to be blabera (harmful) is to be a vice that is worthy of censure but such a thing is also ache-mones (unseemly) which is also objected to on the grounds that it is alogos lsquounreason-ablersquo or lsquoirrationalrsquo as the following texts illustrate

Cf Aristotle Homeric Questions fr 150 (tr Malcolm Heath)2

fr 150 [on Iliad 3441] Why does he portray Paris as such a miserable wretch that he is not only beaten in single combat but also flees and immediately thinks of sex and says that he has never felt such lust and is so hopelessly dissolute Aristotle says that it is reasonable he was of a lustful disposition even before that and it intensified on this occasion for everyone longs most for what they do not have or fear they will lose This is why reproof intensifies desire the duel had the same effect on him

Cf idem fr 143

1 Namely going to excess or falling short of the mean in expenditures of money2 (wwwleedsacukclassicsresourcespoeticspoettexthtm [122298]) ldquoThis is a selection of the surviving fragments of Aristotles Homeric Questions which covered more extensively the kinds of problem discussed in a very compressed manner in ch 25 of the Poeticsrdquo [= Heathrsquos Headnote]

9

fr 143 [on Iliad 2183] It seems unseemly for Odysseus to throw off his cloak and run through the camp just in his tunic and especially for someone such as Odysseus is taken to be Aristotle says that it is so the crowd will turn round in amazement and his voice will reach further with people assembling from different directions Solon is said to have done something of the kind when he gathered a crowd with reference to Salamis

Now it is apparent that the character of Paris as described in the first excerpt is no less un-seemly than that of Odysseus in the second the portrayal of which is defended as being reasonable and therefore not unreasonable or alogos Consequently the consideration of the portrayal of certain faults of character while being subject to the charge that it is harm-ful also may be censured as irrational

sect

10

2 The requirement that character be lsquoappropriatersquo as well as lsquolikersquo

Cf Aelius Theon Progymnasmata ii 60 29-30 [= Progymnasmata Greek Textbooks of Prose Composition and Rhetoric Translated with Introductions and Notes by George A Kennedy Society of Biblical Literature (Atlanta 2003)] p 4

Personification (prosocircpopoeia) is the introduction of a person to whom words are attributed that are suitable to the speaker [= lsquoappropriatersquo] and have an indisputable application to the subject discussed [= lsquolikersquo]hellip And personification is not only an historical exercise but applicable also to oratory and dialogue and poetry and is most advantageous in everyday life and in our conversation with each other and (understanding of it) is most useful in study of prose writings Thus we praise Homer first because of his ability to attri-bute the right words to each of the characters he introduces but we find fault with Euripides because his Hecuba philosophizes inopportunely

Cf [Hermogenes] Progymnasmata ix 20-21 (= ldquoPreliminary Exercises Attributed to Hermogenesrdquo in Kennedy pp 84-85

9 ON ETHOPOEIA (excerpt)

Ethopoeia (ecircthopoiia) is an imitation of the character of a person supposed to be speaking for example what words Andromache might say to Hectorhellip

Cf Origen Contra Celsus ANF Vol 4 (Buffalo 1886) (tr Frederick Crombie) VII 36

This figure of speech is properly employed when the character and sentiments of the person introduced are faithfully preserved but it is an abuse of the figure when these do not agree with the character and opinions of the speaker Thus we should justly condemn a man who put into the mouths of barbarians slaves or uneducated people the language of philosophy because we know that the philosophy belonged to the author and not to such persons who could not know anything of philosophy And in like manner we should condemn a man for introducing persons who are represented as wise and well versed in divine knowledge and should make them give expression to language which could only come out of the mouths of those who are ignorant or under the influence of vulgar passions Hence Homer is admired among other things for preserving a consistency of character in his heroes as in Nestor Ulysses Diomede Agamemnon Telemachus Penelope and the rest Euripides on the contrary was assailed in the comedies of Aristophanes as a frivolous talker often putting into the mouth of a barbarian woman a wretched slave the wise maxims which he had learned from Anaxagoras or some other philosophers

Cf Proclus Commentaries of Proclus on the Timaeus of Plato (London 1829 Vol 1) Translated by Thomas Taylor pp 54-55

For he who in a written work narrates the deeds of the most excellent men composes a history But he who narrates the speeches of these men if he intends to preserve the manners of the speaker assumes a disposition similar to the speaker For words are seen to differ according to the inward dispositions For thus we deride most of those except Plato who have written the Apology of Socrates as not preserving the Socratic manner in their com-position Though the narration of this very thing that Socrates was accused made an apol-ogy and was sentenced to die would not be thought worthy of laughter but the dissimili-tude of imitation in the composition renders the imitators ridiculous

11

Since also to say of Achilles that he came forth armed after such a manner and that he performed such deeds is not difficult but to narrate copiously what he said when detained in the river is not easy But this is the province of one who is able to assume the manners of the hero and to write conformably to what he would have said

Cf also Dionysius of Halicarnassus On Literary Composition Tr D A Russell in D A Russell and M Winterbottom Ancient Literary Criticism (Oxford 1972) 334-335

It remains to consider propriety Propriety is a necessary concomitant to all the rest Any work which is lacking herein lacks if not its whole effect [334-335] at least the most important part of it It would generally be agreed that lsquoproprietyrsquo consists in what suits the persons or actions to be handled Just as word-selection can be proper or improper to a subject so surely can word-arrangement Ordinary life gives evidence of this when we are angry or pleased sorrowful or afraid or in any other troubled or emotional state we employ a different word-arrangement from when we think that there is nothing to perturb or grieve us It would be an interminable task to enumerate all the species of propriety but I will make one point which is both the most readily made and the most general in application When people report events of which they have been eye-witnesses even though their state of mind does not change they do not use the same word-arrangement for everything but imitate what they are reporting even in the way they put words together this is a natural instinct not the result of effort Observing this the good poet or orator should imitate whatever he is speaking about not only in his selection of words but in his arrangement of them Homer does this superb genius that he is despite the fact that he possesses only one metre and few rhythms he is none the less always innovating and using his ingenuity within this field so that we see the things happening as much as we hear them described I will give a few instances out the large number possiblehellip

Cf Marcus Tullius Cicero De officis i xxviii 97-98 (in part)

97 XXVIII That this is the common acceptation of propriety1 we may infer from that propriety which poets aim to secure Concerning that I have occasion to say more in another connection Now we say that the poets observe propriety when every word or action is in accord with each individual character For example if Aeacus or Minos said ldquoLet them hate if only they fearrdquo or ldquoThe father is himself his childrenrsquos tombrdquo that would seem improper because we are told that they were just men But when Atreus speaks those lines they call forth applause for the sentiment is in keeping with the character 2 But it will rest with the poets to decide according to the individual characters what is proper for each but to us Nature herself has assigned a character of surpassing excellence far superior to that of all other living creatures and in accordance with that we shall have to decide what propriety requires

98 The poets will observe therefore amid a great variety of characters what is suitable and proper for all ndash even for the badhellip (emphasis added)

Cf Aristotle Rhet III 6 (1408a 10mdash1408b 1) (tr W Rhys Roberts)1 Sc ldquolsquoPropriety is that which harmonizes with manrsquos superiority in those respects in which his nature differs from that of the rest of the animal creationrsquo And they so define the special type of propriety which is sub-ordinate to the general notion that they represent it to be that propriety which harmonizes with Nature in the sense that it manifestly embraces temperance and self-control together with a certain deportment such as becomes a gentlemanrdquo (n 96)2 Seeing as how it is unlike a just man to be cruel or a cruel man to be just it must be noted that in relation to the teaching of Aristotle under discussion both the definition and the examples Cicero gives suit the require-ment that character be lsquolikersquo just as much as that it be lsquoappropriatersquo

12

[10] Your language will be appropriate if it expresses emotion and character and if it corresponds to its subject lsquoCorrespondence to subjectrsquo means that we must neither speak casually about weighty matters nor solemnly about trivial ones nor must we add ornamental epithets to commonplace nouns or the effect will be comic as in the [15] works of Cleophon who can use phrases as absurd as lsquoO queenly fig-treersquo To express emotion you will employ the language of anger in speaking of outrage the language of disgust and discreet reluctance to utter a word when speaking of impiety or foulness the language of exultation for a tale of glory and that of humiliation for a tale of and so in all other cases [20] This aptness of language is one thing that makes people believe in the truth of your story their minds draw the false conclusion that you are to be trusted from the fact that others behave as you do when things are as you describe them and therefore they take your story to be true whether it is so or not Besides an emotional speaker always makes his audience feel with him even when there is nothing in his arguments which is why many [25] speakers try to overwhelm their audience by mere noise Furthermore this way of proving your story by displaying these signs of its genuineness expresses your personal character Each class of men each type of disposition will have its own appropriate way of letting the truth appear Under lsquoclassrsquo I include differences of age as boy man or old man of sex as man or woman of nationality as Spartan or Thessalian By lsquodispositionsrsquo I here mean those dispositions only which determine the [30] character of a manrsquos life for it is not every disposition that does this If then a speaker uses the very words which are in keeping with a particular disposition he will reproduce the corresponding character for a rustic and an educated man will not say the same things nor speak in the same way Again some impression is made upon an audience by a device which speech-writers employ to nauseous excess when they say lsquoWho does not know thisrsquo or lsquoIt is known to everybodyrsquo The hearer is ashamed of his ignorance and agrees with the speaker so as to [35] have a share of the knowledge that everybody else possesses (emphasis added)

Cf idem III 16 (1417a 17-20) (tr W Rhys Roberts)

The narration should depict character to which end you must know what makes it do so One such thing is the indication of moral purpose [proairesis ie lsquochoicersquo] the quality of purpose indicated determines the quality of character depicted and is itself determined by the end pursued Thus it is that mathematical discourses depict no character they have nothing to do with moral purpose for they represent nobody as pursuing any end On the other hand the Socratic discourses [Socirckratikoi logoi] do depict character being concerned with moral [20] questions (emphasis added)

Cf Albinus ldquoThe Introduction of Albinus to the Doctrines of Platordquo in The Works of Plato A New and Literal Version chiefly from the text of Stallbaum Vol VI containing the doubtful works by George Burges MA Trinity College Cambridge London Henry G Bohn York Street Covent Garden (1885) pp 315-316)

But as regards that which is combined with a becoming delineation of the manners of the characters introduced1 (and) their being different in their discourses through life some as philosophers and others as sophists it is requisite to assign to each their peculiar manners (emphasis added)

Cf Aristotle Metaph IV 2 (1004b 24) (tr W D Ross)

1 tecircs prepousecircs ecircthopoiias tocircn paralambanomenocircn prosopocircn lit lsquoa becoming depiction of the characters of the persons introducedrsquo

13

[For philosophy differs] from sophistic in respect of the purpose of the philosophic life [tecircs de tou biou tecirci proairesei] [25] Dialectic is merely critical where philosophy claims to know and sophistic is what appears to be philosophy but is not

3 Aristotle on the depiction of character The comparison of the philosopher with the sophist

As Aristotle states the end pursued determines the quality of the proairesis or moral purpose indicated which in turn determines the quality of the ecircthos or character de-picted for which reason the philosopher differs from the sophist tecircs de tou biou tecirci pro-airesei ldquoin respect of the purpose of the philosophic liferdquo as he explains (cf Metaph IV 2 1004b 15-26) Hence a narrative will have character to the extent that it portrays some-one as pursuing an end and so a Socratic discourse will have character insofar as it por-trays Socrates (and his interlocutors) as pursuing an end But it should be noted that pro-airesis here translated as lsquopurposersquo is defined in the Nicomachean Ethics as ldquothe deliber-ate desire of things in our own powerrdquo (III 3 1113a 10) and so is most accurately ren-dered by lsquochoicersquo Hence Aristotle distinguishes the philosopher from the sophist accord-ing to his lsquopurposersquo understood as lsquochoicersquo taking the form of a deliberate desire of things in onersquos power Whereas the philosopher claims to know making knowledge the object of his choice (and whereas the dialectician is lsquomerely criticalrsquo of what the philosopher claims to knowmdashwhich is to say passing judgement on it according to common intentions as is explained in logic) the sophist desires only the appearance of knowledge and not the reality This last point is well-explained by St Thomas Aquinas in his commentary on the passage in question

But the philosopher differs from the sophist by proairesis that is by lsquochoicersquo or lsquopleasurersquo in other words by the desire of his [way of] life [desiderio vitae] For the philosopher and the sophist order their lives and actions to different thingsmdashthe philosopher to knowing the truth but the sophist to this that he appear to know although he does not know (In IV Meta lect 4 n 6 tr BAM)

In sum in the view of St Thomas Aristotle is saying that the philosopher and the sophist differ proairesei which St Thomas glosses as electio lsquochoice or pleasurersquo and explains as meaning desiderio vitae lsquodesire of lifersquo or lsquodesire of his way of lifersquomdashthat is the thing which gives him pleasure or the thing which he desires to get out of life which for the philosopher is the possession of wisdom but for the sophist merely the appearance of wisdom In light of these considerations we must note the indebtedness to Aristotlersquos doctrine of the passage from the Neo-Platonist Albinus1

But as regards that which is combined with a becoming delineation of the manners of the characters introduced (and) their being different in their discourses through life some as philosophers and others as sophists it is requisite to assign to each their peculiar manners to the philosopher that which is noble and simple and truth-loving but to the sophist that which is of many hues and tricky and reputation-loving but to an individual what is peculiar to him (emphasis added)

In this text lsquodelineation of the manners of the characters introducedrsquo translates ecircthopoiias tocircn paralambanomenocircn prosopocircn which means more literally lsquothe depiction 1 ldquoThe Introduction of Albinus to the Doctrines of Platordquo pp 315-316

14

of the characters of the persons introducedrsquo namely in a Platonic dialogue Albinus goes on to distinguish such persons with respect to ldquotheir discourses through liferdquomdashthat is to say in their conversations with respect to their lsquolifersquo or lsquoway of lifersquo a remark that is easily understood if it is taken to refer to Aristotlersquos account of the distinction between the philosopher and the sophist as noted above Hence the character of the persons imitated in a Platonic dialogue will be determined by the portrayal of the various ends they pursue as this determines their proaireseis which in turn determines their ecircthecirc as this is revealed in and by their logoi or dialogoi their lsquodiscoursesrsquo or lsquoconversationsrsquo

