Energy Policy 39 (2011) 3476–3482

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Energy Policy

0301-42

doi:10.1

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journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/enpol

India’s emissions in a climate constrained world

Kartikeya Singh

Yale School of Forestry & Environmental Studies, 195 Prospect Street, New Haven, CT 06511, USA

a r t i c l e i n f o

Article history:

Received 26 June 2010

Accepted 18 March 2011

Keywords:

Carbon budgets

Energy policy

Energy forecasting

15/$ - see front matter & 2011 Elsevier Ltd. A

016/j.enpol.2011.03.046

ail addresses: Kartikeya.singh@yale.edu, karti

a b s t r a c t

Scientific studies have repeatedly shown the need to prevent the increase in global emissions so that

the planet’s average temperature does not exceed 2 1C over pre-industrial levels. While the divisions

between Annex 1 and non-Annex nations continue to prevent the realization of a comprehensive global

climate treaty, all members of the G-20 (incidentally also major emitters) have agreed to prevent the

rise in global temperatures above 2 1C. This requires that nations consider budgeting their carbon

emissions. India presents a unique case study to examine how a major emitter facing a desperate need

to increase energy consumption will meet this challenge. The Greenhouse Development Rights (GDR)

framework, perhaps considered the most favorable with respect to the responsibility and capacity of

India to reduce emissions, was used to explore India’s emissions trajectory. India’s emissions have been

pegged to the pathway required to meet the 2 1C target by non-Annex countries. The results have been

compared to the expected emissions from 11 energy fuel mix scenarios up to the year 2031 forecasted

by the Planning Commission of India. Results reveal that none of the 11 energy scenarios would help

India meet its emissions target if it were to follow the 2 1C pathway. A thought experiment is followed

to explore how India may meet this target. This includes a sensitivity analysis targeting coal

consumption, the biggest contributor to India’s emissions.

& 2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction

The lack of a comprehensive climate agreement at the UnitedNations Climate Conference in Copenhagen, Denmark has posed achallenge for genuine greenhouse gas mitigation efforts. In thelead up to Copenhagen there was much debate between main-taining global carbon emission levels such that they do not resultin exceeding a mean over 2 or 1.5 1C from pre-industrial levels.While 2 1C has been politically agreed to be the upper limit, thereare many studies revealing the need for the upper limit to be wellbelow 2 1C (Hansen et al., 2008; Krause et al., 1989). As a result,many ‘‘Least Developed Countries’’ (LDCs) and small island stateshave demanded stricter cuts and an upper threashold of 1.5 1C or350 ppm (parts per million) as the safe upper limit of carbondioxide in the atmosphere (Hansen et al., 2008).

For many years the world allowed analysts with a ‘‘wait andsee’’ attitude to govern policies on climate change (Krause et al.,1989). These were analysts who doubted the climate science andfelt that the costs of mitigation were so high that they did notwarrant immediate action, and instead funds would be betterspent on further research on climate science. However science hasrepeatedly shown that to avoid a catastrophic change in the globalclimate system, we must control emissions so that they do not

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keya.singh07@gmail.com

increase the global average temperature by more than 2 1C. One ofthe most plausible and practial ways to do this is by setting amaximum limit on the amount of carbon that countries areallowed to emit. This needs to be based on a maximum limit ofthe warming of the earth and a division of the carbon budgetamong countries. The idea of carbon budgets under a 2 1C limit ofwarming as first introduced by Krause et al. (1989) implied that areduction of 20% below 1985 emission levels should be achievedby 2015, that 50% reduction should be achieved by 2030, andfinally that 75% reduction below 1985 should be achieved by 2050.

Eighteen years have passed since the launch of the UnitedNations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in1992 and the world still grapples with the task of redefining ourdevelopment paradigms in the context of a climate constrainedworld. The Kyoto Protocol called for global emissions to bereduced by 5.2% below 1990 levels but they have actuallyincreased worldwide by 38% between 1992 and 2007. In thewake of such uncontrolled emissions growth, scientists of theUnited Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change(IPCC) have shown in their 4th Assesment Report that anthro-pogenic climate change could set off ecological tipping points,causing the collapse of countless unique ecosystems that sustainthe livelihoods of billions across the globe (IPCC, 2007).

