perfect and whole': aristotle's poetics on the structure of the plot (papers in poetics 1)

7/29/2019 'Perfect and Whole': Aristotle's Poetics on the Structure of the Plot (Papers In Poetics 1)

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PERFECT AND WHOLE: ARISTOTLES POETICS ON THE STRUCTURE OF THE PLOT

Bart A. Mazzetti

I

IN his work, Aristotles Vision of Nature , the classical scholar Frederick J. E. Woodbridge,discussing the problems involved in a reading of Aristotle, considers two possibilities toaccount for their difficulty. In his view, these writings

may be the preserved notes from which he lectured, for he is supposed to havelectured in his school, called the Lyceum. They may be the treasured notes of thosewho heard him. Either hypothesis is good enough as an hypothesis. But neither isvery helpful, for as notes of either speaker or hearer, they too frequently indicate amultiplicity of occasions when the lectures were delivered, or a multiplicity of hearers who attended them. The whole matter looks rather hopeless of solution. 1

Having reached an impasse with regard to his framing of this problem, he goes on to say,

There may be no necessity of solving it, but the embarrassment involved is this,there is so much disorder, so many cross references, so many evident misplace-ments, so many parentheses and omissions, so many elliptical expressions, that thereader readily gets in the habit of yielding to mass impressions which are oftendifficult to support by specific expositions in the text. He must read one book inlight of another. He must make supplementations of his own. He must correct whathe reads in one place with one import, by what he reads in another place with adifferent import. If the writings only went straight ahead progressively and con-tinuously, as they do now and then, they would be far more readable, and therewould be far less danger of misinterpretation .2

While these remarks are made apropos the entire Corpus Aristotelicum , they are particularly apt when applied to Aristotles Poetics , especially with regard to the problemsof evident misplacements and omissions. With respect to the latter, among the greatestlosses the Corpus is known to have suffered is that of the entire second book of his peri\poihtikh=j , or work About the Poetic Art , dealing with comedy. 3 Second only in im-

portance is the loss of the discussion of katharsis . As for misplacements, several of themost important were recognized by the Renaissance commentator Daniel Heinsius in hiswork Ordo Aristotelis , appended to his De Tragoediae Constitutione (first published in1611). 4

1 Aristotles Vision of Nature , by Frederick J. E. Woodbridge, John Herman Randall, Charles H. Kahn,

Harold A. Larrabee (orig. pub. Columbia Univ. Press, 1965; Greenwood Press Reprint 1983), p. 10.2 ibid . An excellent overview of their difficulties, as well as a vindication of the works scientific character, is provided by Hippocrates G. Apostle in the Introduction to his collection Aristotle: Selected Works (Grinnell,Iowa: The Peripatetic Press, 2 nd ed. 1986), Sec. III, pp. 5-12.3 As with most subjects connected with the study of Aristotle, this evident truth has been controverted. See,for instance, A. P. McMahon, On the Second Book of Aristotles Poetics and the Source of TheophrastusDefinition of Tragedy, Harvard Studies in Classical Philology 28 (1917), 9-19.4 For an English translation, see Daniel Heinsius, On Plot in Tragedy . Translated by Paul R. Sellin and JohnJ. McManmon, With Introduction and Notes by Paul R. Sellin (Northridge, California: San Fernando ValleyState College Renaissance Editions, 1971). The Ordo will be found on pp. 155-164.

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Taking his beginning from the definition of tragedy in Chapter 6, he summarizes the con-tents of the surviving book, noting, almost in passing, most, though not all, of the mis-

placed passages that are arguably present from that point on. 5

How can one tell that such misplacements have occurred? As an acquaintance withthe preeminent works of the commentary tradition makes clear, in the writings that havecome down to us Aristotle not only treated logic, but also embodied logical procedure. Ac-cordingly, understanding Aristotle to be a supremely logical thinker, the educated student 6

expects his works to follow a strictly logical order. 7 In the Poetics itself, for instance, inChapter 1 he begins with a treatment of the poetic art itself, determining its genus, beforeending with a treatment of the first difference, which is that in which an imitation is made,which is the means; Chapter 2 then treating the difference consisting in the object imitated,while Chapter 3 deals with the difference in manner; the argument thereby going from themost to the least evident of these differences. 8 Now if the manuscripts which have reachedus all were to begin with Chapter 2 followed by Chapter 1, or if a part of the argument con-cerning the manner of imitation belonging to Chapter 3 were to be found in Chapter 2, noone would doubt that their order had been disturbed and therefore needed to be corrected.

An excellent example of Aristotles orderliness will be found in the proem to hiswork, a starting-point which may be fruitfully examined both as an exemplary instance of his method, as well as an initiation into the subjects to be treated in the investigation tofollow:

5 A brief overview of these misplacements is the subject of Part II of this paper.6 By educated, I mean one in possession of what Aristotle calls paideia : Cf. Marie I. Georg e, Aristotle onPaideia of Principles. Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy (1998) (Abstract): Aristotle maintains that

paideia enables one to judge the method used by a given speaker without judging the conclusions drawn aswell (I.1 De Partibus Animalium ). He contends that this paideia of principles requires three things: seeingthat principles are not derived from one another; seeing that there is nothing before them within reason; and,seeing that they are the source of much knowledge. In order to grasp these principles, one must respectivelylearn to recognize what distinguishes the subject matters studied in different disciplines, see first principles as

coming from experience and acquire the habit of seeking them in ones experience and, finally, see first principles as being the source of conclusions. While the second and third points might at first seem to pertainto nous and science, respectively, rather than to paideia , the case can be made that paideia involves more of a firm grasp of principles than nous and a less perfect way of relating conclusions to principles thanscience. Thus, when one has attained science, he will be able to judge the conclusions as well.7 Consequently, the exposition in question being a mature work of the Philosopher, one may reasonablysuppose any deviation from the canons of method to be due to textual corruption.8 As a help to understanding Aristotles method here, cf. the following: It would seem, then, that accordingto the general doctrine of the distinction of speculative and practical knowledge, the resolutive or analytic

process abstracts the universal formal principles of objectswhether operable or non-operable. It proceeds by defining its object according to genus and differentia, dividing its object and demonstrating its proper pas-sions (Bro. Edmund Dolan, Resolution and Composition in Speculative and Practical Discourse, Laval thologique et philosophique 6, 1950, p. 19). In line with this method, Aristotle in the Poetics first divides the

genus the poetic art into certain principal species (sc. epic poetry, tragedy, comedy, and the melic arts);then defines the art by genus and differentiae; a work of the poetic art being an imitation (genus) using cer-tain means (difference) to represent certain things (difference) in a certain manner (difference), the second of these being the species-making difference; then proceeds to demonstrate its proper passions, for example,that it belongs to tragedy to carry out a purgation of the passions of pity and fear. Not surprisingly, commen-tators unfamiliar with the several modes of proceeding often suppose the Poetics to be written like a how-tomanual for poets, which would be a practical rather than a speculative treatment of an operable object, andthus begin with the matter and proceed compositively, from the ground up, so to speak, instructing thewould-be poet how he is to construct his poem, rather than proceeding analytically, as Aristotle does, in order to inform the student of poetry how a poem is to be constructed if it is to be good.

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About the poetic art itself and its forms themselves, what power each one has, andhow plots [10] should be constructed if the making in which poetry consists is to

be well disposed; and further, from how many and of what sort of parts [each one]is; and likewise about whatever else belongs to the same method let us speak,

beginning according to nature first from first things .9

The first things from which Aristotle begins are, as we have seen, the genus and differ-ences defining the poetic art, while the next major division of the text treats its formsthemselves, principally tragedy, comedy and epic, the principal conclusions concerningwhich are reached in Chapters 4 and 5 respectively, while treatments of their power, dispo-sition, and parts (in number and kind) follow in due course. Beginning with Chapter 6,Aristotle unfolds the definition of tragedy, investigating in the following chapters its prin-cipal qualitative parts, plot, character, and thought, before turning to language (chs. 20-22),then epic (chs. 23 and 24), then devoting single chapters to things consequent to his con-sideration as a whole, namely, problems and solutions in the poetic art (ch. 25), and the su-

periority of tragedy to epic (ch. 26), thereby staking out a position contrary to that of histeacher Plato in the Laws , while reaching a satisfying conclusion to the first part of hiswork. Then would have come the second book on comedy. As for the treatment of plot, its

proper disposition will be discussed in Parts II and III of this paper.