NB On the foregoing see my paper ldquoOn the Dialogue Formrdquo

sect

15

4 The requirement that character be lsquolikersquo

Cf Hollis Rinehart ldquoAristotlersquos Four Aims for Dramatic Character and His Method in the Poeticsrdquo University of Toronto Quarterly - Volume 69 Number 2 Spring 2000 sec IV1

We return now to our original starting point the interpretation of the third aim lsquolikenessrsquo The question is lsquolike whatrsquo There is little in the immediate context to assist us but perhaps our examination of the general context of Aristotlersquos treatment of character and of the first two aims may be of some help We recall in the first place that Aristotlersquos interest in this part of the Poetics is in practical matters in how the plot (and by implication the other parts of tragedy) lsquoshould be constructed if the poem is to be a successrsquo Secondly we notice that the aims are presented in logical and chronological order That is the first aim of the drama-tist (Aristotle calls it lsquothe first and most importantrsquo [Greek omitted]) is to decide whether character in the sense of moral choice is necessary and useful Only then should it be brought into the action The next task of the dramatist is to choose or create a character appropriate to the use which is to be made of it in the play ndash ie one whose choices will not only influence the action but by their moral quality give that action an appropriate moral quality Having determined this question what then would be the next logical task of the dramatist Surely it would be to ask what such a character would be like ndash that is how it would manifest itself in ways that an audience would recognize ndash for all tragedy must be interpreted by an audience through dialogue and action alone Thus once a dramatist had decided that his plot required a woman to kill her husband ndash an act requiring moral choice ndash his next step would be to ask what sort of woman would make such a choice If his answer were lsquoa woman with the heart of a manrsquo he would then need to ask himself how such a woman would reveal herself to the audience ie what are the visible or audible signs by which such a character would reveal itself

That is to say the audience must be able to recognize the original of which the character before them is a faithful representation

For when an imitation is ldquobadrdquo cf also Plato Republic II 377d-e (tr Alan Bloom)

ldquoWhen a man in a speech makes a bad representation of what gods [e] and heroes are like just as a painter who paints something that doesnrsquot resemble the things whose likeness he wished to paint [hotan eikazecirci tis kakocircs [ousian] tocirci logocirci peri theocircn te kai hecircrocircocircn hoioi eisin hocircsper grapheus mecircden eoikota graphocircn hois an homoia boulecircthecirci grapsai]helliprdquo

On likeness as such cf St Thomas Aquinas Summa Theol Ia q 4 art 3 c (tr BAM)

[It must be said that] things are called lsquolikersquo which agree in form

Cf St Thomas Aquinas Summa Theol Ia q 93 art 9 c (tr English Dominican Fathers)

[Now] [l]ikeness is a kind of unity for oneness in quality causes likeness as the Philosopher sayshellip2 For we say that an image is like or unlike what it represents according as the repre-sentation is perfect or imperfect

Cf St Thomas Aquinas Summa Theol Ia q 35 art 1 c (tr BAM)

1 (wwwutpjournalscomproductutq692692_rineharthtml [10703])2 Cf Metaph V 15 (1021 a 11) (tr W D Ross) ldquothose are called like whose quality is onerdquo

16

I reply that it must be said that likeness belongs to the notion of an image Nevertheless not any likeness whatsoever suffices for the notion of an image but rather a likeness in the species of a thing or at least in some sign of the species But a sign of the species in bodily things would seem to be shape most of all for we observe that with respect to animals diverse according to species they are of diverse shapes but not of diverse colors Whence if the color of something were painted on a wall it would not be called an image unless the shape were depicted But neither does a likeness in species suffice by itself nor shape but the notion of origin is required for an image since as Augustine says one egg is not the image of another since it is not an expression of it So for something truly to be an image requires that it proceed from another similar to it in species or at least in a sign of the species


For an image represents according to a likeness in species as we have said But a trace re-presents by way of an effect which represents the cause in such a way as not to attain to a likeness of species for impressions that are left by the motion of an animal are called traces and likewise smoke is called a trace of fire and the desolation of the earth the trace of a hostile army

Cf St Thomas Aquinas Comp Theol I c 43 (tr BAM)

Now certain things that proceed from other things are found not to follow after the perfect species of those things from which they proceed In one way as in equivocal generations for a sun is not generated from the sun but a certain animalhellip In another way what proceeds from something differs from it because of a lack of purity when that is from what is simple and pure in itself by an application to exterior matter something is produced falling short of the first species as a house in matter comes from a house in the mind of an artisan and color comes from light received in a limited body and a mixed thing comes from fire joined to the other elements and a shadow comes from a ray [of light] by the opposition of an opaque bodyhellip In a third way what proceeds from something does not follow after its species because of a lack of truthmdashthat is to say it does not truly receive its nature but only a certain likeness of it like an image in a mirror or sculpture or even the likeness of a thing in the intellect or sense For the image of a man is not called a true man but a likeness nor is a stone [truly in] the soul as the Philosopher says but a species of the stone


I reply that it must be said that since a likeness is looked to according to an agreement or communication in form likeness is manifold according to the many ways of communication in form For certain things are called lsquolikersquo which communicate in the same form according to the same notion and according to the same mode and these things are not only called lsquolikersquo but lsquoequalrsquo in their likeness just as two things equally white are called alike in whiteness And this is the most perfect likeness In another way things are called lsquolikersquo which communicate in form according to the same notion and not according to the same mode but according to more or less as the less white is said to be lsquolikersquo the more white And this is an imperfect likeness In a third way things are called lsquolikersquo which communicate in the same form but not according to the same notion as is clear in non-univocal agents For since every agent makes something similar to itself inasmuch as it is an agent but it makes each thing according to its own form a likeness to the form of the agent must be in the effect If then

17

the agent is contained in the same species with its effect there will be a likeness in form between the maker and the thing made according to the same notion of the species just as man generates man But if the agent is not contained in the same species there will [still] be a likeness but not according to the same notion of the species just as the things generated by the power of the sun approach to some likeness to the sun but not such that they receive the form of the sun according to a likeness in species but according to a likeness in genus If then there be any agents which are not contained in a genus their effects would even more remotely approach to a likeness of the form of the agent yet not such that they share in a likeness to the form of the agent according to the same notion of the species but according to some sort of analogy just as being itself is common to everything And in this way the things that are from God are likened to Him inasmuch as they are beings as to the first and universal principal of their whole being

A character then must be lsquosimilar in a sign of the speciesrsquo with respect to the exemplar according to whose likeness it is made and this is what Aristotle primarily has in mind

sect

18

5 The requirement that character be lsquoconsistentrsquo

Cf Mitchell Carroll Aristotlersquos Poetics c XXV in the Light of the Homeric Scholia (diss Baltimore 1895) pp 24-25

(a) to a)nwmalon lsquothe inconsistent in characterrsquo

In the schol Por W 559 ff (fr 168 ed Teubner) in which passage Achilles addresses Priam in harsh terms we read A)ristotelhj fhsin a)nwmalon ei)=nai to A)xillewj h)=qoj1 Romer thinks rightly that Aristotle does not mean by this to censure the poet but in defending the character of Achilles perhaps against Plato (Hippias Minor 370 A) he ex-plains that Homer has represented Achilles as far as concerns h)=qoj from the first to the last book perfectly correctly namely a)nwmalon to h)=qoj It is what is emphasized in Poet c XV 1454a 25 tetarton de to o(malon ka)n gar a)nwmaloj tij h)= o( thn mimhsin parexwn kai toiou=ton h)=qoj u(poteqh= o(mwj o(malw=j a)nwmalon dei= ei)=nai Aristotle accordingly understands the h)=qoj of Achilles as o(malw=j a)nwmalon Eustathiosrsquo obser-vation on the passage (p 1365) seems to justify this view xxx Cf A 169 I 357 I 619-650 It seems evident therefore that Aristotle solved the a)poria based on the inconsistent character of Achilles in the above mentioned manner

Cf also Ingram Bywater Aristotle On the Art of Poetry p 228 on 1454a 26 also citing Eustathius on Iliad XXIV 569 and D W Lucas Aristotle Poetics ad loc

sect

1 ldquoAristotle says that the character of Achilles is inconsistentrdquo

19

6 On lsquounnecessaryrsquo wickedness

Cf Hollis Rinehart ldquoAristotlersquos Four Aims for Dramatic Character and His Method in the Poeticsrdquo University of Toronto Quarterly - Volume 69 Number 2 Spring 2000 sec III1

The situation is this after Orestes kills Clytemnestra he appeals to his uncle Menelaus Agamemnonrsquos brother to help him Menelaus demurs an act which Orestes attributes to cowardice and to Menelausrsquos wish to succeed him on the throne of Argos This action however does not decide Orestesrsquo fate Else puts the case succinctly

The significant thing is that the poet has chosen to decide Orestesrsquo fate through an entirely different mechanism the vote in the assembly and has thereby nullified or neutralized the importance of Menelaus The latterrsquos poltroonery is lsquounnecessaryrsquo in view of the premise Euripides himself has laid down for the plot It decides nothing and a different characterization of him need not have altered matters essentially5

Note that it is not Menelausrsquos lsquopoltrooneryrsquo that Aristotle objects to but the fact that it is unnecessary from the point of view of the plot Aristotle was fond enough of this example to use it again to make the same point in chapter 25 Speaking of legitimate criticisms which may be made of individual tragedies Aristotle says lsquoIt is right however to censure both improbability and depravity where there is no necessity and no use is made of the improba-bility An example [of improbability] is Euripidesrsquo introduction of Aegeus or (of depravity) the character of Menelaus in the Orestesrsquo (xxv 31 my emphasis) Again note that it is not Menelausrsquos depravity in itself that Aristotle objects to but the fact that it is unnecessary and useless6

5 Argument 447 [= Aristotlersquos Poetics The Argument Cambridge Mass Harvard University Press 1963] Elsersquos emphasis In Euripidesrsquo defence however it must be said that Menelausrsquos response is what motivates Orestes to appeal to the assembly and also to plot the murder of Helen and the kidnapping of Hermione Without Menelaus the plot of the Orestes would consist simply of the condemnation of Orestes and his rescue by Apollo 6 [footnote omitted]

sect

1 (wwwutpjournalscomproductutq692692_rineharthtml [10703])

20

7 The four requirements of character in sum

The four requirements of character are that it be (1) good sc of its kind (2) appropriate (3) like and (4) consistent

(1) A character will be chrestos or lsquogood of its kindrsquo when by its speech or action it makes clear what the manrsquos choice is (as for instance a good hero is one who recog-nizably acts heroically and a good villain one who acts villainously the latter being just as lsquogoodrsquo in this sense as the former as a knife is good of its kind when it cuts well)

(2) It will be harmatton or lsquoappropriatersquo when it is suitable to its subject as eg when a woman says what a woman would say or a slave as opposed to a free man etc

(3) It will be homoion or lsquolikersquo when by the possession of its proper form it resembles its exemplar as the well-painted portrait of a man who is better than us will be more beautiful than we are but of one worse uglier

(4) It will be homalon or lsquoconsistentrsquo when the later character resembles its earlier self (as for instance when a character who acts nobly in the first act conducts herself the same way in the last as opposed to suddenly becoming duplicitous)

sect

21

8 Aristotle on ecircthos (lsquocharacterrsquo) An overview

Cf Aristotle Poetics ch 6 (1450a 6-7)

hellip[B]ut by lsquocharactersrsquo [ta ecircthecirc] [I mean] that according to which we say those who do things [tous prattontas] are of a certain sorthellip

Cf Aristotle Poetics ch 6 (1450b 9-12)

But character [ecircthos] is that which choice [proairesin] reveals ltthat isgt what sort of thing lthellipgt one [10] chooses or avoids Consequently those speeches have no character in which it is not entirely ltcleargt what the speaker chooses or avoids

Cf Aristotle Poetics ch 15 (1454a 19)

Now one will have character [ecircthos] if as has been said by speech or action he make clear what his choice is and a good [character] if a good [choice]

Cf Aristotle Nic Eth III 2 (1111b 5-6) (tr W D Ross)

For choice [proairesis] is thought to be most proper to virtue and to reveal character more than actions do

Cf Aristotle Nic Eth III 2 (1112a 2) (tr W D Ross)

hellip[F]or by choosing what is good or bad we are men of a certain characterhellip

Cf Aristotle Rhet III 16 (1417a 16-1417b 20) (tr W Rhys Roberts)

The narration should depict character to which end you must know what makes it do so

One such thing is the indication of moral purpose [or lsquochoicersquo proairesis] the quality of purpose indicated determines the quality of character depicted and is itself determined by the end pursued Thus it is that mathematical discourses depict no character they have nothing to do with moral purpose for they represent nobody as pursuing any end On the other hand the Socratic dialogues [= Socirckratikoi logoi lsquothe Socratic discoursesrsquo] do depict character being concerned with moral [20] questions This end will also be gained by describing the manifestations of various types of character eg ldquohe kept walking along as he talkedrdquo which shows the manrsquos recklessness and rough manners Do not let your words seem inspired so much by intelligence in the manner now current as by moral purpose eg ldquoI willed this aye it was my moral purpose true I gained nothing by it still it is [25] better thusrdquo For the other way shows good sense but this shows good character good sense making us go after what is useful and good character after what is noble Where any detail may appear incredible then add the cause of it of this Sophocles provides an example in the Antigone where Antigone says she had cared more for her brother than for husband or children since if the latter perished they might be replaced [30]

But since my father and mother in their gravesLie dead no brother can be born to me1

22

If you have no such cause to suggest just say that you are aware that no one will believe your words but the fact remains that such is our nature however hard the world may find it to believe that a man deliberately does [35] anything except what pays him Again you must make use of the emotions Relate the familiar manifestations of them and those that distinguish yourself and your opponent for instance ldquohe went away scowling at merdquo So Aeschines described Cratylus2 as ldquohiss- [1417b]

