ie 463 lec 3. firm and external cooperation-1 1. transaction cost economics (tce) all exchange...

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IE 463 Lec 3. Firm and External Cooperation-1 1

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Page 1: IE 463 Lec 3. Firm and External Cooperation-1 1. TRANSACTION COST ECONOMICS (TCE) All exchange transactions encounter problems of information enforcement

IE 463

Lec 3. Firm and External Cooperation-1

1

Page 2: IE 463 Lec 3. Firm and External Cooperation-1 1. TRANSACTION COST ECONOMICS (TCE) All exchange transactions encounter problems of information enforcement

TRANSACTION COST ECONOMICS (TCE)

All exchange transactions encounter problems of• information • enforcement

Transaction: dealing or trading with others

Transaction costs: costs incurred during the process of buying or selling, on top of the price of whatever is changing hands;• costs of managing relationships• costs of performance evaluation• costs related to safeguarding the exchange relationship• adaptation costs etc.

Page 3: IE 463 Lec 3. Firm and External Cooperation-1 1. TRANSACTION COST ECONOMICS (TCE) All exchange transactions encounter problems of information enforcement

economic costs

production costs

costs of transforming inputs into outputs,or direct production costs

transaction costs

costs of making exchange,or indirect production costs

motivation costscosts of motivating specialized agents to align their interests, e.g.• cost of cheating or opportunistic behavior• agency cost among owners, managers, and debt holders

coordination costscosts of coordinating the actions between specialized agents, e.g.• cost of obtaining information• cost of coordinating input in production• cost of measurement

costs mainly caused by opportunism

costs mainly caused by bounded rationality

Page 4: IE 463 Lec 3. Firm and External Cooperation-1 1. TRANSACTION COST ECONOMICS (TCE) All exchange transactions encounter problems of information enforcement

Agency cost:

can arise when somebody (the principal) hires somebody else (the

agent) to carry out a task and the interests of the agent conflict with

the interests of the principal. One way to reduce agency costs is for

the principal to monitor what the agent does to make sure it is what he

has been hired to do. But this can be costly, too. Another way to

lower agency costs, especially when monitoring is too expensive or

too difficult, is to make the interests of the agent more like those of the

principal.

Asset: an economic resource belonging to a company or entity, an item owned by the company or entity; an asset has future economic benefit and is the result of past financial transaction.

Page 5: IE 463 Lec 3. Firm and External Cooperation-1 1. TRANSACTION COST ECONOMICS (TCE) All exchange transactions encounter problems of information enforcement

TCE is concerned with the examination of the comparative

costs of planning, adapting and monitoring task completion

under alternative governance structures like,• market• firm (hierarchy)• network

etc.

Question:

“ Why are some transactions directed by managers inside firms or networks rather than in an open market ? “

Page 6: IE 463 Lec 3. Firm and External Cooperation-1 1. TRANSACTION COST ECONOMICS (TCE) All exchange transactions encounter problems of information enforcement

ASSUMPTIONS of TCE

1. Bounded Rationality• can’t assimilate all the information at one’s disposal

(limit to the amount of information one can hold)• can’t accurately work out the consequences of the

information obtained (limit to the amount of calculations one can understand)

2. Opportunism• can possibly act in a self-interested way “with guile”,• not entirely honest and truthful about their intensions• attempting to take advantage of unforseen

circumstances that gives them the chance to exploit others

Page 7: IE 463 Lec 3. Firm and External Cooperation-1 1. TRANSACTION COST ECONOMICS (TCE) All exchange transactions encounter problems of information enforcement

Potential opportunism of economic actors is central in TCE, hence TCE focuses on the organization of a transaction through the most efficient governance structure; one which minimizes the transaction costs associated with safeguarding against opportunistic behavior.

If a firm chooses to conduct an activity through some form of collaboration, such a choice reflects the fact that the collaborative form is the transactionally efficient mode of organizing that activity.