In marked contrast to the approach taken here is that employed by the eminentclassicist Ingram Bywater. In the opening paragraphs of his Introduction to his edition of the Poetics , he lays out his position in the following terms:

The text of the Poetics has been supposed to have suffered more seriously thanmost prose Greek texts in the process of transmission; and many scholars ac-cordingly have allowed themselves a very free hand in dealing with its diffi-culties. One cannot help suspecting, however, that not a few of their doubts andsuspicions start from a certain preconceived idea, inherited from the Middle Ages,of the general character of the Aristotelian writingsthat the master of them thatknow could never for a moment forget his logic; that his mind worked with all thesureness of a machine; and that a treatise of his must not only have been writtenthroughout on the straightest lines, but also have left his hands as free fromoversights and inconsistencies as a modern published work is expected to be. Theuntenableness of these assumptions, as thus stated, is obvious, and no one, Iimagine, would confess to them in so many words. But it is impossible to readmuch of the current criticism of the Poetics without seeing that its working hypo-thesis is in many instances what I have said.

Aristotle, with all his scientific formalism, is even as a thinker much morehuman than we are apt to suppose; his writing, too, is marked by great inequalities,

pass-ages of admirable lucidity and finish being often followed by a stretch of textin a style so curt and crabbed as to be the despair of his interpreters, ancient as wellas modern. The Poetics begin fairly well, but as the work advances, there are signsof failing attention to form, and the statement becomes in places little better than aseries of notes. The continuity also of the expression is frequently broken by [xiii -xiv] parentheses, sometimes on matters of very minor importance for the imme-diate argument. 10

9 Poet . ch. 1 (1447a 8-13) (tr. B.A.M.).10 Ingram Bywater, Aristotle on the Art of Poetry (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1909), pp. xiii-xiv.

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Much of the foregoing is mere impertinence; a person who recognizes Aristotles employ-ment of logical procedure being in no way committed to the view that he composed hisworks in simplistic fashion; whereas the claims that he was incapable of avoiding over-sights and inconsistencies because he lacked the resources of modern publishing, or thathis attention flagged, are insults to the intelligence. Equally objectionable is the insinuationthat the logical is opposed to the human, as well as his sneer that a principled reading of the Philosophers works is a relic of the Middle Ages.

In the paragraphs which follow, Bywater then proceeds to enumerate five headingscomprising what he calls anomalies and informalities in the text, some of which aresound, but others questionable: First, The anticipatory use of technical terms, which aredefined afterwards, a practice Bywater plausibly accounts for by supposing that most of these and similar technical terms may have already been sufficiently recognized andestablished in the language of the period, and that Aristotle only defines them for a specialreason, in the interest of scholastic precision or clearness. 11 Second, Variations of terminology; it apparently being a fault of Aristotles not to use exactly the same form of words every time a subject is dealt with (evidently Bywater has forgotten his objection tothe view that Aristotles mind worked with the sureness of a machine; nothing being somechanical as the rigid adherence to an unchanging nomenclature). Third, Inconsistenciesin the use of terms; it being another fault of Aristotles that he used the same words inmore than one meaning; the Philosopher apparently being of the opinion that certain thingsare said in many ways. Fourth, Inconsistencies of thought, and fifth, Lapses of mem-ory; these last two certainly being possible, but needing to be judged on a case-by-case

basis.Before accusing Aristotle of contradiction, however, one must carefully consider

the rule he lays down in Poetics ch. 25 (1460b 311461a 4), where he explains that whena charge of inconsistency is made such that what is said would give rise to a contradiction,it must be considered in the same way as refutations in arguments are, i.e. one must seewhether the same thing is said , that is, without using the subject or predicate equivocally(cf. De Int. 6, 17a 35, tr. H. G. Apostle), and with respect to the same thing , that is, theopposition of the same predicate with respect to the same subject ( ibid .), and in the sameway, that is, taking the predicate in the same manner in its relation to the same subject, andthus one must see whether the author has contradicted himself with respect to what hehimself says or what a sensible man would suppose that is, what a man of reasonableintelligence would think the author actually to have said (especially, it must be pointed out,when the text before him may be corrupt), as opposed to what a captious critic would sup-

posethat is, one ignorant of the principles appropriate to the subject-matter, the know-ledge of which is necessary if the pronouncements made upon a given work are to be just. 12

As those who read Aristotle with care well understand, when this procedure is fol-lowed,many of the criticisms leveled at the Philosopher fall to the ground.

Clearly, then, one who reads Aristotle as Bywater does will be out of sympathywith the method I employ in the investigation to follow.

11 ibid ., p. xiv. One may also suppose that he prefers not to delay his investigation unnecessarily.12For to refute is to contradict one and the same attributenot merely the name, but the realityand a namethat is not merely synonymous but the same nameand to confute it from the [25] propositions granted,necessarily, without including in the reckoning the original point to be proved, in the same respect and re-lation and manner and time in which it was asserted. ( Soph. Ref. , 5, 167a 23-27; tr. W. A. Pickard-Cam-

bridge)

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II

Before turning to our discussion of Aristotles introductory treatment of the structure of the plota part of Aristotles investigation which I believe to have suffered both misplace-ments and omissionsit will be helpful to look briefly at several other, principal, dislo-cations I believe to exist in the text.

First of all, the proper order of treatment to be observed in the remainder of the Poetics through Chapter 18 is indicated by the conclusion concerning the qualitative partsof tragedy which Aristotle reaches in Chapter 6 (1450a 9-11):

...[T]here must therefore be six parts to every tragedy according to which tragedyis of a certain sort: and these are plot, characters, language, [10] thought, appear-ance, and song.

As Aristotle goes on to explain, first comes plot, second is character, and third is thought. 13

One would therefore naturally expect the discussion that follows to conform to this order.But if so, one can easily see that Chapter 15, being concerned with character, coming as itdoes while the handling of plot is ongoing, is out of place; 14 its natural place being imme-diately after the treatment of the plot has been completed, and not somewhere in the

middle. Almost as easy to see is the mistaken placement of Chapter 12 on the quantitative parts of tragedy, 15 coming, in the received versions of the text, immediately after a dis-cussion of reversal, recognition, and suffering, and right before the treatment of the requis-ites of the finest tragedy, two subjects with which it has no discernible connection. But,as Heinsius notes, the most natural place for it to occur is immediately after Chapter 6where Aristotle has determined the qualitative parts of tragedy, in which case a brief dis-cussion of its quantitative parts, before turning to a detailed treatment of the former, wouldnot be out of place.

Next comes the observation that the treatment of pathos or suffering comprisingChapter 14 should come right after its definition in Chapter 11, at 1452b 9, being its con-

tinuation;16

the claim here being that the body of this chapter investigates what sufferingconsists in, as well as the best way to achieve it. 17 As for the discussion of reversal andrecognition preceding it, I must disagree with Heinsius (cf. sec. XIII, p. 158) that Chapter 16 on the species of recognition belongs with it, as its first sentence clearly has the charac-ter of a return to a subject previously discussed ,18 rather than being a continuation of it. Wesuppose, rather, that Chapter 11 and its continuation, Chapter 14, should come right after Chapter 9 (for which, see below), followed by Chapter 13 on the construction of the finesttragedy 19 (which would reasonably follow a discussion of pathos , as would an explanationof katharsis ), and then Chapter 16 on the species of recognition. Then would come Chapter 17 on what the poet should aim at, and Chapter 18 on lusis and desis (et alia ).

13

Cf. 1450a 37 ff. That language is given third in the initial listing is probably due to a copyists error.14 Cf. Heinsius, op. cit., sec. XVI, p. 162.15 Cf. Heinsius, sec. VII, pp. 155-156.16 Cf. Heinsius, sec. XIV, pp. 159-169.17 When the chapter is so placed, the argument will then conform to a pattern recurrent in the Poeticswhereby the last member of a series becomes the first elucidated in the discussion to follow, an example

being ch. 4, 1449a 4ff. where Aristotle, after giving two causes for the poetic art, begins with the second,namely, that all men delight in imitation. There are, of course, exceptions to this rule.18 Sc. What recognition is has been stated earlier; let us discuss its species.19 Minus its first and last sentences, which I treat next.

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Much more difficult to see, and an admirable indication of the perspicacity of theRenaissance commentator, 20 is the need to move the opening sentence of Chapter 13 to the

beginning of Chapter 17, so that the text reads as follows:

As a consequent to what has been said, in the next place we must show what the poet should aim at and what he should avoid in constructing his plots , andwhence the work of tragedy will be effected. (= ch. 13, 1452b 28-30)

But in constructing plots and in bringing them to a finished state with the lang-uage, one should , as much as possible, set them before the eyes: for in this way,observing with the utmost vividness as if he were present at the deeds themselveswhile they were being carried out, he will discover what is appropriate and willleast overlook any inconsistencies. (= ch. 17, 1455a 23-26)

Another dislocation, albeit one missed by Heinsius, is this: the final words of Chap-ter 14 21 ought to be appended to the end of Chapter 18, being the last part of Aristotlestreatment of the plot, and therefore most suitably placed before the treatment of character,which therefore comes next. Among the remaining places where I believe displacementsand lacunae are indicated, one of the most important is the discussion of the history of

poetry in Chapter 4, and another is Chapter 25 on problems and solutions in the poetic art.These chapters, however, are of such difficulty that even a cursory indication of the major problems would be out of place here. 22

Having adequately dealt with these preliminary matters, we now turn to the subjectof this paper.