1 Sophocles Antigone 911 912 2 [Aeschines may be the friend of Socrates and Cratylus (who was Platorsquos instructor in Heraclitean philosophy) but this is uncertain]

ing with fury and shaking his fistsrdquo These details carry conviction the audience take the truth of what they know as so much evidence for the truth of what they do not Plenty of such details may be found in Homer

[5] Thus did she say but the old woman buried her face in her hands1

a true touch ndash people beginning to cry do put their hands over their eyes Bring yourself on the stage from the first in the right character that people may regard you in that light and the same with your adversary but do not let them see what you are about How easily such impressions may be conveyed we can see from the way in which we get some [10] inkling of things we know nothing of by the mere look of the messenger bringing news of them Have some narrative in many different parts of your speech and sometimes let there be none at the beginning of it In political oratory there is very little opening for narration nobody can ldquonarraterdquo what has not yet happened If there is narration at all it will be of past events the recollection of which is to help the hearers to make better [15] plans for the future Or it may be employed to attack some onersquos character or to eulogize him ndash only then you will not be doing what the political speaker as such has to do If any statement you make is hard to believe you must guarantee its truth and at once offer an explanation and then furnish it with such particulars as will be expected Thus Carcinusrsquo Jocasta in his Oedipus keeps guaranteeing the truth of her answers to the inquiries of the man [20] who is seeking her son and so with Haemon in Sophocles

1 Odyssey xix 3612 Or possibly lsquoand then arranged your reasons systematically for those who demand themrsquo3 [A tragic poet of the fifth cent]4 Cp Sophocles Antigone 635-8 701-4 (emphasis added)

Cf Aristotle Rhet II 21 (1395b 1-19) (tr W Rhys Roberts)

One great advantage of Maxims to a speaker is due to the want of intelligence in his hearers who love to hear him succeed in expressing as a universal truth the opinions which they hold themselves about particular cases I will explain what I mean by this indicating at the same time how we are to hunt down the maxims required The maxim as has been already said a general statement [5] and people love to hear stated in general terms what they already believe in some particular connexion eg if a man happens to have bad neighbours or bad children he will agree with any one who tells him ldquoNothing is more annoying than having neighboursrdquo or ldquoNothing is more foolish than to be the parent of childrenrdquo The orator has therefore to guess the subjects on which his hearers really [10] hold views already and what those views are and then must express as general truths these same views on these same subjects This is one advantage of using maxims There is another which is more important ndash it invests a speech with moral character There is moral character in every speech in which the moral purpose is conspicuous and

23

maxims always produce this effect because the utterance of them amounts to a general declaration of moral [15] principles so that if the maxims are sound they display the speaker as a man of sound moral character So much for the Maxim ndash its nature varieties proper use and advantages (emphasis added)

The ethos or character of the prattontas (ie their nature according to their moral qualities)

spoudaios (noble or elevated) (above us eg Achilles)phaulos (base or lowly) (beneath us eg Margites)homoios (like us) (level with us)

beltion (better than we are the quality of the spoudaious taken relatively)cheiron (worse than we are the quality of the phaulous)toioiutos (such as we are the quality of the homoious)

arete (excellence the quality of men better than we are taken absolutely)kakia (badness the quality of men worse than we are)

sect

24

9 On lsquocharacterizationrsquo or lsquopersonificationrsquo understood as lsquoimpersonationrsquo

Cf Aelius Theon Progymnasmata ii 68 (=ldquoThe Exercises of Aelius Theonrdquo in Progym-nasmata Greek Textbooks of Prose Composition and Rhetoric Translated with Introduc-tions and Notes by George A Kennedy Society of Biblical Literature Atlanta 2003) p 11

What would be a better example of prosopopoeia than (speeches in) the poetry of Homer and the dialogues of Plato and other Socratics and the dramas of Menander

Cf ibid pp 47-48

8 (SPENGEL 10) ON PROSOPOPOEIA [excerpt]

[115] Personification (prosocircpopoeia) is the introduction of a person to whom words are attributed that are suitable to the speaker and have an indisputable application to the subject discussed What words would a man say to his wife when leaving on a journey Or a general to his soldiers in time of danger Also when the persons are specified for example What words would Cyrus say when marching against the Massagetae Or what would Datis say when he met the king at the battle of Marathon Under this genus of exercise fall the species of consolations and exhortation and letter writing149

First of all then one should have in mind what the personality of the speaker is like and to whom the speech is addressed the speakerrsquos age the occasion the place the social status of the speaker also the general subject which the projected speeches are

149 Ie addresses at festivals exhortations and letters in which the writer imagines what a particular historical person would have said The exercise provided preparation for declam-ations on political themes in the person of historical [47-48] personages such as Demos-thenes as well as for composing speeches in works of history and in dramas This passage and Nicolaus (below p 166) suggest that the letter writing in character may have occasion-ally been practiced in schools Imaginative literary epistolography was a minor genre of the Second Sophistic cf extant examples by Alciphron Aelian Aristanetus and Philostratus

going to discuss Then one is ready to try to say appropriate words Different ways of speaking belong to different ages of life not the same to an older man and a younger one the speech of a younger man will be mingled with simplicity and modesty [116] that of an older man with knowledge and experience150 Different ways of speaking would also be fitting by nature for a woman and for a man and by status for a slave and a free man and by activities for a soldier and a farmer and by state of mind for a lover and a temperate man and by their origin the words of Laconian sparse and clear differ from those of a man of Attica which are voluble We say that Herodotus often speaks like barbarians although writing in Greek because he imitates their ways of speaking What is said is also affected by the places and occasions when it is said speeches in a military camp are not the same as those in an assembly of the citizens nor are those in peace and war the same nor those by victors and vanquished and whatever else applies to the persons speaking And surely each subject has its appropriate form of expression We become masters of this if we do not speak about great things vulgarly nor about small things loftily nor about paltry things solemnly nor about fearful things in a casual manner nor about shameful things rashly nor about pitiable things excessively but give what is appropriate to each subject aiming at what fits the speaker and his manner of speech and the time and his lot in life and each of the things mentioned above

25

150 For a somewhat different view see Aristotle Rhetoric 212-14 [Cf also Rhet III 6 1408a 10ffmdashBAM]

Cf [Hermogenes] Progymnasmata ix 20-21 (=ldquoPreliminary Exercises Attributed to Her-mogenesrdquo in Progymnasmata Greek Textbooks of Prose Composition and Rhetoric Translated with Introductions and Notes by George A Kennedy Society of Biblical Liter-ature Atlanta 2003) pp 84-85


Ethopoeia (ecircthopoiia) is an imitation of the character of a person supposed to be speaking for example what words Andromache might say to Hector41 It is called personification (prosocircpopoeia) when we personify a thing like Elenchus (Disproof) in Menander42 and as in Aristeidesrsquo speech where ldquoThe Seardquo addresses the Athenians43 The difference is clear in ethopoeia we imagine words for a real person in prosopopoeia we imagine a non-existing person They say it is image-making (eidolopoiia) when we attribute words to the dead as does Aristeides in Against Plato on Behalf of the [84-85]

41 As in Iliad 6406-39 On this chapter see Patillon Thersquoorie du Discours pp 300-30442 Frag 545 ed Koch43 Aelius Aristides the most famous sophist of the mid-second century after Christ is the only post-classical orator cited by late Greek rhetoricians however the address of The Sea to the Athenians does not occur in his numerous extant works

Four for there he has attributed words to Themistoclesrsquo companions44

There are characterizations of both definite and indefinite persons of indefinite for example what words someone would say to his family when about to go away from home of definite for example what words Achilles would say to Deidamia when about to go to war Those characterizations are single when someone [21] is imagined as making a speech by himself those are double when he is speaking to someone else By himself for example What would a general say when returning from victory To another for example What would a general say to his army after a victory45

Throughout the exercise you will preserve what is distinctive and appropriate to the persons imagined as speaking and to the occasions for the speech of a young man differs from that of an old man and that of one who rejoices from that of one who grieves Some personifications are ethical some pathetical some mixed Ethical are those in which the characterization of the speaker is dominant throughout for example what a farmer would say when first seeing a ship pathetical are those in which there is emotion throughout for example what Andromache would say over the dead Patroclus for there would be pathos because of the slaughter of Patroclus and ethos in Achillesrsquo plans for war46

44 Cf Aristeides 3367ff where Miltiades Themistocles Pericles and Cimon (ldquothe Fourrdquo) are imagined as coming back to life and answering Platorsquos attack on them in Gorgias According to a scholiat on the passage Sopatros claimed this was ethopoeia since the speakers were represented as alive The best example of eidolopoeia in ancient oratory is probably Cicerorsquos evocation of the ghost of Appius Claudius Caecus in Pro Caelio 33-34 speeches by ghost occur in Greek and Latin tragedy45 Presumably the contents and style of the second speech would be influenced by perception of the audience but the author may have misunderstood his sourcerdquoDoublerdquo ethopoeia would better describe two speeches on the same subject by different characters such as is often found in historical writing46 Ie his plans for revenge will reveal character cf Iliad 18324-42

26

Cf Apthonius Progymnasmata 11 (tr Malcolm Heath excerpted from his Website Ancient Rhetoric An Introduction)

11 Characterisation

Characterisation is the imitation of the character of a given person

It has three species the portrayal of image person and character

In the portrayal of character the person is known the character invented hence it is called characterisation

Eg What Heracles would say when Eurystheus gives him orders

In this case Heracles is known and we invent the speakerrsquos character

In the portrayal of image the character is known but dead and no longer able to speak as with the fictions of Eupolis in the Demes and Aristides in On the Four hence it is called portrayal of image

In portrayal of person everything is invented both character and person as Menander created Refutationmdashfor refutation is a thing not a person hence it is called personification since the person is invented along with the character This is the division Characterisations may be pathetic ethical or mixed

The pathetic are those which indicate emotion at every point eg What Hecabe would say after the sack of Troy

The ethical are those which involve character only eg What someone from the mainland would say on first seeing the sea

The mixed are those which have both character and emotion eg What Achilles would say over Patroclusrsquo body when resolving to fight the deliberation is character the friendrsquos death emotion

Characterisation is developed in a style that is clear concise colourful unconstrained not intricate or figurative

Instead of heads you will divide into the three times - present past and future

NB The elements out of which the foregoing account is composed according to Aph-thonius are the following

1 person2 character a known b not known c if not known then invented

The person can be known or not known and if not known then invented

27

If known the person can be living or dead and if dead then fictitiously portrayed in keeping with his known character

The character can be known or not known and if unknown it is invented

The character can be known and the person living (and so able to speak for himself) or known and dead and so no longer able to speak

Hercules the person is known but the character invented (since his character is not known)Pericles the person is known and the character is known but he is dead

1 First case where a person is known but his character is not as with the portrayal of Hercules the portrayal of character

2 Second case where a person whorsquos character is known but is dead gives rise to a fiction as with the fictions of Eupolis and Aristides the portrayal of image

3 Third case where both person and character are not known as with Refutation the portrayal of person

Note that Aphthonius does not consider the case of the portrayal of a living man whose character is known as Aristophanes portrayed Socrates in the latterrsquos lifetime

Cf Anon Prol I (311-13) [In L G Westerink Anonymous Prolegomena to Platonic Philosophy (Amsterdam 1962) p 6]

He [Plato] imitated also the mimes of Sophron to complete as it were his technique of character-drawing for writing dialogues means portraying characters1

NB Since the meaning of lsquoimpersonationrsquo presupposes an understanding of the definition of lsquopersonrsquo let us next consider the following witnesses

Cf St Thomas Aquinas In I Sent dist 23 q 1 art 1 c (tr BAM)

hellipAnd according to Boethius the name lsquopersonrsquo has been taken from personando from the fact that in tragedies and comedies those reciting them used to place upon themselves a certain mask in order to represent the man whose deeds they narrated by their descanting And so it is that it has been taken up into use such that any individual man about whom such a narration is made is called a lsquopersonrsquo And for the same reason it is called prosopa in Greek from pro which is lsquobeforersquo and sopos which is lsquothe facersquo because masks of this sort were placed before the face

Cf Boethius Liber de duabus naturis (Contra Eutychen III Ed and trans by S J Tester Loeb Classical Library No 74 1973 pp 85-87) (tr rev BAM)

1 e)zhlwsen de kai Swfona ton gelwtopoion thn mimhtikhn w)sper katorqw=sai boulomenoj o( gar dialogoj grafwn mimhsin proswpwn ei)sagei Cf my translation ldquoHe [Plato] emulated as well Sophron the comic-writer wishing as it were to bring the imitative art to a successful issue for writing a dialogue leads to the imitation of personsrdquo

28

hellipFor the name lsquopersonrsquo seems to be carried over from elsewhere namely from the per-sonae [= lsquomasksrsquo] which in comedies and tragedies used to represent the men concerned But persona with the circumflex on the penultimate syllable is so called from personando [= lsquosounding throughrsquo] But if the accent be pronounced on the antepenultimate syllable it will most clearly be seen to be said from sonus [= lsquosoundrsquo] And it is from sonus for the reason that a greater sound must be produced from its concavity The Greeks also call these per-sonas prosopa from the fact that they are placed over the face and conceal the countenance in front of the eyes ldquobeing put up against the facerdquo But since actors represented the indi-vidual men concerned in tragedy or comedy by the personas [or lsquomasksrsquo] they put on as has been said ie Hecuba or Medea or Simo or Chremes so also of the rest of the men who were clearly recognized by their own look the Latins have named personas [lsquopersonsrsquo] and the Greeks prosopa