Specific areas of concern include the instability of the Green-land and West Antarctic ice sheets, the collapse of the amazonianforest, the weakening of the North Atlantic current, and the

K. Singh / Energy Policy 39 (2011) 3476–3482 3477

transformation of the Southwest Indian Subcontinent Monsoon(IPCC, 2007). The impacts of a run-away climate change scenarioon agricultural productivity, water security, health, and humandisplacement is predicted to be devastating.

As a result the ‘‘2 1C guard rail’’, as it is now known, has beenmade the goal of the climate policies of 133 nations representing80% of the global population and it includes G8 nations as well asrapidly emerging economies such as China, India, and Brazil (nowa part of the larger G-20) (WBGU, 2009).

Limiting emissions while 1.6 billion people still do not haveaccess to electricity and 2.4 billion people rely on traditionalbiomass for cooking fuel poses a great development challenge(UN, 2007). As development is directly related to having access toenergy, it cannot be denied that the world’s energy consumptionwill have to expand making the current total primary energysupply of approximately 12,029 Mtoe (million tons of oil equiva-lent) increase to 14,000–17,000 Mtoe (IEA, 2009). Thus we are leftwith no choice but to set a cap on our global carbon emission toensure that this growth is through clean enegy sources.

A scientific study conducted by Meinshausen et al. suggeststhat ‘‘limiting cumulative CO2 emissions over 2000–2050 to1000 Gt CO2 yields a 25% probability of warming exceeding2 1C’’ (2009). Futhermore, it states that based on the emissionsbudget consumed by 2006 of 234 Gt CO2, ‘‘less than half of theproven economically recoverable oil, gas, and coal reserves canstill be emitted up to 2050 to achieve such a goal.’’ Though thisstudy claims that we may be on track toward not exceeding 2 1Cwarming, the ‘‘probability of exceeding 2 1C rises to 50–87% ifglobal GHG emissions are still more than 25% above 2000 levels in2020’’ (Meinshausen et al., 2009). Science is telling us that wemust begin to take action to reduce the emissions immediately.Thus the questions include by when, for whom, and how much, ina way that ensures the right to development and the eradicationof poverty?

India’s role in this dilemma is key as providing access toelectricity for India’s approximately 400 million poor and meetingthe goals of poverty eradication in a climate constrained worldwill be an indicator for how many nations can chart low-carbonpathways for development. As a result we must see whetherscenarios of India’s energy consumption fit within the requiredemission reductions as called for by the 2 1C warming limit.

Taking the example of the Greenhouse Development Rights(GDR) Framework established by Baer et al. (2008), under the 2 1C‘‘emergency pathway,’’ we may peg India to the larger ‘‘South’sdilemma’’. In this model (see Fig. 1), peaking global emissions by2013 reduces the possibility of passing the 2 1C limit from 54%(should we peak in 2017) to 32%. This requires Annex 1 countries

Fig. 1. South’s Dilemma, GDR Framework. Green line shows the pathway/budget

for the non-Annex countries in order to meet the global 2 1C target (Baer et al.,

2008). (For interpretation of the references to color in this figure legend, the

reader is referred to the web version of this article.)

to peak in 2010 and reduce emissions to 90% below 1990 levels by2050. For the purposes of this study we will assume that this mayhave happened by the end of 2010. However it still does not leavemuch room for emissions in the non-Annex 1 nations to grow,requiring them to peak latest by 2015–2020 and then decline by6% annually through 2050.

This paper seeks to project into 2030 India’s current emissions(440 million tons of carbon annually) to the 2 1C pathwayproposed by the GDR Framework to see how the various scenariosof its energy future compare. Using the results we will be able toconduct some thought experiments on what is required for Indiato meet this challenge, which will have global implications.

2. Methodology and data

Taking the budgets as depicted by the Greenhouse Develop-ment Rights Framework in Fig. 1, indexing was done to map India’scurrent emissions and project its growth into the future based onthe tragectory required of the non-Annex 1 countries under the2 1C emergency pathway. This meant starting India’s CO2 emissionsexpressed as approximately 0.44 Gt carbon annually (IEA estimateas of 2007) and making them increase and peak at 2020 beforebeginning the incremental decline (IEA, 2007). The point of thisexercise is simply to show the emissions India would be requiredto have at the 2020 peak year under this budget scenario. This canthen be compared with the emission scenarios given by variousdifferent agencies under the same time period.

