No. 12-____

WILSON-EPES PRINTING CO., INC. – (202) 789-0096 – WASHINGTON, D. C. 20002

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States ————

LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY ET AL., Petitioners,

v.

JANE DOE, Respondent.

————

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF PUERTO RICO

————

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

————

BARBARA B. BROWN STEPHEN B. KINNAIRD

Counsel of Record NEAL D. MOLLEN INTRA L. GERMANIS ERIN E. LARUFFA PAUL HASTINGS LLP 875 15th Street, N.W. Washington, DC 20005 (202) 551-1700 stephenkinnaird@paulhastings.com

Counsel for Petitioners

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QUESTION PRESENTED

The arbitration agreement between petitioner Limited Liability Company (“LLC”), a business with offices in Puerto Rico and Washington, D.C., and respondent requires, in relevant part, arbitration of “any action, suit, complaint or demand of whatever nature and for whatever relief or remedy against the [LLC] or any of its Members or employees ….” Despite the sweeping scope of this arbitration clause in an agreement governing operation of an interstate business, the Court of Appeals for the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico ruled that the underlying agreement was not a contract “evidencing a transaction involving commerce” that was subject to the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”). 9 U.S.C. § 2. Having declared the FAA inapplicable, the Court of Appeals disregarded the selection of commercial arbitration rules that empower the arbitrator to decide questions of arbitrability, and applied arbitration-specific Puerto Rico law that would have otherwise been preempted by the FAA to deny arbitration. The questions presented are

1. Is the contract for operation of an interstate business “a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce” governed by the FAA?

2. Are arbitration-specific rules under Puerto Rico law that limit an arbitration clause to the subject matter of the underlying agreement and entitle a person to judicial enforcement of discrimination and retaliation claims preempted by the FAA?

3. Should questions of arbitrability be decided by the arbitrator when the parties select commercial arbitration rules that so provide?

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PARTIES

In addition to petitioner Limited Liability Company (“LLC”) and respondent Jane Doe listed in the caption, the other parties below (all petitioners in this Court) are John Doe, Jean Doe, Jack Joe, Jacky Joe, Larry Loe, Larissa Loe; Unknown Defendants A, B and C; and Unknown Insurance Companies Defendants X, Y, Z. In accordance with Supreme Court Rule 29.6, Petitioner McConnell Valdés LLC, a law firm, is a limited liability company with no parent company. No entity of any kind has 10 percent or greater ownership in McConnell Valdés LLC. “Limited Liability Company” or “LLC” refers to the law firm of McConnell Valdés LLC. “John Doe” refers to Arturo J. Garcia-Sola, the Managing Director of McConnell Valdés. “Jean Doe” refers to Garcia-Sola’s wife, Isis Carballo, who is a special counsel at McConnell Valdés. “Jack Joe” refers to Néstor Durán Gonzáles, who is a retired capital member of McConnell Valdés and who now works as an independent contractor for McConnell Valdés. “Jacky Joe” refers to Elaine Ruiz, who is Durán’s wife and who is not an employee or capital member of McConnell Valdés. “Larry Loe” refers to Alfredo Hopgood Jovet, a capital member of McConnell Valdés and the chair of the firm’s employment practice group. “Larissa Loe” refers to Ana M. Otero, who is Hopgood’s wife and who is not an employee or capital member of McConnell Valdés. “Jane Doe” refers to Plaintiff Maggie Correa Avilés.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page(s) QUESTION PRESENTED .............................................. i

PARTIES ......................................................................... ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS ................................................ iii

TABLE OF APPENDICES ..............................................v

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ......................................... vii

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI ................. 1

OPINIONS AND ORDERS BELOW ............................. 1

JURISDICTION.............................................................. 2

STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED ..................... 2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE ........................................ 3

STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW ................................................................ 5

A. Jane Doe Was A Capital Member Of LLC .......... 5

B. Jane Doe Agreed To Arbitrate Any Claim “Of Whatever Nature And For Whatever Relief” She Might Have Against LLC Or Its Members ............................................................... 6

C. LLC Reduced Jane Doe’s Compensation Pursuant To The Operating Agreement ............. 8

D. Jane Doe Invoked The Claim Resolution Process Set Forth In The Operating Agreement ............................................................ 9

E. Jane Doe Filed A Lawsuit In Puerto Rico Court To Enjoin The Arbitration; LLC Responded With A Petition To Compel Arbitration ............................................................ 9

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TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued)

Page(s)

F. The Trial Court Denied LLC’s Motion To Compel Arbitration ............................................ 10

G. LLC’s Appeal To The Appellate Court Was Unsuccessful ....................................................... 11

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION ........... 14

I. The Ruling Below That The Operating Agreement Was Not Subject To The FAA Because It Did Not Evince A “Transaction Involving Commerce” Conflicts With The Decisions Of This Court ..................................... 15

II. The Court of Appeals Improperly Applied Restrictive, Arbitration-Specific Puerto Rico Law That Is Clearly Pre-empted By The FAA Under This Court’s Precedents ......................... 18

III. The Ruling Below That The Scope of An Arbitration Clause Providing For AAA Arbitration Is Determined By The Court Is In Conflict With Decisions Of Federal Courts Of Appeals .......................................................... 27

CONCLUSION ............................................................. 31

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TABLE OF APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

Jane Doe v. Limited Liability Co., No. KLCE201200821, Commonwealth of Puerto Rico Court of Appeals, Judicial Region of San Juan Panel III, Resolution, June 15, 2012

APPENDIX B

Jane Doe v. Limited Liability Co., No. KPE2012-1204, Commonwealth of Puerto Rico Court of First Instance San Juan Superior Court, Resolution, June 4, 2012

APPENDIX C Jane Doe v. Limited Liability Co., No. CC-2012-0532, Supreme Court of Puerto Rico, Order Denying Petition for Certiorari, Sept. 7, 2012

APPENDIX D Jane Doe v. Limited Liability Co., No. CC-2012-0532, Supreme Court of Puerto Rico, Order Denying First Motion for Reconsideration of Denial of Certiorari, Oct. 5, 2012

APPENDIX E Jane Doe v. Limited Liability Co., No. CC-2012-0532, Supreme Court of Puerto Rico, Order Denying Second Motion for Reconsideration of Denial of Certiorari, Nov. 30, 2012

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TABLE OF APPENDICES (continued)

APPENDIX F

Jane Doe v. Limited Liability Co., No. KPE2012-1204, Commonwealth of Puerto Rico Court of First Instance San Juan Superior Court, Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction and to Compel Compulsory Arbitration in Light of Binding Arbitration Agreement, Apr. 11, 2012

APPENDIX G Jane Doe v. Limited Liability Co., No KLCE201200821, Commonwealth of Puerto Rico Court of Appeals, Judicial Region of San Juan Panel III, Limited Liability Co.’s Petition for Certiorari, June 12, 2012

APPENDIX H Jane Doe v. Limited Liability Co., No. CC-2012-0532, Supreme Court of Puerto Rico, Limited Liability Co.’s Petition for Certiorari, June 19, 2012

APPENDIX I Excerpts of Limited Liability Co.’s Operating Agreement

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page(s)

CASES

Aggarao v. MOL Ship Mgmt. Co., 675 F.3d 355 (4th Cir. 2012) ................................ 17

Allied-Bruce Terminix Companies, Inc. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265 (1995) .................................... 4, 16, 17

Apollo Computer Inc. v. Berg, 886 F.2d 469 (1st Cir. 1989) ................................. 29

AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011) .......................... 5, 21, 22, 28

AT&T Techs., Inc. v. Commc’ns Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643 (1986) ............................ 14, 25, 26, 27

Benders v. Bellows & Bellows, 515 F.3d 757 (7th Cir. 2008) ................................ 17

Bowen v. Amoco Pipeline Co., 254 F.3d 925 (10th Cir. 2001) .............................. 20

Brown v. ITT Consumer Fin. Corp., 211 F.3d 1217 (11th Cir. 2000) ............................ 24

Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of N.Y., Inc. v. Soft Drink & Brewery Workers Union Local 812, 242 F.3d 52 (2d Cir. 2001) .................................... 15

Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426 (1955) .............................................. 26

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (continued)

Page(s)

CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 132 S. Ct. 665 (2012) ............................................ 15

Contec Corp. v. Remote Solution, Co., 398 F.3d 205 (2d Cir. 2005) ............................ 28, 29

Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213 (1985) .............................................. 15

Doctor’s Assocs. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681 (1996) .............................................. 21

Doe v. Princess Cruise Lines, Ltd., 657 F.3d 1204 (11th Cir. 2011) ............................ 24

E.E.O.C. v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279 (2002) .............................................. 17

Edwards v. Hovensa, LLC, 497 F.3d 355 (3d Cir. 2007) .................................. 17

Fallo v. High-Tech Institute, 559 F.3d 874 (8th Cir. 2009) ................................ 28

First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938 (1995) ........................................ 25, 27

Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991) .................................... 14, 20, 23

Green v. SuperShuttle Int’l, Inc., 653 F.3d 766 (8th Cir. 2011) ................................ 28

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (continued)

Page(s)

Harrison v. PPG Indus., Inc., 446 U.S. 578 (1980) .............................................. 26

Levin v. Alms & Assocs., Inc., 634 F.3d 260 (4th Cir. 2011) ................................ 24

Marmet Health Care Center, Inc. v. Brown, 132 S. Ct. 1201 (2012) .................................. passim

Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52 (1995) ................................................ 25

Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985) .................................... 3, 14, 21

Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 723 F.2d 155 (1st Cir. 1983), aff’d in part and rev’d on other grounds, 473 U.S. 614 (1985) ........ 21

Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983) .................................................. 14

Nitro-Lift Technologies, LLC v. Howard, No. 11-1377, 2012 U.S. LEXIS 8897 (Nov. 26, 2012).............................................................. passim

Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483 (1987) .............................................. 21

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (continued)

Page(s)

Pers. Sec. & Safety Sys., Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 297 F.3d 388 (5th Cir. 2002) ................................ 24

Petrofac, Inc. v. DYNMcDermott Petroleum Operations Co., 687 F.3d 671 (5th Cir. 2012) ................................ 28

Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967) .............................................. 16

Qualcomm Inc. v. Nokia Corp., 466 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2006) ....................... 27, 29

Rent-A-Center v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772 (2010) .............................. 23, 24, 27

Riley Mfg. Co. v. Anchor Glass Container Corp., 157 F.3d 775 (10th Cir. 1998) .............................. 29

SCI v. Fulmer, 883 So.2d 621 (Ala. 2003) ..................................... 16

Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U. S. 1 (1984) ................................................... 2

Terminix Int’l Co. v. Palmer Ranch Ltd. Partnership, 432 F.3d 1327 (11th Cir. 2005) ...................... 20, 29

United States v. Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1 (1997) .................................................. 26

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (continued)

Page(s)

Urbanic v. Travelers Ins. Co., No. 10-2368 (WYD) (MJW), 2011 WL 1743412 (D. Colo. May 6, 2011) .......................................... 29

CONSTITUTION, STATUTES, AND GUIDELINES

28 U.S.C. § 1257 ...................................................................... 2 § 1258 ...................................................................... 2

9 U.S.C. § 2 ................................................... 2, 4, 16, 21

OTHER AUTHORITIES

American Arbitration Association, Commercial Arbitration Rules and Mediation Procedures (June 1, 2009) ........................................... 12, 20, 28

Eugene Gressman et al., Supreme Court Practice (9th ed. 2007) .......................................................... 2

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PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Petitioners Limited Liability Company, John Doe, Jean Doe, Jack Joe, Jacky Joe, Larry Loe, Larissa Loe, CP John and Jean Doe, CP Jack and Jacky Doe, and CP Larry and Larissa Loe, Unknown Defendants A, B, C, and Unknown Insurance Companies Defendants X, Y, Z (collectively “LLC”)1 respectfully petition for a writ of certiorari to review the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.

OPINIONS AND ORDERS BELOW

The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico is unreported and included at App. 1a-34a. The order of the Court of First Instance for the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico is unreported and has been kept under seal by the courts below, and is included at App. 35a-77a. The Supreme Court of Puerto Rico’s opinion and order denying certiorari is unreported and has been kept under seal by the courts below, but is included at App. 78a-82a. The Supreme Court of Puerto Rico’s first and second orders denying LLC’s motions for reconsideration of the denial of the petition for certiorari are unpublished and have been kept under seal by the courts below, but are included as App. 83a-87a, 88a-96a.

1As explained infra at pp. 7-8, the Operating Agreement at issue requires that all parties keep any claims by a member against the firm and its members confidential, the parties have litigated this case using pseudonyms and made filings under seal, and the Puerto Rico courts at every level have kept the proceedings under seal. For that reason, we use “Jane Doe” rather than respondent’s real name, and we refer to the petitioners collectively as “LLC.”

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JURISDICTION

The Court of First Instance for the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico entered its order denying arbitration on June 4, 2012. App. 56a. The Court of Appeals for the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico entered its judgment confirming the denial of arbitration and denying a petition for certiorari on June 15, 2012. App. 33a. The Supreme Court of Puerto Rico denied a petition for certiorari on September 7, 2012, App. 80a, and denied motions for reconsideration on October 5, 2012 and November 30, 2012 (the latter by a 5-4 split vote). App. 85a, 92a. An order denying arbitration is a final judgment subject to this Court’s review under 28 U.S.C. § 1258. See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U. S. 1, 7-8 (1984) (ruling under 28 U.S.C. § 1257).2

STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

Section 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 2, provides, “A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole or any part thereof, or an agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an existing controversy arising out of such a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as

2 Eugene Gressman et al., Supreme Court Practice § 4.24, at 294 (9th ed. 2007) (noting that section 1258 creates parallel jurisdiction with section 1257, and “for review purposes affords the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico the status of the highest court of a state”); id. § 3.13, at 179 (“Should the highest court decline to exercise its authority, the judgment of an intermediate court rather than the order of refusal by the higher court is the judgment reviewable under § 1257. . . .”) (citing cases).

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exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Congress enacted the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16, “to overcome an anachronistic judicial hostility to agreements to arbitrate, which American courts had borrowed from English common law.” Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 626 n.14 (1985) (citations omitted). The Court of Appeals below manifested just such hostility and flouted this Court’s precedents in declaring that an agreement for the operation of an interstate business did not involve interstate commerce, and proceeded to apply restrictive, arbitration-specific Puerto Rico law to refuse to enforce an exceptionally broad arbitration clause – despite the fact that this Court’s recent and unambiguous precedents have made clear that such state laws are preempted by the FAA. This case is cut from the same cloth as the misguided actions of the West Virginia and Oklahoma Supreme Courts that were recently summarily vacated by this Court. See Nitro-Lift Technologies, LLC v. Howard, No. 11-1377, 2012 U.S. LEXIS 8897, at *1 (Nov. 26, 2012) (per curiam); Marmet Health Care Center, Inc. v. Brown, 132 S. Ct. 1201 (2012) (per curiam). The decision below should receive similar treatment in light of its obdurate refusal to submit to the tenets of preemptive federal law. E.g., Nitro-Lift, 2012 U.S. LEXIS 8897, at *1 (“It is a matter of great importance … that state supreme courts adhere to a correct interpretation of the legislation[.]”).

The agreement at issue is the Operating Agreement (also referred to as “OA”) of LLC, the largest law firm in Puerto Rico. The Operating Agreement provides that

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any claims by a capital member against the firm or other members will be handled confidentially by a three-step process of internal resolution, mediation, and arbitration. The arbitration agreement has comprehensive breadth, applying to “any action, suit, complaint or demand of whatever nature and for whatever relief or remedy against the firm or any of its members or employees,” with enumerated exceptions not relevant here. After the firm reviewed and reduced the compensation of Jane Doe, a capital member of the firm, pursuant to the Operating Agreement because her origination of business declined with the loss of a major client, Jane Doe initially pursued a claim for discrimination under the three-step resolution process. But after the firm filed for arbitration, she sought to circumvent this final stage and air her complaint in a judicial forum.

The Court of Appeals for the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico upheld the trial court’s denial of LLC’s motion to compel arbitration in a decision irreconcilable with this Court’s FAA precedents. The court below first narrowly construed the FAA requirement of a “contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce,” 9 U.S.C. § 2, to declare the FAA inapplicable to the Operating Agreement, in contravention of Allied-Bruce Terminix Companies, Inc. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265 (1995). Having done so, the Court of Appeals applied restrictive, arbitration-specific Puerto Rico law – state law which limits an exceptionally broad arbitration clause to the subject matter of the underlying agreement and effectively prohibits arbitration of all discrimination and retaliation claims under the Puerto Rico constitution – to deny arbitration, in contravention of Nitro-Lift Technologies, Marmet Health Care Center,

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and AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011).

Indeed, here, the Puerto Rico Court of Appeals strayed even farther from this Court’s precedents than did the state courts in Nitro-Lift and Marmet Health Care Center, and its decision is even more deserving of summary vacatur. The court below contrived to hold that a contract for the operation of an interstate business is not a contract evincing a transaction involving commerce that is subject to the FAA. It used this holding – which contravenes this Court’s precedents establishing the broad applicability of the FAA – as a stepping stone to applying Puerto Rico law that would otherwise be preempted. This Court cannot tolerate the irrepressible hostility of state courts to federal pro-arbitration policy, and it should grant review to vindicate its precedents and the supremacy of federal law.

STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW

A. Jane Doe Was A Capital Member Of LLC

LLC is a law firm that became a limited liability company governed under the General Law of Corporations of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico in 2007. LLC has offices in San Juan, Puerto Rico, and Washington, D.C., and represents a variety of principally corporate clients both within and outside Puerto Rico. Jane Doe was a capital member of LLC from 2007 until 2012, and an equity partner at LLC for 20 years before the firm changed the manner in which it is organized under Puerto Rican law.

LLC’s operations are governed by an “Operating Agreement” to which all of its owners are signatory.

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Among other things, it provides a process for establishing equity accounts, setting owner compensation, and distributing profits and losses; it establishes committees for firm administration and sets out the procedures for the election and expulsion of members. From 2009 to 2012, Jane Doe was elected to and served as a member of the LLC’s seven-member governing Policy Committee, which makes strategy decisions for the firm, recommends the promotion of new capital members, approves the annual compensation and bonuses of capital members, and generally makes the policy decisions that govern the LLC.

B. Jane Doe Agreed To Arbitrate Any Claim “Of Whatever Nature And For Whatever Relief” She Might Have Against LLC Or Its Members

In addition to ordering the administration of LLC, the Operating Agreement also contains the mutual agreement of the firm and each signatory owner-member to resolve any claim that might arise between LLC and any current or former capital member exclusively by following a three-step alternative dispute resolution process. First, the complaining party must submit the dispute to the firm’s Policy Committee. If the dispute is not resolved to the satisfaction of both parties by the Committee, the matter is then submitted to mediation. Finally, claims that are not resolved in the first two steps proceed to arbitration. App. 490a-492a (Agreement ¶¶ 1.07, 14.01-14.04).

When they execute the Operating Agreement, all capital members “expressly agree[]” that any claim will be resolved by mediation or arbitration. App. 490a (Agreement ¶ 14.01) (“It is the intent and purpose of the [LLC] and any Claimant to resolve any Claim by

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mediation or arbitration.”) (emphasis added). Specifically, the firm and its members agree that “[i]f mediation fails, the Claim shall be settled by arbitration administered by the American Arbitration Association under its Commercial Arbitration Rules, and judgment on the award rendered by the arbitrator(s) may be entered in any court having jurisdiction thereof.” App. 490a, 491a (Agreement ¶ 14.04).

That promise to arbitrate is not limited to disputes arising out of the terms of the Operating Agreement. Rather, by becoming an owner of the firm and executing the Operating Agreement, each member-owner commits without reservation or exception to arbitrate any “claim” he or she might have against the firm or any of its employees or other members. The sweep of this promise is reflected in Paragraph 1.06 of the Operating Agreement which defines the word “claim” as used in the arbitration provision. “‘Claim’ means any action, suit, complaint or demand of whatever nature and for whatever relief or remedy against the [LLC] or any of its Members or employees,” excepting only actions for injunctive or equitable relief by the firm for unfair competition or unauthorized disclosure of trade secrets. App. 483a (Agreement ¶ 1.06) (emphasis added).

A principal reason the owners of LLC have made this mutual promise, to each other and to the firm, is the desire of all concerned to resolve disputes among its members in confidence, without undermining the firm’s reputation among its clients and the public. Thus, Paragraph 14.05 of the Operating Agreement explicitly provides that every “claim” will be resolved confidentially:

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The Claimant and the [LLC] agree that the underlying purpose of the provisions set forth in section 14 of this Agreement is to provide a mechanism by which any Claim shall be resolved in a confidential manner, without publicity and the attendant distractions. Accordingly, all mediation meetings and arbitration hearings shall be private and confidential, and attended by the parties, counsel, and witnesses only. The parties agree to maintain the confidentiality of such meetings and hearings, and of the documents produced or created in such meetings and hearings. . . .

App. 492a (Agreement ¶ 14.05) (emphasis added).

C. LLC Reduced Jane Doe’s Compensation Pursuant To The Operating Agreement

During her career, Jane Doe was successful in developing a significant amount of business from just one major client, a large pharmaceutical company headquartered in the continental United States. Beginning in 2008, when that client became the acquisition target of another pharmaceutical company, firm management advised Jane Doe to undertake all necessary efforts and initiatives to replace the anticipated loss of that client’s business from existing or new clients. When business from that client disappeared in 2010, as predicted, Jane Doe was unable to replace this work, and her business production — her economic contribution to the firm — plummeted.

Pursuant to paragraph 5.01 of the Operating Agreement, the LLC’s Policy Committee annually reviews and adjusts member compensation, and in May 2011, the Policy Committee (on which Jane Doe served)

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decided to reduce Jane Doe’s compensation if she was unable to meet certain goals by a date certain. It informed Jane Doe promptly of the decision. She failed to achieve the goals set for her, and her compensation reduction became effective in December 2011.

D. Jane Doe Invoked The Claim Resolution Process Set Forth In The Operating Agreement

Jane Doe disputed the reduction in her compensation. On January 24, 2012, she invoked the Operating Agreement’s three-step resolution process as described above by submitting a claim to the Policy Committee, alleging that the decision to reduce her compensation breached the LLC’s Operating Agreement and constituted discrimination against her on the basis of sex and age in violation of various local and federal laws. When the Policy Committee rejected her claim, the parties proceeded to mediation, the second step in the Operating Agreement’s dispute resolution process. The mediation was unsuccessful. On March 22, 2012, LLC initiated the third and final step of the process by filing a Demand for Arbitration with the AAA.

E. Jane Doe Filed A Lawsuit In Puerto Rico Court To Enjoin The Arbitration; LLC Responded With A Petition To Compel Arbitration

On April 2, 2012, Jane Doe sought an injunction against the AAA arbitration proceedings in the Court of First Instance (the trial court). In filing this court action, Jane Doe used fictitious names to preserve the confidentiality of the dispute in accordance with Paragraph 14.05 of the Operating Agreement, pending the trial court’s decision on the arbitrability issue. The trial court issued an order preserving confidentiality.

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Jane Doe sought a declaratory judgment as well as a preliminary and permanent injunction permitting her to avoid arbitration, claiming that she was not bound by the arbitration provision because her claims related to her employment relationship with LLC, rather than her status as a capital member.

LLC moved to compel arbitration, and also expelled Jane Doe as a result of this and other blatant breaches of the Operating Agreement. LLC argued that the Operating Agreement was a contract affecting interstate commerce; that the question of arbitrability should be submitted to the arbitrator under the Commercial Arbitration Rules; and that under the FAA Jane Doe’s claims were clearly arbitrable pursuant to the broadly worded arbitration clause. App. 134a-160a.

F. The Trial Court Denied LLC’s Motion To Compel Arbitration

On June 4, 2012, the trial court denied the motion to compel arbitration, for several reasons.

First, it rejected arbitration as a permissible forum for Jane Doe’s claims because if the dispute were arbitrated, the court held, the arbitrator would be “delegated to resolve the disagreement in a completely confidential forum with no right of appeal for the affected parties,” a result the court apparently found unacceptable. App. 74a. Second, in its “Findings of Law,” the trial court held that “[b]ecause these claims arise from the employment relationship between Jane Doe and LLC they are excluded from the arbitration demand filed under the OA. This is because it [the OA] governs the operational and administrative aspects of the LLC and not the existing employment relationship between the capital members and the LLC that is

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regulated by the EM [Employee Manual].” Id. at 74a-75a (original emphasis deleted). The court so ruled even though Jane Doe’s compensation is governed by paragraph 5.01 of the Operating Agreement, and her termination is governed by paragraph 12.02 of the same (and there is no provision in the Employee Manual governing compensation or termination of capital members).3

G. LLC’s Appeal To The Appellate Court Was Unsuccessful

LLC immediately sought discretionary review of the trial court’s decision on June 12, 2012 by filing a Petition for a Writ of Certiorari with the Puerto Rico Court of Appeals as well as an Urgent Motion for Stay of the Proceedings. LLC argued each of the points now raised in this petition for certiorari. App. 163a-247a, 248a-380a.

On June 15, the Appellate Court denied both the motion to stay and the petition for certiorari and effectively adopted the result reached by the trial court. App. 31a-32a (“we believe that the Court of First Instance did not err upon concluding that the arbitration clause is not controlling as to respondent’s role” in deciding the merits of Jane Doe’s claims; “The Judge of [First] Instance not only reasonably exercised his discretion but also made a determination that is correct in Law.”). In addition to adopting the trial court’s legal conclusions, the Appellate Court held that:

3 LLC disputes whether Jane Doe – a capital member of the firm and a member of its Policy Committee – was an employee entitled to bring discrimination and retaliation claims, but that is a merits question that should be resolved by the arbitrator.

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1. the FAA only applies to “contracts [that] involve interstate commercial transactions,” a “circumstance [that] is not present in this case,” App. 26a, 31a.

2. although Jane Doe agreed to arbitrate every possible claim “of whatever nature and for whatever relief or remedy,” App. 483a (Agreement ¶ 1.06), Jane Doe’s employment claims are not arbitrable because they are “not related to the governance or administration of the LLC,” which are the only matters “regulated by the arbitration clause of the Operating Agreement,” App. 31a; and

3. arbitration would be inconsistent with Puerto Rico public policy because injunctive relief must be available for claims of constitutional violations, App. 31a-32a.

The Court of Appeals also held that the trial court was entitled to decide the question whether the parties had agreed to arbitrate Jane Doe’s claims because “the parties did not agree that the adjudication of the arbitrability [question] . . . would be referred to an arbitrator.” App. 31a. The court reached this conclusion notwithstanding the fact that the parties had expressly agreed to adopt the rules of the AAA, App. 491a (Agreement ¶ 14.04), including the rule that “[t]he arbitrator shall have the power to rule on his or her own jurisdiction, including any objections with respect to the existence, scope or validity of the arbitration agreement.”4

4American Arbitration Association, Commercial Arbitration Rules and Mediation Procedures, Rule R-7(a) (June 1, 2009), http://www.adr.org/aaa/faces/aoe/commercial (follow “AAA

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Finally, the Court of Appeals gave its apparent approval to the trial court’s inclination to open the record to the public with dispatch. It approved of the trial court’s intention to “soon issue its ruling regarding the extent of the term of the confidentiality agreement keeping confidential the names of the above-captioned parties [and it] encourage[d] giving the issue priority in the Court calendar.” App. 32a. Weighing in on the merits of that question, the Court of Appeals noted that the “[p]ublic interest calls for individuals to know about the judicial system’s activities” and cited the “presumption . . . stating that the parties’ identities form part of the public record.” Id. The court did not weigh against this presumption the right of contracting parties to the benefit of their bargain.5

LLC filed for a stay and petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico. The petition raised each of the questions presented in this petition for certiorari. App. 455a, 464a, 470a, 475a. After initially granting a stay, the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico denied the petition for certiorari without explanation on September 7, 2012. The Supreme Court denied LLC’s first petition for reconsideration on October 5, 2012, and its second petition for reconsideration on November 30, 2012, by a 5-4 vote. App. 86a, 95a.

Commercial Arbitration Rules and Mediation Procedures” hyperlink) (hereafter, “AAA Commercial Rules”) (emphasis added). 5 Petitioners have sought a writ of certiorari to the Court of Appeals because its opinion, although formally styled as a denial of certiorari, resolved the arbitration questions on the merits in a manner different from the Court of First Instance. Alternatively, to the extent that the judgment of the Court of First Instance is deemed the operative judgment, petitioners seek a writ of certiorari to that court.

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REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

The FAA’s “purpose was to reverse the longstanding judicial hostility to arbitration agreements that had existed at English common law and had been adopted by American courts, and to place arbitration agreements upon the same footing as other contracts.” Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24 (1991) (citations omitted). Because the FAA declares “a national policy” in favor of arbitration, courts must apply the “federal substantive law of arbitrability, applicable to any arbitration agreement within the coverage of the Act.” Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 473 U.S. at 626 (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983)). That federal substantive law commands that courts apply a presumption of arbitrability in determining which claims must be submitted to arbitration: “[a]n order to arbitrate the particular grievance should not be denied unless it may be said with positive assurance that the arbitration clause is not susceptible of an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute. Doubts should be resolved in favor of coverage.” AT&T Techs., Inc. v. Commc’ns Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 650 (1986) (emphasis added) (quoting Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582-83 (1960)); Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp., 460 U.S. at 24-25. State court hostility to the FAA continues unabated as evidenced by those courts’ continued invocation of state-specific laws and policies hostile to arbitration to trump the federal policy to which they must defer. This case is just the latest in a string of such cases. The message of federal supremacy should be reinforced by summary vacatur of the holdings below.

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LLC’s motion to enforce Jane Doe’s agreement to arbitrate should have been a simple matter in light of the presumption of arbitrability and Jane Doe’s unambiguous and unqualified agreement to arbitrate any claim “of whatever nature and for whatever relief or remedy.” App. 483a (Agreement ¶ 1.06); see CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 132 S. Ct. 665, 669 (2012) (agreement to arbitrate must be enforced according to its terms); Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 221 (1985). No categorical exclusion for discrimination claims exists in her promise to arbitrate; indeed, the Agreement excludes two types of claims expressly (certain trade-secret and trademark claims), which militates against implied exclusion of other claims. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of N.Y., Inc. v. Soft Drink & Brewery Workers Union Local 812, 242 F.3d 52, 57 (2d Cir. 2001). The court below, however, exuding hostility to arbitration, flouted the terms of the FAA, the explicit scope of Jane Doe’s agreement to arbitrate, and fundamental federal policies, as well as numerous precedents of this Court, in denying arbitration. This Court should grant review and summarily vacate the decision below, or alternatively set the case for argument.

I. The Ruling Below That The Operating Agreement Was Not Subject To The FAA Because It Did Not Evince A “Transaction Involving Commerce” Conflicts With The Decisions Of This Court.

Remarkably, the Court of Appeals held that the FAA did not even apply to the Operating Agreement. It declared that the FAA only applies to “contracts [that] involve interstate commercial transactions,” a circumstance that it held is “not present in this case.”

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App. 26a, 31a. This holding ignores this Court’s decisions on the broad meaning of “commerce” as used in the FAA.

The FAA applies to arbitration clauses in any “contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce.” 9 U.S.C. § 2. In Allied-Bruce Terminix Companies v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265 (1995), this Court read the word “involving” in the statutory phrase as the functional equivalent of “affecting.” Id. at 273-74. Because the term “affecting commerce” signals Congress’s intent to exercise its Commerce Clause powers to the maximum extent possible, id. at 273, the Court applied that expansive scope to the FAA. Id. at 274. Extending the reach of the FAA to the limits of Congress’s Commerce Clause power is consistent with the Act’s purpose to “put arbitration provisions on the ‘same footing’ as a contract’s other terms.” Id. at 275 (quoting Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 511 (1974)).

The Court of Appeals simply disregarded this precedent in denying application of the FAA to the Operating Agreement altogether. There is no question that an agreement for the operation of a law firm is a contract evidencing transactions involving commerce. See Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 401 (1967) (finding a contract that, among other things, was tied “to the continuing operations of an interstate manufacturing and wholesaling business” to be a contract involving commerce); SCI v. Fulmer, 883 So.2d 621, 629 (Ala. 2003) (“[I]t would be difficult indeed to give an example of an economic or commercial activity that one could . . . declare beyond the reach of Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause, and, by extension, under the FAA.”). The U.S. legal services industry is a $220 billion industry, U.S. Commerce

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Dep’t Bureau of Economic Analysis, 1998-2011 NAICS Data, http://www.bea.gov/industry/gdpbyind_ data.htm (last visited Oct. 24, 2012), and Congress has exercised its Commerce Clause power to regulate law firms. See Benders v. Bellows & Bellows, 515 F.3d 757, 764 (7th Cir. 2008) (applying Title VII to defendant law firm).

Moreover, the Court of Appeals stated that “[b]oth the Operating Agreement and the Employee Manual are part of Jane Doe’s employment contract.” App. 31a. Following Allied-Bruce, this Court has observed that “[e]mployment contracts, except for those covering workers engaged in transportation, are covered by the FAA,” E.E.O.C. v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 289 (2002), and courts of appeals have routinely applied the FAA to arbitration clauses in employment agreements, even when the claimant’s work itself may not involve interstate contacts. See, e.g., Aggarao v. MOL Ship Mgmt. Co., 675 F.3d 355, 369 (4th Cir. 2012) (“As the Supreme Court has observed, ‘a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce’ includes an employment contract.”) (quoting Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 113 (2001)); Edwards v. Hovensa, LLC, 497 F.3d 355, 363 (3d Cir. 2007) (“[t]he [Supreme] Court made clear that the Federal Arbitration Act applies to employment contracts”) (citation omitted).

So long as the contract is subject to the Commerce Power of Congress, it is within the scope of the FAA; there is no requirement that the claims to be arbitrated must be as well. In any event, Jane Doe’s own claims did involve interstate commerce. As a part-owner of a law firm with offices in both San Juan, Puerto Rico, and Washington, D.C. that served clients from outside Puerto Rico, she derived part of her income from

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“interstate” operations, and as she alleged in her Complaint, her principal client was a pharmaceutical company headquartered in the continental United States. Indeed, her allegations of discrimination include the accusation that her co-owners failed to support her efforts to keep that client by accompanying her to a meeting in New York. Third Am. Compl. ¶¶ 49-53; App. 157a-158a (Defs.’ Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction and to Compel Compulsory Arbitration in Light of Binding Arbitration Agreement.)

The lower court’s summary ruling that the contract did not evidence transactions involving commerce manifests its hostility to the FAA and the federal policy of arbitration, and disregards the precedent of this Court that defines the proper interstate commerce rule for determining applicability of the FAA. “When this Court has fulfilled its duty to interpret federal law, a state court may not contradict or fail to implement the rule so established.” Marmet Health Care Ctr., Inc. v. Brown, 132 S. Ct. 1201, 1202 (2012) (per curiam) (citation omitted).

II. The Court of Appeals Improperly Applied Restrictive, Arbitration-Specific Puerto Rico Law That Is Clearly Pre-empted By The FAA Under This Court’s Precedents.

The Puerto Rican courts below did not enforce the Arbitration Clause according to its broad terms and compel arbitration of Jane Doe’s employment claims. In its “Findings of Law,” the trial court held that “[b]ecause these claims arise from the employment relationship between Jane Doe and LLC they are excluded from the arbitration demand filed under the OA. This is because it [the OA] governs the operational and administrative aspects of the LLC and not the

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existing employment relationship between the capital members and the LLC that is regulated by the EM.” App. 75a (original emphasis deleted and new emphasis added).

Having dispensed with the FAA with its interstate commerce ruling, the Court of Appeals invoked restrictive Puerto Rico law to limit the scope of the arbitration agreement. The court relied upon Article 1 of Puerto Rico’s Commercial Arbitration Act, which provides that the parties “may include in a written agreement a provision for the settlement by arbitration of any dispute which may in future arise between them from such settlement or in connection therewith.” App. 26a (quoting Art. 1 of the Arbitration Act, 32 L.P.R.A. § 3201) (emphasis in original). The court interpreted that provision to mean that “the law of Puerto Rico allows the parties to bind themselves to arbitrate any possible future controversy arising from their contract.” App. 26a (emphasis in original). Accordingly, the court deemed the arbitration clause, despite the exceptional breadth of its language, to be limited to only those claims that arise from what it considered to be the scope of the Operating Agreement (i.e., governance or administration of the LLC):

[W]e believe that the Court of First Instance did not err upon concluding that the arbitration clause is not controlling as to respondent’s role. Both the Operating Agreement and the Employee Manual are part of Jane Doe’s employment contract; thus, at this stage of the proceedings, the dispute of the case is not related to the governance or administration of the LLC, which is regulated by the arbitration clause of the Operating Agreement.

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App. 31a (original emphasis deleted and new emphasis added). The Court of Appeals buttressed its ruling by invoking Puerto Rico policy favoring judicial resolution of discrimination and retaliation claims under the Puerto Rico constitution. The court ruled that the trial court “made a determination that is correct in Law,” for “the claim that Jane Doe moves for the judicial forum to adjudicate is one attributing to LLC a severance resulting from discrimination and retaliation,” and the “dispute is related to conduct attributed to the LLC that violates her fundamental constitutional rights which our current legal system protects through injunctive relief.” App. 32a.6

6 The remedial element the court below assumed would be lacking in arbitration — “the protect[ions] [of] injunctive relief” — is fully available in arbitration. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 32 (“arbitrators do have the power to fashion equitable relief”) (citation omitted); Terminix Int’l Co. v. Palmer Ranch Ltd. Partnership, 432 F.3d 1327, 1329 n.2 (11th Cir. 2005) (noting that arbitrator could award injunctive relief) (citation omitted); Bowen v. Amoco Pipeline Co., 254 F.3d 925, 939 (10th Cir. 2001) (noting that arbitrator had power to order injunctive relief and that any doubts regarding the arbitrator’s authority to award certain remedies should be resolved in favor of the arbitrator); AAA Commercial Rule R-43(a) (“The arbitrator may grant any remedy or relief that the arbitrator deems just and equitable and within the scope of the agreement of the parties. . . .”). As the Court held in Gilmer, “[b]y agreeing to arbitrate a statutory [discrimination] claim, a party does not forgo the substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum.” 500 U.S. at 26 (citing Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Any policy of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico that a party must have recourse to the courts to secure injunctive relief for violations of the Puerto Rico constitution is superseded by the federal policy of the FAA that gives parties the right to agree to an arbitration forum that provides these remedies.

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Thus, by its peremptory and unreasoned ruling that the FAA does not apply to a contract that clearly involves interstate commerce, the Court of Appeals succeeded in applying arbitration-specific commonwealth rules that the FAA would clearly preempt. State (or commonwealth) policy of whatever kind must give way to the paramount federal policies embodied in the FAA.7 The FAA preempts any state-law rule that “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress” in making arbitration agreements fully enforceable on their terms. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1753 (2011). “By enacting § 2, Congress precluded States from singling out arbitration provisions for suspect status, requiring instead that such provisions be placed upon the same footing as other contracts.” Doctor’s Assocs. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 682 (1996) (citation omitted); Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 489 (1987) (“[The FAA] is a congressional declaration of a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements, notwithstanding any state substantive or procedural

7 This is not the only example of Puerto Rican hostility to arbitration. In Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 723 F.2d 155, 158 (1st Cir. 1983), aff’d in part and rev’d on other grounds, 473 U.S. 614 (1985), the First Circuit confronted another example of Puerto Rico’s hostility to arbitration: a statute that explicitly refused to enforce any arbitration agreement that would “obligate[] a [car] dealer to . . . arbitrate . . . any controversy . . . regarding [the] dealer’s contract outside of Puerto Rico, or under foreign law or rule of law.” The Court of Appeals in Mitsubishi held that the Puerto Rico statute was preempted by federal law. The issue was not raised in this Court, which held that statutory antitrust claims were subject to arbitration.

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policies to the contrary.”) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citation omitted).

Quite recently, in Marmet Health Care Center, the Court granted certiorari and summarily vacated a decision materially indistinguishable from the decisions below in this case. There, the Court confronted a series of state supreme court decisions that refused to enforce pre-dispute arbitration agreements in nursing home admission agreements as “a matter of public policy under West Virginia law.” The West Virginia Supreme Court had concluded that “Congress did not intend for the FAA to be, in any way, applicable to personal injury or wrongful death suits that only collaterally derive from a written agreement that evidences a transaction affecting interstate commerce. . . .” 132 S. Ct. at 1203. Summarily vacating the judgment, the Court reiterated what it had said just last term in AT & T Mobility LLC, 131 S. Ct. at 1747:

“When state law prohibits outright the arbitration of a particular type of claim, the analysis is straightforward: The conflicting rule is displaced by the FAA . . . .” The [FAA’s] text includes no exception for personal-injury or wrongful-death claims. It “requires courts to enforce the bargain of the parties to arbitrate.” Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 217, 105 S. Ct. 1238, 84 L.Ed.2d 158 (1985). It reflects an “emphatic federal policy in favor of arbitral dispute resolution.” KPMG LLP v. Cocchi, 565 U.S. ––––, ––––, 132 S. Ct. 23, 25, 181 L.Ed.2d 323 (2011) (per curiam) (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler–Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 631, 105 S.Ct. 3346, 87 L.Ed.2d 444 (1985)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

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Marmet Health Care Ctr., 132 S. Ct. at 1203.

Similarly, in Nitro-Lift Technologies, the Court summarily vacated a decision of the Oklahoma Supreme Court, which had applied state law governing non-competition agreements in lieu of an FAA rule of decision established by the Court. This Court declared that “[i]t is a matter of great importance … that state supreme courts adhere to a correct interpretation of the legislation[,]” 2012 U.S. LEXIS 8897, at *1, and that state courts “must abide by the FAA, which is ‘the supreme Law of the Land,’ U. S. Const., Art. VI, cl. 2, and by the opinions of this Court interpreting that law.” Id. at *7.8

There is no question that the commonwealth law and policy invoked by the Court of Appeals conflicts with the rules that would govern the interpretation of the arbitration clause under the FAA. First, the FAA does not permit a court to limit an exceptionally broad arbitration clause based on the subject matter of the underlying agreement. In Gilmer, this Court upheld the arbitration of statutory employment discrimination claims even though the agreement containing the arbitration clause was indisputably not an employment contract: “the arbitration clause at issue is in Gilmer’s securities registration application, which is a contract with the securities exchanges, not with Interstate [the employer].” 500 U.S. at 25 n.2. Indeed, a separate employment contract would have been relevant only if it had its own (potentially conflicting) arbitration clause. Id. And in Rent-A-Center v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct.

8 Petitioners notified the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico of the Nitro-Lift Technologies decision prior to its denial of the second petition for reconsideration.

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2772 (2010), this Court enforced a free-standing arbitration agreement that was not embedded in any underlying contract, holding that the federal rule that the arbitration clause is severable “does not depend on the substance of the remainder of the contract.” Id. at 2779.9

Second, the approach of the Court of Appeals below under Puerto Rico law – which looks to the scope of the underlying agreement to narrow a broad arbitration clause, and prefers judicial resolution of commonwealth 9 The decision below that a broad arbitration clause is limited by the subject matter of the underlying agreement also starkly conflicts with decisions of multiple courts of appeals that reject that rule. See Doe v. Princess Cruise Lines, Ltd., 657 F.3d 1204, 1218 (11th Cir. 2011) (“If the cruise line had wanted a broader arbitration provision, it should have left the scope of it at ‘any and all disputes, claims, or controversies whatsoever’ instead of including the limitation that narrowed the scope to only those disputes, claims, or controversies ‘relating to or in any way arising out of or connected with the Crew Agreement, these terms, or services performed for the Company.’ That would have done it . . . .”); Levin v. Alms & Assocs., Inc., 634 F.3d 260, 267-68 (4th Cir. 2011) (holding that broad arbitration clause covered disputes that arose prior to parties’ signing of agreement that contained clause, even though agreement did not explicitly state that it covered earlier disputes and previous agreements between the parties did not contain arbitration provisions); Pers. Sec. & Safety Sys., Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 297 F.3d 388, 393 (5th Cir. 2002) (holding that arbitration provision in one contract governed dispute under another contract between the parties, where the arbitration provision was broad and where “the agreements must be construed together because they were executed at the same time as part of the same overall transaction”); see also Brown v. ITT Consumer Fin. Corp., 211 F.3d 1217, 1221 (11th Cir. 2000) (“The language of the [arbitration] clause at issue is brief, unequivocal and all-encompassing. It states that ‘any dispute between them or claim by either against the other’ is subject to arbitration. By using this inclusive language, the parties agreed to arbitrate any and all claims against each other, with no exceptions.”).

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constitutional claims of discrimination and retaliation – runs directly afoul of the federal presumption of arbitrability. This presumption applies with special force to clauses that use “broad” language like the one at issue here. AT&T Techs., Inc., 475 U.S. at 657. “In such cases, ‘[in] the absence of any express provision excluding a particular grievance from arbitration, we think only the most forceful evidence of a purpose to exclude the claim from arbitration can prevail.’” Id. at 657 (quoting Warrior & Gulf, 363 U.S. at 584-85); First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 945 (1995) (the FAA “insist[s] upon clarity before concluding that the parties did not want to arbitrate a related matter”).

The omission of any express mention of employment discrimination or retaliation claims in the agreement is of no moment. In Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 59 & n.2 (1995), this Court interpreted a clause requiring arbitration of “any controversy arising out of or relating to” accounts or transactions with a securities broker to include claims for punitive damages. The Court found nothing in the contract that “expresses an intent to preclude an award of punitive damages[.]” Id. at 62. It noted that even if a separate choice-of-law provision created ambiguity as to the scope of the arbitration clause, “due regard must be given to the federal policy favoring arbitration, and ambiguities as to the scope of the arbitration clause itself resolved in favor of arbitration.” Id. (quoting Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 476 (1989)). It did not matter that the arbitration clause did not specifically refer to punitive damages; it was enough that the clause “appears broad enough at least to contemplate such a remedy.” Id. at 61. So too here the omission of

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specific references to employment claims cannot defeat the parties’ bargained-for right to arbitration.

The Operating Agreement uses the broadest of possible terms to place in arbitration every claim that a member has against the firm or another member: “‘Claim’ means any action, suit, complaint or demand of whatever nature and for whatever relief or remedy against [LLC] or any of its Members or employees.” App. 483a (emphasis added). “Read naturally, the word ‘any’ has an expansive meaning, that is, ‘one or some indiscriminately of whatever kind.’” United States v. Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1, 5 (1997) (citation omitted). Further, the term “whatever” gives a “sweeping scope” to this provision. Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 429 (1955); see also Harrison v. PPG Indus., Inc., 446 U.S. 578, 589 (1980) (holding that there was “no indication whatever that Congress intended” to limit the “expansive language” “any other final action” to particular kinds of agency action). The arbitration clause is certainly susceptible of an interpretation that would include Jane Doe’s discrimination and retaliation claims, AT&T Techs., Inc., 475 U.S. at 650; indeed, that interpretation is compelled.

The FAA is enforceable in state court, but it is only this Court that can police judicial hostility to arbitration when it occurs. Like the West Virginia and Oklahoma Supreme Courts, the Court of Appeals here “by misreading and disregarding the precedents of this Court interpreting the FAA, did not follow controlling federal law . . . .” Marmet Health Care Ctr., 132 S. Ct. at 1202. The Supreme Court of Puerto Rico abdicated its role of ensuring compliance with the FAA, necessitating this Court’s intervention. This Court

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should grant certiorari and summarily vacate the judgment below.

III. The Ruling Below That The Scope of An Arbitration Clause Providing For AAA Arbitration Is Determined By The Court Is In Conflict With Decisions Of Federal Courts Of Appeals.

In First Options of Chicago, this Court held that “the question ‘who has the primary power to decide arbitrability’ turns upon what the parties agreed about that matter.” 514 U.S. at 943. The term “arbitrability” refers to “whether [the parties] agreed to arbitrate the merits” of the dispute (i.e., whether the claim is within the scope of the arbitration clause). Id.10 The parties may agree to submit questions of arbitrability to the arbitrator, but “[i]f, on the other hand, the parties did not agree to submit the arbitrability question itself to arbitration, then the court should decide that question just as it would decide any other question that the parties did not submit to arbitration, namely independently.” Id. Furthermore, “[c]ourts should not assume that the parties agreed to arbitrate arbitrability unless there is clear and unmistakable evidence that they did so.” Id. at 944 (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted).11

10 Arbitrability may also include other “gateway” issues such as whether the parties have a valid agreement to arbitrate. Rent-A-Center, 130 S. Ct. at 2777-78. 11 See also AT&T Techs., Inc., 475 U.S. at 649 (“Unless the parties clearly and unmistakably provide otherwise, the question of whether the parties agreed to arbitrate is to be decided by the court, not the arbitrator.”); Qualcomm Inc. v. Nokia Corp., 466 F.3d 1366, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (although the question of arbitrability is usually for the court, the arbitrator has the power

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Applying the default rule, Puerto Rico courts below declared the court should determine the question whether the parties had agreed to arbitrate Jane Doe’s claims. App. 22a, 31a-32a, 71a-73a. But the court disregarded that the parties explicitly agreed to be bound by the Rules of the American Arbitration Association, and those rules provide that the “arbitrator [and not the courts] shall have the power to rule on his or her own jurisdiction, including any objections with respect to the existence, scope or validity of the arbitration agreement.” AAA Commercial Rule R-7(a) (emphasis added). Having made this agreement, the parties are bound by it, and the courts are required to enforce their agreement “according to [its] terms.” AT&T Mobility, 131 S. Ct. at 1745-46. The courts below should have left for the arbitrator the question whether the parties had agreed to arbitrate Jane Doe’s claims.

This question is the subject of a mature split in the circuits. Based on the rule that arbitration agreements must be enforced according to their terms, many courts have left to arbitrators the question of arbitrability where the parties have incorporated the AAA rules by reference. See, e.g., Petrofac, Inc. v. DYNMcDermott Petroleum Operations Co., 687 F.3d 671, 675 (5th Cir. 2012) (“We agree with most of our sister circuits that the express adoption of these rules presents clear and unmistakable evidence that the parties agreed to arbitrate arbitrability.”).12 Other courts, however, have

to make that decision if the parties so agreed); Contec Corp. v. Remote Solution, Co., 398 F.3d 205, 211 (2d Cir. 2005) (same). 12See, e.g., Green v. SuperShuttle Int’l, Inc., 653 F.3d 766, 769 (8th Cir. 2011) (“By incorporating the AAA [Commercial] Rules, the parties agreed to allow the arbitrator to determine threshold questions of arbitrability.”); Fallo v. High-Tech Institute, 559 F.3d 874, 878 (8th Cir. 2009) (parties’ incorporation of AAA Commercial

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refused to enforce this part of the parties’ bargain and thus would have concurred in the approach adopted by the courts below notwithstanding the parties’ agreement to the contrary.13

The decision below, then, represents one side of a controversy that has divided the lower federal courts: whether courts are obligated to enforce the parties’ agreement to leave to the arbitrator questions of arbitrability when they evidence that agreement by

Rules into their arbitration agreement “constitutes a clear and unmistakable expression of the parties’ intent to leave the question of arbitrability to an arbitrator”); Qualcomm Inc., 466 F.3d at 1373 (arbitrator should decide questions of arbitrability when the parties incorporated the AAA rules into their arbitration agreement); Contec Corp., 398 F.3d at 208 (incorporation of AAA Commercial Rules “serves as clear and unmistakable evidence of the parties’ intent to delegate [questions of arbitrability] to an arbitrator”); Terminix Int’l Co., LP v. Palmer Ranch Ltd. Partnership, 432 F.3d 1327, 1332 (11th Cir. 2005) (“By incorporating the AAA [Commercial] Rules . . . into their agreement, the parties clearly and unmistakably agreed that the arbitrator should decide whether the arbitration clause is valid.”); see also Apollo Computer Inc. v. Berg, 886 F.2d 469, 473 (1st Cir. 1989) (parties agreed to have arbitrator decide arbitrability by incorporating International Chamber of Commerce rules into their arbitration agreement). 13Riley Mfg. Co. v. Anchor Glass Container Corp., 157 F.3d 775, 780 (10th Cir. 1998) (court should decide arbitrability, despite the reference to the AAA Commercial Rules in the arbitration provision); see also Urbanic v. Travelers Ins. Co., No. 10-2368 (WYD) (MJW), 2011 WL 1743412, at *6 (D. Colo. May 6, 2011) (“[W]hile I find that Traveler’ Arbitration Agreement references the AAA, it does not expressly incorporate specific AAA Rules, nor does it state that the validity of the Arbitration Agreement shall be decided by the arbitrator. Accordingly, I find that the Arbitration Agreement does not contain a ‘clear and unmistakable’ choice of arbitration of the validity of whether the parties agreed to arbitrate.”).

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incorporating the AAA (or some other set of) rules that would dictate that result. The question is an important one, as parties who do business in multiple jurisdictions are currently uncertain as to the rules that govern the enforceability of ubiquitous agreements that select the commercial arbitration rules of the AAA.

The need for review is underscored by the importance of the issues presented. The unprecedented rulings of the Court of Appeals, the only one in Puerto Rico, is of great importance in the Commonwealth. The holdings that the basic operating agreements of partnerships and limited liability corporations are not subject to the FAA, and that the broadest arbitration clauses in such agreements will not be deemed to apply to employment-related claims, create enormous uncertainty as to the validity and reliability of existing agreements. But this case has broader national importance. As it did in Nitro-Lift and Marmet Health Care Center, this Court must continue to review the decisions of wayward state courts – including courts of last resort in jurisdictions where the FAA is applicable – that still manifest an antiquated hostility to arbitration, and in particular must bring into line courts that avoid this Court’s preemption rulings by the contrivance of declaring agreements outside Congress’s Commerce Power. Only this Court can ultimately secure to parties in state court their rights under the FAA and thereby vindicate the pro-arbitration policy of supreme federal law.

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CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, this Court should grant the petition for a writ of certiorari and summarily vacate the judgment below, or alternatively grant the petition and set the case for argument.

Respectfully submitted,

BARBARA B. BROWN STEPHEN B. KINNAIRD COUNSEL OF RECORD NEAL D. MOLLEN INTRA L. GERMANIS ERIN E. LARUFFA PAUL HASTINGS LLP 875 15TH STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, DC 20005 (202) 551-1700 stephenkinnaird@paulhastings.com Counsel for Petitioners

December 2012

APPENDICIES

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TABLE OF APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

Jane Doe v. Limited Liability Co., No. KLCE201200821, Commonwealth of Puerto Rico Court of Appeals, Judicial Region of San Juan Panel III, Resolution, June 15, 2012

APPENDIX B

Jane Doe v. Limited Liability Co., No. KPE2012-1204, Commonwealth of Puerto Rico Court of First Instance San Juan Superior Court, Resolution, June 4, 2012

APPENDIX C Jane Doe v. Limited Liability Co., No. CC-2012-0532, Supreme Court of Puerto Rico, Order Denying Petition for Certiorari, Sept. 7, 2012

APPENDIX D Jane Doe v. Limited Liability Co., No. CC-2012-0532, Supreme Court of Puerto Rico, Order Denying First Motion for Reconsideration of Denial of Certiorari, Oct. 5, 2012

APPENDIX E Jane Doe v. Limited Liability Co., No. CC-2012-0532, Supreme Court of Puerto Rico, Order Denying Second Motion for Reconsideration of Denial of Certiorari, Nov. 30, 2012

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TABLE OF APPENDICES (continued)

APPENDIX F

Jane Doe v. Limited Liability Co., No. KPE2012-1204, Commonwealth of Puerto Rico Court of First Instance San Juan Superior Court, Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction and to Compel Compulsory Arbitration in Light of Binding Arbitration Agreement, Apr. 11, 2012

APPENDIX G Jane Doe v. Limited Liability Co., No KLCE201200821, Commonwealth of Puerto Rico Court of Appeals, Judicial Region of San Juan Panel III, Limited Liability Co.’s Petition for Certiorari, June 12, 2012

APPENDIX H Jane Doe v. Limited Liability Co., No. CC-2012-0532, Supreme Court of Puerto Rico, Limited Liability Co.’s Petition for Certiorari, June 19, 2012

APPENDIX I Excerpts of Limited Liability Co.’s Operating Agreement

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APPENDIX A

ESTADO LIBRE ASOCIADO DE PUERTO RICO TRIBUNAL DE APELACIONES REGIÓN

JUDICIAL DE SAN JUAN PANEL III

JANE DOE,

Demandante-Recurrida,

v.

COMPAÑÍA DE RESPONSABILIDAD LIMITADA

(“CRL”); FULANO DE TAL, PERSONALMENTE, EN SU

CARÁCTER DE PATRONO DE JANE DOE Y COMO CO-ADMINISTRADOR DE LA SOCIEDAD LEGAL DE BIENES

GANANCIALES (“SLG”) CONSTITUIDA CON FULANA DE

TAL, QUIEN ES DEMANDADA COMO CO-ADMINISTRADORA

DE LA SLG CONSTITUIDA CON FULANO DE TAL; “SLG

FULANO Y FULANA DE TAL” SUTANO DE CUAL

PERSONALMENTE, EN SU CARÁCTER DE PATRONO DE

JANE DOE Y COMO CO-ADMINISTRADOR DE LA SLG

CONSTITUIDA CON SUTANA DE CUAL, QUIEN ES

DEMANDADA COMO CO-ADMINISTRADORA DE LA “SLG

SUTANO Y SUTANA DE CUAL” CONSTITUIDA CON SUTANO

Y SUTANA DE CUAL; ESPERENCEJO MÁS CUAL, PERSONALMENTE, EN SU CARÁCTER DE PATRONO DE

JANE DOE Y COMO CO ADMINISTRADOR DE LA SLG

CONSTITUIDA CON ESPERENCEJA MÁS CUAL, QUIEN ES DEMANDADA COMO CO-ADMINISTRADORA DE LA

SLG CONSTITUIDA CON ESPERENCEJO MÁS CUAL;

“SLG ESPERENCEJO Y ESPERENCEJA MÁS CUAL”

CONSTITUIDA POR ESPERENCEJO Y ESPERENCEJA MÁS

CUAL; DEMANDADOS DESCONOCIDOS A, B Y C; DEMANDADAS COMPAÑÍAS ASEGURADORAS

DESCONOCIDAS X, Y, Z

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Demandados-Peticionarios.

___________

KLCE201200821 ___________

CERTIORARI

procedente del Tribunal de Primera Instancia, Sala Superior de San Juan

Caso Núm.:

___________

K PE2012-1204

___________

Sobre:

Sentencia Declaratoria e Injunction

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Panel integrado por su presidente, el Juez Ramírez Nazario, el Juez Piñero Gonzáles y la Juez Surén Fuentes

Surén Fuentes, Juez Ponente

RESOLUCIÓN

En San Juan, Puerto Rico, a 15 de junio de 2012.

La peticionaria Compañía de Responsabilidad Limitada (CRL) comparece ante nos mediante recurso de certiorari y nombrándose a sí y a las partes demandadas mediante nombres ficticios. En el mismo, impugna una resolución emitida por el Tribunal de Primera Instancia, Sala de San Juan (TPI), la cual determinó tener jurisdicción para adjudicar en sus méritos las reclamaciones de discrimen, represalias y daños y perjuicios incoadas por Jane Doe en su segunda demanda enmendada contra de la CRL.

I.

Estancado el proceso de mediación entre Jane Doe y la CRL, ésta última presentó el 22 de marzo de 2012, solicitud de arbitraje ante el American Arbitration Association (AAA) utilizando las Reglas de Arbitraje Comercial de dicha Asociación. El 2 de abril de 2012, Jane Doe presentó Demanda Jurada en Solicitud de Sentencia Declaratoria e Injunction Preliminar y Permanente. El objeto de su Sentencia Declaratoria fue solicitarle al TPI declarara la inaplicabilidad de una cláusula de arbitraje para que sus contenciones laborales -predicadas en discrimen en el empleo y represalia- fueran atendidas judicialmente. Jane Doe arguyó que con la solicitud de arbitraje, la CRL estaba tratando de impedir la litigación de las causas de acción presentadas en su

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demanda ante el TPI. También presentó Moción Urgente en Solicitud de Orden en la que solicitó que los procedimientos se mantuvieran en estricta confidencialidad, por lo que no reveló los nombres reales de la partes en el epígrafe. Explicó que su solicitud de confidencialidad era “hasta tanto se resolviera la controversia de umbral que se plantea en la demanda de epígrafe.” (Ap., pág. 20). Jane Doe proveyó mediante declaración jurada las identidades de los demandados.

Al día siguiente de Jane Doe haber presentado la demanda, el foro de Instancia le ordenó a ésta justificar su solicitud de confidencialidad. Fue así que el 4 de abril de 2012, Jane Doe explicó que la única disposición en que descansaba para solicitar que los procedimientos se llevaran a acabo de forma confidencial, era la cláusula de arbitraje contenida en la Sección 14.03 del Artículo 14 del Procedimiento de Resolución de Disputas contenido en el Acuerdo Operativo (“Operating Agreement”) entre la CRL y sus empleados y contratistas. Fue al amparo de esta cláusula arbitral en que la CRL se basó para solicitar resolver las controversias en al foro arbitral. Esta cláusula de arbitraje lea de la siguiente forma:

“14.05 Confidentiality- The Claimant and the Firm agree that all the underlying purpose of the provisions set forth in section 14 of this Agreement is to provide a mechanism by which any Claim shall be resolved in a confidential manner, without publicity and the attendant distractions. Accordingly, all mediation meetings and arbitration hearings shall be private and confidential, and attended by the parties, counsel, and witnesses only. The

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parties agree to maintain confidentiality of such meetings and hearings, and of the documents produced or created in such meeting and hearings. Any and all actions taken by the parties shall be in conformity with the underlying purpose set forth in section 14 of this Agreement.”

(AP. TA., pág. 98).