NB As we see Boethiusrsquo derivation of the name lsquopersonarsquo or lsquomaskrsquo from personando by reason of the greater sound made by the maskrsquos concavitas or hollowness demonstrates that the Roman philosopher is looking to the meaning of the word as lsquosounding throughrsquo But since by means of such masks men performing comedies and tragedies on the stage re-presented others (since the masks resembled the faces of the men represented) personando itself came to mean lsquorepresentingrsquo or as we would say in English lsquoimpersonatingrsquo In his remarks excerpted above St Thomas clearly has this second meaning of personando in mind Accordingly lsquoimpersonationrsquo will be understood to mean lsquoassuming the person of anotherrsquo by likening onersquos words and deeds to that those of that other

sect

29

10 On the employment of dramatization in epic poetry

On the manner of imitating cf Aristotle Poetics ch 3 (1446a 19-23) (tr BAM)

But there is yet a third difference of these [arts] in the [20] manner by which each of these things might be imitated For in the same things1 one might imitate the same things2 some-times by narrating (whether becoming another person3 as Homer does or in the same manner throughout without changing) or in the manner of imitating all those doing things in the very act of doing them [prattontas kai energountas]

On the manner of imitating in sum

For in the same things one might imitate the same things sometimes

(1) by narrating(a) becoming another person as Homer does or(b) by narrating in the same manner without changing [without becoming another

person ie in propria persona](2) or in the manner of imitating all the agents as engaged in action (dramatization

properly speaking the acting out of a play by means of performers)

Cf Aristotle Poetics ch 4 (1448b 34mdash1449a 1) (tr BAM)

Now just as Homer was the greatest [35] poet according to seriousness (not only because he made his imitations well but because he made them dramatic [dramatikas epoiecircsen]) so also because he first showed forth the form of comedy dramatically composing [or dramatically producing dramatopoiesas] not invectives but the laughable For his Margites have a proportion as the Iliad and the Odyssey are to [1441a] tragedies so this is to comedies

Cf Aristotle Poetics ch 23 (1459a 17ndash20) (tr BAM)

But as for the art imitative in narrative and in metre [peri de tecircs diecircgecircmatikecircs kai en metrocirci mimecirctikecircs] it is clear that its plots should be constructed the way they are in tragedies dramatically [sunistanai dramatikous] and around one action whole and complete [20] having a beginning middles and an endhellip

Cf August Wilhelm Schlegel Lectures on Dramatic Art and Literature (London 1904) Lecture II (tr John Black)

What is dramatic To many the answer will seem very easy where various persons are intro-duced conversing together and the poet does not speak in his own person This is however merely the first external foundation of the form and that is dialogue But the characters may express thoughts and sentiments without operating any change on each other and so leave the minds of both in exactly the same state in which they were at the commencement in such a case however interesting the conversation may be it cannot be said to possess a dramatic interest

1 Ie as means2 Ie as objects3 Ie after having spoken in onersquos own person

30

11 Supplement On the employment of dramatization in historiography cf Polybius His-tories II 566-11 (LCL 1922) (tr W R Paton)

Wishing for instance to insist on the cruelty of Antigonus and the Macedonians and also on that of Aratus and the Achaeans he tells us that the Mantineans when they surrendered were exposed to terrible sufferings and that such were the misfortunes that overtook this the most ancient and greatest city in Arcadia as to impress deeply and move to tears all the Greeks In his eagerness to arouse the pity and attention of his readers he treats us to a picture of clinging women with their [hair] disheveled and their breasts bare or again of crowds of both sexes together with their children and aged parents weeping and lamenting as they are led away to slavery This sort of thing he keeps up throughout his history always trying to bring horrors vividly before our eyes Leaving aside the ignoble and womanish character of such a treatment of his subject let us consider how far it is proper or serviceable to history A historical author should not try to thrill his readers by such ex-aggerated pictures nor should he like a tragic poet try to imagine the probable utterances of this characters or reckon up all the consequences probably incidental to the occurrences with which he deals but simply record what really happened and what really was said however commonplace For the object of tragedy is not the same as that of history but quite the opposite (emphasis added)

Cf Stefan Rebenich ldquoHistorical Proserdquo in Handbook of Rhetoric in the Hellenistic Per-iod 330 BCmdashAD 400 ed Stanley Porter (Brill 1997) pp 265-266

This sweeping judgment [of Dionysius of Halicarnassus] however fails to recognize the divergent lines of development and takes no notice of the different models which can be identified in Greek historiography from the fourth century on Thus Polybius himself brings against Phylarchus4 a historian of the third century BC the reproach that he had betrayed the proper task of historical [265-266] writing5 The efforts of the historian ought not to be directed towards winning the attention of the public through the narration of sensational occurrences (terateia) Again it was not proper for a historianmdashin contrast to a tra-gedianmdashto interpolate fine speeches such as might perhaps have been delivered or to recount the subsidiary circumstances which accompanied events Rather it was his duty to record exclusively what actually (kat )a)lhqeian) happened and what was really said even if it was a question of quite ordinary things For the aim of history writing and that of tragedy were opposed to one another the task of the tragic poet was to thrill and charm (e)kplh=cai kai yuxagwgh=sai) his hearers for the moment by using the most plausible words that of the historian was to instruct and convince (didacai kai pei=sai) for all time those who were desirous of learning through his portrayal of the actual events and speeches

4 [note omitted]5 Plb 2568-12 (emphasis added)

Cf Kurt von Fritz Dictionary of the History of Ideas The Influence of Ideas on Ancient Greek Historiography1

In a totally different way a considerable section of Hellenistic historiography was influen-ced by a famous sentence in Aristotlersquos Poetics which says that poetry is more philosophical than history His reasons are (1) poetry (he has especially dramatic poetry in mind) is more καθόλου (more ldquogeneralrdquo) and (2) history tells what has actually happened while poetry represents what might have happened according to necessity or probability To say that (dra-

1 (httpetextlibvirginiaeducgi-localDHIdhicgiid=dv2-54 [61504])

31

matic) poetry is more general than history may seem strange at first since ancient tragedy usually stages in great detail what is supposed to have happened in one day or less while historiography is quite unable to go into so much detail and to tell what every actor on the political scene has said or done within the compass of one day What Aristotle means is that in actual life much happens that is purely accidental having no deeper significance while poetry especially tragic poetry places the extreme possibilities of what can happen to a human being in a most concentrated form before the eyes of the spectators In other words poetry provides within the narrow compass of a play a deep insight into fundamental aspects of what has been called la condition humaine Aristotle called this kind of representation of human life in the concentrated form of dramatic action (or epic narrative) mimesis It may seem strange but it is proved by rather incontestable evidence that a certain school of Hellenistic historians was induced to mix the principles of historiography and dramatic poetry by the very statement with which Aristotle tried to distinguish the two The move-ment so far as we can see was led by Duris of Samos a tyrant of his homeland who had been a disciple of Theophrastus and who in the time left from his governmental duties developed a rather extensive literary activity Duris wrote not only several historical works but also various treatises on poetry especially dramatic poetry In the introduction to one of his historical works he blamed the historians Ephorus and Theopompus because there was no mimesis in their works that is he blamed them because their historical works lacked what Aristotle had considered the essence of poetry in contrast to historiography It looks as if Duris had been irked by Aristotlersquos statement that poetry was more philosophical than historiography and had tried to raise historiography to the highest possible level by making it more poetical That this was actually his intention is shown by the surviving fragments of his historical works many of which show a strong tendency towards dramatization of the events An especially good illustration of his method is provided by a fragment from his history of Samos In this fragment Duris relates a most dramatic incident that is supposed to have occurred in the war between Athens and Aegina at the beginning of the fifth century A whole detachment of Athenians that had made an inroad on the island are captured on their way back and all of them are killed except one man who is sent to Athens in order to tell the story of what has happened to his comrades When he arrives at Athens with the terrible news he is surrounded by the wives mothers and sisters of his dead comrades who ask him angrily where he has left their husbands sons and brothers and why he is the only one who has escaped Then they unfasten the buckles with which their clothes are held together and use the tongues to pierce his eyes and finally kill him This story might be considered factual but Herodotus tells the same story at a different occasion Both authors Herodotus and Duris add that henceforth the Athenians forbade their women to wear buckles or brooches with sharp long tongues so that the incident could not be repeated It appears therefore that Durismdashwho can hardly have failed to know the work of Herodotus but who had no occasion in his histories to tell the story in the connection in which it is told in Herodotusrsquo workmdashused it in order to make his history more dra-matic and thereby in his opinion also more philosophical by giving an example of the extreme situations which can arise in human life As this use of the Aristotelian mimesis shows Duris derived the idea from Aristotle in this form it is not truly Aristotelian but Duris obviously found followers For in the next two generations many historians wrote highly dramatized histories Phylarchus who was about two generations younger than Duris is the most outstanding example (emphasis added)

Cf Proclus Diadochus Commentaries of Proclus on the Timaeus of Plato (London 1829 Vol 1) Translated by Thomas Taylor pp 54-55

The last part however of the words of Socrates being in a certain respect difficult may be rendered perspicuous as follows But the words are ldquothat which is foreign to the education

32

of anyone it is difficult to imitate well in deeds and still more difficult in wordsrdquo For it seems to be easy to imitate words or deeds Not a few therefore act sophistically by exhibiting virtue as far as words but in deeds being entirely alien from it Will it not therefore be better to interpret these words thus vizrdquo To suppose the most excellent education is implied in the words that which is foreign to the education of anyone but to assume in deeds and words as equivalent to conformably to deeds and conformably to words and to imitate well as having the same meaning with to be well imitated And thus we may collect from all these that for that which is most excellent to be well imitated it is difficult indeed according to deeds but it is still more difficult for it to be well imitated according to words in a written work For this is the thing [54-55] proposed to be effected in poetry And you may see how this accords with things themselves For he who in a written work narrates the deeds of the most excellent men composes a history But he who narrates the speeches of these men if he intends to preserve the manners of the speaker assumes a disposition similar to the speaker For words are seen to differ according to the inward dispositions For thus we deride most of those except Plato who have written the Apology of Socrates as not preserving the Socratic manner in their composition Though the narration of this very thing that Socrates was accused made an apology and was sentenced to die would not be thought worthy of laughter but the dissimilitude of imitation in the composition renders the imitators ridiculous Since also to say of Achilles that he came forth armed after such a manner and that he performed such deeds is not difficult but to narrate copiously what he said when detained in the river is not easy But this is the province of one who is able to assume the manners of the hero and to write conformably to what he would have said

sect

33

12 On problems arising from differences in the person

Cf Bryn Mawr Classical Review 96118 Frederick Ahl and Hanna M Roisman The Od-yssey Re-Formed Ithaca Cornell University Press 1996 Pp 341 $1995 ISBN 0-8014-8335-2 (pb) Reviewed by James J OrsquoHara Wesleyan University1

Aristarchus seems to be the source of the idea found in the Homeric scholia and elsewhere that the prosopon the character who is speaking or the persona is the source of many incon-sistencies in Homer Porphyriusrsquo term for this critical maneuver is lysis ek tou prosopou (ldquosolution from the character speakingrdquo) A scholiast on Il 6265 (Aristonicus perhaps drawing on Aristarchus) notes the apparent contradiction between Hecubarsquos claim that wine gives strength and Hectorrsquos idea that wine weakens but explains ldquothe characters (prosopa) who speak are differentrdquo

Porphyrius Quaest Hom p100 4 Schrader used this passage to speak at length on the general principle ldquoIt is no cause for wonder if in Homer contradictory things are said by different voices For whatever things he himself says speaking in his own prosopon must be consistent and not in conflict with one another But whatever he gives to other prosopa to say should be thought to be not his own words but those of the persons speakingrdquo

A scholiast on Il 17588 (again Aristonicus) where Hector calls Menelaus a soft warrior explains the apparent contradiction between this passage and others where Menelaus is shown to be a good fighter ldquothe character who is hostile to Menelaus speaks slanderouslyrdquo

Athenaeus Deipn 5178d faults Plato for saying based on this line that Menelaus is a soft warrior (Symp 174B) saying that ldquoit is not true that if something is said in Homer it is Homer who says itrdquo)

At Od 9107 Odysseus describes the Cyclopes as ldquotrusting in the immortal godsrdquo A scholiast on 106 reconciles this with Polyphemusrsquo statement that ldquothe Cyclopes do not care about aegis-bearing Zeusrdquo (9275) by noting ldquoconsider that the character speaking is the flesh-eating savage Polyphemusrdquo

Cf Jasper Griffin Homer on Life and Death (Oxford 1983 first published 1980) p 166

Only in the tales told by Odysseus do we find monsters and magic and the poet prefers not to vouch for their truth himself as Aristotle pointed out47 and even there the achievements and powers of the hero do not exceed the limits of humanity

47 Aristotle fr 163 R2 King Alcinous pays Odysseus a rather two-edged compliment when he tells him lsquoWe do not think you are a liar like so many deceivers on earthhellip You have told your story like a rhapsodersquo that is like a professional singer Amazons like the Chima-era are also kept by Homer to allusions in speeches made by characters in the poems like the shape-changing of Proteus the petrifaction of Niobe and the weird stories of the daughters of Pandareus

1 (ccatsasupennedubmcr1996961108html [41105])2 Cf Fr 163 R on the birth of Heracles (Il 19108) where Aristotle states that ldquoThe whole thing is fabulous [or mythical to muthodes] for in fact Homer does not say these things of himself [that is in propria per-sona] nor are these things that have taken place (ginomena) he is introducing but he mentions them as being things handed down (diadedoumenon) concerning the birth of Heraclesrdquo (tr D C Feeney rev BAM) See further below

34

Note

According to Griffin Aristotle pointed out that Homer does not vouch for the truth of such things as the monsters and magic in the tales told by Odysseus but one must attribute them to the speaker reducing the consideration of the fabulous to the manner of imitation On this matter cf D C Feeney The Gods in Epic Poets and Critics of the Classical Tra-dition (Oxford 1991 rpt 2000) p 41

