lewis, the seventh letter, and the unity of plato's political philosophy

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The Southern Journal

o

Philosophy 2000)

Vol.

XXXVIIII

The

Seventh Letter

and the Unity

of

Plato’s Political Philosophy

V

Bradley Lewis

The Catholic University

o

America

At the hea rt of th e

S e u e n t h L e t t e r

l ies a teaching th a t

should challenge conventional orthodoxy regarding the uni ty

of Plato’s political philosophy. That orthodoxy holds that

Plato’s L a w s represents a change or development in his

thinki ng about the best regime. In the

R e p u b l i c ,

s o

this

account goes,

Plato

advocated the unlimited rule of

philosophers, b ut th e experience of Syracuse convinced him

th at th is goal was unrealistic. The

L a w s

represents, then,

Plato’s revised political teaching, one that advocates the rule

no t of philosophy, but of law.’ What is curious about th is

account, however, is th a t the S e v e n t h L e t t e r , the source of

all

our knowledge about th e tr ip s to Sicily, appea rs to advocate

both teachings: th e ru le of philosophy an d th e ru le of law. If

we can make sense of the teaching of the

S e v e n t h L e t t e r,

then

we will have

a

more complete understanding of Plato’s

political philosophy, one t ha t renders the

R e p u b l i c

and

L a w s

parts of

a

lar ger In thi s paper,

I

shaII argue tha t

Plato’s consistent political teaching was that philosophy must

have a place in t he best regime, but th at th e character of tha t

regime will be legal. The larger and more systematic works,

the

Republ ic

and

L a w s ,

represent two stages of a single line of

inquiry: the fir st in to th e n at ure of philosophy, which shows

the character

o f

i t s influence i n political life

as

well

as

the

tensions between philosophical and political life, an d t he

second into the specific legal form

of

a

regime adequate or

as

adequate as possible) t o those principle^.^ The Seven th Le t t er

presents t his teaching in miniature , and while it lacks the

subtlety and completeness of the larger dialogues, it provides a

valuable glimpse into the shape of Plato’s political teaching as

a

whole.

V

Bradley Lew is i s Ass i s tant Professor in the School of Phi losoph y

o

t he Ca tho l i c Un iver s i t y of Am er ica . H i s work o n Plato’ s po li t ica l

phi losophy has appeared i n

His tory o f Polit ical Th oug ht

and

Polity.

231



V.

Bradley

Lewis

There are two preliminary matters about the letter tha t call

for brief mention, both of which raise possible objections

t o

the

very idea of reading the lett er a s I do. First, many scholars

contend that the letter is not an authentic work of

plat^.^

While

this paper is not directly concerned with the question of

authenticity, its conclusions do support Platonic a ~ t h o r s h i p . ~

Most scholars who reject the letter do so on the grounds that its

content contradicts that of Plato’s dialogues, particularly the

Republic and Laws.‘j If it can be shown that the teaching of the

let ter i s consistent with Plato’s other works, as thi s paper

argues, then this objection loses much of its force.7

Second, most scholars read the letter primarily as a kind of

apologia Platonis, explaining in detail why Plato saw fit t o

involve himself in the political mess of Syracuse under the

tyranny of Dionysius II.8 Hence, the letter is viewed first as an

exercise in self-justification. This is not an unreasonable way

to

read th e letter, since in i t Plato defends himself again st a

number of accusations see especially 328c, 329abL9 However, it

is an inadequate reading since it allows one t o overlook much of

wha t is most valuable in t he l ette r from the perspective of

political philosophy, namely, its actual view

of

politics. I take

the letter, the n, a t it s word in it s claim

t o

be advice

t o

the

“friends and comrades”of Dion.lo

The basic facts of Plato’s involvement in Syracuse are well

known and can be briefly summarized.” Plato probably first

went t o Syracuse at the invitation of Dionysius the Elder ( c . 430-

367), who ruled as military strongman f o r some thirty-eight

years. 2 The tyrant, a somewhat idiosyncratic character who

fancied himself a great poet, apparently desired the company

of

renowned men

of

letters.13 Other biographers hold t ha t Plato

traveled

t o

Syracuse initially

t o

observe the volcano on Mount

Aetna.14 In either case, he did not get along with the tyrant,

perhaps because

of

his free way of speaking parrZsia),15 nd

returned

t o

Athens that same year.16 He did, however, have time

to meet and befriend Dionysius’s ascetical brother-in-law,Dion.

A t

the tyrant’s death, his son Dionysius I1 inherited the rule.

His early days seemed hopeful since he cut taxes, released

prisoners , and made Dion an important advisor. Dionysius

seemingly aspired t o become a kind of enlightened despot, and

it was this turn of events that prompted Dion to invite Plato t o

return and assist in educating the young tyrant in philosophy

thus to effect more sweeping political reform in Syracuse. After

serious hesitation discussed more fully below), Plato returned

in 367. Other forces a t court, however, resented Dion’s influence

and thought the philosopher a threa t t o their own power. They

subsequently turned Dionysius against Dion and secured the

latter’s exile. Plato found himself under house arrest for a time,

but Dionysius valued Plato’s opinion of him and eventually set

the philosopher free.

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The

Seventh Letter

and the Unity

of


Six years later th e ty rant invited Plato to return again,

sending emissaries

t o

report on his zeal for and progress in

philosophy

as

well as to deliver

a

veiled thr ea t aga ins t Dion

should Plato not come. So in 362 Plato traveled to Syracuse for

the third time, motivated chiefly, i t seems, by concern for Dion.

The visit was a disaster, however, and P lato was once again

embroiled in complicated court intrigue. He returned to Athens,

and at th e Olympiad of

36

elated all

of

this to t he still-exiled

Dion, who th en formed a plot to invade and liberate Syracuse.

With the cooperation of

a

number of Plato’s followers i n the

Academy tho ugh not Plato ), he launched a successful

expedition t o Sicily, forcing Dionysius

I1

to withdraw. One of his

allies, however, the populist Heraclides, soon became a powerful

rival, and Dion was again exiled. When Dionysius I1 launched

an effort t o retake Syracuse, Dion returned to thwart him and

again took power. The enemy of tyrants then may have become

one himself the sources ar e somewhat unclear) and was in any

case assassinated in 353, His followers fled to Leontini, and it

was their request f o r Plato’s advice that motivated the

composition of the Seventh Letter.

1. The Evils of Cities:

Plato’s Motivation

The first questions t o be answered concern the motivation

behind Plato’s only known intervention in actual politics. Why

would he abandon his philosophical enterprises” for something

as bizarre as what eventually transpired in Syracuse? Of course

Plato would not have known precisely how the

affair

would end,

but the letter does contain striking statemen ts of Plato’s

apprehension about the trip. These apprehensions are important,

for

they belie any sense of political idealism o r zeal

for

massive

political reform, th e sort of zeal tha t must have been present if

Plato’s intentions had been something like the establishment of

Kallipolis in Sicily. Just w ha t were Plato’s expectations? They

were an yth ing bu t naive. While P lato confesses to havin g

nurtured political ambitions as a young man, these ambitions

had already been purged by the ti me of his involvement in

Syracuse. Plato’s hopes fell victim to the turbulence of the period

at the end and just after the Pelopponesian War, and they mirror

quite closely the doubts about political activity voiced by Socrates

in the Apology. There Plato has Socrates distance himself from

any political party. First he explains that he incurred t he wrath

of democrats by his refusal to participate in the illegal

prosecution of the generals held responsible for Athenian losses

after the battle of Arginusae in 4 6

B.C. Apology

32b); la ter he

refused to participate in the arrest of Leon of Salamis during the

rule of the Thirty Tyrants in 4 4

B.C .