El 11 de abril de 2012, el TPI celebró vista de injunction preliminar en la que la CRL presentó solicitud de desestimación por falta de jurisdicción. Adujo que conforme al Acuerdo Operativo, las partes, incluyendo a Jane Doe, “acordaron resolver todas sus desavenencias a través del antedicho proceso interno de resolución de disputas, el cual culmina con el arbitraje.” Id., pág. 41. Las partes acordaron mantener la confidencialidad del expediente mientras el tribunal adjudicara la controversia relativa al deber de las partes en someter las controversias al foro arbitral. El foro de Instancia expidió orden a la Secretaría para que tomara las medidas necesarias para que el expediente se tramitara de forma confidencial y permitieran la presentación de documentos sellados con sus respectivas firmas. Id. págs. 127-128. Luego de que Jane Doe presentara oposición a la solicitud de desestimación y enmendara en dos ocasiones la demanda original, el 4 de junio de 2012, notificada ese mismo día, el TPI emitió la resolución de la cual la CRL aquí recurre. En dicho dictamen el foro de Instancia resolvió que “adjudi[caría] en sus méritos las reclamaciones de discrimen, represalias y daños y perjuicios presentadas por Jane Doe y no un árbitro del AAA, así como la solicitud de remedio interdictal peticionada.”

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Id., pág. 498. De este modo, se resolvió el asunto sobre la arbitrabilidad de la controversia y quedó pendiente para vista el desfile de prueba con relación a la solicitud del remedio interdictal. Id.

Las determinaciones a las que arribó el foro de Instancia consistieron en que las reclamaciones de Jane Doe no estaban comprendidas en el Acuerdo Operativo que contenía la cláusula arbitral. En cuanto al hecho de si Jane Doe era empleada, propietaria o ambas, el foro de Instancia determinó que ello aún estaba por dilucidarse luego de que las partes desfilaran prueba al respecto. Id., pág. 497. Aun así, el TPI consideró que “ambas capacidades, empleada o propietaria de ser probadas, no son mutuamente excluyentes.” Id.

El mismo día de dictada esta resolución de la cual la CRL recurre, Jane Doe presentó solicitud para que el TPI ordenara la apertura de los procedimientos y permitiera la presentación de una Tercera Demanda Enmendada desvelando los nombres de todas las partes del epígrafe. También presentó el 5 de junio de 2012, solicitud de reinstalación a su puesto como remedio adicional al amparo de la Regla 59.4 de Procedimiento Civil, 32 L.P.R.A. Ap. V, al pago de sus haberes y a que dictara sentencia parcial al amparo de la Lay Núm. 115 de Represalias, 29 LP.R.A. § 194 et seq.1 Inconforme con la resolución emitida por el TPI el 4 de junio de 2012, -que tuvo el

1 Celebrada la vista de injunction preliminar de 5 de junio de 2012, surge que Jane Doe le solicitó al TPI que se diera* por terminado el acuerdo de confidencialidad entre las partes y el tribunal, y la CRL solicitó lo contrario. (Ap., pág. 548). Así las cosas, el TPI le dio hasta el 15 de junio de 2012 a la CRL para consignar su posición por escrito en cuanto a la confidencialidad.

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efecto de denegar la solicitud de desestimación por falta de jurisdicción y para obligar a que las controversias fuesen resueltas mediante el procedimiento de arbitraje-, la CLR presentó el recurso de certiorari del epígrafe, imputándole al foro de Instancia la comisión de los siguientes errores:

ERRÓ MANIFIESTAMENTE EL TPI AL ASUMIR JURISDICCIÓN SOBRE LA CONTROVERSIA DE SI JANE DOE ESTÁ OBLIGADA A ARBITRAR SUS SUPUESTOS RECLAMOS: JANE DOE Y CRL INEQUÍVOCAMENTE PACTARON QUE EL ÁRBITRO TIENE LA FACULTAD DE DETERMINAR EL ALCANCE DE SU JURISDICCIÓN.

ERRÓ MANIFIESTAMENTE EL TPI AL CONCLUIR QUE JANE DOE NO TIENE QUE ARBITRAR SUS SUPUESTOS RECLAMOS CONTRA CRL Y LOS DEMÁS DEMANDADOS-PETICIONARIOS PUESTO QUE LA CLÁUSULA DE ARBTTRAJE DEL ACUERDO ES AMPLIA, CLARA Y ABARCA CUALQUIER RECLAMO ENTRE LAS PARTES.

ERRÓ MANIFIESTAMENTE EL TPI AL EXIMIR A JANE DOE DE ARBITRAR SUS RECLAMOS POR LA ALEGADA NATURALEZA “DE EMPLEO” O ‘‘LABORAL” Y “CONSTITUCIONAL” DE ESTOS YA QUE EL FAA DESPLAZA (“PREEMPTS”) TODA POLÍTICA ESTATAL CONTRARIA AL ARBITRAJE.

La peticionaria acompañó el recurso con una “Moción Urgente en Auxilio de Jurisdicción”.

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II.

El auto de certiorari es un remedio procesal extraordinario utilizado para que un tribunal de mayor jerarquía pueda corregir un error cometido por un tribunal de primera instancia. Pueblo v. Colon Mendoza, 149 D.P.R. 630, 637 (1999). Distinto a los recursos de apelación, el tribunal apelativo tiene la facultad de expedir el auto de certiorari de manera discrecional. Negrón Placer v. Srio. de Justicia, 154 D.P.R. 79, 91 (2001); J. Cuevas Segarra, Tratado de Derecho Procesal Civil, San Juan, Publicaciones J.T.S., 2000, T. I, pág. 884. Esta discreción, en nuestro ordenamiento jurídico, ha sido definida como una forma de razonabilidad aplicada al discernimiento judicial para llegar a una conclusión justiciera. Negrón Placer v. Srio. de Justicia, supra; Bco. Popular de P.R. v. Mun. de Aguadilla, 144 D.P.R. 651, 658 (1997); Pueblo v. Sánchez González, 90 D.P.R. 197, 200 (1964). No significa poder actuar en una forma u otra haciendo abstracción del resto del derecho, porque ciertamente eso constituiría un abuso de discreción. Íd.

Con el fin de que este Tribunal pueda ejercer de una manera sabia y prudente su facultad discrecional de entender o no en los méritos de los asuntos que le son planteados mediante recurso de Certiorari la Regla 40 del Reglamento del Tribunal de Apelaciones, 4 L.P.R.A. Ap. XXII-B, establece los siguientes criterios al determinar si expide un auto de Certiorari:

A. Si el remedio y la disposición de la decisión recurrida, a diferencia de sus fundamentos, son contrarios a derecho.

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B. Si la situación de hechos planteada es la más indicada para el análisis del problema.

C. Si ha mediado prejuicio, parcialidad o error craso y manifiesto en la apreciación de la prueba por el Tribunal de Primera Instancia.

D. Si el asunto planteado exige consideración mas detenida a la luz de los autos originales, los cuales deberán ser elevados, o de alegatos más elaborados.

E. Si la etapa del procedimiento en que se presenta el caso es la más propicia para su consideración.

F. Si la expedición del auto o de la orden de mostrar causa no causan un fraccionamiento indebido del pleito y una dilación indeseable en la solución final del litigio.

G. Si la expedición del auto o de la orden de mostrar causa evita un fracaso de la justicia.

Si ninguno de los criterios anteriores está presente en la petición ante nuestra consideración, entonces procede que nos abstengamos de expedir el auto solicitado, de manera que se continúe con los procedimientos del caso, sin mayor dilación, ante el Tribunal de Primera Instancia.

De otra parte, En Puerto Rico, el arbitraje, como método alterno de solucionar las disputas, juega un papel muy importante. VDE Corporation v. F & R Contractors, 180 D.P.R. 21 (2010). Así, el ordenamiento jurídico de Puerto Rico permite que las partes en un contrato se obliguen al arbitraje de las posibles controversias futuras relacionadas con su contrato. Esta facultad surge principalmente de la

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Ley Núm. 376 de 8 de mayo de 1951, 32 L.P.R.A. §§ 3201 et seq., conocida como la Ley de Arbitraje Comercial. El Articulo 1 de esta legislación establece que las partes “podrán incluir en un convenio por escrito una disposición para el arreglo mediante arbitraje de cualquier controversia que en el futuro surgiere entre ellos de dicho acuerdo o en relación con el mismo.” Art. 1 de la Ley de Arbitraje, 32 L.P.R.A. § 3201. (Énfasis nuestro)

La Ley de Arbitraje tiene su génesis y sigue en gran medida las disposiciones de la Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1- 307 (“FAA” por sus siglas en inglés o “Ley Federal de Arbitraje”). Méndez Acevedo v. Nieves Rivera, 179 D.P.R. a la pág. 369; Cristina Navarro Motta, estudiante, La participación de terceros no signatarios en los procesos de arbitraje en Puerto Rico, 44 Rev. Jur. U.I.P.R. 615, 618 (2010); David M. Helfeld, La jurisprudencia creadora: Factor determinante en el desarrollo del derecho de arbitraje en Puerto Rico, 70 Rev. Jurídica U.P.R. 1, 25 (2001). Sin embargo, esta legislación no aplica ni ocupa el campo bajo toda circunstancia. La Ley Federal de Arbitraje aplica a los estados cuando se trata de contratos que involucran transacciones en el comercio interestatal. 9 U.S.C. § 2; Méndez Acevedo v. Nieves Rivera, 179 D.P.R. a la pág. 370; Mun. de Mayagüez v. Lebrón, 167 D.P.R. 713, 721 (2006). Es decir, “sus disposiciones se activan solamente, cuando las partes alegan y prueban que la transacción envuelta en la controversia formó parte del comercio interestatal.” Méndez Acevedo v. Nieves Rivera, 179 D.P.R. a la pág. 371; Medina v. Crus Azul de P.R., 155 D.P.R. 735, 742 (2001).

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Ahora bien, aclaramos que ante la inaplicabilidad de la Ley Federal de Arbitraje, tanto sus disposiciones como su jurisprudencia interpretativa se han seguido estrechamente en la doctrina puertorriqueña cuando se trata de materia de arbitraje. Su inaplicabilidad tampoco implica que los tribunales estemos impedidos de observar lo resuelto por otros foros que comparten nuestra política arbitral. Mun. de Mayagüez v. Lebrón, 167 D.P.R. 713 (2006).

Ahora bien, la figura del arbitraje es una de carácter contractual. Méndez Acevedo v. Nieves Rivera, 179 D.P.R. 359, 367 (2010). En la materia de las obligaciones y los contratos de Puerto Rico rige el principio de la autonomía de la voluntad. Este principio le concede a las partes que desean obligarse libertad de acción. VDE Corporation v. F & R Contrators, supra; BPPR v. Sucn. Talavera, 174 D.P.R. 686, 693 (2008). La aludida norma está recogida en el Artículo 1207 del Código Civil, el cual dispone que “los contratantes pueden establecer los pactos, cláusulas y condiciones que tengan por conveniente, siempre que no sean contrarios a las leyes, a la moral, ni al orden público”. 31 L.P.R.A. § 3372. Además, conforme a lo establecido en nuestro Código Civil, “[l]as obligaciones que nacen de los contratos tienen fuerza de ley entre las partes contratantes, y deben cumplirse al tenor de los mismos.” Art. 1044 del Código Civil, 31 L.P.R.A. § 2994.

También, sobre la interpretación contractual, el Artículo 1233 de nuestro Código Civil dispone: “[s]i los términos de un contrato son claros y no dejan duda sobre la intención de los contratantes, se estará

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al sentido literal de sus cláusulas”. 31 L.P.R.A. § 3471. Así bien “[u]na vez se determina lo que las partes acordaron, el juzgador debe resolver las controversias entre las partes acorde a lo estipulado.” C.F.S.E. v. Unión, 170 D.P.R. 443, 451 (2007). Una vez acordado el arbitraje, los tribunales carecen de discreción respecto a su eficacia y tienen que dar cumplimiento a lo acordado. S.L.G. Méndez Acevedo v. Nieves Rivera, 179 D.P.R. a la pág. 368; Municipio Mayagüez v. Lebrón, 167 D.P.R. a la pág. 721. Además, debe tenerse presente que, en el ámbito estatal puertorriqueño y en la jurisdicción federal norteamericana se ha reiterado constantemente que “existe una fuerte política pública a favor del arbitraje, y que toda duda que pueda existir sobre si procede o no el arbitraje, debe resolverse a favor de éste.” Méndez Acevedo v. Nieves Rivera, 179 D.P.R. a la pág. 368; Quiñones v. Asociación, 161 D.P.R. 668, 673 (2004).

Por lo anterior, ante un convenio de arbitraje, lo prudencial es la abstención judicial. Pero, la intervención judicial no está vedada. VDE Corporation v. F&R Contrators, supra; Municipio Mayagüez v. Lebrón, 167 D.P.R. a la pág. 721; S.L.G. Méndez Acevedo v. Nieves Rivera, 179 D.P.R. a la pág. 368. La propia Ley de Arbitraje Comercial que dispone:

Si existe controversia respecto a la obligación de arbitrar, las partes tienen derecho a que se dirima en los tribunales. Art. 4, Ley de Arbitraje, 32 L.P.R.A. § 3204; 167 D.P.R. 713 (2006). En Puerto Rico y en Estados Unidos se ha suscitado en numerosas ocasiones controversias sobre el foro que le

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corresponde dilucidar la obligatoriedad de arbitrar las controversias, si los tribunales o los árbitros.

Recientemente, en Méndez Acevedo v. Nieves Rivera, 179 D.P.R. 359 (2010), el Tribunal Supremo de Puerto Rico acogió la norma pautada en Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440 (2006), en cuanto a que un reclamo de nulidad de un contrato en su totalidad que contiene una cláusula de arbitraje debe ser atendida por un árbitro. Sin embargo, cuando se trata de una controversia para dilucidar la obligatoriedad o invalidez del acuerdo de arbitraje en sí, la misma le compete a los tribunales. Es decir, “la determinación de si un acuerdo crea el deber de las partes de arbitrar una controversia, en particular es tarea judicial”. Crufon Construction Corp. v. Autoridad de Edificios Públicos, 156 D.P.R. 197, 205 (2002); Navarro Motta, supra, a la pág. 619. Cabe distinguir, que esta norma no aplicaría si las partes en el contrato pactan expresamente que la determinación de arbitrabilidad será adjudicada por un árbitro. Ante esa situación, los tribunales deben referir el caso al árbitro para que determine si el proceso continuará mediante el proceso de arbitraje. Esta fue la norma aplicada en Rent-A-Center v. Jackson, ___ U.S. ___ (2010), 130 S. Ct. 2772 (2010).

En nuestra tarea de adjudicar la obligatoriedad de un acuerdo de arbitraje debemos tener presente que, a pesar de que existe una fuerte política pública a favor del arbitraje, no se trata de una norma absoluta. Se han reconocido excepciones a la norma general de cumplimiento del acuerdo de arbitraje. Así, en el pasado se ha prescindido de darle efectividad al acuerdo de arbitraje cuando una unión obrera falta a su deber de proveer justa

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representación a sus miembros, cuando referir el caso a arbitraje constituya un gesto fútil y vacío, y en reclamaciones por hostigamiento sexual bajo la Ley Núm. 17 de 22 de abril de 1998, 29. L.P.R.A. §§ 146, et seq. Quiñones González v. Asociación de Condóminos Plava Azul II, 161 D.P.R. 668, 673 (2004) citando a F.S.E. v. J.R.T., 111 D.P.R. 505 (1981), Hermandad Unión de Empleados v. F.S.E., 112 D.P.R. 51 (1982) y Vélez v. Serv. Legales de P.R., 144 D.P.R. 673 (1998).

III.

En su escrito de certiorari la CRL valora que la resolución recurrida no interpretó íntegramente la totalidad de la cláusula arbitral, de la cual claramente surge “la intención y el propósito de las partes, incluyendo a Jane Doe y los comparecientes, el resolver cualquier reclamación (“any claim”) mediante mediación y arbitraje.” (Escrito del recurso, pág. 21). La CRL expone que esta expresión “no puede significar otra cosa que no sea “cualquier reclamación”. La cual se traduce en este caso como una reclamación de compensación que hace Jane Doe en calidad de Miembro de Capital de CRL, por lo que arguye que es de aplicación la cláusula arbitral del Acuerdo operativo y le corresponde al foro arbitral adjudicar los reclamos de discrimen o represalias en el foro arbitral conforme las disposiciones del FAA y su jurisprudencia interpretativa.

Constituye la pretensión de la peticionaria de que expidamos el presente recurso para revocar la determinación del foro de Instancia de adjudicar en los méritos las reclamaciones de discrimen, represalias y daños y perjuicios. Sin embargo, entendemos que no erró el foro de Instancia al

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entender que la cláusula de arbitraje no es controlante al rol de la recurrida. Tanto el Acuerdo Operativo como el Manual de Empleado son partes del contrato de trabajo de Jane Doe, por lo que en la etapa en la que se encuentran los procedimientos, la disputa en este caso no es relativa al gobierno o administración de la CRL, regida por la cláusula arbitral del Acuerdo Operativo.

Como explicamos, el Artículo 1 de la Ley de Arbitraje Comercial, 32 L.P.R.A. sec. 3201, establece que las partes pueden convenir para el arreglo mediante arbitraje de cualquier controversia entre las partes que surja y se relacione con el acuerdo pactado. Véase, Martínez Marrero v. González Droz, 180 D.P.R. 579, 587-588 (2011). Las disposiciones de la Federal Arbitration Act tampoco ocupan el campo sobre las reclamaciones hechas por la recurrida.

Como hemos señalado, la FAA ocupa el campo cuando la transacción envuelta en la controversia formó parte del comercio interestatal. Esta circunstancia no está presente en este caso. Asimismo, el árbitro no es el único llamado a determinar la obligatoriedad de la cláusula de arbitraje. La jurisprudencia estatal puertorriqueña y federal ha distinguido las circunstancias bajo las cuales precede referir ese asunto a un árbitro y cuando son los tribunales los foros facultados para hacer esa determinación. Bajo las circunstancias del presente caso, el TPI tenía autoridad para hacer esa adjudicación y así lo hizo porque se trata de la arbitrabilidad de la controversia y no sobre la nulidad del contrato en su totalidad. Tampoco surge que las partes pactaron que la adjudicación de la

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arbitrabilidad de la controversia también iba a ser referida a un árbitro.

Evaluado los hechos y el derecho aplicable, conforme a la Regla 40 no vemos circunstancia alguna que provoque efecto perjudicial a la CRL en esta etapa temprana del pleito. El Tribunal de Primera Instancia consideró los argumentos de las partes y el trámite procesal del caso y denegó la solicitud de desestimación. Al así actuar el Juez de Instancia no solo ejerció su discreción con razonabilidad sino que tomó una determinación que es correcta en Derecho. Ello en atención a que la reclamación que Jane Doe interesa que el foro Judicial adjudique es una que imputa a la CRL el haberla separado de manera discriminatoria y por represalias. Además, dicha controversia trata de una conducta imputada a la CRL en violación de sus derechos constitucionales fundamentales, por lo que nuestro estado de derecho le reconoce a la recurrida vindicar tales derechos mediante una acción de injunction. Véase, Arroyo y Rattan Specialties, Inc., 117 D.P.R. 35, 65-66 (1986). La CRL no nos ha puesto en condiciones de sustituir el ponderado criterio del foro primario en esta etapa, por lo que resolvemos denegar la expedición del auto de certiorari.

Ante el hecho de que el TPI resolverá pronto la duración del acuerdo de confidencialidad que mantiene en resguardo los nombres de las partes del epígrafe, invitamos a que este asunto sea prioritario en el calendario de la Sala. Es parte del interés público que las personas conozcan lo que el sistema judicial está haciendo. También existe una

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presunción de que la identidad de las partes es parte del expediente público.

IV.

Por los fundamentos antes expuestos se deniega la expedición del auto de certiorari. En consecuencia, se declara sin lugar la moción en auxilio de jurisdicción sometida por el peticionario.

Adelántese a las partes y al Tribunal de Primera Instancia inmediatamente por fax, por teléfono o por correo electrónico y notifíquese por la vía ordinaria.

Lo acordó el Tribunal y lo certifica la Secretaria del Tribunal de Apelaciones.

/s/ [signature]

Lcda. Dimarie Alicea Lozada Secretaria del Tribunal de Apelaciones

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APPENDIX A

COMMONWEALTH OF PUERTO RICO COURT OF APPEALS

JUDICIAL REGION OF SAN JUAN PANEL III

JANE DOE

−Plaintiff Respondent

v.

LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY (LLC); JOHN DOE, in his personal capacity and as employer of

JANE DOE and as co-administrator of the Conjugal Partnership (“CP”) constituted with JEAN DOE, who is sued as co-administrator of the CP constituted with John Doe; “CP John and Jean Doe” JACK JOE in his personal capacity and as employer of JANE DOE and

as co-administrator of the “CP” constituted with JACKY JOE, who is sued as co-administrator of the

“CP Jack and Jacky Joe” constituted by Jack and Jacky Joe; LARRY LOE in his personal capacity and as employer of JANE DOE, and as co-administrator of the CP constituted with LARISSA LOE, who is

sued as co-administrator of the CP constituted with Larry Loe; “CP Larry and Larissa Loe” constituted by

Larry and Larissa Loe; Unknown Defendants A, B and C; Unknown Insurance Companies Defendants,

X,Y,Z,

Defendants−Petitioners

KLCE201200821

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CERTIORARI FROM THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE, SAN JUAN SUPERIOR PART

__________________

Case No.: K PE2012-1204

__________________

RE:

DECLARATORY JUDGMENT AND INJUNCTION

Panel formed by its president, Judge Ramírez Nazario, Judge Piñero González and Judge Surén

Fuentes

Ruling by Surén Fuentes, Judge

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RESOLUTION

In San Juan, Puerto Rico, this June 15, 2012.

Petitioner Limited Liability Company (LLC) appears before us through a Certiorari petition and identifying itself and defendants with fictitious names. In it, they challenge a resolution issued by the Court of First Instance, San Juan Part (CFI) determining that that Court has jurisdiction to adjudicate on its merits the claims of discrimination, retaliation and damages initiated by Jane Doe in her second amended complaint against LLC.

I.

Upon facing a standstill in the mediation process between Jane Doe and LLC, on March 22, 2012, LLC filed a demand for arbitration before the American Arbitration Association (AAA) using its Commercial Arbitration Rules. On April 2, 2012, Jane Doe filed a Verified Complaint Requesting Declaratory Judgment and Preliminary and Permanent Injunction. In the Declaratory Judgment, she requested the CFI to declare the arbitration clause inapplicable, so that her work-related contentions based on employment discrimination and retaliation could be adjudicated by the courts. Jane Doe argued that, through the arbitration demand, LLC was attempting to prevent litigation of the causes of action included in her complaint before the CFI. She also filed an Urgent Motion Requesting Order where she petitioned strict confidentiality of the proceedings, for which reason she did not reveal the real names of the parties in the caption. She explained that her request for confidentiality would continue “until the threshold issue asserted in the captioned complaint was resolved.” (App., page 20).

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Jane Doe submitted through sworn statement the identities of the defendants.

The day after Jane had filed the complaint, the CFI, ordered her to justify her request for confidentiality. Thus, on April 4, 2012, Jane Doe indicated that the only provision, on which she based the request for the confidentiality of the proceedings, was the arbitration clause of Section 14.03, Article 14 of the Dispute Resolution Process provided in the Operating Agreement existing between LLC and its employees and contractors. That was the arbitration clause that LLC used as basis to demand arbitration. The arbitration clause reads as follows:

“14.5 Confidentiality- The Claimant and the Firm agree the all the underlying purposes of the provisions set forth in Section 14 of this Agreement is to provide a mechanism by which any Claim shall be resolved in a confidential manner, without publicity and the attendant distractions. Accordingly, all mediation meetings and arbitration hearings shall be private and confidential, and attended by the parties, counsel, and witnesses only. The parties agree to maintain confidentiality of such meetings and hearings, and of the documents produced or created in such meetings and hearings. Any and all actions taken by the parties shall be in conformity with the underlying purpose set forth in section14 of this Agreement.”

(App. TA., page 98).

On April 11, 2012, the CFI held a preliminary injunction hearing where LLC presented a motion requesting dismissal due to lack of jurisdiction. It argued that, in accordance with the Operating Agreement, the parties, including Jane Doe, “agreed

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that the resolution of all their disagreements through the aforesaid internal process of dispute resolution, which culminates with the arbitration.” Id., page 41. The parties agreed to maintain the confidentiality of the records while the court adjudicated the issue regarding the duty of the parties to submit the disputes to the arbitration process. The CFI issued an order to the Clerk of the Court with instructions to take the needed measures for the records to be processed confidentially and to allow the filing of sealed documents with their corresponding signatures. Id. pages 127-128. After Jane Doe filed her opposition to the motion to dismiss and twice amended the original complaint, on June 4, 2012, notified that same date, the CFI issued its resolution, which LLC herein seeks review. In its resolution the CFI determined that “the Court and not an arbitrator from the AAA, will adjudicate in its merits, the discrimination, retaliation and damages claims filed by Jane Doe, as well as the request for injunctive relief.” Id., page 498. With this, the issue of the arbitrability of the dispute was resolved and only the presentation of evidence over the injunctive relief remained pending for hearing. Id.

The determinations by the CFI were that Jane Doe’s claims were not comprised in the Operating Agreement containing the arbitration clause. In regard to the question whether Jane Doe was an employee, owner or both, the CFI found that it was to be adjudicated after the parties presented evidence in that regard. Id., page 497. Even so, the CFI considered that “both roles, employee and owner, if proven, are not mutually exclusive.” Id.

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The same date the resolution was issued, which LLC seeks review, Jane Doe filed a petition before the CFI requesting an order to open the proceedings and allow the filing of a Third Amended Complaint releasing the names of all the above-captioned parties. On June 5, 2012, under Rule 59.4 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, 32 L.P.R.A. App V, she also filed a request of reinstatement of her employment as an additional remedy, the payment of her salary, and a partial judgment under Retaliation Act No. 115, 29 L.P.R.A. Sec 194, et seq.1 In disagreement with the Resolution issued by the CFI on June 4, 2012, which had the effect of denying the request for dismissal due to lack of jurisdiction and to compel the resolution of the disputes through arbitration, the LLC filed the above-captioned Certiorari petition, arguing that the CFI had erred as follows:

THE CFI CLEARLY ERRED UPON ASSUMING JURISDICTION OVER THE ISSUE REGARDING JANE DOE’S OBLIGATION TO ARBITRATE HER ALLEGED CLAIMS: JANE DOE AND LLC UNEQUIVOCALLY AGREED THAT THE ARBITRATOR HAS THE AUTHORITY TO DETERMINE THE SCOPE OF HIS/HER JURISDICTION.

THE CFI CLEARLY ERRED UPON CONCLUDING THAT JANE DOE IS NOT REQUIRED TO ARBITRATE HER ALLEGED

1 At the June 5, 2012 preliminary hearing, Jane Doe requested that the CFI terminate the confidentiality agreement between the Parties and the Court, and LLC opposed the petition. (App., page 548). Moreover, the CFI granted the LLC until June 15, 2012, to submit in writing its position concerning confidentiality.

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CLAIMS AGAINST LLC AND THE REMAINING DEFENDANTS-PETITIONERS, INASMUCH AS THE ARBITRATION CLAUSE IN THE AGREEMENT IS BROAD, CLEAR, AND ENCOMPASSES ANY CLAIM BETWEEN THE PARTIES.

THE CFI CLEARLY ERRED UPON RELEASING JANE DOE FROM HER OBLIGATION TO ARBITRATE HER CLAIMS DUE TO THE ALLEGED “EMPLOYMENT” OR “WORK-RELATED” AND “CONSTITUTIONAL” NATURE THEREOF INASMUCH AS THE FAA PREEMPTS ANY STATE POLICY AGAINST ARBITRATION.

Petitioner filed with her brief an “Urgent Motion in Aid of the Court’s Jurisdiction.”

II.

The writ of Certiorari is an extraordinary remedial procedure used to allow a higher ranking court to correct an error made by a court of first instance. Pueblo v. Colón Mendoza, 149 D.P.R. 630, 637 (1999). As opposed to appeals, the Court of Appeals may issue the writ for Certiorari in a discretionary manner. Negrón Placer v. Srio. de Justicia, 154 D.P.R. 79, 91 (2001); J. Cuevas Segarra, Tratado de Derecho Procesal Civil, San Juan, Publicaciones J.T.S., 2000, T. I., page 884. Such discretion has been defined in our legal system as a formula of reasonability applied to judicial discernment in order to arrive at a justice-seeking conclusion. Negrón Placer v. Srio de Justicia, supra; Banco Popular de P.R. v. Municipio de Aguadilla, 144 D.P.R. 651, 658 (1997); Pueblo v. Sánchez González, 90 D.P.R. 197, 200 (1964). It does not signify having the authority to act in one way or another setting

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aside all other laws, because this would certainly constitute an abuse of discretion. Id.

In order that this Court may exercise its discretionary authority to hear on the merits the issues posed through Certiorari petitions, Rule 40 of the Rules for the Court of Appeals, 4 L.P.R.A. Ap. XXII-B, provides the following criteria for the determination as to whether to issue a writ of Certiorari:

A. If the remedy and disposition of the decision for which review is sought, as opposed to its legal

grounds, are contrary to the law.

B. If the findings of facts that have been posed are the most suitable for the analysis of the problem.

C. If the court of first instance has incurred in prejudice, partiality or a gross and manifest error

upon consideration of the evidence.

D. If the posed issue requires more detailed consideration in light of the original case records,

which shall be submitted, or of more intricate pleadings.

E. If the current stage of the proceeding is the most favorable for its consideration.

F. If the issuance of the writ or orders to show cause do not produce undue fragmentation of the

case and an undesirable delay in the final resolution of the litigation.

G. If issuance of the writ or order to show cause will avert a failure of justice.

If none of the aforesaid criteria exists in the petition before us, then we shall abstain from issuing

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the requested writ, so as to allow continuance of the proceedings in the Court of First Instance without further delays.

On the other hand, arbitration in Puerto Rico plays a major role as an alternate method of dispute resolution. VDE Corporation v. F&R Contractors, 180 D.P.R. 21 (2010). Thus, the law of Puerto Rico allows the parties to bind themselves to arbitrate any possible future controversy arising from their contract. Said authority arises mainly from Act No. 376 of May 8, 1951, 32 L.P.R.A. Secs. 3201 et. seq., known as the Commercial Arbitration Act. Article 1 of this legislation provides that the parties “may include in a written agreement a provision for the settlement by arbitration of any dispute which may in future arise between them from such settlement or in connection therewith.” Art. 1 of the Arbitration Act, 32 L.P.R.A. sec. 3201. (Emphasis ours).

The Arbitration Act originates and follows mainly the provisions of the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. Secs. 1-307 (“FAA” or “Federal Arbitration Act”). Méndez Acevedo v. Nieves Rivera, 179 D.P.R, page 369; Cristina Navarro Motta, student, La participatión de terceros no signatarios en los procesos de arbitraje en Puerto Rico, 44 Rev. Jur. U.I.P.R. 615, 618 (2010); David M. Helfeld, La jurisprudencia creadora: Factor determinante en el desarrollo del derecho de arbitraje en Puerto Rico, 70_Rev. Juridica U.P.R 1, 25 (2001). However, this legislation does not apply nor preempt the field under every circumstance. The Federal Arbitration Act applies to the states when the contracts involve interstate commercial transactions. 9 U.S.C. Sec. 2; Méndez

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Acevedo v. Nieves Rivera, 179 D.P.R page 370; Municipio de Mayagüez v. Lebrón, 167 D.P.R. 731, 721 (2006). That is to say, its “provisions apply only when the parties allege and prove that the transaction involving the dispute was part of interstate commerce.” Méndez Acevedo v. Nieves Rivera, 179 D.P.R page 371; Medina v. Cruz Azul de P.R., 155 D.P.R. 735, 742 (2001).

However, given the inapplicability of the Federal Arbitration Act, we must clarify that Puerto Rico’s doctrine in the subject matter of arbitration has closely followed its provisions, as well as its interpretative case law. Its inapplicability does not imply that the courts are precluded from observing the case law in other forums sharing our arbitration policy. Mun. de Mayagüez v. Lebrón 167 D.P.R. 713 (2006).

Now, the concept of arbitration is contractual in character. Méndez Acevedo v. Nieves Rivera, 179 D.P.R 359, 367 (2010). In the legal matter of obligations and contracts of Puerto Rico, the free will principle rules. This principle grants the contracting parties freedom of action. VDE Corporation v. F&R Contractors, supra; BPPR v. Sucn. Talavera, 174 D.P.R. 686, 693 (2008). This norm is presented in Article 1207 of the Civil Code, which provides that “the contracting parties may make the agreement and establish the clauses and conditions which they may deem advisable, provided they are not in contravention of law, morals, or public order.” 31 L.P.R.A. Sec. 3372. Furthermore, per our Civil Code, “Obligations arising from contracts have legal force between the contracting parties, and must be fulfilled

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in accordance with their stipulations.” Art. 1044 of the Civil Code, 31 L.P.R.A. Sec. 2994.

Also, in regard to contractual interpretation, Article 1233 of our Civil Code provides that “if the terms of a contract are clear and leave no doubt as to the intentions of the contracting parties, the literal sense of its stipulations shall be observed.” 31 L.P.R.A. Sec. 3471. Therefore, “once it is determined what the parties stipulated, the judge must resolve the disputes between the parties based on what was stipulated.” C.F.S.E. v. Unión, 170 D.P.R. 443, 451 (2007). Once the arbitration has been agreed between the parties, the courts have no discretion over its efficacy and must comply with the agreement. S.L.G. Méndez Acevedo v. Nieves Rivera, 179 D.P.R., page 368; Municipio Mayagüez v. Lebrón, 167 D.P.R., page 721. Furthermore, it must be kept in mind that, both in Puerto Rico and in the North American federal jurisdictions, it has been repeatedly reiterated that “a strong public policy in favor of arbitration exists, and that any doubt that may arise about whether arbitration proceeds or not must be solved in favor thereof.” Méndez Acevedo v. Nieves Rivera, 179 D.P.R. page 368; Quiñones v. Asociación, 161 D.P.R. 668, 673 (2004).

Therefore, upon encountering an arbitration agreement, prudency calls for judicial abstention. But judicial intervention is not prohibited. VDE Corporation v. F&R Contractors, supra; Municipio Mayagüez v. Lebrón, 167 D.P.R., page 721; S.L.G. Méndez Acevedo v. Nieves Rivera, 179 D.P.R page 368. The Commercial Arbitration Act states:

If a dispute exists regarding the obligation to arbitrate, the parties have a right to have it resolved

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at the courts. Art. 4, Arbitration Act, 32 L.P.R.A. 3204; 167 D.P.R. 713 (2006). Both in Puerto Rico and the United States, the issue over which forum shall determine the obligation to arbitrate the disputes, the courts or arbitrators, has surfaced in numerous occasions.

Recently, in Méndez Acevedo v. Nieves Rivera, 179 D.P.R 359 (2010), the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico invoked the norm advised in Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440 (2006), in the sense that a claim of nullity of a contract, in its entirety, that contains an arbitration clause shall be determined by an arbitrator. However, if the dispute deals with from the binding effect or nullity of the arbitration agreement per se, the courts shall entertain it. That is to say, “Whether an agreement creates a binding effect upon parties to arbitrate a particular controversy is an issue to be determined by the Courts.” Crufon Construction Corp v. Autoridad de Edificios Públicos, 156 D.P.R. 197, 205 (2002); Navarro Motta, supra, page 619. It must be noted that this norm does not apply if the parties to the contract expressly agree that the arbitrability issue will be adjudicated by an arbitrator. Upon encountering such situation, the courts must move the case to the arbitrator who will determine if the process will continue through arbitration. This norm was applied in Rent-A-Center v. Jackson, ___ U.S. ____ (2010), 130 S. Ct. 2772 (2010).

Upon taking up the task of adjudicating the binding force of an arbitration agreement we must keep in mind that, even though a strong public policy favoring arbitration exists, we are not dealing with an absolute norm. Exceptions to the general rule of

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the binding effect of an arbitration agreement have been acknowledged. Case in point, in the past, the arbitration agreement has been rendered ineffective when a workers union does not grant fair representation to its members, when referring the case to arbitration constitutes a futile and empty gesture, and in claims of sexual harassment under Act No. 17 of April 22, 1998, 29 L.P.R.A. Secs. 146 et seq., Quiñones González v. Asociación de Cóndominos Playa Azul II, 161 D.P.R. 668, 673 (2004), quoting, F.S.E. v. J.R.T., 111 D.P.R. 505 (1981), Hermandad Union de Empleados v. F.S.E., 112 D.P.R. 51 (1982) and Vélez v. Serv. Legales de P.R., 144 D.P.R. 673 (1998).

III.

In its Certiorari petition, the LLC argues that the resolution for which review is sought did not fully interpret the entirety of the arbitration clause, where it is clearly established that “the intention and purpose of the parties, including Jane Doe and the appearing parties, is to resolve any claim through mediation and arbitration.” (See Certiorari petition, page 21) The LLC argues that this statement “has no possible meaning other than “any claim,” which, in this case translates to a compensation claim made by Jane Doe as a Capital Member of the LLC; thus, it argues, the arbitration clause of the Operating Agreement applies, and the arbitration forum must adjudicate the retaliation or discrimination claims in the arbitration forum per the FAA provisions and its interpretative jurisprudence.

The petitioner moves with the petition herein so we reverse the ruling of the Court of First Instance where it determined to adjudicate in its merits the

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claims of discrimination, retaliation and damages. However, we believe that the Court of First Instance did not err upon concluding that the arbitration clause is not controlling as to respondent’s role. Both the Operating Agreement and the Employee Manual are part of Jane Doe’s employment contract; thus, at this stage of the proceedings, the dispute of the case is not related to the governance or administration of the LLC, which is regulated by the arbitration clause of the Operating Agreement.

As we explained, Article 1 of the Commercial Arbitration Act, 32 L.P.R.A. Sec. 3201, establishes that the parties may agree to arbitrate any dispute between them that arises and is related to the contracted agreement. See Martinez Marrero v. González Droz, 180 D.P.R. 579, 587-588 (2011). The Federal Arbitration Act provisions do not preempt the claims raised by respondent.

As pointed out before, the FAA preempts when the transaction involved in the dispute formed part of interstate commerce. That circumstance is not present in this case. Also, the arbitrator is not the only one called upon to determine the binding force of the arbitration clause. Both Puerto Rican and federal jurisprudence have distinguished the circumstances under which that issue must be referred to an arbitrator and when the courts are the forum with authority to hear the matter. Under the present case, the CFI had the authority to adjudicate and so it did because the issue was the arbitrability of the dispute, and not the nullity of the contract in its entirety. Furthermore, the parties did not agree that

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the adjudication of the arbitrability of the dispute would be referred to an arbitrator.

Upon evaluation of the facts and applicable law, in accordance with Rule 40, we find no circumstance that will cause a prejudicial effect to LLC at this early stage of the case. The Court of First Instance took into consideration both parties’ arguments and the procedural course of the case and denied the motion to dismiss. The Judge of Instance not only reasonably exercised his discretion but also made a determination that is correct in Law. This, in consideration of the fact that the claim that Jane Doe moves for the judicial forum to adjudicate is one attributing LLC a severance resulting from discrimination and retaliation. Furthermore, said dispute is related to conduct attributed to the LLC that violates her fundamental constitutional rights which our current legal system protects through injunctive relief. See, Arroyo v. Rattan Specialties, Inc., 117 D. P.R. 35, 65-66 (1986). The LLC has not placed us in a position at this stage, where we can substitute the well-pondered criteria of the court of instance, wherefore we decide to deny the issuance of the writ of certiorari.

Since the CFI will soon issue its ruling regarding the extent of the term of the confidentiality agreement keeping confidential the names of the above-captioned parties, we encourage giving the issue priority in the Court calendar. Public interest calls for individuals to know about the judicial system’s activities. A presumption also exists stating that the parties’ identities form part of the public record.

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IV.

In view of the foregoing, the Certiorari petition is denied. Therefore, the motion in aid of the Court’s jurisdiction filed by the petitioner is denied.

Notify the parties and the Court of First Instance via fax, telephone or electronic mail and notify them through regular mail.

Agreed by the Court and certified by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals

/s/ [signature]

Dimarie Alicea Lozada Clerk of the Court of Appeals.

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The LanguageWorks, Inc. 1123 Broadway New York, NY 10010 Tel. 212 447 6060 Fax 212 447 6257

LanguageWorks

STATE OF NEW YORK ) ) ss: COUNTY OF NEW YORK )

CERTIFICATION

This is to certify that the accompanying, to the best of my knowledge and belief, is a true and accurate translation from Spanish into English of a Resolution issued by the Court of Appeals of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico on June 15, 2012, completed on October 29, 2012.

/s/ Kevin Rees President The LanguageWorks, Inc.

Sworn to and subscribed before me this 29th day of October, 2012

/s/ Notary Public

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APPENDIX B

ESTADO LIBRE ASOCIADO DE PUERTO RICO TRIBUNAL DE PRIMERA INSTANCIA CENTRO

JUDICIAL DE SAN JUAN SALA SUPERIOR

JANE DOE,

Demandante,

v.

COMPAÑÍA DE RESPONSABILIDAD

LIMITADA (“CRL”); FULANO DE TAL, PERSONALMENTE, EN SU CARÁCTER DE PATRONO DE

JANE DOE Y COMO CO-ADMINISTRADOR DE LA

SOCIEDAD LEGAL DE BIENES GANANCIALES (“SLG”) CONSTITUIDA CON FULANA DE TAL, QUIEN ES

DEMANDADA COMO CO-ADMINISTRADORA DE LA SLG

CONSTITUIDA CON FULANO DE TAL; “SLG FULANO Y

FULANA DE TAL; CONSTITUIDA POR FULANO Y FULANA

DE TAL; SUTANO DE CUAL PERSONALMENTE, EN SU

CARÁCTER DE PATRONO DE JANE DOE Y COMO CO- ADMINISTRADOR DE LA SLG CONSTITUIDA CON

SUTANA DE CUAL, QUIEN ES DEMANDADA COMO CO-ADMINISTRADORA DE LA “SLG SUTANO Y SUTANA DE

CUAL” CONSTITUIDA CON SUTANO DE CUAL; “SLG

SUTANO Y SUTANA” CONSTITUIDA POR SUTANO Y

SUTANA DE CUAL; ESPERENCEJO MÁS CUAL

PERSONALMENTE, EN SU CARÁCTER DE PATRONO DE

JANE DOE Y COMO CO-ADMINASTRADOR DE LA SLG

CONSTITUIDA CON ESPERENCEJA MÁS CUAL, QUIEN ES DEMANDADA COMO CO-ADMINISTRADORA DE LA

SLG CONSTITUIDA CON ESPERENCEJO MÁS CUAL; “SLG ESPERENCEJO Y ESPERENCEJA MÁS CUAL”

CONSTITUIDA POR ESPERENCEJA Y ESPERENCEJA MÁS

CUAL; DEMANDADOS DESCONOCIDOS A, B Y C;

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DEMANDADAS COMPAÑÍAS ASEGURADORAS, DESCONOCIDAS X, Y, Z,

Demandados.

___________

CIVIL NUM.: KPE 2012-1204

___________

SALA: 904

SOBRE:

SENTENCIA DECLARATORIA; INJUNCTION PRELIMINAR Y PERMANENTE; VIOLACIÓN A

DERECHOS CONSTITUCIONALES; REPRESALIAS; DAÑOS Y PERJUICIOS

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RESOLUCIÓN

I.

La acción de marras tiene su génesis el 2 de abril de 2012 cuando la Parte Demandante, Jane Doe , presentó una Demanda Jurada en Solicitud de Sentencia Declaratoria e Injunction Preliminar y Permanente.1 Acompañó la Demanda original con una Moción Solicitando Injunction Preliminar y Permanente y una Moción Urgente en Solicitud de Orden. Mediante esta última solicitaba que los procedimientos judiciales se mantuvieran en estricta confidencialidad.2

En su Segunda Demanda Enmendada y Jurada Jane Doe presentó las siguientes causas de acción: Solicitad de Sentencia Declaratoria; Violación a Política Pública; Injunction; Violación de Derechos Constitucionales; Represalias.

Jane Doe reclamó a su vez del Tribunal que resolviera que:

1 Jane Doe solicitó enmendar la Demanda original en dos ocasiones conforme a la Regla 13.1 de las de Procedimiento Civil, vigentes. Las tres demandas fueron acompañadas de una Declaración Jurada suscrita por Jane Doe en las que proveía la verdadera identidad de todas las partes. La parte demandada se opuso a la presentación de la primera demanda enmendada únicamente. Mediante Orden el 23 de mayo de 2012 indicamos que no haríamos pronunciamiento alguno hasta considerar el asunto de la arbitrabilidad de las reclamaciones. Véase, Clemente González v. Departamento de la Vivienda, 114 D.P.R. 763,771 (1983). 2 Por esto, Jane identificó a todas las partes con nombres ficticios. En la vista de injunction preliminar celebrada el 11 de abril de 2012 ambas partes acordaron que el caso se ventile, en etapa de los procedimientos, de forma confidencial dado un acuerdo escrito por las mismas que las obliga a tramitar así el litigio, al menos en esta etapa.

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(1) a. El Acuerdo Operacional (AO) y su procedimiento de resolución de disputas son nulos e ineficaces porque, de ser interpretados como pretende la demandada, tendrían el efecto de extinguir los derechos constitucionales y estatutarios de Jane y proveer un mecanismo para eliminar las protecciones en contra del discrimen que constituyen la política pública del ELA;

b. la cláusula de arbitraje del AO no es aplicable; va dirigida a la resolución de disputas que surgen de la operación y administración de la Compañía de Responsabilidad Limitada (CRL) y no de las reclamaciones que surgen de la relación de empleo entre la CRL y sus empleados y miembros;

c. las reclamaciones de Jane no están sujetas a la cláusula de arbitraje del AO porque surgen de su relación de empleo con la CRL; y

d. Jane es empleada de la parte demandada;

(2) en la alternativa, una Sentencia declarando que el acuerdo de arbitraje es irrazonable y excesivo (“unconscionable”) como cuestión de derecho y, por lo tanto, nulo;

(3) un Injunction Permanente ordenando a la parte demandada a desistir con perjuicio de la solicitud de arbitraje presentada ante la AAA el 22 de marzo de 2012;

(4) un Injunction Permanente ordenando a la parte demandada reinstalar inmediatamente a Jane como empleada y Miembro Capital de la CRL, con todos los haberes dejados de devengar, o en su defecto, una compensación por salarios en vez de la reinstalación (“front pay”), si el tribunal determina que la reinstalación no es factible;

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(5) un Injunction Permanente ordenando a la parte demandada y todos sus agentes y empleados a desistir de todo discrimen y/o represalia en contra de Jane, una vez reinstalada en su empleo;

(6) daños compensatorios por una cantidad no menor de $3,000,000.00;

(7) doble daño conforme a la Ley Núm. 115 de 20 de diciembre de 1991;

(8) una cantidad equivalente al 25% por concepto de honorarios de abogado, más una partida razonable por concepto de costas y gastos incurridos en el litigio; y

(9) cualquier otro remedio que en derecho proceda.

Según las alegaciones, la CRL presentó una solicitud de arbitraje y Jane Doe estaba obligada a contestar dicho procedimiento y a participar del mismo, salvo que este Tribunal ordenara a la parte demandada desistir de su reclamación en arbitraje para que las reclamaciones fueran resueltas por el Tribunal. Jane Doe también solicitó que el tribunal dictara una sentencia declarando la improcedencia del procedimiento arbitral conforme la §14.04 del Acuerdo Operacional (“AO”), porque el mismo no contemplaba las reclamaciones de discrimen, represalia y de daños que surgían de la relación de empleo. Alegó que la CRL admitió en su solicitud de arbitraje que las reclamaciones de discrimen y represalias y daños a arbitrarse no surgían de una reclamación de empleo.

En su petición de injunction preliminar Jane Doe solicitó que del Tribunal conceder el remedio interdictal solicitado, se paralizara el procedimiento arbitral iniciado por la CRL en lo que el Tribunal resolvía si, en efecto, el arbitraje era el método

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obligatorio escogido por las partes para resolver sus controversias.

Hasta ahora, todos los escritos han sido presentados bajo sello y tomando medidas de seguridad necesarias para lograr la confidencialidad solicitada y acordada por todas las partes. A priori, dicha confidencialidad fue protegida y el 3 de abril de 2012 requerimos de Jane Doe que justificara las razones para proceder de ese modo. Al día siguiente, en cumplimiento con la Orden del Tribunal, Jane Doe explicó que su pedido de tramitar el litigio de manera confidencial en esta etapa estaba predicada en su afán de protegerse de potenciales alegaciones que pudiese hacer la parte demandada sobre la supuesta violación de Jane Doe al acuerdo de confidencialidad del AO y para evitar que se tomaran represalias adicionales en su contra. Aclaró que la única base para solicitar que los procedimientos fuesen confidenciales era la cláusula contenida en la sección 14.05 del AO. No obstante, enfatizó estar consciente de que la norma prevaleciente requiere que los procedimientos judiciales sean abiertos, excepto en casos excepcionales. Fulana de Tal v. Demandado A, 138 D.P.R. 610, 616 (1995).

El 3 de abril de 2012 emitimos una orden para dilucidar la procedencia del recurso extraordinario y señalamos vista para el 11 de abril a los 9:30 a.m. Dispusimos para la pronta notificación de la misma. La parte demandante fue emplazada con copia de los escritos y órdenes el 4 de abril de 2012, a través de su agente autorizado para tales efectos.

El 11 de abril de 2012, se celebró la vista de injunction preliminar en el caso. Las partes comparecieron representados por sus respectivos abogados. Allí llegaron a un acuerdo para disponer de la solicitud de injunction preliminar,

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provisionalmente. Mediante éste, la parte demandada solicitaría la paralización de los procedimientos de arbitraje ante la Asociación Americana de Arbitraje (“AAA”), mientras el Tribunal adjudicaba la controversia planteada sobre la arbitrabilidad de las reclamaciones de Jane Doe. De igual forma, las partes acordaron mantener la confidencialidad que se había preservado hasta ese momento, en lo que el Tribunal resolvía el asunto planteado,3 En la vista, Jane Doe reiteró lo expuesto en su Moción en Cumplimiento de Orden presentada el 4 de abril de 2012. La parte solicitó que se mantuviese la confidencialidad.

La parte demandada le anticipó al Tribunal durante la vista que presentaría su posición por escrito. Al concluir la vista, la parte demandada entregó copia a Jane Doe y copia de cortesía al Tribunal de su Solicitud de Desestimación por Falta de Jurisdicción y para Compeler Arbitraje Compulsorio en Vista de Acuerdo Vinculante de Arbitraje, en adelante “Solicitud de Desestimación” radicada posteriormente ese mismo día y se pautaron las fechas en que se presentarían los respectivos escritos replicando a la posición de las partes. Se pautó, además, una vista para desfilar prueba, de ser necesario, para el 10 de mayo de 2012.4 El primer asunto que el Tribunal dispuso resolver fue la arbitrabilidad de la controversia. Véase, Minuta Resolución del 11 de abril de 2012.

3 El 13 de abril de 2012 emitimos Orden para preservar la confidencialidad en esta etapa de los procedimientos, a tenor con la solicitud de ambos partes. 4 Posteriormente se transfirió dicha villa a solicitud de ambas partes al 5 de junio de 2012.

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En su Solicitud de Desestimación5, la parte demandada adujo varios argumentos para que el recurso extraordinario y demanda presentados fuesen desestimados a saber: que existía un programa de resolución de disputas que incluía el arbitraje que Jane Doe había firmado como miembro capital; que era el árbitro y no el juez el llamado a dilucidar si las controversias eran arbitrables; que Jane Doe no era empleada de la CRL, sino que tenía que considerarse como patrono y que por tanto “ausente una relación de empleo,” no existían reclamaciones laborales que la cobijaran, sino reclamaciones contractuales que sí estaban incluidas en la cláusula de arbitraje; que el “Federal Arbitration Act” (“FAA”) requería del Tribunal que pusiese en vigor el pacto de arbitraje

5 Aunque la parte demandada expresa no estar sometiéndose a la jurisdicción del tribunal en su Solicitud de Desestimación, ya lo había hecho en su comparecencia inicial y a través de su participación activa durante la vista del 11 de abril de 2012 sin hacer reserva alguna. En reiteradas ocasiones el Tribunal Supremo de Puerto Rico ha resuelto que aquella parte que comparece voluntariamente y realiza algún acto sustancial que la constituya parte en el pleito, se somete a la jurisdicción del tribunal. Así a modo de ejemplo, en Rodríguez v. Urbin Brands, 167 D.P.R. 509 (2006) el Tribunal Supremo señaló que “a pesar de que [la parte] ha indicado que comparece ante el Tribunal de Primera Instancia sin someterse a su jurisdicción para cuestionar el emplazamiento y la notificando de la sentencia, es claro que en sus comparecencias orales y escritas presentó argumentas en los méritos en curanto a la suficiencia de la prueba presentada [p]or lo tanto, entendemos que [la parte] se sometió tácitamente a la jurisdicción del foro de instancia y renunció a su planteamiento sobro suficiencia del emplazamiento”. Peña v. Warren, 162 D.P.R 714 (2003); Vázquez v. López, 160 D.P.R. 714 (2003); Qume Caribe, Inc. v. Srio.de Hacienda, 153 D.P.R, 700 (2001), citados en Cruz González v. Carrera, 2009 TA 3249. Véase además. Banco Santander v. Fajardo Faros, 141 D.P.R. 237 (1996) y Fernández v. Rodríguez Arroyo, 2009 TA 4677.

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favoreciendo la política pública establecida y que ocupaba el campo, entre otras alegaciones.

En su Oposición a la Solicitud de Desestimación, en adelante “Oposición”, Jane Doe adujo, entre otras cosas, que la cláusula de arbitraje del AO no era aplicable a sus reclamaciones que surgían de su relación de empleo con la CRL, sino que aplicaba a asuntos relacionados con la operación y administración de la CRL y que la intención de las partes no era la inclusión de estas reclamaciones bajo el AO; que el propio AO en su cláusula 14.03 permitía presentar la controversia ante el Tribunal como otro foro de resolución de disputas; que ella era empleada para propósitos de las reclamaciones que surgían de su relación de empleo con la parte demandada y, por tanto, las mismas estaban excluidas del arbitraje del AO; y que ella no había renunciado a arbitrar sus reclamaciones de derechos constitucionales y las que surgían de su relación de empleo y, por tanto, que la cláusula de arbitraje invocada era nula6. Jane Doe también argumentó que le aplicaba el Manual del Empleado (“ME”) de la CRL y éste no contenía disposición alguna relativa al arbitraje de disputas sobre las reclamaciones surgidas de la relación de empleo.

El 1 de mayo de 2012 la parte demandada presentó su Réplica a Oposición, en lo sucesivo “Réplica”, y la parte demandante presentó su Dúplica de la Demandante (“Dúplica”) el 7 de mayo de 2012.7

6 Jane Doe también argumentó que, de aplicar la cláusula de arbitraje del AO, la misma seria “unconscionable’’ y por lo tanto inválida, ya que requeriría que el árbitro adjudicara sus reclamaciones constitucionales en ausencia de una renuncia expresa e inequívoca de tales derechos. 7 Concedimos el plazo solicitado por la parte demandada para reaccionar a la Dúplica. Luego de revisar la misma, la

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La parte demandada reiteró su posición de que las reclamaciones que presentaba Jane Doe al Tribunal surgían del AO y por tanto, ésta tenía una obligación prima facie de arbitrar las mismas. Sin embargo, en su Réplica la parte demandada admite que no es importante determinar si el reclamo es de naturaleza laboral o administrativo, pues se trata de una reclamación que surge a la luz del AO por diferencias en cuanto a la compensación de Jane Doe.8 También argumentó que Jane Doe venía obligada a arbitrar sus alegadas causas de acción aunque fuesen de índole constitucional y que el Manual de Empleado de la CRL no neutralizaba la obligación de arbitrar de Jane Doe, ni la convertía en empleada.9 Finalmente la parte demandada en su Réplica argumentó que era innecesario e inapropiado que el Tribunal resolviese si Jane Doe era empleada o patrono.

En la Dúplica de la Demandante, en adelante “Duplica”, Jane Doe reiteró que conforme a la admisión de la CRL, el arbitraje compulsorio del AO no aplicaba a reclamaciones que surgen de una relación de empleo, y sus reclamaciones si surgían de su relación de empleo con la parte demandada. Es

demandada informó que no presentaría escrito adicional alguno y dio por sometido el asunto. 8 Para la parte demandada había sido importante, hasta ese momento determinar la naturaleza del reclamo, puesto que había argumentado que Jane Doe no tenía ninguna reclamación que surgiese de su relación de empleo por supuestamente ser “patrono” y no “empleada”, Así surge de su solicitud de arbitraje (“Demand for Arbitration”). 9 Adviértase que la parte demandada reconoce la aplicación del Manual de Empleado a Jane Doe, lo cual surge claramente del propio texto de dicho Manual. Sin embargo, en su posición que le aplica sólo en “su capacidad de supervisora”. (De una cuidadosa revisión de los documentos sometidos no encontramos en las disposiciones del Manual de Empleados que éste sólo aplique a Jane Doe en su capacidad do supervisora).

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decir, que aún validando la existencia de dicha cláusula en el AO, la misma no podía utilizarse para obligar a Jane Doe a arbitrar reclamaciones que no están contempladas en el ámbito del AO, ni en su cláusula de arbitraje. Jane Doe argumentó que la cláusula de arbitraje del AO es para un arbitraje comercial de los asuntos operacionales, comerciales y administrativos de la CRL.10 Jane Doe también alegó que las controversias que surgen de su relación de empleo están cubiertas por el ME, no por el AO. De hecho, indicó que el AO no contiene políticas de discrimen, represalia, hostigamiento, etc. Argumenta que el AO en ningún lugar habla de reclamaciones de discrimen o represalias.

Tras un análisis objetivo, sereno y cuidadoso de las contenciones de las parles y de la totalidad del voluminoso legajo que constituye los autos del caso formulamos las siguientes:

II. DETERMINACIONES DE HECHOS

(1) Jane Doe es abogada licenciada por el Tribunal Supremo de Puerto Rico desde hace 38 años.

(2) La CRL se organizó d 13 de septiembre de 2007 para limitar la responsabilidad civil de sus miembros, de esa fecha en adelante denominados miembros capitales. Véase, Ley Núm. 487 de 23 de septiembre de 2004.

(3) Los miembros capitales pudieran tener dos capacidades en la CRL: (1) como propietarios; y (2) empleados. Estas no son mutuamente excluyentes.

10 Jane Doe resulto y la parte demandada no refutó que los Regias de la AAA que incorpora el AO son las de arbitraje comercial y no las que la AAA promulga para reclamaciones de empleo.

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(4) La CRL es una compañía de responsabilidad limitada creada conforme a la Ley General de Corporaciones del Estado Libre Asociado de Puerto Rico.

(5) Al cambiar su estatus de sociedad a ente corporativo, la CRL aprobó un AO, que reglamenta sus aspectos operacionales y administrativos.

(6) Jane Doe se convirtió en miembro capital de la CRL en el 2007, cuando firmó el AO.

(7) El AO regula los asuntos internos y de administración de las operaciones de la CRL y provee para el establecimiento de cuentas capitales, distribución de ganancias pérdidas, pago de contribuciones sobre ingresos, la administración de la CRL, el establecimiento de comités, elección de los miembros y Director Administrativo, establecimiento de quórum, terminación de miembros, proceso de compensación, salarios y bonos, asuntos de contabilidad interna, asuntos encomendados al Director Administrativo, clasificación de miembros y sus responsabilidades, deber de fiducia y lealtad, retiros, suspensiones o expulsiones de miembros, retiros mandatarios, pagos en caso de retiros, expulsiones o muertes, resoluciones de reclamaciones y otras relacionadas con la operación de la CRL.

(8) El AO no tiene disposiciones relacionadas con reclamaciones que surjan de una relación de empleo, tales como de discrimen, hostigamiento o represalia.

(9) El ME aplica a los miembros capitales.

(10) El ME incluye las políticas, prácticas, obligaciones y beneficios aplicables a todos los empleados y miembros capitales, incluyendo políticas sobre discrimen, hostigamiento sexual, represalia, incapacidad, licencias de maternidad, vacaciones y enfermedad, código de vestimenta, entre otras.

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(11) El ME no contempla el arbitraje como el mecanismo para resolver disputas que surjan de la relación de empleo.

(12) El ME se firmó con posterioridad al AO, el 22 de octubre de 2007.

(13) El AO tiene una cláusula de arbitraje en su sección 14.04.

(14) La cláusula de arbitraje aplica a cualquier reclamación presentada por un miembro capital sobre asuntos operativos o administrativos de la CRL

(15) El 22 de marzo de 2012, la CRL presentó una solicitud de arbitraje (“Demand for Arbitration”) ante el AAA bajo las reglas de arbitraje comercial.

(16) En su solicitud de arbitraje, la CRL admitió que las reclamaciones que presentó Jane Doe por discrimen, represalia y daños, no surgen de una relación de empleo.

(17) Desde su reclamación del 24 de enero de 2012, Jane Doe ha cuestionado la aplicabilidad de la cláusula de arbitraje del AO a sus reclamaciones de empleo de discrimen, represalia y daños.

(18) En la cláusula de arbitraje del AO se incorporan específicamente las reglas de arbitraje comercial de la AAA.

(19) El AAA tiene reglas de arbitraje para resolver disputas surgidas de una relación de empleo.

(20) Los daños allegadamente sufridos por Jane Doe son la consecuencia del alegado discrimen y represalias sufridos por parte de las actuaciones de la parte demandada, según se alega y deberán ser probados.

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(21) Jane Doe no pactó arbitrar las reclamaciones que surgen de su relación de empleo con la parte demandada al firmar el AO.

(22) El 30 de marzo de 2012 la CRL destituyó a Jane Doe del Consejo Directivo por haber presentado su reclamación de discrimen y represalia contra ésta el 24 de enero de 2012.

(23) Jane Doe presentó su Demanda original y solicitud de injunction preliminar y permanente el 2 de abril de 2012 para, entre otras cosas, dejar sin efecto el arbitraje solicitado por la parte Demandada.