The Indian government approved the Integrated Energy Policyin 2006 after many public consultations. This report outlines thechallenges and prospects India faces in the energy sector up to2031–2032 while attempting to maintain 7–8% economic growthin order to achieve poverty alleviation. Under an 8% growth rate,11 scenarios are outlined in the report depicting what the energyfuel mix could be in the year 2031–2032 (see Fig. 2). The statisticsgiven in the report were used to create graphs and visualizethe percentage difference in fuel-type between the scenarios (seeTable 1 for exact figures).

Scenario 1 is coal dominant as this is the most economicaloption for India. India is the 3rd largest producer and consumer ofcoal and has the 3rd largest reserves of coal in the world after theUnited States and China (IEA, 2007).

Scenario 5 sees a maximization of hydro to the full potential of150 GW by 2031, assumes nuclear to provide 63 GW of power by2030 on account of 8 GW worth of imports of Light WaterReactors with fuel over the next ten years. The latter assumesthat the 8 GW capacity worth of imports could be coupled with

MTO

E C

onsu

mpt

ion

Fuel-mix Comparison in Year 2031-32 For 8% Growth

Oil Natural Gas Coal Hydro Nuclear

Solar Wind Fuelwood Ethanol Bio-diesel

0200400600800

10001200140016001800

Fig. 2. Energy mix scenarios as outlined in the Integrated Energy Policy Report.

Source: Planning Commission, Government of India.

Fig. 3. India’s projections for electricity requirement up to 2031.

Source: Planning Commission, Government of India.

Fig. 4. India’s emissions pathway under the 2 1C emergency pathway.

Fig. 5. Planning Commission’s CO2 generation comparison in the year 2031–2032

as per each scenario and compared with the emissions required under the 2 1C

guard rail (2.08 Gt).

Table 1Energy consumption mix in Scenario 1 (coal dominant), Scenario 5 (forced hydro

and nuclear), Scenario 9 (improvements on coal plant and demand side efficiency,

increased rail transport), and Scenario 11 (builds on previous scenarios and adds

fuel efficiency and increased renewable energy). *CO2 emissions are rough

estimates based on data from the Planning Commission of India and are listed

in million tones.

Consumption (Mtoe) Scenario 1 Scenario 5 Scenario 9 Scenario 11

Oil 467 464 487 406

Natural gas 114 224 164 168

Coal 1082 807 658 573

Hydro 5 49 50 50

Nuclear 3 89 89 89

Solar 4

Wind 1 1 12

Fuelwood 69

Ethanol 4

Biodiesel 8

Total 1672 1634 1448 1383

CO2 Emissionsn 6400 5400 4700 4050

K. Singh / Energy Policy 39 (2011) 3476–34823478

indigenous research and development in order to place India on atarget to gradually increase generation capacity up to 63 GW. Thisscenario forces 20% of the electricy demand and 14% of the totalprimary energy demand to be sourced through natural gas. It alsoassumes that the share of coal in the total primary energy supplydrops from 65% to 49%.

Scenario 9 builds on the progress of Scenario 5 but adds to itgreater coal power-plant efficiency (up to 42% from current 36%for all plants of 500 MW capacity), the implementation of demandside management policies to reduce electricity demand by 15%,and increasing the share of frieght transported through railwaysfrom 32% to 50%. This scenario sees the share of coal in the totalprimary energy supply drop to 45%.

The most progressive scenario given by the report is Scenario 11.

It builds on all the previous scenarios but adds to them increasedfuel efficiency standards of 50% for all motor vehicles and usage ofrenewable energy: 30 GW of wind, 10 GW of solar, 50 GW ofbiomass power, 10 million tons of biodiesel, and 5 million tons ofethanol fuel by 2030. This brings the share of coal in the fuel mix to42% of the total supply (Planning Comission, 2006).