Page 8: IE 463 Lec 3. Firm and External Cooperation-1 1. TRANSACTION COST ECONOMICS (TCE) All exchange transactions encounter problems of information enforcement

VARIABLES OF TCE

TCE uses three variables that are common to any transaction;1. Frequency A firm would not want to internalize the activity concerning a good or a service that is very rarely used (ie. will not integrate within the firm) . It is then better to use the services of another firm which has the competency for it.

2. UncertaintyDuring the course of a transaction, it is difficult to forsee all the consequences, especially for long transaction times. When uncertainty is not low, the firm can choose to integrate inside or establish long-term partnerships with other firms in order to reduce uncertainty.

Page 9: IE 463 Lec 3. Firm and External Cooperation-1 1. TRANSACTION COST ECONOMICS (TCE) All exchange transactions encounter problems of information enforcement

3. Asset Specificity

Transactions involve assets that are only valuable in the

context of a specific transaction. In that case, transaction

costs will be reduced by integration,• within the firm or• amongst partners within a network structure

Such assets normally have low alternative use values so

that owners have a strong interest in continuing the

transaction. Strong asset specificity is a reason for

establishing long-term relationships, but because of

bounded rationality and opportunism factors, it involves

high risks. Other things being equal, when transactions

involve highly specific assets, transaction costs are

likely to be lower in hierarchies and networks than in

markets.

Page 10: IE 463 Lec 3. Firm and External Cooperation-1 1. TRANSACTION COST ECONOMICS (TCE) All exchange transactions encounter problems of information enforcement

SOURCES OF ASSET SPECIFICITY

1. Site specificity

When successive stages of production are located in close proximity, common ownership generally results. This occurs when assets are immobile or, the set-up or relocation costs are large. Once an asset is in place, owners of the asset may use that asset for a single purpose.

2. Physical asset specificity

If the assests are mobile and their specificity is attributable to their physical features (specialized parts or components), market procurement of particular product might or might not be possible. If the seller has no other buyer for his particularized part/component then the seller’s assets have physical asset specificity.

Page 11: IE 463 Lec 3. Firm and External Cooperation-1 1. TRANSACTION COST ECONOMICS (TCE) All exchange transactions encounter problems of information enforcement

3. Human asset specificity

Specialization in a particular field may give rise to human asset specificity. Where an emloyee had developed special skills that are useful only to a particular employer, the employee has developed a degree of human asset specificity.

contractual responsedegree of specificity

non-specific

semi-specific

highly specific

spot market

long-term contracts

vertical integration

Page 12: IE 463 Lec 3. Firm and External Cooperation-1 1. TRANSACTION COST ECONOMICS (TCE) All exchange transactions encounter problems of information enforcement

Transaction costs are low when;

• organizations are exchanging nonspecific goods and services• uncertainty is low• there are many possible exchange partners

Transaction costs are high when;

• organizations are exchanging specific goods and services• uncertainty is high• the number of possible exchange partners is small

According to TCE, organizations will adopt increasingly formal linkage mechanisms with their exchange partners as transaction costs increase (alliances etc.). But these mechanisms also carry bureaucratic costs within the organization.

Page 13: IE 463 Lec 3. Firm and External Cooperation-1 1. TRANSACTION COST ECONOMICS (TCE) All exchange transactions encounter problems of information enforcement

6 - 13

When deciding the firm strategy;

• locate and estimate the transaction costs of an exchange relationship• estimate the transaction cost savings from using different linkage mechanisms• estimate the bureaucratic costs of operating the linkage mechanism• choose the strategy that gives the most transaction cost savings at the lowest bureaucratic costs.

However, TCE is criticised for • assuming that individuals usually behave opportunistically not paying sufficient attention to trust and market instruments that strengthen it

Page 14: IE 463 Lec 3. Firm and External Cooperation-1 1. TRANSACTION COST ECONOMICS (TCE) All exchange transactions encounter problems of information enforcement

Basic Assumptions:• Firms are unique bundles of resources and capabilities • Competitive advantage derives from unique (not tradable

and difficult to substitute) and inimitable resources and competencies, which allow to achieve a superior customer benefit

Firm derives competitive advantage from unique (not

tradable and difficult to substitute) resources and

competencies.