32cd), th us provoking the

enm ity of th e oligarchic party. Plato’s own doubts ar e qui te

233



V.

Bradley Lewis

similar. He writes that an opening was made for him by relatives

involved i n t he reign of the Thirty and th at , while favorably

disposed to the more noble ambitions of the Thirty, he was

eventually disillusioned. What were their initial plans?

The arist ocrat s who made up the puppet government

established by the Spartans were opposed to what some historians

have called th e “radical” democracy th at was established by t he

political reforms of Cleisthenes 510

B.c.)

and continued through

th e mid-fifth centu ry by Ephialtes, culminating i n th e

emasculation of the conservative Areopagite Council in 462. l8

Plato writes explicitly that these men disapproved of the regime

(pol i te ia , 324~2)f Athens and that he himself was motivated by

hopes that they would lead the city from “an unjust life t o

a

just

character” 324d6). We know from other sources th at the Thirty

justified their revolution in the name of the p atr io s p o l i t e i ~ . ’ ~his

course may even have been prescribed in the treaty of peace with

Sparta.20The patr ios pol i te ia was usually identified with reforms

of Solon made in 594. While the phrase patr ios po l i t e ia does not

often occur in the Platonic corpus, Solon’s regime does receive

particular praise. In the Republ ic Solon is referred to

as

a “good

lawgiver” 599e1-3), though more important is th e discussion of

Solon in the Laws.

In the third book of the

Laws,

the Athenian s t ranger

arti cula tes his teaching on t he “mixed regime” through

a

comparison of the two “mother regimes,” Persia and Athens, t he

former characterized by extreme monarchy and t he l at te r by

extreme democracy. Each, however, had originally been mixed:

Persia during the reign of Cyrus and again under Darius), and

Athens under th e “ancient regime

(p a la ia p o l i t e ia )

with certain

rulers according

t o

a division into four classes” 698134-5).This

is an obvious reference to Solon’s reforms, the hallmark of

which was the division of Athenian citizenship into four classes

based on wealth.21What was crucial about this regime, however,

was the presence among the citizens of

aid ,

“awe” which was

rooted in their “enslavement t o the laws” 698b6, 69 9~ 2- 5,

700a3-5) an d led to friendshi p ( p h i l i a ) among them 69 8~ 3,

699~1-2 ). his friendship was destroyed with t he loss of awe

and the corruption of the laws that followed the radical

democratization of the regime and ended in lawlessness and the

abolition of obedience not only to law, but t o parents, elders, and

even the gods “leading to

a

hard era with no surcease of evils”

701~4-5) .n t he more constructive pa rts of the Laws, the

Athenian says th at a legislator will respect awe with the

greates t honors and consider its absence th e “greatest evil for

everyone, both individually and in public” 647a8-b ) , and later,

in explaining his understanding

of

th e best sort of regime, he

recounts the myth of th e rule of Kronos, who administered the

human things through daimons who “provided peace and awe

and good law

( e u n o m i a )

and justice in abundance” 713e1-2),

234



The

Seventh Letter

and the Unity of Plato’s Political Philosophy

which led to happiness for the people and freedom from civil

strife

s t a s i s ) .

His advice, then, is

t o

imitate the age of Kronos

by subjecting the human desires for tyranny to the rule of law:

This present argument is saying, then, that there will be no rest

from evils and toils for those cities where not a god, but some

mortal rules. Rather we should imitate by every device what is

said to have been the life under Kronos, and obey whatever

within us partakes of immortality, publicly and privately, in the

running of households and cities, giving the name law to the

issue of intelligence ( nous ) . 713e3-714a2)

Whether Plato retained his loyalty to the p a t r io s p o l i t e ia of his

aristocratic relations is unknown. He did, however, maint ain

his advocacy of the rule of law supported by awe

as

th e only

check on22 h e destructive desire for preeminence that ruined

the politics of his youth and destroyed his own political

aspirations. This understanding of Plato’s youthful experience

is clarified in th e re st of the autobiographical section of the

Seventh L et ter .

Plato’s initial disaffection resulted from the Thirty’s

attempts to implicate Socrates in their actions by ordering him

to participate in the arrest of Leon of Salamis as described in

the A p o l o g y . Plato writes that he was “unable to bear”

( e d u s c h e r a n a )

this

sig ht and so “withdrew myself from those

evils” 325a4-5). After th e fall of the Thirty and the restoration

of democracy, Plato again considered entering

a

political career

desp ite his clear-eyed obse rvation of some of th e s eam ier

aspects of the new politics, especially the use of the revolution

as

a cover for crude personal score-settling. Overall, however, he

thought tha t the returned exiles behaved equitably with

e p i e i k e i a , 325b41, bu t no sooner had h e concluded th is t han

Socrates was arrested, tried for impiety, and sentenced to death.

The more Plato reflected on the political things, the more

difficult

it

seemed for them to be managed rightly 325~6-d l ).

Any real reform seemed impossible without “men who were

frien ds an d trustw orth y companions” 325d1). This was

presumably a problem because the qualities tha t would make

potential allies trustwo rthy were precisely those in s hortest

supply in the increasingly corrupt Athenian regime since “the

practices (ep i tedeurnata)and character traits (Gthesin)”were no

longer those of the ancestors (patrcjn, 325d3-41, that is, those of

the p a t r i o s p o l i t e i a . Training men with better characters,

moreover, would be extremely difficult, especially since the

written laws

(norno i g ra rnrna to i )

and character trai ts were

decaying s o quickly. All of thes e fac tor s stifled Plato’s fir e

(horrne)for public life. While he never stopped thinking about

improvements in the “whole regime,” he held back “waiting for

the right time” ( k a i r o s , 326a2). Finally, Plato concluded t hat

politics was so badly conducted that only “some amazing

235



V. Bradley Lewis

preparation accompanied by fortune” could improve it 326a5-6).

That amazing thing would be either the conversion of rulers to

philosophy o r the entrance of philosophers into politics.

I

was forced to say, praising correct philosophy, that from

it

alone

was i t possible to see the jus t things in both public and private

life, and th at t he human race would never be free of evils unless

eit her th ose who tru ly an d correctly philosophize come into

power

o r

th e political men and chiefs in cities, throug h some

divine dispensation, become philosophers. 326a6-b4)

This conclusion

is

precisely th at sta ted by Socrates in t he

fifth book of t h e R e p u b l i c 473c l l -e2) to the young a nd

ambitious Glaukon in response to the latter’s zeal for

establ ishing

a

city of perfect just ice .2 3 n th at discussion

between Plato’s mentor an d his brother , Plato m ust have

recounted the bitter frui t of his own experience. Moreover, he

sta ted a principle th at was to remain a n importa nt pa rt of

his understanding of politics.