This data was compared with thought experiments on whatkind of fuel mixes would be required for India under a 2 1Cemergency pathway that could still meet a growing energydemand or maintain the energy demand projected by the dataof the planning document (approximately 1400 Mtoe annualconsumption). The results are discussed below.

The Integrated Energy Policy report further provides thescenarios of CO2 generation comparison for 2031–2032 basedon the 11 scenarios and shows, relatively, the share of varioussectors (transport, electricity, etc.) driving current CO2 emissions.

These emission scenarios range from over six gigatons of CO2

emissions in the coal-dominant scenario to just over four gigatonsin Scenario 11. Taking the results of the indexing exercise ofIndia’s project emissions under the 2 1C pathway, the result ofthe peak amount of emissions was compared with the variousscenarios of emissions given by the planning Commission.This would give a sense of whether India’s energy fuel mix forthe next several decades is as ambitious as required to keep theworld below the 2 1C guard rail.

3. Results and discussion

Based on the indexing exercise (see Fig. 4), India’s emissionsunder the 2 1C emergency pathway would grow to 0.66 Gt carbon(660 millon tons), peak in the year 2020, and come down toapproximately 0.572 Gt carbon by 2030. We then convert thecarbon emissions into carbon dioxide emissions and arrive atapproximately 2.41 Gt CO2 emissions in 2020 and 2.09 Gt CO2

emissions by 2030. Comparing this with the CO2 emissions givenfor the projected energy scenarios helps visualize whether India’senergy plans are within the required 2 1C emergency pathway(see Fig. 5). 2.09 Gt CO2 is marked with a line across the CO2

emission scenarios of the Planning Commission’s report.The result reveals a substantial difference between the 2.09 Gt

peak and the coal-dominant Scenario 1 at over 6 Gt CO2 by2031–2032 and Scenario 11, which has the most renewable energyin it and emits just over 4 Gt CO2 2031–2032. This difference impliesthat India must reduce its emissions by half even with the PlanningCommission’s renewable energy intensive scenario.

The projection of CO2 under the various scenarios in Fig. 5 gives abreakdown of the share of emissions coming from various sectors.Given that there are approximately 500 million people withoutaccess to energy and that providing electricity is a key priority of thegovernment in trying to alleviate poverty and boost supply for

K. Singh / Energy Policy 39 (2011) 3476–3482 3479

growing industries, emissions from this sector will continue to riseand be the greatest in every scenario. To achieve universal elec-trification by 2030, India will need 245 TW h annually (IEA, 2010). Itis important to note that this does not imply that the majority ofemissions coming from India will be from the poor; the IEA reporthighlights that despite the increased demand from providing uni-versal access, the impact on emissions will be a mere 0.6–0.8% ofglobal emissions. This distinction is vital to ensure that focus forclimate mitigation remains on urban areas where the majority ofconsumption is likely. Other sources state that by 2030, 800 GW ofelectricity is required to meet the demands of economic growth atthe rate of 8–10% (Ringwald, 2008). Fig. 3 depicts the projectedgrowth in electricity demand under a 7% and 8% economic growthscenario indicating the upward trend.

This expected increase is supported by the fact that India hasthe third largest reserves of coal in the world totaling approxi-mately 98 billion tons (IEA, 2007). Furthermore it is the thirdlargest producer and consumer of this resource. As coal is also thecheapest option, it is thus expected to power much of India’selectricity generation needs.

We can explore mitigation options by experimenting with thefuel mix for India for the year 2030 to see if it can be altered tomeet the emissions target of 2.09 Gt of CO2. Given that 70% of theelectricity produced comes from coal (IEA, 2007) and the PlanningCommission shows that the greatest source of CO2 is electricitygeneration, we can start the substitution process and see whattype of energy mixes might be required.

First we take the total energy consumption in each scenarioand depict it as a percentage of the total so that we can bettervisualize the change required for each type of fuel mix (see Fig. 6).Given that electricity is the biggest source of carbon, whatemissions would result if India displaced all coal-fired generationwith non-emitting sources? Furthermore, what would it mean forIndia to stop using fossil fuels altogether? Let us say India wouldneed to get rid of coal, oil, and natural gas. This would of course gobeyond the carbon budget of 2.09 Gt CO2 but there is no harm inhaving a carbon neutral budget. It would then entail the increasein the usage of all other forms of energy.