III

As we shall see from the considerations to follow, beginning with Chapter 7, Aristotles in-troductory treatment of the structure of the plot 23 can be shown to include not only thewhole of the following chapter, but also the brief Chapter 10 on the division of plots into

simple and complex, as well as the last two discrete sections of Chapter 9, the first of which treats the problem of when a plot is episodic, the second and last, the composition of incidents most effective for evoking pity and fear. Yet the course of the argument ismarked by several omissions, some of them quite obvious, others less so.

By the opening words of Chapter 7, for instance, Aristotle informs us that he hadearlier defined tragedy as an imitation of an action perfect and whole, having a certainsize, going on to add that there is a whole which does not have size (1450b 24-25). Yetthe text which follows tells us nothing further on either point, while the next passage oc-curring speaks of a whole without qualification, as though Aristotle had not just said thatthere are two different kinds. Now it is not like the Philosopher to proceed in this way, therecognition of which anomaly leads one to suppose that something must have been lost

from the text.20 Cf. Heinsius, sec. XVI, pp. 161-164.21 Sc. The makeup of the incidents, therefore, and of what sort plots ought to be, has been sufficientlydiscussed. (= ch. 14, 1454a 14-15)22 On the difficulties of Chapter 4, a good place to start is Carnes Lord, Aristotle's History of Poetry Tran-

sactions of the American Philological Association 104 (1974), 195-229. Treatments of Chapter 25 abound, but see especially Mitchell Carroll, Aristotles Poetics, c. XXV in the Light of the Homeric Scholia (diss. Bal-timore, 1895). A third, well-known instance of these defects, is Chapter 20 on the parts of lexis .23 The treatment in detail of matters dealt with by way of introduction taking up subsequent parts of the work.

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Returning to the body of Chapter 7, at 1450b 34 we observe that, in contrast withits possession of order, the next subject taken up is the plots possession of size:

Further still, since that which is beautiful, whether it be a living thing or anythingelse which is composed of certain things, should not only [35] have these thingsarranged, but also not just any chance sizefor the beautiful consists in size andorder.... (1450a 34-35)

Here Aristotle not only indicates by way of summary the last subject discussed, namely,order, but also gives us to understand that he has just completed his introductory treatmentof it. 24 Now for our present purposes there are two things we can take from his remarks:first, that whatever pertains to that treatment belongs to his argument; and second, that anysuch texts ought to occur before his treatment of size. Yet two passages concerning order are found afterwards: 25 the brief Chapter 10 on the division of plots into simple and com-

plex, 26 and the portion of Chapter 9 on the badness of episodic plots .27 Now when these passages are read in tandem, it becomes immediately apparent that they go together. Thefirst reason for supposing so is their agreement in treating the structure of the plot asarising from a necessary or likely connection between successive incidents, which connec-tion pertains to order, being an embodiment of it. 28 The second reason is indicated by thetransitions Aristotle has helpfully provided in the text:

Of plots , however, some are simple, but others complex; for the actions of whichthe plots are the imitations are also such to begin with. (ch. 10, 1452 a 12-13)

But simply speaking, of plots and actions the episodic are the worst. (ch. 9, 1451b34)

As the reader will observe, such words and phrases both establish (in the manner of jointsand ligaments), and reveal (in the manner of signs), the unity as well as the continuity of the argument, and so are a great help in discovering the proper ordering of its parts. I do

not, of course, maintain that such correspondences are by themselves sufficient for deter-mining that order (there being many points in the argument where Aristotle returns to asubject previously discussed); but if one carefully consider the subject under discussion, aswell as the course of its development, then surveys the argument as a whole in the light of its principles (which, when inevident, are always discoverable), an order of treatmenthinging on these transitions will quite often come into view.

24 He also introduces, somewhat abruptly it seems to me, the comparison with a living thing and its identi-fication with the beautiful, a subject to which I return below.25 There also being a third, to be discussed shortly.26 Which partition, being a per se division of the genusthat is to say, one made of the plot insofar as it is a

plot, or as suchbeing made with reference to the necessary or likely connection of its incidents, reveals to

us that this attribute, whereby it is both continuous and one, is the plots defining characteristic.27 Which badness arises when the defining characteristic of the plot is absent.28 Cf. ch. 10, 1452 a 19-20: These, however, should arise from the very way in which the plot is put together [or from the structure of the plot itself], so that from what has already taken place [20] it happen that thethings mentioned [e.g. recognition and reversal] come about either of necessity or in accordance withlikelihood. Cf. ch. 9, 1451b 34-35: I call episodic a plot in which it is neither [35] likely nor necessarythat the episodes follow one another. The discussion of what makes a plot episodic manifestly having no-thing to do with the matters treated up to that point in Chapter 9 (which has to do with plot being composedof the sort of thing the might happen, etc.), we have an additional reason for supposing the text to have beenwrongly placed.

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Having dealt with its possession of size, the received version of the text sub-sequently treats the question of what makes a plot one, in the course of which argumentAristotle concludes that the parts of the plot must be so arranged that the transposition or removal of any of them changes the whole, which is to say that they must be arranged in adeterminate order for it to have its species; a conclusion indicating that this entire chapter ought to come before the treatment of size, rather than after it. But the passage defining awhole as something having a beginning, a middle, and an end is the explanation of just

what that order is, and so should follow this part of the argument rather than precede it.That the precise placement of the whole of the text of our Chapter 8 is after the openingstatement of Chapter 7 29 will be clear from the commentary to follow.

Now as we have observed above, the opening statement of Chapter 7 tells us thatthe plot of tragedy must be perfect as well as whole. But the text of Chapter 9 com-

prising 1452a 2-11 begins with a transition indicating that he has just completed his con-sideration of what is perfect, 30 demonstrating that this passage also belongs to his treat-ment, being, in fact, its culmination. That this is so may be seen by considering the Philo-sophers summary statement occasioned by his comparison of epic poetry to tragedy foundin Chapter 23:

As for the imitative art which is narrative and in verse, it is clear that its plotsshould be constructed the way they are in tragedies, dramatically, and around oneaction, whole and perfect, [20] having a beginning, middles ,31 and an end, so that,like one whole living thing, it may produce its proper pleasure.... (= ch. 23, 1459a17-20)

But the producing of its proper pleasure consists in the evoking of pity and fear, making itimmediately evident that the final section of Chapter 9 is the concluding portion of Aris-totles introductory treatment.

Having briefly indicated the parts belonging to the argument, I will now give the pertinent texts in full, restored to their proper order, and supplemented with brief additions

of my own indicating what I believe to have been lost from the text. 32 Having done so, Ishall then add explanatory notes in support of my supplements and re-orderings, 33 beforeturning to a consideration of the argument as a whole.

IV

As the reader will observe, the entire course of the argument as I conceive it is comprisedin seven parts, which may be laid out as follows:

29 That is, following the words for there is a whole which does not have size, a point in the argument whichI have already indicated as suffering a loss of text.30

But since imitation is not only of a perfect action..., etc. A problem associated with the wording of thissentence will be noticed in my note to this text below. I will also argue hereafter that its last sentence,namely, that such plots of necessity are more beautiful, is better suited to another part of the argument andshould be moved accordingly.31 With other commentators, I believe the presence of the plural here to be due to textual corruption.32 In accordance with the principle of parsimony, I have given these supplements (printed in italics and set off from Aristotles text | in upright braces | ) in as brief a form as possible.33 Far from speaking out of myself, I hasten to add that my supplements are drawn in their entirety fromAristotles own works, fleshed out and illuminated by relevant texts of St. Thomas Aquinas, which texts, inevery instance, are either restatements of Aristotles own teachings, or helpful elaborations of it.

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1. Poetics ch. 7 (1450b 21-25) (the beginning):

With these things having been determined, let us next discuss the sort of makeup thethings done should have , since this is the first and most important part of tragedy.

It has been laid down by us that tragedy is [25] an imitation of an action perfect andwhole, having a certain size : for there is a whole which does not have size .

| But a whole having size , of the sort an action is, being composed of certain thingsarranged in a certain order (cf. ch. 7, 1450b 34-36), has a certain single form , for whichreason it is one .34 |

2. Poetics ch. 8 (1451a 16-35) (complete):

A plot is not one , as some think, if it is about one man; for manyindeed aninfinite numberof things happen to one man, out of some of which no one thing arises. Soalso there are many actions of one man out of which no one action results. For this reason all[20] the poets seem to have erred who have composed a Heracleid , a Theseid , and such-like

poems. For they think that since Heracles was one man, a story about him is one thing. ButHomer, just as he excels in other things, appears to have grasped this point well, whether byart or by nature. For in [25] making the Odyssey , he did not compose everything that ever happened to him, for example, his being wounded on Parnassus, and his feigned madness atthe gathering of the army, the one thing being done, it being neither necessary nor likely thatthe other come about; but he constructed the Odyssey around one action , of the sort of which we are speaking; and likewise the [30] Iliad . | But when the incidents composing the

plot are so constructedthat is to say, some one thing being done, it is either necessary or likely that the other come aboutthen such a plot will be both continuous and one . |

Accordingly, just as in the other imitative arts, one imitation must be of one thing , soalso the plot, since it is the imitation of an action, must be of one thing , and this a whole ;and the parts of the thing must be so constituted that when some one part is transposedor removed it makes a difference in the sense that the whole is changed ; for what makes[35] no noticeable difference when it is present or not present is no part of the whole .