What is crucial is Plato’s claim to have reached these

conclusions before his very first journey t o Syracuse he sta tes

this explicitly a t 326b5-6).

S o

Plato’s views about politics were

indeed characterized by disillusionment, but this happened

t o

him

at

a relatively young age and before he ever set foot in the

court of Dionysius II.24When he did arrive in Sicily, it was after

much trepidation over his possible intervention in the island’s

political affairs. This in iti al trepidation was only reinforced

when Plato found life in Syracuse exceedingly disordered. The

only things

its

inhabitants took seriously ( s p o u d e ) were eating,

drinking, and sexual excess 326d3). Plato did not believe that

any city that lived such a life could be well-governed, but would

always be ch aracterized by turmoil an d change of regimes,

although none of which was “just or equitable” isonornos,

326d5-6). And indeed Plato found Syracuse full of civil str ife

stasis,

329b8).

The diagnosis of the central political problem as one of s tas i s

is

a

staple of Plato’s political philosophy and is prominent in his

dialogues, especially the Republ ic and

Laws.25

n fact, it is the

problem of s ta s i s tha t provokes the proposals, bizarre as they

are, that comprise the bulk

of

the fifth book of the Republ ic . The

problem begins

at

th e very

start

of the construction of th e “city

in speech” and th e acceptance of Glaukon’s demand t ha t their

city be constructed on the basis of not the ascetical characters

of

the “healthy city,” but rather th e more realistic inhabitants of

the “feverish city.” The liberation of desire tha t leads to that city

also leads to war with other cities and thus to the creation of an

army. Since that army will be conceived on the basis of

Socra tes’ principle of “one man, one a rt ,” it will be

a

professional army of highly trained soldiers, but precisely their

military prowess will ra ise th e possibility t ha t they may pu t

236



The Seuenth Letter

and the Unity

of

Plato’s Political

Philosophy

the ir expertise to use against one anothe r or against th e

citizens they a re trained to protect 375bc). Hence the elaborate

educational regime that makes up most of the second and third

books of the dialogue. The purpose of this education is to make

the soldiers both exemplary warriors and exemplary citizens,

that is, not prone

t o

fight with one ano ther 386a, 414de,

416ab).

The principle that justif ies the introduction of communism

among th e gua rdi ans is absolute unity 423d), as s ta ted

explicitly in th e fifth book. There a program for eugenics is

introduced and secretly administered by the rulers so that the

division of th e city into th e th ree classes distinguis hed by

unique functions is maintained and that th e “herd of guardians

be as free as possible from faction” a s t a s i a s t o s , 459e1-3).

Similarly, Socrates gets his interlocutors to agree th at there is

no greater evil for a city th an “whatever divides i t up an d

makes it many rath er than one” 462a9-bl) and th at t he best-

governed city is “most like a single human being” 462~10). his

se ts up an analogy of th e best city to

a

single human being in

which every citizen feels the same pleasures and pains as the

others. However desirable i t may be in theory, it seems obvious

th a t such a high degree of functio nal un ity

is

a practical

impossibility in any human political organization. Plato has the

Athenian stran ger say

as

much in the

Laws

7 3 9 ~ - e ) . ~ ~he

contrary, however, tha t stasis was the great political evil does

seem to have been Plato’s consistent view, and this because of

the violence and disorder that resulted from it , a disorder th at

was t he legacy of the heroic age whose Homeric motto was

“always t o be the best and excel all

The whole principle of philosopher-rulers is explicitly said to

be a n answe r to this problem late r in the sixth and seve nth

books. Socrates sets the stage by telling Glaukon and

Adeimantus tha t philosophers ar e motivated chiefly by th ei r

love of knowledge

at

th e end of the fifth book and reinforcing

this in t he sixth with his statement t h at the ir inquiries into

what

is

“always” will cause them to regard the human things as

nothing great. He illustra tes this view with the image of the

pilot: th e tru e pilot is of course the only one on board the ship

who does not wish to steer it, but t o indulge his enthusiasm for

stargazing, while t he others fight over who sits in the captain’s

chair 488a-el. Finally, in the seventh book Socrates gives his

best short-hand justification for philosophic rule by saying that

“men who are not lovers of ruling must go to it; otherwise rival

lovers will figh t” 521b4-5). Thu s t he gr eat evil is faction

s tas i s ) ,

and the cause of faction

is

the love of honor that causes

men to compete for political preeminence. The only solution

here is to reserve political rule for men who do not wish it, but

instead desire the only good that can be truly common:

knowledge.

237



V. Bradley Lewis

That faction is the principal political problem is also evident

in the L a w s . Civil war ( s t a s i s ) is frequently said to be the worst

o r harshest form

of

war, worse than war with external enemies

628bc, 629c, 630b). It is also called th e “greatest illness” for a

city 744d4-5) and the man responsible for causing i t is held to

be th e “gr eat est enemy of th e whole city” 856b6-7) an d

is

subject to the death penalty. Recall also the myth of the age of

Kronos which was preeminently an age without s t a s i s , since

this problem is one characteristic of mortals and not gods. The

problem t he n is s t a s i s , the often violent competition for the

goods

a t

st ak e in political life, most impor tan tly honor. The

solution is philosophy since philosophy’s object is not finite as is

the love of honor’s.

2.

Philosophical Politics

It is one thing to argue that philosophy is

a

passion which,

since its object is infinite and immaterial, does not lead to

s tas is ,

yet i t is quite another actually to determine how philosophy can

influence political life. Let us look again at the statement about

philosophic rule in the S e v e n t h L e t te r side by side with th e

comparable sta tement s from the Republ ic and aws and then

look at the letter’s more specific political proposals with these

passages in mind. In the letter, Plato writes,

I was forced to say, prais ing correct philosophy, t hat from th at

alone was it possible to see the ju st things in both public and

private life; and that t he h um an race would not be free of evils

unle ss ei the r those who truly an d correctly philosophize come

into power or the political men a nd chiefs in cities, through some

divine dispensation, become philosophers. 326a6-b4)

Now the Republ ic:

Unless, I said, th e philosophers exercise kingship in cities

o r

those now said

to

be kings an d chiefs genuinely and adequately

philosophize, an d political power and philosophy come toge ther

in th e sa me place, while th e many natu res now approach one

separa te from the other ar e forcefully excluded, the re is no rest

from evils, de ar Glaukon, for t he cit ies, nor,

I

think, for the

hu ma n race, nor will the regime we have now described in

speech come forth by nat ure , as f ar

as it is

possible, and

see

the

light of the sun. 473cll-e2)

Finally, from the L a w s :

What th e present account

is

saying, us ing t he t ru th ,

is

t h a t

ther e can be no re st from evi ls an d toi ls for those c it ies in

which some mortal rules rather than

a

god. 713e3-6)

While the first two s tatements a re virtually identical, the third

differs a bit, though the difference can be easily explained. The

238



The Seuenth Letter and the Unity

of


reason philosophers are to rule in the

Republic

is explicitly said

to result from their peculiar characters, that is, that they do not

desire th e sorts of things tha t nonphilosophers do, most notably

the honor tha t is the prize of those who rule. Philosophical rule

is a n answer to th e problem of

stasis.