For example, removing coal places a greater burden on hydro,nuclear, solar, wind, and to some extent natural gas. In its analysisof various sources the Planning Commission has suggested thatthe maximum potential for hydro energy, which currently makesup 14% of the electricity according to the IEA (2007) report, couldprovide up to 150 GW of energy.

In the Planning Commission’s most optimistic scenario theassumptions for nuclear are up to the year 2050, and the number275 GW is used to imply the forcing of nuclear. India has a limitedsupply of uranium, which exists in low grade. The IntegratedEnergy Policy envisages a three-stage program that involves theinitial importing of uranium and foreign technology (with the

Fig. 6. Singh no fossil fuel thought experiment.

long-term vision of indigenization) to power Pressurized HeavyWater Reactors. It is hoped that through subsequent research anddevelopment, including use of its own Fast Breader Technology, itwill be able to utilize spent uranium and resulting plutoniumcombined with its abundant thorium reserves to multiply manyfold the energy output. Thus with the aim of making nuclear aneconomically feasible option in the long run, if India imports8 GW worth of light water reactors over the next ten years, itcould generate up to 275 GW of electricity from nuclear energy inthe future (Planning Comission, 2006).

Wind energy has a maximum potential including currentinstalled capacity of up to 45 GW according to the Indian WindEnergy Association (INWEA, 2007). However there has beenalmost no analysis of the potential of offshore wind developmentin India. Thus, with approximately 7000 km of coastline, there ispotential to add a great deal more. For this reason an arbitraryamount was determined for the wind energy potential for India at75 GW for the purpose of this experiment.

Solar is another untapped source: the Planning Commissionstates that with approximately 5 million hectares of waste landavailable for solar photovoltaic projects and with a solar panelefficiency of 15% approximately 13,956 GW worth of electricitycould be generated (Planning Comission, 2006). This entirepotential of solar energy has not been factored in this experimentinstead approximately 295 GW has been arbitrarily chosen as atarget. It is important to note that the Indian government hasrecently announced plans to install 20 GW worth of solar energyin the country by 2022, which is 4000 times the current amountof installed capacity (Costa, 2009). Given this rate of scaling upinstalled capacity, 295 GW seems a small fraction compared tothe entire solar potential of the nation. It is important to note thatin the report, the solar potential is calculated only in terms ofharvest from wastelands, but using rooftops is likely to be a greatsource as well in addition to being closer to demand centers.

The amount of fuelwood consumed has been kept constant forthis experiment as compared to Scenario 11 of the Planning Commis-sion document. While approximately 600 million people still dependon traditional biomass for cooking needs, this may continue well inthe future with the help of sustainable forestry methods and cleansmoke-less stoves that are more efficient and less harmful to health(IEA, 2007). However it is likely that a large part of this fuelwoodconsumption could be substituted through the use of household andcommunity level biogas digesters for villages. These are powered bylivestock (generally cow and buffalo) dung and water to producemethane. This gas can then be directly piped into the home to beused for cooking. A report by the Internaitonal Labor Organization ongreening the economy estimates that by 2025, India could have900,000 jobs in the biomass gasification sector alone; this shows thepotential for growth in this area though the amount of energy itwould produce is hard to estimate (Pansare, 2009).

Finally, it is uncertain to say to what extent biodiesel and ethanolmight actually be deployed and how that may influence India’sfuture energy mix. However, the Government of India’s NationalMission on Biofuels calls for a target of 20% blend of both biodieseland ethanol by 2017 (MNRE, 2009). It is important to note that thisis a target, not a mandate by law at this point. Despite the variabilityin oil prices on the market, however, there has been heavyinvestment by many states in this sector. The Department of LandResources, Government of India, states ‘‘wastelands,’’ lands ‘‘unsui-table for cultivation,’’ total 63.9 million hectares (Rajagopal, 2007).However, out of this total area, the potential to grow biofuel plantssuch as jatropha and pongamia is estimated at 17 million hectares.Rajagopal evaluates several studies taking into account economicand social feasibility factors that ultimately reveal that no more than10% of this 17 million hectares can actually be used for thecultivation of biofuels. Issues surrounding the use of common lands

K. Singh / Energy Policy 39 (2011) 3476–34823480

by industries, and the application of water and fertilizers to oncedeemed ‘‘miracle’’ biofuel crops, have cast a shadow of doubt to thesuccess of existing biofuel programs. Thus their share of the fuel mixin this experiment has also been kept arbitrarily low despite its highfuture potential in the wake of oil and gas stubstitution fortransportation or decentralized energy demands in rural areas.