3. Poetics ch. 7 (1450b 26-33) (continued):

But a whole is that which has a beginning, amiddle, and an end . A beginning is that which itself is not of necessity after anything else,

but something else naturally is or comes to be after it. An end, conversely, is that whichnaturally is after something else, either [30] of necessity or for the most part, but nothingelse after this. A middle is that which itself is after something else and another thing after it.35

34

While what is perfect and whole is that of which nothing is outside. (For the sources of these additions, aswell as their explanations, see the notes to their respective sections below.)35 Cf. Aristotle, Metaph. , V. 26 (1024a 1-5) (tr. W. D. Ross): Again (3) of quanta that have a beginning anda middle and an end, those to which the position does not make a difference are called totals, and those towhich it does, wholes. Those which admit of both descriptions are both wholes and totals. These are thethings whose nature remains the same after transposition, but whose form does not, e.g. wax or a coat; theyare called both wholes and totals; for they [5] have both characteristics. Cf. also St. Thomas Aquinas, In V

Meta. , lect. 21, n. 21 (tr. B.A.M.): For when it is so that in a quantity there is an order of parts, because thereis a beginning, a middle, and an end there, in which the account of position consists, every such continuouswhole must have position in its parts.

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A well-constructed plot , then, should not begin or end just anywhere, but should use thespecies mentioned. 36 | For then, like one whole living thing (cf. ch. 23, 1459a 21), it will have its parts fittingly arranged (cf. ch. 7, 1450b 34). | [And so such plots of necessity aremore beautiful . (= ch. 9, 1452a 11)] 37

4. Poetics ch. 10 (1452a 12-21) (complete):

Of plots , however, some are simple, but others complex; for the actions of which the plotsare the imitations are also such to begin with. But I call simple an action in which [15](being, as defined, continuous and one ) a change without reversal or recognition results;

but complex, [one] from which there is a change involving recognition, or reversal, or both. These, however, should arise from the very way in which the plot is put together [or from the structure of the plot itself, ex autes tes sustaseos tou muthou ], so that from whathas already taken place [20] it happen that the things mentioned come about either of necessity or in accordance with likelihood. For it makes a great difference whether thesethings 38 come about because of these things 39 [= propter hoc ] or (merely) after them [= post hoc ].

5. Poetics ch. 9 (1451b 341452a 1) (excerpt):

But simply speaking, 40 of plots and actions the episodic are the worst. I call episodic a plot in which it is neither [35] likely nor necessary that the episodes follow one another.Such are made by bad poets because of their own but by thegood because of the actors; for, composing works to be per-formed at contests, andextending the plot beyond its capacity, they are often forced to distort the connection [sc.of the episodes].

6. Poetics ch. 7 (1450b 341451a 15 (tr. B.A.M. based in part on Theodore Buckley) 41

(continued):

36 Thus Odysseus slaying of the suitors must come after his return to Ithaca, and so must be preceded by his

shipwreck on Calypsos island, the poems beginning; the many episodes intervening constituting its middle.37 My reason for moving this sentence here will be found in my note on this section given below.38 Namely, recognition and reversal.39 Namely, the incidents which precede them in time; it being Aristotles view that a plot which is continuousand one will consist of incidents which do not merely precede a recognition or reversal, but which

precipitate them.40 For the justification of this translation, cf. the note of H. G. Apostle in his edition:

Perhaps there is a corruption of the Greek text. If the Greek term a(plw=n (= of simple, in the plural) is kept, the resulting translation, which is Of simple plots and actions the episodic are theworst, leaves out plots and actions which are not simple. Our explanation is simple. If the lastletter of the Greek term is changed to s, the term becomes a(plw=j (= without qualification); thenthe resulting translation becomes Without qualification, plots and actions which are episodic are the

worst, which is another way of saying that plots and actions which are episodic are without exceptionthe worst. (Hippocrates G. Apostle, Elizabeth A. Dobbs, and Morris A. Parslow trans., Aristotles

Poetics . Grin-nell, Iowa: The Peripatetic Press, 1990, note 8 to Chapter 9, pp. 63-64)

Actually, there is an even stronger reason for making the emendation Apostle adopts. At 1452a 14-15, simpleas well as complex plots and actions are defined as continuous and one; but to be episodic is by definitionto be discontinuous and lacking unity; consequently, a simple plot or action that is episodic would be a con-tradiction in terms.41 Cf. The Poetic of Aristotle , literally translated, with a selection of notes, an analysis, and questions. ByTheodore Buckley (London and New York: Bohn, 1906; rpt. Prometheus Books, 1992).

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Further still, since that which is beautiful , whether it be a living thing or anything elsewhich is composed of certain things , should not only [35] have these things arranged [=their connection ], but also not just any chance size for the beautiful consists in size andorder hence, neither can any very small animal be beautiful; for the contemplation of it isconfused, since it is effected in a nearly insensible time; nor yet a very large animal; [1451a]for it is not contemplated at once, but its being one and a whole escapes the view of theonlookers; such as if there should be an animal of ten thousand stadia [in length]. And so, asin bodies and in animals there should be size , but such as can be easily seen; so also in plots,

there should be length , but this such as can be [5] easily remembered.

But the definition of the length with reference to contests and the senses does not fall under the consideration of art. For if it were necessary to perform a hundred tragedies, the per-formance would have to be regulated by a water-clock, as they are said to have been at onetime. But the definition according to the nature of the thing is this, that the plot is [10] al-ways more beautiful the greater it is, if at the same time it is perspicuous . But in order todefine it simply, one may say, in whatever extent , in successive incidents in accordancewith likelihood or necessity, a change from bad fortune to good fortune or from good fortuneto bad fortune takes place, is a [15] sufficient limit of the size .

| But a plot or an action that has attained the sufficient limit of its size will for that very

reason be perfect .42

|

7. Poetics ch . 9 (1452a 2-11) (continued to the end):

But since tragedy is not only the imitation of a perfect action, but also of things evokingfear and pity , but they become such to the greatest extent when, contrary to expectation,they are accomplished [5] through each other, . 43 For then they will have more of the wonderful than if by chance and luck, since even in things brought about by luck, these seemmost wonderful whenever they appear to have been accomplished as though [10] by design,as, for instance, the statue of Mitys of Argo killed the man responsible for Mitys death,falling upon him while he was looking at it; for such things seem not to have happened at

random. 44

N.B. Inasmuch as the remainder of Chapter 9 has to do with the modality of the pragmatacomposing a plot; being concerned as it is with the sort of thing that might happen in accor-dance with either necessity or likelihood (1451a 36), that is, with what happens always andnecessarily or for the most part; whereas the last thing mentioned in Section 7, concerningchance things which seem not to have happened at random, being things happening per accidens , or for the least part, also concerns that modality; these being the three ways inwhich things happen, as Aristotle explains (cf. Metaph. , XI. 8, 1064b 361065a 2); that

block of text would reasonably follow upon this. On the other hand, as I point out in a noteappended to this paper, an additional passage may have stood between the two; a subject towhich I have devoted a treatment of its own.

42 As with the text I have appended to Section 1 above, the foregoing statement furnishes in the briefest formcompatible with clarity my understanding of what has been lost from the text.43 As the reader will observe, the text of this section, being unusually lacunose, has required several addi-tions; the words needed to complete the sense being easily inferred from the context; the first words added

being especially required to avoid a manifest falsehood, since not every imitation evokes pity and fear.44 It should be noted here that the case of Mitys is presented as something that actually took place.