RESOURCE BASED VIEW (RBV)

Page 15: IE 463 Lec 3. Firm and External Cooperation-1 1. TRANSACTION COST ECONOMICS (TCE) All exchange transactions encounter problems of information enforcement

Resources(Stocks)

Activities(Flows)

ResourceCommitments

CapabilityDevelopment

Page 16: IE 463 Lec 3. Firm and External Cooperation-1 1. TRANSACTION COST ECONOMICS (TCE) All exchange transactions encounter problems of information enforcement

TYPES OF RESOURCES

Tangible Resources

Relatively easy to identify, and include physical and

financial assets used to create value for customers

1. Financial resources• firm’s cash accounts• firm’s capacity to raise equity• firm’s borrowing capacity

2. Physical resources• modern plant and facilities• favorable manufacturing locations• state-of-the-art machinery and equipment

Page 17: IE 463 Lec 3. Firm and External Cooperation-1 1. TRANSACTION COST ECONOMICS (TCE) All exchange transactions encounter problems of information enforcement

3. Technological resources• trade secrets• innovative production processes• patents, copyrights, trademarks

4. Organizational resources• effective strategic planning processes• excellent evaluation and control systems

Intangible Resources

Difficult for competitors (and the firm itself) to account for or imitate, typically embedded in unique routines and practices that have evolved over time

1. Human• experience and capabilities of employees• trust• managerial skills• firm-specific practices and procedures

Page 18: IE 463 Lec 3. Firm and External Cooperation-1 1. TRANSACTION COST ECONOMICS (TCE) All exchange transactions encounter problems of information enforcement

2. Innovation and creativity• technical and scientific skills• innovation capacities

3. Reputation• effective strategic planning processes• excellent evaluation and control systems

Page 19: IE 463 Lec 3. Firm and External Cooperation-1 1. TRANSACTION COST ECONOMICS (TCE) All exchange transactions encounter problems of information enforcement

Routines:“... an executable capability for repeated performance in some context that has been learned by an organization in response to selective pressures”

•“… the decision rules which firms employ, both in terms of highly defined production techniques and extremely tacit strategic directions. These routines encompass most of what is regular and predictable about business behavior, and represent the genetic material of the firm in the evolutionary model. They are persistent within the firm, and heritable toward the future of the firm. They define not only how the firm operates now, but also how it will tend to operate in the future”

Organizational Capabilities:• outstanding customer service• excellent product development capabilities• innovativeness of products and services• ability to hire, motivate, and retain human capital

Page 20: IE 463 Lec 3. Firm and External Cooperation-1 1. TRANSACTION COST ECONOMICS (TCE) All exchange transactions encounter problems of information enforcement

Resource

It is the input to a firm’s production process.Capability

It is the ability to exploit resources. They consist of a set of organization processes and routines that manage the interaction among the resources. A capability resides in a particular function i.e. it is functionally based. (“teams” of resources).Competence

It is the cross-functional integration and coordination of capabilities and resources.

capabilities

resources

competencecompetitive

advantage

Page 21: IE 463 Lec 3. Firm and External Cooperation-1 1. TRANSACTION COST ECONOMICS (TCE) All exchange transactions encounter problems of information enforcement

competencies

systemsstructures

tangible

resources

capabilitiesintangible

processess

Page 22: IE 463 Lec 3. Firm and External Cooperation-1 1. TRANSACTION COST ECONOMICS (TCE) All exchange transactions encounter problems of information enforcement

Core Competence

It is a well-performed internal capability that is central, not

peripheral, to a company’s strategy, competitiveness, and

profitability. Core competence reflects a collective

learning in the organization, especially how to coordinate diverse production skills and integrate multiple streams of technologies.