On the whole however most writers were happiest when they could exculpate the poet by claiming that he was following tradition thereby taking the softer of Aristotlersquos options On Homerrsquos account of the birth of Heracles for example a scholion says that lsquothe whole thing is mythical for in fact Homer does not say these things on his own initiative nor are these actual events he is introducing but he mentions them as being things handed down con-cerning the birth of Heraclesrsquo (to men ou)=n o(lon muqw=dej kai gar ou)d )a)f )e(autou= tau=ta fhsin (Omhroj ou)de ginomena ei)sagei a)ll )w(j diadedomenwn peri thn (Hrakleouj genesin memnhtai A Il 19 108)151 In such comments the poetrsquos right to follow myths (e(pesqai toi=j muqoij) is regarded as a matter of course and the Latin commentary trad-ition follows suit in deorum ratione fabulae sequendae sunt (lsquoin the system adopted for the gods the myths have to be followedrsquo Serv Aen 1 297)152 At times however a more dir-ectly apologetic tendency is discernible as when the bT-scholia on Il 5 385 say that Homerrsquos following of old traditions absolves him from blasphemy since he is not inno-vating a similar tack is found in Serviusrsquo urge to find some precedent for apparent inno-vations in Vergil153

151 Cf A 20 40 T 20 147 PEQ Od 6 42 see Kroll (1924) 60 Even the language of diadedomenwn mu=qoi goes back to Aristotle (Poet 1451 b 24) Hintenlang (1961) 44-51152 Serviusrsquo standard phrase is opinionem sequitur Aen 1 15 3 110 5 527 The adaptation of the Greek critical term was current in Horacersquos day famam sequere Ars 119153 Aen 3 46 9 81 contrast his comment on 6 617 that poets frequently vary myths

Supplement Fr 163 R (tr D Feeney rev BAM)

to men ou)=n o(lon muqw=dej kai gar ou)d )a)f )e(autou= tau=ta fhsin (Omhroj ou)de ginomena ei)sagei a)ll )w(j diadedomenwn peri thn (Hrakleouj genesin memnhtai

But the whole thing is fabulous for in fact Homer does not say these things of himself [that is in propria persona] nor are these things that have taken place he is introducing but he men-tions them as being things handed down concerning the birth of Heracles

Aristotlersquos division in sum

Pertaining to the manner of imitating

things the poet says aph eautou lsquoof himselfrsquo or in propria persona the veracity of which we may suppose himself to vouch for

Pertaining to the object imitated

things that have taken place (ginomena) things handed down being the matter of lsquotraditionrsquo (diadedomenon)

35

Aristotle here implies that the poet employing traditional subject matter1 is not to be per-sonally identified with that matter Presumably such things are to be understood as coming under the rationale Aristotle determines about at Poetics ch 25 (1460b35mdash1461a1) (tr BAM) ldquoIf however in neither way2 [it may be replied] ldquobut so they sayrdquo such as the things [they say] about the gods for perhaps it is not better nor true to say [things are so] but is just as it happens as in the view of Xenophanes 3 lsquobut at any rate they say [they are so]rsquordquo So to take an example Herodotus tells us that with respect to the gods the poets Hesiod and Homer taught the Greeks their origin their duration their descent their names their offices their activities and their outward forms or appearances (The Histories 2531-3) ldquoAndrdquo adds Aristotle (Pol I 2 1252b 24-27 tr BAM) ldquohellipas men liken the form of the gods to themselves so also do they liken the godrsquos ways of liferdquo For as Xeno-phanes tells us ldquohellipmortals consider that the gods are born and that they have clothes and speech and bodies like their ownrdquo4 Accordingly he says ldquoThe gods of Ethiopia are black their noses flat In Thrace their hair is red and eyes are bluerdquo5 To sum up the poetrsquos use of mythologems like the divine descent of Heracles may be justified by an appeal to the things men saymdashthat is to what is merely a matter of tradition to which the many give beliefmdashbut such things are referred in the first place to the manner in which the poet speaks in such cases he is speaking not of himself but as a storyteller Now it would appear that many such marvels have their ultimate source in the storytellerrsquos desire when recounting a deed to gratify his hearers this statement implying that while the deed itself is not wonderful (presumably because it is something which has actually happened) what is added is But what is it precisely that is added to some (presumably historical) deed in order to arouse wonder On this matter let us consider the following evidence

1 On traditional material as a source of the plots of tragedy cf Poet 9 (1451b 24-25) (tr BAM)

Wherefore one must not seek to adhere entirely to the traditional fables [or lsquoto the fables that have been handed downrsquo paradedomenon muthon] which are the concern [25] of tragedies For it is ridic-ulous to seek this out since such known names are known to few yet they give pleasure to everyone

2 That is to say if the poet is censured that his imitation is neither true nor better it may be replied that men say such things ie ldquoso the story goesrdquo or ldquothus runs the talerdquo3 According to Xenophanes (Fr 186 Raven and Kirk) with respect to the gods ldquohellipshould one chance to say what is true for the most part he could not know it to be the truth But all is mere guessworkrdquo (tr BAM) Compare also Plato Crat 425c (tr B Jowett) ldquohellipas I said before about the gods that of the truth about them we know nothing and do but entertain human notions about themrdquo Such being the case we cannot dis-miss out of hand the things men say in such matters but owe rather to tradition a respectful hearing Cf Pau-sanias Description of Greece with an English Translation by WHS Jones LittD in 4 Volumes Volume 1 Attica and Corinth (Cambridge amp London 1918) 883

When I began to write my history I was inclined to count these legends as foolishness but on getting as far as Arcadia I grew to hold a more thoughtful view of them which is this In the days of old those Greeks who were considered wise spoke their sayings not straight out but in riddles and so the legends about Cronus I conjectured to be one sort of Greek wisdom In matters of divinity therefore I shall adopt the received tradition

4It follows that while the mythical or fabulous is taken by certain men as incrediblemdashthat is as unworthy of beliefmdashfor many others they are not One must consider here the mythical character of the believed religionmdashthat is insofar as it consists in the sort of story with its allied cultic ritual lying at the origin of religion I mean here that arising from manrsquos most direct experience of the mysteries of life and the wonders of nature a sort which I discuss at length elsewhere in relation to superstition and idolatry Cf G S Kirk and J E Raven The Presocratic Philosophers (Cambridge 1957) n 167 p 1695 Translation from David Mulroy ed Early Greek Lyric Poetry (Ann Arbor 1992) p 123

36

13 On what is added to a story in order to gratify onersquos hearers

On the narration of things happening unexpectedly but because of each other cf Aristotle Rhet I 11(1371a 31-33) (tr BAM)

And since learning [manthanein] and wondering [thaumazein] are pleasing such things as works of imitation must also be pleasing for instance the arts of painting and sculpture and the poetic art and everything well imitated even if what is imitated itself is not pleasing for it is not such a thing that causes pleasure but there is a syllogizing [sc drawing inferences] that this is that and thus it happens that one learns something And reversals [ie sudden turns of fortune] and hairrsquos-breadth escapes from danger [are pleasing] for all such things are to be wondered at [thaumasta] (emphasis added)

For the rationale of the unfamiliar or remote cf idem III 2 (1404b 9-10) (tr BAM)

For the way in which men ltfeelgt in regard to strangers and fellow-citizens so also do they feel in regard to language And so one should make his language strange [or lsquounfamiliarrsquo zenon] for men wonder at things remote but the wonderful [to thaumaston] is pleasing (emphasis added)

For the rationale at issue now cf Aristotle Poetics ch 24 (1460a 17-18) (tr BAM)

But the wonderful [to thaumaston] is pleasing Its sign is that all men recount a deed by adding to it [prostithentes] it in order to gratify [charizomenoi sc their hearers]

Cf Origen Contra Celsum ANF Vol 4 (Buffalo 1886) (tr Frederick Crombie) I 42

Before we begin our reply we have to remark that the endeavour to show with regard to almost any history however true that it actually occurred and to produce an intelligent conception regarding it is one of the most difficult undertakings that can be attempted and is in some instances an impossibility For suppose that someone were to assert that there never had been any Trojan war chiefly on account of the impossible narrative inter-woven therewith about a certain Achilles being the son of a sea-goddess Thetis and of a man Peleus or Sarpedon being the son of Zeus or Ascalaphus and Ialmenus the sons of Ares or Aeneas that of Aphrodite how should we prove that such was the case especially under the weight of the fiction attached I know not how to the universally prevalent opin-ion that there was really a war in Ilium between Greeks and Trojans And suppose also that someone disbelieved the story of Oedipus and Jocasta and of their two sons Eteocles and Polynices because the sphinx a kind of half-virgin was introduced into the narrative how should we demonstrate the reality of such a thing And in like manner also with the history of the Epigoni1 although there is no such marvellous event interwoven with it or with the return of the Heracleidae2 or countless other historical events

1 That is a recounting of the expedition of the sons of the seven against Thebes and the sack of Troy2 Cf Mosaics of Grecian History by Marcius Willson and Robert Pierpont Willson (New York 1883) p 127

About twenty years after the Thessalian conquest the Dorians who had frequently changed their homes and had finally settled in a mountainous region on the south of Thessaly commenced a migra-tion to the Peloponnesus accompanied by portions of other tribes and led as was asserted by de-scendants of Hercules who had been deprived of their dominions in the latter country and who had hitherto made several unsuccessful attempts to recover them This important event in Grecian history is therefore called the ldquoReturn of the Heraclidaeligrdquo

37

But he who deals candidly with histories and would wish to keep himself also from being imposed upon by them will exercise his judgment as to what statements he will give his assent to and what he will accept figuratively seeking to discover the meaning of the authors of such inventions and from what statements he will withhold his belief as having been written for the gratification of certain individuals1 And we have said this by way of anticipation respecting the whole history related in the Gospels concerning Jesus not as inviting men of acuteness to a simple and unreasoning faith but wishing to show that there is need of candour in those who are to read and of much investigation and so to speak of insight into the meaning of the writers that the object with which each event has been recorded may be discovered (emphasis added)

For an additional rendering cf Origen Contra Celsus I 42 (tr Robert Lamberton)

He who approaches the stories generously and wishes to avoid being mislead in read-ing them will decide which parts he will believe and which he will interpret allegor-ically searching out the intentions of the authors of such fictions [to boulemeuna ereunon ton anaplasamenon] and which he will refuse to believe and will consider sim-ply as things written to please someone [pros tinas charin anangegrammenois] And hav-ing said this we have been speaking in anticipation about the whole story of Jesus in the Gospels We do not urge the intelligent in the direction of simple and irrational faith but wish to advise them that those who are going to read this story need to be generous in their approach and will require a great deal of insight and if I may call it that power of pene-tration into the meaning of the Scriptures in order that the intention with which each passage was written may be discovered (emphasis added)

Note the division Origen makes

what is to be believed ie history what is to be interpreted allegorically or figuratively ie lsquoenigmaticrsquo myth what is not to be believed but has been written in order to gratify someone ie to

muthodes (the fabulous or mythical) comprising an impossible narrative as with epic poems recounting the divine parentage of heroes like Achilles and Aeneas and the Sphinx in the tale of Oedipus (= what is impossible as well as unbelievable to some but nevertheless taken on faith by the many)

As noted above such things come under the rationale of what is impossible but rendered likely being admitted by the hearer inasmuch as it makes a good story (as if one were to say ldquothus runs the talersquo etc sc ldquothings men say such as about the godsrdquo Poet 25 1460b 35-61a 1) In my view lsquomythrsquo properly so called embraces the last two members of this division the first member being history the second member what I have called lsquoenigmaticrsquo myth that is the symbolic representation of the wonders of nature (= ldquoan untrue story illustrating a truthrdquo ie what CS Lewis calls lsquosacramentalismrsquo for which see below) the third member being to muthodes the fanciful embellishment characteristic of popular myth fable and legend

1 Cp David Hume Of Tragedy (1757)

We find that common liars always magnify in their narrations all kinds of danger pain distress sickness deaths murders and cruelties as well as joy beauty mirth and magnificence It is an ab-surd secret which they have for pleasing their company fixing their attention and attaching them to such marvellous relations by the passions and emotions which they excite

38

14 Supplement On the practice of Homer as representative of the poetrsquos desire to gratify his hearers cf Strabo Geogr 129 (tr Horace Leonard Jones) pp 71-72

9 Now inasmuch as Homer referred his myths to the province of education he was wont to pay considerable attention to the truth ldquoAnd he mingled thereinrdquo [Il 8 14 ] a false element also giving his sanction to the truth but using the false to win the favour of the populace and to out-general the masses [71-72] ldquoAnd as when some skilful man overlays gold upon silverrdquo [Od 6 232] just so was Homer wont to add a mythical element [prosetithai muthon] to actual occurrences [alethesi peripiteias = lsquoreally occurring reversalsrsquo or lsquodramatic turns of events which have happenedrsquo] thus giving flavour and adornment to his style [hedonon kai kosmon ten phasin lit lsquogiving pleasure and ornamentation to what is saidrsquo] but he has the same end in view as the historian or the person who narrates facts So for instance he took the Trojan war an historical fact [gegonota] and decked it out with his myths [ekosmese tais muthopoiias = lsquoadorned it with story-tellingrsquo or lsquomyth-makingrsquo] and he did the same in the case of the wan-derings of Odysseus but to hang an empty story of marvels [kenon teratologian] on something wholly untrue is not Homerrsquos way of doing things For it occurs to us at once doubtless that a man will lie [pseudoito] more plausibly [pithanoteron] if he will mix in some actual truth [alethinon] just as Polybius says when he is discussing the wanderings of Odysseus This is what Homer himself means when he says of Odysseus ldquoSo he told many lies in the likeness of truthrdquo for Homer does not say ldquoallrdquo but ldquomanyrdquo lies since otherwise they would not have been ldquoin the likeness of truthrdquo Accordingly he took the foundations of his stories from history (emphasis added)

Cf Strabo Geogr 129 (In Roos Meijering Literary and Rhetorical Theories in Greek Scholia (Groningen 1987)

It was because Homer regarded his fables as educative that he thought so much of the truth while also lsquoplacing thereinrsquo some falsehoods The truth he himself accepted the false he used to manage and command the multitude lsquoLike a man that covers silver with goldrsquo Homer added fable to real events embellishing and adorning his style but looking to the same end as the historian or the dealer in facts Thus he added fabulous elements to the real event of the Trojan war and so also with Odysseusrsquo wanderings (emphasis added)