The same can be said of

the principle

as

stated in the letter as interpreted above. Why

are gods substituted for philosophers in th e Laws, and what are

the implications of this change?

The Athenian’s app eal to the myth of the age of Kronos,

already indicated, offers an explanation. The rule of law is a n

“imitation” of th e mythical rule of Kronos. I t is not the same as

that rule since the god is not actually administering the human

things, but it is

a

second-best solution to the problems involved

in administering th e human things that stem precisely from th e

mortal n at ur e of humans, th e insecurity, neediness, an d

desperate partiality of th e human condition on its own. The

desire for tyranny is the most characteristic nonphilosophical

attempt to transcend t he neediness and incompleteness of th e

human condition, to escape the portion of mort als which is

death. The rule of law is a n attempt to mitigate this problem by

removing t he worst excesses of the se desir es from political

affairs. It is a n attempt to t ake th e

most mortat

element out of

politics 875a-d).

Of course the rule of law is always conditioned by the rule of

men. The very best laws,

as laws, are of no use a gain st the

boundless cunning of vicious men. And similarly, laws mus t

always be interpreted, a truth nicely summarized in the famous

o r infamous) ta g th at “the constitution is what the Supreme

Court says it is.” The degree to which interpretation and

enforcement actually blend i nto lawmaking vari es with th e

system of law and th e power of the interp reters , and is most

present i n limit cases, but it

is

inescapable. The Athenia n

stranger recognizes this need and provides for it in an

ingenious way throu gh t he vehicle of th e “nightly meeting”

nukterinos

s u l l o g o s ) , a body of men whose business it is to

debate the nature of the noble and the just things and who also

occupy the principal political offices of the city. The discussions

that take place during their nightly conferences will influence

th e daily execution of thei r juridical duties an d thus give the

ruling class

a

ta st e for philosophy that may serve as

a

bulwark

against stasis and tyranny.28

What is crucial here is th at th e rule of law represents a n

approximation of philosophy insofar as both intend the sam e

specifically

political

end, th e prevention of

stasis

and tyranny.

Philosophy, of course, has a higher end, as acknowledged by the

provisions Socrates makes for the compulsion of the philosophers

to return to the cave and his doubts that they would ever consent

to rule absent coercion.29 ndeed, the very notion of philosophers

engaging in political rule is intentionally p a ra d o ~ i ca l .~ ~ever-

239



V. Bradley Lewis

theless, in their political contexts they aim

at

the establishment of

a good th at transcends t he desires of individuals and factions

against one another. That a city would be ruled by philosophers is,

the R e p u b l i c clearly suggests, highly unlikely.31 That a city

governed by laws and officials who valued philosophy might exist

is another question. At a minimum, a Platonically-minded political

reformer would wish to substitute some legal regime for the rule of

a tyrant, for a regime governed fundamentally by laws would go

some distance towards mitigating the evils of stasis. That stasis is

a political evil, a danger to the healthy life of cities, seems clear.

One might well ask, however, why a philosopher whose proper

concerns transcend human affairs should be concerned with stusis.

A complete answer to th is question would t ak e us beyond t he

present discussion. Nevertheless, one can say

at

least the

following:

a

philosopher of the Socratic type has an interest in

being able to carry out philosophic inquiry in common with other

inquirers and thus would be concerned for the maintenance of the

conditions necessary to support the common good of philosophical

inquiry. These would likely include just those goods threatened by

or rendered null by civil strife, e.g., peace, basic justice, and the

education both moral and intel lectual) of potential fellow

inquirers. These are a few basic interests that might encourage a

philosopher to become involved in the kind of political reform

described above.32What would

a

genuinely practical attempt

at

such reform look like? This brings us back to the

Seuenth Letter.

3. Fate Plays Its Hand

Plato’s advice to the friends and companions of Dion is, he

claims, precisely the advice he gave Dionysius

I1

and the advice

that Dion himself would have taken, had his at tempt to wrest

power from the tyrant succeeded 331d6-el; 33 4~ 3-8, 5-6). That

advice is for whomever governs Syracuse to renounce tyranny

and insti tute

a

regime governed by laws, th a t is, th e sor t of

regime described in the L a w s . 3 3Plato also, however, places

constraints on political action, which he similarly discusses in

the

R e p u b l i c

and Laws. The co nstraints highlight ju st how

precarious an activity political reform is and therefore reinforce

one of the most central and consistent facets of Plato’s political

philosophy. The constraints

are

of two kinds, though related in

an important way.

The first constraint is that one should not do violence in

at tempting t o reform one’s regime. Thi s may seem a n odd

principle when one thinks of some of the more outrageous

proposals put forth by Socrates in the Republic , for example, the

proposal th a t the easiest way by which to establish Kallipolis

would be t o expel everyone over the age of ten 540e5-541a7).34

However, given th e proposals in th e fifth book, th is notion

seems intended to a le rt us to precisely the dangers of radical

240



The Seventh

Letter

and the Unity of Plato’s Political Philosophy

political reform. We see this idea confirmed in the L a ws . There

th e Athenian stranger is in the process of criticizing the Dorian

warrior psychology that informs the regimes of his two

interlocutors, Kretan an d Sp ar ta n respectively. The Athenian

suggest s t h at in any large family, one t h at includes many

brothers, more are likely to be unjust th an just an d asks who

would be the more appropriate judge in such

a

situation: would

it be one who destroyed the evil ones and set the good ones up

to rule themselves, one who made the worthy rule while

allowing the vicious to be ruled by them, or finally one who

“ta kin g over one divided family and destroying no one, bu t

ra th er reconciling ( d i a l l a s s e i n ) them by laying down laws for

them for the

rest

of time able to safeguard their friendship with

one another” 627e3-628a3)? Kleinias accepts tha t th is th ird

alt ern ati ve would be best, an d th e dialogue proceeds along

those lines, proposing a politics of reconciliation that aims at

peace and friendship. Of course this legal regime is not the best

simply-the second possibility, in which the vicious are ruled by

th e virtuous, is the absolute standard paradoxical though it is)

shown in the Rep ub l i c . The claims of the truly best citizens of

the Republ ic are in the Laws submerged in the rule of law and

in the principle tha t claims

t o

rule need to be properly mixed,

so tha t the L a w s envisions not the best regime bu t the best

practicable

regime.35

This principle is stated even more emphatically in the letter,

no doubt because th e circumsta nces of the l et te r ar e more

immediately political. Plato is advising men who in all

likelihood still harbor revolutionary plans. To these men Plato

writes that one should never use violence against one’s native

city, tha t “revolution” ( r n e t a b o k , 331d3) is not a n option. If the

task of reform requir es t he exile or de at h of one’s political

enemies, one should “rem ain stil l an d pray f o r the good of

himself and his city” 331d5-6). The dialogues, as dramatic

works whose end is philosophy, point

t o

this principle; the letter

states

it

e ~ p l i c i t l y . ~ ~owever, in light of th e addressees of th e

letter, it stil l seems unnecessary to tr ea t the prohibition on

violence as categorical. If Plato had assessed the character of

Dion’s followers differently, his advice might have been

diff erent . While h e refused t o take any role in Dion’s own

efforts, he never s ays he opposed them. There could be a

strategic reason for this, i.e., an unwillingness to criticize Dion’s

actions to his friends and companions. I t could also be t ha t

Plato thought Dion capable of bringing off th e sort of reform he

supported. Plato seems most concerned to moderate t he desire

for vengeance on the part of Dion’s followers an d elsewhere in

the letter advises that if they do come into power they should

refrain from the usual retribution against political opponents

th a t follows changes of regime see especially 336d8-337b3).