(24) El 5 de abril de 2012, el Consejo Directivo de la CRL recomendó la expulsión de Jane Doe por haber presentado esta acción civil.

(25) El 9 de abril de 2012, Jane fue despedida de la CRL por haber presentado su Demanda Jurada y Solicitud de Sentencia Declaratoria y de Injunction Preliminar y Permanente.

A tenor con las determinaciones de hecho precedentemente expuestas formulamos las siguientes:

III. CONCLUSIONES DE DERECHO

De entrada es menester pormenorizar que el punto de partida en el ámbito de materia de interpretación de las cláusulas de arbitraje lo son las disposiciones contractuales acordadas entre las partes. Se ha reconocido federal y estatalmente que el arbitraje es materia de contrato. AT & T Techs., Inc. v. Communications Workers, 475 U.S. 643, 648 (1986). “Whether given parties have agreed to arbitrate a dispute is a matter of contract interpretation and, thus, is normally for the court to decide.” United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nav.

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Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582-583, 80 S.CL 1347,4 L.Ed.2d 1409 (1960).

Esta política tiene relación con la doctrina de la autonomía de los contratantes enunciada en el Art. 1207 de nuestro Código Civil, 31 L.P.RA. § 3372. En Puerto Rico rige el principio de la libertad de contratación. Véase Unisys v. Ramallo Brothers, 128 D.P.R, 842, 850 (1991). Como parte de esta norma, “los contratantes pueden establecer los pactos, cláusulas y condiciones que tengan por conveniente, siempre que no sean contrarios a las leyes, a la moral, ni al orden público”. Art. 1207 del Código Civil, 31 L.P.R.A. § 3372.

Si el propio contrato entre las partes establece ciertos tipos de disputas especificas que se verán en arbitraje, o si el contrato excluye algunas controversias particulares, los tribunales deben actuar de acuerdo con lo dispuesto en el contrato. Medina Betancourt v. La Cruz Azul de P.R, 155 D.P.R. 735 (2001).

Una vez establecidas las cláusulas y condiciones del acuerdo, se entenderá perfeccionado el contrato por el consentimiento entre las partes y, desde ese momento, cada una de ellas vendrá obligada no sólo a cumplir con lo expresamente pactado, sino también con las consecuencias que, según su naturaleza, sean conformes a la buena fe, al uso y a la ley. Art. 1210 del Código Civil, 31 L.P.R.A. § 3375.

Esa obligación de cumplir con lo pactado se fundamenta en el principio de la buena fe, la cual exige no defraudar la confianza que otro ha puesta en una promesa o conducta. Unisys v. Ramalo, supra, a la pág. 852, citando a L. Diez-Picazo, Fundamentos de Derecho Civil Patrimonial, 2da ed., Madrid, Ed. Tecnos, 1983, Vol. I, Cap. IV, pág. 99.

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La glosa jurisprudencial ha establecido que generalmente, cuando las cortes deben decidir si las partes acordaron arbitrar un asunto, éstas deben utilizar principios comunes de derecho estatal que gobiernan la formación de contratos. Combined Energies v. CCI, Inc. 514 F.3d 168 (lst Cir. 2008), citando a First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Koplan, 514 U.S. 938, 943-944 (1995). A una parte no puede obligarse a someter a arbitraje una disputa que no acordó resolver por ese procedimiento. AT&T Techs, Inc, 475 U.S. a la pág. 648; Combined Energies, supra; Municipality or San Juan v. Corporación para el Fomento Económico de la Ciudad Capital, 415 F.3d 145,149 (lst Cir. 2005); InterGen N.V. v. Grina, 344 F.3d 134, 142 (1st Cir. 2003).

Por otro lado, el propósito fundamental del Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) es que los tribunales pongan en vigor los contratos válidos de arbitraje. FAA 9 U.S.C. § 1. La política pública a favor del arbitraje como método alterno para la solución de disputas no es absoluta y tiene sus excepciones.

La regla general bajo el estatuto federal es que la arbitrabilidad de una disputa deberá ser determinada por un tribunal. AT&T Techs., Inc, 475 U.S. a la pág. 649; Apollo Computer, Inc. v. Berg, 886 F.2d 469, 472 (lst Cir. 1989). Las partes pueden pactar que sea el árbitro quien decida si una disputa en particular es arbitrable, así como también los méritos de la disputa Id., a la pág. 473. Pero sólo cuando las partes han acordado clara e inequívocamente que el árbitro debería decidir si una cuestión es arbitrable, éste se convierte en un asunto que deberá ser decidido por el árbitro. Awah v. Coverall N. Am, Inc, 554 F.3d 7,10 (1st Cir. 2009).11 Los árbitros derivan su autoridad

11 En este caso, no hay que determinar si la delegación de jurisdicción al árbitro bajo la cláusula es clara e inequívoca,

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para resolver disputas solamente porque las partes han acordado de antemano someter dichos agravios a arbitraje, AT&T Techs., Inc, supra, a la pág. 648. No obstante la política pública a favor del arbitraje y la presunción general de arbitrabilidad, los tribunales no pueden anular la intención de las partes dándole a la cláusula de arbitraje mayor amplitud de lo que las partes acordaron, pues en última instancia se corre el peligro de socavar en lugar de servir dicha política pública. National Railroad Passenger Corporation v. Boston and Maine Corporation, 850 F.2d 756 (D.C. Columbra, 1988); véase además, Litton Financial Printing Div. v. N.L.R.B., 501 U.S. 190, 200 (1991) en donde se resolvió que: “[N]o obligation to arbitrate a labor dispute arises solely by operation of law. The law compels a party to submit his grievance to arbitration only if he has contracted to do so.”

Es norma de derecho reiterada y establecida que las disputas sobre la aplicabilidad una cláusula de arbitraje a un tipo particular de controversia deben ser resueltas por el Tribunal. Kristlian v. Comcast Corp., 446 F.3d 25, 39 (lst Cir. 2006), citando a Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, 537 U.S. 79, 83 (2002); Rent-A-Center v. Jackson, 130 S.CL 2772.

Luego de revisar el derecho y analizar los hechos en los que las partes fundamentan sus reclamaciones, concluimos que las reclamaciones de discrimen,

porque la cláusula de arbitraje no es aplicable en las controversias presentadas. Aún cuando las partes le delegan al árbitro la autoridad de decidir qué asuntos están sujetos a arbitraje, el tribunal debe determinar, de entrada, si las reclamaciones de la disputa caen dentro del alcance contemplado del acuerdo de las partes. Después de todo el arbitraje es un asunto estricto de consentimiento, es una manera de resolver las disputas que las partes han acordado someter a arbitraje. Granite Rock Co. y. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 30 S. Ct 2847 (2010).

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represalia y daños de Jane Doe no están contempladas en el AO y, por lo tanto, han de ser resueltas en el foro judicial y no mediante arbitraje. Esta conclusión cuenta con vasto apoyo en los hechos presentados por la propia parte demandada. Notamos que el énfasis principal de la parte demandada surge de su interpretación general de que el arbitraje contenido en el AO aplica a toda reclamación (“any claim”), independientemente de su naturaleza (“of any nature”). No podemos avalar tal posición a la luz del lenguaje del AO y la existencia del ME en su aplicación a los miembros capitales. Resolvemos que, la delegación al árbitro no puede ser ilimitada y uno de dichos límites es que la disputa tenga que ver (“subject matter”) con lo que contemplaba el acuerdo de arbitraje. Visibility Corporation v. Schilling Robotics, LLC, 2011 WL 5075816 (D. Mass. Op. del 25 de octubre de 2011) citando a Turi v. Main Street Adoption Services, LLP, 633 F.3d 496, 507 (6to Cir. 2011).

Adviértase que desde sus comienzos, la CRL adoptó un AO (13 de septiembre de 2007) y un ME (22 de octubre de 2007). Ambos aplican a los miembros capitales. Sabido es que el Manual de Empleado es parte del contrato de trabajo. Santiago v. Kodak Caribbean, Ltd., 129 D.P.R. 763 (1992).

El AO cubre los aspectos de la capacidad propietaria de los miembros capitales y el ME aquéllos relativos a su capacidad como empleados. Aunque los miembros capitales de las Compañías de Responsabilidad Limitada han recibido diferente trato por parte de los tribunales anglosajones al momento de determinar si son empleados, dueños o ambos para propósitos de la protección en contra del discrimen y represalias, entendemos que el derecho en Puerto Rico, y su interpretación jurisprudencial y

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los hechos ante nos, requieren que determinemos que gozan de tales protecciones. Véase, Constitución de Puerto Rico, Art 2, secciones 1, 16, 17 y 18.

Nos resulta conflictiva la posición de la CRL cuando por un lado argumenta que el AO reglamenta todas las disputas de Jane Doe con la CRL y cualquier miembro capital, incluyendo aquéllas de discrimen, represalias y daños que presenta Jane Doe, mientras del otro lado admite en su solicitud de arbitraje que dichas reclamaciones no surgen de una relación de empleo. Además resaltamos la postura de la parte demandada en su Solicitud de Desestimación de que Jane Doe no es una empleada y no goza de las protecciones constitucionales y estatutarias por esta razón.12

La posición conflictiva de la parte demandada antes descrita en ambos foros abona a nuestro convencimiento de que las reclamaciones presentadas por Jane Doe sobre discrimen, represalia y daños, con sus respectivos remedios, están fuera del ámbito (“subject matter”) del AO y su cláusula de arbitraje. Por surgir estas reclamaciones de la relación de empleo de Jane Doe con la CRL es que se excluyen de la solicitud de arbitraje, presentada al amparo del AO. Es así porque éste reglamenta los aspectos operacionales y administrativos de la CRL y no in relación de empleo existente entre los miembros capitales y la CRL que regula el ME. Concluir que Jane Doe está obligada a someterse al arbitraje, en 12 Avalar tal argumentación, permitiría que los miembros capitales decidieran en otro momento utilizar otros criterios protegidos, como la raza o la religión y utilizarlos de base para privar a otros miembros capitales de su protección constitucional. De acuerdo a la interpretación y postura de la CRL, mediante el AO se delegaría al árbitro resolver la controversia en un foro totalmente confidencial y sin derecho de apelación para los afectados.

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nuestra opinión, proveería el imprimatur judicial a que se ventilen reclamaciones que surgen de una relación de empleo en un procedimiento invocado por la propia demandada para resolver disputas que nada tienen que ver con una relación de empleo. Además, la legislación protectora de los empleados en Puerto Rico es de amplio alcance, no restrictiva y la exclusión de un empleado de los beneficios de la legislación laboral debe ser clara, debiendo los tribunales interpretar dichas exclusiones en forma restrictiva. Malavé Serrano v. Oriental Bank, 2006 TSPR 63.

Al analizar las funciones que Jane Doe realizaba para la CRL, según surge de los documentos en autos, parece necesario concluir que ella carecía del control con el que cuentan los dueños y patronos. Véase, Acevedo Colora, Legislación Laboral del Trabajo Comentada, 8va Ed. (2005).

No obstante las partes deberán desfilar su prueba en relación a sí, a los fines de lo aquí controvertido, era empleada, propietaria o ambas. Inclusive, estamos conscientes que Jane Doe no niega que, como miembro capital, tuviese intereses propietarios dentro de la CRL Lo que no podemos perder de vista es que ambas capacidades, empleada y propietaria de ser probadas, no son mutuamente excluyentes. Véase, Goldberg v. Whitaker House Coop., Inc, 366 U.S. 28, 32 (1961). Deberá apartar prueba sobre el particular.

De igual forma, nada impide que la CRL en su día establezca que tiene derecho a sus defensas sobre el resto de las reclamaciones invocadas en su Demanda o que Jane Doe cuenta con prueba insuficiente para probarlas. Por lo cual en correcta práctica adjudicativa dictamos la:

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IV. RESOLUCIÓN

A base de los fundamentos precedentemente expuestos resolvemos que las reclamaciones presentadas por Jane Doe no están cobijadas bajo la cláusula de arbitraje del AO, por surgir éstas de su relación laboral con la parte demandada. Por tanto determinamos que el Tribunal será quien adjudique en sus méritos las reclamaciones de discrimen, represalias y daños presentadas por Jane Doe y no un árbitro del AAA, así como la solicitud de remedio interdictal peticionada.

Se mantiene en pie la vista de injunction señalada para el 5 de junio a las 9:00 a.m. en la cual las partes tendrán la oportunidad de desfilar su prueba en relación a la solicitud de remedio interdictal peticionada, en atención a que el acuerdo entre las partes relacionado a la paralización del arbitraje se mantendría hasta que fuera resuelto el asunto sobre la arbitrabilidad de la controversia. Por lo cual, se acepta la segunda demanda enmendada que actualiza e incluye las alegaciones previamente formuladas en la primera demanda enmendada.

NOTIFIQUESE. Adelántese vía correo electrónico.

Dada en San Juan, Puerto Rico, a 4 de junio de 2012.

/s/ [signature]

ÁNGEL R. PAGÁN OCASIO JUEZ SUPERIOR

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APPENDIX B

COMMONWEALTH OF PUERTO RICO

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE SAN JUAN SUPERIOR PART

JANE DOE,

Plaintiff

v.

LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY (LLC); JOHN DOE, in his personal capacity as employer of JANE

DOE and as co-administrator of the Conjugal Partnership (“CP”) established with JEAN DOE, who is sued as co-administrator of the CP established with

John Doe; “CP John and Jean Doe” constituted by John and Jean Doe; JACK JOE in his personal capacity as employer of JANE DOE and as co-

administrator of the CP established with JACKY JOE, who is sued as co-administrator of “CP Jack and Jacky Joe” constituted with Jack Joe; “CP Jack and

Jacky Joe” constituted with Jack and Jacky Joe; LARRY LOE in his personal capacity as employer of

JANE DOE, and as co-administrator of the CP constituted with LARISSA LOE, who is sued as co-administrator of the CP constituted with Larry Loe;

“CP Larry and Larissa Loe” constituted by Larry and Larissa Loe; Unknown Defendants A, B and C;

Unknown Insurance Companies Defendants, X, Y, Z,

Defendants.

___________________

CIVIL No. KPE2012-1204

_________________

Chamber: 904

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RE: Declaratory Judgment and request for preliminary and permanent injunction; violation of

constitutional rights; retaliation; damages.

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RESOLUTION

I.

The Claim hereunder originated on April 2, 2012 when Plaintiff, “Jane Doe,” filed a Verified Complaint and Request for Declaratory Judgment and Preliminary and Permanent Injunction.1 The original Complaint was submitted together with a Motion requesting Preliminary and Permanent Injunction and an Urgent Motion Requesting Order. In the latter, Jane Doe requested that the proceedings in this case remain in strict confidentiality.2

In her Second Amended Verified Complaint, Jane Doe stated the following causes of action: Request for Declaratory Judgment, Violation of Public Policy; Injunction; Violation of Constitutional Rights; Retaliation.

1 On two occasions Jane Doe requested amendments to the Complaint pursuant to Rule 13.1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure that are currently in effect. The three Complaints included Sworn Statements undersigned by Jane Doe where the true identity of each party was indicated. Defendant opposed the first amended complaint only. By means of Order issued on May 23, 2012, we stated that no pronouncement would be made until considering the mater of the arbitrability of the claims. See, Clemente González v. Departamento de la Vivienda, 114 D.P.R. 763, 771 (1983). 2 This is the reason why Jane identified all parties with fictitious names. At the Preliminary Injunction hearing held on April 11, 2012, both parties agreed that the case would be heard, at this stage of the proceedings, under strict confidentiality, upon written agreement by both parties to such effects, at least throughout this stage of the litigation.

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Jane Doe also requested the court to rule the following:

(1) a. The Operating Agreement (OA) and its dispute resolution procedure are null and void inasmuch as if interpreted as expected by the Defendants, the effect would be the extinguishment of Jane’s constitutional and statutory rights while granting a mechanism to eliminate those protections against discrimination that constitute the Public Policy of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.

b. The OA’s Arbitration Clause is not applicable; it has been designed to deal with claims resulting from the operation and administration of the Limited Liability Company (LLC) and not with claims related to the employment relationship between LLC and its employees and members;

c. Jane’s claims are not subject to the OA’s Arbitration Clause because they arise from her employment relationship with LLC; and

d. Jane is an employee of the Defendant.

(2) In the alternative, a Judgment declaring that the arbitration clause is unreasonable and excessive (unconscionable) as a matter of law and, thus, null and void;

(3) Issue a Permanent Injunction against Defendant ordering it to desist with prejudice from the arbitration demand made before the AAA on March 22, 2012;

(4) Issue a Permanent Injunction ordering Jane’s immediate reinstatement as an employee and Capital Member of LLC, with all lost earnings, otherwise, a

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front pay instead of reinstatement, if the Court determines that reinstatement is not feasible;

(5) Issue a Permanent Injunction ordering Defendants and all their agents and employees to abstain from any discrimination and /or retaliation against Jane, once reinstated in her employment.

(6) Grant compensatory damages in an amount of no less than $3,000,000.00;

(7) Grant double damages in accordance with Act No. 115, of December 20, 1991;

(8) Grant an amount equivalent to 25% of attorney’s fees, plus a reasonable amount for costs and expenses of litigation; and

(9) Any other remedy admissible under the law.

According to the allegations, LLC filed a demand for arbitration and Jane Doe was required to answer the same as well as participate therein, unless this Court ordered Defendant to desist from its arbitration demand for the claims to be heard before the Court. Jane Doe also requested the Court to issue a judgment declaring the inapplicability of the arbitration procedure in accordance with section 14.04 of the Operations Agreement (OA), as it did not consider the discrimination, retaliation and damages claims arising from the employment relationship. She claimed that LLC admitted in its arbitration request that the claims of discrimination, retaliation and damages to be arbitrated did not come from an employment claim.

Jane Doe submitted to the Court that if the petition for injunctive relief was granted, a stay of the arbitration process that had already been initiated by

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the LLC must be ordered while the Court determined if, in effect, arbitration was the obligatory method chosen by the parties to solve the disagreements.

Until this point in time, all documents have been filed under seal and the necessary security measures to ensure the confidentiality requested and agreed upon by all parties have been taken. Confidentiality had been protected a priori, and on April 3, 2012 we ordered Jane Doe to submit justification as to the reasons such process should be followed. The next day, per the Court’s orders, Jane Doe explained that her request for confidentiality at this stage of the litigation was based on a need to protect herself against potential allegations by the Defendant of violations of the confidentiality agreement in the OA and to prevent further retaliation against her. She clarified that her only reason for requesting the confidentiality of the process was the OA’s clause in section 14.05. However, she emphasized her awareness of the prevailing standard, which is that judicial proceedings must be open except in extraordinary cases. Fulana de Tal v. Demandado A, 138 D.P.R. 610, 616 (1995).

On April 3 2012, we issued an order to determine the merits of the extraordinary remedy and a hearing was scheduled to be held on April 11 at 9:30 a.m. Prompt notification was ordered. Plaintiff was summoned with copy of the pleadings and orders on April 4, 2012, through its authorized agent.

The injunctive relief hearing took place on April 11, 2012. Parties appeared through their corresponding attorneys. Parties agreed therein that the injunctive relief plea would be dropped, temporarily. Defendant agreed to request a stay in

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the arbitration proceedings before the American Arbitration Association (AAA), while the Court adjudicated the dispute regarding the arbitrability of Jane Doe’s claims. Also, the parties agreed to maintain the confidentiality that had been in force up until that point in time, while the Court adjudicated the question presented.3 At the hearing, Jane Doe reiterated her declarations asserted in her Motion in Compliance with Order filed on April 4, 2012. Defendant requested that confidentiality be kept.

Defendant stated to the Court during the hearing that they would submit their position in writing. Upon the hearing’s conclusion, Defendants submitted to Jane Doe with a courtesy copy to the Court, their Motion to Dismiss due to Lack of Jurisdiction and to Compel Compulsory Arbitration in View of a Binding Arbitration Agreement, hereinafter “Motion to Dismiss,” filed later that same day, and the filing dates for documents answering the parties’ positions were established. Furthermore a hearing to present evidence, if needed, was scheduled for May 10, 2012.4 The first issue to be resolved by the Court would be the arbitrability of the dispute.. See, Resolution Minute of April 11, 2012.

In its Motion to Dismiss,5 Defendant put forth several arguments for the dismissal of the

3 On April 13, 2012 an Order was issued granting the petition of Confidentiality throughout this stage of the proceedings, based on both parties’ request. 4 Later the hearing was rescheduled for June 5, 2012, upon petition by both parties. 5 Even though in their Motion to Dismiss Defendants argue that they are not submitting to this Court’s jurisdiction, they had

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extraordinary remedy and complaint, to wit: that a dispute resolution program existed that included the arbitration and which Jane Doe had signed as a capital member; that the arbitrator and not the judge was the one called upon to solve whether the disputes were arbitrable; that Jane Doe was not an employee of the LLC but an employer and therefore, “in the absence of an employment relationship,” no labor claims existed to shelter her but contractual claims which were included in the arbitration clause; that the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) required the Court to enforce the arbitration agreement as to favor the established public policy and that the field is preempted, among other allegations.

In its Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss, hereinafter “Opposition,” Jane Doe adduced, among

already done so through their initial appearance and through their active participation without reservation, in the April11, 2012 hearing. The Puerto Rico Supreme Court in several occasions has ruled that a party that appears voluntarily and materially partakes of an action establishing itself as a party in the suit is submitting to the jurisdiction of the court. As an example, in Rodriguez v. Urban Brands, 167 D.P.R. 509 (2006) the Supreme Court stated that: “even though [the party] has indicated that it appears before the Court of First Instance without submitting to its jurisdiction to question the summons and notification of judgment, it is clear that in its written and oral appearances it presented arguments, on the merits, regarding the adequacy of the submitted evidence…, therefore, we believe that the [party] tacitly submitted itself to the court of first instance’s jurisdiction and waived its position about the adequacy of the summons.” Pena v. Warren, 162 D.P.R. 764 (2004); Vázquez v. López, 160 D.P.R. 714 (2003); Qume Caribe Inc. v. Srio. de Hacienda, 153 D.P.R. 700 (2001); quoted in Cruz González v. Carrera, 2009 TA 3249. See also Banco Santander v. Fajardo Faros, 141 D.P.R. 237 (1996); Fernández v. Rodríguez Arroyo, 2009 TA 4677.

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other things, that the arbitration clause in the OA was not applicable to her claims arising from an employment relationship with the LLC, but that it applied to issues related to the operations and administration of the LLC and that the intention of the parties was not to include these type of claims under the OA; that the OA itself in its section 14.03 allowed filing the controversy before the Court as another forum for the resolution of disputes; that she was an employee for purposes of the claims arising from her employment relationship with the defendant, and thus, they were excluded from the OA’s arbitration clause; and that she had not waived the arbitration of her claims over constitutional rights and those arising from her employment relationship and, thus, the invoked arbitration clause was null.6 Jane Doe also contended that the LLC’s Employee Manual (“EM”) was applicable to her and it did not contain any provision related to the arbitration of disputes over claims arising from an employment relationship.

On May 1, 2012 Defendant filed their Reply to Opposition, hereinafter “Reply,” and Plaintiff filed its “Plaintiff’s Sur-Reply” (“Sur-Reply”) on May 7, 2012.7

Defendants reiterated their plea that the claims filed before the Court by Jane Doe emerge from the 6 Jane Doe also asserted that, should the OA’s arbitration clause apply, it would be considered unconscionable and thus it would be null and void, as it would require the arbitrator to adjudicate her constitutional claims in the absence of an express and unequivocal waiver of those rights. 7 We granted Defendants the term requested for their answer to the Sur-Reply. After reviewing the same, Defendants informed that they would not file additional motions and rested their case.

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OA and therefore, she had a prima facie obligation of arbitrating the same. However, in their Reply, Defendants admitted that it is not important to determine the labor or administrative nature of the claim, inasmuch as the claim arises in light of the OA due to disagreements regarding Jane Doe’s compensation.8 Defendants also argued that Jane Doe was required to submit to arbitration her alleged causes of action even if they were of a constitutional nature and that the LLC’s EM did not neutralize Jane Doe’s obligation to follow arbitration, nor did it transform her into an employee.9 Finally, Defendants argued in their Reply that it was unnecessary and inappropriate for the Court to rule if Jane Doe was an employee or an employer.

In Plaintiff’s Sur-Reply, hereinafter “Sur-Reply,” Jane Doe reiterated that per the LLC’s own admission, the compulsory arbitration in the OA did not apply to claims arising from an employment relationship, and her claims did arise from an employment relationship with Defendants. To wit, even validating the existence of said clause in the OA, it could not be used to force Jane Doe to arbitrate claims not considered in the OA’s scope, nor in its

8 Defendant had given importance to the nature of the claim up until that time, as it had already contended that Jane Doe had no claim arising from her employment relationship inasmuch as she was an “employer” and not an “employee.” This arises from their Demand for Arbitration. 9 Please note that Defendants acknowledge the application of the Employee Manual to Jane Doe, which clearly arises from the Manual itself. However, they argue that it applies only in “her capacity as supervisor.” (A careful review of the documentation filed did not show that the provisions of the Employee Manual applied to Jane Doe only in her capacity as supervisor).

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arbitration clause. Jane Doe argued that the arbitration clause of the OA applies to the commercial arbitration of operational, commercial and administrative matters of the LLC.10 Jane Doe also alleged that the disputes arising from her employment relationship are covered under the EM and not under the OA. In fact, she stated that the OA does not provide for any discrimination, retaliation or harassment policies. She argues that the subject of claims over discrimination or retaliation is not addressed anywhere in the OA.

After a serene, objective and careful analysis of both parties’ arguments and the totality of the voluminous file constituting the case record, we arrive to the following:

II. FINDINGS OF FACT

(1) Jane Doe is and has been an attorney licensed by the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico for 38 years.

(2) The LLC was organized on September 13, 2007 to limit its members’ civil liability, thereafter referred to as Capital Members. See, Act No. 487 of September 23, 2004.

(3) Capital Members may have two capacities in the LLC (1) as owners; and (2) as employees. They are not mutually exclusive.

(4) The LLC is a limited liability company created pursuant to the General Law of Corporations of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.

10 Jane Doe emphasized and Defendant did not dispute that the AAA Rules referenced in the OA are those related to commercial arbitration and not those promulgated by the AAA for labor claims.

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(5) Upon changing its status from Partnership to corporate entity, the LLC approved an OA, that governs is operational and administrative aspects.

(6) Jane Doe became a capital member of LLC in 2007, when she signed the OA.

(7) The OA governs internal and administrative affairs of LLC’s operations and provides for the establishment of equity accounts, profit and loss distribution, income tax payments, the LLC’s administration, the establishment of committees, members’ and Managing Director’s election, determination of quorum, members’ termination, compensation method, salaries and bonuses, internal accounting matters, Managing Director’s responsibilities, classification of members and their responsibilities, fiduciary and loyalty duties, retirement, suspension and expulsion of members, mandatory retirement, payments in case of retirement, expulsion or death, resolution of claims and others related to the operations of the LLC.

(8) The OA has no provisions related to any claims arising from an employment relationship such as discrimination, harassment or retaliation.

(9) The EM applies to capital members.

(10) The EM contains the policies, practices, obligations and benefits that are applicable to all employees and capital members, including policies on discrimination, sexual harassment, retaliation, disability, maternity leave, vacations, and illness, dress code, among others.

(11) The EM does not consider arbitration as a method to solve employment relationship disputes.

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(12) The EM was executed after the OA, on October 22, 2007.

(13) The OA has an arbitration clause in its Section 14.04.

(14) The arbitration clause applies to any claim filed by a capital member in regard to operational or administrative affairs of the LLC.

(15) On March 22, 2012, the LLC filed a Demand for Arbitration before the AAA under the rules of commercial arbitration.

(16) In its demand for arbitration, the LLC admitted that Jane Doe’s claims of discrimination, retaliation and damages do not arise from an employment relationship.

(17) Since her January 24, 2012 claim, Jane Doe has challenged the applicability of the OA’s arbitration clause to her employment claims based on discrimination, retaliation and damages.

(18) The arbitration clause of the OA specifically implements the commercial arbitration rules of the AAA.

(19) The AAA has arbitration rules to solve disputes arising from an employment relationship.

(20) Jane Doe’s alleged damages are a consequence of the alleged discrimination and retaliation resulting from defendants’ alleged actions, and must be proven.

(21) Jane Doe did not agree to arbitrate any claims arising from her employment relationship with defendant upon signing the OA.

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(22) On March 30, 2012 the LLC removed Jane Doe from its Policy Committee upon her filing of the discrimination and retaliation claim on January 24, 2012.

(23) Jane Doe filed her original Complaint and Preliminary and Permanent Injunction Claim on April 2, 2012 to, among other things, render ineffective the arbitration demanded by Defendant.

(24) On April 5, 2012, the Policy Committee of the LLC recommended Jane Doe’s expulsion upon her filing the civil action suit.

(25) On April 9, 2012, Jane was dismissed from the LLC because of the Verified Complaint and Request for Declaratory Judgment and Preliminary and Permanent Injunction filed by her.

Based on the aforementioned findings of facts we arrive at the following:

III. FINDINGS OF LAW

To start with, it is important to point out that the interpretation of arbitration clauses will be based on the contractual provisions agreed between the parties. The Federal and State venues have acknowledged that arbitration is a contractual subject matter. AT&T Techs., Inc. v. Communications Workers, 475 U.S. 643, 648 (1986). “Whether given parties have agreed to arbitrate a dispute is a matter of contractual interpretation and, thus, is normally for the Court to decide.” United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nav. Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582-583, 80 S. Ct. 1347, 4 L.Ed.2d 1409 (1960).

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This policy is connected to doctrine about the autonomy of the contracting parties enunciated in Article 1207 of the Civil Code, 31 L.P.R.A. sec. 3372. In Puerto Rico the contractual liberty principle rules. See Unisis v. Ramallo Brothers, 128 D.P.R. 842, 850 (1991). As part of this norm, “the contracting parties may make the agreement and establish the clauses and conditions which they deem advisable, provided they are not in contravention of law, morals, or public order.” Art.1207 Civil Code, 31 L.P.R.A. Sec. 3372.

If the contract between the parties establishes certain types of specific disputes that will be heard through arbitration, or if the contract excludes certain particular controversies, the courts must act in accordance with what is stipulated in the contract. Medina Betancourt v. La Cruz Azul de Puerto Rico, 155 D.P.R. 735 (2001).

Once the clauses and conditions of the agreement have been established, the Contract is perfected by mere consent between the parties, and from that time they are bound, not only with regard to the fulfillment of what has been expressly stipulated, but also with regard to all the consequences which, according to their character, are in accordance with good faith, use, and law. Article 1210 of the Civil Code, 31 L.P.R.A. Sec. 3375.

This obligation of fulfilling what has been stipulated is based on the principle of good faith, which requires not defrauding the trust that other has placed in a promise or conduct. Unisys v. Ramalo, supra, and page 852, quoting L. Díez-Picazo, Fundamentos de Derecho Civil Patrimonial,

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2nd Ed., Madrid. Ed. Tecnos, 1983, Vol. 1, Ch. IV, page 99.

Case law has established that generally, when the courts must determine if the parties agreed to arbitrate an issue, they must use as guidelines the common principles of state law that govern contracts. Combined Energies v. CCI, Inc. 514 F. 3rd 168 (1st. Cir. 2008), quoting First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 943-944 (1995). A party may not be required to submit to arbitration any dispute which he has not agreed so to submit. AT&T Techs., Inc., 475 U.S., page 648; Combined Energies, supra; Municipality of San Juan v. Corporación para el Fomento Económico de la Ciudad Capital, 415 F 3rd 145, 149 (1st Cir. 2005); InterGen N.V. v. Grina, 344 F 3rd. 134, 142 (1st Cir. 2003).

On the other hand, the Federal Arbitration Act’s (“FAA”) main purpose is for the Courts to enforce all valid arbitration contracts. FAA 9 U.S.C. sec. 1. The public policy in favor of arbitration as an alternate method of dispute resolution is not absolute and has its exceptions.

The general rule under the federal statute is that the question of arbitrability is undeniably an issue for judicial determination. AT&T Techs., Inc., 475 U.S., page 649; Apollo Computer, Inc. v. Berg, 886 F 2nd 469, 472 (1st Cir. 1989). The parties may agree to have the arbitrator decide if a grievance is arbitrable or not, as well as the merits of the claim. Id., page 473. But only when the parties have clearly and unequivocally determined that the arbitrator must decide if a claim is arbitrable, does it turn into an issue that must be heard by the arbitrator. Awah

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v. Coverall N. Am., Inc., 554 F. 3rd 7, 10 (1st. Cir 2009).11 Arbitrators derive their authority to resolve disputes only because the parties have agreed in advance to submit such grievances to arbitration. AT&T Techs., Inc. supra, page 648. Notwithstanding the public policy favoring arbitration and its accompanying presumption of arbitrability, the courts may not override the will of the parties by giving the arbitration clause greater coverage than the parties intended, inasmuch as [we] run the risk of undermining rather than serving that policy. National Railroad Passenger Corporation v. Boston and Maine Corporation, 850 F. 2nd 756 (D.C. Columbia, 1988); see also, Litton Financial Printing Div. v. N.L.R.B., 501 U.S. 190, 200 (1991) where the Court resolved that: “[N]o obligation to arbitrate a labor dispute arises solely by operation of law. The law compels a party to submit his [sic] grievance to arbitration only if he has contracted to do so.”

It has been legally reiterated and established that whether an arbitration clause applies to a particular dispute is an issue for judicial determination. Kristian v. Comcast Corp. 446 F 3rd. 25, 39 (1st. Cir. 2006), quoting Howsam v. Dean Witter 11 In this particular case, we do not need to determine if the delegation of jurisdiction to the arbitrator was clear and unequivocal, inasmuch as the arbitration clause is not applicable to the disputes at issue. Even when the parties delegate to the arbitrator the authority to determine which grievances are arbitrable, the court must determine at once if the claims under dispute fall within the scope contemplated under the agreement between the parties. After all, arbitration is strictly a matter of consent; it is a way of solving disputes that parties have agreed to submit to arbitration. Granite Rock Co. v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 30 S. Ct. 2847 (2010).

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Reynolds, 537 U.S. 79, 83 (2002); Rent- A- Center v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772.

After a review of the law and analysis of the facts on which the parties have based their claims, we have concluded that Jane Doe’s discrimination, retaliation and damages claims are not included in the OA and therefore, must be resolved in the judicial forum and not through arbitration. This conclusion is broadly supported by the facts submitted by the defendants themselves. We observed that defendant’s main emphasis arises from their general interpretation that the arbitration [clause] of the OA applies to all claims (“any claim”), independent of their nature (“of any nature”). We cannot endorse such stance in light of the OA and the existence of the EM in its application to capital members. We determine that the delegation to the arbitrator is not unlimited and one of the limitations is that the dispute needs to have something to do with the subject matter covered by the arbitration agreement. Visibility Corporation v. Schilling Robotics, LLC, 2011 WL 5075816 (D. Mass Op. of October 25, 2011) citing Turi v. Main Street Adoption Services, LLP, 633 F 3rd 496, 507 (6th Cir. 2011).

It must be noted that since its beginnings the LLC adopted an OA (September 13, 2007) and an EM (October 22, 2007). Both apply to Capital Members. It is well known that the Employee Manual is part of the employment contract. Santiago v. Kodak Caribbean, Ltd., 129 D.P.R. 763 (1992).

The OA covers capital members’ roles as owners and the EM those as employees. Even though capital members of LLC’s have received a different treatment by U.S. courts at the time of determining if

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they are employees, owners or both for purposes of a protection against discrimination and retaliation, we believe that Puerto Rico’s laws and their judicial interpretation together with the facts before us, require that we determine that they enjoy said protections. See, Constitution of Puerto Rico, Art. 2, Sections 1, 16, 17 and 18.

We find a conflicting position when the LLC on the one hand argues that the OA governs all of Jane Doe’s disputes against the LLC and any capital member, including those asserting discrimination, retaliation and damages, as claimed by Jane Doe, and on the other hand admits in its arbitration demand that said claims do not arise from an employment relationship. We also highlight defendants’ stance in their Motion to Dismiss when they state that Jane Doe is not an employee and because of this, does not posses the statutory and constitutional protections.12

The above-described conflicting stance by defendants in both forums lends weight to our conviction that the discrimination, retaliation and damages claims by Jane Doe, with their corresponding remedies, are outside the scope (“subject matter”) of the OA and its arbitration clause. Because these claims arise from the employment relationship between Jane Doe and LLC they are excluded from the arbitration demand filed 12 To endorse said argument would be to authorize capital members in other instances the use of other protected criteria, such as race or religion, as basis to deprive other capital members of their constitutional protection. Per LLC’s interpretation and stance, through the OA, the arbitrator is delegated to resolve the disagreement in a completely confidential forum with no right of appeal for the affected parties.

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under the OA. This is because it [the OA] governs the operational and administrative aspects of the LLC and not the existing employment relationship between the capital members and the LLC that is regulated by the EM. To conclude that Jane Doe has the obligation to submit to arbitration, in our opinion, would be granting a judicial imprimatur to hear claims arising from an employment relationship at a proceeding which the defendant itself has determined is intended to solve grievances that have nothing to do with an employment relationship. Furthermore, the scope of the legislation that protects employees in Puerto Rico is broad and non-restrictive and the exclusion of an employee from the benefits of the labor law must be clear, since the courts have the obligation to interpret said exclusions restrictively. Malavé Serrano v. Oriental Bank, 2006 TSPR 63.

Upon analyzing Jane Doe’s duties at the LLC, per the documents in the file, it seems necessary to conclude that she lacked the control typical of owners and employers. See, Acevedo Colom, Legislación Laboral del Trabajo Comentada, 8th. Ed. (2005).

However the parties must present evidence regarding whether, in regards to the matters at issue herein, she was an employee, owner or both. We are aware of the fact that Jane Doe does not deny that, as a capital member, she had ownership rights within the LLC. What we must not lose sight of is that both roles, employee and owner, if confirmed, are not mutually exclusive. See, Goldberg v. Whitaker House Coop., Inc., 366 U.S. 28, 32 (1961). Evidence to this effect must be submitted.

In the same way, nothing hinders the LLC from, in due course, ascertaining their right to a defense

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against the remaining claims in the Complaint or that Jane Doe does not have enough evidence to prove them. Therefore, in compliance with the adjudicative process we issue the following:

IV. RESOLUTION

Based on the aforesaid grounds, we find that the OA’s Arbitration Clause does not cover the claims submitted by Jane Doe because they arise from her employment relationship with defendants. Therefore, we find that the Court and not an arbitrator from the AAA will adjudicate in its merits the discrimination, retaliation and damages claim filed by Jane Doe, as well as the requested injunction.

The injunction hearing scheduled for June 5 at 9:00 a.m. will still take place, wherein the parties will have the opportunity to submit evidence related to the requested injunction, inasmuch as the agreement between the parties regarding the arbitration stay would be effective until the arbitrability issue were solved. Consequently, the second amended complaint updating and including all prior allegations from the first amended complaint is admitted.

NOTIFY. Forward in advance by electronic mail.

In San Juan, Puerto Rico, June 4, 2012.

/s/ [signature]

ÁNGEL R. PÁGAN OCASIO

SUPERIOR JUDGE

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The LanguageWorks, Inc. 1123 Broadway New York, NY 10010 Tel. 212 447 6060 Fax 212 447 6257

LanguageWorks

STATE OF NEW YORK ) ) ss: COUNTY OF NEW YORK )

CERTIFICATION

This is to certify that the accompanying, to the best of my knowledge and belief, is a true and accurate translation from Spanish into English of a Resolution issued by Court of First Instance of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico on June 4, 2012, completed on October 29, 2012.

/s/ Kevin Rees President The LanguageWorks, Inc.

Sworn to and subscribed before me this 29th day of October, 2012

/s/ Notary Public

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APPENDIX C

EN EL TRIBUNAL SUPREMO DE PUERTO RICO

JANE DOE,

Recurrida,

v.

COMPAÑÍA DE RESPONSABILIDAD LIMITADA (“CRL”); FULANO DE TAL, PERSONALMENTE, EN SU CARÁCTER DE

PATRONO DE JANE DOE Y COMO CO-ADMINISTRADOR DE

LA SOCIEDAD LEGAL DE BIENES GANANCIALES (“SLG”) CONSTITUIDA CON FULANA DE TAL, ET AL.,

Peticionarios.

___________

CC-2012-0532

___________

Certiorari

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Sala de Verano integrada por el Juez Presidente señor Hernández Denton y los Jueces Asociados señor Martínez Torres y señor Estrella Martínez,

RESOLUCIÓN

SAN JUAN, Puerto Rico, a 7 de septiembre de 2012.

A la petición de certiorari, no ha lugar.

Lo acordó el Tribunal y certifica la Secretaria del Tribunal Supremo. El Juez Asociado señor Martínez Torres expediría.

/s/ [signature]

Ana Oquendo Graulau Secretaria del Tribunal Supremo

[seal]

COMMONWEALTH OF PUERTO RICO SUPREME COURT SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE

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APPENDIX C

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PUERTO RICO

JANE DOE,

Respondent

v.

Limited Liability Company (“LLC”); JOHN DOE, in his personal capacity and as employer of JANE DOE and as co-administrator of the Conjugal Partnership

(“CP”) constituted with JEAN DOE, et al.

Petitioners

___________

CC-2012-0532

___________

Certiorari

Summer Session Panel formed by Chief Judge Hernandez Denton, and Associate Judges Martínez

Torres and Estrella Martínez.

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RESOLUTION

In San Juan, Puerto Rico, September 7, 2012.

The petition for certiorari is denied.

Agreed by the Court and certified by the Clerk of the Supreme Court. The Associate Judge Martínez Torres would have issued the petition for certiorari.

/s/ [signature]

Aida Ileana Oquendo Graulau Clerk of the Supreme Court

[seal]

COMMONWEALTH OF PUERTO RICO SUPREME COURT SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE

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The LanguageWorks, Inc. 1123 Broadway New York, NY 10010 Tel. 212 447 6060 Fax 212 447 6257

LanguageWorks

STATE OF NEW YORK ) ) ss: COUNTY OF NEW YORK )

CERTIFICATION

This is to certify that the accompanying, to the best of my knowledge and belief, is a true and accurate translation from Spanish into English of a Resolution issued by the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico dated September 7, 2012, completed on November 5, 2012.

/s/ Brett Gianna Hyatt Senior Account Executive The LanguageWorks, Inc.

Sworn to and subscribed before me this 5th day of November, 2012

/s/ Notary Public

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APPENDIX D

EN EL TRIBUNAL SUPREMO DE PUERTO RICO SALA III

JANE DOE,

Recurrida,

v.

COMPAÑÍA DE RESPONSABILIDAD LIMITADA (“CRL”), ET

AL.,

Peticionarios.

____________

Núm. CC-2012-0532

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Sala de Despacho integrada por la Juez Asociada señora Rodríguez Rodríguez como Presidenta, el Juez Asociado señor Kolthoff Caraballo y el Juez Asociado señor Estrella Martínez

RESOLUCIÓN

San Juan, Puerto Rico, a 5 de octubre de 2012.

Atendida la primera moción de reconsideración presentada por la parte peticionaria Compañía de Responsabilidad Limitada, se provee no ha lugar.

Lo acordó el Tribunal y certifica la Secretaria del Tribunal Supremo.

/s/ [signature] Aida Ileana Oquendo Graulau Secretaria del Tribunal Supremo

[seal] COMMONWEALTH OF PUERTO RICO SUPREME COURT SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE

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APPENDIX D

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PUERTO RICO PANEL III

JANE DOE

Respondent

v.

LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY (“LLC”), et al.

Petitioners

__________

CC-2012-0532

_________

Issuance Panel formed by Associate Judge Rodríguez Rodriguez as President, Associate Judge Kolthoff Caraballo and Associate Judge Estrella Martínez.

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RESOLUTION

In San Juan, Puerto Rico, on October 5, 2012.

The first motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner LLC is denied.

Agreed by the Court and certified by the Clerk of the Supreme Court.

/s/ [signature]

Aida Ileana Oquendo Graulau Clerk of the Supreme Court

[seal] COMMONWEALTH OF PUERTO RICO SUPREME COURT SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE

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The LanguageWorks, Inc. 1123 Broadway New York, NY 10010 Tel. 212 447 6060 Fax 212 447 6257

LanguageWorks

STATE OF NEW YORK ) ) ss: COUNTY OF NEW YORK )

CERTIFICATION

This is to certify that the accompanying, to the best of my knowledge and belief, is a true and accurate translation from Spanish into English of a Resolution issued by the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico dated October 5, 2012, completed on November 5, 2012.

/s/ Brett Gianna Hyatt Senior Account Executive The LanguageWorks, Inc.

Sworn to and subscribed before me this 5th day of November, 2012

/s/ Notary Public

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APPENDIX E

01DE 01

ESTADO LIBRE ASOCIADO DE PUERTO RICO TRIBUNAL GENERAL DE JUSTICIA

TRIBUNAL SUPREMO

JANE DOE

Recurrido

vs

COMPAÑIA DE RESPONSABILIDAD LIMITADA

Peticionario

______________________

CASO.: CC-2012-0532 CASO ORI.: K PE201201204

CASO CIR.: KLCE2012 0 0 821 ______________________

PROCEDIMIENTOS ESPECIALES

GONZALEZ ACEVEDO, FRANK M.

ACCION CIVIL O DELITO

PO BOX 9282

SAN JUAN, PR 00908-0282

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NOTIFICACION

CERTIFICO QUE EN RELACION CON EL/LA SEGUNDA MOCION DE RECONSIDERACION EL TRIBUNAL DICTO EL/LA RESOLUCION QUE SE ACOMPAÑA :

PORRO VIZCARRA MANUEL [LIC.] CAPARRA HEIGHTS 382 AVE ESCORIAL SAN JUAN, PR 00920

GONZALEZ MUNOZ JUAN R [LIC.] PO BOX 9024055 SAN JUAN, PR 00902-4055

MENDOZA MENDEZ ENRIQUE J [LIC.] P O BOX 9282 SAN JUAN, PR 00908-0282

SAN JUAN , PUERTO RICO A 03 DE DICIEMBRE DE 2012

LCDA. AIDA ILEANA OQUENDO GRAULAU

/s/ SECRETARIA DEL TRIBUNAL SUPREMO

ROSALIA PABON RIVERA

/s/ SECRETARIO AUXILIAR

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EN EL TRIBUNAL SUPREMO DE PUERTO RICO

JANE DOE

Recurrida

v.

COMPAÑÍA DE RESPONSABILIDAD LIMITADA (“CRL”); FULANO DE TAL, PERSONALMENTE EN SU CARÁCTER DE

PATRONO DE JANE DOE Y COMO CO-ADMINISTRADOR DE

LA SOCIEDAD LEGAL DE BIENES GANANCIALES (“SLG”) CONSTITUIDA CON FULANA DE TAL, ET AL

Peticionarios

_______________

CC- 2 012-0532

_______________

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RESOLUCIÓN

En San Juan, Puerto Rico, a 30 de noviembre de 2012.

A la segunda moción de reconsideración presentada por la parte peticionaria, no ha lugar. Aténgase a lo resuelto.

Lo acordó el Tribunal y lo certifica la Secretaria del Tribunal Supremo. El Juez Asociado señor Martínez Torres, la Jueza Asociada señora Pabón Charneco y los Jueces Asociados señor Rivera García y señor Feliberti Cintrón reconsiderarían.

/s/ Aida I. Oquendo Graulau Secretaria del Tribunal Supremo

[seal] COMMONWEALTH OF PUERTO RICO GENERAL COURT OF JUSTICE SUPREME COURT

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APPENDIX E

01DE 01

COMMONWEALTH OF PUERTO RICO GENERAL COURT OF JUSTICE

SUPREME COURT

JANE DOE

RESPONDENT

V.

COMPAÑIA DE RESPONSABILIDAD LIMITADA [Limited liability company]

PETITIONER

CASE: CC-2012-0532

CASE ORI.: K PE201201204 SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS

CASE CIR.: KLCE201200821

CIVIL ACTION OR CRIME

GONZALEZ ACEVEDO, FRANK M.

PO BOX 9282

SAN JUAN, PR 00908-0282

NOTIFICATION

I CERTIFY THAT IN RELATION TO THE SECOND MOTION FOR CONSIDERATION THE COURT

HAS ENTERED THE ATTACHED RESOLUTION:

PORRO VIZCARRA MANUEL (LIC.) CAPARRA HEIGHTS 382 AVE ESCORIAL

SAN JUAN, PR 00920

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GONZALEZ MUNOZ JUAN R (LIC.) PO BOX 9024055

SAN JUAN, PR 00902-4055 MENDOZA MENDEZ, ENRIQUE J. (LIC.)

PO BOX 9282 SAN JUAN, PR 00908-0282

SAN JUAN, PUERTO RICO, ON DECEMBER 3, 2012

AIDA ILEANA OQUENDO GRAULAU, ESQ.

/s/ CLERK OF THE SUPREME COURT

ROSALIA PABON RIVERA [initials]

/s/ ASSISTANT CLERK

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PUERTO RICO

Jane Doe

Respondent

v.

Compania de Responsabilidad Limitada (“CRL” [Limited liability company]); John Doe, personally, in

his capacity as employer of Jane Doe and as co-member of the Sociedad Legal de Bienes Gananciales

(“SLG” [statutory community of marital property]) formed with Jane Doe, et al.

Petitioners

______________

No. CC-2012-0532

______________

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RESOLUTION

In San Juan, Puerto Rico, on November 30, 2012.

The second motion for reconsideration submitted by Petitioners is hereby denied. Peitioners must abide by this ruling.

So decided by the Court and certified by the Clerk of the Supreme Court. Associate Judge Mr. Martínez Torres, Associate Judge Mrs. Pabón Charneco, and Associate Judges Mr. Rivera García and Mr. Feliberti Cintrón would have reconsidered.

/s/ [signature] Aida I. Oquendo Graulau Office of the Clerk of the Supreme Court

[seal] COMMONWEALTH OF PUERTO RICO GENERAL COURT OF JUSTICE SUPREME COURT

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The LanguageWorks,Inc. 1123 Broadway New York, NY 10010 Tel. 212 447 6060 Fax 212 447 6257

LanguageWorks

STATE OF NEW YORK ) ) ss: COUNTY OF NEW YORK )

CERTIFICATION

This is to certify that the accompanying, to the best of my knowledge and belief, is a true and accurate translation from Spanish into English of two Resolutions issued by the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico on November 30, 2012, completed on December 5, 2012.

/s/ Amy Stoyko Senior Account Executive The LanguageWorks, Inc.

Sworn to and subscribed before me this 5th day of December, 2012

/s/ Notary Public

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APPENDIX F

ESTADO LIBRE ASOCIADO DE PUERTO RICO TRIBUNAL DE PRIMERA INSTANCIA

CENTRO JUDICIAL DE SAN JUAN SALA SUPERIOR

JANE DOE,

Demandante,

v.

COMPAÑÍA DE RESPONSABILIDAD LIMITADA; FULANO

DE TAL, en su carácter personal y como patrono de JANE DOE; SUTANO DE CUAL, en su carácter personal

y como patrono de JANE DOE; ESPERENCEJO MÁS

CUAL, en su carácter personal y como patrono de JANE

DOE,

Demandados.1

___________

CIVIL NÚM. KPE 2012-1204 (904)

___________

Sobre: Sentencia Declaratoria e Injunction

___________

1 Por razones de estricta confidencialidad las partes de este pleito no están identificadas con sus respectivos nombres. En la Declaración Jurada Bajo Sello de la Demandante sometida junto con la Demanda que da lugar a este pleito, ésta identificó a cada una de las partes con sus respectivos nombres, direcciones y teléfonos.

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SOLICITUD DE DESESTIMACIÓN POR FALTA DE JURISDICCIÓN Y PARA COMPELER

ARBITRAJE COMPULSORIO EN VISTA DE ACUERDO VINCULANTE DE ARBITRAJE

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AL HONORABLE TRIBUNAL:

Comparecen los demandados de epígrafe, Compañía de Responsabilidad Limitada (“CRL”), Fulano de Tal, Sutano de Cual y Esperencejo Más Cual, sin someterse a la jurisdicción de este Honorable Tribunal, por conducto de la representación legal que suscribe, y muy respetuosamente exponen que la Demanda Jurada y Solicitud de Sentencia Declaratoria e Injunction Preliminar y Permanente de epígrafe (“Demanda") debe ser desestimada en su totalidad bajo la Regla 10.2 de Procedimiento Civil, 32 L.P.R.A. Ap. V y el Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1 et seq. (“FAA”), debido a la existencia de un acuerdo de arbitraje válido, otorgado voluntariamente v el cual constituye la ley entre las partes. Veamos.

I. INTRODUCCIÓN

El 2 de abril de 2012, Jane Doe presentó ante este Tribunal una Demanda y una Moción Solicitando Injunction Preliminar y Permanente solicitando que este Tribunal emita una Sentencia Declaratoria en la que se declare la inaplicabilidad de la cláusula de arbitraje contenida en el Operating Agreement (“Acuerdo”) suscrito entre ésta, los demás Miembros Capitales de CRL y CRL.2 Jane Doe predica su

2 Además, Jane Doe solicita que este Tribunal ordene la paralización del caso de arbitraje presentado por CRL a la American Arbitration Association el 22 de marzo de 2012. Dicho proceso de arbitraje pretende que se diluciden y resuelvan las mismas alegadas controversias que Jane Doe ha traído a la atención de este Tribunal mediante la presente acción judicial.

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solicitud en la proposición de que sus alegados reclamos no están cubiertos por dicha cláusula de arbitraje por tratarse de reclamos laborales que surgen de una relación patrono-empleado. Es decir, Jane Doe sostiene que el convenio de arbitraje suscrito por ella no alcanza las controversias del caso de epígrafe. Como veremos más adelante, no le asiste la razón a Jane Doe. La cláusula de resolución de reclamaciones (Sección 14, “Resolution of Claim”) del Acuerdo es extremadamente amplia y deja claro que la intención de todas las partes era que cualquier reclamación ("claim”) fuera resuelta mediante los procedimientos provistos en dicha cláusula:

Intent and Purpose - It is the intent and purpose of the Firm and any Claimant to resolve any Claim by mediation or arbitration. The Claimant expressly agrees that the Claim shall be settled or resolved through the procedures set forth herein, and shall not in any way circumvent or otherwise challenge in any way these proceedings relative to mediation and arbitration.

(Sección 14.01 del Acuerdo.)

Por otro lado, el Acuerdo define reclamación ("claim") como “any action, suit, complaint or demand of whatever nature and for whatever relief or remedy against the Firm or any of its Members or employees.” (Sección 1.06 del Acuerdo.) De manera que bajo el Acuerdo suscrito por Jane Doe, sus socios y CRL, una “reclamación” es cualquier tipo de acción, caso, demanda o reclamación de cualquier naturaleza y sobre cualquier tipo de remedio o auxilio en contra de

Jane Doe tiene que contestar dicha solicitud de arbitraje en o antes del 23 de abril de 2012.

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la Firma (CRL) o cualquiera de sus Miembros o empleados. No cabe duda que Jane Doe se obligó con sus socios a someter al procedimiento descrito en la Sección 14 del Acuerdo (incluyendo arbitraje) cualquier tipo de reclamación, no importa la naturaleza de la misma. Por ende, procede la desestimación de la Demanda en el caso de epígrafe, como muy respetuosamente se solicita.

Como veremos, estamos ante una controversia sobre arbitrabilidad sustantiva. Específicamente, la obligación que tienen las partes de arbitrar todo tipo de controversia entre sí. La pregunta de umbral es qué Foro tiene jurisdicción para determinar el alcance de la cláusula de arbitraje contenida en el Acuerdo suscrito por Jane Doe, el cual rige la relación entre los Miembros Capitales de CRL y entre los Miembros Capitales y CRL. E Como tal, el hecho operativo que da base a la reclamación de epígrafe es precisamente una decisión tomada con respecto a la compensación de Jane Doe como Miembro Capital. Un asunto, que como veremos, se rige por el Acuerdo que ésta suscribió y que suscribieron todos los Miembros Capitales de CRL, y que bajo el Acuerdo se tiene que someter a arbitraje.

Por las razones que consignamos a continuación, los comparecientes muy respetuosamente sostienen que la controversia sobre arbitrabilidad sustantiva tal y como se presenta en las circunstancias específicas de este caso es materia que le corresponde dirimir al árbitro y no a este Honorable Tribunal. Asimismo, los comparecientes sostienen que procede compeler a las partes a resolver todo reclamo entre ellos mediante el procedimiento de arbitraje pactado

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que ya fue iniciado ante el American Arbitration Association (“AAA"). Veamos.

II. ARGUMENTACIÓN

A. El Acuerdo entre Jane Doe v CRL Establece un Programa de Resolución de Disputas gue Incluye el Arbitraje

En todo momento pertinente a esta moción, Jane Doe fue Miembro Capital de CRL. (Véase Demanda, ¶ 2.) El Acuerdo firmado por Jane Doe y por todos los Miembros Capitales de CRL establece, en su parte relevante, que sus signatarios constituyen todos los Miembros Capitales a esa fecha de la sociedad civil [...] dedicada a la práctica del derecho. (Véase pág. 1 del Acuerdo, Anejo 1.)3 Dicho Acuerdo fue otorgado por los Miembros Capitales de CRL, incluyendo a Jane Doe, el 13 de septiembre de 2007. (Id., en la pág. 38-39.)

En lo que nos es pertinente, el Acuerdo provee un mecanismo de resolución de disputas para qué cualquiera de sus signatarios, incluyendo Jane Doe, pueda encauzar cualquier reclamación o controversia contra CRL y/o contra cualquier otro Miembro Capital de CRL. (Id., págs. 33-34.) A tales efectos, la Sección 14.01 del Acuerdo establece que “es la intención y el propósito de [CRL] y cualquier reclamante resolver cualquier reclamación mediante mediación y arbitraje.” (Id., pág. 33) (énfasis y traducción nuestra). Dicha Sección añade que “el reclamante acuerda expresamente que su reclamación será transigida o resuelta a través del

3 Con el propósito de mantener estricta confidencialidad, se someten las copias citadas del Acuerdo como Anejo 1 en un sobre sellado.

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procedimiento [allí] establecido, y que en ninguna manera soslayará o retará estos procedimientos relacionados a mediación y arbitraje.” (Id.)

Cónsono con lo anterior, el Acuerdo establece un esquema de tres pasos para resolver disputas entre un Miembro Capital de CRL y CRL, y entre Miembros Capitales de CRL. El primer paso consiste en presentar una reclamación por escrito al ente directivo de CRL, indicando en ella la naturaleza del reclamo y el remedio solicitado. Dicho paso se establece en la Sección 14.02 del Acuerdo. (Id., págs. 33-34.) Jane Doe se sometió voluntariamente a este primer paso. (Demanda, ¶14.) El segundo paso consiste en intentar resolver la reclamación de forma amigable y de buena fe a través de un procedimiento de mediación administrado por la AAA. Véase Sección 14.03 del Acuerdo. (Id., pág. 34.) Jane Doe se sometió voluntariamente a este segundo paso. (Demanda,¶¶ 15-19.) De no poderse resolver la reclamación durante el segundo paso, el Acuerdo establece inequívocamente la obligación de las partes de someter la controversia a arbitraje compulsorio. A esos efectos, la Sección 14.04 del Acuerdo al cristalizar el tercer paso, dispone:

If mediation fails, the Claim shall be settled by arbitration administered by the American Arbitration Association under its Commercial Arbitration Rules, and judgment on the award rendered by the arbitrator(s) may be entered in any court having jurisdiction thereof. [...]

(Id.)

De lo anterior se colige que al firmar el Acuerdo, las partes -incluyendo Jane Doe y los comparecientes- acordaron contractualmente resolver todas sus

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desavenencias a través del antedicho proceso interno de resolución de disputas, el cual culmina con el arbitraje.

Como cuestión de realidad, Jane Doe participó de los primeros dos (2) pasos del esquema contractual de resolución de disputas. En primer término, el 24 de enero de 2012, presentó una reclamación interna ante el ente directivo de CRL alegando que, inter alia, se violó el Acuerdo y se discriminó contra ella a base de sexo y edad al reducir su compensación. (Demanda, ¶ 14; Reclamación Extrajudicial del 24 de enero de 2012, sometida bajo sello como Anejo 3.) En segundo término, las partes se sometieron al proceso de mediación, aceptando CRL al mediador sugerido por Jane Doe. Dicho proceso de mediación culminó sin éxito el 20 de marzo de 2012. (Demanda, ¶¶ 15-23.)

Así las cosas, y con el propósito de cumplir con la Sección 14.04 del Acuerdo, CRL presentó una solicitud de arbitraje, Demand for Arbitration, ante la AAA, el 22 de marzo de 2012. (Demanda, ¶ 24.) Es este proceso de arbitraje el que Jane Doe pretende soslayar bajo el pretexto de que sus reclamos no son arbitrables bajo el Acuerdo por tratarse de reclamaciones constitucionales, discrimen en el empleo, represalias, interdicto, y daños y perjuicios. (Demanda ¶25.)

Jane Doe no tiene razón. Como cuestión de umbral hay que puntualizar que entre Jane Doe y los comparecientes no existe una relación de patrono-empleado.4 Sin embargo, si asumimos para fines de 4 Según elaboraremos más adelante, durante el término relevante a la controversia de autos, Jane Doe fue Miembro Capital de CRL, y tuvo un interés propietario en CRL, así como lo tiene Fulano de Tal y Esperencejo Más Cual, y como lo tuvo

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argumentación que exista tal relación (cosa que no aceptamos), ello no exime a las partes de someter sus reclamos al foro arbitral. Ello es así, pues la cláusula de arbitraje es amplia, clara y libre de toda ambigüedad y exige que se someta a arbitraje (Sección 14.01 del Acuerdo), significando “claim” "... any action, suit, complaint or demand of whatever nature and for whatever relief or remedy against the Firm or any of its Members or employees.” (Sección 1.06 del Acuerdo.)