The results of this experiment reveal that India’s energyconsumption though lower in 2030, about 944 Mtoe (as com-pared to that of the Planning Commission’s projection of1383 Mtoe by 2030), could be met solely through the use ofrenewable energy, thus drastically reducing its emissions.

Understanding this, we know that India does not have to gocompletely carbon neutral as yet in order to meet the global 2 1Cguard rail. In fact, it would only be doing other countries a favor bycreating extra space for their emissions. However there are grossassumptions in this study about how fast or how far we can pushtechnologies and that India will have to do to become an efficientsociety, continue its economic growth, and keep its energy consump-tion low, something that it has already shown in the last two decadesby increasing its share of service industries (IEA, 2007). Another wayof visualizing the challenge is by looking at the renewable energy mixacross the five scenarios discussed to see the difference (see Fig. 7).

A report by McKinsey & Company reveals an abatement case forIndia by 2030 that would drastically reduce its carbon emissionsfrom 6 Gt annually to 2.8 Gt, which comes close to our requirementof India under the 2 1C emergency pathway (McKinsey & Company,2009). As with our thought experiment, the McKinsey reportassumes the greatest reduction of emissions from the power sectorat approximately 900 million tons of CO2e and another 1020million tons reduction through gains in efficiency in buildingsand steel, cement, and other industries. In fact, the report revealsthat India’s energy demand could be reduced in 2030 from aprojected 760 to 640 GW in the abatement case, which strengthensour proposal (McKinsey & Company, 2009).

Based on this information, we can choose to conduct a sensi-tivity analysis on the Planning Commission’s 11th scenario using

Fig. 7. This figure compares the renewable energy mix across four Planning

Commission scenarios and the ‘‘no fossil fuels’’ thought experiment scenario

(Singh).

Table 2Demand in coal, oil, and natural gas in Scenario 11 and their respective share of the tota

from EIA and are in kg CO2/MMBtu (EIA, 2011). Reduction requirements (%) were weight

the new values for CO2 emissions and correlating energy demand.

Source Demand(Mtoe)

Share ofTPES (%)

Coefficient

Coal 573 42 95.52

Natural Gas 168 12 53.06

Oil 406 29 74.54

Total 1147 83

what information we might have on policies that can affect certainenergy types and the experience from the ‘‘no fossil fuels’’ scenario.The Government of India estimates that the difference in CO2

emissions between Scenarios 1 and 11 is approximately 35%(Planning Comission, 2006). Coupled with the knowledge thatScenario 11 is roughly 2 Gt (50%) above the target required underthe GDR framework we can begin our analysis. Coal makes up to42% of the energy supply in 2031–2032 in Scenario 11 with naturalgas at 12% and oil at 29%. Thus any reduction in the requiredemissions should come from these three sources and we mightchoose to do a weighted reduction according to the amount thesource is a part of the whole mix. For example, emissions from coalcould be reduced by 84%, natural gas by 24%, and oil by 58%. Thenwe may use another measure for the sensitivity analysis based oncertain policies that might give preference to coal over oil (i.e., theformer is available domestically and will be required for growingelectricity demand whereas the latter is largely imported). By usingthe CO2 coefficient per energy source we can know roughly howmuch in Gt we must reduce emissions from Scenario 11 in order tomake it meet the 2 1C target (see Table 2). The scenario below takesus once again well below the 2.08 Gt target and thus allows us toexperiment further with how we may shift the fuel mix based onsensitivity to certain government policies.

One of the limitations of the above exercise is the use of U.S.coefficients for fuel-specific CO2 emissions, which may actuallymake the emissions much lower than the per unit of fuelconsumed in India. Knowing that India’s energy and carbonintensity are higher than those of the United States, we can assumethat this fuel mix might actually get us closer to the 2.08 Gt target.