Here as in the Rep ub l i c and Laws Plato emphasizes the risks

241



V. Bradley Lewis

and precariousness of political reform in an attempt to

moderate its most destructive excesses.

The second, related constraint is really th e exposition of a

limit on political activity generally, a limit tied to the necessity

for political activity to be importantly coextensive with

friendship. Recall th a t earlier Plato wrote th at his withdrawal

from political ambition was partly based on the inability to find

adequate comrades 325d1). Plato’s advice and Dion’s

as

well)

was t ha t Dionysius work t o establ ish control over himself to

become e n k r a t g s , 331d9), and th us win friends and allies for

himself. The implicit principle here seems to be th at virtue, real

vir tue,

is

attr acti ve. As a practical example, Plato tu rn s to

Darius, the great Persian king whose principal accomplishment,

according to Plato, was his legislation 332b5). Darius served

as

a positive model in the L a w s , where his achievement is said by

the Athenian stranger t o have been legislation 695~10)nd a

regime characteri zed by “a so rt of equali ty” ( i s o t s t a t i n a ,

695clO-d1), which in t urn led t o the acquisition of allies and

friendship

( p h i l i a ,

695d2). Recall also that one of the most

chilling aspects of tyranny described by Socrates in

Republ ic

IX

is its destruction of friendship 576a4-6).

One advantage th at Darius is said to have had in the Laws

an advantage that led to his institution of friendship and th e

rule of law, was

a

good education. More specifically, he was not

raised under an “indulgent education” (pa ide ia ou d ia truphGsd ,

6 9 5 ~ 7 ) . ionysius’s education and instruction ( p a i d e i a and

s u n o u s i a , 332d2), however, were neglected by his fa ther and

predecessor), thus leading

t o

the dissolute way of life that Plato

found s o antithetical to both the life of philosophy and t o

orderly politics. Thus th e

first

necessity was for the tyrant to

change his way of life, t o live in th e orderly way t h a t is a

prerequisite to philosophy as a mea ns of gett ing Dion to see

that tyranny itself is bad and to consent to its replacement by

law.

S o

Plato urged Dionysius to induce his relatives a nd

companions t o become “friends in t he pu rsui t of excellence”

One might plausibly object here that Plato’s ambition to

convert Dionysius

t o

philosophy an d th us accomplish t he

reform of Syracuse’s regime was itself naive. Indeed, one can

ente rtain considerable skepticism about th e possibility of any

politician, much less

a

ruling tyrant, becoming a philosopher.

It is not at all clear, however, that Plato thought th is possible

or seriously attempted i t. He did attempt to instruct Dionysius

and

t o

convince him t o reform his life, thou gh he seems to

have done th is a t a level below t h e phi lo sop h i^.^? Indeed,

Plato’s counsel t o Dionysius is described

as

l e g o m e n a k a i

p a r a k e l e u o m e n a 333a6) t o the effect that by perfecting

himself in prudence and self-control and setting up a regime of

laws he might make oth er cities his allies and increase th e

332d3-5).

242



The Seventh Letter and the Unity of Plato’s Political Philosophy

scope of his empire 333e). In oth er words, Plato offered the

ty ra nt specifically political inducements to embark on the path

of genuine reform. A similar moment occurs on the very last

page of the L aw s , when th e Athenian s t ra nger exhorts

Kleinias to tr y

t o

found th e so rt of city and institutions they

have been discussing by predicting t ha t if the project were

carried out successfully, th e Kre tan would reap “the grea tes t

fame” 969 a7) . The cooperation of political power a nd

philosophy i s always accomplished thr ough th e medium of

rhetoric and p e r s u a ~ i o n . ~ ~

How such reform might actuall y occur is exposed in th e

very real i ty of the let te r , but i t is confirmed by both the

Republ ic and L a w s . The basic mechanism is the coming

together of political power and philosophy,

a

convergence that

could take a number of forms. The first and most obvious form

is t ha t philosophers could come t o rule. This seems the least

likely and, for reasons sta ted above, I do not think Plato could

have considered i t seriously.39 Second, those who are rule rs

could come to philosophize. T his is perhaps somewhat more

likely, and t he putati ve end of Plato’s att em pts to in str uct

Dionysius 11, though th e chance of th is occurring on the p art

of one used t o and genuin ely in love with th e exercise of

political power, the feeling of having one’s hand

“at

th e wheel

of history” in Max Weber’s memorable p hrase,40 s probably

sligh t.41 Th at philosophy may deploy

a

kind of persuasive

rhetoric in a n at temp t to convince

a

tyr ant to moderate his

rule may be more likely.42Most likely is the third possibility-

i t is s t i l l only a possibility-that a philosophic man will

influence the drawing up of a legal code. In this way

philosophy and politics meet in the hybrid activity of

legi slat ion t h a t aims-however imperfectly-at genu ine

human excellence. Such

a

situation is treated

at

great length

in the

L aw s ,

which we can see

as

the fullest exposition of

Plato’s teaching in it s

specifically political

aspect. Plato an d

D i ~ n ~ ~eem to have been aiming at something like thi s thir d

way in their relations with Dionysius 11, although they made

it look similar to the second type.

4 Conclusion

How likely is such reform? Plato’s answer should be clear:

not very. Plato’s dialogues always evince

a

profound skepticism

about the possibility of political reform and a sober knowledge

of the dan ger s it poses. In a ll of his political writing s, th e

possibility of success is seen as more in the power of gods than

human beings, and so it i s often said to be dependent on “fate”

or divine interventio n theia rno ira) Seventh Letter 326133,

327~3-5; epublic 499a-c; Laws 960c-d, and cf. 792a-b, 8 7 5 ~ ) .

Here the theme of kairos is important. Recall th at earlier, in

243



V.