Cf Strabo Geogr 1215 (apud Polybius The Histories LCL Harvard 1917)

Having thus prepared his way he does not allow us to treat Aeolus and the whole of the wanderings of Ulysses as mythical but he says that while some mythical elements have been added as in the case of the Trojan war the main statements about Sicily correspond to those of the other writers who treat of the local history of Italy and Sicily Neither does he applaud the dictum of Eratosthenes that we may find out where Ulysses travelled when we find the cobbler who sewed the bag of the winds (emphasis added)

Cf Eustathius of Thessalonica Commentary on the Iliad from the preface (tr David Jenkins David Bachrach and Darin Hayton copy University of Notre Dame 2002)1

However since this work is full of myths there is the risk of wondering whether he runs afoul First of all these Homeric myths are not intended to be humorous They are instead the phantoms or veils of noble thoughts Some are molded by him to fit his subject matter while others naturally allegorize his themes

1 (httpwwwbyzantinendeduEustathioshtml [6603])

39

Finally many of these myths that were composed by the ancients and drawn aptly into his poetry are not allegories specifically related to the Trojans at all but rather are used as those who first composed them intended But a man so prolific in wisdom did not delight in myths alone For if wisdom is truthful observation then the wise man observes truthfully How can we say that Homer did not do the same He performed his art by bringing together many elements and mingling them together in his work Thus he first entices and charms by surface appearance then captures in this net so they say those who shrink from the subtlety of philosophy Then having given them a taste of the sweetness in truth he sends them off to proceed as wise men to hunt after truth in other places Moreover he becomes the model for creating credible myths in order that he might lead those eager to learn in this technique just as he does in all the others But it is especially remarkable that although his work is full of myths he is not shunned but loved Even those who allege to hate him do not in fact shrink from having contact with him (emphasis added)

Cf also [Plutarch] Essay on the Life and Poetry of Homer n 92 tr Keaney amp Lamberton rev BAM)

Indeed if we should find that Homer provides the beginnings and seeds of all of these [arts and sciences] how then would he not deserve the greatest admiration And if he reveals these ideas through enigmatic and mythic language [ainigmaton kai muthikon logon] this should not be unexpected for the reason is the nature of poetry and the custom of the ancients They did this so that lovers of learning delighted by a certain elegance [eumousias psuchagogoumenoi] might more easily seek and find the truth [rhaon zetosi te kai euriskosi ten aletheian] while the ignorant would not scorn what they could not understand That which is signified through hidden meanings [di huponoias semainomenon] may be attractive where that which is said explicitly is of little value (emphasis added)

On the practice of the preceding generations cf Plutarch ldquoThe Oracles at Delphirdquo 406 (Plutarchrsquos Moralia LCL vol 5) (tr F C Babbitt) pp 327-330

There was then a time when men used as the coinage of speech verses and tunes and songs and reduced to poetic and musical form [C] all history and philosophy and in a word every experience and action that required a more impressive utterance lthellipgt But as life took on a change along with the change in menrsquos fortunes and their natures when usage banished the unusual and did away with the golden topknotsc and dressing [in] soft robes and on oc-casion cut off the stately long hair and caused the buskin to be no longer worn men accus-tomed themselves (nor was it a bad thing) to oppose expensive outlay by adorning them-selves with economy [E] and to rate as decorative the plain and [327-328] simple rather than the ornate and elaborate So as language also underwent a change and put off its finery history descended from its vehicle of versification and went on foot in prose whereby the truth was mostly shifted from the fabulous [tou muthodous] Philosophy welcomed clearness and teachability in preference to creating amazement [ekpletton] and pursued its investiga-tions through the medium of everyday language [logon epoieito zetesin] The god put an end to having his prophetic priestess call her own citizens lsquofire-blazersrsquo the Spartans lsquosnake-devourersrsquo men lsquomountain-roamersrsquo and rivers lsquomountain-engorgersrsquo When he had taken away from the oracles epic versification strange words circumlocutions and vagueness [epe kai glottas kai periphraseis kai asapheian] he had thus made them ready to talk to his consultants as the laws talk to States or as kings meet with common people or as pupils listen to teachers since he adapted the language to what was intelligible and convincing

c Cf Thucydides i 6

25 ldquoMen ought to understand thoroughly as Sophoclesa says that the god is

40

For wise men author of dark edicts ayeFor dull men a poor teacher if concise

a Cf Nauck Trag Graec Frag p 298 Sophocles no 704 (no 771 Pearson)

The introduction of clearness was attended also by a revolution of belief which underwent a change along with everything else And this was the result in days of old what was not familiar or common [me sunethes mede koinon] but was expressed altogether indirectly and through circumlocution the mass of people imputed to an assumed manifestation of divine power and held it in awe and reverence [ekplettesthai kai sebesthai] but in later times being well satisfied to apprehend all these various things clearly and easily without the attendant grandiloquence and artifi- [329-330] ality they blamed the poetic language with which the oracles were clothed not only for obstructing the understanding of these in their true meaning and for combining vagueness and obscurity [B] with the communication but already they were coming to look with suspicion upon metaphors riddles ambiguous statements [tas metaphoras kai ta enigmata kai tas amphibolias] feeling that these were secluded nooks of refuge devised for furtive withdrawal and retreat for him that should err in his prophecy Moreover there was the oft-repeated tale that certain men with a gift for poetry were wont to sit about close by the shrine waiting to catch the words spoken and then weaving about them a fabric of extempore hexameters or other verses or rhythms as lsquocontainersrsquo so to speak for the oracles I forbear to mention how much blame men like Onomacritus Prodicus and Cinaethon have brought upon themselves from the oracles by foisting upon them a tragic diction and a grandiloquence [hos tragoidean autois kai ongkon] of which they had no need nor have I any kindly feeling toward their changes

Cf Julian the Apostate The Works of the Emperor Julian With an English Translation by Wilmer Cave Wright PhD In Three Volumes Oration VII To the Cynic Heracleios pp 75-77

Now one could no more discover where myth was originally invented and who was the first to compose fiction in a plausible manner for the benefit or entertainment of his hearers than if one were to try to find out who was the first man that sneezed or the first horse that neighed But as cavalry arose in Thrace and Thessaly l and archers and the lighter [75 76] sort of weapons in India Crete and Caria since the customs of the people were I suppose adapted to the nature of the country just so we may assume about other things as well that where anything is highly prized by a nation it was first discovered by that nation rather than by any other On this assumption then it seems likely that myth was originally the invention of men given to pastoral pursuits and from that day to this the making of myths is still peculiarly cultivated by them just as they first invented instruments of music the flute and the lyre for their pleasure and entertainment For just as it is the nature of birds to fly and of fish to swim and of stags to run and hence they need not be taught to do so and even if one bind or imprison these animals they try none the less to use those special parts of themselves for the purpose for which they know they are naturally adapted even so I think the human race whose soul is no other than reason and knowledge imprisoned so to speak in the bodymdashthe philosophers call it a potentialitymdasheven so I say the human race inclines to learning research and study as of all tasks most congenial to it And when a kindly god without delay looses a manrsquos fetters and brings that potentiality into activity then on the instant knowledge is his whereas in those who are still imprisoned false opinion instead of true is implanted just as I think Ixion is said to have embraced a sort of cloud instead of the goddess1 And hence they produce wind-eggs2 and monstrous

1 ie Hera cf Pindar Pythian 2 20 foll Dio Chrysostom 4 130 Arnim 2 Cf Plato Theaetetus 151 E [76-77]

41

births mere phantoms and shadows so to speak of true science And thus instead of genuine science they profess false doctrines and are very zealous in learning and teaching such doctrines as though forsooth they were something useful and admirable But if I am bound to say something in defence of those who originally invented myths I think they wrote them for childish souls and I liken them to nurses who hang leathern toys to the hands of children when they are irritated by teething in order to ease their suffering so those mythologists wrote for the feeble soul whose wings are just beginning to sprout and who though still incapable of being taught the truth is yearning for further knowledge and they poured in a stream of myths like men who water a thirsty field so as to soothe their irritation and pangs1

1 The whole passage echoes Plato Phaedrus 251 (emphasis added)

Cf Madeline Clark ldquoEmperor Julian and Neoplatonismrdquo1

Quoting Julianrsquos own words in admirable translation shows us the clarity and precision of his thinking Reading his discourses and letters at length deepens this impression In his oration ldquoTo the Cynic Heracleiosrdquo he develops the subject of myth and shows that myth is most properly used in presenting recondite teaching (the Mysteries)

For nature loves to hide her secrets and she does not suffer the hidden truth about the essential nature of the gods to be flung in naked words to the ears of the profanehellip Through riddles and the dramatic setting of myths that knowledge is insinuated into the ears of the multitude who cannot receive divine truths in their purest form The more paradoxical and prodigious the riddle is the more it seems to warn usto study diligently the hidden truth (emphasis added)

Cf A Pert ldquoRevealing Christianityrdquo Plutarch

Plutarch of Chaerona (c45 - c125AD) was a philosopher scholar essayist and also a priest of Apollo at Delphi (Fideler p 385) His On Isis and Osiris tells the story of how Isis saved Osiris and discusses other issues of Egyptian religion It is the only work surviving from antiquity to present the true meaning of aspects of Egyptian mythology Plutarch says that the priests of Egypt had a ldquophilosophy that is hidden for the most part in myths and stories which show dim reflections and insights of the truthrdquo (ch 9) Sphinxes are placed before shrines ldquointimating that their teaching about the gods holds a mysterious wisdomrdquo (Ibid) The ldquowisest of the Greeksrdquo Solon Thales Plato Eudoxus Pythagoras and Lycurgus went to Egypt to be instructed by the priests (Ibid ch 10) Plutarch is well aware of the allegorical content of Egyptian myths ldquoThus whenever you hear the myths told by the Egyptians about the gods those for instance which tell of their wanderings mutilations and many other such tales you should remember what was said above and not think that any of these things is said to have actually happened so or to have been enacted so for they do not call Hermes lsquothe Dogrsquo in a literal sense but inasmuch as the animal discriminates friend and foe by recognition and non-recognition as Plato says (Resp 375E sqq) they associate its qualities of guardianship vigilance and sagacity with the most discerning of gods Nor do they believe that the Sun-god arises from a lotus-flower as a newborn babe but thus they represent sunrise symbolizing the rekindling of the sun from amid moisturehellip

1 (wwwtheosophy-nworgtheosnwworldmedme-mclkhtm [112507) [(From Sunrise magazine OctoberNovember 1996 Dec 96Jan 97 Copyright copy 1997 by Theosophical University Press)]

42

If you hear the matters pertaining to the gods in this way receiving the myth from those who interpret it reverently and philosophically and if you perform and observe constantly the accepted rites considering that nothing is more pleasing to the gods whether sacrifice or ritual enactment than the true belief about them thus you will avoid superstition which is no less an evil than atheism (Ibid ch11)

Plutarch makes his attitude to the myths quite clear ldquoWe must not treat the myths as wholly factual accounts but take what is fitting in each episode according to the principle of likeness (to truth)rdquo (Ibid ch 58) ldquoJust as the scientists tell us that the rainbow is an image of the sun made brilliant by the reflection of its appearance into a cloud so the present myth is the image of a reality which turns the mind back to other thoughtsrdquo ( Ibid ch 20) To take the myths literally is to hold ldquoextreme and barbarous views about the godsrdquo (Ibid) Plutarch tells us that ldquoThe dismemberment of Osiris into fourteen parts is interpreted in relation to the days in which the planet [the moon] wanes after the full moon until a new moon occurs (Ibid ch 42) Plutarch understands and supports genuine myths about the gods He is opposed to ldquothe flimsy stories and hollow figments such as poets and prose writers weave and spread out before us like spiders creating from themselves as first principles which are quite un-foundedrdquo (Ibid ch 20) In How to Study Poetry Plutarch criticises those poets who stray from the path of genuine myth by creating their own ldquofable and falsehoodrdquo (How to Study Poetry 17) Like Plato Plutarch does not want the young to be corrupted by cryptic or misleading poetry In The Oracles at Delphi Plutarch tells about a change in attitude to myths In the ancient days ldquoowing to this aptitude for poetic composition most men through lyre and song admonished spoke out frankly or exhorted they attained their ends by the use of myths and proverbs and besides composed hymns prayers and paeans in honour of the gods in verse and musicrdquo (The Oracles at Delphi 406) ldquoBut as life took on a change in menrsquos fortunes and their naturesrdquo (Ibid) there grew a desire for clearness and the use of everyday language

However the thing that most filled the poetic art with disrepute was the tribe of wandering soothsayers and rogues that practised their charlatanry about the shrines of the Great Mother and of Serapis making up oracles some using their own ingenuity others taking by lot from certain treatises oracles for the benefit of servants and womenfolk who are most enticed by verse and a poetic vocabulary This then is not the least among the reasons why poetry by apparently lending herself to the service of tricksters mountebanks and false prophets lost all standing with the truth and the tripod (Ibid)

Understanding a need for clearness in his own day Plutarch says ldquoFor my part I am well content with the settled conditions prevailing at presentrdquo (Ibid 408) But Plutarch does not criticise the validity of allegories and metaphors as such only those people who mis-understand them These people are like children who ldquotake more delight and satisfaction in seeing rainbows haloes and comets than in seeing moon and sun and so these persons yearn for the riddles allegories and metaphors which are but reflections of the prophetic art when it acts upon a human imaginationrdquo (Ibid 409) These people miss the truth because they are dazzled by the surface of the allegories and donrsquot get behind them to grasp the real meaning Plutarch was aware that some people misunderstood the nature of the gods He says that some Greeks think that statues and paintings of gods are the gods themselves not knowing that they are images of the gods (On Isis ch 71) Similarly some Egyptians treat certain animals as gods not understanding their symbolic significance (Ibid) As he says ldquonor should we honour these animals but rather the divine through them as being very clear mirrors which nature provides for these animals should be regarded as the instrument or art of the God who orders everythingrdquo (Ibid ch 76) Plutarch also takes pains to point out that