Hay que reiterar, no obstante, que independientemente del matiz que Jane Doe pretende darle ahora a su relación con los comparecientes, lo cierto es que por virtud del Acuerdo, ésta aceptó que cualquier reclamación (“any claim’) sea resuelta a través del proceso de resolución de disputas, el cual incluye el arbitraje compulsorio.

Según adelantamos, el Acuerdo define el concepto de “reclamación” (“claim”) de forma abarcadora, de suerte que cubre reclamaciones de cualquier naturaleza. A tales efectos, la Sección 1.06 del Acuerdo establece que una “reclamación” significa "... any action, suit, complaint or demand of whatever nature and for whatever relief or remedy against

Sutano de Cual, quien es un Miembro Capital de CRL retirado. Más aún, por los pasados casi tres años, Jane Doe fue miembro del ente directivo de CRL siendo éste el organismo rector de la firma, que aprueba asuntos neurálgicos tales como la compensación de los miembros y el presupuesto operacional de CRL, entre otros. Es decir, la relación que existe entre Jane Doe y los comparecientes no surge de un contrato de empleo sino del Acuerdo. Como tal, Jane Doe no puede ahora obviar acomodaticiamente su condición de co-propietaria de CRL con el fin de no cumplir con el Acuerdo y caracterizar sus reclamos como obrero-patronales para no arbitrarlos.

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the Firm or any of its Members or employees.” (Véase pág. 2 del Acuerdo, Anejo 1) (énfasis nuestro).

Del anterior texto, surge con meridiana claridad que toda reclamación, con independencia de su naturaleza o el remedio solicitado, queda cubierta por la cláusula de arbitraje contenida en el Acuerdo. Jane Doe no puede escapar esta realidad con subterfugios y entuertos. El Acuerdo constituye la ley entre las partes y éstas vienen obligadas a ceñirse por el mismo. Véase Art. Art. 1044 del Código Civil, 31 L.P.R.A. § 2994.

Contrario a lo que argumenta Jane Doe en su Demanda, los comparecientes no pretenden interferir con el ejercicio de los alegados derechos de ésta y la vindicación de sus reclamos. Lo que sí sostienen los comparecientes es que los reclamos de Jane Doe, aunque patentemente frívolos e inmeritorios, deben ventilarse a través del arbitraje -el método acordado entre las partes, y de manera confidencial según también pactado.

En nuestra jurisdicción rige el principio de libertad de contratación. Véase Art. 1207 del Código Civil, 31 L.P.R.A. § 3372. Así, los contratantes pueden establecer los pactos, cláusulas y condiciones que tengan por convenientes, siempre que no sean contrarios a las leyes, a la moral y al orden público. Id. Como corolario del principio de autonomía contractual, las obligaciones que nacen de los contratos tienen fuerza de ley entre las partes y deben cumplirse. Art. 1044 del Código Civil, 31 L.P.R.A. § 2994.

Como resultado del axioma jurídico citado, las partes acordaron, además, que es el árbitro quien decidirá sobre su propia jurisdicción,

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incluyendo cualesquiera objeciones con respecto a la existencia, alcance o validez del acuerdo de arbitraje. Ello es así, toda vez que las partes incorporaron por referencia a la cláusula de arbitraje contenida en el Acuerdo, las Reglas de Arbitraje Comercial de la AAA, las cuales proveen para que sea el árbitro quien determine arbitrabilidad, o sea, su propia jurisdicción. (Véase Sección 14.04 del Acuerdo, pág. 34, Anejo 1.)

Así pues, en todo caso, la frívola y temeraria controversia sobre arbitrabilidad que Jane Doe ha creado mediante la presentación de la Demanda de epígrafe, es materia que le corresponde al árbitro resolver.

B. Le Corresponde al Árbitro Determinar si las Controversias del Caso de Autos son Arbitrables

Según ha reconocido el Tribunal Supremo de Puerto Rico, citando a National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Boston S. Maine Corp., 850 F.2d 756 (D.C. Cir. 1988), la controversia sobre arbitrabilidad comporta tres (3) modalidades. Véase Méndez Acevedo v. Nieves Rivera, 179 D.P.R. 359, 367-68 (2010); Municipio Mayagüez v. Lebrón, 167 D.P.R. 713, 720-21 (2006). Puede referirse a (i) si existe un convenio de arbitraje; (ii) el alcance de un convenio de arbitraje (“si tal convenio alcanza determinada controversia”); (iii) y si tal convenio alcanza una disputa sobre la duración o expiración del contrato. Méndez Acevedo, supra; Municipio de Mayagüez, supra; World Films, Inc. v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 125 D.P.R. 352 (1990). Es sobre la modalidad número dos (2) que trata la controversia de autos.

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Sobre el particular, nuestro más Alto Foro Judicial ha precisado, como regla general que admite excepciones, que la determinación de si un acuerdo crea el deber de las partes de arbitrar determinada controversia es tarea judicial. Méndez Acevedo, supra; World Films, Inc., supra, en la pág. 361. No obstante lo anterior, el asunto de la arbitrabilidad no será de competencia judicial si las partes pactaron en el convenio de arbitraje que tal facultad se delega al árbitro. Es decir, convenido en un acuerdo de arbitraje que es el árbitro quien resolverá las cuestiones de arbitrabilidad, procede que sea éste y no el tribunal el que determine si existe la obligación de arbitrar determinada controversia. U.G.T. v. Corp. Difusión Pub., 168 D.P.R. 674. 684 (2006) (“De ordinario y salvo que el convenio colectivo disponga otra cosa, los asuntos de arbitrabilidad sustantiva deben ser resueltos por los tribunales...”) (énfasis nuestro).

Dicho de otra manera, la norma esbozada por el Tribunal Supremo es una regla de defecto que opera sólo en ausencia de una delegación expresa pactada en el acuerdo de arbitraje a los efectos de que la determinación de arbitrabilidad es de la jurisdicción del árbitro. Y es que otra no puede ser la interpretación, puesto que el mecanismo de arbitraje se utilizará no tan sólo si las partes así lo pactaron, sino en la forma en que lo han pactado. Véase Crufon Const, v. Aut. Edif. Púbs., 156 D.P.R. 197, 205 (2002).

Consistente con lo anterior, es un principio bien sentado en el ámbito federal y bajo el FAA que cualquier impugnación a la validez de un acuerdo de arbitraje, incluyendo cualquier controversia sobre arbitrabilidad (si determinada controversia es

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arbitrable o no), debe ser referida al árbitro si hay evidencia clara e inequívoca (“clear and unmistakable evidence”) de que las partes así lo pactaron -de que esa fue su intención. First Options of Chicago. Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 945 (1995). Esta es precisamente la situación que presenta el caso de autos.

En la cláusula de arbitraje contenida en el Acuerdo, Jane Doe, así como todos los Miembros Capitales de CRL, se comprometieron a que el tercer paso del proceso de resolución de disputas, el arbitraje, se conduzca bajo las Reglas de Arbitraje Comercial de la AAA. (Sección 14.04 del Acuerdo, pág. 34, Anejo 1.) A su vez, la Regla 7(a) del cuerpo de Reglas de Arbitraje Comercial de la AAA dispone: “[t]he arbitrator shall have the power to rule on his or her own jurisdiction, including any objections with respect to the existence, scope or validity of the arbitration agreement.” (Commercial Arbitration Rules de la AAA, Regla 7(a), pág. 23, Anejo 2) (énfasis nuestro).

Según ha resuelto cada tribunal federal que ha tenido ante sí esta controversia, cuando las partes incorporan a sus acuerdos o cláusulas de arbitraje reglas institucionales de entidades como la AAA en las que se delega al árbitro la facultad de decidir sobre su propia jurisdicción -decidir arbitrabilidad- ello constituye evidencia suficiente en Derecho (clara e inequívoca) de que esa era la intención de las partes. Véase Contec Corp. v. Remote Solution Co., 398 F.3d 205, 208 (2nd Cir. 2005) (“When...parties explicitly incorporate rules that empower an arbitrator to decide issues of arbitrability, the incorporation serves as clear and unmistakable

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evidence of the parties’ intent to delegate such issues to an arbitrator, Sleeper Farms v. Agway. Inc., 211 F. Supp. 2d 197 (D. Me. 2002) (“[Since the AAA rules constitute] a clear and unmistakable delegation of scope-determining authority to an arbitrator, [the court refers this dispute [to the arbitrator] to determine [...] what issues [...] are covered by the arbitration clause.”)

Véase, además; Terminix Int’l. Co. v. Palmer Ranch Ltd., 432 F.3d 1327, 29, 33-34 (11th Cir. 2005) (Resolviendo que toda vez que las Reglas de Arbitraje de la AAA delegan al árbitro la determinación de arbitrabilidad, la reclamación del demandante de que el acuerdo de arbitraje lo despojaba ilegalmente de varios remedios estatutarios, era materia a ser adjudicada por el árbitro, no por el tribunal); Qualcomm Inc. v. Nokia Corp., 466 F.3d 1366, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Apollo Computer, Inc. v. Berg, 886 F.2d 469, 473 (1st Cir. 1989).

Lo resuelto por el Tribunal Supremo de Estados Unidos en First Options., supra, así como la casuística federal citada, es consistente con el ordenamiento jurídico local en materia de contratos. A fin de cuentas, “el arbitraje es una figura jurídica inherentemente contractual.” Méndez Acevedo, supra, en la pág. 367; Municipio Mayaqüez. supra); U.C.P.R. v. Triangle Engineering Corp., 136 D.P.R. 133, 144 (1994); véase, además, Granite Rock Co. v. Int'l Broth. of Teamsters, 130 S. Ct. 2847, 2857 (2010) (“[Where] parties concede that they have agreed to arbitrate some matters pursuant to an arbitration clause, the “law's permissive policies in respect to arbitration” counsel that “ ‘any doubts concerning the

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scope of arbitral issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration.’”)

Por lo tanto, en materia de arbitraje puede exigirse el cumplimiento de aquello que se haya pactado por escrito. Véase Crufon Const., supra, en la pág. 204; Municipio de Ponce v. Gobernador, 136 D.P.R. 776, 783 (1994). A su vez, cuando los términos de un contrato son claros y no presentan ambigüedad, sus disposiciones se aplicarán según el sentido literal que le dieron las partes. Art. 1233 del Código Civil, supra, § 3471. Una vez se determina qué fue lo que las partes acordaron, el juzgador debe resolver las controversias entre las partes de conformidad con lo estipulado. Véase C. F.S.E. v. Unión de Médicos, 170 D.P.R. 443 (2007).

En resumen, en el presente caso, la cláusula de arbitraje incorpora por referencia expresamente las Reglas de Arbitraje Comercial de la AAA, las cuales a su vez delegan en el árbitro -de forma clara e inequívoca- la autoridad para determinar su propia jurisdicción. Por tanto, conforme a las autoridades aquí citadas, procede que este Honorable Tribunal ordene a Jane Doe continuar con el procedimiento de arbitraje que pactó, de suerte que sea el árbitro el que resuelva si tiene autoridad para entender en los méritos las reclamaciones de ésta. Así lo pactaron las partes, sin ambigüedad alguna, y ello constituye la ley entre las partes. Véase HIETEL v. Puerto Rico Telephone Company, 2011 T.S.P.R. 100.

C. En la Alternativa, las Controversias del Caso de Autos son Arbitrables, Toda Vez que Entre Jane Doe y los Comparecientes No Existe una Relación de Empleado-Patrono y la Cláusula de Arbitraje Alcanza Sus Reclamaciones

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En la alternativa, de este Honorable Tribunal entender que tiene jurisdicción para determinar la arbitrabilidad de las reclamaciones de Jane Doe, lo que negamos, procede que emita una orden compeliendo el arbitraje. Según hemos adelantado, Jane Doe fundamenta su posición en la premisa de que es empleada de los comparecientes y, en consecuencia, sus reclamos quedan excluidos de la cláusula de arbitraje por ser ésta sólo de índole comercial y no laboral. Jane Doe no tiene razón.

En primer término, Jane Doe era una Miembro Capital de CRL desde 1987 y en esa capacidad ha sido co-propietaria de CRL por cerca de veinticinco (25) años, es decir, durante el término relevante a su reclamación. Asimismo, Jane Doe fue miembro del ente directivo de CRL desde el 2009 hasta el 2012, el comité de más alta jerarquía en el esquema organizacional de CRL. (Véase Reclamación Extrajudicial del 24 de enero de 2012, pág. 5, Anejo 3, sometida bajo sello.)

Como miembro del ente directivo, Jane Doe era una de siete (7) miembros capitales de CRL a cargo de, entre otras funciones, formular las políticas y los planes estratégicos a largo plazo de CRL, supervisar las funciones de su Director General, aprobar los presupuestos anuales, aprobar criterios de compensación, y aprobar la compensación de los miembros. (Véase Secciones 4.06 y 4.07del Acuerdo, pág. 13, Anejo 1.)

En vista de lo anterior es forzoso Concluir que Jane Doe no tiene razón para alegar que es empleada de CRL. Sencillamente, tal alegación es una sinrazón jurídica. Así lo establecen los principios jurisprudenciales discutidos a continuación, que

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apuntan tajantemente a que Jane Doe es propiamente “patrono” y no “empleada” para fines de la legislación social protectora del trabajador que invoca en su Demanda.

El Tribunal Supremo de Estados Unidos ha elaborado seis (6) criterios para guiar y facilitar la determinación de si un individuo es “patrono” o “empleado”, a saber: (i) facultad para contratar y despedir empleados; (ii) supervisión de empleados; (iii) supervisión por otros individuos; (iv) capacidad de ejercer influencias sobre la organización; (v) intención de las partes; (vi) y participación del individuo en las ganancias, pérdidas y obligaciones de la organización. Clackamas Gastroenterology Associates. P.C. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440, 449-50 (2003). Ningún factor es decisivo. Id., en la pág.451. Según el máximo Foro Federal, un “patrono” “es la persona o grupo de personas que son propietarios y administran la organización.” Id., en la pág. 450 (traducción nuestra).

A priori es razonable concluir que como Miembro Capital de CRL por más de dos (2) décadas, y miembro del máximo cuerpo rector de CRL por tres años, Jane Doe está necesariamente dentro del “grupo de personas que son propietarios y administran la organización.” Id. Como cuestión de realidad, y a modo ilustrativo, en el año 2010 Jane Doe —como miembro del ente directivo de CRL- aprobó reducciones en compensación para dos (2) miembros capitales de CRL a base de su rendimiento. Asimismo, en el 2011 Jane Doe aprobó reducciones o congelamientos en compensación para varias personas, incluyendo a otra Miembro Capital de CRL. Los hechos anteriores hacen patentemente evidente

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que Jane Doe no se conducía como una “empleada” según alega, sino como un “patrono”., o lo que es lo mismo, una de las co-propietarias de CRL.

Al aplicar los factores de Clackamas, supra, el Tercer Circuito de Apelaciones federal sostuvo la determinación de un tribunal de distrito de que un accionista-director de un bufete de abogados no era “empleado” para fines del Título VII. Véase Kirleis v. Dickie. McCamev & Chilcote. P.C., 09-4498, 2010 WL 2780927 (3rd Cir. 2010) (Refiérase a copia del caso que se incluye como Anejo 4.) Aunque la demandante en el citado caso argumentó que el Comité Ejecutivo (del cual ella no era parte) tomaba las decisiones de compensación y ejercía otras funciones de administración, el Tribunal determinó que ésta no era empleada.

Razonó el Tribunal que la allí demandante tenía la facultad de participar en la dirección del bufete, el derecho a no ser expulsada por causa sin el voto de 3/4

partes de la Junta de Directores y el derecho a participar de un porciento de las ganancias, pérdidas y obligaciones del bufete. Id., en la pág. 2. Igualmente, Jane Doe ha tenido la facultad de participar de la dirección de CRL, no podía ser expulsada sin el voto de 3/4 partes de otros miembros capitales y tuvo derecho a participar de las ganancias, pérdidas y obligaciones de CRL durante el periodo relevante a su reclamación. (Véase Acuerdo, Secciones .) Más aún, distinto a la demandante en el caso de Kirleis, supra, Jane Doe fue miembro del ente directivo desde el 2009 hasta el 2012 —el cuerpo directivo de mayor poder decisional en CRL- lo que milita de forma más contundente todavía a una

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determinación de que Jane Doe es realmente “dueña” y no “empleada”.

Aunque resuelto previo a la decisión del Tribunal Supremo federal en Clackamas, supra, lo determinado por el Primer Circuito de Apelaciones en Serapión v. Martínez, 119 F.3d 982 (1st Cir. 1997), es también altamente persuasivo. En este caso, el Tribunal concluyó que un socio capital de un bufete de abogados era inelegible para reclamar bajo el Título VII, toda vez que dicho estatuto ofrecía protección sólo a empleados. Al así concluir, el Tribunal examinó los siguientes criterios: (i) interés propietario; (ii) remuneración; (iii) y gerencia. Id., en la pág. 990. Estos factores son consistentes con los criterios esbozados por el Tribunal Supremo en Clackamas, supra, y sostenidos por el sentido común. Jane Doe, así como la demandante en Serapión, supra, tiene un interés propietario en CRL, su compensación depende sustancialmente de las ganancias de CRL y disfrutó de derechos de voto en el principal cuerpo rector de CRL. En otras palabras, Jane Doe, así como la demandante en el citado caso, Margarita Serapión, no puede ser considerada como una “empleada”.5

5 Merece precisarse que distinto sería el caso si Jane Doe no fuera una Miembro Capital. En ese escenario ficticio, Jane Doe podría ser considerada como una “empleada” para fines de las leyes que invoca, conforme a lo resuelto por el Tribunal Supremo en Belk Arce v. Martínez v Otros. 146 D.P.R. 215 (1998). (Acción de discrimen bajo la Ley 100 de 30 de junio de 1959, según enmendada, presentada por un abogado que no era socio capital de un bufete de abogados.) No obstante, este caso no aplica a la situación de autos, toda vez que Jane Doe fue Miembro Capital de CRL y, por ende, “patrono” conforme a las autoridades aquí citadas.

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En virtud de lo anterior, la posición de Jane Doe al efecto de que las reclamaciones en el presente caso son de naturaleza laboral y como tales quedan excluidas de la cláusula de arbitraje del Acuerdo es insostenible. Ausente una relación de empleo, no cabe hablar de reclamaciones laborales. Jane Doe se desempeñó como co-propietaria de CRL y su relación con los comparecientes se rigió por el Acuerdo.

Jane Doe intenta tirar una cortina de humo con el único propósito de encubrir una controversia verdaderamente contractual entre co-propietarios que surge bajo el Acuerdo por desavenencias y diferencias entre ésta y el ente rector. Eso es todo. Y es que ello persigue el único objetivo de disfrazar de “discrimen en el empleo” una reclamación de naturaleza contractual entre miembros capitales que obligaría a Jane Doe prima facie a arbitrar el asunto conforme a la cláusula de arbitraje contenida en el Acuerdo.

La compensación de los miembros de CRL se rige por el Acuerdo. Específicamente, las secciones 5.01-5.06 del mismo. (Véase Acuerdo, págs. 20-22, Aenejo 1.) Así, cualquier desavenencia o diferencia surgida con respecto a la compensación de un miembro capital es materia que queda cubierta por la obligación de arbitrar sus reclamos que las partes pactaron mediante el Acuerdo. Jane Doe no puede escapar esta realidad y pretender borrar de un plumazo su obligación de arbitrar toda controversia entre ésta y CRL y los otros miembros capitales de CRL.

El Acuerdo suscrito entre Jane Doe y CRL constituye la ley entre ellos. Jane Doe está impedida de litigar sus reclamos contra CRL y otros Miembros Capitales de CRL ante los tribunales, pues así lo

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pactó libre y voluntariamente. Pacta Sunt Servanda es el principio que tutela la obligación de arbitrar que tienen las partes, en virtud del Acuerdo. Conformemente, los tribunales no pueden relevar a una parte de cumplir con lo que se obligó a realizar mediante un contrato, cuando éste es legal, válido y no contiene vicio alguno. Véase Mercado Rivera v. U.C.P.R., 143 D.P.R. 610 (1997); Cervecería Corona v. Commonwealth Ins. Co., 115 D.P.R. 345 (1984).

Nuestro Tribunal Supremo ha sido consecuente en expresar que existe una vigorosa política pública en Puerto Rico favoreciendo el arbitraje como método alterno para la solución de disputas. Véase Pain Webber v. Service Concepts, Inc., 151 D.P.R. 307 (2000). Pactado en un contrato la obligación de arbitrar, los tribunales recurren a “una política vigorosa en favor del arbitraje... y [t]oda duda que pueda existir debe ser resuelta a favor del arbitraje”. Id.

Asimismo, el Tribunal Supremo de Puerto Rico ha puntualizado que las cláusulas de arbitraje a tenor con el FAA serán válidas e irrevocables y los tribunales carecen de discreción respecto a la eficacia de las mismas. Medina Betancourt v. La Cruz Azul, 155 D.P.R. 732 (2001). Por lo tanto, cuando se establece un pacto en el cual dos partes se comprometen a llevar a un foro arbitral las disputas que puedan surgir del mismo, los tribunales deben, respetar la voluntad de las partes y hacer valer el acuerdo ordenando que el asunto se resuelva primero en arbitraje.” Id.

Cónsono con lo anterior, y siguiendo el modelo federal, el Tribunal Supremo de Puerto Rico ha hecho un llamado a la judicatura al efecto de que ante un

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acuerdo de arbitraje, lo prudencial es la abstención judicial. Lo anterior, toda vez que una vez acordado el arbitraje, los tribunales carecen de discreción respecto a su eficacia y tienen que dar cumplimiento al arbitraje acordado. Méndez Acevedo, supra, en la pág. 368.

Por otro lado, en Puerto Rico hay una política que favorece el agotamiento de los procedimientos de arbitraje. Véase Junta de Relaciones del Trabajo v. Junta de Administración del Muelle del Municipio de Ponce, 122 D.P.R. 318 (1988). Como cuestión de realidad, nuestro más Alto Tribunal de Justicia no ha titubeado al determinar que las partes deben agotar los remedios contractuales antes de acudir a los tribunales, salvo que exista justa causa para obviarlos. Véase Pagán v. Fundación Hospital Dr. Pila, 114 D.P.R. 224 (1983).

Lo cierto es que si Jane Doe se obligó voluntariamente a arbitrar, no puede ahora reclamar el derecho de acudir al tribunal. Jane Doe tiene que cumplir con lo pactado y someter su reclamación al árbitro, de conformidad con lo dispuesto en el Acuerdo, y no puede evadir sus obligaciones contractuales utilizando el foro judicial como subterfugio ni categorizar como “discrimen en el empleo” reclamaciones que surgen por razón de diferencias entre co-propietarios de CRL.

Por los fundamentos antes expuestos, los comparecientes sostienen que de este Tribunal entender que tiene jurisdicción para determinar la arbitrabilidad de los reclamos de Jane Doe, lo que negamos -pues entendemos que le corresponde al árbitro decidirlo-, procede que ordene que ésta continúe el arbitraje que voluntariamente pactó y que

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CRL ya puso en marcha. Jane Doe debe estar obligada a cumplir con el Acuerdo y someter su posición al árbitro -según lo pactado.

D. El FAA y su Aplicación al Presente Caso

Dos (2) casos recientes del Tribunal Supremo de los Estados Unidos (“TSEU”) impiden a Jane Doe evadir su obligación de arbitrar sus reclamaciones (“any Claim”) contra los co-demandados. El año pasado, el TSEU se reafirmó en que el FAA desplaza (“preempts”) toda ley estatal que constituya un obstáculo al objetivo del Congreso de que se pongan en vigor los contratos de arbitraje. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepción, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1753 (2011)(“Concepción”). Además, el TSEU indicó que los Estados no pueden requerir procedimientos que sean inconsistentes con el FAA, aún si ello resultare deseable por otras razones. Id., en la pág. 1753. Por el contrario, los tribunales deben poner en vigor los pactos de arbitraje conforme a sus propios términos. Id., en la pág. 1742. Por otro lado, en Marmet Health Care Center, Inc. v. Brown, 132 S. Ct. 1201 (2012) (“Marmet”), el TSEU resolvió que el FAA ocupa el campo y desplaza toda aquella política pública estatal que prohíba el arbitraje de ciertos tipos de casos de negligencia.

Los referidos casos, sin duda alguna, requieren que este Honorable Tribunal ponga en vigor el pacto de sumisión a arbitraje de la Sección 14 del Acuerdo suscrito entre las partes.

Aun en instancias donde las partes no han acordado el someter las controversias de arbitrabilidad sustantivas al foro arbitral, los tribunales tienden a dejar la controversia para que sea resuelta inicialmente por el árbitro cuando la

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arbitrabilidad no puede ser determinada sin entrar en los méritos de la controversia. Elkouri & Elkouri, How Arbitrations Works, (BNA Books, 6ta Edición 2003), en la pág. 281. (“However, even though the agreement does not expressly leave the determination of arbitrability to the arbitrator, and in spite of the fact that the parties have first gone to court, courts have left the initial determination to the arbitrator. This was the result, for instance, where arbitrability could not be determined without delving into the merits...”)

Así, en Camden Indus. Co. v. Carpenters Local 1688, 353 F.3d 178 (1st Cir. 1969), el Primer Circuito de Apelaciones resolvó:

In these circumstances we believe the matter should proceed to arbitration, where the arbitrator may determine the subsidiary facts upon which depend both the merits of the controversy and his jurisdiction to decide it. A finding of jurisdiction, unlike a finding on the merits when jurisdiction is not in question... will not be insulated from subsequent judicial review... We believe full recognition of the role of labor arbitration requires court intervention in a case such as this only when it has become absolutely necessary, viz., on a petition to vacate or enforce the award.

Id.

Esta es precisamente la situación que nos ocupa. La invitación que Jane Doe le hace al Honorable Tribunal es que entre a dilucidar los méritos de la controversia de si ella es o no empleada como cuestión previa a adjudicar la arbitrabilidad de sus reclamos. Claramente, un asunto que a todas luces le corresponde al árbitro resolver.

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E. El FAA Reconoce una Fuerte Política Pública a Favor del Arbitraje que Requiere Poner en Vigor los Pactos de Arbitraje Tal y Como Pactados

Este Honorable Tribunal debe compeler a Jane Doe a presentar sus reclamos en el foro acordado por las partes -arbitraje ante la AAA. Ello, en vista de que existe una fuerte política pública federal a favor del arbitraje, lo cual requiere que los acuerdos de arbitraje se presuman válidos y ejecutables.6 Sobre

6 Los acuerdos de arbitraje llevan consigo una fuerte presunción de validez: Where a written contract contains an arbitration clause, there is a presumption of arbitrability in the sense that a request for an order compelling arbitration should not be denied by the Court, unless it may be said with positive assurance that the arbitration clause is not susceptible of an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute. Doubts should be resolved in favor of coverage. Codecom, Inc. v. Alcatel Standard. S.A., 103 F.Supp.2d 65, 68-69 (D.P.R. 2000); Véase además, Jorae-Colon v. Mandara Spa Puerto Rico, 685 F.Supp. 2d 280, 283 (D.P.R. 2010)(“[Q]uestions of arbitrability must be addressed with a healthy regard for the federal policy favoring arbitration ... and as a matter of federal law, any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration, whether the problem at hand is the construction of the contract language itself or an allegation of waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability” (comillas internas omitidas)); PaineWebber Inc. v. Elahi, 87 F.3d 589, 595 (1er Cir. 1996)("the Supreme Court has established a broad presumption of arbitrability)-, Brennan v. Kina, 139 F.3d 258, 264 (1 er Cir. 1998)(“In FAA cases, the Supreme Court precedents instruct courts to use a particular hermeneutic principle for interpreting the breadth of the agreement, viz., the presumption of arbitrability (comillas internas omitidas)); World Films. Inc. v. Paramount Piet. Corp., 125 D.P.R. 352, 362 (1990)(“Existe ... una presunción de 'arbitrabilidad' cuando el contrato tiene una cláusula de arbitraje”).

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esta fuerte política pública, el TSEU ha expresado lo siguiente:

[The FAA] is a congressional declaration of a liberal policy favoring arbitration agreements, notwithstanding any state substantive or procedural policies to the contrary.

**** [I]n enacting § 2 of the federal Act, Congress

declared a national policy favoring arbitration and withdrew the power of the states to require a judicial forum for the resolution of claims which the contracting parties agreed to resolve by arbitration.

Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 489 (1987) (citas y comillas internas omitidas). Véase además, Concepción, 131 S. Ct. 1745, 1748 (“The FAA was enacted in 1925 in response to widespread judicial hostility to arbitration agreements.... The overarching purpose of the FAA, evident in the text of §§ 2, 3, and 4, is to ensure the enforcement of arbitration agreements according to their terms so as to facilitate streamlined proceedings.”)(comillas internas omitidas y énfasis suplido).

F. El FAA Ocupa el Campo y Desplaza Toda Ley Estatal que Constituya un Obstáculo a la Puesta en Vigor de los Pactos de Arbitraje Conforme a los Términos del Acuerdo.

Jane Doe alega que no debe ser compelida a arbitrar sus reclamos. Específicamente, ésta alega lo siguiente:

24. El 22 de marzo de 2012, la CRL presentó una solicitud de arbitraje (“Demand for Arbitration”) ante la AAA ....

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25. Mediante dicha solicitud, la CRL pretende interferir con el ejercicio de la jurisdicción del Tribunal para atender la demanda. De prevalecer, lograría impedirle a JANE vindicar sus derechos mediante la presentación de una demanda ante este Honorable Tribunal exponiendo sus reclamaciones de violación a derechos constitucionales, discrimen en el empleo y represalias; injunction; y daños y perjuicios bajo la constitución y leyes del [ELA].

Demanda, en la pág. 4.

El referido intento de Jane Doe de evadir su obligación de arbitrar sus reclamos contra los co-demandados es contrario a la política pública federal establecida mediante el FAA y no se ajusta a Derecho. Veamos.

El TSEU estableció claramente en Concepción que el FAA ocupa el campo y desplaza toda ley de los Estados que impida que se cumplan los objetivos del Congreso de hacer valor los pactos de arbitraje. 131 S. Ct., en la pág. 1753. Ello pues, el propósito general del FAA es garantizar la puesta en vigor de los acuerdos de arbitraje conforme a sus propios términos a los fines de facilitar procedimientos más eficientes. Id. en la pág. 1748. Dado que el arbitraje es materia contractual, el FAA requiere que los tribunales honren las expectativas de las partes. Id. en la pág. 1752. Toda esta fuerte política en favor del arbitraje impide que los acuerdos de arbitraje sean invalidados mediante defensas que aplican sólo a arbitrajes o que derivan su significado del hecho de que está en juego un pacto de arbitraje. Id. en la pág. 1746.

Hace apenas un mes y medio, el TSEU en Marmet, 132 S. Ct. 1201 (2012), resolvió que el

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Tribunal Supremo de Virginia Occidental había errado al aplicar la política pública de ese Estado, la cual prohíbe dar validez a una cláusula de arbitraje contenida en un acuerdo de admisión a un asilo de ancianos suscrita previo a la ocurrencia de un evento de negligencia que resulte en muerte o daños corporales. Específicamente, el TSEU citando a Concepción indicó lo siguiente:

[W]hen state law prohibits outright the arbitration of a particular type of claim, the analysis is straightforward: The conflicting rule is displaced by the FAA. ... West Virginia’s prohibition against predispute agreements to arbitrate personal-injury or wrongful-death claims against nursing home is a categorical rule prohibiting arbitration of a particular type of claim, and that rule is contrary to the terms and coverage of the FAA.

Id. en las págs. 1203-04 (citas y comillas internas omitidas).

Conforme lo anterior, no hay duda de que el FAA desplaza cualquier disposición legal estatutaria o bajo la Constitución de Puerto Rico que no haga valer y reconozca el compromiso asumido por las partes de resolver toda reclamación (“any Claim”) mediante el procedimiento de arbitraje pactado en la Sección 14 del Acuerdo. A esos efectos, procede que este Honorable Tribunal ordene a Jane Doe arbitrar sus reclamos contra los co-demandados.

G. El FAA Aplica a los Contratos en el Comercio Interestatal y. en Consecuencia, el Acuerdo Queda Tutelado por Ella

“[A] trial court evaluating a contract connected to some economic or commercial activity would rarely,

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if ever, refuse to compel arbitration on the ground that the transactions lacked ‘involvement’ in interstate commerce’’

SCI v. Fulmer, 883 So.2d 621,629 (Ala. 2003) (énfasis suplido).

Es norma establecida que el FAA es de aplicación a los contratos en el comercio interestatal. Véase § 2 del FAA7; World Films. Inc., supra, en la pág. 357 (El FAA “aplica a contratos en el comercio interestatal...”.). El Acuerdo es un contrato en el comercio interestatal, pues, entre otras razones, el mismo gobierna el interés propietario de las partes y las operaciones de CRL en Puerto Rico y en sus oficinas fuera de Puerto Rico. Véase, SCI v. Fulmer. 883 So.2d 621, 629 (Ala 2003)(“[l]t would be difficult indeed to give an example of an economic or commercial activity that one could ... declare beyond the reach of Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause, and, by extension, under the FAA’)(énfasis nuestro).8 Además, la gran 7 La § 2 del FAA, en lo pertinente, dispone como sigue: A written provision in ... a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract... shall be valid irrevocable, and enforceable .... 9USCA § 2 (énfasis suplido). 8 Véase además, Thomas H. Oehmke, Commercial Arbitration § 3:6 (2011)(contract needs only the slightest nexus to interstate commerce to apply the FAA.”): 21 Willinston on Contracts § 57: (4thed. 2011)("Consistent with the broad approach to interpreting the term ‘involving commerce’ in the [FAA], it has been said that a contract containing an arbitration provision need only be related to commerce to fall within the coverage of the Act")(énfasis suplido); Bowen v. Security Pest Control. Inc., 879 So.2d 1139, 1142 (Ala. 2003)(resuelve que la transacción envolvía el comercio interestatal, en parte, porque

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mayoría de sus clientes están ubicados fuera de Puerto Rico (principalmente en los Estados Unidos), lo cual requiere que CRL y sus clientes mantengan comunicación constantemente como parte de sus operaciones mediante el uso del correo, Internet, teléfono y otros medios de comunicación interestatal. Igualmente, resulta significativo sobre este particular la naturaleza económica del Acuerdo y que los siguientes estatutos federales, entre otros, aplican a la relación de CRL con aquellos que son propiamente considerados empleados: 1) Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-78; 2) Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654; 3) Family Medical Leave Act of 2000, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17; 4) Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964; y 5) Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34. Por ende, resulta claro que al igual que los contratos en los casos de Allied-Bruce y Citizens, el Acuerdo es un contrato en el comercio interestatal al que le es de aplicación el FAA.

Por ende, el FAA, por virtud de la Cláusula de Supremacía de la Constitución de los Estados Unidos,9 desplaza cualquier disposición legal una de las partes en la transacción realizaba negocios en dos Estados). De hecho, el poder del Congreso bajo la Cláusula de Comercio de la Constitución de los Estados Unidos es tan amplio que en los pasados 75 años sólo dos casos del TSEU han resuelto que el Congreso excedió sus poderes bajo la referida Cláusula de Comercio. Véanse U.S. v. López, 514 U.S. 549 (1995); US v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000). Nótese que ninguno de los estatutos en controversia en dichos casos iba dirigido a regular transacciones puramente económicas, sino conducta criminal de naturaleza no económica. 9 En Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984) el Tribunal Supremo de los Estados Unidos resolvió que cuando

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estatutaria o bajo la Constitución de Puerto Rico que no haga valer y reconozca el compromiso asumido por las partes en este caso de resolver toda reclamación (“any Claim”) mediante el procedimiento de arbitraje pactado en la Sección 14 del Acuerdo. Dicho procedimiento dio inicio el 22 de marzo de 2012 mediante la presentación del Demand for Arbitration ante la AAA. Ante esa situación, el FAA ordena que dicho procedimiento siga su curso sin mayor intervención de este Honorable Tribunal que la necesaria para compeler el arbitraje.

III. CONCLUSIÓN

Los comparecientes han ofrecido a este Honorable Tribunal fundamentos de peso y vinculantes que sostienen su posición al efecto de que es de la jurisdicción del árbitro el determinar las controversias cubiertas por el Acuerdo; que entre Jane Doe y los comparecientes no existe una relación de empleado-patrono; que ello no es más que un intento de Jane Doe para esquivar sus obligaciones contractuales bajo el Acuerdo; que sus reclamaciones son arbitrables bajo el Acuerdo; que el Acuerdo está cubierto por el FAA] y que se debe ordenar el arbitraje compulsorio pactado por las partes.

EN MERITO DE LO CUAL, los comparecientes respetuosamente solicitan de este Honorable Tribunal que, a tenor con los fundamentos esbozados en el presente escrito, desestime la Demanda por falta de jurisdicción y compela a Jane Doe al arbitraje. Asimismo, los comparecientes solicitan muy respetuosamente que se le imponga a Jane Doe

una ley estatal conflige directamente con la § 2 del FAA, ello viola la Cláusula de Supremacía.

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y/o a sus abogados el pago de costas, gastos y honorarios de abogado que correspondan.

En San Juan, Puerto Rico, hoy 11 de abril de 2012.

RESPETUOSAMENTE SOMETIDA.

CERTIFICO: Que en esta misma fecha he entregado a la mano y enviado por correo regular una copia fiel y exacta del presente escrito a los abogados de Jane Doe, el Ledo. Juan R. González Muñoz, González Muñoz Law Office, P.S.C., P.O. Box 9024055, San Juan, PR 00902-4055 y el Lcdo. Manuel Porro Vizcarra, Manuel Porro Vizcarra Law Offices, 382 Ave. Escorial, Urb. Caparra Heights, San Juan, PR 00920.

MENDOZA LAW OFFICES Abogado de los demandados PO Box 9282 San Juan, Puerto Rico 00908-0282 Tel. (787) 722-5522; 5530; 5540 Fax (787) 723-7057 Correo electrónico: mendozalo@vahoo.com /s/ Enrique J. Mendoza Méndez TSPR-8304

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APPENDIX F

[rubber stamp:] RECEIVED, SUBMITTALS DEPARTMENT, SAN JUAN JUDICIAL CENTER, APRIL 11, 2012, 12:27 PM

COMMONWEALTH OF PUERTO RICO COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

SAN JUAN JUDICIAL CENTER SUPERIOR COURT

JANE DOE,

Plaintiff

Vs.

COMPANIA DE RESPONSABILIDAD LIMITADA (CRL) [limited liability company]; JOHN DOE, in his

personal capacity and as employer of JANE DOE; JACK JOE, in his personal capacity and as employer of JANE DOE; LARRY LOE, in his personal capacity

and as employer of JANE DOE,

Defendants1.

__________________ CIVIL No. KPE 2012-1204 (904)

__________________ Re: Declaratory Judgment and Injunction

1 For the purposes of strict confidentiality, the parties in this case are not identified by their respective names. In the Affidavit Under Seal of the Plaintiff filed in conjunction with the Complaint that commenced this action, [Plaintiff] identified each of the parties by their respective names, addresses, and telephone numbers.

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MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION AND TO COMPEL

COMPULSORY ARBITRATION IN LIGHT OF BINDING ARBITRATION AGREEMENT

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TO THE HONORABLE COURT:

Now appears the defendants referenced above, Companía de Responsabilidad Limitada (“CRL”) [Limited Liability Company (“LLC)], John Doe, Jack Joe and Larry Loe, without submitting to the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, through the undersigned legal representative, and they do very respectfully state that the Verified Complaint and Request for Declaratory Judgment and for Preliminary and Permanent Injunction in the instant case (“Complaint”) should be dismissed in its entirety under Rule 10.2 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, 32 L.P.R.A. App. V, and the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1 et seq. (“FAA”), due to the existence of a valid arbitration agreement that was entered into voluntarily and which constitutes the law between the parties, as demonstrated below.

I. INTRODUCTION

On April 2, 2012, Jane Doe filed with this Court a Complaint and a Petition Requesting Preliminary and Permanent Injunction asking this Court to issue a Declaratory Judgment to determine the inapplicability of the arbitration clause contained in the Operating Agreement (“Agreement”) signed between her, the other Capital Members of CRL and CRL2. Jane Doe predicates her request on the

2 Jane Doe also asks that this Court order the stay of the arbitration case brought by CRL before the American Arbitration Association on March 22, 2012. The intention of this arbitration proceeding is the presentation and resolution of the same alleged controversies as those that Jane Doe has brought to the attention of this Court by means of the present judicial

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proposition that her alleged claims are not covered by that arbitration clause because they are labor claims that arise under an employer-employee relationship. That is, Jane Doe maintains that the arbitration agreement signed by her does not apply to the controversies in the case at bar. As we shall see below, Jane Doe is incorrect. The claims resolution clause (Section 14, in English “Resolution of Claim”) in the Agreement is extremely broad and it makes clear that the intention of all of the parties was that any claim (in English, “claim”) is to be resolved by the processes provided for in that clause:

[English:]

Intent and Purpose - It is the intent and purpose of the Firm and any Claimant to resolve any Claim by mediation or arbitration. The Claimant expressly agrees that the Claim shall be settled or resolved through the procedures set forth herein, and shall not in any way circumvent or otherwise challenge in any way these proceedings relative to mediation and arbitration.

(Section 14.01 of the Agreement)

Furthermore, the Agreement defines a “claim” as, in English, “any action, suit, complaint or demand of whatever nature and for whatever relief or remedy against the Firm or any of its Members or employees.” (Section 1.06 of the Agreement.) Thus, under the Agreement signed by Jane Doe, her partners, and CRL, a “claim” is any type of action, case, complaint or claim of whatever nature and for

action. Jane Doe must answer this request for arbitration on or before April 23, 2012.

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whatever relief or remedy against the Firm (CRL) or any of its Members or employees. There is no doubt that Jane Doe has committed before her partners to submitting any type of claim to the process described in Section 14 of the Agreement (including arbitration) no matter what the nature of the claim may be. Consequently, it is proper that the Complaint in the case at bar be dismissed, as very respectfully requested.

As demonstrated below, this is a controversy regarding substantive arbitrability. It specifically concerns the obligation borne by the parties to arbitrate any type of controversy among them. The threshold issue is which forum has jurisdiction to determine the scope of the arbitration clause contained in the Agreement signed by Jane Doe, which governs the relations among the Capital Members of CRL and between the Capital Members and CRL. That being the case, the operative fact that provides the basis for the claim in the case at bar is, specifically, a decision made with regard to Jane Doe’s compensation as a Capital Member. This is an issue that, as will be demonstrated below, is governed by the Agreement that she signed, and which was signed by all of the Capital Members of CRL, an issue that, under the Agreement, must be submitted to arbitration.

For reasons that we shall further set forth below, the appearing parties very respectfully maintain that the controversy regarding substantive arbitrability, as presented in the specific circumstances of this case, is an issue that is proper to decide in arbitration and not before this Honorable Court. Furthermore, the appearing parties maintain that it is proper to

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compel the parties to resolve any claim raised between them by means of the arbitration process agreed to, which has already commenced before the American Arbitration Association (“AAA”), as discussed below.

II. DISCUSSION

A. The Agreement between Jane Doe and CRL Establishes an Alternate Dispute Resolution Program that Includes Arbitration

At all times pertinent to this petition, Jane Doe has been a Capital Member of CRL. (See the Complaint, paragraph 2). The Agreement signed by Jane Doe and by all of the Capital Members of CRL establishes, in its pertinent part, that its signatories as of that date were all Capital Members of the civil partnership (…), devoted to the practice of law. (See page 1 of the Agreement, Exhibit 13.) This Agreement was entered into by the Capital Members of CRL, including Jane Doe, on September 13, 2007. (Id., on pages 38-39.)

With regard to what is pertinent here, the Agreement provides a mechanism for resolving controversies so that any of its signatories, including Jane Doe, may raise any claim or controversy in opposition to CRL and/or against any other Capital Member of CRL. (Id., pages 33-34.) For such purposes, Section 14.01 of the Agreement establishes that “it is the intention and purpose of [CRL] and any claimant to resolve any claim by mediation and arbitration.” (Id., page 33) (emphasis and translation

3 For the purpose of maintaining strict confidentiality, the mentioned copies of the Agreement that are referred to as Exhibit 1 are in a sealed envelope.

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ours). This Section adds that “the claimant expressly agrees that the claim thereof is to be settled or resolved by means of the process established [there], and that such claimant shall not bypass or challenge such proceedings involving mediation and arbitration.” (Id.)

In line with that set forth above, the Agreement establishes a three-step process for resolving controversies between a Capital Member of CRL and CRL and among Capital Members of CRL. The first step consists of submitting a written claim to the management board of CRL indicating the nature of the claim and the relief sought. This step is established in Section 14.02 of the Agreement. (Id., pages 33-34.) Jane Doe voluntarily submitted to this first step. (Complaint, paragraph 14.) The second step consists of attempting to resolve the claim amicably and in good faith by means of a mediation process administered by the AAA. See Section 14.03 of the Agreement. (Id., page 34.) Jane Doe voluntarily submitted to this second step. (Complaint, paragraphs 15-19.) If the claim cannot be resolved in the second step, the Agreement clearly establishes that it is the obligation of the parties to submit the controversy to compulsory arbitration. For these purposes, Section 14.04 of the Agreement provides as follows in outlining the third step:

[English:]

lf mediation fails, the Claim shall be settled by arbitration administered by the American Arbitration Association under its Commercial Arbitration Rules, and judgment on the award rendered by the arbitrator(s) may be entered in any court having jurisdiction thereof. [...]

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(Id.)

That set forth above signifies that, when signing the Agreement, the parties – including Jane Doe and the appearing parties – contractually agreed to resolve all of their differences by means of the aforementioned internal dispute process, which culminates in arbitration.

As a factual matter, Jane Doe has participated in the first two (2) steps of the contractual process for dispute resolution. First of all, on January 24, 2012, she submitted an internal claim to the management board of CRL alleging that, among other things, there was a breach of the Agreement and there was discrimination against her, based on sex and age, by reducing her compensation. (Complaint, paragraph 14; Extrajudicial Claim of January 24, 2012, submitted under seal as Exhibit 3). Secondly, the parties submitted themselves to the mediation process, with CRL accepting the mediator suggested by Jane Doe. That mediation process ended unsuccessfully on March 20, 2012. (Complaint, paragraphs 15-23.)

Under those circumstances, with the purpose of complying with Section 14.04 of the Agreement, CRL submitted a request for arbitration (in English, Demand for Arbitration) before the AAA on March 22, 2012. (Complaint, paragraph 24.) It is this arbitration process that Jane Doe intends to circumvent under the pretext that her claims are not subject to arbitration under the Agreement because they involve constitutional claims, employment discrimination, retaliation, injunction, and damages. (Complaint, paragraph 25.)

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Jane Doe is incorrect. As a threshold issue, it should be pointed out that no employer-employee relationship exists between Jane Doe and the appearing parties4. However, if we assume, for argument purposes, that such relationship were to exist (something that we do not accept), this would still not discharge the parties from having to submit their claims to arbitration. This is so, given that the arbitration clause is broad, clear, and devoid of all ambiguity, and requires that “any claim” be submitted to arbitration (Section 14.01 of the Agreement), with “claim” meaning, in English, “any action, suit, complaint or demand of whatever nature and for whatever relief or remedy against the Firm or any of its Members or employees.” (Section 1.06 of the Agreement.)

It should be reiterated, however, regardless of the context in which Jane Doe may now desire to view her relationship with the appearing parties, the truth of the matter is that, by virtue of the Agreement, she accepted that any claim (in English, “any claim”) is to

4 As we further discuss below, during the period pertinent to this controversy Jane Doe was a Capital Member of CRL and had an ownership interest in CRL, as did John Doe and Larry Loe, as did Jack Joe, who is a retired Capital Member of CRL. Moreover, for nearly the past three years Jane Doe has been a member of the management board of CRL, the body that directs the firm and approves important matters such as the compensation of the members and the operating budget of CRL, among other things. So, the relationship that exists between Jane Doe and the appearing parties does not arise from an employment contract but, rather, from the Agreement. Therefore, Jane Doe cannot now conveniently conceal her position as co-owner of CRL in order to breach the Agreement and characterize her claims as employment claims so that they will not be submitted to arbitration.

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be resolved by means of the dispute resolution process, which includes compulsory arbitration.

As we have maintained, the Agreement defines the concept of “claim” in an all-inclusive manner so that claims of any nature are covered. Thus, Section 1.06 of the Agreement establishes that a “claim” means, in English, “…any action, suit, complaint or demand of whatever nature and for whatever relief or remedy against the Firm or any of its Members or employees.” (See page 2 of the Agreement, Exhibit 1) (emphasis ours).

The text set forth above makes it perfectly clear that any claim, whatever its nature or whatever the relief requested, is covered by the arbitration clause contained in the Agreement. Jane Doe cannot escape this reality by the use of subterfuges and distortions. The Agreement constitutes the law among the parties and they are required to comply with it. See Article [sic] 1044 of the Civil Code, 31 L.P.R.A. § 2994.

Contrary to what is argued by Jane Doe in her Complaint, the appearing parties do not intend to interfere with the exercise of her alleged rights and the vindication of her claims. What the appearing parties do indeed maintain is that Jane Doe’s claims, although blatantly frivolous and groundless, should be decided by arbitration, the method agreed to among the parties, and in a confidential manner, as has also been agreed.

The principle of freedom of contract governs our court system. See Article 1207 of the Civil Code, 31 L.P.R.A. § 3372. Thus, contracting parties can establish covenants, clauses, and conditions, as they may see fit provided that they do not violate the laws, morals, and public order. Id. As a corollary to the

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principle of contractual freedom, the obligations that arise from contracts have the force of law between the parties and they must be complied with. Article 1044 of the Civil Code, 31 L.P.R.A. § 2994.

As a result of the mentioned legal axiom, the parties may furthermore agree that it is the arbitrator that is to decide with regard to his own jurisdiction, including any defenses relating to the existence, scope, or validity of the arbitration agreement. This is the case, inasmuch as the parties incorporated by reference to the arbitration clause contained in the Agreement the Commercial Arbitration Rules of the AAA, which provide that it shall be the arbitrator who decides arbitrability, that is, his own jurisdiction. (See Section 14.04 of the Agreement, page 34, Exhibit 1.)

Therefore, in any event, the frivolous and bold controversy that Jane Doe has created regarding arbitrability by filing the Complaint in the above-referenced case is an issue that pertains to the arbitrator to resolve.

B. It Pertains to the Arbitrator to Determine Whether the Issues in the Case at Bar are Subject to Arbitration

As recognized by the Puerto Rico Supreme Court, citing National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Boston S. Maine Corp., 850 F.2d 756 (D.C. Cir. 1988), a controversy regarding arbitrability has (3) kinds. See Méndez Acevedo v. Nieves Rivera, 179 D.P.R. 359, 367-68 (2010); Município Mayaguez v. Lebrón, 167 D.P.R. 713, 720-21 (2006). Attention may be drawn to (i) whether an arbitration agreement exists, (ii) the scope of an arbitration agreement (“whether such agreement covers a given controversy”), and (iii)

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whether such agreement covers a controversy regarding the duration or expiration of the contract. Méndez Acevedo, supra, Município de Mayagüez, supra; World Films, Inc. v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 125 D.P.R. 352 (1990). The issue in the case at bar concerns the second (2nd) kind mentioned.

In this regard, our highest judicial authority has specified, as a general rule that allows for exceptions, that the determination of whether an agreement creates an obligation on the part of the parties to arbitrate a given controversy is a judicial task. Méndez Acevedo, supra, World Films, Inc., supra, at page 361. That notwithstanding, the issue of arbitrability is not to pertain to the authority of the court if the parties agreed, in the arbitration agreement, that such authority is to be delegated to the arbitrator. That is, when it is agreed to in arbitration agreement that it is the arbitrator that is to resolve the issues of arbitrability it is proper that the arbitrator and not the court determine whether an obligation to arbitrate a given controversy exists. U.G.T. v. Corp. Difusión Pub., 168 D.P.R. 674. 684 (2006) (“Ordinarily, and unless the collective bargaining agreement provides otherwise, issues of substantive arbitrability are to be resolved by the courts….”) (emphasis ours).

In other words, the rule outlined by the Supreme Court is a default rule that only applies in the absence of an express delegation agreed to in the arbitration agreement to the effect that the determination of arbitrability pertains to the jurisdiction of the arbitrator. The interpretation cannot be otherwise, given that the mechanism of arbitration is to be used not only just if the parties

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have agreed to it, but it also must be used in the form that they have agreed to. See Crufon Const. v. Aut. Edif. Púbs., 156 D.P.R. 197, 205 (2002).

In line with that set forth above, it is a well settled principle within the federal jurisdiction and under the FAA that any challenge against the validity of an arbitration agreement, including any controversy regarding arbitrability (whether a given controversy is or is not subject to arbitration) must be referred to the arbitrator if there is clear and unequivocal evidence (in English, “clear and unmistakable evidence”) that the parties so agreed, that this was their intent. First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 945 (1995). This is the very situation that has arisen in the case at bar.

In the arbitration clause contained in the Agreement, Jane Doe, as well as all of the Capital Members of CRL, undertook that the third step of the dispute resolution process, the arbitration, would be conducted under the Commercial Arbitration Rules of the AAA. (See Section 14.04 of the Agreement, page 34, Exhibit 1.) In turn, Rule 7(a) of the text of the Commercial Arbitration Rules of the AAA provides as follows, in English: “[t]he arbitrator shall have the power to rule on his or her own jurisdiction, including any objections with respect to the existence, scope or validity of the arbitration agreement.” (Commercial Arbitration Rules of the AAA, Rule 7(a), page 23, Exhibit 2) (emphasis ours).

As held by every federal court that has had this issue before it, when parties incorporate, in their arbitration clauses or agreements, the institutional rules of entities such as the AAA, in which the arbitrator is delegated the authority to decide on his

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own jurisdiction – to decide on arbitrability – this constitutes sufficient evidence in law (clear and unequivocal) that this was the intent of the parties. See Contec Corp. v. Remote Solution Co., 398 F.3d 205, 208 (2nd Cir. 2005) (in English, “When.. parties explicitly incorporate rules that empower an arbitrator to decide issues of arbitrability, the incorporation serves as clear and unmistakable evidence of the parties’ intent to delegate such issues to an arbitrator”); Sleeper Farms v. Agway. Inc., 211 F. Supp. 2d 197 (D. Me. 2002) (in English, “[Since the AAA rules constitute] a clear and unmistakable delegation of scope-determining authority to an arbitrator, [the court] refers this controversy [to the arbitrator] to determine [...] what issues [...] are covered by the arbitration clause.”)

See, also: Terminix Int’l. Co. v. Palmer Ranch Ltd., 432 F.3d 1327, 29, 33-34 (11th Cir. 2005) (holding that, whereas the AAA Arbitration Rules delegate to the arbitrator the determination regarding arbitrability, the plaintiff’s claim that the arbitration agreement unlawfully deprives the plaintiff of various statutory remedies was an issue to be adjudicated by the arbitrator, not by the court); Qualcomm Inc. v. Nokia Corp., 466 F.3d 1366, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Apollo Computer. Inc. v. Berg, 886 F.2d 469, 473 (1st Cir. 1989).

The holding of the United States Supreme Court in First Options, supra, and the federal case law cited are consistent with the holdings of the local legal system on the subject of contracts. Ultimately, “arbitration is an inherently contractual legal concept.” Méndez Acevedo, supra, at page 367; Município Mayagüez, supra, U.C.P.R. v. Triangle

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Engineering Corp., 136 D.P.R. 133, 144 (1994); see, also, Granite Rock Co. v. Int’l Broth. of Teamsters, 130 S. Ct. 2847, 2857 (2010) (in English, “[Where] parties concede that they have agreed to arbitrate some matters pursuant to an arbitration clause, the “law’s permissive policies in respect to arbitration” counsel that “any doubts concerning the scope of arbitral issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration.”)

Thus, with respect to arbitration, compliance with what has been agreed to in writing may be demanded. See Crufon Const., supra, at page 204; Município de Ponce v. Gobernador, 136 D.P.R. 776, 783 (1994). In turn, when the terms of a contract are clear and do not present any ambiguity, the provisions thereof are to be applied according to the literal meaning given to them by the parties. See Article 1233 of the Civil Code, supra, § 3471. Once it is determined that this is what the parties agreed to, the adjudicator must resolve the controversies between the parties in compliance with what has been stipulated. See C. F.S.E. v. Unión de Médicos, 170 D.P.R. 443 (2007).

To summarize, in the case at bar, the arbitration clause incorporates, by express reference, the Commercial Arbitration Rules of the AAA, which, in turn, delegate to the arbitrator – in a clear and unequivocal manner – the authority to determine his own jurisdiction. Therefore, to follow the authorities cited here, it is proper for this Honorable Court to order Jane Doe to proceed with the arbitration proceeding that she agreed to, as it is the arbitrator that is to decide whether he has authority to hear her claims on the merits.

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It was so agreed to by the parties, with no ambiguity whatsoever, and this constitutes the law between the parties. See HIETEL v. Puerto Rico Telephone Company, 2011 T.S.P.R. 100.

C. In the Alternative, the Issues in the Case at Bar Are Subject to Arbitration Given that There Is No Employer-Employee Relationship Between Jane Doe and the Appearing Parties and the Arbitration Clause Covers Her Claims

In the alternative, if this Honorable Court holds that it has jurisdiction to determine the arbitrability of Jane Doe’s claims, which we refute, it is still proper that an order be issued compelling arbitration. As we have maintained, Jane Doe bases her position on the premise that she is an employee of the appearing parties and, therefore, her claims are not covered by the arbitration clause because it only relates to commercial matters and not to labor. Jane Doe is incorrect.

First of all, Jane Doe has been a Capital Member of CRL since 1987 and, in such capacity, she has been a co-owner of CRL for about twenty-five (25) years, that is, during the period relevant to her claim. Furthermore, Jane Doe was a member of the management board of CRL from 2009 to 2012, the committee at the highest point of the hierarchy in the organizational chart of CRL. (See the Extrajudicial Claim of January 24, 2012, page 5, Exhibit 3, submitted under seal.)

As a member of the management board, Jane Doe was one of seven (7) capital members of CRL in charge of – among other functions – formulating CRL long-term strategic plans and policies, supervising the functions of its General Manager, approving the

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annual budgets, approving criteria for compensation, and approving the compensation of the members. (See Sections 4.06 and 4.07 of the Agreement, page 13, Exhibit 1.)

In view of that, it must be concluded that Jane Doe has no grounds to allege that she is an employee of CRL. Such allegation is simply a legal absurdity. It is so deemed by the principles of case law discussed below, which decisively characterize Jane Doe as an “employer” herself, and not an “employee,” for the purposes of the social legislation for the protection of workers that she invoked in her Complaint.

The United States Supreme Court has set forth six (6) criteria for guiding and facilitating a determination regarding whether an individual is an “employer” or “employee,” to wit: (i) the ability to hire and discharge employees; (ii) supervision of employees; (iii) supervision by other individuals; (iv) ability to have influence on the organization; (v) intent of the parties; (vi) and the sharing by the individual in the profits, losses, and obligations of the organization. Clackamas Gastroenterology Associates, P.C, v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440, 449-50 (2003). None of these factors is decisive. Id., at page 451. According to the highest federal court, an “employer” “is the person or group of persons who are the owners and manage the organization.” Id., at page 450 (translation ours).

A priori, it is reasonable to conclude that, as a Capital Member of CRL for more than two (2) decades and a member of the highest directing body of CRL for three years, Jane Doe necessarily belongs to the “group of persons who are the owners and manage the organization.” Id. As a factual matter,

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in illustration, in 2010 Jane Doe – as a member of the management board of CRL – approved reductions in the compensation for two (2) capital members of CRL, on the basis of their performance. Also, in 2011 Jane Doe approved compensation freezes and reductions for various persons, including another Capital Member of CRL. These facts make it patently evident that Jane Doe did not act as an “employee” as she has alleged, but rather as an “employer” or, what amounts to the same thing, one of the co-owners of CRL.

In applying the factors from Clackamas, supra, the Third Circuit of the Federal Court of Appeals upheld the determination of a district court that a shareholder and manager of a law firm was not an “employee” for the purposes of Title VII. See Kirleis v. Dickie, McCarney & Chilcote, P.C., 09-4498, 2010 WL 2780927 (3rd Cir. 2010) (Refer to the copy of the case attached as Exhibit 4.) Even though the plaintiff in that case argued that the Executive Committee (to which she did not belong) made the decisions on compensation and exercised other management functions, the Court determined that she was not an employee.

The Court reasoned that the plaintiff in that case had the ability to participate in the management of the firm, the right not to be removed for cause without the vote of ¾ of the Board of Directors, and the right to share in a percentage of the profits, losses, and obligations of the firm. Id., at page 2. Likewise, Jane Doe had the authority to participate in the management of CRL, could not be removed without the vote of ¾ of the other capital members, and had the right to share in the profits, losses, and

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obligations of CRL during the period pertinent to her claim. (See the Agreement, Sections [blank].) Moreover, unlike the plaintiff in Kirleis, supra, Jane Doe was a member of the management board, the directing body with the greatest decision-making authority in CRL, from 2009 to 2012, and this is what most convincingly argues in favor of determining that Jane Doe is actually an “owner” and not an “employee.”

Although preceding the decision by the Federal Supreme Court in Clackamas, supra, what the First Circuit Court of Appeals determined in Serapión v. Martínez. 119 F.3d 982 (1st Cir. 1997), is also highly persuasive. In that case the Court concluded that an equity partner of a law firm was ineligible to raise claim under Title VII given that the mentioned statute only offered protection to employees. In so holding, the Court examined the following criteria: (i) proprietary interest; (ii) remuneration; (iii) and management. Id., at page 990. These factors are in line with the criteria outlined by the Supreme Court in Clackamas, supra, and are supported by common sense. Jane Doe, like the plaintiff in Serapión, supra, has a proprietary interest in CRL, her compensation depends substantially on the profits of CRL, and she enjoyed voting rights within the main directing body of CRL. In other words, Jane Doe, like the plaintiff in the mentioned case, Margarita Serapión, cannot be considered an “employee”5.