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Note to Section 1

Let us turn now to the first supplement I propose making to the text. As Aristotleexplains in the Physics (cf. III. 6, 207a 8-12, tr. R. Glen Coughlin), [t]hat of which no-thing is outside...is perfect and whole. For thus do we define a whole, that of which no-thing is absent, like a whole man [10] or coffer. But as the particular [whole is], so too iswhat is properly [a whole], as the whole is that of which nothing is outside. That of which

there is something absent outside, whatever be absent, is not all. But perfect means thatoutside of which it is not possible to find any, even one, of its parts; e.g. the perfect [or complete] time of each thing is that outside which it is not possible to find any timewhich is [15] a part proper to it ( Metaph. , V. 16, 1021b 9-15, tr. W. D. Ross; slightly rev.B.A.M.). Whole and perfect, however, either are entirely the same 45 or are close innature. 46 Nothing not having an end is perfect, but the end is a limit 47 ( Phys. , III. 6, 207a12-14). For [a] limit means the extremity of each thing, understood as the first thingoutside of which there is nothing to be found and the first thing inside of which everything

belonging to it is ( Metaph. , V. 17, 1022a 5-6, tr. B.A.M.). But by a whole which does nothave size Aristotle means the whole which is said of but not composed of its parts, as thegenus animal is said of but not composed of its species man and ox (i.e. the universalwhole; cf. Metaph. , V. 26, 1023b 28-33), whereas the whole which does have size is com-

posed of but not said of its parts (i.e. the integral whole), as the sole, heel and upper makeup a shoe but are not said of it. But as the Philosopher goes on to explain (cf. Metaph . V.26, 1023b 26, tr. W. D. Ross), this second kind of whole, being that from which is absentnone of the parts of which it is said to be naturally a whole, is that which so contains thethings it contains that they form a unity; not, to be sure, as being each severally onesingle thing [i.e. the universal whole], but as making up the unity between them..[i.e. the integral whole] ( ibid ., 1023b 27-28). In the latter case, the continuous and limitedis a whole when it is a unity consisting of several parts, especially if they are present only

potentially [as with a body continuous by nature, like water], but, failing this, even if theyare present actually [as with two or more bodies conjoined in some way, as sticks by glue].Of these things themselves, [35] those which are so by nature are wholes in a higher degreethan those which are so by art, 48 as we said in the case of unity also, wholeness being infact a sort of oneness ( ibid ., 1023b 32-37, tr. W. D. Ross).

45 For perfect and whole is that which lacks nothing.... (St. Thomas Aquinas, In V Meta. , lect. 8, n. 6, tr.B.A.M.).46 And the reason why he says this is because a whole is not found in simple things, which do not have parts,in which, nevertheless, we do employ the name of perfect (St. Thomas Aquinas, In III Phys. , lect. 11, n. 4,tr. B.A.M.).47 Cf. also Metaph . V. 16 (1021b 24-25) (tr. W. D. Ross): Things which have attained their end, this beinggood, are called perfect. But the end and that for the sake of which is the what it is and the form( Phys. , II. 7, 198b 3, tr. R. Glen Coughlin). Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol ., Ia-IIae, q. 49, art 2, c.,ad 1 (tr. B.A.M): And because the very form and nature of a thing is the end and that for the sake of which

something comes to be, as is said in the second book of the Physics (ch. 7, 198b 3), thus, in the first species[of quality] there is considered both good and bad, and also movable with ease or with difficulty, accordingas some nature is the end of a generation and a motion. Also relevant here is the fourth species of quality,where the end is the form and figure of the whole; figure being defined as a quality around a quantity (St.Thomas Aquinas, In VII Physic. , lect. 5, n. 2), being its termination ( ibid ., n. 3); a thing having such an end

possessing that form of the beautiful called the limited or definiteness (cf. Metaph. , XIII. 3, 1078b 1).48 For when a whole consists of parts, the form of the whole which does not give being to the individual

parts is a form which is composition and order, like the form of a house, and such a form is accidental (St.Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol. , Ia, q. 76, art. 8, c., tr. B.A.M.); whereas the form of the whole which doesgive being to the parts is substantial, as is the soul with respect to the body, as St. Thomas goes on to explain.

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Consequently, the parts of the plot must be arranged in such a way that the plot isone species: For, [w]hile in a sense we call anything one if it is a quantity and contin-uous, 49 in a sense we do not unless it is a whole, i.e. unless it has unity of form [or species]; e.g. if we saw the parts of a shoe put together in just any way we should not callthem one all the same (unless because of their continuity); we do this only if they are puttogether so as to be a shoe and to have already a certain single form [or species].( Metaph ., V. 6, 1016b 11-17, tr. W. D. Ross; slightly rev. B.A.M.) 50 That is, we call some-

thing one in this sense when its parts are so arranged that the kind of thing it was meantto be results (one here meaning undivided being; cf. Summa Theol. , Ia, q. 11, art. 1, c.).But when it is so constituted, a whole possesses that form of the beautiful called order(cf. Metaph. , XIII. 3, 1078a 37).

Note how the treatment of a things being perfect and whole reveals the way inwhich it is both continuous and one. As for the course of the argument, we may supposethat Aristotle, after having stated that there is a whole which does not have size, couldhave gone on to speak of the whole having size as being the sort that is one by having aunity of formthat is, one whose parts are so put together as to have a certain singleform; something being one in this sense when (as St. Thomas Aquinas puts it), it is acertain totality requiring a determinate order of parts. Then would have come the text of our Chapter 8: A plot is not one, as some think..., etc., concluding with thewords, Accordingly, just as in the other imitative arts, one imitation must be of onething, etc., where the necessity of having a determinate order of parts is indicated byAristotles statement that the parts of the thing must be so constituted that when some one

part is transposed or removed it makes a difference in the sense that the whole is changed,etc., in which case the course of the argument would be both continuous and clear. It must

be emphasized, however, that an imitation of an action is understood as coming under theforegoing species of whole according to a likeness , inasmuch as it is not truly a quantityand continuous, but is merely similar to one. Thus Aristotle speaks of the plot as the be-ginning and, as it were , the soul of tragedy (ch. 6, 1449b 37) when, properly speaking, itis not the soul of anything. 51

49 Something being continuous when, in those which touch, the limit of each comes to be one and the same,and are held together. Cf. Aristotles definition of the continuous, from which the foregoing formulation has

been adapted: The continuous { sunexe/j } is what is indeed something contiguous, but I call a thingcontinuous when, in those which touch, the limit of each comes to be one and the same, and, as the namesignifies, are held together { sune/xhtai }. This is not possible if the extremes are two. This beingdetermined, [15] it is apparent that the continuous is among those things from which something one isnaturally apt to come to be according to contact. And in the way in which the continuous comes to be one atsome time, so too the whole will be one, e.g., either by a nail or by glue or by touch or by growing together.( Phys. , V. 3, 227a 10-18, tr. R. Glen Coughlin). Cf. the discussion of poetic continuity in my Note toSection 2 below.50 Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In V Meta. , lect. 8, n. 5 (tr. B.A.M.): And he says that sometimes some thingsare called one solely by reason of continuity, but sometimes not, except something be whole and perfect ;which, in fact, happens when it has some one species, not indeed as a homogeneous subject is called one

species [like the silver of a drinking vessel, for which see below], which pertains to the second mode setforth earlier, but according as the species consists in a certain totality requiring a determinate order of parts;

just as it is clear that we do not call something one, like a work produced by art, when we observe the partsof a shoe composed in any way whatsoever, except perhaps according as one is taken for the continuous;

but we do say all the parts of a shoe are one when they are so composed that there is a shoe and it have someone species, namely, of a shoe. Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In V Meta. , lect. 3, n. 3 (tr. B.A.M.): For it must

be understood that sometimes one thing is of one matter simply, like the silver of a drinking vessel; and thenthe form corresponding to such a matter can be called a species.51 When he goes on to compare the plot to an outline or sketch in black and white, Aristotle shows the sort of form it most closely resembles. Cf. GA, II. 6 (743b 24-25).

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Note to Section 2

In describing Homers procedure in the Odyssey , Aristotle informs us that it would be bad poetic practice to so compose the plot that, the one thing being done, it [is] neither necessary nor likely that the other come about, from which it follows that a plot will be

properly constructed when, some one thing being done, it will be either necessary or likelythat the other come about. But if so, then the plot will be both continuous and one, having

been constructed . . . around one action. With respect to this supplement, however, itmust be emphasized that, unlike the state of the text at the end of Section 1 where an omis-sion is clearly indicated, the place where I have inserted the definition of poetic continuityin no way appears to require any addition. There are two reasons why I have added some-thing: First, while the text as it stands is unproblematic in describing what Homer does, or rather does not do, in constructing the plot of the Odyssey , it nevertheless lacks a positivestatement of what correct poetic practice consists in; but one expects to find such astatement somewhere, and I have found no better place to put it than here. Second, hisremark at 1452a 14-15 would seem to demand it; 52 it being unlikely that the Philosopher would refer to a definition as given unless he had actually given it.