Bradley Lewis

recounting his withdrawal from politics, Plato decided t o wait

“for the right time” 326a2). Dion urged tha t the sit uati on in

Syracuse presented precisely this opportune time to attempt

real reform, since all that was required was the conversion of

one man, the tyr an t 328bc). Tha t th e quickest way to

accomplish this reform was the meeting of a philosopher and a

tyrant is stated in the L a w s as well 709e-710b), though here

the qualification is added th at the tyrant be naturally virtuous,

a

situation which th e Athenian str anger implies is controlled

more by chance ( t u c k ? ) th an anything else 709a). The

combination of political power a nd philosophy is most

precarious and Plato harbors no illusions about it, even in th e

“idealistic”R e p u b l i c see especially 497d8-10). If, however, we

take seriously Plato’s account of the different objects of

philosophy and politics and see the love

of

an d desi re for

knowledge as the only truly common good, then th e conclusion

follows that politics must become more philosophical if it is to

become le ss con tent ious . How it

m i g h t

become more

philosophical Plato ha s indicated; th a t i t w i l l

is

by no means

assured o r even likely.44Yet Plato never abandons the notion.

No

matter how fa r ap ar t philosophy and politics may diverge,

one is never completely out of view of the other for plat^.^^

What this reading of the lette r reveals is not only the unity

of Plato’s political teaching, but the structure of his approach to

political questions a nd the str uc tu ra l differentiations within

that unified teaching. The totality of the teaching is not to be

found in a ny one of his works, although the L a w s seems to

represent th e most complete summary. I t is con sistently more

‘political’ in i ts character and seems directed to more practical

ends. Where it seems clear t ha t th e political teaching of th e

R e p u b l i c is not t o be found in the picture of Kallipolis as a

blueprint for political reform in a way th a t would open it to the

criticisms voiced by Karl Popper o r Richard Crossm an, one

must exercise care in reading the political aspects of the

L a w s

as well.

The burden

of

th is paper has been t o challenge the

conventional view t hat Plato’s political philosophy underwent a

radical change. I have suggested that the R e p u b l i c and L a w s

ought not to be seen

as

reflecting two opposed views of politics,

but

as

different stages in a single line of inquiry. In conclusion I

want to suggest briefly

a

complementary way to understand the

overall shape of Plato’s political philosophy tha t takes seriously

the dialogue form of its expression. The Republ ic constitutes an

extended defense

of

Socrates that is also

a

defense of

philosophy itself a nd explores the te nsions between t he

philosophical and political life. It reveals the “limits of

from t he perspective of Socratic philosophy and does

so through a n imaginative reconstruction of a defense of

Socrates tha t might have succeeded where the actual defense of

244




Socrates portrayed in the Apology failed. It presents a defense

of philosophy and a n explanation of why the city and

philosophy are in tension with one another. Thus, t o read i t as a

practical political proposal is t o miss its point. The L a w s , on the

other hand, does present a more realistic proposal for political

reform. It too is

an

imaginative construction related to the real

story recounted in the Seventh Letter in a way analogous

t o

the

relationship between the R e p u b l i c and A p o l o g y . Jus t as the

Republic is a picture

of

what an adequate defense of Socrates

might have looked like, the Laws is a picture of what successful

political reform might look like from the perspective

of

the

practical failure in Syracuse. It is not a revision in light of that

failure, but a portrait

of

political reform carried out under

better conditions. While the Laws does represent a more serious

and realistic approach t o political reform, one must keep in

mind Socrates’ crucially important remark in Republic V that

“it is in the nature of action to attain less tru th than speaking”

473a1-2) and the Athenian stranger’s statement that Magnesia,

like Kallipolis,

is

also a “city in speech” 702d1-2, 736136). Syracuse,

however, was a city in deed, and Plato’s failed political

intervention there is as revealing about the relationship between

philosophy and politics as the

two

great dialogues.

Notes

For examples of this ubiquitous view see George Grote, Pluto and

the Other Companions o Sokrates , 3d ed., vol. 3 London: John Murray,

1875), 302-304;

Ernest Barker, Greek Poli tica l Theory: P lu to a nd H is

Predecessors

London: Methuen , 19181, 340, 342; R. H. S. Crossman,

P l u t o T o d a y New York, N.Y.: Oxford Universi ty Press, 19391, 272;

David Grene,

M a n in His P r id e :

A

S t u d y of the Political Philosophy

o f

T h u c y d i d e s a n d P l u t o Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press,

1950), 176.

I t

is

stil l more common to find scholars who see t he

teachings of the

Republic

and

L a w s

as opposed to one another without

specifying Syracuse as th e cause, e.g., George H. Sabine,

A

His tory of

Pol it ica l T heo ry , rev. ed. New York, N.Y.: Holt,

1950), 64-66, 68;

T. A.

Sinclair,

A

His tory o Greek Political Thought London: Routledge and

Kegan Paul,

1951), 187;

Gregory Vlastos, “The Theory of Social Jus tice

in the

Polis

of Plato’s

Republic,”

in

Interpretat ions

o

P lu to ,

edited by

Helen North, (Mn e mo sy n e Supplement

1977): 36-37;

George Klosko,

The Development o Plato’s Polit ical Theory

London: Methuen, 19861,

185-188, 242-243 Klosko thinks Plato had already repudiated the

views of the R e p u b l i c by th e ti me of the Sicilian affair); Nicholas

F.

Jones, “The Organiz ation of th e Kr etan City in Plato’s L a w s , ” T h e

Classical World

83 1990): 473-492;

David Cohen, “Law, Autonomy, and

Political Community in Plato’s

L a w s” C la s s i c a l P h i lo lo gy

88 1993):

301-317, 301. Noteworthy dissents from both views are Paul Shorey in

“Plato’s

L a w s

and the Unity of Plato’s Thought I,”

Classical Ph ilology

9 1914): 329-369, 353 although Shorey does not accept the

authenticity of the letter) ; T.

J

Saunders in his translation of the L a w s

Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1970) , 27-28, 545-547; and Glenn R .

Morrow, P luto’ s C re ta n C i t y Princeton: Princeton University Press,

245



V. Bradley Lewis

19601, 573-590

and Pl u t o ‘ s Ep i s t l e s Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill,

1962), 150. More recently see Andre Laks, “Legislation an d Demiurgy:

On the Relationship Between Plato’s Republ ic and Law s ,” C l as s i ca l

A n t i q u i t y

9 1990): 209-229;

and Timothy C. Shiell, “The Uni ty of

Plato’s Political Thought,”

History

o

Poli t ical Thought

12 1991):377-

390.

The question

is

really even more complicated, since Plato’s

political philosophy consists not only of a po rtr ai t or portrai ts of the

best regime, but also of th e “t ru e politics” of Socrates, a person-to-

person politics which takes place below the level of regimes. See

Apol ogy 29d-30b, 31b; Gor g i as 521d; and discussion in Christopher

Bruell, “On Plato’s Political Philosophy,”Review of Poli t ics

56 1994):

261-282,

especially

263-264.

In addition there is th e question of how

one interprets th e St a t es man . I leave th a t out of account here par tly

because of the hermeneutic issues th at stem from its place in the

trilogy th at includes th e

Theaete tus

and

Sophis t

and pa rtly because

there seems good reason to conclude th at th e view expressed by th e

Eleatic stranger is not Plato’s view. On this la tt er point see Michael S.

Kochin, ”Plato’s Eleatic an d Athenian Sciences of Politics,” Rev i ew

o

Politics

61 1999): 57-84.

I have treated the relationship between the Republ ic and L a w s

in more detail in “ P o l i te i a k a i N o m o i : On the Coherence of Plato’s

Political Philosophy,” Poli ty

3 1 1998): 33 1-349.

