north and south sudan

7/29/2019 North and South Sudan

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Peter Hornbach SOC240

Comparison of Northern and Southern Sudan

It can be said with reasonable certainty that the causes of violent turmoil within

the population of the Sudan are comprehensive and complex. The myriad of causations

that have led the Sudan to its current state of social mayhem range from the geographical,

to the religious, to the political and seem to represent a trend of perpetual division that the

country as a whole cannot escape from. Due to the constant state of social fluctuation

that characterizes this region attaining exact population demographics would be difficult

if not impossible. Because of this my investigation of the Sudan, and comparison of its

two most prominent social groups, will not focus on precise quantification of its

population. Rather it will center around general population trends and highlighted

political events that have not only led to the Sudans current state but are also continuing

to shape its future.

At first glance the political geography of the Sudan alone seems to be primarily

responsible for its ongoing violence, which has subsequently become the longest

postcolonial war in African history. The Sudan being the largest country in Sub-Saharan

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Africa has arguably been a contributor to the difficulty its population has had in

maintaining cultural and political unification. However, more than just its size its

location also creates some very obvious problems. The top half of the Sudan stretches far

up along the lines of the arid and traditionally Islamic region of northern Africa while its

southern portion dips far down into what is typically thought of as black Africa.

Not only does this geographic elongation create the potential for religious tension

but also for drastic cultural differentiation due to the diametrically differing environments

and therefore different forms of food production and economic structure. The differing

environmental pressures, which has led to differing social structures within the same

country, has arguably produced a societal powder keg of tension the ignition of which

can be traced back to one year before the Sudan was released from British occupation.

The issue of race has long been a significant and deeply polarizing issue in this

region. However, the way race is typically defined and conceptualized in the Sudan is

somewhat more abstract than the way distinctions of ethnicity are usually made in the

west. (Jok Madut Jok, 2007) Sudanese distinctions of race are typically made by taking a

full spectrum of factors into account such as religion, language, birthplace, kinship,

complexion, and devotion of loyalties. Through this method of discernment comes the

differentiation of two primary ethnic groups; the Islamic Arabs of the arid north, and the

black Africans of the predominately Christian and vegetative south. (Jok Madut Jok,

2007) Comparing racial demographics is ambiguous at best due to the conceptual nature

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of Sudanese ethnicity however recent population studies have shown that approximately

seventy percent of the Sudan self identifies as Non-Arab.

The numerical differential between these two populations was arguably a

galvanizing force behind the Arabs political power play for control in the year before the

Sudans 1956 independence. (Robert O. Collins, 2008) During British occupation the

populations of north and south were governed under two separate administrations to

prevent the transmission of tropical diseases. The numerically smaller but more

organized north typically had closer relations with the United Kingdoms and

subsequently a stronger political structure. (Robert O. Collins, 2008) Because of this,

Britain granted the north autonomous authority over the Sudans political restructuring

but also forced a 1953 agreement that the north would use this authority to establish a

federal government that incorporated both north and south into the political process.

When in 1955 it was anticipated that this agreement would not be upheld by northern

leaders civil war consequently followed lasting roughly seventeen years.

(Jok Madut Jok, 2007) During the course of the first civil war, particularly in the

1960s, the Sudanese government made considerable efforts to use southern Sudan as a

conduit in which to introduce Islamic culture into Sub-Saharan Africa. These efforts took

the form of governmental policies requiring the construction of mosques in all southern

provinces and the expulsion of Christian missionaries. (Robert O. Collins, 2008) Between

1962 and 1964 governmental dictator Ibrahim Abbud ordered an increased military

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presence in the south in order to enforce his new policies. The presence of Arab soldiers

in the south led to massive immigration from towns and cities into the wilderness where

southern Sudanese would join the rebel group Anyanya as a way of escaping the

indignities of Arab occupation. This process of depopulation almost completely

destabilized the southern economy and had tremendously adverse effects on the economy

of the north, which was dependent on southern resources. (Robert O. Collins, 2008) As

a result of making decisions, which led to such destabilization of the Sudanese economy,

Abudd was removed from power in 1964 by popular protest. While the Anyanya failed

in defeating Abudd militaristically he was never the less thwarted indirectly by his own

actions, which forced southerners resignation from the economic system.