Note to Section 3

Three things are to be noted here: First, that a plot, inasmuch as it is a whole havinga beginning, a middle, and an end of the sort whose species is changed by the transpositionof its parts, comes under the second member of Aristotles last division from the passageof the Metaphysics quoted above (sc. V. 26, 1024a 1-5); but that being the case, my or-dering of the second and third sections gains support, since each includes a part of this de-scription, thereby revealing an otherwise unnoticed connection between them. Second, aswith the previous supplement, while the statement I have appended to the end of this sec-tion is by no means demanded by the state of the text, it nevertheless establishes an other-wise absent continuity with the beginning of Section 6; the mention of a living thing andits identification with the beautiful seeming, as I have said, somewhat abrupt. But the state-ment about such plots being of necessity more beautiful with which Chapter 9 endsclearly belongs here, since the beauty of plots is indicated by Aristotles reference to their

being well-constructedthe well here pertaining to a good disposition of the parts,which is precisely what beauty consists in, as we shall hereafter seewhile the subject un-der discussion in the final section of the text preceding its appearance is neither about plotsnor beauty, nor does the removal of this sentence impair the conclusion of Aristotlesargument, which ends fittingly with the death of Mitys murderer.

Note to Section 4

The final point Aristotle makes here, concerning, as it does, the difference betweenthings happening post hoc versus propter hoc , further specifies the need for the parts of the

plot to be disposed in a determinate order, and thus connects this part of the argument withthe parts comprising Sections 2 and 3.

52 But I call simple an action in which [15] ( being, as defined, continuous and one )..., etc., there being no previous mention of this attribute in these terms. Yet Aristotles statement could only refer to a definitionsuch as I have supplied, since, as is clear from his account of the continuous excerpted above, a plot could becontinuous and one in no other way.

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Note to Section 5

Notice how the last thing mentioned here, concerning the practice of bad dramatistsin distorting the sequence of the episodes, connects with Aristotles criticism of incom-

petent epic poets in Section 2, as well as with the remarks on the parts of the plot being ar-ranged found at the opening of Section 6, thereby making the argument continuous in bothdirections.

Note to Section 6

As will become clear from Aristotles treatment of the relative sizes of the parts of the plot in his consideration of the unity of epic in relation to that of tragedy, 53 the resultantwhole, by virtue of the parts composing it being neither too big nor too small, will neces-sarily possess that form of the beautiful called symmetry (cf. Metaph. , XIII. 3, 1078a37). Cf. Plato, Timaeus 87d-e (tr. Benjamin Jowett):

[N]or do we reflect that when a weak or small frame is the vehicle of a great andmighty soul, or conversely, when a little soul is encased in a large body, then thewhole animal is not fair, for it lacks the most important of all symmetries; but thedue proportion of mind and body is the fairest and loveliest of all sights to himwho has the seeing eye. Just as a body which has a leg too long, or which is un-symmetrical [e] in some other respect, is an unpleasant sight....

In the foregoing passage, Plato speaks of symmetry in terms of what is most evident to us,namely, that a part too big is unsymmetrical, and hence unsightly, whereas Aristotle, in the

passage under discussion, considers the size of a thing as a whole , explaining how there is both an upper and a lower limit to that size, a consideration which presupposes the moreelementary understanding of symmetry found in his later account, as well as in Platos text.

As for the statement I have appended to the end of this section, namely, that a plotor an action possessing the sufficient limit of its size will for that very reason be perfect, its

truth will already be clear to one who has understood the definitions of whole, perfect,and limit given above. For our present purposes, however, it will be helpful to arrive atthe same conclusion starting from Aristotles statement in the Metaphysics that ...eachthing is perfect and every substance is perfect, when in respect of the form of its proper virtue [or excellence], it lacks no part of its natural magnitude ( Metaph. , V. 16, 1021b15-17, tr. W. D. Ross; slightly rev. B.A.M.). Likewise, a thing possessing the limit of itssize with respect to its continuous quantity will necessarily be perfect, as with an animal or any other living thing which has grown as large as it can grow. 54 To see how these conten-tions help us in ordering Aristotles text, we must first consider the whole of the Philos-ophers second account of the perfect, from which this statement comes, as well as St.Thomas commentary on it:

53 Cf. ch. 18 (1456a 14-15) (tr. Apostle et al, Aristotles Poetics , op. cit., p. 21): In epic, the parts assume asuitable magnitude because of the epics length, but in drama, [the use of episodes suitable for one epic] goesfar beyond what is expected. Thus one should not try to make a tragedy out of an epic structure ( ibid .,1456a 12). Cf. also ch. 26 (1462b 4-11), where he speaks of such parts each with a considerable magnitudeof its own ( idem, p. 37), a subject previously touched on in ch. 23 (cf. 1459a 30-1459b 37).54 To deny this would be like claiming that a tank which holds fifty gallons of water is full when it is holdingonly forty-five, or that a man capable of growing to six feet is as tall as he can be at five. Alternatively, it isimpossible for a thing that has attained the utmost of its magnitude, of whatever sort it may be, to be lackingany part of that magnitude. But when its utmost has been attained, then it is perfect, a point I return to below.

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[What is called perfect also means] [t]hat which in respect of virtue [or ex-cellence] and goodness cannot be excelled in its kind; e.g. we have a perfectdoctor or a perfect flute-player, when they lack nothing in respect of the form of their proper virtue [or excellence]. And thus, transferring the word to bad things,we speak of a perfect scandal-monger and a perfect thief; [20] indeed we even callthem good , i.e. a good thief and a good scandal-monger. And virtue [or excel-lence] is a perfection; for each thing is perfect and every substance is perfect,when in respect of the form of its proper virtue [or excellence], it lacks no part of

its natural magnitude. ( Metaph. , V. 16, 1021b 15-24, tr. W. D. Ross)

But, as St. Thomas Aquinas explains (cf. In V Meta. , lect. 18, n. 5, tr. B.A.M.):

[T]hat something is called perfect by comparison to its proper virtue comes about because virtue is a certain perfection of a thing. For each thing is perfect when no part of the natural magnitude, which belongs to it according to the species of its proper virtue, is lacking to it. Now just as any natural thing possesses a deter-minate measure of natural magnitude according to continuous quantity , as is saidin the second book of the De Anima [cf. ch. 4, 415a 15ff.], so also any thing pos-

sesses a determinate quantity of its natural virtue . (emphasis added)

Thus, in accordance with the analogy between a things dimensive quantity and its quantityof virtue or power, Aristotles account of the second way in which something is calledperfect, namely, with respect to virtue or excellence, may be adapted to expressing thefirst way, as I have done, which is taken with respect to a things determinate measure of natural magnitude according to continuous quantity (which is the kind of quantity directlyat issue in the passage currently under discussion), as St. Thomas explains. As for the helpin ordering the text the foregoing passages afford, it is readily apparent that the point madein the present section concerning the plots attaining the limit of its size (cf. in whatever extent) regards its continuous quantity, whereas the principal point made in the next andfinal section concerning its attaining the limit of its power (cf. to the greatest extent) re-gards its quantity of virtue or excellence, a correspondence no reader of philosophicaltemperament will, I think, be willing to ascribe to chance. Having, then, given a reason for

believing the foregoing species of quantity to be at issue in Aristotles treatment, one isnaturally led to wonder what else he might have said concerning them at this point in theargument.

Some further observations helping us to understand the way in which a work of the poetic art is determined or determinate, and thus possesses the third species of the beauty-ful, which is the limited or definiteness, are in order here.

In the Nicomachean Ethics (cf. X. 3, 1173a 24-25, tr. W. D. Ross) Aristotle asksthe pertinent question, ...just as health admits of degrees without being indeterminate,why should not pleasure? The same proportion is not found in all things, nor a single pro-

portion always in the same thing, but it may be relaxed and yet persist up to a point, and it

may differ in degree. The case of pleasure also may therefore be of this kind .55 With re-spect to this observation, St. Thomas Aquinas points out (cf. In X Ethic. , lect 3, n. 8, tr.B.A.M.) that things admitting of more or less, like pleasure or healthand likewise

beauty, although unmentioned heremay be called determined insofar as they some-how attain that to which they are ordained, which is their proper term:

55 But what is true of health and pleasure, also being true of beauty, will therefore be true of the plot insofar as it attains this excellence, it also being the sort of thing admitting of more or less.