43

ldquoone should take the greatest heed and care not unconsciously to reduce and resolve the divine to terms of winds fluxes sowings ploughings terrestial occurrences and seasonal changes like those who explain Dionysus as wine and Hephaestus as flamerdquo (Ibid ch 66) As far as Plutarch is concerned people who call natural objects and phenomena gods are ldquospreading dreadful and atheistic teachingshellip For it is impossible to believe that these things are themselves godsrdquo(Ibid) (emphasis added)

Cf Philip Mayerson Classical Mythology in Literature Art and Music (Waltham Mass 1971) pp 17-18

Up to this point the words ldquomythrdquo and ldquolegendrdquo have been used rather loosely to describe those traditional narratives that have come down to us through Greek and Roman sources This comes about because scholars even within the same discipline find it difficult to come to a common understanding on the definition of terms and the means of classifying the overwhelming variety of tales that are subsumed under the name of ldquomythologyrdquo There is however increasing acceptance of a broad and convenient division of these stories into myth (sometimes called myth proper) legend or saga and folktale But it must be recognized from the start that more often than not no clear line of demarcation exists between these divisions it is quite possible for one story to contain elements common to two or all three of these narrative forms Myths are stories of events usually believed to have taken place in the distant past that embody the traditions of a people concerning the universe and their religious beliefs Myths deal with the actions of the gods their rituals their relationships to one another to heroes and to the existence of natural phenomena Gods or demigods are the main characters of these narratives Myths should be understood not as amusing tales of an ill-informed people but as a mode of perception by which man at a certain stage in his development made order out of chaos made sense out of the manifold diversity existing in the world ldquoIt is the object of myth as of sciencerdquo states Professor Pierre Grimal ldquoto explain the world to make its phenomena intelligiblerdquo Sir G L Gomme makes a similar observation when he says that myth explains matters in ldquothe science of a pre-scientific agerdquo Mythrsquos most characteristic function then is explan-atory or ldquoaetiologicalrdquo (cf Callimachusrsquo Aetia) how the universe was created how man was brought into being why a certain animal is the way it is (for instance they myth of Arachne and the characteristics of the spider) how certain natural phenomena came into existence (such as the Pillars of Hercules) or how rituals began (for example Prometheusrsquo deception of Zeus to explain why certain parts of animals and not others are sacrificed to the gods of heaven) Legends or sagasmdashthe Scandinavian word ldquosagardquo is often used since ldquolegendrdquo has also acquired the very general meaning of story or narrativemdashare those tales which contain an element no matter how minimal and tenuous of historical fact Unlike myths the main characters of these narratives are human the events described (a famous raid a great migration a dangerous hunt) have a basis in fact But as the story passes from generation to generation from singer to singer and is ultimately put into writing the original version has been so elaborated and so modified that it bears little resemblance to the actual event A good illustration of the legendary narrative is Homerrsquos Iliad It has its setting in a very real war of the Late Bronze Age the Trojan War but the causes of the war the intervention of the gods in its conduct and the military strategy described by Homer have no bearing on the historical facts of the war Strabo (64 BC-c 21 AD) a geographer and historian during the reign of Augustus appositely remarks ldquoHomer took the Trojan War a historical fact and decked it out with his fanciful storiesrdquo (emphasis added)

44

Cf Gerard Nadaff ldquoAllegory and the Origins and Development of Philosophy From the Presocratics to the Enlightenmentrdquo Canadian Philosophical Association Presidential Ad-dress delivered at York University May 29 20061

Did Homer and Hesiod themselves believe in these oral traditional accounts Given that the Greeks of subsequent generations did not doubt the authenticity of the Trojan War there is little doubt that this was also the case for Homer and Hesiod But did they believe that the godsgoddess actually intervened in human events in the ways described Did they believe that the heroes were in part of divine origin Did they believe that the gods actually were anthropomorphic and once born behaved toward one another in reprehensible ways It was in fact these lsquononhistoricalrsquo embellishments that were later to be associated first and foremost with muthoi that is lsquomythsrsquo lthellipgt

It is however difficult to know whether Anaximander Anaximenes Xenophanes or Heraclitus believed that the gods of traditional religion were fictions pure and simple or whether they thought that there was an element of truth to the myths that Homer and Hesiod related about the gods just as they thought it was true that the Trojan War had indeed occurred (emphasis added)

sect

1 (httpwwwacpcpacapublicationspresidential-addresses2006-in-english [21307])

45

15 Supplement On the Odyssey in this regard

Cf Homer The Odyssey Translated by S H Butcher and A Lang With Introduction and Notes New York Collier [1909] The Harvard classics v 22

Introduction Composition and Plot of the Odyssey

The Odyssey is generally supposed to be somewhat the later in date of the two most ancient Greek poems which are concerned with the events and consequences of the Trojan war As to the actual history of that war it may be said that nothing is known We may conjecture that some contest between peoples of more or less kindred stocks who occupied the isles and the eastern and western shores of the Aegean left a strong impression on the popular fancy Round the memories of this contest would gather many older legends myths and stories not peculiarly Greek or even lsquoAryanrsquo which previously floated unattached or were connected with heroes whose fame was swallowed up by that of a newer generation It would be the work of minstrels priests and poets as the national spirit grew conscious of itself to shape all these materials into a definite body of tradition This is the rule of developmentmdashfirst scattered stories then the union of these into a NATIONAL legend The growth of later national legends which we are able to trace historically has generally come about in this fashion To take the best known example we are able to compare the real history of Charlemagne with the old epic poems on his life and exploits In these poems we find that facts are strangely exaggerated and distorted that purely fanciful additions are made to the true records that the more striking events of earlier history are crowded into the legend of Charles that mere fairy tales current among African as well as European peoples are transmuted into false history and that the anonymous characters of fairy tales are converted into historical personages We can also watch the process by which feigned genealogies were constructed which connected the princely houses of France with the imaginary heroes of the epics1 The conclusion is that the poetical history of Charlemagne has only the faintest relations to the true history And we are justified in supposing that quite as little of the real history of events can be extracted from the tale of Troy as from the Chansons de Geste

By the time the Odyssey was composed it is certain that a poet had before him a well-arranged mass of legends and traditions from which he might select his materials The author of the Iliad has an extremely full and curiously consistent knowledge of the local traditions of Greece the memories which were cherished by Thebans Pylians people of Mycenae of Argos and so on The Iliad and the Odyssey assume this knowledge in the hearers of the poems and take for granted some acquaintance with other legends as with the story of the Argonautic Expedition Now that story itself is a tissue of popular talesmdashstill current in many distant landsmdashbut all woven by the Greek genius into the history of Iason The history of the return of Odysseus as told in the Odyssey is in the same way a tissue of old maumlrchen2 These must have existed for an unknown length of time before they

1 Note that it is this practice which Greek historians like Herodotus Ephoros and Thucydides had foremost in their minds a concern coincident with Aristotlersquos and Origenrsquos examples of the divine descent of heroes it being just such components of supposedly ldquofact-basedrdquo accounts (as with the Trojan War in the Iliad) that raised red flags among sophisticated readers2 Cf Andrew Lang Introduction to Cinderella Three Hundred and Forty-five Variants by Marian Roalfe Cox (London 1893) p xvi ldquoOur Odyssey is notoriously a tissue of maumlrchenrdquo But it must be recognized that the series of episodes properly so calledmdashnamely the ldquoGreat Wanderingsrdquomdashdoes not constitute the essence of the poem but only a part cf Stith Thompson The Folktale p 3 ldquoOdysseus entertains the court of Alcinous with the marvels of his adventuresrdquo One must consider here Aristotlersquos statement of the poemrsquos plot in universal form (Poet 17 1455b 16-23)

46

gravitated into the cycle of the tale of Troy The extraordinary artistic skill with which legends and myths originally unconnected with each other are woven into the plot of the Odyssey so that the marvels of savage and barbaric fancy become indispensable parts of an artistic whole is one of the chief proofs of the unity of authorship of that poem (emphasis added)

sect

NB On all these matters see my paper ldquoOn the Four Things Producing an Effect of Wonder According to Aristotlerdquo (Papers In Poetics 2)

sect

For the story of the Odyssey is not long a certain man having wandered for many years and per-secuted by a god and alone but in the possessions of his household [standing] thus that his goods are consumed by suitors and his son made to suffer plots but he arrives storm-tossed and making himself known to some and attacking others [ie the suitors] is himself saved but destroys his enemies

In this outline the words lsquoa certain man having wandered for many yearshelliprsquo contain merely potentially the ldquotissue of maumlrchenrdquo comprising the folktale elements

47

16 Supplement On the poetic treatment of traditional matter

Cf Johann Wolfgang Von Goethe Conversations of Goethe with Johann Peter Ecker-mann Translated by John Oxenford edited by J K Moorhead introduction by Havelock Ellis (New York 1998 orig ed London 1930) p 215

[1827] Wed Jan 31

ldquoHere againrdquo continued Goethe ldquothe Greeks were so great that they regarded fidelity to historic facts less than the treatment of them by the poet We have fortunately a fine example in the Philoctetes which subject has been treated by all three of the great trage-dians and lastly and best by Sophocles This poetrsquos excellent play has fortunately come down to us entire while of the Philoctetes of Aeschylus and Euripides only fragments have been found although sufficient to show how they have managed the subject If time per-mitted I would restore these pieces as I did the Phaeton of Euripides it would be to me no unpleasant or useless task ldquoIn this subject the problem was very simple namely to bring Philoctetes with his bow from the island of Lemnos But the manner of doing this was the business of the poet and here each could show the power of his invention and one could excel another Ulysses must fetch him but shall he be known by Philoctetes or not and if not how shall he be dis-guised Shall Ulysses go alone or shall he have companions and who shall they be In Aeschylus there is no companion in Euripides it is Diomed in Sophocles the son of Achilles Then in what situation is Philoctetes to be found Shall the island be inhabited or not And so with a hundred other things which are all at the discretion of the poet and in the selection or omission of which one may show his superiority in wisdom to another Here is the grand point and our present poets should do like the ancients They should not be al-ways asking whether a subject has been used before and look to south and north for un-heard-of adventures which are often barbarous enough and merely to make an impression as incidents But to make something of a simple subject by a masterly treatment requires intellect and great talent and these we do not findrdquo

Cf Fritz Graf Greek Mythology An Introduction Thomas Marier trans (Baltimore Re-print edition 1996 1st ed 1987) p 2

A myth is a particular kind of story It does not coincide with a particular text or literary genre For example in all three major genres of Greek poetry the story of Agamemnonrsquos murder and of Orestesrsquo subsequent revenge is told in epic (at the beginning of the Odyssey) in choral lyric (eg in Stesichorusrsquo Oresteia) and in the work of all three tragedians A myth is not a specific poetic text It transcends the text it is the subject matter a plot fixed in broad outline and with characters no less fixed which the individual poet is free to alter only within limits Whereas a single variant a single poetic work has an author a myth does not Myths are transmitted from one generation to another without anyone knowing who created them this is what is meant by traditional

sect

On Plot Construction and the Portrayal of Character Poetics Chapter 15 and Associated Texts (Papers In Poetics 3)

(c) 2013 Bart A Mazzetti All Rights Reserved

48

See also

On the Four Things Producing an Effect of Wonder According to Aristotle (Papers In Poetics 2)

On the Dialogue Form

Excursus on Myth A Series of Notes

49

Now these habits are vices but they do not carry censure [oneide] with them because they are neither harmful [blabera] to others nor very unseemly [or indecent aschemones]

Note on the order of the text

On the proper placement of Chapter 15 with respect to the constitution of the text cf the following excerpt from my paper lsquoPerfect and Wholersquo Aristotlersquos Poetics on the Structure of the Plot (Papers In Poetics 1) p 5

First of all the proper order of treatment to be observed in the remainder of the Poetics through Chapter 18 is indicated by the conclusion concerning the qualitative parts of tragedy which Aristotle reaches in Chapter 6 (1450a 9-11)

[T]here must therefore be six parts to every tragedy according to which tragedy is of a certain sort and these are plot characters language [10] thought appear-ance and song

As Aristotle goes on to explain first comes plot second is character and third is thought1

One would therefore naturally expect the discussion that follows to conform to this order But if so one can easily see that Chapter 15 being concerned with character coming as it does while the handling of plot is ongoing is out of place2 its natural place being imme-diately after the treatment of the plot has been completed and not somewhere in the middle

POETICS CH 15 REVISED VERSION


With respect to the characters [ethe] there are four things one should aim at first and foremost that they be good [chrestos]3 Now one will have character [ethos] if as has been said4 by speech or action he make clear what his choice is and a good [character] if a good [choice] But there is [20] [something good to chrestos] in each kind for a woman is5 good and a slave though perhaps of these the one is inferior the other wholly base Second [is] appropriateness [to prepon] for a character is [may be] manly but it is not appropriate to a woman to be either manly or clever Third [that it be] like [ to homoion]6 For this is not the same as making a character [25] good and appropriate in the manner already stated Fourth [that it be] consistent [to homalon] For even if someone inconsistent offer himself for imitation (supposing there to be such a character) still he must be consistently inconsistent

2 Poetics ch 15 (1454b 7-14) (tr BAM) (text moved from below)

1 Cf 1450a 37 ff That language is given third in the initial listing is probably due to a copyistrsquos error2 [footnote omitted]3 For to chrestos as meaning lsquogood of its kindrsquo see further below4 Cf ch 6 (1450b 9-12) ldquoBut character [ecircthos] is that which choice [proairesin] reveals ltthat isgt what sort of thing lthellipgt one [10] chooses or avoids Consequently those speeches have no character in which it is not entirely ltcleargt what the speaker chooses or avoidsrdquo5 Or ldquomay berdquo according to a variant reading6 As Aristotle will go on to explain what is homoios or lsquolikersquo arises from ldquothe assigning of the proper form in making likenessesrdquo things being lsquolikersquo which ldquoagree in formrdquo (cf S Th Ia q 4 art 3 c) that is to say in order to be lsquolikersquo the form the imitator assigns must be the very form of the thing being imitated so that that original is recognizable in which case the portrayal will include any character flaws belonging to its subject