Though not a s many as is sometimes casually assumed. The most

recent tabulation of scholarly opinion shows that of

32

scholars who

assessed th e a uthent icity of the Platonic letter s between

1485

and

1983, only 6 rejected th e Seventh L et ter . See Platon: Lettres, translated

and edited by Luc Brisson Paris: G. F. Flammarion,

19871, 72.

Even if, contrary to my own inclinations, Plato did not actual ly

write t he le tte r himself, it remains an important document, not only

because of its value as a historical source, bu t because it represents

the first really sophisticated interpretation of Plato’s polit ical

philosophy. T he author ship question, then , leaves unscat hed my

overall reading of Plato’s political teaching as consistent over both th e

Republic and L a w s .

The most detailed such brief against the letter is Ludwig Edelstein,

Pluto’s Seve nth Le tter ,

Philosophia Antiqua, vol.

14

Leiden:

E.

J

Brill,

1966).

Many of Edelstein’s arguments were answered convincingly in a

magisterial review by Friedrich Solmsen, Gnomon 41 1969): 29-34. One

point th at Solmsen estab lishes and which has been corroborated by

subsequent stylometric analyses

is

this: “Whoever questions the

authen tic ity of the VII. Lett er might as well proceed to deny Plato’s

authorship of the Philebus and/or Laws”

30).

My analysis of the content

of the let ter certainly supports this view, especially with respect to the

L a w s . See also t he discussion

in

Kenneth M. Sayre, Pluto’s Li terary

Garden : How to Read a Platonic Dialogue Notre Dame: University

of

Notre Dame Press,

1996),

xviii-xxiii, with respect to philosophical issues

and Kurt von Fritz,

P l a t o n i n S i z i l ie n u n d d a s P r o b le m d e r

Philosophenherrschaft Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1968), with respect to

historical issues. A less extensive argument against the authenticity of

the letter is Gerhard Muller, “Die Philosophie im pseudoplatonischen VII.

Brief,”Archiu fiir Philosophie

3 1949-50): 251-276.

It has been effectively

answered in Bertha Stenzel, “Is Plato’s Seventh Epist le Spurious?”

American Journal

o

Philology 74 1953): 383-397.

246




Other objections to the authentici ty of the letter rest on stylistic

and philological grounds. Here Gerard Ledger’s recent analys is of th e

whole corpus lends support to authentic ity since he concludes on the

basis of computer-assisted stylometry th a t th e le tte r comes from th e

same hand that composed the Laws. See Re-counting Pluto: A

Computer Analysis of Pluto’s Style Oxford: Clarendon Press ,

19891,

148-150. Most recently, Paul T. Keyser, “Orreries, th e Date

of

[Plato]

Letter ii, and Eudoro s of Alexandria,” Archiv fu r Geschichte d e r

Philosophie 80 1998): 241-267, argues against the authenticity of all

the letter s on the basis of a detailed case aga ins t th e second. While

Keyser’s argumen ts aga inst th e authenticity of Letter ar e serious,

they do not tell against Letter VZZ absent a n argument tha t one must

accept all the letter s o r none. Thi s is a not uncommon view among

those who reject the letters, but I have yet to see

a

real argument for it.

Schola rs often u se words like “manifesto” an d “apologia” to

describe t hi s aspect of th e let ter. See, e.g., Morrow, Pluto’s Epistles,

46; T. A. Sinclair, A History of Greek Politi cal Thought London:

Routledge Kegan Paul, 1953), 122; Eri c Voegelin, Plut o Bato n

Rouge,: Louisiana State University Press, 1966), 15; Ludwig

Edelste in, Pluto’s Seventh Letter, 56-69; I . M. Crombie, “Ryle’s New

Po rt ra it of Plato, ” Philoso phical Review

78 196 9): 369;

E . N .

Tigerst edt, Znterpreting Pluto Stockholm: Almquist Wicksell ,

1977), 44-47; Klosko, The Development of Pluto’s Political Theory,

187;

and the more cautious s tatement in Alice Swift Riginos,

Platonica: The Anecdotes Concerning the Life a n d Writings of Pluto

Leiden: E. J. Brill,

1976), 70.

I cite Plato’s texts parenthet ically in the body of the paper.

For

the Seventh Letter I have used the Bud6 text edited by Joseph Souilhb

in Platon:,Oeuures Completes,

t.

13,

Ire

partie, Lettres, 4th ed. Paris:

Soci6te d’Edition “Les Belles Lettres,” 1977).Translat ions are my own.

For other Platonic works,

I

have used t he Platon is Opera, ed. John

Burnet, 5 vols. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1900-1907), except in t he

case of the Laws, where

I,

have cited th e Bud6 text, Platon: Oeuvres

Completes, t . 11-12, ed. Edouard Des Places,

S.

J and August Dies

Paris: Soci6te d’l?,dition “Les Belles Lettres,” 1951-56).

lo

I

argue th is point i n “The Rhetoric of Philosophical Politics in

Plato’s Seventh Letter,” forthcoming in Philosophy a n d Rhetoric.

Nothing in my view precludes the possibility that the letter could have

been embellished for lat er public dissemination, as Voegelin, Pluto, 15,

suggests. Although I tak e it th at th e embellishments also served

Plato’s interest not only in explaining himself but in saying something

about the perils and possibilities of political reform.

l My account

is

based on the standard sources, especially the lives

of Dion by Plutarch and Nepos as well as th e reconstruct ion in

Morrow, Pluto’s Epistles, 145-180, and t he judicious discussion in

P.

A.

Brunt, “Plato’s Academy a nd Politics,” i n h is Studies in Greek History

and Thought Oxford: Clarendon Press, 19931,314-330. See also D. D.

Westlake, “Dion: A St udy in Liberation,” in Essays On the Greek

Histori ans a n d Greek History Manches ter: Manchest er Univer sity

Press, 1969), 251-264, and A. Fuks, “Redistribution of Land and Houses

in Syracuse in

356

B.c., and Its Ideological Aspects,” Classical Quarterly

18 1968): 207-223, on the aims and results of Dion’s invasion.

l2 Olympiodorus, In Gorg.

41.6.7,

suggests that Plato had visited

Syracuse before this, but the earlier trip is not attested in any other sources.

247



The Seventh L etter and the Unity of Plato’s Political Philosophy

the guardians 464d8-9) also seems to be an acknowledgment of this.

2

I l iad 6.208, 11.784.

See

V.

B. Lewis, “The Nocturnal Council and Platonic Political

Philosophy,” His tory of Poli t ical Thought 19 1998): 1-20. For present

purposes,

I

leave ou t consideration

of

th e limits of law which s tem

from

its

application of st ati c rule s to t he gr eat variability

of

human

affairs. This problem is st ated in th e L a w s 875d) as well a s in th e

S t a t e s m a n .

29 Republic

499b5, c7,520a8, 539e3-4, 540a7; compare

Laws

969c4-d3.

30

Ther e has, of course, been much wr itten on thi s as pect of the

R e p u b l i c .