5 It is worth mentioning that the case would be otherwise if Jane Doe were not a Capital Member. In such hypothetical scenario, Jane Doe could be considered an “employee” for the purposes of the laws that she invokes, as held by the Supreme Court in Belk Arce v. Martinez y Otros, 146 D.P.R. 215 (1998). (This was an

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By virtue of that set forth above, Jane Doe’s position that the claims herein are of a labor nature and, as such, are excluded from the arbitration clause in the Agreement is untenable. Absent an employment relationship, a discussion of labor claims is irrelevant. Jane Doe acted as co-owner of CRL and her relationship with the appearing parties was governed by the Agreement.

Jane Doe is trying to create a smokescreen, with the sole purpose of disguising a controversy that is truly contractual, arising between co-owners, under the Agreement, and deriving from rifts and differences between her and the directing body. That is all it is. And her sole objective is to concoct “employment discrimination” from a claim of a contractual nature between capital members that would require Jane Doe, prima facie, to arbitrate the matter in accordance with the arbitration clause contained in the Agreement.

Compensation of the members of CRL is governed by the Agreement. Specifically, Sections 5.01 to 5.06 thereof. (See the Agreement, pages 20-22, Exhibit 1.) So, any rift or difference that may have arisen with regard to the compensation of a capital member is a subject matter covered by the obligation to arbitrate her claims, as the parties agreed to by means of the Agreement. Jane Doe cannot escape this reality and pretend to erase, in one bold stroke, her obligation to

action decided under Law 100 of June 30, 1959, as amended, brought by an attorney at law who was not an equity partner of a law firm.) However, this case does not apply to the issue in the case at bar, given that Jane Doe was a Capital Member of CRL and, therefore, an “employer” pursuant to the authorities cited here.

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arbitrate any controversy between her and CRL and the other capital members of CRL.

The Agreement signed between Jane Doe and CRL constitutes the law between them. Jane Doe is prevented from litigating her claims against CRL and the other Capital Members of CRL before the courts, given that it has been so freely and voluntarily agreed. Pacta Sunt Servanda is the principle that safeguards the obligation of arbitration that the parties have under the Agreement. Therefore, the courts cannot discharge one party from what such party has undertaken to perform by means of a contract when the contract is lawful, valid, and does not contain any defect. See Mercado Rivera v. U.C.P.R., 143 D.P.R. 610 (1997); Cervecería Corona v. Commonwealth Ins. Co., 115 D.P.R. 345 (1984).

Our Supreme Court has been consistent in expressing that a strong public policy exists in Puerto Rico in favor of arbitration as an alternative method for disputes resolution. See Pain Webber v. Service Concepts, Inc., 151 D.P.R. 307 (2000). When there is an agreement in a contract regarding an obligation to arbitrate, the courts refer to “a strong public policy in favor of arbitration … and [a]ny doubt that may exist should be resolved in favor of arbitration.” Id.

In addition, the Puerto Rico Supreme Court has emphasized that arbitration clauses in line with the FAA are valid and irrevocable and the courts do not have discretion with regard to their effectiveness. Medina Betancourt v. La Cruz Azul, 155 D.P.R. 732 (2001). Therefore, when a covenant is made where the parties undertake to submit to arbitration such controversies as may arise under it the courts must “respect the intent of the parties and implement the

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agreement, ordering that the matter be resolved first in arbitration.” Id.

In line with that, and following the federal model, the Puerto Rico Supreme Court has called upon the judiciary to take the prudent course of refraining from judicial involvement when an arbitration agreement is present. That applies once arbitration has been agreed to and the courts lack discretion regarding the effectiveness thereof and must allow implementation of the arbitration agreed to. Méndez Acevedo, supra, at page 368.

Furthermore, there is a policy in Puerto Rico that favors the exhaustion of arbitration procedures. See Junta de Relaciones del Trabajo v. Junta de Administración del Muelle del Municipio de Ponce, 122 D.P.R. 318 (1988). As a factual matter, our highest court has not hesitated to hold that parties must exhaust contractual remedies before resorting to the courts unless due cause for ignoring them exists. See Pagán v. Fundación Hospital Dr. Pila, 114 D.P.R. 224 (1983).

The fact is, if Jane Doe voluntarily committed herself to arbitration, she cannot now claim the right to bring the matter before the court. Jane Doe must comply with what was agreed to and submit her claim to arbitration as provided for in the Agreement and she cannot evade her contractual obligations by making use of the courts as a subterfuge and nor can she characterize as “employment discrimination” claims that arise from differences between co-owners of CRL.

Upon the grounds set forth above the appearing parties maintain that if this Court holds that it has jurisdiction to determine the arbitrability of Jane

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Doe’s claims, which eventuality we refute as we maintain that it pertains to the arbitrator to decide this, it is proper that it order that she proceed with the arbitration that she voluntarily agreed to and that has already been commenced by CRL. Jane Doe should be required to comply with the Agreement and submit her allegations to the arbitrator, as was agreed.

D. FAA and Its Application in to Present Case

Two (2) recent cases from the United States Supreme Court prevent Jane Doe from avoiding her obligation to arbitrate her claims (in English, “any Claim”) against the co-defendants. Last year the United States Supreme Court reaffirmed that the FAA preempts any state law that constitutes an obstacle to the objective of Congress of allowing implementation of arbitration agreements. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepción, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1753 (2011) (“Concepción”). Furthermore, the United States Supreme Court indicated that the States cannot require proceedings that are inconsistent with the FAA even if their result would be desirable for other reasons. Id., at page 1753. On the contrary, courts must implement arbitration agreements according to their own terms. Id., at page 1742. Furthermore, in Marmet Health Care Center, Inc. v. Brown, 132 S. Ct. 1201 (2012) (“Marmet”), the United States Supreme Court held that the FAA holds the field and preempts any state public policy that may prohibit arbitration in certain types of negligence cases.

Without doubt, the mentioned cases require that this Honorable Court implement the covenant of

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submission to arbitration in Section 14 of the Agreement signed by the parties.

Even in instances where the parties have not agreed to submit to arbitration controversies regarding substantive arbitrability, courts are tending to allow the controversy to be resolved initially by the arbitrator when arbitrability cannot be determined without going into the merits of the controversy. Elkouri & Elkouri, How Arbitrations Works, (BNA Books, 6th Edition 2003), at page 281. (“However, even though the agreement does not expressly leave the determination of arbitrability to the arbitrator, and in spite of the fact that the parties have first gone to court, courts have left the initial determination to the arbitrator. This was the result, for instance, where arbitrability could not be determined without delving into the merits....”)

Thus, in Camden Indus. Co. v. Carpenters Local 1688, 353 F.3d 178 (1st Cir. 1969),

the First Circuit Court of Appeals held:

[English:]

In these circumstances we believe the matter should proceed to arbitration, where the arbitrator may determine the subsidiary facts upon which depend both the merits of the controversy and his jurisdiction to decide it. A finding of jurisdiction, unlike a finding on the merits when jurisdiction is not in question...will not be insulated from subsequent judicial review... We believe full recognition of the role of labor arbitration requires court intervention in a case such as this only when it has become absolutely

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necessary, viz., on a petition to vacate or enforce the award.

Id.

This is the very situation that has arisen in the case at bar. What Jane Doe is inviting the Honorable Court to do is to hear the merits of the controversy regarding whether or not she is an employee as an issue preliminary to adjudicating the arbitrability of her claims. Clearly, this is an issue that, from all perspectives, pertains to the arbitrator to resolve.

E. The FAA Recognizes a Strong Public Policy in Favor of Arbitration that Requires the Implementation of Arbitration as and to the Extent Agreed To

This Honorable Court should compel Jane Doe to submit her claims in the forum agreed to by the parties, that is, arbitration before the AAA. This is the case, given that a strong federal public policy exists in favor of arbitration requiring that arbitration agreements are to be presumed valid and enforceable6. The United States Supreme Court has

6 Arbitration agreements are accorded a strong presumption of validity:

[English] Where a written contract contains an arbitration clause, there is a presumption of arbitrability in the sense that a request for an order compelling arbitration should not be denied by the Court, unless it may be said with positive assurance that the arbitration clause is not susceptible of an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute. Doubts should be resolved in favor of coverage.

Codecom, Inc. v. Alcatel Standard. S.A., 103 F.Supp.2d 65, 68-69 (D.P.R. 2000); See, also, Jorge-Colon v. Mandara Spa Puerto Rico, 685 F.Supp. 2d

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stated the following with regard to this strong public policy:

[English:]

[The FAA] is a congressional declaration of a liberal policy favoring arbitration agreements, notwithstanding any state substantive or procedural policies to the contrary.

****

[I]n enacting § 2 of the federal Act, Congress declared a national policy favoring arbitration and withdrew the power of the states to require a judicial forum for the resolution of claims which the contracting parties agreed to resolve by arbitration.

Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 489 (1987) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). See, also, Concepción, 131 S. Ct. 1745, 1748 ([English] “The FAA was enacted in 1925 in response to widespread judicial hostility to arbitration

280, 283 (D.P.R. 2010) (“[Q]uestions of arbitrability must be addressed with a healthy regard for the federal policy favoring arbitration... and as a matter of federal law, any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration, whether the problem at hand is the construction of the contract language itself or an allegation of waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability” (internal quotation marks omitted)); PaineWebber Inc. v. Elahi, 87 F.3d 589, 595 (1st Cir. 1996) (“the Supreme Court has established a broad presumption of arbitrability”); Brennan v. King, 139 F.3d 258, 264 (1st Cir. 1998) (“In FAA cases, the Supreme Court precedents instruct courts to use a particular hermeneutic principle for interpreting the breadth of the agreement, viz., the presumption of arbitrability” (internal quotation marks omitted)); World Films, Inc. v. Paramount Pict. Corp., 125 D.P.R. 352, 362 (1990) (“There is ... a presumption of “arbitrability” when the contract has an arbitration clause.”)

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agreements.... The overarching purpose of the FAA, evident in the text of §§ 2, 3, and 4, is to ensure the enforcement of arbitration agreements according to their terms so as to facilitate streamlined proceedings.”) (internal quotation marks omitted and emphasis added).

F. The FAA Preempts and Outlaws Any State Law that Constitutes an Obstacle to Implementing Covenants for Arbitration Pursuant to the Terms of the Agreement

Jane Doe alleges that she should not be compelled to arbitrate her claims. Specifically, she alleges the following:

24. On March 22, 2012, CRL submitted a request for arbitration (in English, “Demand for Arbitration”) to the AAA …. .

25. By means of that request, CRL intends to interfere with the exercise of the jurisdiction of the Court to hear the complaint. If it were to prevail, it would succeed in preventing JANE DOE from exercising her rights to submit a complaint before this Honorable Court setting forth her claims of violation of constitutional rights, occupational discrimination, and retaliations, as well as injunction and damages under the Constitution and laws of the [ELA].

See the Complaint, at page 4.

This intention on the part of Jane Doe to avoid her obligation to arbitrate her claims against the co-defendants is contrary to the federal public policy established by means of the FAA and is not in compliance with the law, as demonstrated below.

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The United States Supreme Court clearly established in Concepción that the FAA preempts and displaces all laws of the States impeding achievement of the objectives of Congress in favor of the implementation of covenants for arbitration. See 131 S. Ct., at page 1753. This is the case, considering the fact that the general purpose of the FAA is to ensure the implementation of arbitration agreements in accordance with their own terms for the purposes of facilitating more efficient proceedings. Id., at page 1748. Given that arbitration is a contractual matter, the FAA requires that courts honor the expectations of the parties. Id., at page 1752. This whole policy strongly in favor of arbitration prevents arbitration agreements from being invalidated by defenses that apply only to arbitration and derive their significance from the fact that a covenant for arbitration is involved. Id., at page 1746.

Just one and a half months ago the United States Supreme Court, in Marmet, 132 S. Ct. 1201 (2012), held that the West Virginia Supreme Court had erred in applying the public policy of that State, which prohibits upholding the validity of an arbitration clause contained in an old-age home membership agreement signed prior to the occurrence of an instance of negligence resulting in bodily injury or death. Specifically, the United States Supreme Court indicated the following, citing Concepción:

[English:]

[W]hen state law prohibits outright the arbitration of a particular type of claim, the analysis is straightforward: The conflicting rule is displaced by the FAA. ... West Virginia’s prohibition against predispute

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agreements to arbitrate personal-injury or wrongful-death claims against nursing home is a categorical rule prohibiting arbitration of a particular type of claim, and that rule is contrary to the terms and coverage of the FAA.

Id., at pages 1203-04 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

Based on that, there can be no doubt that the FAA preempts any statutory provision or provision under the Constitution of Puerto Rico that fails to implement and recognize a commitment made by the parties to resolve “any Claim” by means of the arbitration procedure agreed to in Section 14 of the Agreement. It is thus proper for this Honorable Court to order Jane Doe to arbitrate her claims against the co-defendants.

G. The FAA Applies to Contracts in Interstate Commerce and Therefore the Agreement Is

Covered by It

[English:]

“[A] trial court evaluating a contract connected to some economic or commercial activity would rarely, if ever, refuse to compel arbitration on the ground that the transactions lacked “involvement” in interstate commerce”

SCI v. Fulmer, 883 So.2d 621,629 (Ala. 2003) (emphasis added).

It is an established rule that the FAA applies to contracts in interstate commerce. See § 2 of the FAA7; World Films, Inc., supra, at page 357 (the FAA

7 § 2 of the FAA, to the extent pertinent, provides as follows: [English:]

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“applies to contracts in interstate commerce….”). Indeed, the Agreement is a contract in interstate commerce because, among other reasons, it governs the proprietary interests of the parties and the operations of CRL in Puerto Rico and at its offices outside of Puerto Rico. See SCI v. Fulmer, 883 So.2d 621, 629 (Ala 2003) ([English] “[I]t would be difficult indeed to give an example of an economic or commercial activity that one could...declare beyond the reach of Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause, and, by extension, under the FAA.”) (emphasis ours)8. Furthermore, a great majority of its clients are

A written provision in...a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract...shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable ....

9 USCA § 2 (emphasis added). 8 See, also, Thomas H. Oehmke, Commercial Arbitration § 3:6 (2011) (“A contract needs only the slightest nexus to interstate commerce to apply the FAA.”); 21 Willinston on Contracts § 57: (4th ed. 2011) (“Consistent with the broad approach to interpreting the term “involving commerce” in the (FAA), it has been said that a contract containing an arbitration provision need only be related to commerce to fall within the coverage of the Act.”) (emphasis added); Bowen v. Security Pest Control, Inc., 879 So.2d 1139, 1142 (Ala. 2003) (holding that the transaction involved interstate commerce, in part because one of the parties to the transaction did business in the two States). In fact, the authority of Congress under the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution is so broad that, in the last 75 years, only two cases before the United States Supreme Court have held that Congress exceeded its powers under the mentioned Commerce Clause. See U.S. v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995); US v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000). Note that none of the statutes at issue in these cases was aimed at governing transactions of a purely economic nature but, rather, criminal conduct of a non-economic nature.

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located outside of Puerto Rico (mainly in the United States), which requires that CRL and its clients maintain constant communications as part of the operations thereof by means of the use of mail, the internet, telephone, and other means of interstate communications. Also of significance in this regard are the economic nature of the Agreement and the fact that the following federal statutes, among others, apply to the relationship between CRL and those who are appropriately considered employees: 1) Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-78; 2) Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654; 3) Family Medical Leave Act of 2000, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17; 4) Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964; and 5) Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34. So, it is clear that, like the contracts in the Allied-Bruce and Citizens cases, the Agreement is a contract in interstate commerce to which the FAA is applicable.

Therefore, by virtue of the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution9, the FAA preempts any statutory provision or provision under the Constitution of Puerto Rico that fails to implement and recognize a commitment made by the parties to resolve “any Claim” by means of the arbitration procedure agreed to in Section 14 of the Agreement. Such procedure commenced on March 22, 2012, by means of the submittal of the [English:] Demand for Arbitration to the AAA. In view of this circumstance,

9 In Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984), the United States Supreme Court held that when a state law directly conflicts with § 2 of the FAA it violates the Supremacy Clause.

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the FAA requires that this procedure proceed without further intervention from this Honorable Court than what may be necessary in order to compel arbitration.

III. CONCLUSION

The appearing parties have provided to this Honorable Court weighty and decisive grounds in support of their position that it is within the jurisdiction of the arbitrator to decide the controversies covered by the Agreement, that no employee-employer relationship exists between Jane Doe and the appearing parties, that this is nothing more than an attempt on the part of Jane Doe to shirk her contractual obligations under the Agreement, that her claims are susceptible to arbitration under the Agreement, that the Agreement is covered by the FAA, and that the compulsory arbitration agreed to by the parties should be ordered to take place.

UPON WHICH GROUNDS the appearing parties respectfully request that this Honorable Court, in accordance with the grounds outlined herein, dismiss the Complaint for lack of jurisdiction and that it compel Jane Doe to submit to arbitration. Furthermore, the appearing parties respectfully request that Jane Doe and/or her attorneys at law be ordered to pay the costs, expenses, and attorneys’ fees applicable.

In San Juan, Puerto Rico, today, April 11, 2012.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.

I DO CERTIFY: That, on this same date, I have personally delivered and sent by regular mail a true and accurate copy of the present document to Jane

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Doe’s attorneys at law Juan R. González Muñoz, Esq., González Muñoz Law Office, P.S.C., P.O. Box 9024055, San Juan, PR 00902-4055 and Manuel Porro Vizcarra, Esq., Manuel Porro Vizcarra Law Offices, 382 Ave. Escorial, Urb. Caparra Heights, San Juan, PR 00920.

MENDOZA LAW OFFICES Attorney for the Defendants PO Box 9282 San Juan, Puerto Rico 00908-0282 Tel. (787) 722-5522; 5530; 5540 Fax (787) 723-7057 email: mendozalo@yahoo.com

/s/ Enrique J. Mendoza Méndez TSPR-8304

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The LanguageWorks, Inc. 1123 Broadway New York, NY 10010 Tel. 212 447 6060 Fax 212 447 6257

LanguageWorks

STATE OF NEW YORK ) ) ss: COUNTY OF NEW YORK )

CERTIFICATION

This is to certify that the accompanying, to the best of my knowledge and belief, is a true and accurate translation from Spanish into English of a Motion to Compel filed in the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico by Enrique J. Mendoza Mendez, Esq. on April 11, 2012, completed on December 12, 2012.

/s/ Christine Muller Vice President The LanguageWorks, Inc.

Sworn to and subscribed before me this 12th day of December, 2012

/s/ Notary Public

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APPENDIX G

ESTADO LIBRE ASOCIADO DE PUERTO RICO TRIBUNAL DE APELACIONES

REGIÓN JUDICIAL DE SAN JUAN

JANE DOE,

Demandante- Recurrida

v.

COMPAÑÍA DE RESPONSABILIDAD LIMITADA (“CRL”); FULANO DE TAL, personalmente, en su carácter de patrono de JANE DOE y como co-administrador de la Sociedad Legal de Bienes Gananciales (“SLG”) constituida con FULANA DE TAL, quien es demandada como co-administradora de la SLG constituida con Fulano de Tal; “SLG Fulano y Fulana de Tal” constituida por Fulano y Fulana de Tal; SUTANO DE CUAL personalmente, en su carácter de patrono de JANE DOE y como co-administrador de la SLG constituida con SUTANA DE CUAL, quien es demandada como co-administradora de la “SLG Sutano y Sutana de Cual” constituida con Sutano de Cual; “SLG Sutano y Sutana” constituida por Sutano y Sutana de Cual; ESPERENCEJO MAS CUAL personalmente, en su carácter de patrono de JANE DOE y como co-administrador de la SLG constituida con ESPERENCEJA MAS CUAL, quien es demandada como co-administradora de la SLG constituida con Esperencejo Mas Cual; “SLG Esperencejo Y Esperenceja Mas Cual” constituida por Esperencejo Y Esperenceja Más Cual; Demandados Desconocidos A,

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B y C; Demandadas Compañías Aseguradoras, Desconocidas X, Y, Z,

Demandados-– Peticionarios.

___________

NÚM.CASO TA.:

___________

NÚM.CASO TPI: KPE 2012-1204 (904) SALA DE SAN JUAN

___________

CONFIDENCIAL

165a

MOCIÓN SOMETIENDO BAJO SELLO

“SOLICITUD DE CERTIORARI” Y SOLICITUD

AL AMPARO DE LA REGLA 70(D)

COMPARECEN los demandados-peticionarios,1

Compañía de Responsabilidad Limitada (“CRL”),

Fulano de Tal y la Sociedad Legal de Bienes

Gananciales (“SLG”) constituida con Fulana de Tal,

Sutano de Cual y la SLG constituida con Sutana de

Cual y Esperencejo Más Cual y la SLG constituida

con Esperenceja Más Cual y respetuosamente

someten bajo sello su Solicitud de Certiorari y una

Solicitud al Amparo de la Regla 70(d) para la

Aceptación de Solicitud de Certiorari Que Excede el

Máximo de Páginas Reglamentarias y solicitan del

Tribunal que los documentos, y los procedimientos

apelativos así iniciados, se mantengan confidenciales

y bajo sello por los fundamentos expuestos a

continuación:

1 Por razones de estricta confidencialidad las partes de este pleito no están identificadas con sus respectivos nombres. En la Declaración Jurada Bajo Sello de la demandante-recurrida sometida junto con la Demanda y las subsiguientes enmiendas, dicha parte identificó a cada uno de los demandados recurridos con sus respectivos nombres, direcciones y teléfonos. (Apéndice Solicitud de Certiorari (“Ap. TA”, págs. 12-13; 303-305; y 506.)

166a

1. El recurso de certiorari de epígrafe tiene su

origen en un pleito de sentencia declaratoria e

injunction incoado por Jane Doe, quien fue Miembro

Capital de la demandada CRL. Según se explica en

la Solicitud de Certoriari, media entre las partes una

cláusula de arbitraje que requiere que cualquier

disputa entre las partes se ventile de forma

confidencial. (Ap. TA., págs. 97-98.) Además los

Miembros Capitales presentes y pasados de CRL

tienen un deber de mantener confidencial toda

información relacionada a los asuntos de la firma

(“business of the firm”). (Ap. TA., pág. 93.)

2. De conformidad con la obligación de

confidencialidad impuesta por la cláusula de

arbitraje, la demandante- recurrida, Jane Doe,

comenzó los procedimientos ante el Tribunal de

Primera Instancia (“TPI”) bajo sello y los mismos se

han mantenido confidenciales hasta la fecha. (Ap.

TA., págs. 132-133.)

3. En cumplimiento de sus obligaciones de

confidencialidad, CRL y los demás demandados por

este medio someten su Solicitud de Certiorari y una

Solicitud al Amparo de la Regla 70(d) para la

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Aceptación de Solicitud de Certoriari Que Excede el

Máximo de Páginas Reglamentarías y solicitan del

Tribunal que los documentos, y los procedimientos

apelativos así iniciados, se mantegan confidenciales y

bajo sello.

4. Anejo la portada de la Solicitud de Certiorari,

la cual incluye toda la información requerida por las

Reglas de este Honorable Tribunal y el

correspondiente sello de Rentas Internas.

POR TODO LO CUAL, los demandados-peticionarios,

Compañía de Responsabilidad Limitada (“CRL”),

Fulano de Tal y la Sociedad Legal de Bienes

Gananciales (“SLG”) constituida con Fulana de Tal,

Sutano de Cual y la SLG constituida con Sutana de

Cual y Esperencejo Más Cual y la SLG constituida

con Esperenceja Más Cual y respetuosamente

someten bajo sello su Solicitud de Certiorari y

solicitan del Tribunal que los documentos y

procedimientos apelativos así iniciados se mantengan

confidenciales.

Respetuosamente sometido.

CERTIFICO que he notificado copia fiel y exacta del

presente escrito, simultáneamente con su

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presentación, por correo electrónico y mensajero a los

abogados de la parte demandante-recurrida, el Lcdo.

Juan R. González Muñoz, González Muñoz Law

Office, 261 Tetuán, San Juan, Puerto Rico 00901-

1916; jrgmlaw@gmail.com; y el Lcdo. Manuel Porro

Vizcarra, Manuel Porro Vizcarra Law Offices, 382

Ave. Escorial, Urb. Caparra Heights, San Juan, PR

00920; mpv@mpvlawpr.com.

En San Juan, Puerto Rico, hoy 12 de junio de 2012.

MENDOZA LAW OFFICES Abogados de los

Demandados-Peticionarios PO Box 9282

San Juan, Puerto Rico 00908-0282

Teléfonos: (787) 722-5522; 5530; 5540

Fax: (787) 723-7057

Por: /s/

Enrique J. Mendoza Mérrdez

TSPR-8304

mendozalo@yahoo.com

169a

ESTADO LIBRE ASOCIADO DE PUERTO RICO TRIBUNAL DE APELACIONES

REGIÓN DE SAN JUAN

JANE DOE,

Demandante- Recurrida

v.

COMPAÑÍA DE RESPONSABILIDAD LIMITADA (“CRL”); FULANO DE TAL, personalmente, en su carácter de patrono de JANE DOE y como co-administrador de la Sociedad Legal de Bienes Gananciales (“SLG”) constituida con FULANA DE TAL, quien es demandada como co-administradora de la SLG constituida con Fulano de Tal; “SLG Fulano y Fulana de Tal” constituida por Fulano y Fulana de Tal; SUTANO DE CUAL personalmente, en su carácter de patrono de JANE DOE y como co-administrador de la SLG constituida con SUTANA DE CUAL, quien es demandada como co-administradora de la “SLG Sutano y Sutana de Cual” constituida con Sutano de Cual; “SLG Sutano y Sutana” constituida por Sutano y Sutana de Cual; ESPERENCEJO MAS CUAL personalmente, en su carácter de patrono de JANE DOE y como co-administrador de la SLG constituida con ESPERENCEJA MAS CUAL, quien es demandada como co-administradora de la SLG constituida con Esperencejo Mas Cual; “SLG Esperencejo Y Esperenceja Mas Cual” constituida por Esperencejo Y Esperenceja Más Cual; Demandados Desconocidos A, B y C; Demandadas Compañías Aseguradoras, Desconocidas X, Y, Z,

Demandados-– Peticionarios.

170a

___________

NÚM.CASO TA.:

___________

NÚM.CASO TPI: KPE 2012-1204 (904) SALA DE SAN JUAN

___________

CONFIDENCIAL

Naturaleza: Certiorari Civil

Materia: Sentencia Declaratoria; Injunction Preliminar y Permanente; Violación a la Política Pública y Derechos Constitucionales; Represalias; Daños y Perjuicios

Asunto: Denegación de Resolución de Referir Caso a Arbitraje Validamente Pactado

171a

Abogados de la Demandante- Recurrida Jane Doe:

Abogados de los Demandados- Peticionarios

Lcdo. Juan Rafael González Muñoz

TSPR-8185 GONZALEZ MUÑOZ

LAW OFFICE, P.S.C.

PO Box 9024055 San Juan, P.R. 00902-

4055 Tel. (787)766-5052 Fax: (787)766-5551 jrgmlaw@gmail.com

polonorteprlaw@gmail.com

Lcdo. Manuel Porro Vizcarra

TSPR-7994 MANUEL PORRO VIZCARRA LAW

OFFICES 382 Avenida Escorial Urb. Caparra Heights San Juan, P.R. 00920

Tel. (787)774-8200 Fax: (787)774-8297

mpv@mpvlawpr.com

Lcdo. Enrique J. Mendoza Méndez

TSPR-8304 MENDOZA LAW

OFFICES PO Box 9282

San Juan, P.R. 00908-0282

Tel. (787)722-5522;5530;5540

Fax: (787)723-7057 mendoza@yahoo.com

172a

ESTADO LIBRE ASOCIADO DE PUERTO RICO TRIBUNAL DE APELACIONES

REGIÓN JUDICIAL DE SAN JUAN

JANE DOE,

Demandante- Recurrida

v.

COMPAÑÍA DE RESPONSABILIDAD LIMITADA (“CRL”); FULANO DE TAL, personalmente, en su carácter de patrono de JANE DOE y como co-administrador de la Sociedad Legal de Bienes Gananciales (“SLG”) constituida con FULANA DE TAL, quien es demandada como co-administradora de la SLG constituida con Fulano de Tal; “SLG Fulano y Fulana de Tal” constituida por Fulano y Fulana de Tal; SUTANO DE CUAL personalmente, en su carácter de patrono de JANE DOE y como co-administrador de la SLG constituida con SUTANA DE CUAL, quien es demandada como co-administradora de la “SLG Sutano y Sutana de Cual” constituida con Sutano de Cual; “SLG Sutano y Sutana” constituida por Sutano y Sutana de Cual; ESPERENCEJO MAS CUAL personalmente, en su carácter de patrono de JANE DOE y como co-administrador de la SLG constituida con ESPERENCEJA MAS CUAL, quien es demandada como co-administradora de la SLG constituida con Esperencejo Mas Cual; “SLG Esperencejo Y Esperenceja Mas Cual” constituida por Esperencejo Y Esperenceja Más Cual; Demandados Desconocidos A, B y C; Demandadas Compañías Aseguradoras, Desconocidas X, Y, Z,

Demandados-– Peticionarios.

173a

___________

NÚM.CASO TA.:

___________

NÚM.CASO TPI: KPE 2012-1204 (904) SALA DE SAN JUAN

___________

SOLICITUD DE AUTORIZACIÓN BAJO LA REGLA 70(D) PARA LA ACEPTACIÓN DE

SOLICITUD DE CERTIORARI QUE EXCEDE DEL MÁXIMO DE PÁGINAS

REGLAMENTARIAS

AL HONORABLE TRIBUNAL DE APELACIONES:

COMPARECEN los demandados-peticionarios,

Compañía de Responsabilidad Limitada (“CRL”),

Fulano de Tal y la Sociedad Legal de Bienes

Gananciales (“SLG”) constituida con Fulana de Tal,

Sutano de Cual y la SLG constituida con Sutana de

Cual y Esperencejo Más Cual y la SLG constituida

con Esperenceja Más Cual, y respetuosamente

solicitan permiso para presentar su Solicitud de

Certoriari en exceso de tres (3) páginas por los

fundamentos expuestos a continuación.

1. La Regla 34(D) del Reglamento del Tribunal de

Apelaciones dispone que la solicitud de Certoriari no

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excederá de veinticinco (25) páginas. 4 L.P.R.A. Ap.

XXII-B R. 34(D)

2. La Regla 70(D) establece que “[c]uando estas

reglas dispongan un número máximo de páginas para

un escrito, no se aceptará escrito alguno en exceso de

dicho máximo a menos que venga acompañado de

una moción por separado en la que solicite al

tribunal permiso para excederse del máximo

prescrito y se demuestre justa causa”. 4 L.P.R.A.

Ap. XXII-B R. 70. (Énfasis suplido.)

3. Los comparecientes solicitan respetuosamente

que este Honorable Tribunal le exima de cumplir con

el requisito de número máximo de páginas

establecido. A pesar del interés de los comparecientes

de conformar su escrito a la Regla antes citada, la

exposición adecuada y suficiente de los hechos y el

Derecho hizo necesario el que nos excediéramos por

tan sólo tres (3) págs.

4. Exponer en tan sólo veinticinco (25) páginas el

contenido de la Solicitud de Certoriari socavaría

insalvablemente su sentido, claridad y coherencia y

podría dejar fuera argumentos importantes y de peso.

En vista de ello, muy respetuosamente solicitamos

175a

que se autorice que la parte demandada-peticionaria

se exceda en el número de páginas de su escrito,

permitiendo así que los planteamientos que este

Honorable Tribunal de Apelaciones ha de considerar

estén argumentados de una forma clara, completa y

responsable. Ese es el único fin perseguido por los

comparecientes.

POR TODO LO CUAL, la parte demandada-

peticionaria muy respetuosamente solicita que este

Ilustrado Tribunal de Apelaciones autorice la

presentación de la Solicitud de Certoriari con un total

de páginas en exceso de lo contemplado por el

Reglamento del Tribunal.

RESPETUOSAMENTE SOMETIDO.

En San Juan, Puerto Rico, hoy 12 de junio de 2012.

CERTIFICO que he notificado copia fiel y exacta del

presente escrito, simultáneamente con su

presentación, por correo electrónico y mensajero a los

abogados de la parte demandante-recurrida, el Lcdo.

Juan R. González Muñoz, González Muñoz Law

Office, 261 Tetuán, San Juan, Puerto Rico 00901-

176a

1916; jrgmlaw@gmail.com; y el Lcdo. Manuel Porro

Vizcarra, Manuel Porro Vizcarra Law Offices, 382

Ave. Escorial, Urb. Caparra Heights, San Juan, PR

00920; mpv@mpvlawpr.com.

MENDOZA LAW OFFICES

Abogados de los demandados-peticionarios

PO Box 9282

San Juan, Puerto Rico 00908-0282

Teléfonos: (787) 722-5522; 5530; 5540

Fax: (787) 723-7057

Correo elecrónico:

mendozalo@yahoo.com

/s/

Enrique J. Mendoza Méndez

TSPR-8304

177a

ESTADO LIBRE ASOCIADO DE PUERTO RICO TRIBUNAL DE APELACIONES

REGIÓN JUDICIAL DE SAN JUAN

JANE DOE,

Demandante- Recurrida

v.

COMPAÑÍA DE RESPONSABILIDAD LIMITADA (“CRL”); FULANO DE TAL, personalmente, en su carácter de patrono de JANE DOE y como co-administrador de la Sociedad Legal de Bienes Gananciales (“SLG”) constituida con FULANA DE TAL, quien es demandada como co-administradora de la SLG constituida con Fulano de Tal; “SLG Fulano y Fulana de Tal” constituida por Fulano y Fulana de Tal; SUTANO DE CUAL personalmente, en su carácter de patrono de JANE DOE y como co-administrador de la SLG constituida con SUTANA DE CUAL, quien es demandada como co-administradora de la “SLG Sutano y Sutana de Cual” constituida con Sutano de Cual; “SLG Sutano y Sutana” constituida por Sutano y Sutana de Cual; ESPERENCEJO MAS CUAL personalmente, en su carácter de patrono de JANE DOE y como co-administrador de la SLG constituida con ESPERENCEJA MAS CUAL, quien es demandada como co-administradora de la SLG constituida con Esperencejo Mas Cual; “SLG Esperencejo Y Esperenceja Mas Cual” constituida por Esperencejo Y Esperenceja Más Cual; Demandados Desconocidos A, B y C; Demandadas Compañías Aseguradoras, Desconocidas X, Y, Z,

Demandados-– Peticionarios.

178a

___________

NÚM.CASO TA.:

___________

NÚM.CASO TPI: KPE 2012-1204 (904) SALA DE SAN JUAN

___________

CONFIDENCIAL

Naturaleza: Certiorari Civil

Materia: Sentencia Declaratoria; Injunction Preliminar y Permanente; Violación a la Política Pública y Derechos Constitucionales; Represalias; Daños y Perjuicios

Asunto: Denegación de Resolución de Referir Caso a Arbitraje Validamente Pactado

179a

Abogados de la Demandante- Recurrida Jane Doe:

Abogados de los Demandados- Peticionarios

Lcdo. Juan Rafael González Muñoz

TSPR-8185 GONZALEZ MUÑOZ

LAW OFFICE, P.S.C.

PO Box 9024055 San Juan, P.R. 00902-

4055 Tel. (787)766-5052 Fax: (787)766-5551 jrgmlaw@gmail.com

polonorteprlaw@gmail.com

Lcdo. Manuel Porro Vizcarra

TSPR-7994 MANUEL PORRO VIZCARRA LAW

OFFICES 382 Avenida Escorial Urb. Caparra Heights San Juan, P.R. 00920

Tel. (787)774-8200 Fax: (787)774-8297

mpv@mpvlawpr.com

Lcdo. Enrique J. Mendoza Méndez

TSPR-8304 MENDOZA LAW

OFFICES PO Box 9282

San Juan, P.R. 00908-0282

Tel. (787)722-5522;5530;5540

Fax: (787)723-7057 mendoza@yahoo.com

180a

ESTADO LIBRE ASOCIADO DE PUERTO RICO TRIBUNAL DE APELACIONES

REGIÓN JUDICIAL DE SAN JUAN

JANE DOE,

Demandante- Recurrida

v.

COMPAÑÍA DE RESPONSABILIDAD LIMITADA (“CRL”); FULANO DE TAL, personalmente, en su carácter de patrono de JANE DOE y como co-administrador de la Sociedad Legal de Bienes Gananciales (“SLG”) constituida con FULANA DE TAL, quien es demandada como co-administradora de la SLG constituida con Fulano de Tal; “SLG Fulano y Fulana de Tal” constituida por Fulano y Fulana de Tal; SUTANO DE CUAL personalmente, en su carácter de patrono de JANE DOE y como co-administrador de la SLG constituida con SUTANA DE CUAL, quien es demandada como co-administradora de la “SLG Sutano y Sutana de Cual” constituida con Sutano de Cual; “SLG Sutano y Sutana” constituida por Sutano y Sutana de Cual; ESPERENCEJO MAS CUAL personalmente, en su carácter de patrono de JANE DOE y como co-administrador de la SLG constituida con ESPERENCEJA MAS CUAL, quien es demandada como co-administradora de la SLG constituida con Esperencejo Mas Cual; “SLG Esperencejo Y Esperenceja Mas Cual” constituida por Esperencejo Y Esperenceja Más Cual; Demandados Desconocidos A, B y C; Demandadas Compañías Aseguradoras, Desconocidas X, Y, Z,

Demandados-– Peticionarios.

181a

___________

NUM.CASO TA.:

___________

NUM.CASO TPI: KPE 2012-1204 (904) Sala De San Juan

___________

SOLICITUD DE CERTIORARI

AL HONORABLE TRIBUNAL DE APELACIONES:

COMPARECEN los demandados2-peticionarios,

Compañía de Responsabilidad Limitada (“CRL”),

Fulano de Tal y la Sociedad Legal de Bienes

Gananciales (“SLG”) constituida con Fulana de Tal,

Sutano de Cual y la SLG constituida con Sutana de

Cual y Esperencejo Más Cual y la SLG constituida

con Esperenceja Más Cual, y respetuosamente

solicitan la expedición del auto de Certoriari para

revocar la Resolución emitida por el Tribunal de

Primera Instancia (“TPI”) el 4 de junio de 2012 que

2 Por razones de estricta confidencialidad las partes de este pleito no están identificadas con sus respectivos nombres. En la Declaración Jurada Bajo Sello de la demandante-recurrida sometida junto con la Demanda y las subsiguientes enmiendas, dicha parte identificó a cada uno de los demandados- recurridos con sus respectivos nombres, direcciones y teléfonos. (Apéndice Solicitud de Certoriari (“Ap. TA”, págs. 12-13; 303-305; y 506.)

182a

negó compeler a la parte demandante-recurrida a

arbitrar sus reclamos.

I. INTRODUCCIÓN

Mediante la Resolución recurrida en esta Solicitud de

Certiorari, el TPI ha avalado que Jane Doe, una

abogada sofisticada con estudios post-graduados en

Derecho y con 38 años de experiencia en el litigio

comercial y el derecho laboral, incumpla con su

obligación de arbitrar y ventilar confidencialmente

cualquier reclamación o demanda contra CRL. CRL

es una compañía de responsabilidad limitada

organizada bajo las leyes del Estado Libre Asociado

de Puerto Rico, con oficinas principales en San Juan y

una oficina fuera de Puerto Rico que provee servicios

a una clientela foránea y local. (Ap. TA., págs. 38-

126.)

La demandante-recurrida contrajo la obligación de

arbitrar y ventilar confidencialmente cualquier

reclamación o demanda contra CRL en la Sección 14

del Acuerdo Operativo (“Acuerdo”) que suscribió con

los otros Miembros Capitales de CRL, quiénes

también contrajeron dicha obligación. (Ap. TA., págs.

183a

97-99.) La Sección 14 del Acuerdo reza en su primer

párrafo:

It is the intent and purpose of the Firm and any

Claimant to resolve any claim by mediation or

arbitration. The Claimant expressly agrees that the

Claim shall be settled or resolved through the

procedures set forth herein, and shall not in any way

circumvent or otherwise challenge in any way these

proceedings relative to mediation and arbitration.

(Ap. TA., pág. 97.) A pesar del amplísimo alcance de

esta cláusula de arbitraje que abarca “any Claim”, es

decir “cualquier reclamación”,3 la Resolución

recurrida concluyó que Jane Doe no tiene que

someter a arbitraje sus reclamos de represalias,

daños, y discrimen y que las mismas deberán ser

adjudicadas por el Tribunal. (Ap.TA., págs. 484-498.)

Por los fundamentos resumidos a continuación, y

explicados en detalle en esta solicitud, los

demandados-peticionarios solicitan de este Honorable

3 El Acuerdo define “Claim” como “any action, suit, complaint or demand of whatever nature and for whatever relief against the Firm or any of its Members or employees.” (“cualquier acción, pleito, demanda o reclamación de cualquier naturaleza y para cualquier reparación o remedio en contra de la Firma o cualquiera de sus Miembros o empleados.)

184a

Tribunal que expida el recurso de certiorari y revoque

la Resolución recurrida.

Primero, el TPI erróneamente asumió jurisdicción

sobre la controversia de si Jane Doe está obligada a

arbitrar sus reclamos contra CRL y los demás co-

demandados. La cláusula de arbitraje pactada por

Jane Doe y todos los Miembros Capitales de CRL

dispone que el arbitraje ha de regirse por las Reglas

de Arbitraje Comercial de la American Arbitration

Association (“AAA”), las cuales a su vez delegan en el

árbitro la potestad de determinar su jurisdicción y el

alcance de la cláusula de arbitraje. Bajo la

jurisprudencia aplicable ello es evidencia suficiente

en Derecho (clara e inequívoca) de que la intención de

las partes es confiar al árbitro las decisiones sobre

arbitrabilidad, y no a los tribunals.

Segundo, habiendo asumido erróneamente

jurisdicción sobre la disputa en cuanto a

arbitrabilidad, el TPI resolvió incorrectamente la

misma. Para ello tuvo que hacer caso omiso de la

letra clara de la Sección 14.01 del Acuerdo donde los

Miembros Capitales de CLR acordaron someter a

arbitraje cualquier reclamación (“any claim”) sin

185a

importar su naturaleza o el remedio solicitado. Al

actuar así, el TPI desacató la norma de interpretación

prescrita por la Ley Federal de Arbitraje (“FAA”) y su

jurisprudencia interpretativa que requiere que las

dudas sobre arbitrabilidad sean resueltas a favor del

arbitraje. Asimismo, el TPI desacató el principio

elemental de interpretación de contratos bajo el

derecho puertorriqueño de que cuando los términos

de un contrato son claros y no presentan ambigüedad,

sus disposiciones se aplicarán según el sentido literal

que le dieron las partes. Art. 1233 del Código Civil, 31

L.P.R.A. § 3471.

Tercero, y por último, el TPI erró al denegar el

arbitraje pactado por las partes debido a la supuesta

naturaleza “de empleo” o “laboral” y “constitucional”

de los alegados reclamos de Jane Doe. Esta

determinación del TPI viola el FAA, la Cláusula de

Supremacía de la Constitución de los Estados Unidos

y la jurisprudencia interpretativa de ambas que

desplazan (“preempt”) cualquier intento de prohibir el

arbitraje de ciertos tipos de reclamaciones.

186a

II. JURISDICCIÓN

La jurisdicción de este Honorable Tribunal de

Apelaciones (“TA”) para entender en esta Solicitud de

Certoriari surge del Artículo 4.006(b) de la Ley de la

Judicatura del Estado Libre Asociado de Puerto Rico

(2003), 4 L.P.R.A. § 24y(b); las Reglas 31, 32(D), 33-

34 y 40 del Reglamento del TA, 4 L.P.R.A. Ap. XXII-

B, R. 33-34 y 40; y las Reglas 52.1 y 52.2(b) de

Procedimiento Civil de Puerto Rico, 32 L.P.R.A. Ap.

V, R. 52.1 y 52.2(b).

III. DECISIÓN CUYA REVISIÓN SE SOLICITA

CRL y los demás demandados solicitan la revocación

de la Resolución emitida por el TPI en el caso, Jane

Doe v. Compañía de Responsabilidad Limitada et al.,

KPE 2012-1204 (904) (Hon. Juez Ángel R. Pagán

Ocasio), Sala de San Juan, el 4 de junio de 2012, y

enviada a las partes por correo electrónico ese mismo

día (en adelante “Resolución”). (Ap. TA., págs. 484-

498.) La Resolución denegó la Solicitud de

Desestimación por Falta de Jurisdicción y para

Compeler Arbitraje Compulsorio en Vista de Acuerdo

Vinculante de Arbitraje presentada por los

demandados-peticionarios el 11 de abril de 2012 (en

187a

adelante “Solicitud de Desestimación”) (Ap. TA., págs.

38- 126.)

Dado que la Resolución del TPI se notificó el 4 de

junio, el término de 30 días que tienen los

comparecientes para presentar el presente recurso

vence el 5 de julio de 2012.4 Este recurso ha sido

presentado a tiempo y el Tribunal tiene jurisdicción

para entender en el mismo.

Al presente no existe otro recurso sobre este caso

pendiente ante este Tribunal ni ante el Tribunal

Supremo de Puerto Rico.

IV. PROCEDENCIA DE LA EXPEDICIÓN DEL

RECURSO

El presente recurso cumple con los criterios de la

Regla 52.1 de Procedimiento Civil, supra, (“Regla 4 En atención a la naturaleza de la Resolución recurrida -que deniega una solicitud para compeler arbitraje según pactado por las partes- y el hecho de que el TPI tiene plena intención de continuar con los procedimientos ante sí, para lo cual ha ordenado la consolidación del injunction preliminar con el permanente y ordenó a las partes a someter estipulaciones el pasado 8 de junio de 2012, CRL y los demás demandados han presentado junto a esta Solicitud de Certoriari una Moción Urgente en Auxilio de Jurisdicción. En dicha moción se solicita respetuosamente de este Honorable Tribunal que, en auxilio de su jurisdicción, ordene la paralización de los procedimientos del TPI y que se mantenga la confidencialidad de los expedientes e identidad de las partes.

188a

52.1”) y la Regla 40 del Reglamento del TA, supra,

(“Regla 40”) para su expedición.

La Resolución del TPI denegó la moción dispositiva y

para compeler arbitraje presentada por los

demandados-peticionarios. En dicha moción se

planteó que el TPI no tenía jurisdicción sobre la

acción instada por Jane Doe (“Jane”) dado que entre

las partes existe un acuerdo claro e inequívoco que

requiere que las partes sometan cualquier

reclamación entre ellas a arbitraje y que sea el

árbitro el que resuelva cualquier controversia sobre si

las reclamaciones de Jane son arbitrables o no.

Además, los demandados-peticionarios

argumentaron, en la alternativa, que conforme al

pacto de sumisión en cuestión procede que el TPI

ordene a Jane a arbitrar sus reclamos contra éstos.

La Resolución del TPI denegó dichos argumentos y

resuelve, en violación a la fuerte política pública

establecida en la § 2 del FAA y la Ley de Arbitraje de

Puerto Rico (“LAPR”), que: (a) es al TPI al que le

corresponde resolver la controversia sobre

arbitrabilidad, y; (b) que Jane no viene obligada a

arbitrar sus reclamaciones de alegado discrimen

189a

laboral, represalias y daños por no estar éstas

cobijadas por la cláusula de arbitraje suscrita por las

partes. (Ap. TA., págs. 484-498.) El TPI llegó a la

referida conclusión a pesar de que la cláusula de

arbitraje requiere que Jane dilucide toda reclamación

(“any Claim”) contra los demandados-peticionarios

mediante el procedimiento de arbitraje

independientemente de la naturaleza de la

misma. (Ap. TA., págs. 66 (“Claim”); 97-98

(“Resolution of Claim’’).)

Como veremos más adelante, la Resolución del TPI

adolece de la hostilidad hacia el arbitraje que el FAA

pretende erradicar. AT&T Mobility LLC v.

Concepción, 131 S.Ct. 1740, 1745 (2011)(“The FAA

was enacted ... in response to widespread judicial

hostility to arbitration agreements.”)

La Regla 52.1, en lo pertinente, dispone que el

recurso de certiorari solamente será expedido por este

Honorable Tribunal: (1) cuando se recurra de la

denegatoria de una moción de carácter dispositivo, (2)

en casos que revistan interés público o (3) en

cualquier otra situación en la cual esperar a la

apelación constituiría un fracaso irremediable de la

190a

justicia. Las tres excepciones están presentes en este

caso.

La primera excepción de la Regla 52.1 es de

aplicación, pues, como vimos, la Resolución del TPI

denegó la moción dispositiva5 de los demandados-

peticionarios que establece la improcedencia de la

acción judicial instada por Jane dado que las

controversias sobre arbitrabilidad deben ser resueltas

por el propio árbitro y que Jane viene obligada

contractualmente a tramitar todos sus reclamos

mediante un procedimiento confidencial de arbitraje.

La segunda excepción también se satisface

plenamente, pues no existe duda alguna de que tanto

bajo la LAPR como bajo el FAA el arbitraje es materia

revestida del más alto interés público. Perry v.

Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 489 (1987) (“[l]n enacting § 2

of [FAA], Congress declared a national policy

favoring arbitration...”) (Énfasis nuestro);

Constructora Estelar v. Aut. Edif. Pub., 2011 T.S.P.R.

139, pág. 13, 183 D.P.R.____ (“[E]n Puerto Rico existe

una vigorosa política pública a favor del

5 Véase Solicitud de Desestimación por Falta de Jurisdicción y para Compeler Arbitraje Compulsorio en Vista de Acuerdo Vinculante de Arbitraje. (Ap. TA., págs. 38-126.)

191a

arbitraje como método alterno para la solución de

disputas y toda duda sobre si procede o no el arbitraje

debe resolverse a favor de éste conforme ha sido

pactado.”) (Énfasis Nuestro.)

Igualmente, la tercera excepción es de aplicación.

Sería impráctico y constituiría un fracaso

irremediable de la justicia tener que esperar hasta la

resolución final del caso en el foro judicial para poder

presentar una apelación ante este Honorable

Tribunal y plantear como error que los reclamos

planteados por Jane debieron ser adjudicados en un

procedimiento confidencial de arbitraje. A manera de

derecho comparado, en Kansas Gas & Elec. Co. v.

Westighouse Elec. Corp., 861 F.2d 420 (4th Cir. 1988)

(caso resolviendo que las denegatorias de órdenes

compeliendo el arbitraje son apelables

interlocutoriamente), el Tribunal de Apelaciones de

los Estados Unidos para el Cuarto Circuito reconoció

que las órdenes denegando arbitraje pueden causar

daño irreparable si no son revisadas

interlocutoriamente:

[o]rders denying arbitration do have an injunctive

effect and have ‘serious, perhaps, irreparable,

192a

consequence’. The order is injunctive because it

enjoins proceedings in another tribunal. It has

serious consequences because of the

‘irreparable harm that exists when

arbitration is denied ab initio...’ If a party

must undergo the expense and delay of trial before

being able to appeal, the advantages of arbitration-

speed and economy-are lost forever.

Véase 861 F.2d, en la pág. 422; Véase además City of

Meridian Miss, v. Algernon Blair. Inc.. 721 F.2d 525,

529 (5t0 Cir. 1983) (un injunction paralizando un

arbitraje constituye daño irreparable debido a los

costos de litigar). Evidentemente, de este Honorable

Tribunal no intervenir en esta etapa de los

procedimientos, los remedios solicitados por los

demandados-peticionarios se tornarían académicos.

Por otro lado, de no expedirse el auto de Certoriari, se

le estaría permitiendo a Jane burlar su obligación de

someter a arbitraje confidencial toda reclamación, de

cualquier naturaleza, que pudiera tener en contra de

los demandados, obligación que contrajo libre y

voluntariamente.

193a

Además, como veremos a continuación, los criterios

de la Regla 40 para la expedición del recurso de

Certoriari se satisfacen en el presente caso.6 Veamos.

Según se discute a lo largo del presente escrito, la

Resolución del TPI es contraria a derecho y, en

particular, a las normas sobre arbitraje e

interpretación de contratos, pues resuelve que Jane

no está obligada a seguir el procedimiento de

arbitraje que dio inicio el 22 de marzo de 2012 ante el

American Arbitration Association (“AAA”) a pesar de

que el acuerdo entre las partes requiere que Jane

presente en el arbitraje todos sus reclamos contra los

demandados (“resolve any Claim by ...

arbitration”) independiente de la naturaleza de los 6 Dichos criterios son: (A) Si el remedio y la disposición de la decisión recurrida, a diferencia de su fundamentos, son contrario a derecho. (B) Si la situación de hechos planteada es la más indicada para el análisis del problema. (C) Si ha mediado perjuicio, parcialidad o error craso y manifiesto en la apreciación de la prueba por el [TPI]. (D) .... (E) Si la etapa del procedimiento en que se presenta el caso es la más propicia para su consideración. (F) Si la expedición del auto o de la orden de mostrar causa no causan un fraccionamiento indebido del pleito y una dilación indeseable en la solución final del litigio. (G) Si la expedición del auto o de la orden de mostrar causa evita un fracaso de la justicia.

194a

mismos (“any action ... of whatever nature ...

against the Firm or any of its Members...”), En

consecuencia, procede expedir el recurso de Certoriari

de conformidad con el inciso (A) de la Regla 40.

El TPI cometió un error craso en su interpretación y

apreciación de la cláusula de arbitraje. Ello, pues, del

texto de la cláusula de arbitraje en cuestión surge

claramente que es el árbitro quien tiene la obligación

de resolver las controversias planteadas por Jane

ante el foro judicial. En consecuencia, procede expedir

recurso de Certoriari de conformidad con el inciso (C)

de la Regla 40.

Tampoco existe duda de que, de conformidad con el

inciso (B) de la Regla 40, la situación de hechos que

se plantea es la más indicada para el análisis de la

controversia ante este Ilustrado Tribunal, pues para

su resolución sólo se requiere que el Tribunal

interprete la cláusula de arbitraje pactada de

conformidad con el FAA y las normas de

interpretación contractual.

La intervención del Honorable Tribunal en esta etapa

es la más propicia para su consideración, pues de no

paralizarse los trámites ante el TPI, se tornará

195a

académica la obligación de Jane de ventilar sus

reclamos ante el foro arbitral y se causaría daño

irreparable a los demandados-peticionarios al verse

incumplidos los compromisos pactados de llevar a

cabo un procedimiento de arbitraje confidencial.

En consecuencia, a los fines de evitar un fracaso de la

justicia procede expedir el recurso de Certoriari de

conformidad con los incisos (G)-(l) de la Regla 40.

V. RELACIÓN DE HECHOS PROCESALES Y

SUSTANTIVOS MATERIALES DEL CASO

A. Relación de Hechos Procesales.

1. El 2 de abril de 2012, Jane presentó ante el TPI

Demanda Jurada y Solicitud de Sentencia

Declaratoria e Injunction Preliminar y Permanente

(“Demanda”). Jane alegó en la Demanda que no le es

de aplicación la cláusula de arbitraje del “Operating

Agreement” o Acuerdo Operacional de CRL

(“Acuerdo”) arguyendo que ese contrato sólo regula

las operaciones comerciales y administrativas de

CRL. Jane Doe alegó además que sus reclamaciones

son de índole laboral y que éstas están cobijadas por

la Constitución de Puerto Rico, la Ley Núm. 100 de

30 de junio de 1959 (edad), la Ley Núm. 69 de 6 de

196a

julio de 1985 (sexo y represalias), la Ley Núm. 115 de

20 de diciembre de 1991 (represalias) y el Manual de

Empleados de CRL (“Manual”), el cual no contiene

cláusula de arbitraje. A esos efectos, Jane solicitó que

el TPI declare inaplicable la cláusula de arbitraje del

Acuerdo a sus alegadas reclamaciones laborales y que

se ordene a CRL a que solicite la paralización del

arbitraje bajo la Regla 57 de Procedimiento Civil en lo

que el TPI resuelve la controversia planteada sobre

arbitrabilidad. (Ap. Ta., págs. 1-13.) Como se expone

en la relación de hechos materiales, las alegaciones

de Jane a los efectos de que el Acuerdo no tiene

pertinencia a sus reclamos son abiertamente

contradictorias a la reclamación extrajudicial que

hizo Jane al Consejo Directo de CRL donde

expresamente enmarcó los mismos reclamos como

violaciones al Acuerdo. (Ap. TA., págs. 119-123.)

2. Junto con la Demanda, Jane presentó una Moción

Solicitando injunction Preliminar y Permanente

(“Solicitud de Injunction”), en la que solicitó

igualmente una orden para paralizar el arbitraje en

lo que el TPI resuelve la Sentencia Declaratoria, pero

con el pedido de que una vez la misma sea resuelta a

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favor de Jane dicho foro convierta la orden de

paralización en permanente y proceda a resolver en

los méritos las controversias planteadas. (Ap. TA.,

págs. 14-19.)

3. Además, Jane presentó una Moción Urgente en

Solicitud de Orden a los fines de que todos los

procedimientos se mantengan estrictamente

confidenciales. (Ap. TA., págs. 20-21.)

4. El 3 de abril de 2012, el TPI emitió una Orden

señalando una vista para el 11 de abril de 2012, para

dilucidar la procedencia del recurso extraordinario

solicitado. (Ap. TA., págs. 23.)

5. El 11 de abril de 2012, los demandados-

peticionarios presentaron una Solicitud de

Desestimación, en la que esencialmente

argumentaron que el Acuerdo es un contrato en el

comercio interestatal, por lo que es de aplicación el

FAA, que conforme a la cláusula de arbitraje del

Acuerdo toda controversia sobre si los reclamos de

Jane son arbitrables o no le corresponde resolverla al

propio árbitro y no al TPI y que, en la alternativa,

procede que el TPI reconozca que mediante la Sección

14.04 del Acuerdo Jane se obligó a tramitar todos su

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reclamos (“any Claim”) de forma confidencial

mediante el procedimiento de arbitraje

independientemente de la naturaleza de los reclamos

o si éstos surgen bajo el Acuerdo. Además, los

demandados-peticionarios argumentaron que bajo la

Cláusula de Supremacía de la Constitución de los

Estados Unidos, independientemente de la alegada

naturaleza constitucional y laboral de las

reclamaciones de Jane, la § 2 del FAA requiere que

dichos reclamos sean adjudicados en el procedimiento

de arbitraje iniciado ante la AAA. (Ap. TA., págs. 38-

126.)

6. Ese mismo día se celebró una vista en la cual se

acordó que los demandados-peticionarios paralizarían

sus gestiones en el caso de arbitraje en lo que el TPI

resolvía las mociones presentadas sobre

arbitrabilidad, que se mantendría la confidencialidad

del expediente y que todo documento se presentaría

bajo sello. Además, el TPI indicó que el primer asunto

a resolver será la arbitrabilidad de los reclamos de

Jane. Finalmente, el TPI señaló una vista de

injunction preliminar para el 10 de mayo de 2012, de

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ser necesario el desfile de prueba.7 (Ap. TA., págs.

127-128.)

7. El 23 de abril de 2012, Jane presentó su

Oposición a la Solicitud de Desestimación. En dicha

Oposición Jane alegó, entre otras cosas, que la

cláusula de arbitraje del Acuerdo no aplica a sus

alegados reclamos de índole laboral pues dicho

documento sólo aplica a asuntos relacionados con la

administración de CRL, máxime cuando los reclamos

de Jane son de rango constitucional. Además, Jane

alegó que es el TPI el llamado a resolver todos sus

reclamos.8 (Ap. TA., págs. 134-278.)

8. Luego de la presentación de varios escritos por las

partes 9 y que Jane presentara una Segunda

7 El 8 de mayo de 2012, dicha vista fue re-señalada para el 5 de junio. (Ap. TA., págs. 450-451.) 8 Ese mismo día, Jane presentó una Demanda Enmendada y Jurada a los fines de incluir como demandadas a las cónyuges de los demandados en calidad de co-administradoras de las respectivas Sociedades Legales de Gananciales y enmendar sus causas de acción. (Ap. TA., págs. 279-305.) El 1 de mayo de 2012, los demandados se opusieron a la referida enmienda. (Ap. TA., págs. 306-313.) 9 El 1 de mayo de 2012, los demandados-peticionarios presentaron su Réplica a ‘Oposición a la Solicitud de Desestimación por Falta de Jurisdicción y para Compeler Arbitraje Compulsorio en Vista de Acuerdo Vinculante de Arbitraje’. (Ap. TA., págs. 314-416.) Por su parte, el 7 de mayo

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Demanda Enmendada, el 4 de junio de 2012, a las

11:41 a.m., el TPI notificó vía correo electrónico la

Resolución objeto del presente recurso, la cual, como

mencionamos, resuelve contrario al FAA y su

jurisprudencia interpretativa que es a dicho foro al

que le compete resolver la controversia sobre

arbitrabilidad y que, además, Jane no viene obligada

a arbitrar sus reclamaciones de alegado discrimen

laboral, represalias y daños por éstas no estar

cobijadas por la cláusula de arbitraje del Acuerdo.

(Ap. TA., págs. 484-498.) En la nota al calce 12 de la

Resolución, el TPI hace las siguientes expresiones

que hacen evidente su hostilidad hacia el

procedimiento de arbitraje: “De acuerdo a la

interpretación y postura de la CRL, mediante el

[Acuerdo] se delegaría al árbitro resolver la

controversia en un foro totalmente confidencial

y sin derecho de apelación para los afectados.”

(Ap. TA., pág. 497; énfasis nuestro.)

9. Además, el TPI indicó que se mantendría en pie

la vista de injunction señalada para el día siguiente

en donde las partes tendrán que presentar prueba en de 2012, Jane presentó un escrito intitulado Dúplica de la Demandante. (Ap. TA., págs. 414-449.)

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relación a la solicitud de remedio interdictal.

Igualmente, autorizó la presentación de la Segunda

Demanda Enmendada. (Ap. TA., pág. 498.) Debemos

señalar que de un análisis del formato, tipografía y

estilo de la Resolución se puede razonablemente

inferir que la misma probablemente es producto de

un borrador de proyecto de Resolución sometido por

Jane, por lo que, de ser ello correcto, ésta habría

tenido conocimiento de la determinación del TPI

mucho antes que los demandados- peticionarios.