Distinctive Competence It is a competitively valuable core competence that a company performs better than its rivals, something a company does especially well in comparison to its competitors.

Page 23: IE 463 Lec 3. Firm and External Cooperation-1 1. TRANSACTION COST ECONOMICS (TCE) All exchange transactions encounter problems of information enforcement

DEVELOPING COMPETENCIES

competencies

capabilities

resources

value

difficulty

increasing

core competencies

Distictive competencies

Page 24: IE 463 Lec 3. Firm and External Cooperation-1 1. TRANSACTION COST ECONOMICS (TCE) All exchange transactions encounter problems of information enforcement

EXAMPLES: DISTINCTIVE COMPETENCIES • Toyota, Honda, Nissan

– Low-cost, high-quality manufacturing capability and short design-to-market cycles

• Intel– Ability to design and manufacture ever more powerful

microprocessors for PCs

• Motorola– Defect-free manufacture (six-sigma quality) of cell

phones

Page 25: IE 463 Lec 3. Firm and External Cooperation-1 1. TRANSACTION COST ECONOMICS (TCE) All exchange transactions encounter problems of information enforcement

Cooperation is a strategic response to conditions of uncertainty and dependence:

• the primary goal of organizations is to maximize power• organizations need to obtain resources and

competencies from their environment for survival• environment is uncertain• few organizations are self-sufficient w.r.t. critical

resources and competencies

Therefore• reliance on others for resources and competencies is

unavoidable• when resource flows are not under control, it causes

uncertainty in firm’s decision making

Page 26: IE 463 Lec 3. Firm and External Cooperation-1 1. TRANSACTION COST ECONOMICS (TCE) All exchange transactions encounter problems of information enforcement

However RBV,• neglects cooperative relations when actors have no

direct dependence (does not adequately adress the issues of networking)

• motivation and rationale for cooperation is restricted to gaining resources and power (but, org.s make strategic choices to join networks when the advantage of increased survival capacity outweighs the costs of maintaining relations)

Page 27: IE 463 Lec 3. Firm and External Cooperation-1 1. TRANSACTION COST ECONOMICS (TCE) All exchange transactions encounter problems of information enforcement

RESOURCE BASED APPROACH TO STRATEGY

4. Select a strategy which best exploits the firm's resources and capabilities relative to external opportunities.

3. Appraise the rent-generating potential of resources and capabilities in terms of,•their potential of sustainable competitive advantage, and•the appropriability of their returns 

2. Identify the firm's capabilities: What can the firm do more effectively than its rivals? Identify the resources inputs to each capability, and the complexity of each capability.

1. Identify and classify the firm's resources. Appraise Strengths and weaknesses

relative to competitors. Identify opportunities for better utilization of resources .

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aug

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. M

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Strategy

CompetitiveAdvantage

Capabilities

Resources

Page 28: IE 463 Lec 3. Firm and External Cooperation-1 1. TRANSACTION COST ECONOMICS (TCE) All exchange transactions encounter problems of information enforcement

Firms enter into cooperative relationships with other firms; • to acquire competencies that the firm lacks • to learn how to operate in new markets • to acquire resources• to diversify into new business• to capitalize on economies of scale• to circumvate trade or foreign restrictions• ...Strategic management involves both long-range thinking and adaptation to changing conditions. It concentrates on the development, manintanence and explotitation of strategic potentials. Firm derives competitive advantage from strategic fit with its external environment.

STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT THEORY (SMT)

Page 29: IE 463 Lec 3. Firm and External Cooperation-1 1. TRANSACTION COST ECONOMICS (TCE) All exchange transactions encounter problems of information enforcement

SUPPLIERS

POTENTIALENTRANTS

SUBSTITUTES

BUYERS

INDUSTRYCOMPETITORS

Rivalry amongexisting firms

bargaining power of suppliers

bargaining power of buyers

threat of

new entrants

threat of

substitutes

Porter’s Five Forces of Competition

Industry analysis to identify attractive industries for corporate strategy

Page 30: IE 463 Lec 3. Firm and External Cooperation-1 1. TRANSACTION COST ECONOMICS (TCE) All exchange transactions encounter problems of information enforcement