Most recently see Drew A. Hyland,

Fini tude and Transcen-

dence in the Platonic Dialogues Albany: Stat e University

of

New York

Press, 1995), 59-86, and Jacob Howland, “The

Republic’s

Third Wave

an d the Paradox of Political Philosophy,” R e v i e w

o

M e t a p h y s i c s

51

3

See especially

Republic

450c6-d2, 457d6-458b7, 462a2-e6, 4 7 2 ~ 4 -

473e5, 496~5-497b2, 4-6, 499all-c2 , 501a2-7, 540e5-541a8, 592a5-b6,

and

L a w s

739b8-e6; bearing in mind

Republ ic

499 ~2-3 , 4-6, 502~5- 7,

540dl-e3.

32 For

some illuminating recent discussions of the possible political

inte rests of philosophers as such see Thomas L. Pangle, “Jus tice

Among Natio ns i n P laton ic and Aris totel ian Political Philosophy,”

A m e r ic a n J o u rn a l

o

Political Science

42

1998):

377-397; Michael

S.

Kochin, “Weeds: Cult iva tin g t h e Imag inati on in Medieval Arabic

Political Philosophy,” JournaE o f th e H ist or y of Zdeas 60

19991: 399-

416; and Alasdair MacI ntyre,

D e p e n d en t R a t i o na l A n i m a l s : W h y

H u m a n B e i n g s N e e d t h e V i r t u e s

Chicago, Ill.: Open Court , 1999),

especially chapters 9-13.

33

And,

of

course, Plato

is

not unique here, for precisely th e sa me

sort of advice, and for t h e sa me reasons, is given by Aristotle. See

Nicomachean Ethics 1134a30-1134bl.

34 The stri ctur e ag ains t violence

is

a major part of Edelstein’s

argument against th e au thenticity of the letter. See

P luto ’s S e v e n th

Letter, 25-27.

35 For

th e compromises of th e

L a w s

see especially 690a-e, 693d-

694a, 739a-e, 756e-758a, and consider Aristotle Politics 1265a1-4 and

36

Here

it

seems to be precisely an unwil l ingness to read th e

dialogues dramatically-rather to read them doctrinally-which has

led many interpreters to see insuperable contradictions between them

and the S e v e n t h L e t t e r . This

is

particularly th e case with Edelstein,

Pluto’s Seventh Lette r,

especially page 3.

3 7C f .

discussion in Ronald B. Levinson, In De fe n se o f P l a t o

Cambridge: Harvard University

Press,

1953), 379-381 in response to

the view of Crossman,

Pla to Today ,

367-68.

38 This

is

a n impo rtan t point since one of Edelstein‘s objections

(Pluto’s Seventh Lette r,

71-76, 110)

is

th at th e kind of education which

Plato and Dion intended for Dionysius

is

not t he same

as

t h a t

recommended for the philosophers of th e R e p u b l i c . This inconsistency

makes perfect sense once we acknowledge what must surely have been

the case: that Dionysius was never to have become a genuine

philosopher.

I

have discussed the rhetoric of the l ett er in more detail

in “The Rhetoric of Philosophical Politics in Plato’s Seventh Letter.”

39

This rema ins a disputed question am ong stud ents of Plato’s

1998): 633-657.

1288b21-39.

249



V. Bradley Lewis

political philosophy. For a n i lluminating exchange on t he issue see

Dale Hall, “The Republ ic and the Limits of Politics,”Political Theory 5

1977) : 293-313 an d Allan Bloom, “Aristophanes and Socrat es: A

Response to Hall,” P o l i t i c a l T h e o r y 5 197 7): 315-330, and more

recently Edward Andrew, “Descent to th e Cave,”

Review of Polit ics 45

1983): 510-535, Jacob Howland, “The Republic’s Third Wave and t he

Paradox of Political Philosophy,” an d Josiah Ober, Poli t ical Dissent in

Democrat ic Athens

Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), ch. 4.

Though Ober’s account h as nuances lacking in ma ny conventional

readings, he sti l l sees in t he

R e p u b l i c

a “f oundat ionali st political,

moral, and metaphysical project” see 191, 215, 252, 321, 367 ). As

is

alread y clear, I thi nk t he t ext s cited above in note 31 support the

views of Bloom and Howland.

4

In his essay “Politics as

a

Vocation,” in

From M ax Weber: Essa ys

in Sociology, transla ted and edited by H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills

New York: Oxford University Press,

1946), 115.

4 The example of Socrates’ failure with Alcibiades is a n obvious

parallel case. See the discussion in Mark

J

Lutz, Socrates’ Educa t ion

to Vir tue: Learnin g the Love of the Nob le

Albany, N.Y.: Sta te Univer-

sity of New York Press, 19981, chapters 6-7.

42 This sort of rhetoric also seems to be wha t is exhibited in the

Myth of Er which Socrates tells in the tenth book of the Republic . The

point of that myth is tha t only philosophy supplies the resources by

which one can make a rational choice about one’s way of life and that

that very claim of philosophy vindicates

it

in the face of tyranny. For a

more detailed account of such

a

rhetoric one would have to examine

Xenophon’s somewhat different port rait of Socrates in h is re lat ions

wi th other political men. See, e.g., Leo Strauss, O n T y r a n n y , rev. ed.,

edited by V. Gourevitch and M. S. Roth New York: The Free Press ,

1991);

and David K. O’Connor, “The Erotic Self-Sufficiency of Socrates:

A Reading of Xenophon’s

M e m o r a b i l i a , ”

in

T h e S o c r a t i c M o v e m e n t ,

edited by Paul A. Vander Waerdt Ithaca , N.Y.: Cornell University

Press, 1994), 151-180. One should also consider Aristotle’s discussion

of tyranny in Politics V.

43 J u s t a s one might wonder about a possible nai vete on Plato’s

part with respect to Dionysius 11, there is

a

question about ju st how

accurat e Plato’s view of Dion was. Dion’s r ead iness to t ak e u p a rm s

against the tyrant shows tha t he was willing to ignore one important

piece of Platonic advice though

as

sta ted above, it seems unnecessary

to read the opposition to violence as categorical. It may well be

directed primarily to the letter’s explicit addressees),

a

fact evidently

glossed over in Levinson, In Defense

o

P la to , 385-389. The picture one

gets of Dion from Aristotle

(Poli t ics

1312al-b33) seems somewhat less

positive tha n th at of the letter. Admitting this, however, we a re under

no obligation to hold t hat Pla to was a n infallible judge of character.

See also Brunt , “Plato’s Academy and Politics,” 317, 327-330.

44 This may lead us back to t he “Socratic politics,” or p erh aps

“antipolitics” suggested above in note

2.

45 Cf. Brunt, “Plato’s Academy and Politics,” 313, and Paul

Friedlander,

Pluto: A n In troduc t ion ,

trans . Hans Meyerhoff Princeton:

Bollingen, 1958), 6, 104. One might also profitably consider t he

examples of Locke and Rousseau in this context.

46

Leo Strauss,

The City and M an

Chicago, Ill.: Rand McNally, 19641,

138.

250

lewis, the seventh letter, and the unity of plato's political philosophy

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