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But the very form and nature of a thing is the end and that for the sake of which some-thing comes to be, as is said in the second book of the Physics (ch. 7, 198b 3) ( SummaTheol ., Ia-IIae, q. 49, art 2, c., tr. B.A.M). For the form is the term [or limit] of eachthing; the reason being that by the form the matter of each thing is terminated at its proper

being, and by the magnitude at its determinate measure. For the quantities of things followupon their forms. ( In IV Phys ., lect. 3, n. 3, tr. B.A.M.) And so in material things each

perfection is terminated and finite, since it also has one determinate form through which it

exists in one species; and also through a determinate power it has an inclination and order to certain things proportionate to it, as the heavy [is inclined and ordered] to the center.( In III Sent ., d. 27, q. 1, a. 4, c., tr. B.A.M.) Thus a work of the poetic art, like a tragedy or an epic poem, will be determinate when it possesses its form and nature as its end, limit,and perfection (the form in this case being the plot). But, as is clear from the foregoingtexts, this happens in two ways: in one way, with respect to its continuous quantity (so-called according to a likeness); in another, with respect to its quantity of virtue or power.With respect to its continuous quantity, a work of the poetic art like a tragedy will be deter-minate when its plot has attained the sufficient limit of its size in the way in which Aris-totle has explained. With respect to its quantity of virtue or power, it will be determinatewhen its plot has the ability to evoke fear and pity in the most effective manner, as is madeclear in the final passage given above, which is to attain the limit of its power. On this last

point, cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In II De Caelo , lect. 4, n. 5 (= The Heavens , translated byFabian R. Larcher and Pierre H. Conway, n. 334):

Now, Aristotle uses this manner of speaking here. He says that anything which possesses its own operation exists for its operation, for everything seeks its perfection as its end; but operation is the ultimate perfection of a thing (or at leastthe product of the operation is, in the case of those things in which there is some

product beyond the operation, as is said in Ethics I [1094a 3-7]). For it is said inOn the Soul II [412a 23] that form is first act, and operation second act as the

perfection and end of the thing acting. 56

Also worth quoting here is the following text from the same work ( In I De Caelo ,lect. 25, n. 4, = The Heavens , n. 249):

To explain the first [180] he says that if a thing is capable of something great, for example, if a man can walk 100 stades or can lift a great weight, we alwaysdetermine or describe his power in terms of the most he can do. For example, wesay that the power of this man is that he can lift a weight of 100 talents or can walk a distance of 100 stades, even though he is capable of all the partial distancesincluded in that quantity, since he can do what exceeds. But his power is notdescribed by these parts we do not determine his power as being able to carry 50talents or walk 50 stades, but by the most he can do. Consequently, the power of each thing is described with respect to the end , i.e., with respect to the ultimate,

and to the maximum of which it is capable, and with respect to the strength of itsexcellence. Thus, too, the size of a thing is determined by what is greatest for example, in describing the size of something that is three cubits, we do not say thatit is two cubits.

56 But act [ energeia ] is said in two ways, as in the case of knowledge and as in the case of the exercise of knowledge. (Aristotle, De Anima , II, 1, 412a 23, tr. H. G. Apostle) [= Aristotle. De Anima (On the Soul)(Grinnell, Iowa: The Peripatetic Press, 1981, p. 19); rev. B.A.M.] Thus, the possession of knowledge, being aform, is like first act, whereas the exercise of knowledge, being an operation, is second act.

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Similarly, we assign as the notion of man that he is rational, not that he is sensible, because what is the ultimate and greatest in a thing is what completes it and putsupon it the stamp of its species [lit. and giving its species to the thing, et dans

speciem re ]. Consequently, it is plain that one who can do what exceeds, ne-cessarily can do what is less. For example, if a person can carry 100 talents, he canalso carry two, and if he can walk 100 stades, he can also walk two; yet it is towhat is excelling that the virtue of a thing is attributed, i.e., the virtue of a thing isgauged in terms of what is most excellent of all the things that can be done. This is

what is said in another translation, the virtue is the limit of a power, because,namely, the virtue of a thing is determined according to the ultimate it can do. Andthis applies also to the virtues of the soul: for a human virtue is that through whicha man is capable of what is most excellent in human actions, i.e., in an actionwhich is in accordance with reason.

Note to Section 7

As noted above, that these remarks complete Aristotles introductory treatment of the structure of the plot is clear from the corresponding summary statement found in Chap-ter 23 (1459a 1730), especially the last part regarding the proper pleasure produced bya plot that is perfect and whole, which pleasure consists in the evoking of pity and fear, the

previous sections having adequately treated the construction of the plot around one action,whole and perfect, having a beginning, middles, and an end. (With respect to the lastsentence found in the received text of this passage, I have given my reasons for moving itin my Note to Section 3, above.)

One final point before taking leave of this section: since the text as it currentlystands makes the way in which the plot attains the limit of its power into something other than being perfect, when, as we have seen, it is itself a form of perfection, our interpret-tation suggests a further revision of its opening sentence is needed. 57

We now turn to the final part of our paper, concerning Aristotles treatment of thestructure of the plot as a whole, a consideration to be made with reference to the principleswe are now in a position to recognize as underlying the argument, namely, the three great-est forms of the beautiful.

V

Aristotle begins his treatment of the structure of the plot with what is most materialin it, namely, the parts making it up as a whole, first considering their order before turningto their size, then ending with what is most formal in it, namely, the attainment of itslimit, 58 a perfection itself presupposing the plots possession of the right size and order. Itwill be observed that the principal divisions of the text as I have organized it above cor-respond to the three greatest forms of the beautiful as follows: What pertains to order :sections 1 through 5. What pertains to symmetry : the first part of Section 6. What pertainsto the limited or definiteness : the second part of Section 6 as well as Section 7. Thus theentire course of the argument as I conceive it may be laid out as follows:

57 For example, were the text to read, But since imitation is not only of a perfect action , but also , etc., no inconsistency would arise.58 Cf. In II De Caelo , lect. 20. n. 7, where St. Thomas explains that the contained and the limited pertain tothe notion of matter, but to be containing and limiting, to the notion of form.

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I. What pertains to order (sections 1 through 5):

1. Being perfect and whole, having a certain size, manifesting the way inwhich the plot is one: Section 1

2. Being one: the way in which the plot is not one manifesting when it isso, and thus continuous: Section 2

3. (a) Being continuous and one, which is to have its parts so constructed

that, the one thing being done, it is [e]ither necessary or likely that theother come about (this being the plots defining characteristic); the plotthen being divided:

(i) with respect to quantity into what has a beginning, a middle, and anend (a division of its composing parts into species) and so pos-sessing the first form of the beautiful, namely, order : Section 3

(ii) with respect to quality into what is either simple or complex (adivision of the plot itself into species): Section 4

4. (b) Being neither continuous nor one, the connection of the episodes being distorted, from which it follows that, simply speaking, of plots andactions, the episodic are the worst: Section 5 59

II. What pertains to symmetry : Having not just any chance size but a determinateone, being neither too small to be seen nor too big to be grasped as a whole, andthus composed of parts possessing symmetry , which attribute is the second of the three greatest forms of the beautiful: the first part of Section 6

III. What pertains to the limited or definiteness , which has to do with the plots being perfect in magnitude (the last part of Section 6, as well as Section 7):

1. With respect to its dimensive quantity : when the plot has attained the limitof its size: the last part of Section 6

2. With respect to its quantity of virtue or excellence : when the plot has at-tained the limit of its power; both attributes coming under the third of thethree greatest forms of the beautiful, the limited or definiteness : Section 7

Before taking leave of this division, it must be emphasized that, as Aristotle nowhere usesthe word symmetry in the extant Poetics , the role it plays in the course of his argumentmust be inferred from what he says about the size and structure of plots as these are suit-able to epic or tragedy (a plot being too large or too small in virtue of the parts composingit), as I have indicated above in my Note to Section 6.

As a way of rounding off our investigation, it will be helpful here to take a brief look at Aristotles statement concerning the greatest forms of the beautiful in the Metaphysics :60

Now since the good and the beautiful are different (for the former always impliesconduct as its subject, while the beautiful is found also in motionless things), thosewho assert that the mathematical sciences say nothing of the beautiful or the goodare in error.

59 Note that the members of this division may also be ordered in another way, inasmuch as the first threecome under the heading possessing order, but the last, 3 (b), under not possessing order.60 Metaph. , XIII. 3 (1078a 311078b 6) (tr. W. D. Ross, rev. B.A.M.).

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For these sciences say and prove a great deal about them; if they do [35] notexpressly mention them, but prove attributes which are their results or their definitions, it is not true to say that they tell us nothing about them. The chief forms of beauty are order and symmetry [1078b] and definiteness, which themathematical sciences demonstrate in a special degree. And since these (e.g. order and definiteness) are obviously causes of many things, evidently these sciencesmust treat this sort of causative principle also (i.e. the beautiful) as in [5] somesense a cause. But we shall speak more plainly elsewhere about these matters. 61

What Aristotle understands by these terms is helpfully unfolded by the following text:

As the mathematician investigates abstractions (for before beginning his invest-tigation he strips off all the sensible qualities, e.g. [30] weight and lightness, hard-ness and its contrary, and also heat and cold and the other sensible contrarieties,and leaves only the quantitative and continuous, sometimes in one, sometimes intwo, sometimes in three dimensions, and the attributes of these qua quantitativeand [35] continuous, and does not consider them in any other respect, and ex-amines the relative positions of some and the attributes of these, and the com-mensurabilities and incommensurabilities of others [ tn de tas summetrias kaiassumetrias ], [1061b] and the ratios of others; but yet we posit one and the samescience of all these thingsgeometry)the same is true with regard to being. 62 (emphasis added)

Now inasmuch as order consists in the before and after of things, 63 it is easy to see thatthe relative positions of quantitative and continuous things pertains to this species,whereas their relative sizes, insofar as they admit of a common measure, 64 will thereforeenter into symmetry .65 The third species of the beautiful, definiteness (or, as others translateto hrismenon , the limited ), will therefore have to do with their ratios. How this is so may

be seen from the following passages from the De Anima and the De Partibus respectively:

[B]ut a thing which is composed by nature of all [the elements] has a limit and a

[certain] ratio [of elements] with respect to both size and growth, and these [i.e.limit and ratio] belong to the soul and not to fire, 66 and to the formula{= logos }rather that to the matter of the thing. 67

For nature is more a principle than matter [ a)rxh\ ga\r h( fu/sij ma=llon th=ju(\lhj , ed. Loeb].