Strategic Positioning:

Superior performance comes from close linkages and correspondence

from;• distinctive value propositions

(unique added value an organization offers customers through their operations; it describes how an organization will differentiate itself to customers)

• a carefully designed product-market focus

(comprises the products a firm chooses to trade in and the customer

segments it targets)• a set of unique value activities

(the things a firm does to deliver the value proposition to the target product-market segments; value system/chain)

Page 31: IE 463 Lec 3. Firm and External Cooperation-1 1. TRANSACTION COST ECONOMICS (TCE) All exchange transactions encounter problems of information enforcement

Porter: A cooperative strategy might offer a mutually advantageous opportunity for firms to modify their market positions and increase market power.

Strategic approach to inter-org. linkages:

• competitive advantage often is derived from linkages

among activities• alliances provide competitive benefits in improving

firms’ strategic posture within the industry• firms enter cooperative relationships in order to

achieve expansion and growth as well as to secure efficiencies of the kind identified in transaction cost economies

• in SMT, networking is a competitive strategy which is used by managers to position their firms in a favorable environment

Page 32: IE 463 Lec 3. Firm and External Cooperation-1 1. TRANSACTION COST ECONOMICS (TCE) All exchange transactions encounter problems of information enforcement

• firm’s competitive advantage lies in its capacity to gain access to, and exploit, valued external resources and expertise through the network

Network is regarded as an investment for future access to other firm’s internal assets.

However STM is criticised for• not considering socially organized relations as important

Page 33: IE 463 Lec 3. Firm and External Cooperation-1 1. TRANSACTION COST ECONOMICS (TCE) All exchange transactions encounter problems of information enforcement

EFFICIENCY

In the framework of the strategic business management the issue of organization’s efficiency is of primary importance.

i. Previously, efficiency was perceived through the internal resources (technological, technical, informational, economic) and was based on comparing costs and results. In that case the process of strategic planning is about the functions of •defining the organization’s targets•interpreting the environment•forming a strategy•adjusting the organization to the needs of implementing the adopted strategy.

Page 34: IE 463 Lec 3. Firm and External Cooperation-1 1. TRANSACTION COST ECONOMICS (TCE) All exchange transactions encounter problems of information enforcement

ii. The "network" model gave rise to an altogether different

approach to the problem of an effective management of an organization. Relationships move to the center of the strategic management.

• The cooperative dimension of strategy ensures its

efficiency through a coordinated behavior of individuals within the system of interactions,

• relationship becomes the main focus in defining efficiency

and setting the strategy• thus, efficiency of organization’s strategy is based on its

interactive behavior.

Page 35: IE 463 Lec 3. Firm and External Cooperation-1 1. TRANSACTION COST ECONOMICS (TCE) All exchange transactions encounter problems of information enforcement

Linking of activities and exchange of resources among the network members are sources of dependence and power. These aspects are missing in the literature on marketing. For example, in the models of marketing buyers and sellers are free to choose and change business partners. It is assumed that suppliers and buyers can be always changed. However, dependence on external resources is important. As a result, in industrial marketing neither sellers nor buyers are free to pick and change partners and such steps are highly risky. The degree of dependence of a firm on the partner depends on,•the partner’s resource collection and•the partner’s monopoly (control) for such supplies.

DEPENDENCE

Page 36: IE 463 Lec 3. Firm and External Cooperation-1 1. TRANSACTION COST ECONOMICS (TCE) All exchange transactions encounter problems of information enforcement

Therefore, • dependence is rather a characteristic of the structure of complementary activities and the distribution of the resources of ‘interacting firms’ than a characteristic of the buyer and the seller • dependence is the basis for power relationships.

As soon as interacting firms begin to appreciate interfirm relationships and not isolated transactions, •coordination of the activities and•cooperation of the firms

across the network is achieved.