10. De hecho, sorpresivamente, a tan sólo cuatro (4)

horas de notificarse la Resolución, Jane presentó ante

el TPI una Solicitud de Orden Sobre la

Confidencialidad de los Procedimientos Ulteríores

alegando que en vista de lo resuelto horas antes por

el TPI no existía razón para que los procedimientos

continuaran tramitándose de forma confidencial. (Ap.

TA., págs. 499-504.) Además, Jane presentó bajo sello

una Tercera Demanda Enmendada y Jurada donde

se identifica a los demandados con sus respectivos

nombres. (Ap. TA., págs. 505-528.)

11. Además, justo antes de que iniciara la vista

señalada para el 5 de junio de 2012, Jane presentó en

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el TPI a las 8:47 a.m., una Solicitud de Reinstalación

Como Remedio Adicional al Amparo de la Regla 59.4

de Procedimiento Civil mediante la cual solicita que

se dicte Sentencia Parcial ordenando mediante un

injunction preliminar y permanente su reinstalación

a CRL. (Ap. TA., págs. 529-535.) Copia de esta

Solicitud le fue entregada al abogado de los

demandado-peticionarios al momento de entrar a la

Sala del TPI para la vista.

12. Minutos más tarde, las partes comparecieron a la

vista de injunction preliminar señalada para ese día.

A pesar de que no habían transcurrido ni tan siquiera

24 horas desde que los demandados-peticionarios

advinieron en conocimiento de que la acción judicial

de Jane no sería desestimada para que procediera el

arbitraje, el TPI pretendía que éstos presentarán

prueba sobre las alegaciones del caso para poder

entrar a resolverlo en los méritos. En vista de lo

atropellado que pretendía ser el proceso, los

demandados-peticionarios objetaron el proceder del

TPI amparándose en argumentos de razonabilidad y

de Debido Proceso de Ley, entre otros. El TPI

concedió entonces hasta el 8 de junio para que Jane

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presentara la propuesta de estipulaciones de hechos

que no habían sido aceptadas por los demandados-

peticionarios, para que los demandados presentaran

propuestas de hechos y para que ambas partes

presentaran los documentos que deberían ser

considerados por el TPI. Además, el TPI consolidó la

vista de injunction preliminar con la de injunction

permanente e indicó que de ser necesario el desfile de

prueba las partes serán notificadas sobre la

celebración de la vista.10 (Ap. TA, págs. 548-551 y

552-617.)

B. Relación de Hechos Materiales.

1. En noviembre de 1979, Jane se unió a CRL como

abogada luego de haber obtenido una Maestría en

Derecho y haber comenzado a ejercer la profesión.

(Ap. TA., págs. 1-13 y 38-126.)

2. En el momento en que Jane se unió a CRL, CRL

era una sociedad civil. En aquel entonces y al

presente CRL provee servicios a una clientela

10 El TPI también concedió 10 días para que los demandados-peticionarios presenten su posición en cuanto a la solicitud de Jane de que se deje sin efecto la orden de confidencialidad y 15 días para que se expresen sobre la solicitud de reinstalación de Jane a CRL. (Ap. TA., págs. 548-551.)

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foránea, mayormente de Estados Unidos, y local. (Ap.

TA., págs. 38-126.)

3. En septiembre de 1987, Jane fue promovida como

socia capital de CRL. (Ap. TA., págs. 1-13 y 38-126.)

4. El 13 de septiembre de 2007, CRL se convirtió en

una compañía de responsabilidad limitada bajo las

leyes de Puerto Rico. De conformidad con el referido

cambio, Jane advino Miembro Capital de CRL. (Ap.

TA., págs. 1-13 y 38-126.)

5. Ese mismo día, Jane y los demás Miembros

Capitales de CRL suscribieron un documento

intitulado Operating Agreement (“Acuerdo

Operacional” o “Acuerdo”).11 (Ap. TA., págs. 60-115 y

338-353.)

6. En lo pertinente, dicho Acuerdo provee en sus

Secciones relevantes lo siguiente:

1. Definitions. For the purposes of this

Agreement, the following terms shall have the

meaning set forth below:

11 El Acuerdo establece que su fecha de efectividad se retrotrae al 1 de junio de 2007.

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1.06 “Claim” means any action, suit, complaint or

demand of whatever nature and for whatever

relief or remedy against the Firm or any of its

Members or employees. ….

1.07 “Claimant” means any Member or Former

Member asserting a Claim.

5. Compensation.12

5.02 Salaries of Members- Each Capital Member shall

be entitled to such annual salary as shall be

determined pursuant to section 5.01 of this

Agreement, to be paid in one (1) or more installments.

….

10.Fiduciary Duty and Duty of Loyalty of

Members.

10.1 Fiduciary Duties of Members- Members owe

the Firm and each other a fiduciary duty and a duty

of loyalty, which requires each Member, among other

things:

(f) To treat all Firm Documents as confidential

‘trade secrets’, except to the extent such Firm

12 Para el resto de las cláusulas relevantes sobre compensación véase la Sección 5 del Acuerdo. (Ap. TA, págs. 84-86.)

206a

Documents are publicly available other than as a

result of any violation of this or any other

confidentiality obligation... and to treat as

confidential all information relating to the

deliberations of the Members and the business of the

Firm while such Member is a Member of the Firm

and, in the event the Member leaves the Firm, after

such Member’s departure.

12. Withdrawal, Retirement, Suspension,

Expulsion ... of a Member.

12.02 Suspension and/or Expulsion- The Firm may,

upon the recommendation of the Policy Committee

and the affirmative vote of three-fourths (3/4) of the

Capital Members, ...(b) expel any Member at any date

specified by the Policy Committee with or without

cause or prior notice to such Member. In the case of

any such expulsion, the Member so expelled shall

cease to be a Member on the date specified by the

Policy Committee.

14. Resolution of Claim.

14.01 Intent and Purpose - It is the intent and

purpose of the Firm and any Claimant to

resolve any Claim by mediation or arbitration.

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The Claimant expressly agrees that the Claim shall

be settled or resolved through the procedures set

forth herein, and shall not in any way circumvent

or otherwise challenge in any way these

proceedings relative to mediation and

arbitration.

14.04 Arbitration - If mediation fails, the Claim

shall be settled by arbitration administered by

the [AAA] under its Commercial Arbitration Rules,

and judgment on the award rendered by the

arbitrator(s) may be entered in any court having

jurisdiction thereof. ...

14.05 Confidentiality - The Claimant and the Firm

agree that the underlying purpose of the provisions

set forth in section 14 of this Agreement is to provide

a mechanism by which any Claim shall be

resolved in a confidential manner, without

publicity and the attendant distractions. .... The

parties agree to maintain the confidentiality of

such meetings and hearings, and of the

documents produced or created in such

meetings and hearings. Any and all actions

taken by the parties shall be in conformity with

208a

the underlying purpose set forth in section 14

of this Agreement.

Nótese que es un hecho no disputado por Jane que el

Acuerdo es un contrato en el comercio interestatal a

los fines del FAA. (Ap. TA., págs. 1-3; 38-126; 134-

278; 314-416; y 417-449.) Tampoco está en

controversia la validez de la cláusula de arbitraje de

la Sección 14 del Acuerdo. (Id.)

209a

7. El 22 de octubre de 2007, entró en vigor el

Manual de Empleados de CRL el cual aplica a todos

sus empleados y a los Miembros de CRL. No obstante,

dicho Manual no convierte a un Miembro en

empleado. Por el contrario, el Manual claramente

mantiene la diferencia entre la clasificación de

“Miembro” y “empleado”. (Ap. TA., págs. 191-257.) El

Manual tampoco establece las políticas relacionadas

a la compensación de los Miembros, ni el proceso de

terminación de su relación con CRL, ni el método

para resolver disputas entre los Miembros y CRL.

Dichas políticas están contenidas en las Secciones 5,

12 y 14 del Acuerdo, respectivamente. (Ap. TA., págs.

84-86 y 94-98.)

8. CRL tiene oficinas en Puerto Rico y fuera de

Puerto Rico. Además, la gran mayoría de sus clientes

están ubicados fuera de Puerto Rico (principalmente

en los Estados Unidos), lo cual requiere que CRL y

sus clientes mantengan comunicación constante como

parte de sus operaciones mediante el uso del correo,

Internet, teléfono y otros medios de comunicación

interestatal. Igualmente, resulta significativo en

cuanto al hecho de que el Acuerdo es un contrato en

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el comercio interestatal y la naturaleza económica del

mismo, el que los siguientes estatutos federales, entre

otros, aplican a la relación de CRL con aquellos que

son propiamente considerados empleados: 1) Fair

Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-78; 2)

Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29

U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654; 3) Family Medical Leave Act of

2000, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17; 4) Title VII of the

Civil Rights Act of 1964; y 5) Age Discrímination in

Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34. (Ap.

TA., págs. 38-126.)

9. A mediados del 2009, Jane fue electa al Consejo

Directivo de CRL, el cual es el organismo rector de

mayor jerarquía de CRL.

10. La compensación de Jane tuvo que ser reducida

por razones de negocio. Como resultado de ello, el 24

de enero de 2012, Jane presentó una reclamación

extrajudicial a los Miembros del Consejo Directo de

CRL, según requerido por la Sección 14.02 del

Acuerdo. En su reclamación extrajudicial, Jane alegó

en síntesis que su compensación había sido reducida

en violación al Acuerdo. En ninguna parte de su

reclamación Jane mencionó que se hubiera violado el

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Manual. De hecho, el único contrato escrito que Jane

alega fue violado es el Acuerdo. En lo pertinente, la

recurrida específicamente alegó amparándose en el

Acuerdo lo siguiente:

...[L]es solicito formalmente que reconsideren la decisión de [Fulano de Tal] y pauten, lo más rápido posible y antes de los próximos 15 días, una reunión del Consejo Directivo a tenor con la cláusula 14 y siguiente del “Operating Agreement”, de manera que yo como Miembro Capital presente mi posición y objeciones. Quiero dejar claro que el someterme al procedimiento de la cláusula 14 no debe entenderse como una renuncia de los derechos que me amparan bajo las leyes locales y federales.

Procedo a reseñar brevemente mis objeciones:

1. La reducción de mi salario y beneficios se hizo (sic) infringe el “Operating Agreement” y el acuerdo entre [Fulano de Tal] y yo, y está en contravención con el acuerdo particular establecido conmigo.

2. ... Evidentemente, el procedimiento seguido fue inadecuado y en violación al “Operating Agreement”, a las decisiones del Consejo Directivo aprobadas al 31 de mayo de 2011 y la decisión del 20 de diciembre de 2011.

16. Igualmente me sentí ofendida cuando [Sutano de Cual] en una reunión del Consejo dijo que ‘para sentarse en esa mesa hay que traer negocio’ y nadie

212a

le aclaró lo impropio de su comentario. ¿Es ese un requisito en el Operating Agreement? ....

(Ap. TA., págs. 119-123; énfasis nuestro.)

11. De conformidad con la Sección 14.03 del Acuerdo,

el 20 de marzo de 2012 las partes se sometieron al

proceso de mediación el cual culminó sin lograrse

acuerdo alguno.

12. Ante el fracaso de la mediación, el 22 de marzo de

2012, CRL presentó ante la AAA una Demanda de

Arbitraje contra Jane para darle curso a la cláusula

de arbitraje de la Sección 14.04 del Acuerdo que

requiere que toda disputa (“any Claim”) entre las

partes independientemente de su naturaleza o de si

surge o no bajo el Acuerdo sea resuelta mediante

dicho método de resolución de disputas y de forma

confidencial. (Ap. TA., págs. 259-260.)

VI. SEÑALAMIENTOS DE ERRORES

PRIMER SEÑALAMIENTO DE ERROR: ERRÓ

MANIFIESTAMENTE EL TPI AL ASUMIR

JURISDICCION SOBRE LA CONTROVERSIA DE

SI JANE DOE ESTÁ OBLIGADA A ARBITRAR SUS

SUPUESTOS RECLAMOS: JANE DOE Y CRL

INEQUIVOCAMENTE PACTARON QUE EL

213a

ÁRBITRO TIENE LA FACULTAD DE

DETERMINAR EL ALCANCE DE SU

JURISDICCIÓN.

SEGUNDO SEÑALAMIENTO DE ERROR: ERRÓ

MANIFIESTAMENTE EL TPI AL CONCLUIR QUE

JANE DOE NO TIENE QUE ARBITRAR SUS

SUPUESTOS RECLAMOS CONTRA CRL Y LOS

DEMÁS DEMANDADOS-PETICIONARIOS

PUESTO QUE LA CLÁUSULA DE ARBITRAJE

DEL ACUERDO ES AMPLIA, CLARA Y ABARCA

CUALQUIER RECLAMO ENTRE LAS PARTES.

TERCER SEÑALAMIENTO DE ERROR: ERRÓ

MANIFIESTAMENTE EL TPI AL EXIMIR A JANE

DOE DE ARBITRAR SUS RECLAMOS POR LA

ALEGADA NATURALEZA “DE EMPLEO” O

“LABORAL” Y “CONSTITUCIONAL” DE ÉSTOS YA

QUE EL FAA DESPLAZA (“PREEMPTS’) TODA

POLITICA ESTATAL CONTRARIA AL

ARBITRAJE.

VII. DISCUSIÓN DE LOS ERRORES

SEÑALADOS

A. PRIMER SEÑALAMIENTO DE ERROR:

ERRÓ MANIFIESTAMENTE EL TPI AL ASUMIR

214a

JURISDICCION SOBRE LA CONTROVERSIA DE

SI JANE DOE ESTÁ OBLIGADA A ARBITRAR SUS

SUPUESTOS RECLAMOS: JANE DOE Y CRL

INEQUIVOCAMENTE PACTARON QUE EL

ÁRBITRO TIENE LA FACULTAD DE

DETERMINAR EL ALCANCE DE SU

JURISDICCIÓN.

El TPI erró manifiestamente al asumir jurisdicción

para decidir si Jane Doe tiene que arbitrar sus

supuestos reclamos contra CRL y los demás

demandados- peticionarios. A pesar de que el TPI

reconoció que las partes pueden pactar que sea el

árbitro quien decida si una disputa es arbitrable así

como los méritos de la misma cuando así se ha

pactado clara e inequívocamente (Ap. TA., pág.

495.),13 dicho foro decidió que “no hay que determinar

si la delegación de jurisdicción al árbitro es clara e

inequívoca porque la cláusula de arbitraje no es

aplicable a las controversias presentadas.” (Id.) En

otras palabras el TPI descansó en un

argumento rotundamente circular para hacer

caso omiso del lenguaje claro de la amplia 13 Véase First Options of Chicago. Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 945 (1995).

215a

cláusula de arbitraje del Acuerdo, las

disposiciones del FAA y su jurisprudencia

interpretativa, y la normativa puertorriqueña

sobre interpretación de contratos. Todas esas

normas requerían referir al árbitro el asunto de si los

reclamos de Jane Doe son arbitrables bajo la Sección

14 del Acuerdo.

Como cuestión preliminar, es menester hacer una

exposición breve del FAA ya que fue oportunamente

invocado por los demandados-peticionarios, Jane Doe

no disputó su aplicación al asunto que nos ocupa y

dicha ley es dispositiva de este recurso. (Ap. TA.,

págs. 52-58.) EL FAA, 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. aplica a

contratos en el comercio interestatal y aplica tanto en

los tribunales federales como en los estatales. World

Films. Inc. v. Paramount Pict. Corp., 125 D.P.R. 352,

357 y 364 (1990). La sección 2 de la FAA dispone que:

A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction or the refusal to perform the whole or any part thereof, or an agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an existing controversy arising out of such a contract, transaction or

216a

refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, save upon such grounds as exist in law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.

9 U.S.C. § 2 (Énfasis nuestro.)

El FAA refleja una política federal contundente, bien

establecida y ampliamente reconocida a favor del

arbitraje. Véase Méndez Acevedo v. Nieves Rivera,

179 D.P.R. 359 (2010); KKW Enterprises v. Gloria

Jean’s Gourmet Coffees Franchising Corp., 184 F.3d

42, 50 (1st Cir. 1999); citando Vimar Seguros v

Reaseguros. S.A., v. M/V SKY Reefer. 29 F.3d 727,

730 (1st Cir.); confirmado en 515 U.S. 528 (1995).

Sobre esta fuerte política pública, el Tribunal

Supremo de los Estados Unidos (“TSEU”) ha

expresado lo siguiente:

[The FAA] is a congressional declaration of a liberal policy favoring arbitration agreements, notwithstanding any state substantive or procedural policies to the contrary.

****

[l]n enacting § 2 of the federal Act, Congress declared a national policy favoring arbitration and withdrew the power of the states to require a judicial forum for the resolution of

217a

claims which the contracting parties agreed to resolve by arbitration.

Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 489 (1987) (citas y

comillas internas omitidas) (énfasis nuestro). En

otras palabras, el FAA aplica sin acepción de políticas

estatales procesales o sustantivas al contrario y le

quitó el poder a los Estados de requerir un foro

judicial para resolver reclamaciones que las partes

contratantes acordaron resolver mediante arbitraje.

El FAA fue promulgado precisamente como respuesta

a la hostilidad que tradicionalmente los Tribunales

han mostrado hacia los acuerdos de arbitraje. Véase

Circuit City Stores v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 111

(2001) (resolviendo que los contratos de empleo en el

comercio interestatal salvo aquellos de ciertos

empleados de transportación están cubiertos por el

FAA). El Tribunal Supremo de Puerto Rico ha

reconocido sin ambages la política pública encarnada

en el FAA al expresar que dicha ley dispone que:

... las cláusulas de arbitrajes en esos contratos son válidas, irrevocables y mandatorias. Una vez acordado el arbitraje, los tribunales carecen de discreción en cuanto a su eficacia y tienen que dar cumplimiento al arbitraje acordado. Según esta ley,

218a

v la jurisprudencia federal interpretativa de la misma, cualquier duda sobre el alcance de las controversias que pueden ser llevadas a arbitraje debe resolverse en favor del arbitraje. Esto aplica tanto a los tribunales federales como a los estatales.

Véase Painewebber Incorporated of Puerto Rico v.

Service Concepts. Inc., 151 D.P.R. 307, 311-12 (2000)

(énfasis nuestro); Southland Corp. v. Keatinq, 465

U.S.1, 16 (1984).

Las controversias sobre arbitrabilidad comportan tres

(3) modalidades: (i) si existe un convenio de arbitraje;

(ii) el alcance de un convenio de arbitraje (“si tal

convenio alcanza determinada controversia”); (iii) y si

tal convenio alcanza una disputa sobre la duración o

expiración del contrato. Véase Méndez Acevedo v.

Nieves Rivera, supra, en las págs. 367-68; Municipio

de Mavaoüez v. Lebrón. 167 D.P.R. 713, 720-21

(2006); World Films. Inc. v. Paramount Pictures

Corp., supra.

Como regla general, la determinación de si un

acuerdo crea el deber de las partes de arbitrar

determinada controversia es tarea judicial. Méndez

Acevedo, supra; World Films. Inc., supra, en la pág.

219a

361. No obstante lo anterior, el asunto de la

arbitrabilidad no será de competencia judicial

si las partes pactaron en el convenio de

arbitraje que tal facultad se delega al árbitro.

Es decir, convenido en un acuerdo de arbitraje que es

el árbitro quien resolverá las cuestiones de

arbitrabilidad, procede que sea éste y no el tribunal el

que determine si existe la obligación de arbitrar

determinada controversia. U.G.T. v. Corp. Difusión

Pub., 168 D.P.R. 674, 684 (2006) (“De ordinario y

salvo que el convenio colectivo disponga otra

cosa, los asuntos de arbitrabilidad sustantiva deben

ser resueltos por los tribunales...”) (énfasis nuestro).

Consistente con lo anterior, es un principio bien

sentado en el ámbito federal y bajo el FAA que

cualquier impugnación a la validez de un acuerdo de

arbitraje, incluyendo cualquier controversia sobre

arbitrabilidad (si determinada controversia es

arbitrable o no), debe ser referida al árbitro si hay

evidencia clara e inequívoca (“clear and unmistakable

evidence”) de que las partes así lo pactaron-de que esa

fue su intención. First Options of Chicago, Inc. v.

Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 945 (1995). La anterior es

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precisamente la situación que presenta el caso de

autos. El FAA aplica al Acuerdo entre Jane Doe y

CRL y las partes delegaron al foro arbitral la

determinación de arbitrabilidad por lo que el TPI erró

al asumir jurisdicción.

El FAA aplica al Acuerdo entre Jane Doe y CRL

ya que se trata de un contrato que involucra el

comercio interestatal. Para determinar si existe

una transacción que involucra el comercio

interestatal, el Tribunal debe examinar entre otras

cosas el contrato y las operaciones comerciales de las

partes. Véase Ideal Services Corp. v. Swift-Eckrich,

Inc., 727 F. Supp. 75, 76 (D.P.R. 1989).

En Allied Bruce Terminix v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265,

282 (1995), el TSEU resolvió que al promulgar el FAA

el Congreso de los Estados Unidos quiso utilizar su

poder constitucional bajo la Cláusula de Comercio al

máximo:

Thus, the Court interpreted the words “involving commerce” as broadly as the words “affecting commerce”; and, as we have said, these latter words normally mean a full exercise of constitutional power. At the same time, the Court’s opinion does not discuss the

221a

implications of the “interstate” facts to which the respondents now point. For these reasons, Bernhardt does not require us to narrow the scope of the word “involving.” And, we conclude that the word “involving,” like “affecting,” signals an intent to exercise Congress’ commerce power to the full.

513 U.S. en la pág. 277. En Allied Bruce, la disputa

giraba en torno a una cláusula de arbitraje en un

contrato de servicios de exterminación a una

residencia. El TSEU determinó que el contrato

envolvía el comercio interestatal para propósitos del

FAA ya que los pesticidas fueron manufacturados

fuera del estado y el demandado tenía operaciones en

múltiples estados.

El Acuerdo es un contrato que involucra el

comercio interestatal. Entre otras razones, el

Acuerdo gobierna el interés propietario de las partes

y las operaciones de CRL en Puerto Rico y en su

oficina fuera de Puerto Rico. Véase, SCI v. Fulmer,

883 So.2d 621, 629 (Ala 2003) (“[I]t would be

difficult indeed to give an example of an

economic or commercial activity that one could

... declare beyond the reach of Congress’s power

under the Commerce Clause, and, by extension,

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under the FAA.”) (énfasis nuestro). 14 Además, la

gran mayoría de los clientes de CRL están ubicados

fuera de Puerto Rico (principalmente en los Estados

Unidos), lo cual requiere que CRL y sus clientes

mantengan comunicación constantemente como parte

de sus operaciones mediante el uso del correo,

Internet, teléfono y otros medios de comunicación

interestatal. Igualmente, resulta significativo sobre

este particular la naturaleza económica del Acuerdo y

que los siguientes estatutos federales, entre otros,

aplican a la relación de CRL con aquellos que son

propiamente considerados empleados: 1) Fair Labor

14 Vease ademas, Thomas H. Oehmke, Commercial Arbitration § 3:6 (2011)(“A contract needs only the slightest nexus to interstate commerce to apply the FAA.”); 21 Willinston on Contracts § 57: (41 ed. 2011)(“Consistent with the broad approach to interpreting the term ‘involving commerce’ in the [FAA], it has been said that a contract containing an arbitration provision need only be related to commerce to fall within the coverage of the Act.”)(énfasis suplido); Bowen v. Security Pest Control. Inc., 879 So.2d 1139, 1142 (Ala. 2003) (resuelve que Ia transacción envolvía el comercio interestatal, en parte, porque una de las partes en la transacción realizaba negocios en dos Estados). De hecho, el poder del Congreso bajo la Cláusula de Comercio de la Constitución de los Estados Unidos es tan amplio que en los pasados 75 años sólo dos casos del TSEU han resuelto que el Congreso excedió sus poderes bajo la referida Cláusula de Comercio. Véanse U.S. v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995); US v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000). Nótese que ninguno de los estatutos en controversia en dichos casos iba dirigido a regular transacciones puramente económicas, sino conducta criminal de naturaleza no económica.

223a

Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-78; 2)

Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29

U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654; 3) Family Medical Leave Act of

2000, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17; 4) Title VII of

the Civil Rights Act of 1964; y 5) Age Discrimination

in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34.

Además, y según señalamos previamente, Jane Doe

no disputó la aplicación del FAA a la cláusula de

arbitraje del Acuerdo y, por ende, ésta renunció

cualquier argumento al contrario. Véase Caguas

Satellite Corp. v. Echostar Satellite LLC, F.Supp.2d ,

2011 WL 5517037, n. 2 (D. P.R.)(“Plaintiffs [the party

opposing arbitration,] ...do not make any arguments

about whether or not the agreement involves interstate

commerce and therefore waive this argument’).

Dado el lenguaje claro de la Sección 14 del

Acuerdo, el TPI erró manifiestamente al asumir

jurisdicción sobre la controversia de si los

reclamos de Jane Doe son arbitrables o no. En

la cláusula de arbitraje contenida en el Acuerdo, Jane

se comprometió a que el arbitraje se condujera bajo

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las Reglas de Arbitraje Comercial de la AAA.15 La

Sección 14.04 del Acuerdo dispone en lo pertinente

“[i]f mediation fails, the Claim shall be settled by

arbitration under its Commercial Arbitration

Rules...”. A su vez, la Regla 7(a) de dicho cuerpo de

Reglas dispone: “[t]he arbitrator shall have the power

to rule on his or her own jurisdiction, including any

objections with respect to the existence, scope or

validity of the arbitration agreement.” (Commercial

Arbitration Rules de la AAA, Regla 7(a), Ap. TA.,

págs. 116-118.) (énfasis nuestro). Ante la

incorporación en la cláusula de arbitraje entre Jane

Doe y CRL de un cuerpo de reglas de arbitraje que

delega al árbitro la facultad de determinar, era claro

que no le competía al TPI determinar si los reclamos

de Jane Doe eran arbitrables.

Cada tribunal federal que ha tenido ante sí esta

controversia ha resuelto que cuando las partes

incorporan a sus acuerdos o cláusulas de arbitraje

reglas institucionales de entidades como la AAA en

las que se delega al árbitro la facultad de decidir

15 Las Reglas de Arbitraje Comercial de la AAA gozan de la misma generalidad que las Reglas de Procedimiento Civil de Puerto Rico.

225a

sobre su propia jurisdicción -decidir arbitrabilidad-

ello constituye evidencia suficiente en Derecho (clara

e inequívoca) de que esa era la intención de las

partes. Véase Contec Corp. v. Remote Solution Co.,

398 F.3d 205, 208 (2nd Cir. 2005) (“When...parties

explicitly incorporate rules that empower an

arbitrator to decide issues of arbitrability, the

incorporation serves as clear and unmistakable

evidence of the parties’ intent to delegate such issues to

an arbitrator”); Sleeper Farms v. Agway, Inc., 211 F.

Supp. 2d 197 (D. Me. 2002) (“[Since the AAA rules

constitute] a clear and unmistakable delegation of

scope-determining authority to an arbitrator, [the

court] refers this dispute [to the arbitrator] to

determine [...] what issues [...] are covered by the

arbitration clause.”) 16

16 Véase, además; Terminix Int’l. Co. v. Palmer Ranch Ltd., 432 F.3d 1327, 29, 33-34 (11th Cir. 2005) (Resolviendo que toda vez que las Reglas de Arbitraje de la AAA delegan al árbitro la determinación de arbitrabilidad, la reclamación del demandante de que el acuerdo de arbitraje lo despojaba ilegalmente de varios remedios estatutarios, era materia a ser adjudicada por el árbitro, no por el tribunal); Qualcomm Inc. v. Nokia Corp.. 466 F.3d 1366, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Apollo Computer, Inc. v. Berq, 886 F.2d 469, 473 (1st Cir. 1989)(“Ordinarily, [Plaintiff] would be entitled to have these issues resolved by a court. [...] By contracting to have all disputes resolved according to the Rules of the ICC, however, [Plaintiff] agreed to be bound by Articles 8.3

226a

De hecho, aun en instancias donde las partes no han

acordado el someter las controversias de

arbitrabilidad sustantivas al foro arbitral, los

tribunales tienden a dejar la controversia para que

sea resuelta inicialmente por el árbitro cuando la

arbitrabilidad no puede ser determinada sin entrar

en los méritos de la controversia. Elkouri & Elkouri,

How Arbitrations Works, (BNA Books, 6ta Edición

2003), en la pág. 281. (“However, even though the

agreement does not expressly leave the determination

of arbitrability to the arbitrator, and in spite of the

fact that the parties have first gone to court, courts

have left the initial determination to the arbitrator.

This was the result, for instance, where arbitrability

could not be determined without delving into the

merits...”)

Así, en Camden Indus. Co. v. Carpenters Local 1688,

353 F.3d 178, 180 (1st Cir. 1969), el Primer Circuito

de Apelaciones resolvió:

and 8.4. These provisions clearly and unmistakably allow the arbitrator to determine her own jurisdiction when, as here, there exists a prima facie agreement to arbitrate whose continued existence and validity is being questioned.”).

227a

In these circumstances we believe the matter should proceed to arbitration, where the arbitrator may determine the subsidiary facts upon which depend both the merits of the controversy and his jurisdiction to decide it. A fínding of jurisdiction, unlike a finding on the merits when jurisdiction is not in question... will not be insulated from subsequent judicial review... We believe full recognition of the role of labor arbitration requires court intervention in a case such as this only when it has become absolutely necessary, viz., on a petition to vacate or enforce the award.

La casuística federal citada es consistente con el

ordenamiento jurídico local en materia de contratos.

A fin de cuentas, “el arbitraje es una figura jurídica

inherentemente contractual.” Méndez Acevedo,

supra, en la pág. 367; Municipio de Mayaaüez. supra;

U.C.P.R. v. Triangle Engineering Corp., 136 D.P.R.

133, 144 (1994).

Por lo tanto, en materia de arbitraje puede exigirse el

cumplimiento de aquello que se haya pactado por

escrito. Véase Crufon Const, v. Aut. Edif. Púbs.. 156

D.P.R. 197, 204 (2002); Municipio de Ponce v.

Gobernador, 136 D.P.R. 776, 783 (1994). A su vez,

228a

cuando los términos de un contrato son claros y no

presentan ambigüedad, sus disposiciones se aplicarán

según el sentido literal que le dieron las partes. Art.

1233 del Código Civil, supra, § 3471. Una vez se

determina qué fue lo que las partes acordaron, el

juzgador debe resolver las controversias entre las

partes de conformidad con lo estipulado. Véase

C.F.S.E. v. Unión de Médicos, 170 D.P.R. 443 (2007).

En resumen, en el presente caso, la cláusula de

arbitraje incorpora por referencia expresamente las

Reglas de Arbitraje Comercial de la AAA, las cuales a

su vez delegan en el árbitro de forma clara e

inequívoca la autoridad para determinar su propia

jurisdicción. Por tanto, conforme a las autoridades

aquí citadas, procede que este Honorable Tribunal

revoque la Resolución del TPI y ordene a Jane

continuar con el procedimiento de arbitraje que pactó,

de suerte que sea el árbitro el que resuelva si tiene

autoridad para entender en los méritos las

reclamaciones de ésta. Así lo pactaron las partes, sin

ambigüedad alguna, y ello constituye la ley entre las

partes. Véase HIETEL v. PRTC, 2011 T.S.P.R. 100.

En la alternativa, de este Honorable Tribunal

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entender que el TPI no cometió el primer error

señalado, debe pasar considerar los próximos dos (2)

señalamientos de error.

B. SEGUNDO SEÑALAMIENTO DE ERROR:

ERRÓ MANIFIESTAMENTE EL TPI AL

CONCLUIR QUE JANE DOE NO TIENE QUE

ARBITRAR SUS SUPUESTOS RECLAMOS

CONTRA CRL Y LOS DEMÁS DEMANDADOS-

PETICIONARIOS PUESTO QUE LA CLÁUSULA

DE ARBITRAJE DEL ACUERDO ES AMPLIA,

CLARA Y ABARCA CUALQUIER RECLAMO

ENTRE LAS PARTES.

El TPI también erró manifiestamente al resolver que

las reclamaciones presentadas por Jane Doe no están

cobijadas por la cláusula de arbitraje del Acuerdo

porque éstas son supuestamente de naturaleza “de

empleo” o “laboral” y “constitucional”. (Ap. TA., págs.

486-498.) Esencialmente, el TPI fundamentó su

decisión en la conclusión errada de que el Manual de

Empleados de CRL rige la relación entre CRL y Jane

Doe para fines de la presente acción judicial. (Ap.

TA., pág. 496-497.) Para llegar a este resultado, el

TPI tuvo que imponer por fíat una limitación

230a

insostenible al alcance de la cláusula de arbitraje del

Acuerdo, la cual según su texto literal es claramente

amplia y cubre toda reclamación (“any claim”) entre

las partes - incluyendo aquellas que no surgen del

Acuerdo. Al así hacerlo, el TPI no tan sólo erró, sino

que hizo manifiesta una marcada hostilidad al foro

arbitral, contrariando así los postulados del FAA y su

jurisprudencia interpretativa.

De la faz de la Resolución surge que el TPI hizo caso

omiso al lenguaje amplio de la cláusula de arbitraje

compulsorio contenida en el Acuerdo. Muestra de

ello, es el hecho de que ni siquiera el texto

íntegro de la cláusula fue citado en el cuerpo de

la Resolución como parte del análisis del TPI.

Para facilitar la labor de este Tribunal, reproducimos

la sección relevante del Acuerdo, que evidencia sin

lugar a dudas que el TPI debió haber compelido a

Jane Doe a arbitrar sus reclamos:

Intent and Purpose - It is the intent and purpose of the Firm and any Claimant to resolve any Claim by mediation or arbitration. The Claimant expressly agrees that the Claim shall be settled or resolved through the procedures set forth herein, and shall not in any way circumvent or otherwise

231a

challenge in any way these proceedings relative to mediation and arbitration.

Véase Sección 14.01 del Acuerdo (énfasis suplido).

(Ap. TA., pág. 97.)

La Sección 14.01 del Acuerdo antes transcrita

demuestra que era la intención y el propósito de las

partes, incluyendo Jane Doe y los comparecientes, el

resolver cualquier reclamación (“any Claim”)

mediante mediación y arbitraje. Más revelador aún es

el hecho de que en el Acuerdo se define “Claim” como

“... any action, suit, complaint or demand of

whatever nature and for whatever relief or

remedy against the Firm or any of its Members

or employees.” (Sección 1.06 del Acuerdo; énfasis

suplido.) (Ap. TA., pág. 66.) En otras palabras, el

término “any claim” significa literalmente cualquier

reclamación, queja, demanda o pleito de cualquier

naturaleza v solicitando cualquier remedio.

Dado el texto de la Sección 14.01 y la definición de

“Claim” del propio Acuerdo, “any Claim” no puede

significar otra cosa que no sea “cualquier

reclamación”, y ello abarca todo tipo de reclamo y

solicitud de remedio presentado por Jane. O sea,

232a

según los antedichos términos (y sin necesidad de

interpretación alguna), cualquier tipo de acción, caso,

demanda o reclamación de cualquier naturaleza y

sobre cualquier tipo de remedio o auxilio en contra de

CRL o cualquiera de sus Miembros o empleados está

cubierta por la cláusula de arbitraje. Según

señalamos anteriormente, bajo el derecho

puertorriqueño cuando los términos de un contrato

son claros y no presentan ambigüedad, sus

disposiciones se aplicarán según el sentido literal que

le dieron las partes. Art. 1233 del Código Civil, supra,

§ 3471. Sobre este particular, en Marcial v. Tome, 144

D.P.R. 522 (1997), el Tribunal Supremo reconoció que

se debe seguir la letra clara del contrato, cuando la

misma refleja inequívocamente la voluntad de las

partes.

Aún si hubiera alguna duda sobre el alcance de la

cláusula de arbitraje y el significado de “any Claim”,

lo cual se niega, el FAA requiere que la duda sea

resuelta a favor del arbitraje. Véase Moses H. Cone

Memorial Hosp. v. Mercurv Const. Corp., 460 U.S. 1,

24-25 (1983)(“The [FAA] establishes that, as a matter

of federal law, any doubts conceming the scope of

233a

arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of

arbitration, whether the problem at hand is the

construction of the contract language itself or an

allegation of waiver, delay, or a like defense to

arbitrability.”)] Granite Rock Co. v. Int’l Broth. of

Teamsters, 130 S. Ct. 2847, 2857 (2010) (igual);

Painewebber Incorporated of Puerto Rico v. Service

Concepts, Inc., 151 D.P.R. 307, 311-12 (2000).

En mérito de lo anterior, no importa para la

determinación de arbitrabilidad si el reclamo es de

naturaleza laboral o administrativo, contractual,

extracontractual, estatutario o constitucional.

Tampoco importa si los Miembros Capitales de CRL

pueden clasificarse como dueño o empleados o ambos.

Se trata pues de una cláusula de arbitraje amplísima

que el TPI debió avalar conforme a sus términos bajo

el FAA. Estos principios fueron crasamente ignorados

por el TPI al emitir la Resolución de la cual se

recurre.

La conclusión de que Jane Doe tiene que

arbitrar sus reclamos se impone aún si este

Tribunal estuviese inclinado a ir más allá del

texto de la Sección 14 y las definiciones del

234a

Acuerdo para determinar el alcance de la

obligación de arbitrar de los Miembros

Capitales (presentes y antiguos) de CRL. Ello es

así, toda vez que lo que Jane Doe cuestiona e

impugna fundamentalmente es su compensación

como Miembro Capital de CRL (por alegado

discrimen), y su expulsión del ente directivo de CRL y

como Miembro Capital de CRL (por alegadas

represalias). Véase las distintas alegaciones que Jane

Doe ha presentado como parte de este caso, desde su

reclamación interna, hasta la Tercera Demanda

Enmendada y Jurada. (Ap. TA., págs. 119-123; 1-13;

279-305; 456-481; y 505-528.)

Todos estos son aspectos de la relación de Jane Doe

con CRL que están regidos expresamente por el

Acuerdo. De hecho, así surge de las propias

determinaciones de hecho del Tribunal. Véase

Determinación de Hecho Número 7, Resolución. (Ap.

TA., pág. 492.) Ello se traduce en que para poder

adjudicar los reclamos de Jane Doe de alegado

discrimen o de represalia, el foro correspondiente - el

arbitral tendrá que necesariamente referirse al

Acuerdo.

235a

Según surge fehacientemente del récord, la

compensación de los Miembros Capitales de CRL se

rige por las secciones 5.01-5.06 del Acuerdo. (Ap. TA.,

págs. 84- 86.) Basta una lectura de dichas secciones

para constatarlo. Tan es así, que la propia Jane Doe

admitió ante el TPI que “el mecanismo mediante el

cual se determina la compensación lo rige el

[Acuerdo]”. (Véase Oposición, en la pág. 9, nota al pie

12., Ap. TA., pág. 144.)

Como cuestión de realidad, el TPI omitió considerar

el hecho que desde la reclamación interna que Jane

Doe presentó ante el ente directivo de CRL, ésta

alegó, entre otras cosas, violaciones al Acuerdo. (Ap.

TA., págs. 119-123.) (Véase Sección V(B), párrafo 10,

supra.

Conforme a lo anterior, el TPI erró al no referir a

arbitraje los reclamos de Jane Doe. Según

argumentamos ante el TPI, Jane Doe no puede

escapar la realidad de que sus reclamos se originan

en virtud de una alegada violación al Acuerdo, sea

por razones discriminatorias o no. Precisamente, ello

es lo que le compete al Árbitro dirimir.

236a

De la misma manera sucede con la alegada expulsión

en represalias de Jane Doe como Miembro del ente

directivo de CRL y Miembro Capital de CRL. La

expulsión de un Miembro del ente directivo de CRL

está regida por la cláusula 4.15 del Acuerdo; mientras

que la expulsión de un Miembro Capital de CRL está

regida por la cláusula 12.2 del Acuerdo. (Ap. TA.,

págs. 83 y 94-95.) Por tanto, cualquier reclamación o

impugnación de dichos procedimientos debe

atenderse mediante el proceso de resolución de

disputas de la cláusula 14 del Acuerdo, el cual incluye

el arbitraje compulsorio que las partes pactaron. Ese

fue el compromiso suscrito por Jane Doe y erró el TPI

al permitir que Jane Doe no cumpliera con lo pactado.

Para concluir, ni del lenguaje claro y amplio de la

cláusula de arbitraje, ni del contexto provisto por las

materias gobernadas por el Acuerdo y los reclamos de

Jane Doe, se puede interpretar como que la obligación

de arbitrar se limita a reclamaciones sobre asuntos

operativos o administrativos de CRL. El TPI no sólo

asumió jurisdicción erróneamente sobre la

controversia de arbitrabilidad sino que la resolvió de

forma completamente contraria a derecho.

237a

C. TERCER SEÑALAMIENTO DE ERROR:

ERRÓ MANIFIESTAMENTE EL TPI AL EXIMIR A

JANE DOE DE ARBITRAR SUS RECLAMOS POR

LA ALEGADA NATURALEZA “DE EMPLEO” O

“LABORAL” Y “CONSTITUCIONAL” DE ÉSTOS YA

QUE EL FAA DESPLAZA (“PREEMPTS”) TODA

POLÍTICA ESTATAL CONTRARIA AL

ARBITRAJE.

Además de hacer caso omiso de la letra clara de la

clausula de arbitraje pactada en la sección 14 del

Acuerdo, el TPI amparó su determinación en la

alegada naturaleza “de empleo” o “laboral” y

“constitucional” de los reclamos de Jane Doe para

eximirla de tener que arbitrarlos. De acuerdo al TPI:

...la legislación protectora de los empleados en Puerto Rico es de amplio alcance, no restrictiva, y la exclusión de un empleado de los beneficios de la legislación laboral debe ser clara, debiendo los tribunales interpretar dichas exclusiones en forma restrictiva.

Véase Resolución, en la pág. 12. (Ap. TA., pág. 497.)

Más aún el TPI expresó su preocupación de que

acoger la “argumentación” de los demandados-

peticionarios

238a

...permitiría que los miembros capitales decidieran en otro momento utilizar otros criterios protegidos como la raza o la religión para privar a otros miembros capitales de su protección constitucional. De acuerdo a la interpretación y postura de la CRL, mediante el AO [el Acuerdo] se delegaría al árbitro resolver la controversia en un foro confidencial y sin derecho de apelación para los afectados.17

Véase Resolución, en la pág. 12. (Id.) Estas

determinaciones del TPI están impregnadas de la

hostilidad al arbitraje que el FAA vino a erradicar y

demuestran que dicho foro se amparó en la

naturaleza de los alegados reclamos de Jane Doe así

como en supuestas políticas estatales para rehusarse

a compeler el arbitraje. Al así proceder, el TPI actuó

en abierta contradicción al FAA y a la Cláusula de

Supremacía de la Constitución de los Estados Unidos.

Nuevamente, el TPI erró manifiestamente.

Como se desprende de su § 2, la cual

transcribimos en la discusión del primer

señalamiento de error, el FAA no establece

distinción alguna entre la arbitrabilidad de

derechos estatutarios o derechos 17 Vale mencionar que bajo el FAA, los tribunales pueden revisar la decisión del árbitro si se entendiera que éste se excedió en su jurisdicción. Véase 9 U.S.C.A. § 10.

239a

constitucionales.18 Todo lo que el FAA requiere es

que los pactos de arbitraje se pongan en vigor

conforme a sus propios términos. Véase Concepción.

131 S. Ct. 1745 (“courts must place arbitration

agreements on an equal footing with other contracts,

[...] and enforce them according to their terms”)(citas

omitidas). Es decir, lo importante no es la naturaleza

del reclamo en cuestión, sino si las partes acordaron

arbitrar dicho reclamo.19 Como el FAA no distingue

entre la arbitrabilidad de derechos estatutarios o

derechos constitucionales el TPI no podía crear dicha

distinción por fiat judicial al amparo de su

interpretación del derecho puertorriqueño.

Es un principio elemental de derecho que cuando una

norma federal está en conflicto con una norma

18 En cuanto a jurisprudencia del TSEU indicativa de que no se deben incluir requisitos para arbitrar controversias que no surjan del texto de la § 2 del FAA, véase Rent-A-Center v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772, 2778, n. 1 (“[§ 2] grounds do not include ... any requirement that its lack of unconscionability must be ‘clear and unmistakable.’”); Marmet v. Brown, 132 S. Ct. 1201, 1203 (2012)(‘‘[The FAA’s] text includes no exception for personal-injury or wrongful-death claims. It ‘requires courts to enforce the bargain of the parties to arbitrate.’“)(cita omitida). 19 Como hemos discutido anteriormente, el alegado reclamo constitucional de Jane está cobijado dentro de la cláusula de arbitraje del Acuerdo que requiere que Jane Doe presente en arbitraje todos sus reclamos contra los demandados (“any Claim”).

240a

estatal, incluso de rango constitucional, la norma

estatal queda desplazada por la federal por virtud de

la Cláusula de Supremacía de la Constitución de los

Estados Unidos. La Cláusula de Supremacía dispone

que:

This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States ..., shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.

Const. E.U.A., Art. VI, cl. 2 (énfasis nuestro). Sobre

este particular el Profesor Gorrín Peralta expresa lo

siguiente:

[U]na ley federal prevalece sobre lo dispuesto en la Constitución del [ELA] de Puerto Rico. ... En cualquier situación en que conflija una norma jurídica puertorriqueña con la ‘Ley Suprema,’ es decir con la Constitución de [EU], [o] con una ley ... federal aplicable en Puerto Rico, ... siempre debe prevalecer el Derecho federal sobre el puertorriqueño.

Carlos I. Gorrín Peralta, Fuentes y proceso de

investigación jurídica 43 (1991)(énfasis suplido).

Véase además, U.S. v. Georgia Public Service Comm.,

371 U.S. 285, 293 (1983)(“a State is without power by

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reason of the Supremacy Clause to provide the

conditions on which the Federal Government will

effectuate its policies.”); U.S. v. Pérez, 465 F.Supp.

1284, 1286 (D.P.R. 1979) (“[The Constitution of Puerto

Rico] cannot provide conditions on which Congress

will effectuate its policies as to matters well within its

province”).20

Como consecuencia de estos principios, es

norma establecida y consistentemente

reiterada que cuando un Estado requiere que

cierto tipo de reclamo se dilucide

exclusivamente en los tribunales, a pesar de

que las partes acordaron arbitrar sus disputas,

dicha norma estatal queda desplazada por el

FAA. Ello fue resuelto específicamente por el TSEU

20 Véase además Dowling v. Davis, 840 F.Supp. 731, 734 (E.D. Cal.)(“The Supremacy Clause does not permit federal law to be superseded by state law, including state constitutional provisions.”); U.S. v. Spencer, 160 F.3d 413, 414 (7th Cir. 1998)(¡gual); Keaveney v. Town of Brookline, 937 F.Supp. 975, 982 (D. Mass. 1996)(igual). El Prof. Gorrín Peralta también expresa sobre este particular lo siguiente: “Las fuentes legales en Puerto Rico son, pues: (1) la Constitución de EE.UU.; (2) las leyes federales ...; …(5) la Constitución del [ELA] de Puerto Rico; (6) las leyes ordinarias aprobadas por la Asamblea Legislativa [de Puerto Rico]; . . .” Gorrín Peralta, supra, en la pág. 43.

242a

en Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984), al

indicar lo siguiente:

In enacting § 2 of the [FAA], Congress declared a national policy favoring arbitration and withdrew the power of the states to require a judicial forum for the resolution of claims which the contracting parties agreed to resolve by arbitration.

Id. en la pág. 10 (énfasis nuestro).21

Recientemente, el TSEU reafirmó esta norma en

Marmet Health Care Center. Inc. v. Brown, 132 S. Ct.

1201 (res. el 21 de febrero 2012). En Marmet Health

Care Center, el TSEU, citando a Concepción, 131 S.

Ct. 1740, 1747 (2011), resolvió lo siguiente:

[W]hen state law prohibits outright the arbitration of a particular type of claim, the analysis is straightforward: The conflicting rule is displaced by the FAA. ... West Virginia’s prohibition against predispute agreements to arbitrate personal-injury or wrongful-death claims against nursing home is a categorical rule prohibiting arbitration of a particular type of claim, and that rule is contrary to the terms and coverage of the FAA.

21 Véase Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 491 (“This clear federal policy places § 2 of the Act in unmistakable conflict with California’s § 229 requirement that litigants be provided a judicial forum for resolving wage disputes.”)

243a

Id. en las págs. 1203-04 (citas y comillas internas

omitidas). En Marmet el TSEU resolvió que el

Tribunal Supremo de West Virginia había errado al

aplicar la política pública de ese Estado, la cual

prohíbe dar validez a una cláusula de arbitraje

contenida en un acuerdo de admisión a un asilo de

ancianos suscrita previo a la ocurrencia de un evento

de negligencia que resulte en muerte o daños

corporales. En el caso que nos ocupa, el TPI ha

pretendido relevar de su obligación de Arbitrar a una

abogada con 38 años de experiencia, y todo ello sin

que ni tan siquiera exista una legislación de Puerto

Rico para requerir que los reclamos de Jane se tengan

que resolver por un tribunal, lo cual también estaría

en contravención del FAA. De manera que, si el FAA

desplaza cualquier legislación estatal que conflija con

las disposiciones del FAA, es aún más claro que

cualquier determinación de un tribunal (como la

Resolución recurrida) que atente contra el FAA

también se tiene que dejar sin efecto.

El Tribunal Supremo de Puerto Rico es plenamente

consciente de estos principios. En World Films. Inc. v.

Paramount Pict. Corp., supra, el Tribunal Supremo

244a

reconoció que las leyes estatales que limitan las

clausula de arbitraje quedan desplazadas

(“preempted”) por el FAA. La controversia en World

Films giraba en torno a si la aplicación del Artículo 3-

B de la Ley 75, 10 L.P.R.A. § 278b-2, que establecía la

nulidad de cualquier estipulación en un contrato de

distribución que obligue a un distribuidor a arbitrar

fuera de Puerto Rico cualquier controversia que surja

de dicho contrato, había de prevalecer por encima de

la LFA. El Tribunal Supremo de Puerto Rico

determinó que en la medida que el Artículo 3-B de la

Ley 75 conflija en su aplicación con la FAA,

prevalecerá esta última. Id., pág. 364. El Tribunal

Supremo en efecto determinó que ante el FAA, el

Artículo 3-B era inoficioso y contrario a derecho. Al

resolver de esta manera, se revocó de manera expresa

los pronunciamientos de Walborg Corp. v. Tribunal

Superior, 104 D.P.R. 184 (1975), en el cual había

determinado que los tribunales estatales no venían

obligados a aplicar la LFA. En Walborq, el Tribunal

había resuelto que no podía concedérsele a una

cláusula de arbitraje mayor fuerza que la política

establecida en la Ley 75, y que los tribunales

245a

estatales no estaban obligados a aplicar la LFA.

Dicha doctrina quedó revocada por World Films.

Conforme lo anterior, no hay duda de que el TPI erró

al denegar el arbitraje basado en la supuesta

naturaleza “constitucional” y “laboral” de los reclamos

de Jane Doe. El FAA desplaza cualquier disposición

legal estatutaria o bajo la Constitución de Puerto Rico

que no haga valer y reconozca el compromiso asumido

por Jane Doe y CRL de resolver toda reclamación

(“any Claim”) mediante el procedimiento de arbitraje

pactado en la Sección 14 del Acuerdo.

VIII. CONCLUSIÓN Y SÚPLICA

Jane Doe inició los procedimientos ante el TPI en

violación a los términos de la cláusula compulsoria de

arbitraje que pactaron todos los Miembros Capitales

de CRL en el Acuerdo. El dictamen del TPI debe ser

revocado por contravenir los términos claros de la

Sección 14 del Acuerdo, las disposiciones del Ley

Federal de Arbitraje, la Claúsula de Supremacía de la

Constitución de los Estados Unidos y su

jurisprudencia interpretativa.

EN MÉRITO DE LO ANTERIORMENTE

EXPUESTO, muy respetuosamente solicitamos de

246a

este Honorable Tribunal que expida la presente

Solicitud de Certiorari, revoque la Resolución del TPI,

ordene a Jane Doe a presentar sus reclamos en el

arbitraje iniciado ante la AAA y desestime la

Demanda.

Respetuosamente sometido.

En San Juan, Puerto Rico, hoy 12 de junio de 2012.

CERTIFICO que he notificado copia fiel y exacta del

presente escrito, simultáneamente con su

presentación, por correo electrónico y mensajero a los

abogados de la parte demandante-recurrida, el Lcdo.

Juan R. González Muñoz, González Muñoz Law

Office, 261 Tetuán, San Juan, Puerto Rico 00901-

1916; jrgmlaw@gmail.com; y el Lcdo. Manuel Porro

Vizcarra, Manuel Porro Vizcarra Law Offices, 382

Ave. Escorial, Urb. Caparra Heights, San Juan, PR

00920; mpv@mpvlawpr.com.

MENDOZA LAW OFFICES Abogados de los

Demandados-Peticionarios PO Box 9282

San Juan, Puerto Rico 00908-0282

Tel. (787) 722-5522; 5530; 5540

247a

Fax: (787) 723-7057

Correo elecrónico

mendozalo@yahoo.com

/s/

Enrique J. Mendoza Méndez

TSPR-8304

248a

APPENDIX G

COMMONWEALTH OF PUERTO RICO COURT OF APPEALS

JUDICIAL REGION OF SAN JUAN

JANE DOE,

Plaintiff – Respondent,

v.

LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY (LLC); JOHN

DOE, in his personal capacity and as employer of JANE DOE and as co-administrator of the Conjugal Partnership (“CP”) constituted with JEAN DOE, who is sued as co-administrator of the CP constituted with

John Doe; “CP John and Jean Doe”; JACK JOE in his personal capacity and as employer of Jane Doe

and as co-administrator of the “CP” constituted with

JACKY JOE, who is sued as co-administrator of the

“CP Jack and Jacky Joe” constituted by Jack and Jacky Joe; LARRY LOE in his personal capacity and as employer of Jane Doe, and as co-administrator of the CP constituted with LARISSA LOE, who is sued as co-administrator of the CP constituted with Larry Loe; “CP Larry and Larissa Loe” constituted by Larry and Larissa Loe; Unknown Defendants A, B and C; Unknown Insurance Companies Defendants, X,Y,Z,

Defendants – Petitioners.

249a

[stamp:]

KLCE20 [hw:] 1200821

TA [COURT OF APPEALS] CASE NO.:

TPI [TRIAL COURT] CASE NO.:

___________

KPE 2012-1204 (904)

___________

San Juan Part

CONFIDENTIAL

[stamp:]

[2 illegible lines]

COURT OF APPEALS

___________

2012 JUN 12 AM 9:46

___________

250a

MOTION SUBMITTING UNDER SEAL “PETITION FOR CERTIORARI” AND

APPLICATION UNDER RULE 70(D)

APPEAR defendants-petitioners,1 Limited Liability Company (“LLC”), John Doe and the conjugal partnership (“CP”) established with Jean Doe, Jack Joe and the CP established with Jacky Joe, and Larry Loe and the CP established with Larissa Loe, and very respectfully submit under seal their Petition for Certiorari and an Application under Rule 70(d) to Accept a Petition for Certiorari that Exceeds the Maximum Number of Pages According to the Rules and ask the Court to have the documents and appeal proceedings so instituted remain confidential and under seal for the reasons stated below:

1. The petition for certiorari of reference has its origin in an action for declaratory judgment and injunction filed by Jane Doe, who was a Capital Member of defendant LLC. As explained in the Petition for Certiorari, there is an arbitration clause between the parties that requires that any dispute between the parties be heard confidentially. (Ap. TA., pgs. 97-98.) Furthermore, the past and present Capital Members of LLC have a duty to keep all information related to the affairs of the firm (“business of the firm”) confidential. (Ap. TA., pg. 93.)

1 For reasons of strict confidentiality the parties to this action are not identified by their respective names. In the Affidavit under Seal by the plaintiff-respondent submitted with the Complaint and the subsequent amendments, such party identified each one of the defendants-appellees [sic] using their respective names, addresses, and telephone numbers. (Appendix Petition for Certiorari (“Ap. TA.,” pgs. 12-13; 303-305; and 506.)

251a

2. According to the confidentiality obligation imposed by the arbitration clause, plaintiff-respondent Jane Doe commenced the proceedings before the Court of First Instance (trial court or “TPI”) under seal and they have remained confidential to date. (Ap. TA., pgs. 132-133.)

3. Pursuant to their confidentiality obligations, LLC and the other defendants hereby submit their Petition for Certiorari and an Application under Rule 70(d) to Accept a Petition for Certiorari that Exceeds the Maximum Number of Pages According to the Rules and ask the Court to have the documents and appeal proceedings so instituted remain confidential and under seal.

4. Attached is the cover of the Petition for Certiorari, which includes all of the information required by the Rules of this Honorable Court and the corresponding Internal Revenue stamp.

WHEREFORE, defendants-petitioners, Limited Liability Company (“LLC”), John Doe and the CP established with Jean Doe, Jack Joe and the CP established with Jacky Joe, and Larry Loe and the CP established with Larissa Loe and they very respectfully submit under seal their Petition for Certiorari and they ask the Court to have the documents and appeals proceedings so instituted remain confidential.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.

I CERTIFY that I have notified a true and exact copy of this writing, simultaneously with its submission, by electronic mail and messenger to the attorneys for the plaintiff-respondent, Juan R. González, Esq., González Muñoz Law Office, 261 Tetuán, San Juan,

252a

Puerto Rico 00901-1916; jrgmlaw@gmail.com; and Manuel Porro Vizcarra, Esq., Manuel Porro Vizcarra Law Offices, 382 Ave. Escorial, Urb. Caparra Heights, San Juan, PR 00920; mpv@mpvlawpr.com.

In San Juan, Puerto Rico, today, June 12, 2012

MENDOZA LAW OFFICES Attorney for the Defendants-Petitioners PO Box 9282 San Juan, Puerto Rico 00908-0282 Tel. (787) 722-5522; 5530; 5540 Fax: (787) 723-7057

/s/ By: Enrique J. Mendoza Méndez, Esq. TSPR-8304 mendozalo@yahoo.com

253a

COMMONWEALTH OF PUERTO RICO COURT OF APPEALS SAN JUAN REGION

JANE DOE,

Plaintiff – Respondent,

v.

LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY (LLC); JOHN

DOE, in his personal capacity and as employer of JANE DOE and as co-administrator of the Conjugal Partnership (“CP”) constituted with JEAN DOE, who is sued as co-administrator of the CP constituted with

John Doe; “CP John and Jean Doe”; JACK JOE in his personal capacity and as employer of Jane Doe

and as co-administrator of the “CP” constituted with

JACKY JOE, who is sued as co-administrator of the “CP Jack and Jacky Joe” constituted by Jack and

Jacky Joe; LARRY LOE in his personal capacity and as employer of Jane Doe, and as co-administrator of the CP constituted with LARISSA LOE, who is sued as co-administrator of the CP constituted with Larry Loe; “CP Larry and Larissa Loe” constituted by Larry and Larissa Loe; Unknown Defendants A, B and C; Unknown Insurance Companies Defendants, X,Y,Z,

Defendants – Petitioners.

254a

[stamp:]

KLCE20 [hw:] 1200821

TA [COURT OF APPEALS] CASE NO.:

TPI [TRIAL COURT] CASE NO.:

___________

KPE 2012-1204 (904)

___________

SAN JUAN PART

CONFIDENTIAL

[stamp:]

[2 illegible lines]

COURT OF APPEALS

___________

2012 JUN 12 AM 9:46

___________

255a

[Internal Revenue Tax

Stamp:]

Nature: Civil Certiorari

Subject: Declaratory Judgment; Preliminary and Permanent Injunction; Violation of Public Policy and Constitutional Rights; Retaliation; Damages and Injuries

Matter: Denial of Decision to Refer Case to Validly Agreed Arbitration

256a

Attorneys for the Plaintiff

– Respondent Jane Doe:

Attorneys for the Defendants – Petitioners

Juan Rafael González Muñoz, Esq. TSPR-8185

GONZALEZ MUÑOZ LAW OFFICE,

P.S.C. PO Box 9024055 San Juan, P.R.

00902-4055 Tel. (787) 766-5052 Fax: (787) 766-5551 jrgmlaw@gmail.com

polonorteprlaw@gmail.com

Manuel Porro Vizcarra, Eq.

TSPR-7994 MANUEL PORRO VIZCARRA LAW

OFFICES 382 Avenida Escorial Urb. Caparra Heights San Juan, P.R. 00920

Tel. (787)774-8200 Fax: (787)774-8297

mpv@mpvlawpr.com

Enrique J. Mendoza Méndez, Esq. TSPR-8304

MENDOZA LAW OFFICES

PO Box 9282 San Juan, P.R.

00908-0282 Tel. (787) 722-5522; 5530;

5540 Fax: (787) 723-7057 mendoza@yahoo.com

257a

COMMONWEALTH OF PUERTO RICO COURT OF APPEALS

JUDICIAL REGION OF SAN JUAN

JANE DOE,

Plaintiff – Respondent,

v.

LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY (LLC); JOHN

DOE, in his personal capacity and as employer of JANE DOE and as co-administrator of the Conjugal Partnership (“CP”) constituted with JEAN DOE, who is sued as co-administrator of the CP constituted with

John Doe; “CP John and Jean Doe”; JACK JOE in his personal capacity and as employer of Jane Doe

and as co-administrator of the “CP” constituted with

JACKY JOE, who is sued as co-administrator of the “CP Jack and Jacky Joe” constituted by Jack and

Jacky Joe; LARRY LOE in his personal capacity and as employer of Jane Doe, and as co-administrator of the CP constituted with LARISSA LOE, who is sued as co-administrator of the CP constituted with Larry Loe; “CP Larry and Larissa Loe” constituted by Larry and Larissa Loe; Unknown Defendants A, B and C; Unknown Insurance Companies Defendants, X,Y,Z,

Defendants – Petitioners.