The experiment is expanded based on the sensitivity of fossilfuel (focus on coal) consumption in India within this new limit of390 Mtoe (see Fig. 8). It is assumed that this limit on fossil fuelconsumption at around 400 Mtoe will keep India within the 2 Gtemission target. Two new scenarios are created in which coal isreduced by 50% and 25% of the original 573 Mtoe in Scenario 11.This has been pegged with a correlating reduction in consumptionof oil and natural gas by 45% and 66% in the new scenarios,

l primary energy supply. Coefficients for fuel-specific CO2 emissions were derived

ed based on the total share of the energy source. This allowed for the calculation of

Gt CO2 Requiredreductions (%)

New limit(Gt CO2)

New limit(Mtoe)

2.17 84 0.35 92.4

0.353 24 0.27 128.5

1.2 58 0.50 169.2

3.72 1.12 390.1

Fig. 8. Results of the sensitivity analysis performed on the fuels based on the

required 2 1C target and Scenario 11 from the Planning Commission.

K. Singh / Energy Policy 39 (2011) 3476–3482 3481

respectively. Since both of these fuels (oil and natural gas) play avital role in transportation energy, production of both biodieseland ethanol is increased in the two new scenarios to match thisenergy deficit. India does not have a large supply of domestic oilreserves and current supplies are projected to last for just 22years; thus an investment in biofuels or other forms of (electric)transportation is critical (Planning Comission, 2006). While theprospect for natural gas consumption growth for the country isrealistically much higher, the increased use of vehicles will easilyoutstrip the rate of supply of this fuel (see limitations).

This analysis assumes that as the base-load electricity isexpanded through coal, nuclear and hydro energies are decreased,but a positive effect occurs for commercial renewables such as solarand wind. Thanks to a recent law that requires every ton ofdomestically produced as well as imported coal to be taxed togenerate a fund for renewable energy (National Clean Energy Fund),we can assume that increasing amounts of energy will come fromsuch sources even as coal consumption rises (India, 2010). Thoughstill uncertain, hydro power generation may be impacted by reducedand unreliable flows in the Himalayan rivers due to climate change(IIMI, 2007). Thus it is plausible to have a decreased energy supplyfrom this source. Nuclear is a tempting option but is limited asmentioned previously by the import of certain equipment and fuelsin order to build indigenous knowledge on fast breeder technology.All these variables make it likely that it will play a lesser role in theIndian energy mix in 2031–2032.

In this analysis we are presented with an expanded plausiblemix of options that are relatively less extreme than the no fossilfuel scenario. Additionally, the energy demand is kept the same asthat of Scenario 11 to ensure that it would be within the scope ofIndia’s growing energy demand. Finally, fuelwood has been keptout of the new scenarios in order to focus on commercial energysources. Fuelwood will likely continue to play a large part in theIndian energy mix in rural and even urban areas for cooking andpotentially electricity (through successful biomass gasificationoperations).

4. Limitations and future work

One of the biggest limitations of this study is the assumption thatIndia is confined to the same budget mentioned in the 2 1C guardrail for all non-annex countries. In fact, India may be allocated morespace to grow in the group of developing states having an even laterpeaking time. Indeed some suggest that we take a closer look atmeeting the 2 1C goal by taxing the 1 billion highest emitters andallocate country budgets based on per capita emissions (Chakravartyet al., 2009). In addition, this study has taken a more conservativeapproach by chosing the lower sensitivity (32%) pathway forachieving the 2 1C target under the GDR framework instead of thehigher sensitivity (54%). The latter would see a later peak allowingfor a higher peak for both the Annex 1 and non-Annex nations underthe UNFCCC. This would of course broaden the range of measuresavailable for India to achieve its target under the 2 1C guard rail. Theconservative approach taken by the paper is due to the scientificstudies that actually suggest that 2 1C might be considered toohigh as a target to avoid the impacts of run-away climate change(Hansen et al., 2008). The study by Hansen et al. calls for a CO2

concentration upper limit of 350 ppm or roughly 1.5 1C. This justifiestaking the lower sensitivity for achieving the 2 1C target in ouranalysis.