Through this we can see the extraordinary ripple effect internal migration from an

internally divisional economic structure can have on multiple aspects of society. While

the history described thus far appears to identify race and religion as the cause for

hostilities in the Sudan it seems arguable that these things are simply a catalyst for more

basic underpinnings. A lack of resources in the arid north, as compared to the fertile

south, has likely spurned the series of conflicts that still presently continue. (Jok Madut

Jok, 2007) A 2002 United Nations estimate placed the Sudans population at

approximately thirty seven million, seven million of which live in the northern metropolis

of Khartoum, with less dense populations spreading out from Khartoum into barren,

drought affected areas. The lack of fertile land for northern pastoral communities to

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graze their cattle as well as Khartoums inability to effectively grow and store enough

food for its urban population has likely led to the northern wish to exploit southern

resources.

If proceeding along this line of logic it becomes fairly obvious why the northern

political structure so adamantly disallows the south to be involved in national decision-

making. If the population of the south were to be involved in the political process it

could possibly threaten the economic interests and resource consumption of the north.

Because of this the Sudan has trapped itself into a cyclic, self-inflammatory situation

where the north cannot afford to allow either the secession or the absorption of the

southern Sudanese. Race and religion are simply the mechanisms in which these

underpinnings have played out. Race as it is seen in the Sudan (and everywhere else) is

not a biological reality but rather a way of differentiating one group from another by

means of social criteria. And religion, as its been used by the northern government, is

simply their way of imposing dominance over the south in order to ensure their

submission and conformity to the role northern leaders need them to play.

(Robert O. Collins, 2008) The second civil war, which was in many ways a

continuation of the first one, ran from 1983 to 2005 and was sparked by many of the

same causes as its predecessor. During this time roughly 1.9 million civilians were killed

and over four million have been displaced from their homes. The affects on the civilian

population have been exceptionally destabilizing to the Sudans national economy in both

the north and south, which can be seen by the current state of absolute poverty that now

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characterizes the region. (Robert O. Collins, 2008) Additionally, during the period of

1991 to 2001 an estimated two hundred thousand southerners were captured and enslaved

in northern provinces in response to the norths economic desperation. (Jok Madut Jok,

2007) This desperate state also led the north to reach out to the Islamic community and

accept money from organizations and individuals such as the Al-Qaeda and Osama bin

Laden in exchange for safe harbor in their country. This combined with the norths 1990-

1991 support of Saddam Hussein in the Gulf war changed Americas view of the Sudan.

The Clinton administration prohibited American investment in Sudanese industry and

began taking steps to politically isolate the Sudan calling it a rogue state. Through this

we can see how population demographics and geographic resource allocation can often

create a subtle chain of events resulting in global ramifications.

The example of Darfur clearly illustrates how the squeeze of resource shortages

combined with overpopulation and racial division of food production methods often

create the foundations of conflict, thereby relegating religion to a secondary element in its

constitution. Darfur is a territory of the Sudan located on its far western border next to

Chad. The territory primarily consists of farmers of sub-Saharan descent however many

of these people practice Islam and self-identify as Arab. (Jok Madut Jok, 2007) Because

of close geographic proximity to Khartoum, and the prevalence of Islam, Darfur was for

decades a strong supporter of the north in its campaign against the south. However, the

current situation there clearly shows how population concerns often, if not always, take

priority over purely religious ones.