258a

TA [COURT OF APPEALS] CASE NO.:

TPI [TRIAL COURT] CASE NO.:

___________

KPE 2012-1204 (904)

___________

San Juan Part

CONFIDENTIAL

259a

APPLICATION UNDER RULE 70(D) TO ACCEPT A PETITION FOR CERTIORARI

THAT EXCEEDS THE MAXIMUM NUMBER OF PAGES ACCORDING

TO THE RULES

TO THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS:

APPEAR defendants-petitioners, Limited Liability Company (“LLC”), John Doe and the conjugal partnership (“CP”) established with Jean Doe, Jack Joe and the CP established with Jacky Joe, and Larry Loe and the CP established with Larissa Loe, and very respectfully ask leave to submit their Petition for Certiorari in excess of three (3) pages for the reasons stated below.

1. Rule 34(D) of the Rules of the Court of Appeals stipulates that a petition for certiorari shall not exceed twenty-five (25) pages. 4 L.P.R.A. Ap. XXII-B R. 34(D)

2. Rule 70(D) establishes that “[w]hen these rules stipulate a maximum number of pages for a brief, no brief whatsoever shall be accepted in excess of such maximum unless it is accompanied by a separate motion in which the court is asked leave to exceed the maximum prescribed and just cause is shown.” 4 L.P.R.A. Ap. XXI—B R. 70. (Emphasis added.)

3. Appearers respectfully request that this Honorable Court exempt them from complying with the maximum number of pages requirement established. Despite the interest of the appearers in conforming their brief to the aforementioned Rule, an adequate and sufficient statement of the facts and

260a

the Law made it necessary for us to exceed it by just three (3) pages.

4. To state the content of the Petition for Certiorari in just twenty-five (25) pages would incurably undermine its meaning, clarity, and coherence, and it might leave out significant and weighty arguments. In view thereof, we very respectfully ask that authorization be given for the defendant-petitioner to exceed the number of pages in its brief, thus allowing the arguments that this Honorable Court of Appeals must consider to be argued clearly, completely, and reasonably. That is the only purpose pursued by the appearers.

WHEREFORE, defendant-petitioner very respectfully requests that this Honorable Court of Appeals authorize the submission of the Petition for Certiorari with a total number of pages in excess of that allowed by the Rules of the Court.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.

In San Juan, Puerto Rico, today June 12, 2012.

I CERTIFY that I have notified a true and exact copy of this brief, simultaneously with its submission, by electronic mail and messenger to the attorneys for the plaintiff-respondent, Juan R. González, Esq., González Muñoz Law Office, 261 Tetuán, San Juan, Puerto Rico 00901-1916; jrgmlaw@gmail.com; and Manuel Porro Vizcarra, Esq., Manuel Porro Vizcarra Law Offices, 382 Ave. Escorial, Urb. Caparra Heights, San Juan, PR 00920; mpv@mpvlawpr.com.

261a

MENDOZA LAW OFFICES Attorney for the defendants-petitioners PO Box 9282 San Juan, Puerto Rico 00908-0282 Tel. (787) 722-5522; 5530; 5540 Fax: (787) 723-7057 Electronic mail: mendozalo@yahoo.com

/s/ Enrique J. Mendoza Méndez, Esq. TSPR-8304

262a

COMMONWEALTH OF PUERTO RICO COURT OF APPEALS SAN JUAN REGION

JANE DOE,

Plaintiff – Respondent,

v.

LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY (LLC); JOHN

DOE, in his personal capacity and as employer of JANE DOE and as co-administrator of the Conjugal

Partnership (“CP”) constituted with JEAN DOE, who is sued as co-administrator of the CP constituted with

John Doe; “CP John and Jean Doe”; JACK JOE in his personal capacity and as employer of Jane Doe

and as co-administrator of the “CP” constituted with

JACKY JOE, who is sued as co-administrator of the “CP Jack and Jacky Joe” constituted by Jack and

Jacky Joe; LARRY LOE in his personal capacity and as employer of Jane Doe, and as co-administrator of the CP constituted with LARISSA LOE, who is sued as co-administrator of the CP constituted with Larry Loe; “CP Larry and Larissa Loe” constituted by Larry and Larissa Loe; Unknown Defendants A, B and C; Unknown Insurance Companies Defendants, X,Y,Z,

Defendants – Petitioners.

263a

TA [COURT OF APPEALS] CASE NO.:

TPI [TRIAL COURT] CASE NO.:

___________

KPE 2012-1204 (904)

___________

SAN JUAN PART

CONFIDENTIAL

Nature: Civil Certiorari

Subject: Declaratory Judgment; Preliminary and Permanent Injunction; Violation of Public Policy and Constitutional Rights; Retaliation; Damages and Injuries

Matter: Denial of Decision to Refer Case to Validly Agreed Arbitration

264a

Attorneys for the Plaintiff

– Respondent Jane Doe:

Attorneys for the Defendants – Petitioners

Juan Rafael González Muñoz, Esq. TSPR-8185

GONZALEZ MUÑOZ LAW OFFICE,

P.S.C. PO Box 9024055 San Juan, P.R.

00902-4055 Tel. (787) 766-5052 Fax: (787) 766-5551 jrgmlaw@gmail.com

polonorteprlaw@gmail.com

Manuel Porro Vizcarra, Eq.

TSPR-7994 MANUEL PORRO VIZCARRA LAW

OFFICES 382 Avenida Escorial Urb. Caparra Heights San Juan, P.R. 00920

Tel. (787)774-8200 Fax: (787)774-8297

mpv@mpvlawpr.com

Enrique J. Mendoza Méndez, Esq. TSPR-8304

MENDOZA LAW OFFICES

PO Box 9282 San Juan, P.R.

00908-0282 Tel. (787) 722-5522; 5530;

5540 Fax: (787) 723-7057 mendoza@yahoo.com

265a

COMMONWEALTH OF PUERTO RICO COURT OF APPEALS

JUDICIAL REGION OF SAN JUAN

JUDICIAL REGION OF SAN JUAN

JANE DOE,

Plaintiff – Respondent,

v.

LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY (LLC); JOHN

DOE, in his personal capacity and as employer of JANE DOE and as co-administrator of the Conjugal Partnership (“CP”) constituted with JEAN DOE, who is sued as co-administrator of the CP constituted with

John Doe; “CP John and Jean Doe”; JACK JOE in his personal capacity and as employer of Jane Doe

and as co-administrator of the “CP” constituted with

JACKY JOE, who is sued as co-administrator of the “CP Jack and Jacky Joe” constituted by Jack and

Jacky Joe; LARRY LOE in his personal capacity and as employer of Jane Doe, and as co-administrator of the CP constituted with LARISSA LOE, who is sued as co-administrator of the CP constituted with Larry Loe; “CP Larry and Larissa Loe” constituted by Larry and Larissa Loe; Unknown Defendants A, B and C; Unknown Insurance Companies Defendants, X,Y,Z,

Defendants – Petitioners.

266a

TA [COURT OF APPEALS] CASE NO.:

TPI [TRIAL COURT] CASE NO.:

___________

KPE 2012-1204 (904)

___________

San Juan Part

267a

PETITION FOR CERTIORARI

APPEAR defendants-petitioners,2 Limited Liability Company (“LLC”), John Doe and the conjugal estate (“CP”) established with Jean Doe, Jack Joe and the CP established with Jacky Joe, and Larry Loe and the CP established with Larissa Loe, and very respectfully request the issuance of a writ of certiorari to overturn the Decision entered by the Court of First Instance (trial court or “TPI”) on June 4, 2012, which refused to compel plaintiff-respondent to arbitrate her claims.

I. INTRODUCTION

Through the Decision appealed in this Petition for Certiorari the TPI has supported that Jane Doe, a sophisticated attorney with a postgraduate education in Law and 38 years of experience in commercial litigation and labor law, can default on her obligation to arbitrate and hear confidentially any claim or demand against LLC. LLC is a limited liability company organized under the laws of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, with main offices in San Juan and one office outside of Puerto Rico that provides services to foreign and local clientele. (Ap. TA, pgs. 38-126.)

Plaintiff-respondent contracted the obligation to arbitrate and hear confidentially any claim or

2 For reasons of strict confidentiality the parties to this action are not identified by their respective names. In the Affidavit under Seal by the plaintiff-respondent submitted with the Complaint and the subsequent amendments, such party identified each one of the defendants-appellees [sic] using their respective names, addresses, and telephone numbers. (Appendix Petition for Certiorari (“Ap. TA.,” pgs. 12-13; 303-305; and 506.)

268a

complaint against the LLC in Section 14 of the Operating Agreement (“Agreement”) that she signed with the other Capital Members of LLC, who also contracted such obligation. (Ap. TA., pgs. 97-99.) The first paragraph of section 14 of the Agreement reads as follows:

It is the intent and purpose of the Firm and any Claimant to resolve any claim by mediation or arbitration. The Claimant expressly agrees that the Claim shall be settled or resolved through the procedures set forth herein, and shall not in any way circumvent or otherwise challenge in any way these proceedings relative to mediation and arbitration.

(Ap. TA., pg. 97.) Despite the very broad scope of this arbitration clause that includes “any claim”3, the appealed Decision concluded that Jane Doe does not need to submit her claims for retaliation, damages, and discrimination to arbitration, and that they should be adjudicated by the Court. (Ap. TA., pgs. 484-498.)

For the reasons summarized below, and explained in detail in this petition, defendants-petitioners ask this Honorable Court to issue the petition for certiorari and to overturn the appealed decision.

First, the TPI erroneously assumed jurisdiction over the controversy of whether Jane Doe is obligated to arbitrate her claims against LLC and the other co-defendants. The arbitration clause agreed by Jane Doe and all of the Capital Members of LLC stipulates

3 The Agreement defines “Claim” as “any action, suit, complaint or demand of whatever nature and for whatever relief against the Firm or any of its Members or employees.”

269a

that the arbitration must be governed by the Rules of Commercial Arbitration of the American Arbitration Association (“AAA”), which in turn delegate to the arbitrator the authority to determine his jurisdiction and the scope of the arbitration clause. Under the applicable case law that is sufficient evidence in Law (clear and unequivocal) that the intention of the parties is to entrust to the arbitrator decisions on arbitrability, and not to the courts.

Second, having erroneously assumed jurisdiction over the controversy insofar as arbitrability, the TPI incorrectly decided it. For that it had to ignore the clear letter of Section 14.01 of the Agreement where the Capital Members of LLC agreed to submit “any claim” to arbitration regardless of the nature thereof or the remedy requested. By acting thus, the TPI did not adhere to the interpretative rule prescribed by the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) and its interpretative case law that requires that questions of arbitrability be resolved in favor of arbitration. Likewise, the TPI did not adhere to the elemental principle of interpretation of contracts under Puerto Rican law that when the terms of a contract are clear and are no ambiguous, its provisions will be applied according to the literal sense that the parties gave to it. Art. 1233 of the Civil Code, 31 L.P.R.A. § 3471.

Third, and finally, the TPI erred by denying the arbitration agreed by the parties due to the alleged “employment” or “labor” and “constitutional” nature of Jane Doe’s alleged claims. This decision by the TPI infringes the FAA, the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution of the United States and the interpretative case law of both that displace

270a

(“preempt”) any intent to prohibit the arbitration of certain types of claims.

II. JURISDICTION

The jurisdiction of this Honorable Court of Appeals (“TA”) to entertain this Petition for Certiorari arises from Article 4.006(b) of the Judiciary Act of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico (2003), 4. L.P.R.A. § 24(b); Rules 31, 32(D), 33-34, and 40 of the Rules of the TA, 4 L.P.R.A. Ap. XXI-B, R. 33-34 and 40; Rules 52.1 and 52.2(b) of Civil Procedure of Puerto Rico, 32 L.P.R.A. Ap. V. R. 52.1 and 52.2(b).

III. DECISION OF WHICH REVIEW IS SOUGHT

LLC and the other defendants requested that the Decision issued by the TPI in the case Jane Doe v. Compañía de Responsabilidad Limitada et al., KPE 2012-1204 (904) (Hon. Judge Ángel R. Pagán Ocasio), San Juan Part, June 4, 2012, and sent to the parties by electronic mail on that same day (hereinafter “Decision”) be overturned. (Ap. TA., pgs. 484-498.) The Decision denied the Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction and to Compel Compulsory Arbitration in Light of Binding Arbitration Agreement submitted by the defendants-petitioners on April 11, 2012 (hereinafter “Motion to Dismiss”) (Ap. TA., pgs. 38-126.)

Given that the TPI’s Decision was notified on June 4, the 30-day period that the appearers have to submit this petition expires on July 5, 2012.4 This petition

4 In view of the nature of the appealed Decision – which denies a motion to compel arbitration as agreed by the parties – and the fact that the TPI has the full intention to continue with the proceedings before it, for which it has ordered the consolidation of the preliminary injunction with the permanent one and

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has been submitted on time and the Court has jurisdiction to entertain it.

At present there is no other appeal of this case pending before this Court or before the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico.

IV. GROUNDS FOR GRANTING THIS PETITION

This petition complies with the criteria of Rule 52.1 of Civil Procedure, supra, (“Rule 52.1”) and Rule 40 of the TA’s Rules, supra, (“Rule 40”), for it to be issued.

The Decision by the TPI denied the dispositive motion and motion to compel arbitration filed by the defendants-petitioners. Such motion set forth that the TPI did not have jurisdiction over the action instituted by Jane Doe (“Jane”) given that there is a clear and unequivocal agreement between the parties that requires that the parties submit any claim between them to arbitration and that the arbitrator be the one to decide any controversy over whether Jane’s claims are arbitrable or not. Furthermore, the defendants-petitioners argued, in the alternative, that according to the submission agreement in question, it is appropriate for the TPI to order Jane to arbitrate her claims against them. The Decision by the TPI denied such arguments and decided, in violation of the strong public policy established in § 2 of the FAA and the Arbitration Act of Puerto Rico ordered the parties to submit stipulations last June 8, 2012, LLC and the other defendants have submitted an Urgent Motion in Aid of Jurisdiction with this Petition for Certiorari. That motion respectfully asks this Honorable Court, in aid of its jurisdiction, to order a stay of the TPI’s proceedings and to maintain the confidentiality of the record and the identities of the parties.

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(“LAPR”) that: (a) the TPI is the one that should decide the controversy on arbitrability; and (b) that Jane is not obligated to arbitrate her claims of alleged employment discrimination, retaliation, and damages because they are not covered by the arbitration clause signed by the parties. (Ap. TA., pgs. 484-498.)

The TPI reached the aforementioned conclusion despite the fact that the arbitration clause requires that Jane settle “any claim” against the defendants-petitioners through the arbitration proceeding regardless of the nature thereof. (Ap. TA., pgs. 66 (“Claim”); 97-98 (“Resolution of Claim”).)

As we shall see below, the TPI’s Decision suffers from hostility to the arbitration that the FAA seeks to eradicate. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepción, 131 S.Ct. 1740, 1745 (2011) (“The FAA was enacted ... in response to widespread judicial hostility to arbitration agreements.”)

Rule 52.1, insofar as pertinent, stipulates that a petition for certiorari will only be granted by this Honorable Court: (1) when the denial of a motion of a dispositive nature is being appealed; (2) in cases that are in the public interest; or (3) in any other situation in which waiting for an appeal would constitute an irreparable miscarriage of justice. The three exceptions are present in this case.

The first exception of Rule 52.1 is applicable because, as we saw, the TPI’s Decision denied the dispositive motion5 of the defendants-petitioners that establishes the impropriety of the court action instituted by Jane

5 See Motion for Dismissal due to Lack of Jurisdiction and to Compel Binding Arbitration in View of a Binding Arbitration Agreement. (Ap. TA., pgs. 38-126.)

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given that disputes on arbitrability must be resolved by the arbitrator himself and Jane is contractually obligated to prosecute all of her claims through a confidential arbitration proceeding.

The second exception is also fully satisfied, because there is no question whatsoever that both under the LAPR and the FAA arbitration is a matter that is in the highest public interest. Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 489 (1987) (“[I]n enacting § 2 of [FAA], Congress declared a national policy favoring arbitration ... “) (Emphasis added); Constructora Estelar v. Aut. Edif. Pub., 2011 T.S.P.R. 139, pg. 13, 183 D.P.R. ___ (“[I]n Puerto Rico there is a vigorous public policy in favor of arbitration as an alternate method of dispute resolution and all disputes on whether or not arbitration is appropriate must be resolved in favor of it as it has been agreed.”) (Emphasis Added.)

Likewise, the third exception is applicable. It would be impractical and it would constitute an irremediable miscarriage of justice to have to wait for the final resolution of the case in a judicial forum to be able to present and appeal to this Honorable Court and set forth as an error that the claims made by Jane should have been adjudicated in a confidential arbitration proceeding. By way of comparative law, in Kansas Gas & Elec. Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 861 F.2d 420 (4th Cir. 1988) (a case determining that the denials of orders compelling arbitration are appealable on an interlocutory basis), the Court of Appeals of the United State for the Fourth Circuit recognized that orders denying arbitration can cause irreparable harm if they are not reviewed on an interlocutory basis:

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[o]rders denying arbitration do have an injunctive effect and have ‘serious, perhaps, irreparable, consequence.’ The order is injunctive because it enjoins proceedings in another tribunal. It has serious consequences because of the irreparable harm that exists when arbitration is denied ab initio…’ If a party must undergo the expense and delay of trial before being able to appeal, the advantages of arbitration-speed and economy-are lost forever.

See 861 F.2d, at pg. 422; See also City of Meridian Miss. v. Algernon Blair, Inc., 721 F.2d 525, 529 (5th Cir. 1983) (an injunction staying arbitration constitutes irreparable harm due to the costs of litigating). It is evident that if this Honorable Court does not intervene in this phase of the proceedings, the remedies requested by the defendants-petitioners would become moot. Moreover, if the writ of certiorari is not issued, Jane would be allowed to defeat her obligation to submit to arbitration all claims, of any nature, that she might have against the defendants, which obligation she contracted freely and voluntarily.

Furthermore, as we shall see below, the criteria of Rule 40 for the granting of the writ of certiorari are met in the instant case. 6 Let us see.

6 The relevant criteria are: (A) If the remedy and the dispositive part of the judgment or

decision appealed, unlike the bases thereof, infringe the law.

(B) If the facts stated present a situation more indicative for an analysis of the problem put forth.

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As discussed throughout this brief, the Decision of the TPI infringes the law and, in particular, the rules on arbitration and the interpretation of contracts, because it determines that Jane is not obligated to use the arbitration proceeding that commenced on March 22, 2012 before the American Arbitration Association (“AAA”) despite the fact that the agreement between the parties requires that Jane submit to arbitration all of her claims against the defendants (“resolve any Claim by … arbitration”) regardless of the nature thereof (“any action … of whatever nature … against the Firm or any of its Members…”). Consequently, it is appropriate to grant the petition for certiorari pursuant to part (A) of Rule 40.

The TPI committed a gross error in their interpretation and evaluation of the arbitration clause. That, inasmuch as from the text of the arbitration clause in question, it is clearly seen that it is the arbitrator who has the obligation of resolving the controversies put forth by Jane in the judicial forum. As a result, it is appropriate to grant the petition for certiorari pursuant to part (C) of Rule 40.

(C) If there has been prejudice, partiality, or a gross and

manifest error in the evaluation of the evidence by the [TPI].

(D) … (E) If the phase that the case is in is the most appropriate one

for its consideration. (F) If the issuance of the writ or the order to show cause do not

cause an improper division of the action and an undesirable delay with respect to the final resolution of the litigation.

(G) If the issuance of the writ or the order to show cause prevent a miscarriage of justice.

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Nor is there a question that, pursuant to part (B) of Rule 40, the factual situation that is established is the one most indicative for an analysis of the controversy before this Honorable Court, because for it to be decided only requires that the Court interpret the arbitration clause agreed pursuant to the FAA and the rules of contract interpretation.

The intervention of the Honorable Court at this phase is most propitious, because if the proceedings before the TPI stayed, Jane’s obligation to prosecute her claims before the arbitration forum would become moot and irreparable harm would be caused to the defendants-petitioners because the commitments made to undertake a confidential arbitration proceeding would not be complied with.

As a result, in order to avoid a miscarriage of justice it is necessary to grant the petition for certiorari pursuant to parts (G)-(I) of Rule 40.

V. LIST OF PROCEDURAL AND SUBSTANTIVE FACTS MATERIAL TO THE CASE

A. List of Procedural Facts

1. On April 2, 2012, Jane submitted a Verified Complaint and Application for Declaratory Judgment and Preliminary and Permanent Injunction (“Complaint”) with the TPI. Jane claimed in the Complaint that the arbitration clause of the “Operating Agreement” of the LLC (“Agreement”) is not applicable to her, arguing that that agreement only regulates the commercial and administrative operations of the LLC. Jane Doe further claimed that her claims are of a labor nature and that they are covered by the Constitution of Puerto Rico, Law No. 100 of June 30, 1959 (age), Law No. 69 of July 6, 1985

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(sex and retaliation), Law No. 115 of December 20, 1991 (retaliation) and the LLC’s Employee Manual (“Manual”), which does not contain an arbitration clause. To that end, Jane asked the TPI to declare the arbitration clause of the Agreement inapplicable to her alleged labor claims and that the LLC be ordered to cease the arbitration under Rule 57 of Civil Procedure until the TPI can resolve the controversy set forth on arbitrability. (AP. TS., pgs. 1-13) As stated in the list of material facts, Jane’s claims that the Agreement is not pertinent to her claims are in open contradict with the extrajudicial claim that Jane made to the LLC Managing Board where she expressly set them forth as violations of the Agreement. (Ap. TA., pgs. 119-123.)

2. Together with the Complaint, Jane submitted a Motion Requesting a Preliminary and Permanent Injunction (“Motion for Injunction”), in which she likewise requested an order to stay the arbitration until the TPI could decide on the Declaratory Judgment, but with the request that once it was decided in favor of Jane that such forum make the cease and desist order permanent and proceed to decide on the merits of the controversies set forth. (Ap. TA., pgs. 14-19.)

3. Jane also submitted an Emergency Motion in Request of an Order in order for all the proceedings to remain strictly confidential. (Ap. TA., pgs. 20-21.)

4. On April 3, 2012, the TPI issued an Order setting a hearing for April 11, 2012, to determine the appropriateness of the extraordinary motion requested. (Ap. TA., pgs. 23.)

5. On April 11, 2012, the defendants-petitioners submitted a Motion to Dismiss, in which they

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essentially argued that the Agreement is a contract in the interstate commerce, and therefore the FAA is applicable to it, that pursuant to the arbitration clause of the Agreement all disputes on whether Jane’s claims are arbitrable or not are up to the arbitrator himself to decide and not the TPI and that, in the alternative, it would be appropriate for the TPI to recognize that through Section 14.04 of the Agreement Jane undertook to prosecute all of her claims (“any Claim”) confidentially through the arbitration procedure regardless of the nature of the claims or whether they arise under the Agreement. Furthermore, the defendants-petitioners argued that under the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, regardless of the alleged constitutional and labor nature of the Jane’s claims, § 2 of the FAA requires that such claims be adjudicated under the arbitration proceeding initiated before the AAA. (Ap. TA., pgs. 38-126.)

6. On that same day a hearing was held in which it was agreed that the defendants-petitioners would stay their actions in the arbitration case until the TPI could resolve the motions submitted on arbitrability, that the confidentiality of the case would be maintained and that all documents would be submitted under seal. Furthermore, the TPI indicated that the first matter to be decided would be the arbitrability of Jane’s claims. Finally, the TPI set a preliminary injunction hearing for May 10, 2012, if the production of evidence would be necessary.7 (Ap. TA., pgs. 127-128.)

7 On May 8, 2012, that hearing was rescheduled for June 5. (Ap. TA., pgs. 450-451.)

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7. On April 23, 2012, Jane submitted her Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss. In that Opposition Jane claimed, among other things, that the arbitration clause of the Agreement was not applicable to her alleged claims of a labor nature because that document only applies to matters related to the management of the LLC, especially because Jane’s claims are constitutional in nature. Furthermore, Jane claimed that the TPI is the one that must resolve all of her claims.8 (Ap. TA., pgs. 134-278.)

8. After the submission of several memoranda by the parties,9 and the submission by Jane of a Second Amended Complaint, on June 4, 2012, at 11:41 a.m., the TPI notified by electronic mail the Decision under appeal which, as we stated, decides in violation of the FAA and its interpretative case law that that forum is the one that has jurisdiction to decide the controversy on arbitrability and that, furthermore, Jane does not have to arbitrate her claims of alleged employment discrimination, retaliation, and damages because they are not covered by the arbitration clause of the Agreement. (Ap. TA., pgs. 484-498). In footnote 12 of the Decision, the TPI makes the 8 On that same day, Jane submitted an Amended Verified Complaint in order to include the spouses of the defendants as defendants themselves, in their capacities as co-managers of the respective conjugal partnerships, and to amend her causes of action. (Ap. TA., pgs. 279-305.) On May 1, 2012, defendants opposed the aforementioned amendment. (Ap. TA., pgs. 306-313.) 9 On May 1, 2012, defendants-petitioners submitted their Reply to ‘Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss Due to Lack of Jurisdiction and to Compel Binding Arbitration in View of a Binding Arbitration Agreement.’ (Ap. TA., pgs. 314-416.) For her part, on May 7, 2012, Jane submitted a brief called Plaintiff’s Sur-reply. (Ap. TA., pgs. 414-449.)

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following statements that make evident its hostility toward the arbitration proceeding: “According to the interpretation and position of the LLC, through the [Agreement] the arbitrator would be delegated a decision on the dispute in a completely confidential forum without a right for the affected parties to appeal.” (Ap. TA., pg. 497; emphasis ours.)

9. Furthermore, the TPI indicated that it would keep the injunction hearing scheduled for the next day would, where the parties would have to submit evidence in relation to the application for injunctive relief. Likewise, it authorized the submission of the Second Amended Complaint. (Ap. TS., pg. 541.) From an analysis of the format, typography, and style of the Decision it can be reasonably inferred that it is most likely the result of a draft Decision submitted by Jane, and if that is correct, she would have had knowledge of the decision by the TPI significantly in advance of the defendants-petitioners.

10. Indeed, surprisingly, only four (4) hours after the Decision was notified, Jane submitted to the TPI a Motion for an Order on the Confidentiality of Further Proceedings, claiming that in view of the decision hours earlier by the TPI there was no reason for the proceedings to continue to be prosecuted confidentially. (Ap. TA., pgs. 499-504.) Also, Jane submitted a Third Amended Verified Complaint under seal, which identifies the defendants with their respective names. (Ap. TA., pgs. 505-528.)

11. Furthermore, right before the hearing set for June 5, 2012 was to begin, Jane submitted to the TPI, at 8:47 a.m., a Request for Reinstatement as an Additional Remedy under the Scope of Rule 59.4 of

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Civil Procedure by means of which she asked that she be reinstated at the LLC through a Partial Decision to be issued by means of a preliminary and permanent injunction. (Ap. TA., pgs. 529-535.) A copy of this Request was delivered to the attorney for the defendant-petitioners as he was entering the TPI Courtroom for the hearing.

12. Minutes later, the parties appeared at the preliminary injunction hearing set for that day. Although not even 24 hours had elapsed from the time the defendants-petitioners became aware that Jane’s legal action would not be dismissed to proceed to arbitration, the TPI asked them to submit evidence on the claims in the case to be able to begin to decide it on the merits. In view of how hurried the proceeding was becoming, the defendants-petitioners objected to the action by the TPI using arguments of reasonability and Due Process of Law, among others. The TPI then granted until June 8 for Jane to submit the proposed stipulations of fact that had not been accepted by the defendants-petitioners, for the defendants to submit proposed facts and for both parties to submit the documents that should be considered by the TPI. Furthermore, the TPI consolidated the preliminary injunction hearing with the permanent injunction hearing and it indicated that if it was necessary to produce evidence the parties would be notified on the holding of the hearing.10 (Ap. TA., pgs. 548-551 and 552-617.)

10 The TPI also granted 10 days for the defendants-petitioners to present their position regarding Jane’s request to vacate the order of confidentiality and 15 days to state [their position] on the request for reinstatement of Jane at the LLC. (Ap. TA., pgs. 548-551.)

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B. List of Material Facts

1. In November 1979, Jane joined the LLC as an attorney after having obtained a Master’s in Law and having started to practice the profession. (Ap. TA., pgs. 1-13 and 38-126.)

2. When Jane joined LLC, LLC was a civil-law partnership. At that time and now LLC provides services to foreign clientele, mainly in the United States, and locally. (Ap. Ta., pgs. 38-126.)

3. In September 1987, Jane was promoted to Equity Partner of the LLC. (Ap. TA., pgs. 1-13 AND 38-159.)

4. On September 13, 2007, LLC became a limited-liability company under the laws of Puerto Rico. As a result of the aforementioned change, Jane became a Capital Member of LLC. (Ap. TA., pgs. 1-13, and 38-126.)

5. On that same day, Jane and the other LLC Capital Members signed a document titled Operating Agreement (“Operating Agreement” or “Agreement”). 11 Ap. TA., pgs. 60-115 and 338-353.)

6. Insofar as pertinent, such Agreement stipulates the following in its relevant Sections:

1. Definitions. For the purposes of this Agreement, the following terms shall have the meaning set forth below:

1.06 “Claim” means any action, suit, complaint or demand of whatever nature and for whatever relief or remedy against the Firm or any of its Members or employees…

11 The Agreement establishes that its effectiveness is retroactive to June 1, 2007.

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1.07 “Claimant” means any Member or Former Member asserting a Claim.

5. Compensation.12

5.02 Salaries of Members – Each Capital Member shall be entitled to such annual salary as shall be determined pursuant to section 5.01 of this Agreement, to be paid in one (1) or more installments.....

10. Fiduciary Duty and Duty of Loyalty of Members.

10.1 Fiduciary Duties of Members – Members owe the Firm and each other a fiduciary duty and a duty of loyalty, which requires each Member, among other things:

(f) To treat all Firm Documents as confidential ‘trade secrets’, except to the extent such Firm Documents are publicly available other than as a result of any violation of this or any other confidentiality obligation ... and to treat as confidential all information relating to the deliberations of the Members and the business of the Firm while such Member is a Member of the Firm and, in the event the Member leaves the Firm, after such Member’s departure.

12. Withdrawal. Retirement. Suspension. Expulsion ... of a Member.

12.02 Suspension and/or Expulsion – The Firm may, upon the recommendation of the Policy Committee and the affirmative vote of three-fourths (%) of the Capital Members, ... (b) expel any Member 12 For the rest of the relevant clauses on compensation see Section 5 of the Agreement. (Ap. TA., pgs. 84-86.)

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at any date specified by the Policy Committee with or without cause or prior notice to such Member. In the case of any such expulsion, the Member so expelled shall cease to be a Member on the date specified by the Policy Committee.

14. Resolution of Claim.

14.01 Intent and Purpose – It is the intent and purpose of the Firm and any Claimant to resolve any Claim by mediation or arbitration. The Claimant expressly agrees that the Claim shall be settled or resolved through the procedures set forth herein, and shall not in any way circumvent or otherwise challenge in any way these proceedings relative to mediation and arbitration.

14.04 Arbitration – If mediation fails, the Claim shall be settled by arbitration administered by the [AAA] under its Commercial Arbitration Rules, and judgment on the award rendered by the arbitrator(s) may be entered in any court having jurisdiction thereof. ...

14.05 Confidentiality – The Claimant and the Firm agree that the underlying purpose of the provisions set forth in section 14 of this Agreement is to provide a mechanism by which any Claim shall be resolved in a confidential manner, without publicity and the attendant distractions. ... The parties agree to maintain the confidentiality of such meetings and hearings, and of the documents produced or created in such meetings and hearings. Any and all actions taken by the parties shall be in conformity with the underlying purpose set forth in section 14 of this Agreement.

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Note that Jane does not dispute that the Agreement is a contract in the interstate commerce for purposes of the FAA. (Ap. TA., pgs. 1-3; 38-126; 134-278; 314-416; and 417-449.) Nor is the validity of the arbitration clause in Section 14 of the Agreement in dispute. (Id.)

8. On October 22, 2007, the LLC’s Employee Manual took effect which applies to all employees and Members of LLC. However, such Manual does not make a Member an employee. Rather, the Manual clearly maintains the difference between the classification of “Member” and “employee.” (Ap. TA., pgs. 191-257.) The Manual also does not establish the policies related to the compensation of Members, or the process of terminating their relationship with LLC, or the method to resolve disputes between Members and LLC. Those policies are contained in Sections 5, 12, and 14 of the Agreement, respectively. (Ap. TA., pgs. 84-86 and 94-98.)

9. LLC has offices within and outside of Puerto Rico. Furthermore, the great majority of its clients are located outside of Puerto Rico (principally in the United States), which requires that LLC and its clients remain in constant communication as part of its operations through the use of mail, Internet, telephone and other means of interstate communications. Likewise, it is significant insofar as the Agreement is a contract in the interstate commerce, and due to the economic nature thereof, the following federal statutes, among others, apply to the relationship of LLC with those who are deemed employees per se: 1) Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-78; 2) Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654; 3) Family

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Medical Leave Act of 2000, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17; 4) Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964; and 5) Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34. (Ap. TA., pgs. 38-126.)

9. In the middle of 2009, Jane was elected to the Managing Board of LLC, which is the highest governing body of LLC.

10. Jane’s compensation had to be reduced for business reasons. As a result of that, on January 24, 2012, Jane filed an extrajudicial claim against the Members of LLC’s Managing Board, as required under Section 14.02 of the Agreement. In her extrajudicial claim, Jane alleged in sum that her compensation had been reduced in violation of the Agreement. In no part of her claim did Jane mention that the Manual had been violated. Indeed, the only written contact that Jane claimed was violated was the Agreement. Insofar as pertinent, the appellee specifically claimed the following, based on the Agreement:

…I formally ask you to reconsider the decision by [John Doe] and to schedule, as soon as possible and within the next 15 days, a meeting of the Managing Board under the tenor of Clause 14 et seq. of the “Operating Agreement,” such that I as a Capital Member can present my position and objections. I want to make clear that subjecting myself to the procedure under Clause 14 should not be construed as a waiver of the rights that protect me under local and federal laws.

I will now proceed to summarize my objections briefly.

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1. The reduction in my salary and benefits was done (sic) violates the “Operating Agreement” and the agreement between [John Doe] and me, and it violates the specific agreement established with me.

2. …Evidently, the procedure followed was inadequate and in violation of the “Operating Agreement,” the decisions by the Managing Board approved on May 31, 2011, and the decision of December 20, 2011.

16. Likewise I was offended when [Jack Joe], in a meeting of the Board stated that “to sit at that desk means having to bring in business” and no one clarified the impropriety of his comment. Is that a requirement in the Operating Agreement?...

(Ap. TA., pgs. 119-123; emphasis ours.)

11. Pursuant to Section 14.03 of the Agreement, on March 20, 2012 the parties subjected themselves to the mediation process which ended without achieving any agreement whatsoever.

12. Faced with the failure of mediation, on March 22, 2012, LLC submitted an Arbitration Complaint against Jane with the AAA in execution of the arbitration clause of Section 14.04 of the Agreement which requires that all disputes (“any Claim”) between the parties regardless of the nature thereof or whether or not it arises under the Agreement shall be resolved through such dispute resolution method, and confidentially. (Ap. TA., pgs. 259-260.)

VI. INDICATIONS OF ERROR

FIRST INDICATION OF ERROR: THE TPI MANIFESTLY ERRED BY ASSUMING

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JURISDICTION OVER THE CONTROVERSY ON WHETHER JANE DOE IS OBLIGATED TO ARBITRATE HER ALLEGED CLAIMS: JANE DOE AND LLC UNMISTAKABLY AGREED THAT THE ARBITRATOR HAS THE AUTHORITY TO DETERMINE THE SCOPE OF HIS JURISDICTION.

SECOND INDICATION OF ERROR: THE TPI MANIFESTLY ERRED BY CONCLUDING THAT JANE DOE DOES NOT HAVE TO ARBITRATE HER ALLEGED CLAIMS AGAINST LLC AND THE OTHER DEFENDANTS-PETITIONERS GIVEN THAT THE ARBITRATION CLAUSE OF THE AGREEMENT IS BROAD, CLEAR, AND IT COVERS ANY CLAIM BETWEEN THE PARTIES.

THIRD INDICATION OF ERROR: THE TPI MANIFESTLY ERRED BY EXEMPTING JANE DOE FROM ARBITRATING HER CLAIMS BECAUSE OF THEIR ALLEGED “EMPLOYMENT” OR “LABOR” AND CONSTITUTIONAL” NATURE BECAUSE THE FAA DISPLACES (“PREEMPTS”) ALL STATE POLICY CONTRARY TO ARBITRATION.

VII. DISCUSSION OF THE ERRORS INDICATED

A. FIRST INDICATION OF ERROR: THE TPI MANIFESTLY ERRED BY ASSUMING JURISDICTION OVER THE CONTROVERSY ON WHETHER JANE DOE IS OBLIGATED TO ARBITRATE HER ALLEGED CLAIMS: JANE DOE AND LLC UNMISTAKABLY AGREED THAT THE ARBITRATOR HAS THE AUTHORITY TO DETERMINE THE SCOPE OF HIS JURISDICTION.

The TPI manifestly erred on assuming jurisdiction to decide whether Jane Doe has to arbitrate her alleged

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claims against LLC and the other defendants-petitioners. Despite the fact that the TPI acknowledged that the parties can agree to have the arbitrator be the one to decide whether a dispute is arbitrable as well as the merits thereof when it has been clearly and unmistakably been agreed (Ap. TA., pg. 495.),13 that forum decided that “it is not necessary to determine whether the delegation of jurisdiction to the arbitrator is clear and unmistakable because the arbitration clause is not applicable to the controversies presented.” (Id.) In other words the TPI rested on a completely circular argument to ignore the clear language of the broad arbitration clause in the Agreement, the provisions of the FAA and its interpretative case law, and Puerto Rican rules on the interpretation of contracts. All of these precepts required referring the matter of whether Jane Doe’s claims are arbitrable under Section 14 of the Agreement to the arbitrator.

As a preliminary matter, it is necessary to make a brief statement on the FAA because [as] was appropriately claimed by the defendants-petitioners, Jane Doe did not dispute its application to the matter that concerns us and such law is dispositive on this petition. (Ap. TA., pgs. 52-58.) The FAA, 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. applies to contracts in the interstate commerce and it applies both in the federal and the state courts. World Films, Inc. v. Paramount Pict. Corp., 125 D.P.R. 352, 357 and 364 (1990). Section 2 of the FAA stipulates that:

13 See First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 945 (1995).

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A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction or the refusal to perform the whole or any part thereof, or an agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an existing controversy arising out of such a contract, transaction or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, save upon such grounds as exist in law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.

9 U.S.C. § 2 (Emphasis ours).

The FAA reflects a clear, well established and broadly recognized federal policy in favor of arbitration. See Méndez Acevedo v. Nieves Rivera, 179 D.P.R. 359 (2010); KKW Enterprises v. Gloria Jean’s Gourmet Coffees Franchising Corp, 184 F.3d 42, 50 (1st Cir. 1999); citing Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros, S.A. v. M/V SKY Reefer, 29 F.3d 727, 730 (1st Cir.) ; confirmed in 515 U.S. 528 (1995). On this strong public policy, the Supreme Court of the United States (“SCOTUS”) has stated the following:

[The FAA] is a congressional declaration of a liberal policy favoring arbitration agreements, notwithstanding any state substantive or procedural policies to the contrary.

****

[I]n enacting § 2 of the federal Act, Congress declared a national policy favoring arbitration and withdrew the power of the states to require a judicial forum for the resolution of

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claims which the contracting parties agreed to resolve by arbitration.

Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 489 (1987) (internal citations and quotations omitted) (emphasis added). In other words, the FAA applies without accepting state procedural or substantive policies otherwise and it removed the power of the States to require a judicial forum to resolve claims that the contracting parties agreed to resolve through arbitration.

The FAA was passed precisely as a response to the hostility that the Courts have traditionally shown toward arbitration agreements. See Circuit City Stores v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 111 (2011) (deciding that employment contracts in the interstate commerce except those of certain transportation employees are covered by the FAA). The Supreme Court of Puerto Rico has recognized outright the public policy contained in the FAA by stating that such law stipulates that:

…the arbitration clauses in these contracts are valid, irrevocable and mandatory. Once arbitration is agreed, the courts lack discretion regarding their efficacy and they have to enforce the arbitration agreed. According to this law, and the federal case law interpreting it, any question about the scope of the disputes that may be taken to arbitration must be resolved in favor of arbitration. This applies to both the federal courts and the state courts.

See Painewebber Incorporated of Puerto Rico v. Service Concepts, Inc., 151 D.P.R. 307, 311-12 (2000) (emphasis ours); Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 16 (1984).

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Disputes on arbitrability take three (3) forms: (i) whether there is an arbitration agreement; (ii) the scope of an arbitration agreement (“whether such agreement covers a certain dispute”); (iii) and whether such agreement covers a dispute on the duration or expiration of the contract. See Méndez Acevedo v. Nieves Rivera, 179 D.P.R. 359, 367-68 (2010); Municipio de Mayagüez v. Lebrón, 167 D.P.R. 713, 720-21 (2006); World Films, Inc. v. Paramount Pictures Corp., supra.

As a general rule, the determination of whether an agreement creates the duty of the parties to arbitrate a certain dispute is a judicial task. Méndez Acevedo, supra; World Films, Inc., supra. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the matter of arbitrability shall not be under the jurisdiction of a court if the parties agreed in the arbitration agreement that such authority is delegated to the arbitrator. That is to say, if it is agreed in an arbitration agreement that the arbitrator is the one who will decide matters of arbitrability, it is appropriate that he, and not the court, be the one to determine whether there is an obligation to arbitrate a certain dispute. U.G.T. v. Corp. Difusión Pub., 168 D.P.R. 674, 684 (2006) (“Ordinarily and except if the collective agreement stipulates otherwise, matters of substantive arbitrability must be resolved by the courts…”) (emphasis ours).

Consistent with the foregoing, it is a well-settled principle in the federal jurisdiction and under the FAA that a challenge to the validity of an arbitration agreement, including any dispute over arbitrability (if a certain dispute is arbitrable or not), must be referred to the arbitrator if there is “clear and

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unmistakable evidence” that the parties so agreed – that that was their intention. First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 945 (1995). The foregoing is precisely the situation in the case at bar. The FAA is applicable to the Agreement between Jane and LLC and the parties delegated the determination of arbitrability to the arbitral forum and therefore the TPI erred in assuming jurisdiction.

The FAA is applicable to the Agreement between Jane Doe and LLC because it is a contract that involves interstate commerce. To determine whether there is a transaction that involves interstate commerce, the Court must examine the contract and the commercial transactions of the parties, among other things. See Ideal Services Corp. v. Swift-Eckrich, Inc., 727 F.Supp. 75, 76 (D.P.R. 1989).

In Allied Bruce Terminix v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 282 (1995), the SCOTUS decided that when the Congress of the United States passed the FAA it wanted to use its constitutional power under the Commerce Clause to the utmost:

Thus, the Court interpreted the words “involving commerce” as broadly as the words “affecting commerce”; and, as we have said, these latter words normally mean a full exercise of constitutional power. At the same time, the Court’s opinion does not discuss the implications of the “interstate” facts to which the respondents now point. For these reasons, Bernhardt does not require us to narrow the scope of the word “involving.” And, we conclude that the word “involving,” like

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“affecting,” signals an intent to exercise Congress’ commerce power to the full.

513 U.S. at pg. 277. In Allied Bruce, the dispute was around an arbitration clause in an extermination services agreement for a residence. The SCOTUS determined that the contract involved interstate commerce for the purposes of the FAA because the pesticides were manufactured outside of the state and the defendant had operations in multiple states.

The Agreement is a contract that involves interstate commerce. Among other reasons, the Agreement governs the proprietary interest of the parties and the LLC’s operations in Puerto Rico and in its office outside of Puerto Rico. See, SCI v. Fulmer, 883 So.2d 621, 629 (Ala 2003) ((“[I]t would be difficult indeed to give an example of an economic or commercial activity that one could ... declare beyond the reach of Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause, and, by extension, under the FAA.”) (emphasis added).14 Furthermore,

14 See also, Thomas H. Oehmke, Commercial Arbitration § 3:6 (2011) (2011) (“A contract needs only the slightest nexus to interstate commerce to apply the FAA.”); 21 Willinston on Contracts §57: (4th ed. 2011) (“Consistent with the broad approach to interpreting the term ‘involving commerce’ in the [FAA], it has been said that a contract containing an arbitration provision need only be related to commerce to fall within the coverage of the Act “) (emphasis added); Bowen v. Security Pest Control, Inc., 879 So.2d 1139, 1142 (Ala. 2003) (decides that the transaction involved interstate commerce, in part, because one of the parties to the transaction engaged in business in two States). Indeed, the power of Congress under the Commerce Clause of the United States is so broad that in the last 75 years only two SCOTUS cases have decided that Congress exceeded its powers under the aforementioned Commerce Clause. See U.S. v. Lopez,

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the great majority of LLC’s clients are located outside of Puerto Rico (principally in the United States), which means that the LLC and its clients must remain in constant communication as part of its operations through the use of mail, Internet, telephone, and other means of interstate communications. Likewise, the economic nature of the Agreement and the fact that the following federal statutes, among others, apply to the relationship of LLC with those who are considered employees per se, is significant: 1) Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-78; 2) Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654; 3) Family Medical Leave Act of 2000, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17; 4) Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964; and 5) Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34. Furthermore, and as we indicated above, Jane did not dispute the application of the FAA to the arbitration clause of the Agreement and, therefore, she waived any right to the contrary. See Caguas Satellite Corp. v. Echostar Satellite LLC, _ F.Supp.2d _, 2011 WL 5517037, n. 2 (D.P.R.) (“Plaintiffs [, the party opposing arbitration,] ... do not make any arguments about whether or not the agreement involves interstate commerce and therefore waive this argument”).

Given the clear language of Section 14 of the Agreement, the TPI manifestly erred by assuming jurisdiction over the dispute of whether Jane Doe’s claims are arbitrable or

514 U.S. 549 (1995); US v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000). Note that none of the statutes in dispute in those cases was aimed at regulating purely economic transactions, but rather criminal conduct of a noneconomic nature.

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not. In the arbitration clause contained in the Agreement, Jane agreed that the arbitration would be conducted under the Commercial Arbitration Rules of the AAA.15 Section 14.04 of the Agreement stipulates insofar as pertinent: “[i]f mediation fails, the Claim shall be settled by arbitration under its Commercial Arbitration Rules ....” In turn, Rule 7(a) of that body of rules stipulates: [t]he arbitrator shall have the power to rule on his or her own jurisdiction, including any objections with respect to the existence, scope or validity of the arbitration agreement.” (Commercial Arbitration Rules of the AAA, Rule 7(a), Ap. TA. pgs. 116-118.) (emphasis ours). In view of the inclusion within the arbitration clause between Jane and LLC, of a body of arbitration rules that delegates the authority to determine to the arbitrator, it was clear that it was not up to the TPI to determine whether Jane’s claims were arbitrable.

Every federal court that has had this dispute before it has decided that when the parties incorporate institutional rules such as those of the AAA into their arbitration agreement or clauses, which delegate to the arbitrator the authority to decide on his own jurisdiction – to decide arbitrability – that constitutes sufficient (clear and unmistakable) evidence in law that that was the intention of the parties. See Contec Corp. v. Remote Solution Co., 398 F.3d 205, 208 (2nd Cir. 2005) See Contec Corp. v. Remote Solution Co., 398 F.3d 205, 208 (2nd Cir. 2005) (“When … parties explicitly incorporate rules that empower an arbitrator to decide issues of arbitrability, the incorporation serves as clear and

15 The AAA’s Rules of Commercial Arbitration enjoy the same generalness as the Rules of Civil Procedure of Puerto Rico.

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unmistakable evidence of the parties’ intent to delegate such issues to an arbitrator’); Sleeper Farms v. Agway, Inc., 211 F. Supp. 2d 197 (D. Me. 2002) (“[Since the AAA rules constitute] a clear and unmistakable delegation of scope-determining authority to an arbitrator, [the court] refers this dispute to the arbitrator [to determine [...] what issues [...] are covered by the arbitration clause.”)16

Indeed, even when the parties have not agreed to submit substantive disputes on arbitrability to the arbitration forum, the courts tend to leave the dispute to be resolved initially by the arbitrator when the arbitrability cannot be determined without entering into the merits of the dispute. Elkouri & Elkouri, How Arbitrations Works, (BNA Books, 6th Edition 2003), at pg. 281. (“However, even though the agreement does not expressly leave the determination of arbitrability to the arbitrator, and in spite of the fact that the parties have first gone to court, courts have left the initial determination to the arbitrator.

16 See, also: Terminix Int’l Col. v. Palmer Ranch Ltd., 432 F.3d 1327, 29, 33-34 (11th Cir. 2005) (Deciding that because the AAA’s Rules of Arbitration delegate the determination of arbitrability to the arbitrator, the plaintiff’s claim that the arbitration agreement illegally denied him of several statutory remedies, was a matter to be adjudicated by the arbitrator, not by the court); Qualcomm Inc. v. Nokia Corp., 466 F.3d 1366, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Apollo Computer. Inc. v. Berg, 886 F.2d 469, 473 (1st Cir. 1989) (“Ordinarily, [Plaintiff] would be entitled to have these issues resolved by a court. [...] By contracting to have all disputes resolved according to the Rules of the ICC, however, [Plaintiff] agreed to be bound by Articles 8.3 and 8.4. These provisions clearly and unmistakably allow the arbitrator to determine her own jurisdiction when, as here, there exists a prima facie agreement to arbitrate whose continued existence and validity is being questioned.”).

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This was the result, for instance, where arbitrability could not be determined without delving into the merits ...”).

Thus, in Camden Indus. Co. v. Carpenters Local 1688, 353 F.3d 178, 180 (1st Cir. 1969), the First Court of Appeals decided:

In these circumstances we believe the matter should proceed to arbitration, where the arbitrator may determine the subsidiary facts upon which depend both the merits of the controversy and his jurisdiction to decide it. A finding of jurisdiction, unlike a finding on the merits when jurisdiction is not in question ... will not be insulated from subsequent judicial review... We believe full recognition of the role of labor arbitration requires court intervention in a case such as this only when it has become absolutely necessary, viz., on a petition to vacate or enforce the award.

The federal case law cited is consistent with our local law as regards contracts. At the end of the day, “arbitration is an inherently contractual legal concept.” Méndez Acevedo, supra, at pg. 367; Municipio de Mayagüez, supra; U.C.P.R. v. Triangle Engineering Corp., 136 D.P.R. 133, 144 (1994).

Therefore, in terms of arbitration compliance with what has been agreed in writing can be enforced. See Crufon Const. v. Aut. Edif. Púbs., 156 D.P.R. 197, 204 (2002); Municipio de Ponce v. Gobernador, 136 D.P.R. 776, 783 (1994). In turn, when the terms of a contract are clear and unambiguous, its provisions will be applied according to the literal meaning that was given to it by the parties. Art. 1233 of the Civil Code, supra, §3471. Once it is determined what it was that the parties agreed, the court must decide

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the disputes between the parties as stipulated. See C.F.S.E. v. Unión de Médicos, 170 D.P.R. 443 (2007).

In summary, in the instant case, the arbitration clause expressly incorporates by reference the AAA’s Commercial Rules of Arbitration, which in turn delegate to the arbitrator – clearly and unmistakably – the authority to determine his own jurisdiction. Therefore, according to the authorities herein cited, it is appropriate for this Honorable Court to vacate the Decisions by the TPI and order Jane to continue with the arbitration proceeding that she agreed to, such that the arbitrator will be the one who decides whether he has authority to hear her claims on the merits. This is what the parties agreed, without any ambiguity whatsoever, and that constitutes the law between the parties. See HIETEL v. PRTC, 2011 T.S.P.R. 100. In the alternative, if this Honorable Court believes that the TPI did not commit the second error indicated, it must proceed to consider the next two (2) indications of errors.

B. SECOND INDICATION OF ERROR: THE TPI MANIFESTLY ERRED BY CONCLUDING THAT JANE DOE DOES NOT HAVE TO ARBITRATE HER ALLEGED CLAIMS AGAINST LLC AND THE OTHER DEFENDANTS-PETITIONERS GIVEN THAT THE ARBITRATION CLAUSE OF THE AGREEMENT IS BROAD, CLEAR, AND IT COVERS ANY CLAIM BETWEEN THE PARTIES.

The TPI also manifestly erred in deciding that the claims presented by Jane are not covered by the arbitration clause in the Agreement because they are allegedly of an “employment” or “labor” and “constitutional” nature. (Ap. TA., pgs. 486-498.)

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Essentially, the TPI based its decision on the erroneous conclusion that the Agreement does not govern the relationship between LLC and Jane for the purposes of the instant judicial action. (Ap. TA., pgs. 496-497.) To reach that result the TPI had to impose by fiat an unsustainable limitation on the scope of the arbitration clause in the Agreement, which according to its literal text is clearly broad and covers “any Claim” between the parties – including those that do not arise from the Agreement. By doing so, the TPI not only erred, but it also made manifest a marked hostility to the arbitration forum, thus violating the postulates of the FAA and its case law interpretation.

From the face of the Decision it can be seen that the TPI ignored the broad language of the binding arbitration clause contained in the Agreement. An example of this is that not even the full text of the clause was quoted in the Decision as part of the TPI’s analysis. To facilitate the work of this Court, we reproduce the relevant section of the Agreement, which unquestionably evidences that the TPI should have compelled Jane to arbitrator her claims:

Intent and Purpose – It is the intent and purpose of the Firm and any Claimant to resolve any Claim by mediation or arbitration. The Claimant expressly agrees that the Claim shall be settled or resolved through the procedures set forth herein, and shall not in any way circumvent or otherwise challenge in any way these proceedings relative to mediation and arbitration.

See Section 14.01 of the Agreement (emphasis provided). (Ap. TA., pg. 97.)

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Section 14.01 of the Agreement transcribed above shows that it was the intent and purpose of the parties, including Jane and the appearers, to resolve “any Claim” through mediation and arbitration. More revealing still is the fact that in the Agreement “Claim” is defined as, “any action, suit, complaint or demand of whatever nature and for whatever relief or remedy against the Firm or any of its Members or employees.” (Section 1.06 of the Agreement; emphasis added.) (Ap. TA. pg. 66). In other words, the term “any Claim” literally means any claim, complaint, demand, or action of any nature and requesting any remedy.

Given the text of Section 14.01 and the definition of “Claim” in the Agreement itself, “any Claim” can mean nothing other than “any claim,” and that includes all types of claims or requests for relief presented by Jane. That is, according to the foregoing terms (and without need of any interpretation whatsoever), any type of action, case, demand, or claim of any nature and on any type of relief or aid against LLC or any of its Members or employees is covered by the arbitration clause. As we indicated above, under Puerto Rican law when the terms of a contract are clear and unambiguous, its provisions will be applied according to the literal meaning that the parties gave to it. Art. 1233 of the Civil Code, supra, §3471. On this matter, in Marcial v. Tome, 144 D.P.R. 522 (1997), this Supreme Court recognized that the clear letter of the contract had to be followed, when it unmistakably reflects the will of the parties.

Even if there were any doubts on the scope of the arbitration clause and the meaning of “any Claim,”

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which is denied, the FAA requires that the doubt be resolved in favor of arbitration. See Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Const. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983) (“The [FAA] establishes that, as a matter of federal law, any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration, whether the problem at hand is the construction of the contract language itself or an allegation of waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability.”); Granite Rock Co. v. Int’l Broth. of Teamsters, 130 S.Ct. 2847, 2857 (2010) (likewise); Painewebber Incorporated of Puerto Rico v. Service Concepts, Inc., 151 D.P.R. 307, 311-12 (2000).

Therefore, for the determination of arbitrability it does not matter if the claim is of a labor or administrative, contractual, extracontractual, statutory or constitutional nature. Nor does it matter if the Capital Members of LLC can be classified as owners or employees or both. This is a very broad arbitration clause that the TPI should have backed pursuant to its terms under the FAA. These principles were grossly ignored by the TPI when it entered its Decision which is being appealed.

The conclusion that Jane must arbitrate her claims is necessary even if this Court were inclined to go beyond the text of Section 14 and the definitions of the Agreement to determine the scope of the obligation of the Capital Members (present and former) of LLC to arbitrate. That is so, inasmuch as what Jane basically questions and challenges is her compensation as a Capital Member of LLC (because of alleged discrimination), and her expulsion from the management body of LLC and as a Capital Member

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of LLC (for alleged retaliation). See the different claims that Jane has presented as part of this case, from her internal claim to the Third Amended Verified Complaint. (Ap. TA. pgs. 119-123; 1-13; 279-305; 456-481; and 505-528).

All of these are aspects of the relationship of Jane with LLC that are expressly governed by the Agreement. Indeed, such can be seen by the very determinations of fact by the Court. See Conclusion of Fact Number 7, Decision. (Ap. TA., pg. 492.) That translates into the fact that to be able to adjudicate Jane’s claims of alleged discrimination and retaliation, the corresponding forum – the arbitral forum – will necessarily have to refer to the Agreement.

As can certifiably be seen from the record, the compensation of the Capital Members of LLC is governed by sections 5.01-5.06 of the Agreement. (Ap. TA., pgs. 184-86.) A reading of such sections is enough to prove it. So much so that Jane herself admitted to the TPI that “the mechanism by which compensation is determined is governed by the [Agreement].” (See Opposition, at pg. 9, footnote 12, Ap. TA., pg. 144).

As a matter of reality, the TPI failed to consider the fact that from the internal claim that Jane Doe made before the managing body of LLC, she fundamentally claimed some alleged violations of the Agreement. (Ap. TA., pgs. 119-123.) (See Section VI(B), paragraph 10, supra.)

Pursuant to the above, the TPI erred by not referring Jane Doe’s claims to arbitration. As we argued before the TPI, Jane Doe cannot escape the reality that her claims arise from alleged violations of the Agreement,

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whether for discriminatory reasons or not. Precisely, that is what it is up to the Arbitrator to settle.

The same thing happens with the alleged expulsions in retaliation against Jane as a Member of the managing body of LLC and a Capital Member of LLC. The expulsion of a Member of the managing body of LLC is governed by section 4.15 of the Agreement; whereas the expulsion of a Capital Member of LLC is governed by Section 12.02 of the Agreement. (Ap. TA., pgs. 83 and 94-95.) Therefore, any claim or challenge to those procedures must be handled through the dispute resolution process of Clause 14 of the Agreement, which includes the binding arbitration that the parties agreed. That was the undertaking signed by Jane Doe and the TPI erred by allowing Jane Doe not to comply with what was agreed.

To conclude, neither the clear and broad language of the arbitration clause, nor the context provided by the matters governed by the Agreement and Jane Doe’s claims, can be interpreted as the obligation to arbitrate being limited to claims on the operational or administrative matters of LLC. The TPI not only erroneously assumed jurisdiction over the dispute on arbitrability but it also decided it in a manner completely contrary to the law.

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C. THIRD INDICATION OF ERROR: THE TPI MANIFESTLY ERRED BY EXEMPTING JANE DOE FROM ARBITRATING HER CLAIMS BECAUSE OF THEIR ALLEGED “EMPLOYMENT” OR “LABOR” AND CONSTITUTIONAL” NATURE BECAUSE THE FAA DISPLACES (“PREEMPTS”) ALL STATE POLICY CONTRARY TO ARBITRATION.

Beyond ignoring the clear letter of the arbitration clause agreed in Section 14 of the Agreement, the TPI based its decision on the alleged “employment” or “labor” or “constitutional” nature of Jane Doe’s claims to exempt her from having to arbitrate them. According to the TPI:

…the law protecting employees in Puerto Rico is broad and unrestrictive in scope, and the exclusion of an employee from the benefits of labor law must be clear, and the courts must interpret those exclusions restrictively.

See Decision, at pg. 12. (Ap. TA., pg. 497.0 Moreover the TPI stated its concern that if it accepted the “arguments” of the defendants-petitioners:

…it would allow the capital members to decide at another time to use protected criteria such as race or religion to deprive other capital members from their constitutional protection. According to the interpretation and position of the LLC, through the OA [the Agreement] it would be delegated to the arbitrator to decide the dispute in a confidential

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forum without a right to appeal for the affected parties. 17

See Decision, at pg. 12. (Id.) These determinations by the TPI are impregnated with the hostility toward arbitration that the FAA came to eradicate and show that that forum based itself on the nature of Jane Doe’s alleged claims as well as on alleged state policies to refuse to compel arbitration. By acting thus, the TPI acted in open contradiction to the FAA and the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution. Once again, the TPI manifestly erred.

As can be seen from its § 2, of which we transcribe its pertinent text in footnote 11, the FAA does not establish any distinction whatsoever between the arbitrability of statutory rights or constitutional rights.18 All that the FAA requires is that the arbitration agreements be enforced pursuant to their own terms. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S.Ct. 1745 (“courts must place arbitration agreements on an equal footing with other contracts, […] and enforce them according to their terms”) (citations omitted). That is to say, what is important is not the nature of

17 It is worth mentioning that under the FAA, the courts can review the decision of the arbitrator if it is believed that he exceeded his jurisdiction. See 9 U.S.C.A. § 10. 18 Insofar as SCOTUS case law that requirements to arbitrate disputes that do not arise from the text of § 2 of the FAA, see Rent-A-Center v. Jackson, 130 S.Ct. 2772, 2778, n. 1 (“[§ 2] grounds do not include ... any requirement that its lack of unconscionability must be ‘clear and unmistakable.’”); Marmet v. Brown, 132 S.Ct. 1201, 1203 (2012) (“[The FAA’s] text includes no exception for personal-injury or wrongful-death claims. It ‘requires courts to enforce the bargain of the parties to arbitrate.”) (citation omitted).