The report of the German Advisory Council on Global Changewould see India’s emissions rise to a per capita peak of 4 t CO2 in2040 (WBGU, 2009). This would have a markedly different impact onIndia’s policy scenario. However it would also mean a greaterdecrease in emissions from several other country groups. Further

studies of the per capita budget approach and India’s energy andemission projections could be conducted to compare with this study.

In this thought experiment, some limitations included theassumptions on technological innovation and of course the costsof implementing and scaling up the projects. However, this studydid not seek to address the issues of costs or technologicalinnovation—the latter will only drive down the costs and continueto break the barriers. Instead, this study seeks to frame India’senergy scenarios in the context of the 2 1C guard rail using a budgetapproach (the GDR framework) that might be considered as one ofthe most politically favorable ones to the Government of India. Thisis due to the responsibilitiy–capacity framework associated withthe budget that would see India receive considerable financial andtechnological supports in order to help it meet the global emissionstarget. Thus this study triggers the need to begin to think abouttechnology options in a way that is unencumbered by questions ofcost/economic feasibility.

It is important to note that in attempting to be a mostly‘‘electric’’ nation as the hypothetical 2 1C scenario implies therehas been disregard for the fact that India’s growth of personalvehicles has skyrocketed since the 1970s and will continue to seea dramatic growth. For example two wheeler vehicles havegrown from approximately 600,000 in 1971 to 41 million in2001 (Planning Comission, 2006).

It is expected that they will grow to 377 million by 2030 andgrowth in passenger vehicles is likely to be impacted by theintroduction of many low-cost models such as the Tata Nano, the‘‘world’s cheapest car’’ (McKinsey & Company, 2009). In this case Ihave proposed a scenario in which India chooses to ignore its owndomestic oil and gas reserves, which could be vital in meeting theenergy demands of these obviously non-electric vehicles. It couldbe stated however that many cities will then need to invest heavilyin electric and electric-hybrid mass transit systems—alreadyevident by the announcement of metro-rail projects in nearlyevery major city across the country (News, 2003).

5. Conclusions

The 15th Conference of Parties in Copenhagen resulted in ahastily crafted ‘‘Copenhagen Accord.’’ According to a team ofresearchers in the United States, pledges made by the majoremitters in the Accord amount to an average global temperaturerise of 3.9 1C, far higher than the 2 1C committment (Sawin et al.,2010). If the pledges made in this Accord are to be kept, it will putthe ecological balance of the planet in certain peril.

Given the challenge that already exists in attempting to keepglobal emissions below 2 1C, the potential impacts of the com-bined committments of the Copenhange Accord cast a shadow ofdoubt as to whether any of those is feasible. This paper seeks tohighlight the challenge of mapping India’s energy ambitions asoutlined by the Planning Commission of the Government of Indiain a 2 1C pathway. The results show that not only current Indianplanning is far from visualizing India under a global 2 1C pathway,but also the challenge of creating a genuine clean-economytransition is high. Who will pay for it is an entirely differentquestion as the responsibiltiy and capacity certainly do not fall oncountries like India where such a small part of their population isabove the development threshold, as described by the Green-house Development Rights Framework (Baer et al., 2008). In factthe framework places India’s obligation so low as compared to theUnited States and China that the majority of India’s emissionreductions as outlined under the 2 1C C pathway would have to befinanced through external sources. Without such support, Indiacannot meet this challenge, and the world certainly cannot expectto meet the 2 1C challenge.

K. Singh / Energy Policy 39 (2011) 3476–34823482

If India plans on reducing emissions in a truly groundbreakingway, it must reassess all of its previous plans, including anexceedingly un-ambitious Scenario 11, which supposedly reliesheavily on renewable energy technologies. This paper challengesIndian planners: India needs bold visions for its energy sector.Once such visioning exercises have resulted in ambitious plans,creative financing mechanisms might be used to make them real.The results of the lack of such bold visions for many of the majoremitters are already evident in the Copenhagen Accord.

Acknowledgments

I would like to thank the following people for their guidanceduring this project: Dr. Jonathan Koomey, Consulting Professor,Standford University, and Dr. Robert Bailis, Assistant Professor,Yale School of Forestry & Environmental Studies.

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