2










3





sect





4


sect


5











6



Matthew 1116-19 25-30

Exegetical Notes






7








8









Cf idem fr 143


9



sect

10











11








12








13








14



sect

15













16








17



sect

18






sect


19







sect


20







sect

21
















22









23






sect

24




Cf ibid pp 47-48






25










26


11 Characterisation
















27
















28



sect

29
















30









31




32


sect

33












34

Note












35







36












37










38










39






c Cf Thucydides i 6


40







41









42





43




44




sect


45







46


sect


sect



47



[1827] Wed Jan 31




sect



48

See also




49











3





sect





4


sect


5











6



Matthew 1116-19 25-30

Exegetical Notes






7








8









Cf idem fr 143


9



sect

10











11








12








13








14



sect

15













16








17



sect

18






sect


19







sect


20







sect

21
















22









23






sect

24




Cf ibid pp 47-48






25










26


11 Characterisation
















27
















28



sect

29
















30









31




32


sect

33












34

Note












35







36












37










38










39






c Cf Thucydides i 6


40







41









42





43




44




sect


45







46


sect


sect



47



[1827] Wed Jan 31




sect



48

See also




49






sect





4


sect


5











6



Matthew 1116-19 25-30

Exegetical Notes






7








8









Cf idem fr 143


9



sect

10











11








12








13








14



sect

15













16








17



sect

18






sect


19







sect


20







sect

21
















22









23






sect

24




Cf ibid pp 47-48






25










26


11 Characterisation
















27
















28



sect

29
















30









31




32


sect

33












34

Note












35







36












37










38










39






c Cf Thucydides i 6


40







41









42





43




44




sect


45







46


sect


sect



47



[1827] Wed Jan 31




sect



48

See also




49



sect


5











6



Matthew 1116-19 25-30

Exegetical Notes






7








8









Cf idem fr 143


9



sect

10











11








12








13








14



sect

15













16








17



sect

18






sect


19







sect


20







sect

21
















22









23






sect

24




Cf ibid pp 47-48






25










26


11 Characterisation
















27
















28



sect

29
















30









31




32


sect

33












34

Note












35







36












37










38










39






c Cf Thucydides i 6


40







41









42





43




44




sect


45







46


sect


sect



47



[1827] Wed Jan 31




sect



48

See also




49












6



Matthew 1116-19 25-30

Exegetical Notes






7








8









Cf idem fr 143


9



sect

10











11








12








13








14



sect

15













16








17



sect

18






sect


19







sect


20







sect

21
















22









23






sect

24




Cf ibid pp 47-48






25










26


11 Characterisation
















27
















28



sect

29
















30









31




32


sect

33












34

Note












35







36












37










38










39






c Cf Thucydides i 6


40







41









42





43




44




sect


45







46


sect


sect



47



[1827] Wed Jan 31




sect



48

See also




49




Matthew 1116-19 25-30

Exegetical Notes






7








8









Cf idem fr 143


9



sect

10











11








12








13








14



sect

15













16








17



sect

18






sect


19







sect


20







sect

21
















22









23






sect

24




Cf ibid pp 47-48






25










26


11 Characterisation
















27
















28



sect

29
















30









31




32


sect

33












34

Note












35







36












37










38










39






c Cf Thucydides i 6


40







41









42





43




44




sect


45







46


sect


sect



47



[1827] Wed Jan 31




sect



48

See also




49









8









Cf idem fr 143


9



sect

10











11








12








13








14



sect

15













16








17



sect

18






sect


19







sect


20







sect

21
















22









23






sect

24




Cf ibid pp 47-48






25










26


11 Characterisation
















27
















28



sect

29
















30









31




32


sect

33












34

Note












35







36












37










38










39






c Cf Thucydides i 6


40







41









42





43




44




sect


45







46


sect


sect



47



[1827] Wed Jan 31




sect



48

See also




49










Cf idem fr 143


9



sect

10











11








12








13








14



sect

15













16








17



sect

18






sect


19







sect


20







sect

21
















22









23






sect

24




Cf ibid pp 47-48






25










26


11 Characterisation
















27
















28



sect

29
















30









31




32


sect

33












34

Note












35







36












37










38










39






c Cf Thucydides i 6


40







41









42





43




44




sect


45







46


sect


sect



47



[1827] Wed Jan 31




sect



48

See also




49




sect

10











11








12








13








14



sect

15













16








17



sect

18






sect


19







sect


20







sect

21
















22









23






sect

24




Cf ibid pp 47-48






25










26


11 Characterisation
















27
















28



sect

29
















30









31




32


sect

33












34

Note












35







36












37










38










39






c Cf Thucydides i 6


40







41









42





43




44




sect


45







46


sect


sect



47



[1827] Wed Jan 31




sect



48

See also




49












11








12








13








14



sect

15













16








17



sect

18






sect


19







sect


20







sect

21
















22









23






sect

24




Cf ibid pp 47-48






25










26


11 Characterisation
















27
















28



sect

29
















30









31




32


sect

33












34

Note












35







36












37










38










39






c Cf Thucydides i 6


40







41









42





43




44




sect


45







46


sect


sect



47



[1827] Wed Jan 31




sect



48

See also




49









12








13








14



sect

15













16








17



sect

18






sect


19







sect


20







sect

21
















22









23






sect

24




Cf ibid pp 47-48






25










26


11 Characterisation
















27
















28



sect

29
















30









31




32


sect

33












34

Note












35







36












37










38










39






c Cf Thucydides i 6


40







41









42





43




44




sect


45







46


sect


sect



47



[1827] Wed Jan 31




sect



48

See also




49









13








14



sect

15













16








17



sect

18






sect


19







sect


20







sect

21
















22









23






sect

24




Cf ibid pp 47-48






25










26


11 Characterisation
















27
















28



sect

29
















30









31




32


sect

33












34

Note












35







36












37










38










39






c Cf Thucydides i 6


40







41









42





43




44




sect


45







46


sect


sect



47



[1827] Wed Jan 31




sect



48

See also




49









14



sect

15













16








17



sect

18






sect


19







sect


20







sect

21
















22









23






sect

24




Cf ibid pp 47-48






25










26


11 Characterisation
















27
















28



sect

29
















30









31




32


sect

33












34

Note












35







36












37










38










39






c Cf Thucydides i 6


40







41









42





43




44




sect


45







46


sect


sect



47



[1827] Wed Jan 31




sect



48

See also




49




sect

15













16








17



sect

18






sect


19







sect


20







sect

21
















22









23






sect

24




Cf ibid pp 47-48






25










26


11 Characterisation
















27
















28



sect

29
















30









31




32


sect

33












34

Note












35







36












37










38










39






c Cf Thucydides i 6


40







41









42





43




44




sect


45







46


sect


sect



47



[1827] Wed Jan 31




sect



48

See also




49














16








17



sect

18






sect


19







sect


20







sect

21
















22









23






sect

24




Cf ibid pp 47-48






25










26


11 Characterisation
















27
















28



sect

29
















30









31




32


sect

33












34

Note












35







36












37










38










39






c Cf Thucydides i 6


40







41









42





43




44




sect


45







46


sect


sect



47



[1827] Wed Jan 31




sect



48

See also




49









17



sect

18






sect


19







sect


20







sect

21
















22









23






sect

24




Cf ibid pp 47-48






25










26


11 Characterisation
















27
















28



sect

29
















30









31




32


sect

33












34

Note












35







36












37










38










39






c Cf Thucydides i 6


40







41









42





43




44




sect


45







46


sect


sect



47



[1827] Wed Jan 31




sect



48

See also




49




sect

18






sect


19







sect


20







sect

21
















22









23






sect

24




Cf ibid pp 47-48






25










26


11 Characterisation
















27
















28



sect

29
















30









31




32


sect

33












34

Note












35







36












37










38










39






c Cf Thucydides i 6


40







41









42





43




44




sect


45







46


sect


sect



47



[1827] Wed Jan 31




sect



48

See also




49







sect


19







sect


20







sect

21
















22









23






sect

24




Cf ibid pp 47-48






25










26


11 Characterisation
















27
















28



sect

29
















30









31




32


sect

33












34

Note












35







36












37










38










39






c Cf Thucydides i 6


40







41









42





43




44




sect


45







46


sect


sect



47



[1827] Wed Jan 31




sect



48

See also




49








sect


20







sect

21
















22









23






sect

24




Cf ibid pp 47-48






25










26


11 Characterisation
















27
















28



sect

29
















30









31




32


sect

33












34

Note












35







36












37










38










39






c Cf Thucydides i 6


40







41









42





43




44




sect


45







46


sect


sect



47



[1827] Wed Jan 31




sect



48

See also




49








sect

21
















22









23






sect

24




Cf ibid pp 47-48






25










26


11 Characterisation
















27
















28



sect

29
















30









31




32


sect

33












34

Note












35







36












37










38










39






c Cf Thucydides i 6


40







41









42





43




44




sect


45







46


sect


sect



47



[1827] Wed Jan 31




sect



48

See also




49

















22









23






sect

24




Cf ibid pp 47-48






25










26


11 Characterisation
















27
















28



sect

29
















30









31




32


sect

33












34

Note












35







36












37










38










39






c Cf Thucydides i 6


40







41









42





43




44




sect


45







46


sect


sect



47



[1827] Wed Jan 31




sect



48

See also




49










23






sect

24




Cf ibid pp 47-48






25










26


11 Characterisation
















27
















28



sect

29
















30









31




32


sect

33












34

Note












35







36












37










38










39






c Cf Thucydides i 6


40







41









42





43




44




sect


45







46


sect


sect



47



[1827] Wed Jan 31




sect



48

See also




49







sect

24




Cf ibid pp 47-48






25










26


11 Characterisation
















27
















28



sect

29
















30









31




32


sect

33












34

Note












35







36












37










38










39






c Cf Thucydides i 6


40







41









42





43




44




sect


45







46


sect


sect



47



[1827] Wed Jan 31




sect



48

See also




49





Cf ibid pp 47-48






25










26


11 Characterisation
















27
















28



sect

29
















30









31




32


sect

33












34

Note












35







36












37










38










39






c Cf Thucydides i 6


40







41









42





43




44




sect


45







46


sect


sect



47



[1827] Wed Jan 31




sect



48

See also




49











26


11 Characterisation
















27
















28



sect

29
















30









31




32


sect

33












34

Note












35







36












37










38










39






c Cf Thucydides i 6


40







41









42





43




44




sect


45







46


sect


sect



47



[1827] Wed Jan 31




sect



48

See also




49



11 Characterisation
















27
















28



sect

29
















30









31




32


sect

33












34

Note












35







36












37










38










39






c Cf Thucydides i 6


40







41









42





43




44




sect


45







46


sect


sect



47



[1827] Wed Jan 31




sect



48

See also




49

















28



sect

29
















30









31




32


sect

33












34

Note












35







36












37










38










39






c Cf Thucydides i 6


40







41









42





43




44




sect


45







46


sect


sect



47



[1827] Wed Jan 31




sect



48

See also




49




sect

29
















30









31




32


sect

33












34

Note












35







36












37










38










39






c Cf Thucydides i 6


40







41









42





43




44




sect


45







46


sect


sect



47



[1827] Wed Jan 31




sect



48

See also




49

















30









31




32


sect

33












34

Note












35







36












37










38










39






c Cf Thucydides i 6


40







41









42





43




44




sect


45







46


sect


sect



47



[1827] Wed Jan 31




sect



48

See also




49










31




32


sect

33












34

Note












35







36












37










38










39






c Cf Thucydides i 6


40







41









42





43




44




sect


45







46


sect


sect



47



[1827] Wed Jan 31




sect



48

See also




49





32


sect

33












34

Note












35







36












37










38










39






c Cf Thucydides i 6


40







41









42





43




44




sect


45







46


sect


sect



47



[1827] Wed Jan 31




sect



48

See also




49



sect

33












34

Note












35







36












37










38










39






c Cf Thucydides i 6


40







41









42





43




44




sect


45







46


sect


sect



47



[1827] Wed Jan 31




sect



48

See also




49













34

Note












35







36












37










38










39






c Cf Thucydides i 6


40







41









42





43




44




sect


45







46


sect


sect



47



[1827] Wed Jan 31




sect



48

See also




49


Note












35







36












37










38










39






c Cf Thucydides i 6


40







41









42





43




44




sect


45







46


sect


sect



47



[1827] Wed Jan 31




sect



48

See also




49








36












37










38










39






c Cf Thucydides i 6


40







41









42





43




44




sect


45







46


sect


sect



47



[1827] Wed Jan 31




sect



48

See also




49













37










38










39






c Cf Thucydides i 6


40







41









42





43




44




sect


45







46


sect


sect



47



[1827] Wed Jan 31




sect



48

See also




49











38










39






c Cf Thucydides i 6


40







41









42





43




44




sect


45







46


sect


sect



47



[1827] Wed Jan 31




sect



48

See also




49











39






c Cf Thucydides i 6


40







41









42





43




44




sect


45







46


sect


sect



47



[1827] Wed Jan 31




sect



48

See also




49







c Cf Thucydides i 6


40







41









42





43




44




sect


45







46


sect


sect



47



[1827] Wed Jan 31




sect



48

See also




49








41









42





43




44




sect


45







46


sect


sect



47



[1827] Wed Jan 31




sect



48

See also




49










42





43




44




sect


45







46


sect


sect



47



[1827] Wed Jan 31




sect



48

See also




49






43




44




sect


45







46


sect


sect



47



[1827] Wed Jan 31




sect



48

See also




49





44




sect


45







46


sect


sect



47



[1827] Wed Jan 31




sect



48

See also




49





sect


45







46


sect


sect



47



[1827] Wed Jan 31




sect



48

See also




49








46


sect


sect



47



[1827] Wed Jan 31




sect



48

See also




49



sect


sect



47



[1827] Wed Jan 31




sect



48

See also




49




[1827] Wed Jan 31




sect



48

See also




49


on plot construction and the portrayal of character (papers in poetics 3)

Documents