For the majority of its history Darfur was a homogenized state governed by one

ruling aristocracy. (Jok Madut Jok, 2007) However, after it was conquered by the British

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in 1916 Darfur was sectioned off into more than thirty distinct provinces in order to

administratively deal with its size, which is roughly comparable to France. This not only

divided the geography of Darfur but also divided its population creating, as the

Darfurians see it, more than thirty distinct ethnicities each willing to kill and die to

protect their borders. Had the social structure of Darfur been more centralized, as it once

was, the response to Saharan Arab herders encroaching on Darfurian farmland arguably

may not have been as violent.

(Robert O. Collins, 2008) In 1984-1985 northern Sudan was gripped by a drought

that still has yet to subside. The result was a fading of fertile grasslands for Arab goat

and camel herders to graze their herds, which pushed herders into a state of abject

poverty and near social collapse. While some herders made mostly unsuccessful attempts

to farm most began to move down into Darfur and feed their herds by encroaching on

Darfurian crop fields. Predictably, the Darfurians took up arms against the herders and

the herders did the same against the Darfurians. The current state of poverty and

economic collapse in Darfur is not so much the direct result of these hostilities but rather

the governmental response to them. (Jok Madut Jok, 2007) Both sides called upon the

government for assistance.

Its response was to take the side of the Arab herders and dispatch their northern

militia force, known as the Janjaweed, to Darfur for the purpose of suppressing the

Darfurian rebels. At first glance it seems counter intuitive that the government would

take this action considering the religious and political affiliation Darfur once had with

Khartoum. However, upon closer inspection one can see that the government sided with

those whom they view to be not only religiously Muslim but also ethnically Muslim as

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opposed to the black African Darfurians whom the government considers to be second

rate or not real Muslims.

Since the dispatching of the Janjaweed, which roughly translated means devils

on horseback, indiscriminate killings, destruction of farmland, poisoning of water

supplies, burning of villages, and mass rape has become a fact of life in Darfur. By 2004

Darfurian migration to Chad had mushroomed leaving vast areas almost completely

depopulated. At this time refugee camps in Chad had grown to approximately one

hundred and twenty thousand people and nearly one million two hundred thousand

people were displaced internally within Darfur. Presently, this internal displacement and

growing refugee community continues to develop. Despite the obvious economic

ramifications this will likely have on the Sudan as a whole the growing population of

refugees in Chad presents yet another issue.

(Phillip Verwimp, 2004) In 1994 the world saw what is sometimes referred to as a

dogs of war effect when roughly five hundred thousand refugeess fled Rwanda in

response to genocide at the hands of Hutu extremists and began populating refugee

camps in what was then called Zaire. When the Hutu extremist group itself, known as the

Interahamwe, was expelled from Rwanda they too took up refuge in Zaire and

subsequently found throngs of young, orphaned, densely populated males that could

easily be swayed to their cause. Consequently this has greatly contributed to the present

day violence of what is now the Democratic Republic of Congo.

Similarly, it seems that this same phenomenon could very easily happen in the

refugee camps of Chad where population is extremely dense and united together by a

common hatred for Saharan Arabs. Arguably, this could lead to a massive armed reentry

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of the Sudan and perpetuation of the already explosive violence that characterizes the

region. In conclusion if attempting to generalize a comparison between north and south

Sudan possibly the most appropriate way of expressing it is that their dissimilarities are

irreconcilable. Not because they are so dissimilar but rather because of theyre

perceptual dissimilarities concerning each other, themselves, and their relation to the

country as a whole. Differing realities of environment makes the north need the south

while the symbolic pull of culture creates northern aversion toward treating the south as

being needed. Understanding how these population pressures in relation to culture has

created the Sudans cyclical paradox of instability is relevant if attempting to understand

the nature of ourselves and what relation our own behaviors and attitudes have on the

future of our own societies.

Bibliography

Books:

Jok Madut Jok, 2007, Sudan: Race, Religion and Violence

Robert O. Collins, 2008, A History of Modern Sudan

Articles:

Phillip Verwimp, Population Studies, 2004, Death and Survival duringthe 1994 genocide in Rwanda

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