61 To this statement Ross appends the following note: Apparently an unfulfilled promise; but see De Parti-bus I. 1, 641b 16 642a 30, where Aristotle discusses order and definiteness in just these terms.62 ibid ., XI. 3 (1061a 291061b 3) (tr. W. D. Ross).63 Cf. Cat . ch. 6 (5a 25-30) (tr. R. Glen Coughlin): In the case of number, though, one could not see how the

parts have a certain position with regard to each other or lie somewhere.... Nor those of time.... But you

would say rather that there is a certain order, by there being a before and an after of time.64 Cf. Euclid def. X.1: Those magnitudes are said to be commensurable which are measured by the samemeasure, and those incommensurable which cannot have any common measure , from which it follows thatthe parts of a composed whole will be symmetrical when they are measured by something common or one,which is the nature of the whole they compose , as the texts cited below from St. Thomas make clear.65 In which case they will be commensurable rather than incommensurable.66 Fire being a single element which grows indefinitely as long as there is fuel to feed it, as Aristotle explains.67 De An. , II. 4 (416a 15-20) (tr. H. G. Apostle, op. cit., pp. 25-26). Cf. In V Meta. , lect. 18, n. 5, cited above,as well as St. Thomas commentary on this passage, excerpted below under n. 73. And note how, in the next

passage cited, logos means both the form and nature of a thing, as well as the ratio of its elements.

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There are indeed passages in which even Empedocles hits upon this, and followingthe [20] guidance of fact, finds himself constrained to speak of the ratio (logos) asconstituting the essence and real nature of things. Such, for instance, is the casewhen he explains what is a bone. For he does not merely describe its material, andsay it is this one element, or those two or three elements, or a compound of all theelements, but states the ratio (logos) of their combination. As with a bone, so mani-festly is it with the flesh and all other similar parts .68

Thus, with respect to a thing composed by nature of all the elements, since its being limi-ted or definite presupposes its possession of a certain ratio of those elements, the under-standing of it will involve their consideration as well, 69 not only in the sciences of nature,as in the above-mentioned examples, but also in mathematics, as Aristotle says.

Since, then, each thing is perfect when no part of the natural magnitude, which belongs to it according to the species of its proper virtue, is lacking to it, and the same istrue with respect to its continuous quantity, as St. Thomas Aquinas explainsbut thatmagnitude is a function of the ratio of the elements composing it, as we have seen 70 itfollows that a thing will possess the perfection of definiteness when the elements com-

posing it possess whatever ratio will allow it to attain the limit of its size (in living thingsthere also being a limit to its growth), as well as the limit of its power. But it will also

possess symmetry and order : symmetry from the relative sizes of its constituent parts, andorder from their relative positions. 71

68 De Part. Animal. I. 1 (642a 16-24) (tr. William H. Ogle, except for the first sentence, which I have trans-lated after Apostle, Selected Works , op. cit., p. 316, in order to represent the Greek more accurately).69 And this is true whatever the elementary composition of bodies is taken to be. Note also that, inasmuch asart imitates nature as much as it is able, the same arguments will apply to works resulting from techne asmuch as those existing phusei , as is the case with the subject discussed in this paper.70 But this within a certain latitude. Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In X Ethic. , lect. 3, n. 5 (tr. B.A.M.): Nowwhen there is some form which implies in its own account a certain proportion of many things ordered toone, such a form also according to its proper account admits of more and less. This is clear in health and in

beauty, each of which imply a proportion agreeing with the nature of that which is called beautiful or healthy. And because a proportion of this kind can be more or less suitable, for this reason the very beautyor health considered in itself is said according to more and less. And from this it is clear that unity insofar assomething is determinate is the reason why something does not admit of more and less. Since, then, pleasureadmits of more and less, it will not appear to be something determinate and consequently not to belong to thegenus of good things. Cf. also In Psalm. , Ps. 44, n. 2 (tr. B.A.M.): I reply that it must be said that beauty,health, and the like are said through a respect to something: since a certain co-tempering [or balancing,contemporatio ] of humours makes health in a boy, which it does not do in an old man: for there is a certainhealth of a lion, which is death to a man. And so health is a proportion of humours in comparison to somenature. And likewise beauty consists in a proportion of the limbs and colors. And so the beauty of one thingis other than that of another thing. Cf. also Aristotle, Top ., III. 1 (116b 20-23) (tr. E.S. Forster): For healthis inherent in moisture and dryness and in heat and in cold, in a word in all the primary constituents of theliving creature, whereas the others are inherent in the secondary [constituents]; for strength is generally con-sidered to reside in sinews and bones, and beauty to be in a certain symmetry of the limbs. Cf. also Plato,Soph. 228b-c (tr. F. M Cornford): Str. And when things having motion, and aiming at an appointed mark,

continually miss their aim and glance aside, shall we say that this is the effect of symmetry among them, or of the want of symmetry? Theaet. Clearly of the want of symmetry. Thus symmetry in the composition of the body will consist in the parts having an appropriate size relative to the whole, which means hitting themark aimed at by nature. Consequently, where there is a proportion of many things ordered to one (the onehere being understood as the nature of the thing, nature being determined to one), there will be symmetry.(N.B. A brief but comprehensive overview of habitus , the genus of symmetry, comprising an article from theSumma of St. Thomas, will be found as an Appendix below.)71 Cf. Plato, Phaedrus 26a-e, especially the remark about the epitaph of Midas the Phrygian: Now in thisrhyme whether a line comes first or comes last, as you will perceive, makes no difference.... (= 26e, tr. Ben-

jamin Jowett), the defect here being a sort of non sequitur .

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With respect to their sizes, we understand that the parts must be neither too big nor toosmall, not only taken with reference to each other, but also looking to the nature of thething, so that it will be neither too small to be perceived nor too large to be taken in at aglance; while with respect to their order there must be a beginning, a middle, and an endthere, as Plato recognizes when he compares a complete discourse to an animal having ahead, a trunk, and limbs. 72

As we have noted above, then, a whole having a beginning, a middle, and an end

will possess that species of the beautiful called order when its parts are so arranged that itsform or species results; whereas symmetry will belong to a thing the commensuration of whose parts allows it to attain its appropriate size; but the limited or definiteness to that theratio of whose elements allows it to attain the limit of its size, 73 whether taken with re-spect to its continuous quantity (being neither too big nor too small), or with respect to itsquantity of virtue or power, in which case it will have the ability to produce its proper effectwhich is to say, to carry out its proper operation in the most effective manner.

From the foregoing considerations, then, we observe how definiteness presupposessymmetry, which in turn involves order, making Aristotles introductory treatment of thestructure of the plot in terms of order, symmetry, and definiteness a reasonable procedure.

[N.B. Inasmuch as it reduces to unity many parts of the foregoing investigation, the followingconsideration of habitus , the genus of symmetry, and thus of beauty, deserves to be cited in full.]

Appendix on Habitus : St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol. , Ia-IIae, q. 49, art. 4 (tr. B.A.M.)

To the fourth one proceeds as follows. obj. 1. It would seem that it is not necessary for there to behabits. For habits are that whereby something is well or badly disposed toward something, as has

been said. But something is well or badly disposed through its own form, for according to formsomething is good, as well as a being. Therefore, there is no necessity for habits.

obj. 2. Further, habit implies an order to an act. But power sufficiently implies the principle of anact, for natural powers without habits are principles of acts. Therefore, it was not necessary for there to be habits.

obj. 3. Further, just as a power relates to good and bad, so does habit; and just as powers do notalways act, so neither do habits. Therefore, powers existing, it was superfluous for there to behabits.

72 Cf. Phaedrus 264c (tr. Harold N. Fowler): Every speech must be put together like a living creature, with a body of its own; it must be neither without head nor without legs; and it must have a middle and extremitiesthat are fitting both to one another and to the whole work.73 Inasmuch as symmetry and the limited both involve the attaining of a term, it will be helpful here todistinguish between them. As we have seen, things admitting of more or less may be called determinedinsofar as they somehow attain that to which they are ordained, which is their proper term (cf. In X Ethic. ,l

perfect and whole': aristotle's poetics on the structure of the plot (papers in poetics 1)

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