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the claim in question, but rather whether the parties agreed to arbitration such claim.19 Because the FAA does not differentiate between the arbitrability of statutory rights or constitutional rights, the TPI could not create that distinction by judicial fiat under the scope of their interpretation of Puerto Rican law.

It is an elemental principle of law that when a federal law is in conflict with a state law, including one of a constitutional nature, the state law is displaced by the federal one by virtue of the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution. The Supremacy Clause stipulates that:

This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States…, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in very State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.

U.S. Const., Art. VI, cl. 2 (emphasis ours). On this matter Professor Gorrín Peralta states the following:

[A] federal law takes precedence over the provisions of the Constitution of the [Commonwealth] of Puerto Rico. … In any situation in which a Puerto Rican legal precept conflicts with the “Supreme Law,” that is to say the [US] Constitution, [or] with a federal … law applicable in Puerto Rico, the federal Law must always take precedence over the Puerto Rican one.

Carlos I. Gorrin Peralta, Fuentes y proceso de investigación juridical 43 (1991) (emphasis supplied). 19 As we have discussed above, Jane’s alleged constitutional claim is covered within the arbitration clause of the Agreement that requires that Jane Doe submit all of her claims (“any claim”) to arbitration.

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See also, U.S. v. Georgia Public Service Comm., 371 U.S. 285, 293 (1983) (“a State is without power by reason of the Supremacy Clause to provide the conditions on which the Federal Government will effectuate its policies.”); U.S. v. Pérez, 465 F.Supp. 1284, 1286 (D.P.R. 1979) (“[The Constitution of Puerto Rico] cannot provide conditions on which Congress will effectuate its policies as to matters well within its province”).20

As a result of these principles, it is an established and consistently repeated principle that when a State requires that a certain type of claim be settled exclusively in the courts, despite the fact that the parties agreed to arbitrate their disputes, such state rule is displaced by the FAA. That was specifically resolved by the SCOTUS in Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984), by indicating the following:

In enacting § 2 of the [FAA], Congress declared a national policy favoring arbitration and withdrew the power of the states to require a judicial forum for the resolution of claims which the

20 See also Dowling v. Davis, 840 F.Supp. 731, 734 (E.D. Cal.) (“The Supremacy Clause does not permit federal law to be superseded by state law, including state constitutional provisions.”); U.S. v. Spencer, 160 F.3d 413, 414 (7th Cir. 1998) (likewise); Keaveny v. Town of Brookline, 937 F.Supp. 975, 982 (D. Mass. 1996) (likewise). Prof. Gorrín Peralta also states the following regarding this matter: “The sources of law in Puerto Rico are, then: (1) The U.S. Constitution; (2) the federal laws…; (5) the Constitution of the [Commonwealth] of Puerto Rico; (6) the ordinary laws approved by the Legislative Assembly [of Puerto Rico];….” Gorrín Peralta, supra, at pg. 43.

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contracting parties agreed to resolve by arbitration.

Id. at pg. 10 (emphasis ours). 21

Recently, the SCOTUS reaffirmed this principle in Marmet Health Care Center, Inc. v. Brown, 132 S.Ct. (Op. of February 21, 2012). In Marmet, the SCOTUS, citing Concepcion, 131 S.Ct. 1740, 1747 (2011), decided the following:

[W]hen state law prohibits outright the arbitration of a particular type of claim, the analysis is straightforward: The conflicting rule is displaced by the FAA. ... West Virginia's prohibition against predispute agreements to arbitrate personal-injury or wrongful death claims against nursing home is a categorical rule prohibiting arbitration of a particular type of claim, and that rule is contrary to the terms and coverage of the FAA.

Id. at pgs. 1203-04 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). In Marmet the SCOTUS decided that the Supreme Court of West Virginia had erred by applying the public policy of that State, which prohibits enforcement of an arbitration clause contained in an admission agreement to an old-age home signed prior to the occurrence of an event of negligence that results in death or bodily injury. In the case that concerns us, the TPI has sought to relieve an attorney with 38 years of experience from her obligation to arbitrate, and all of that without

21 See Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 491 (“This clear federal policy places § 2 of the Act in unmistakable conflict with California's § 229 requirement that litigants be provided a judicial forum for resolving wage disputes.”)

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there even being a law in Puerto Rico to require that Jane’s claims be decided by a court, which would also infringe the FAA. Such that, if the FAA displaces any state legislation that conflicts with its provisions, it is even more clear that any decision by a court (such as the appealed Decision) that infringes the FAA also must be vacated.

This Supreme Court is fully aware of these principles. In World Films, Inc. v. Paramount Pict. Corp., supra, it recognized that the state laws that limit arbitration clauses are displaced (“preempted”) by the FAA. The dispute in World Films was whether the application of Article 3-B of Law 75, 10 L.P.R.A. 278b-2, which established the nullity of any stipulation in a distribution contract that forced a distributor to arbitrate outside of Puerto Rico any dispute that arose from such contract, had to take precedence over the FAA. This Supreme Court of Puerto Rico determined that insofar as Article 3-B of Law 75 conflicted in its application with the FAA, the latter would take precedence. Id., pg. 364. Indeed, the Supreme Court in effect determined that faced with the FAA, Article 3-B was ineffective and illegal. By deciding thus, the provisions of Walborg Corp. v. Tribunal Superior, 104 D.P.R. 184 (1975), which had determined that the state courts were not obligated to apply the LFA, were expressly revoked. In Walborg, the court had decided that an arbitration clause could not be given greater force than the policy established in Law 75, and that the state courts were not obligated to apply the LFA. That doctrine was revoked by World Films.

Pursuant to the above, there is no question that the TPI erred by denying the arbitration based on the

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alleged “constitutional” and “labor” nature of Jane Doe’s claims. The FAA displaces any statutory legal precept or precept under the Constitution of Puerto Rico that does not enforce and recognize the commitment assumed by Jane Doe and LLC to resolve all claims (“any Claim”) through the arbitration procedure agreed in Section 14 of the Agreement.

VIII.CONCLUSION AND PRAYER FOR RELIEF

Jane Doe commenced the proceedings with the TPI in violation of the terms of the binding arbitration clause that all of the Capital Members of LLC agreed to in the Agreement. The TPI’s ruling must be overturned because it infringes the clear terms of Section 14 of the Agreement, the provisions of the Federal Arbitration Act, the Supremacy Clause of the United State Constitution and its interpretative case law.

WHEREFORE, we very respectfully ask that this Honorable Court grant this Petition for Certiorari, overturn the TPI’s Decision, order Jane Doe to submit her claims to the arbitration commenced before the AAA, and dismiss the Complaint.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.

In San Juan, Puerto Rico, today June 12, 2012.

I CERTIFY that I have notified a true and exact copy of this brief, simultaneously with its submission, by electronic mail and messenger to the attorneys for the plaintiff-respondent, Juan R. González, Esq. González Muñoz Law Office, 261 Tetuán, San Juan, Puerto Rico 00901-1916; jrgmlaw@gmail.com; and Manuel Porro Vizcarra, Esq., Manuel Porro Vizcarra

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Law Offices, 382 Ave. Escorial, Urb. Caparra Heights, San Juan, PR 00920; mpv@mpvlawpr.com.

MENDOZA LAW OFFICES Attorney for the defendants-petitioners PO Box 9282 San Juan, Puerto Rico 00908-0282 Tel. (787) 722-5522; 5530; 5540 Fax: (787) 723-7057 Electronic mail: mendozalo@yahoo.com

/s/ Enrique J. Mendoza Méndez, Esq. TSPR-8304

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The LanguageWorks, Inc.

1123 Broadway New York, NY 10010 Tel. 212 447 6060 Fax 212 447 6257

Language Works

STATE OF NEW YORK ) ) ss: COUNTY OF NEW YORK )

CERTIFICATION

This is to certify that the accompanying, to the best of my knowledge and belief, is a true and accurate translation from Spanish into English of a Certiorari filed in the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico by Enrique J. Mendoza Méndez, Esq. on June 12, 2012, completed on December 12, 2012.

______________________ Christine Muller Vice President The LanguageWorks, Inc.

Sworn to and subscribed before me this 12th day of December, 2012

_________________________ Notary Public

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COMMONWEALTH OF PUERTO RICO COURT OF APPEALS

JUDICIAL REGION OF SAN JUAN JANE DOE

Plaintiff – Respondent

v.

LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY (LLC); JOHN DOE, in his personal capacity and as employer of JANE DOE and as co-administrator of the Conjugal Partnership (“CP”) constituted with JEAN DOE, who is sued as co-administrator of the CP constituted with John Doe; “CP John and Jean Doe”; JACK JOE in his personal capacity and as employer of Jane Doe and as co-administrator of the “CP” constituted with JACKY JOE, who is sued as co-administrator of the “CP Jack and Jacky Joe” constituted by Jack and Jacky Joe; LARRY LOE in his personal capacity and

[stamp:] KLCE20 [hw:] 1200821 TA [COURT OF APPEALS] CASE NO.: TPI [TRIAL COURT] CASE NO.: KPE 2012-1204 (904) San Juan Part CONFIDENTIAL [stamp:] [2 illegible lines] COURT OF APPEALS 2012 JUN 12 AM 9:46

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as employer of Jane Doe, and as co-administrator of the CP constituted with LARISSA LOE, who is sued as co-administrator of the CP constituted with Larry Loe; “CP Larry and Larissa Loe” constituted by Larry and Larissa Loe; Unknown Defendants A, B and C; Unknown Insurance Companies Defendants, X,Y,Z, Defendants – Petitioners

MOTION SUBMITTING UNDER SEAL “PETITION FOR CERTIORARI” AND

APPLICATION UNDER RULE 70(D)

APPEAR defendants-petitioners,1 Limited Liability

Company (“LLC”), John Doe and the conjugal partnership

(“CP”) established with Jean Doe, Jack Joe and the CP

1 For reasons of strict confidentiality the parties to this action are not identified by their respective names. In the Affidavit under Seal by the plaintiff-respondent submitted with the Complaint and the subsequent amendments, such party identified each one of the defendants-appellees [sic] using their respective names, addresses, and telephone numbers. (Appendix Petition for Certiorari (“Ap. TA.,” pgs. 12-13; 303-305; and 506.)

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established with Jacky Joe, and Larry Loe and the CP

established with Larissa Loe, and very respectfully submit

under seal their Petition for Certiorari and an Application

under Rule 70(d) to Accept a Petition for Certiorari that

Exceeds the Maximum Number of Pages According to the

Rules and ask the Court to have the documents and

appeal proceedings so instituted remain confidential and

under seal for the reasons stated below:

1. The petition for certiorari of reference has its origin

in an action for declaratory judgment and injunction filed

by Jane Doe, who was a Capital Member of defendant

LLC. As explained in the Petition for Certiorari, there is

an arbitration clause between the parties that requires

that any dispute between the parties be heard

confidentially. (Ap. TA., pgs. 97-98.) Furthermore, the

past and present Capital Members of LLC have a duty to

keep all information related to the affairs of the firm

(“business of the firm”) confidential. (Ap. TA., pg. 93.)

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2. According to the confidentiality obligation imposed

by the arbitration clause, plaintiff-respondent Jane Doe

commenced the proceedings before the Court of First

Instance (trial court or “TPI”) under seal and they have

remained confidential to date. (Ap. TA., pgs. 132-133.)

3. Pursuant to their confidentiality obligations, LLC

and the other defendants hereby submit their Petition for

Certiorari and an Application under Rule 70(d) to Accept a

Petition for Certiorari that Exceeds the Maximum Number

of Pages According to the Rules and ask the Court to have

the documents and appeal proceedings so instituted

remain confidential and under seal.

4. Attached is the cover of the Petition for Certiorari,

which includes all of the information required by the Rules

of this Honorable Court and the corresponding Internal

Revenue stamp.

WHEREFORE, defendants-petitioners, Limited

Liability Company (“LLC”), John Doe and the CP

established with Jean Doe, Jack Joe and the CP

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established with Jacky Joe, and Larry Loe and the CP

established with Larissa Loe and they very respectfully

submit under seal their Petition for Certiorari and they

ask the Court to have the documents and appeals

proceedings so instituted remain confidential.

Respectfully submitted.

I CERTIFY that I have notified a true and exact

copy of this writing, simultaneously with its submission,

by electronic mail and messenger to the attorneys for the

plaintiff-respondent, Juan R. González, Esq., González

Muñoz Law Office, 261 Tetuán, San Juan, Puerto Rico

00901-1916; jrgmlaw@gmail.com; and Manuel Porro

Vizcarra, Esq., Manuel Porro Vizcarra Law Offices, 382

Ave. Escorial, Urb. Caparra Heights, San Juan, PR 00920;

mpv@mpvlawpr.com.

In San Juan, Puerto Rico, today, June 12, 2012

MENDOZA LAW OFFICES

Attorney for the Defendants-Petitioners

PO Box 9282

319a

San Juan, Puerto Rico 00908-0282

Tel. (787) 722-5522; 5530; 5540

Fax: (787) 723-7057

/s/ By: Enrique J. Mendoza

Méndez, Esq. TSPR-8304

mendozalo@yahoo.com

320a

COMMONWEALTH OF PUERTO RICO

COURT OF APPEALS

SAN JUAN REGION

JANE DOE

Plaintiff – Respondent

v.

LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY (LLC); JOHN DOE, in his personal capacity and as employer of JANE DOE and as co-administrator of the Conjugal Partnership (“CP”) constituted with JEAN DOE, who is sued as co-administrator of the CP constituted with John Doe; “CP John and Jean Doe”; JACK JOE in his personal capacity and as employer of

[stamp:] KLCE20 [hw:] 1200821

TA [COURT OF APPEALS] CASE NO.:

TPI [TRIAL COURT] CASE NO.: KPE 2012-1204

(904)

SAN JUAN PART

CONFIDENTIAL

[stamp:] [2 illegible lines]

COURT OF APPEALS

2012 JUN 12 AM 9:46

[Internal Revenue Tax Stamp:]

321a

Jane Doe and as co-administrator of the “CP” constituted with JACKY JOE, who is sued as co-administrator of the “CP Jack and Jacky Joe” constituted by Jack and Jacky Joe; LARRY LOE in his personal capacity and as employer of Jane Doe, and as co-administrator of the CP constituted with LARISSA LOE, who is sued as co-administrator of the CP constituted with Larry Loe; “CP Larry and Larissa Loe” constituted by Larry and Larissa Loe; Unknown Defendants A, B and C; Unknown Insurance Companies Defendants, X,Y,Z,

Defendants –

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Petitioners

Nature:

Civil Certiorari

Subject: Declaratory Judgment; Preliminary and Permanent Injunction; Violation of Public Policy and Constitutional Rights; Retaliation; Damages and Injuries

Matter: Denial of Decision to Refer Case to Validly Agreed Arbitration

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Attorneys for the Plaintiff

– Respondent Jane Doe:

Juan Rafael González Muñoz, Esq.

TSPR-8185

GONZALEZ MUÑOZ LAW OFFICE,

P.S.C.

PO Box 9024055

San Juan, P.R. 00902-4055

Tel. (787) 766-5052

Fax: (787) 766-5551

jrgmlaw@gmail.com

polonorteprlaw@gmail.com

Manuel Porro Vizcarra, Eq.

TSPR-7994

MANUEL PORRO VIZCARRA LAW

OFFICES

382 Avenida Escorial

Urb. Caparra Heights

San Juan, P.R. 00920

Tel. (787)774-8200

Fax: (787)774-8297

mpv@mpvlawpr.com

Attorneys for the Defendants –

Petitioners

Enrique J. Mendoza Méndez, Esq.

TSPR-8304

MENDOZA LAW OFFICES

PO Box 9282

San Juan, P.R. 00908-0282

Tel. (787) 722-5522; 5530; 5540

Fax: (787) 723-7057

mendoza@yahoo.com

324a

COMMONWEALTH OF PUERTO RICO

COURT OF APPEALS

JUDICIAL REGION OF SAN JUAN

JANE DOE

Plaintiff – Respondent

v.

LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY (LLC); JOHN DOE, in his personal capacity and as employer of JANE DOE and as co-administrator of the Conjugal Partnership (“CP”) constituted with JEAN DOE, who is sued as co-administrator of the CP constituted with John Doe; “CP John and Jean Doe”; JACK JOE in his personal capacity and as employer of Jane Doe and as co-administrator of the “CP” constituted with JACKY JOE, who is sued as co-administrator of the “CP Jack and Jacky

TA [COURT OF APPEALS] CASE NO.:

TPI [TRIAL COURT] CASE NO.: KPE 2012-1204 (904)

San Juan Part

CONFIDENTIAL

325a

Joe” constituted by Jack and Jacky Joe; LARRY LOE in his personal capacity and as employer of Jane Doe, and as co-administrator of the CP constituted with LARISSA LOE, who is sued as co-administrator of the CP constituted with Larry Loe; “CP Larry and Larissa Loe” constituted by Larry and Larissa Loe; Unknown Defendants A, B and C; Unknown Insurance Companies Defendants, X,Y,Z,

Defendants – Petitioners

APPLICATION UNDER RULE 70(D)

TO ACCEPT A PETITION FOR CERTIORARI THAT EXCEEDS THE

MAXIMUM NUMBER OF PAGES ACCORDING TO THE RULES

TO THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS:

APPEAR defendants-petitioners, Limited Liability Company (“LLC”), John Doe and the conjugal

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partnership (“CP”) established with Jean Doe, Jack Joe and the CP established with Jacky Joe, and Larry Loe and the CP established with Larissa Loe, and very respectfully ask leave to submit their Petition for Certiorari in excess of three (3) pages for the reasons stated below.

1. Rule 34(D) of the Rules of the Court of Appeals stipulates that a petition for certiorari shall not exceed twenty-five (25) pages. 4 L.P.R.A. Ap. XXII-B R. 34(D)

2. Rule 70(D) establishes that “[w]hen these rules stipulate a maximum number of pages for a brief, no brief whatsoever shall be accepted in excess of such maximum unless it is accompanied by a separate motion in which the court is asked leave to exceed the maximum prescribed and just cause is shown.” 4 L.P.R.A. Ap. XXI—B R. 70. (Emphasis added.)

3. Appearers respectfully request that this Honorable Court exempt them from complying with the maximum number of pages requirement established. Despite the interest of the appearers in conforming their brief to the aforementioned Rule, an adequate and sufficient statement of the facts and the Law made it necessary for us to exceed it by just three (3) pages.

4. To state the content of the Petition for Certiorari in just twenty-five (25) pages would incurably undermine its meaning, clarity, and coherence, and it might leave out significant and weighty arguments. In view thereof, we very respectfully ask that authorization be given for the defendant-petitioner to exceed the number of pages in its brief, thus allowing the arguments that this Honorable Court of Appeals must consider to be

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argued clearly, completely, and reasonably. That is the only purpose pursued by the appearers.

WHEREFORE, defendant-petitioner very respectfully requests that this Honorable Court of Appeals authorize the submission of the Petition for Certiorari with a total number of pages in excess of that allowed by the Rules of the Court.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.

In San Juan, Puerto Rico, today June 12, 2012.

I CERTIFY that I have notified a true and exact copy of this brief, simultaneously with its submission, by electronic mail and messenger to the attorneys for the plaintiff-respondent, Juan R. González, Esq., González Muñoz Law Office, 261 Tetuán, San Juan, Puerto Rico 00901-1916; jrgmlaw@gmail.com; and Manuel Porro Vizcarra, Esq., Manuel Porro Vizcarra Law Offices, 382 Ave. Escorial, Urb. Caparra Heights, San Juan, PR 00920; mpv@mpvlawpr.com.

MENDOZA LAW OFFICES Attorney for the defendants- petitioners PO Box 9282 San Juan, Puerto Rico 00908-0282 Tel. (787) 722-5522; 5530; 5540 Fax: (787) 723-7057 Electronic mail: mendozalo@yahoo.com /s/ [signature] Enrique J. Mendoza Méndez, Esq. TSPR-8304

328a

COMMONWEALTH OF PUERTO RICO

COURT OF APPEALS

SAN JUAN REGION

JANE DOE

Plaintiff – Respondent

v.

LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY (LLC); JOHN DOE, in his personal capacity and as employer of JANE DOE and as co-administrator of the Conjugal Partnership (“CP”) constituted with JEAN DOE, who is sued as co-administrator of the CP constituted with John Doe; “CP John and Jean Doe”; JACK JOE in his personal capacity and as employer of Jane Doe and as co-administrator of the “CP” constituted with JACKY JOE, who is sued as co-administrator of the “CP Jack and Jacky

TA [COURT OF APPEALS] CASE NO.:

TPI [TRIAL COURT] CASE NO.: KPE 2012-1204

(904)

SAN JUAN PART

CONFIDENTIAL

329a

Joe” constituted by Jack and Jacky Joe; LARRY LOE in his personal capacity and as employer of Jane Doe, and as co-administrator of the CP constituted with LARISSA LOE, who is sued as co-administrator of the CP constituted with Larry Loe; “CP Larry and Larissa Loe” constituted by Larry and Larissa Loe; Unknown Defendants A, B and C; Unknown Insurance Companies Defendants, X,Y,Z,

Defendants – Petitioners

Nature:

Civil Certiorari

Subject: Declaratory Judgment; Preliminary and Permanent Injunction; Violation of Public Policy and Constitutional Rights;

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Retaliation; Damages and Injuries

Matter: Denial of Decision to Refer Case to Validly Agreed Arbitration

331a

Attorneys for the Plaintiff

– Respondent Jane Doe:

Juan Rafael González Muñoz, Esq.

TSPR-8185

GONZALEZ MUÑOZ LAW OFFICE,

P.S.C.

PO Box 9024055

San Juan, P.R. 00902-4055

Tel. (787) 766-5052

Fax: (787) 766-5551

jrgmlaw@gmail.com

polonorteprlaw@gmail.com

Manuel Porro Vizcarra, Eq.

TSPR-7994

MANUEL PORRO VIZCARRA LAW

OFFICES

382 Avenida Escorial

Urb. Caparra Heights

San Juan, P.R. 00920

Tel. (787)774-8200

Fax: (787)774-8297

mpv@mpvlawpr.com

Attorneys for the Defendants –

Petitioners

Enrique J. Mendoza Méndez, Esq.

TSPR-8304

MENDOZA LAW OFFICES

PO Box 9282

San Juan, P.R. 00908-0282

Tel. (787) 722-5522; 5530; 5540

Fax: (787) 723-7057

mendoza@yahoo.com

332a

COMMONWEALTH OF PUERTO RICO

COURT OF APPEALS

JUDICIAL REGION OF SAN JUAN

JUDICIAL REGION OF SAN JUAN

JANE DOE

Plaintiff – Respondent

v.

LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY (LLC); JOHN DOE, in his personal capacity and as employer of JANE DOE and as co-administrator of the Conjugal Partnership (“CP”) constituted with JEAN DOE, who is sued as co-administrator of the CP constituted with John Doe; “CP John and Jean Doe”; JACK JOE in his personal capacity and as employer of Jane Doe and as co-administrator of the “CP” constituted with JACKY JOE, who is sued as co-administrator of the “CP Jack and Jacky Joe”

TA [COURT OF APPEALS] CASE NO.:

TPI [TRIAL COURT] CASE NO.: KPE 2012-1204 (904)

San Juan Part

333a

constituted by Jack and Jacky Joe; LARRY LOE in his personal capacity and as employer of Jane Doe, and as co-administrator of the CP constituted with LARISSA LOE, who is sued as co-administrator of the CP constituted with Larry Loe; “CP Larry and Larissa Loe” constituted by Larry and Larissa Loe; Unknown Defendants A, B and C; Unknown Insurance Companies Defendants, X,Y,Z,

Defendants – Petitioners

PETITION FOR CERTIORARI

TO THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS:

APPEAR defendants-petitioners,1 Limited Liability Company (“LLC”), John Doe and the

1 For reasons of strict confidentiality the parties to this action are not identified by their respective names. In the Affidavit under Seal by the plaintiff-respondent submitted with the Complaint and the subsequent amendments, such party identified each one of the defendants-appellees [sic] using their respective names, addresses, and telephone numbers.

334a

conjugal estate (“CP”) established with Jean Doe, Jack Joe and the CP established with Jacky Joe, and Larry Loe and the CP established with Larissa Loe, and very respectfully request the issuance of a writ of certiorari to overturn the Decision entered by the Court of First Instance (trial court or “TPI”) on June 4, 2012, which refused to compel plaintiff-respondent to arbitrate her claims.

I. INTRODUCTION

Through the Decision appealed in this Petition for Certiorari the TPI has supported that Jane Doe, a sophisticated attorney with a postgraduate education in Law and 38 years of experience in commercial litigation and labor law, can default on her obligation to arbitrate and hear confidentially any claim or demand against LLC. LLC is a limited liability company organized under the laws of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, with main offices in San Juan and one office outside of Puerto Rico that provides services to foreign and local clientele. (Ap. TA, pgs. 38-126.)

Plaintiff-respondent contracted the obligation to arbitrate and hear confidentially any claim or complaint against the LLC in Section 14 of the Operating Agreement (“Agreement”) that she signed with the other Capital Members of LLC, who also contracted such obligation. (Ap. TA., pgs. 97-99.) The first paragraph of section 14 of the Agreement reads as follows:

It is the intent and purpose of the Firm and any Claimant to resolve any claim

(Appendix Petition for Certiorari (“Ap. TA.,” pgs. 12-13; 303-305; and 506.)

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by mediation or arbitration. The Claimant expressly agrees that the Claim shall be settled or resolved through the procedures set forth herein, and shall not in any way circumvent or otherwise challenge in any way these proceedings relative to mediation and arbitration.

(Ap. TA., pg. 97.) Despite the very broad scope of this arbitration clause that includes “any claim”2, the appealed Decision concluded that Jane Doe does not need to submit her claims for retaliation, damages, and discrimination to arbitration, and that they should be adjudicated by the Court. (Ap. TA., pgs. 484-498.)

For the reasons summarized below, and explained in detail in this petition, defendants-petitioners ask this Honorable Court to issue the petition for certiorari and to overturn the appealed decision.

First, the TPI erroneously assumed jurisdiction over the controversy of whether Jane Doe is obligated to arbitrate her claims against LLC and the other co-defendants. The arbitration clause agreed by Jane Doe and all of the Capital Members of LLC stipulates that the arbitration must be governed by the Rules of Commercial Arbitration of the American Arbitration Association (“AAA”), which in turn delegate to the arbitrator the authority to determine his jurisdiction and the scope of the arbitration clause. Under the applicable case law that is sufficient evidence in Law (clear and unequivocal) that the intention of the

2 The Agreement defines “Claim” as “any action, suit, complaint or demand of whatever nature and for whatever relief against the Firm or any of its Members or employees.”

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parties is to entrust to the arbitrator decisions on arbitrability, and not to the courts.

Second, having erroneously assumed jurisdiction over the controversy insofar as arbitrability, the TPI incorrectly decided it. For that it had to ignore the clear letter of Section 14.01 of the Agreement where the Capital Members of LLC agreed to submit “any claim” to arbitration regardless of the nature thereof or the remedy requested. By acting thus, the TPI did not adhere to the interpretative rule prescribed by the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) and its interpretative case law that requires that questions of arbitrability be resolved in favor of arbitration. Likewise, the TPI did not adhere to the elemental principle of interpretation of contracts under Puerto Rican law that when the terms of a contract are clear and are no ambiguous, its provisions will be applied according to the literal sense that the parties gave to it. Art. 1233 of the Civil Code, 31 L.P.R.A. § 3471.

Third, and finally, the TPI erred by denying the arbitration agreed by the parties due to the alleged “employment” or “labor” and “constitutional” nature of Jane Doe’s alleged claims. This decision by the TPI infringes the FAA, the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution of the United States and the interpretative case law of both that displace (“preempt”) any intent to prohibit the arbitration of certain types of claims.

II. JURISDICTION

The jurisdiction of this Honorable Court of Appeals (“TA”) to entertain this Petition for Certiorari arises from Article 4.006(b) of the Judiciary Act of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico (2003), 4. L.P.R.A. § 24(b); Rules 31, 32(D), 33-34, and 40 of the Rules of

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the TA, 4 L.P.R.A. Ap. XXI-B, R. 33-34 and 40; Rules 52.1 and 52.2(b) of Civil Procedure of Puerto Rico, 32 L.P.R.A. Ap. V. R. 52.1 and 52.2(b).

III. DECISION OF WHICH REVIEW IS SOUGHT

LLC and the other defendants requested that the Decision issued by the TPI in the case Jane Doe v. Compañía de Responsabilidad Limitada et al., KPE 2012-1204 (904) (Hon. Judge Ángel R. Pagán Ocasio), San Juan Part, June 4, 2012, and sent to the parties by electronic mail on that same day (hereinafter “Decision”) be overturned. (Ap. TA., pgs. 484-498.) The Decision denied the Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction and to Compel Compulsory Arbitration in Light of Binding Arbitration Agreement submitted by the defendants-petitioners on April 11, 2012 (hereinafter “Motion to Dismiss”) (Ap. TA., pgs. 38-126.)

Given that the TPI’s Decision was notified on June 4, the 30-day period that the appearers have to submit this petition expires on July 5, 2012.3 This petition has been submitted on time and the Court has jurisdiction to entertain it.

3 In view of the nature of the appealed Decision – which denies a motion to compel arbitration as agreed by the parties – and the fact that the TPI has the full intention to continue with the proceedings before it, for which it has ordered the consolidation of the preliminary injunction with the permanent one and ordered the parties to submit stipulations last June 8, 2012, LLC and the other defendants have submitted an Urgent Motion in Aid of Jurisdiction with this Petition for Certiorari. That motion respectfully asks this Honorable Court, in aid of its jurisdiction, to order a stay of the TPI’s proceedings and to maintain the confidentiality of the record and the identities of the parties.

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At present there is no other appeal of this case pending before this Court or before the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico.

IV. GROUNDS FOR GRANTING THIS PETITION

This petition complies with the criteria of Rule 52.1 of Civil Procedure, supra, (“Rule 52.1”) and Rule 40 of the TA’s Rules, supra, (“Rule 40”), for it to be issued.

The Decision by the TPI denied the dispositive motion and motion to compel arbitration filed by the defendants-petitioners. Such motion set forth that the TPI did not have jurisdiction over the action instituted by Jane Doe (“Jane”) given that there is a clear and unequivocal agreement between the parties that requires that the parties submit any claim between them to arbitration and that the arbitrator be the one to decide any controversy over whether Jane’s claims are arbitrable or not. Furthermore, the defendants-petitioners argued, in the alternative, that according to the submission agreement in question, it is appropriate for the TPI to order Jane to arbitrate her claims against them. The Decision by the TPI denied such arguments and decided, in violation of the strong public policy established in § 2 of the FAA and the Arbitration Act of Puerto Rico (“LAPR”) that: (a) the TPI is the one that should decide the controversy on arbitrability; and (b) that Jane is not obligated to arbitrate her claims of alleged employment discrimination, retaliation, and damages because they are not covered by the arbitration clause signed by the parties. (Ap. TA., pgs. 484-498.)

The TPI reached the aforementioned conclusion despite the fact that the arbitration clause requires

339a

that Jane settle (“any claim”) against the defendants-petitioners through the arbitration proceeding regardless of the nature thereof. (Ap. TA., pgs. 66 (“Claim”); 97-98 (“Resolution of Claim”).)

As we shall see below, the TPI’s Decision suffers from hostility to the arbitration that the FAA seeks to eradicate. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepción, 131 S.Ct. 1740, 1745 (2011) (“The FAA was enacted ... in response to widespread judicial hostility to arbitration agreements.”)

Rule 52.1, insofar as pertinent, stipulates that a petition for certiorari will only be granted by this Honorable Court: (1) when the denial of a motion of a dispositive nature is being appealed; (2) in cases that are in the public interest; or (3) in any other situation in which waiting for an appeal would constitute an irreparable miscarriage of justice. The three exceptions are present in this case.

The first exception of Rule 52.1 is applicable because, as we saw, the TPI’s Decision denied the dispositive motion4 of the defendants-petitioners that establishes the impropriety of the court action instituted by Jane given that disputes on arbitrability must be resolved by the arbitrator himself and Jane is contractually obligated to prosecute all of her claims through a confidential arbitration proceeding.

The second exception is also fully satisfied, because there is no question whatsoever that both under the LAPR and the FAA arbitration is a matter that is in the highest public interest. Perry v.

4 See Motion for Dismissal due to Lack of Jurisdiction and to Compel Binding Arbitration in View of a Binding Arbitration Agreement. (Ap. TA., pgs. 38-126.)

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Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 489 (1987) (“[I]n enacting § 2 of [FAA], Congress declared a national policy favoring arbitration ... “) (Emphasis added); Constructora Estelar v. Aut. Edif. Pub., 2011 T.S.P.R. 139, pg. 13, 183 D.P.R. ___ (“[I]n Puerto Rico there is a vigorous public policy in favor of arbitration as an alternate method of dispute resolution and all disputes on whether or not arbitration is appropriate must be resolved in favor of it as it has been agreed.”) (Emphasis Added.)

Likewise, the third exception is applicable. It would be impractical and it would constitute an irremediable miscarriage of justice to have to wait for the final resolution of the case in a judicial forum to be able to present and appeal to this Honorable Court and set forth as an error that the claims made by Jane should have been adjudicated in a confidential arbitration proceeding. By way of comparative law, in Kansas Gas & Elec. Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 861 F.2d 420 (4th Cir. 1988) (a case determining that the denials of orders compelling arbitration are appealable on an interlocutory basis), the Court of Appeals of the United State for the Fourth Circuit recognized that orders denying arbitration can cause irreparable harm if they are not reviewed on an interlocutory basis:

[o]rders denying arbitration do have an injunctive effect and have ‘serious, perhaps, irreparable, consequence.’ The order is injunctive because it enjoins proceedings in another tribunal. It has serious consequences because of the irreparable harm that exists when arbitration is denied ab initio…’ If a

341a

party must undergo the expense and delay of trial before being able to appeal, the advantages of arbitration-speed and economy-are lost forever.

See 861 F.2d, at pg. 422; See also City of Meridian Miss. v. Algernon Blair, Inc., 721 F.2d 525, 529 (5th Cir. 1983) (an injunction staying arbitration constitutes irreparable harm due to the costs of litigating). It is evident that if this Honorable Court does not intervene in this phase of the proceedings, the remedies requested by the defendants-petitioners would become moot. Moreover, if the writ of certiorari is not issued, Jane would be allowed to defeat her obligation to submit to arbitration all claims, of any nature, that she might have against the defendants, which obligation she contracted freely and voluntarily.

Furthermore, as we shall see below, the criteria of Rule 40 for the granting of the writ of certiorari are met in the instant case.5 Let us see.

5 The relevant criteria are: (A) If the remedy and the dispositive part of the judgment or

decision appealed, unlike the bases thereof, infringe the law.

(B) If the facts stated present a situation more indicative for an analysis of the problem put forth.

(C) If there has been prejudice, partiality, or a gross and manifest error in the evaluation of the evidence by the [TPI].

(D) …. (E) If the phase that the case is in is the most appropriate one

for its consideration. (F) If the issuance of the writ or the order to show cause do not

cause an improper division of the action and an undesirable delay with respect to the final resolution of the litigation.

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As discussed throughout this brief, the Decision of the TPI infringes the law and, in particular, the rules on arbitration and the interpretation of contracts, because it determines that Jane is not obligated to use the arbitration proceeding that commenced on March 22, 2012 before the American Arbitration Association (“AAA”) despite the fact that the agreement between the parties requires that Jane submit to arbitration all of her claims against the defendants (“resolve any Claim by … arbitration”) regardless of the nature thereof (“any action … of whatever nature … against the Firm or any of its Members…”). Consequently, it is appropriate to grant the petition for certiorari pursuant to part (A) of Rule 40.

The TPI committed a gross error in their interpretation and evaluation of the arbitration clause. That, inasmuch as from the text of the arbitration clause in question, it is clearly seen that it is the arbitrator who has the obligation of resolving the controversies put forth by Jane in the judicial forum. As a result, it is appropriate to grant the petition for certiorari pursuant to part (C) of Rule 40.

Nor is there a question that, pursuant to part (B) of Rule 40, the factual situation that is established is the one most indicative for an analysis of the controversy before this Honorable Court, because for it to be decided only requires that the Court interpret the arbitration clause agreed pursuant to the FAA and the rules of contract interpretation.

(G) If the issuance of the writ or the order to show cause

prevent a miscarriage of justice.

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The intervention of the Honorable Court at this phase is most propitious, because if the proceedings before the TPI stayed, Jane’s obligation to prosecute her claims before the arbitration forum would become moot and irreparable harm would be caused to the defendants-petitioners because the commitments made to undertake a confidential arbitration proceeding would not be complied with.

As a result, in order to avoid a miscarriage of justice it is necessary to grant the petition for certiorari pursuant to parts (G)-(I) of Rule 40.

V. LIST OF PROCEDURAL AND SUBSTANTIVE FACTS MATERIAL TO THE

CASE

A. List of Procedural Facts

1. On April 2, 2012, Jane submitted a Verified Complaint and Application for Declaratory Judgment and Preliminary and Permanent Injunction (“Complaint”) with the TPI. Jane claimed in the Complaint that the arbitration clause of the “Operating Agreement” of the LLC (“Agreement”) is not applicable to her, arguing that that agreement only regulates the commercial and administrative operations of the LLC. Jane Doe further claimed that her claims are of a labor nature and that they are covered by the Constitution of Puerto Rico, Law No. 100 of June 30, 1959 (age), Law No. 69 of July 6, 1985 (sex and retaliation), Law No. 115 of December 20, 1991 (retaliation) and the LLC’s Employee Manual (“Manual”), which does not contain an arbitration clause. To that end, Jane asked the TPI to declare the arbitration clause of the Agreement inapplicable to her alleged labor claims and that the LLC be ordered to cease the arbitration under Rule 57 of

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Civil Procedure until the TPI can resolve the controversy set forth on arbitrability. (AP. TA., pgs. 1-13) As stated in the list of material facts, Jane’s claims that the Agreement is not pertinent to her claims are in open contradict with the extrajudicial claim that Jane made to the LLC Managing Board where she expressly set them forth as violations of the Agreement. (Ap. TA., pgs. 119-123.)

2. Together with the Complaint, Jane submitted a Motion Requesting a Preliminary and Permanent Injunction (“Motion for Injunction”), in which she likewise requested an order to stay the arbitration until the TPI could decide on the Declaratory Judgment, but with the request that once it was decided in favor of Jane that such forum make the cease and desist order permanent and proceed to decide on the merits of the controversies set forth. (Ap. TA., pgs. 14-19.)

3. Jane also submitted an Emergency Motion in Request of an Order in order for all the proceedings to remain strictly confidential. (Ap. TA., pgs. 20-21.)

4. On April 3, 2012, the TPI issued an Order setting a hearing for April 11, 2012, to determine the appropriateness of the extraordinary motion requested. (Ap. TA., pgs. 23.)

5. On April 11, 2012, the defendants-petitioners submitted a Motion to Dismiss, in which they essentially argued that the Agreement is a contract in the interstate commerce, and therefore the FAA is applicable to it, that pursuant to the arbitration clause of the Agreement all disputes on whether Jane’s claims are arbitrable or not are up to the arbitrator himself to decide and not the TPI and that, in the alternative, it would be appropriate for the TPI

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to recognize that through Section 14.04 of the Agreement Jane undertook to prosecute all of her claims (“any Claim”) confidentially through the arbitration procedure regardless of the nature of the claims or whether they arise under the Agreement. Furthermore, the defendants-petitioners argued that under the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, regardless of the alleged constitutional and labor nature of the Jane’s claims, § 2 of the FAA requires that such claims be adjudicated under the arbitration proceeding initiated before the AAA. (Ap. TA., pgs. 38-126.)

6. On that same day a hearing was held in which it was agreed that the defendants-petitioners would stay their actions in the arbitration case until the TPI could resolve the motions submitted on arbitrability, that the confidentiality of the case would be maintained and that all documents would be submitted under seal. Furthermore, the TPI indicated that the first matter to be decided would be the arbitrability of Jane’s claims. Finally, the TPI set a preliminary injunction hearing for May 10, 2012, if the production of evidence would be necessary.6 (Ap. TA., pgs. 127-128.)

7. On April 23, 2012, Jane submitted her Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss. In that Opposition Jane claimed, among other things, that the arbitration clause of the Agreement was not applicable to her alleged claims of a labor nature because that document only applies to matters related to the management of the LLC, especially because Jane’s claims are constitutional in nature. 6 On May 8, 2012, that hearing was rescheduled for June 5. (Ap. TA., pgs. 450-451.)

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Furthermore, Jane claimed that the TPI is the one that must resolve all of her claims.7 (Ap. TA., pgs. 134-278.)

8. After the submission of several memoranda by the parties,8 and the submission by Jane of a Second Amended Complaint, on June 4, 2012, at 11:41 a.m., the TPI notified by electronic mail the Decision under appeal which, as we stated, decides in violation of the FAA and its interpretative case law that that forum is the one that has jurisdiction to decide the controversy on arbitrability and that, furthermore, Jane does not have to arbitrate her claims of alleged employment discrimination, retaliation, and damages because they are not covered by the arbitration clause of the Agreement. (Ap. TA., pgs. 484-498). In footnote 12 of the Decision, the TPI makes the following statements that make evident its hostility toward the arbitration proceeding: “According to the interpretation and position of the LLC, through the [Agreement] the arbitrator would be delegated a decision on the dispute in a completely confidential forum without a right for the

7 On that same day, Jane submitted an Amended Verified Complaint in order to include the spouses of the defendants as defendants themselves, in their capacities as co-managers of the respective conjugal partnerships, and to amend her causes of action. (Ap. TA., pgs. 279-305.) On May 1, 2012, defendants opposed the aforementioned amendment. (Ap. TA., pgs. 306-313.) 8 On May 1, 2012, defendants-petitioners submitted their Reply to ‘Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss Due to Lack of Jurisdiction and to Compel Binding Arbitration in View of a Binding Arbitration Agreement.’ (Ap. TA., pgs. 314-416.) For her part, on May 7, 2012, Jane submitted a brief called Plaintiff’s Sur-reply. (Ap. TA., pgs. 414-449.)

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affected parties to appeal.” (Ap. TA., pg. 497; emphasis ours.)

9. Furthermore, the TPI indicated that it would keep the injunction hearing scheduled for the next day would, where the parties would have to submit evidence in relation to the application for injunctive relief. Likewise, it authorized the submission of the Second Amended Complaint. (Ap. TS., pg. 541.) From an analysis of the format, typography, and style of the Decision it can be reasonably inferred that it is most likely the result of a draft Decision submitted by Jane, and if that is correct, she would have had knowledge of the decision by the TPI significantly in advance of the defendants-petitioners.

10. Indeed, surprisingly, only four (4) hours after the Decision was notified, Jane submitted to the TPI a Motion for an Order on the Confidentiality of Further Proceedings, claiming that in view of the decision hours earlier by the TPI there was no reason for the proceedings to continue to be prosecuted confidentially. (Ap. TA., pgs. 499-504.) Also, Jane submitted a Third Amended Verified Complaint under seal, which identifies the defendants with their respective names. (Ap. TA., pgs. 505-528.)

11. Furthermore, right before the hearing set for June 5, 2012 was to begin, Jane submitted to the TPI, at 8:47 a.m., a Request for Reinstatement as an Additional Remedy under the Scope of Rule 59.4 of Civil Procedure by means of which she asked that she be reinstated at the LLC through a Partial Decision to be issued by means of a preliminary and permanent injunction. (Ap. TA., pgs. 529-535.) A copy of this Request was delivered to the attorney for

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the defendant-petitioners as he was entering the TPI Courtroom for the hearing.

12. Minutes later, the parties appeared at the preliminary injunction hearing set for that day. Although not even 24 hours had elapsed from the time the defendants-petitioners became aware that Jane’s legal action would not be dismissed to proceed to arbitration, the TPI asked them to submit evidence on the claims in the case to be able to begin to decide it on the merits. In view of how hurried the proceeding was becoming, the defendants-petitioners objected to the action by the TPI using arguments of reasonability and Due Process of Law, among others. The TPI then granted until June 8 for Jane to submit the proposed stipulations of fact that had not been accepted by the defendants-petitioners, for the defendants to submit proposed facts and for both parties to submit the documents that should be considered by the TPI. Furthermore, the TPI consolidated the preliminary injunction hearing with the permanent injunction hearing and it indicated that if it was necessary to produce evidence the parties would be notified on the holding of the hearing.9 (Ap. TA., pgs. 548-551 and 552-617.)

B. List of Material Facts

1. In November 1979, Jane joined the LLC as an attorney after having obtained a Master’s in Law and having started to practice the profession. (Ap. TA., pgs. 1-13 and 38-126.) 9 The TPI also granted 10 days for the defendants-petitioners to present their position regarding Jane’s request to vacate the order of confidentiality and 15 days to state [their position] on the request for reinstatement of Jane at the LLC. (Ap. TA., pgs. 548-551.)

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2. When Jane joined LLC, LLC was a civil-law partnership. At that time and now LLC provides services to foreign clientele, mainly in the United States, and locally. (Ap. Ta., pgs. 38-126.)

3. In September 1987, Jane was promoted to Equity Partner of the LLC. (Ap. TA., pgs. 1-13 AND 38-126.)

4. On September 13, 2007, LLC became a limited-liability company under the laws of Puerto Rico. As a result of the aforementioned change, Jane became a Capital Member of LLC. (Ap. TA., pgs. 1-13, and 38-126.)

5. On that same day, Jane and the other LLC Capital Members signed a document titled Operating Agreement (“Operating Agreement” or “Agreement”).10 (Ap. TA., pgs. 60-115 and 338-353.)

6. Insofar as pertinent, such Agreement stipulates the following in its relevant Sections:

1. Definitions. For the purposes of this Agreement, the following terms shall have the meaning set forth below:

1.06 “Claim” means any action, suit, complaint or demand of whatever nature and for whatever relief or remedy against the Firm or any of its Members or employees…

1.07 “Claimant” means any Member or Former Member asserting a Claim.

10 The Agreement establishes that its effectiveness is retroactive to June 1, 2007.

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5. Compensation.11

5.02 Salaries of Members – Each Capital Member shall be entitled to such annual salary as shall be determined pursuant to section 5.01 of this Agreement, to be paid in one (1) or more installments.....

10. Fiduciary Duty and Duty of Loyalty of Members.

10.1 Fiduciary Duties of Members – Members owe the Firm and each other a fiduciary duty and a duty of loyalty, which requires each Member, among other things:

(f) To treat all Firm Documents as confidential ‘trade secrets’, except to the extent such Firm Documents are publicly available other than as a result of any violation of this or any other confidentiality obligation ... and to treat as confidential all information relating to the deliberations of the Members and the business of the Firm while such Member is a Member of the Firm and, in the event the Member leaves the Firm, after such Member’s departure.

12. Withdrawal, Retirement. Suspension, Expulsion ... of a Member.

12.02 Suspension and/or Expulsion – The Firm may, upon the recommendation of the Policy Committee and the affirmative vote of three-fourths (%) of the Capital Members, ... (b) expel any Member at any date specified by the Policy Committee with or without cause or prior notice to

11 For the rest of the relevant clauses on compensation see Section 5 of the Agreement. (Ap. TA., pgs. 84-86.)

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such Member. In the case of any such expulsion, the Member so expelled shall cease to be a Member on the date specified by the Policy Committee.

14. Resolution of Claim.

14.01 Intent and Purpose – It is the intent and purpose of the Firm and any Claimant to resolve any Claim by mediation or arbitration. The Claimant expressly agrees that the Claim shall be settled or resolved through the procedures set forth herein, and shall not in any way circumvent or otherwise challenge in any way these proceedings relative to mediation and arbitration.

14.04 Arbitration – If mediation fails, the Claim shall be settled by arbitration administered by the [AAA] under its Commercial Arbitration Rules, and judgment on the award rendered by the arbitrator(s) may be entered in any court having jurisdiction thereof. ...

14.05 Confidentiality – The Claimant and the Firm agree that the underlying purpose of the provisions set forth in section 14 of this Agreement is to provide a mechanism by which any Claim shall be resolved in a confidential manner, without publicity and the attendant distractions. ... The parties agree to maintain the confidentiality of such meetings and hearings, and of the documents produced or created in such meetings and hearings. Any and all actions taken by the parties shall be in conformity with the underlying purpose set forth in section 14 of this Agreement.

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Note that Jane does not dispute that the Agreement is a contract in the interstate commerce for purposes of the FAA. (Ap. TA., pgs. 1-3; 38-126; 134-278; 314-416; and 417-449.) Nor is the validity of the arbitration clause in Section 14 of the Agreement in dispute. (Id.)

7. On October 22, 2007, the LLC’s Employee Manual took effect which applies to all employees and Members of LLC. However, such Manual does not make a Member an employee. Rather, the Manual clearly maintains the difference between the classification of “Member” and “employee.” (Ap. TA., pgs. 191-257.) The Manual also does not establish the policies related to the compensation of Members, or the process of terminating their relationship with LLC, or the method to resolve disputes between Members and LLC. Those policies are contained in Sections 5, 12, and 14 of the Agreement, respectively. (Ap. TA., pgs. 84-86 and 94-98.)

8. LLC has offices within and outside of Puerto Rico. Furthermore, the great majority of its clients are located outside of Puerto Rico (principally in the United States), which requires that LLC and its clients remain in constant communication as part of its operations through the use of mail, Internet, telephone and other means of interstate communications. Likewise, it is significant insofar as the Agreement is a contract in the interstate commerce, and due to the economic nature thereof, the following federal statutes, among others, apply to the relationship of LLC with those who are deemed employees per se: 1) Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-78; 2) Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654; 3) Family

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Medical Leave Act of 2000, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17; 4) Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964; and 5) Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34. (Ap. TA., pgs. 38-126.)

9. In the middle of 2009, Jane was elected to the Managing Board of LLC, which is the highest governing body of LLC.

10. Jane’s compensation had to be reduced for business reasons. As a result of that, on January 24, 2012, Jane filed an extrajudicial claim against the Members of LLC’s Managing Board, as required under Section 14.02 of the Agreement. In her extrajudicial claim, Jane alleged in sum that her compensation had been reduced in violation of the Agreement. In no part of her claim did Jane mention that the Manual had been violated. Indeed, the only written contact that Jane claimed was violated was the Agreement. Insofar as pertinent, the appellee specifically claimed the following, based on the Agreement:

…I formally ask you to reconsider the decision by [John Doe] and to schedule, as soon as possible and within the next 15 days, a meeting of the Managing Board under the tenor of Clause 14 et seq. of the “Operating Agreement,” such that I as a Capital Member can present my position and objections. I want to make clear that subjecting myself to the procedure under Clause 14 should not be construed as a waiver of the rights that protect me under local and federal laws.

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I will now proceed to summarize my objections briefly.

1. The reduction in my salary and benefits was done (sic) violates the “Operating Agreement” and the agreement between [John Doe] and me, and it violates the specific agreement established with me.

2. …Evidently, the procedure followed was inadequate and in violation of the “Operating Agreement,” the decisions by the Managing Board approved on May 31, 2011, and the decision of December 20, 2011.

…

16. Likewise I was offended when [Jack Joe], in a meeting of the Board stated that “to sit at that desk means having to bring in business” and no one clarified the impropriety of his comment. Is that a requirement in the Operating Agreement?...

(Ap. TA., pgs. 119-123; emphasis ours.)

11. Pursuant to Section 14.03 of the Agreement, on March 20, 2012 the parties subjected themselves to the mediation process which ended without achieving any agreement whatsoever.

12. Faced with the failure of mediation, on March 22, 2012, LLC submitted an Arbitration Complaint against Jane with the AAA in execution of the arbitration clause of Section 14.04 of the Agreement which requires that all disputes (“any Claim”)

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between the parties regardless of the nature thereof or whether or not it arises under the Agreement shall be resolved through such dispute resolution method, and confidentially. (Ap. TA., pgs. 259-260.)

VI. INDICATIONS OF ERROR

FIRST INDICATION OF ERROR: THE TPI MANIFESTLY ERRED BY ASSUMING JURISDICTION OVER THE CONTROVERSY ON WHETHER JANE DOE IS OBLIGATED TO ARBITRATE HER ALLEGED CLAIMS: JANE DOE AND LLC UNMISTAKABLY AGREED THAT THE ARBITRATOR HAS THE AUTHORITY TO DETERMINE THE SCOPE OF HIS JURISDICTION.

SECOND INDICATION OF ERROR: THE TPI MANIFESTLY ERRED BY CONCLUDING THAT JANE DOE DOES NOT HAVE TO ARBITRATE HER ALLEGED CLAIMS AGAINST LLC AND THE OTHER DEFENDANTS-PETITIONERS GIVEN THAT THE ARBITRATION CLAUSE OF THE AGREEMENT IS BROAD, CLEAR, AND IT COVERS ANY CLAIM BETWEEN THE PARTIES.

THIRD INDICATION OF ERROR: THE TPI MANIFESTLY ERRED BY EXEMPTING JANE DOE FROM ARBITRATING HER CLAIMS BECAUSE OF THEIR ALLEGED “EMPLOYMENT” OR “LABOR” AND CONSTITUTIONAL” NATURE BECAUSE THE FAA DISPLACES (“PREEMPTS”) ALL STATE POLICY CONTRARY TO ARBITRATION.

VII. DISCUSSION OF THE ERRORS INDICATED

A. FIRST INDICATION OF ERROR: THE TPI MANIFESTLY ERRED BY

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ASSUMING JURISDICTION OVER THE CONTROVERSY ON WHETHER JANE DOE IS OBLIGATED TO ARBITRATE HER ALLEGED CLAIMS: JANE DOE AND LLC UNMISTAKABLY AGREED THAT THE ARBITRATOR HAS THE AUTHORITY TO DETERMINE THE SCOPE OF HIS JURISDICTION.

The TPI manifestly erred on assuming jurisdiction to decide whether Jane Doe has to arbitrate her alleged claims against LLC and the other defendants-petitioners. Despite the fact that the TPI acknowledged that the parties can agree to have the arbitrator be the one to decide whether a dispute is arbitrable as well as the merits thereof when it has been clearly and unmistakably been agreed (Ap. TA., pg. 495.),12 that forum decided that “it is not necessary to determine whether the delegation of jurisdiction to the arbitrator is clear and unmistakable because the arbitration clause is not applicable to the controversies presented.” (Id.) In other words the TPI rested on a completely circular argument to ignore the clear language of the broad arbitration clause in the Agreement, the provisions of the FAA and its interpretative case law, and Puerto Rican rules on the interpretation of contracts. All of these precepts required referring the matter of whether Jane Doe’s claims are arbitrable under Section 14 of the Agreement to the arbitrator.

12 See First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 945 (1995).

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As a preliminary matter, it is necessary to make a brief statement on the FAA because [as] was appropriately claimed by the defendants-petitioners, Jane Doe did not dispute its application to the matter that concerns us and such law is dispositive on this petition. (Ap. TA., pgs. 52-58.) The FAA, 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. applies to contracts in the interstate commerce and it applies both in the federal and the state courts. World Films, Inc. v. Paramount Pict. Corp., 125 D.P.R. 352, 357 and 364 (1990). Section 2 of the FAA stipulates that:

A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction or the refusal to perform the whole or any part thereof, or an agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an existing controversy arising out of such a contract, transaction or refusal,

shall be valid, irrevocable, save upon such grounds as exist in law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.

9 U.S.C. § 2 (Emphasis ours).

The FAA reflects a clear, well established and broadly recognized federal policy in favor of arbitration. See Méndez Acevedo v. Nieves Rivera, 179 D.P.R. 359 (2010); KKW Enterprises v. Gloria Jean’s Gourmet Coffees Franchising Corp, 184 F.3d 42, 50 (1st Cir. 1999); citing Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros, S.A. v. M/V SKY Reefer, 29 F.3d 727, 730 (1st Cir.) ; confirmed in 515 U.S. 528 (1995). On this

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strong public policy, the Supreme Court of the United States (“SCOTUS”) has stated the following:

[The FAA] is a congressional declaration of a liberal policy favoring arbitration agreements, notwithstanding any state substantive or procedural policies to the contrary.

****

[I]n enacting § 2 of the federal Act, Congress declared a national policy favoring arbitration and withdrew the power of the states to require a judicial forum for the resolution of claims which the contracting parties agreed to resolve by arbitration.

Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 489 (1987) (internal citations and quotations omitted) (emphasis added). In other words, the FAA applies without accepting state procedural or substantive policies otherwise and it removed the power of the States to require a judicial forum to resolve claims that the contracting parties agreed to resolve through arbitration.

The FAA was passed precisely as a response to the hostility that the Courts have traditionally shown toward arbitration agreements. See Circuit City Stores v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 111 (2011) (deciding that employment contracts in the interstate commerce except those of certain transportation employees are covered by the FAA). The Supreme Court of Puerto Rico has recognized outright the public policy contained in the FAA by stating that such law stipulates that:

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…the arbitration clauses in these contracts are valid, irrevocable and mandatory. Once arbitration is agreed, the courts lack discretion regarding their efficacy and they have to enforce the arbitration agreed. According to this law, and the federal case law interpreting it, any question about the scope of the disputes that may be taken to arbitration must be resolved in favor of arbitration. This applies to both the federal courts and the state courts.

See Painewebber Incorporated of Puerto Rico v. Service Concepts, Inc., 151 D.P.R. 307, 311-12 (2000) (emphasis ours); Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 16 (1984).

Disputes on arbitrability take three (3) forms: (i) whether there is an arbitration agreement; (ii) the scope of an arbitration agreement (“whether such agreement covers a certain dispute”); (iii) and whether such agreement covers a dispute on the duration or expiration of the contract. See Méndez Acevedo v. Nieves Rivera, 179 D.P.R. 359, 367-68 (2010); Municipio de Mayagüez v. Lebrón, 167 D.P.R. 713, 720-21 (2006); World Films, Inc. v. Paramount Pictures Corp., supra.

As a general rule, the determination of whether an agreement creates the duty of the parties to arbitrate a certain dispute is a judicial task. Méndez Acevedo, supra; World Films, Inc., supra. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the matter of arbitrability shall not be under the jurisdiction of a court if the parties agreed in the

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arbitration agreement that such authority is delegated to the arbitrator. That is to say, if it is agreed in an arbitration agreement that the arbitrator is the one who will decide matters of arbitrability, it is appropriate that he, and not the court, be the one to determine whether there is an obligation to arbitrate a certain dispute. U.G.T. v. Corp. Difusión Pub., 168 D.P.R. 674, 684 (2006) (“Ordinarily and except if the collective agreement stipulates otherwise, matters of substantive arbitrability must be resolved by the courts…”) (emphasis ours).

Consistent with the foregoing, it is a well-settled principle in the federal jurisdiction and under the FAA that a challenge to the validity of an arbitration agreement, including any dispute over arbitrability (if a certain dispute is arbitrable or not), must be referred to the arbitrator if there is “clear and unmistakable evidence” that the parties so agreed – that that was their intention. First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 945 (1995). The foregoing is precisely the situation in the case at bar. The FAA is applicable to the Agreement between Jane and LLC and the parties delegated the determination of arbitrability to the arbitral forum and therefore the TPI erred in assuming jurisdiction.

The FAA is applicable to the Agreement between Jane Doe and LLC because it is a contract that involves interstate commerce. To determine whether there is a transaction that involves interstate commerce, the Court must examine the contract and the commercial transactions of the parties, among other things. See

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Ideal Services Corp. v. Swift-Eckrich, Inc., 727 F.Supp. 75, 76 (D.P.R. 1989).

In Allied Bruce Terminix v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 282 (1995), the SCOTUS decided that when the Congress of the United States passed the FAA it wanted to use its constitutional power under the Commerce Clause to the utmost:

Thus, the Court interpreted the words “involving commerce” as broadly as the words “affecting commerce”; and, as we have said, these latter words normally mean a full exercise of constitutional power. At the same time, the Court’s opinion does not discuss the implications of the “interstate” facts to which the respondents now point. For these reasons, Bernhardt does not require us to narrow the scope of the word “involving.” And, we conclude that the word “involving,” like “affecting,” signals an intent to exercise Congress’ commerce power to the full.

513 U.S. at pg. 277. In Allied Bruce, the dispute was around an arbitration clause in an extermination services agreement for a residence. The SCOTUS determined that the contract involved interstate commerce for the purposes of the FAA because the pesticides were manufactured outside of the state and the defendant had operations in multiple states.

The Agreement is a contract that involves interstate commerce. Among other reasons, the Agreement governs the proprietary interest of the parties and the LLC’s operations in Puerto Rico and in its office outside of Puerto Rico. See, SCI v.

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Fulmer, 883 So.2d 621, 629 (Ala 2003) ((“[I]t would be difficult indeed to give an example of an economic or commercial activity that one could ... declare beyond the reach of Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause, and, by extension, under the FAA.”) (emphasis added).13 Furthermore, the great majority of LLC’s clients are located outside of Puerto Rico (principally in the United States), which means that the LLC and its clients must remain in constant communication as part of its operations through the use of mail, Internet, telephone, and other means of interstate communications. Likewise, the economic nature of the Agreement and the fact that the following federal statutes, among others, apply to the relationship of LLC with those who are considered employees per se, is significant: 1) Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-78; 2) Occupational Safety and 13 See also, Thomas H. Oehmke, Commercial Arbitration § 3:6 (2011) (“A contract needs only the slightest nexus to interstate commerce to apply the FAA.”); 21 Willinston on Contracts §57: (4th ed. 2011) (“Consistent with the broad approach to interpreting the term ‘involving commerce’ in the [FAA], it has been said that a contract containing an arbitration provision need only be related to commerce to fall within the coverage of the Act “) (emphasis added); Bowen v. Security Pest Control, Inc., 879 So.2d 1139, 1142 (Ala. 2003) (decides that the transaction involved interstate commerce, in part, because one of the parties to the transaction engaged in business in two States). Indeed, the power of Congress under the Commerce Clause of the United States is so broad that in the last 75 years only two SCOTUS cases have decided that Congress exceeded its powers under the aforementioned Commerce Clause. See U.S. v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995); US v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000). Note that none of the statutes in dispute in those cases was aimed at regulating purely economic transactions, but rather criminal conduct of a noneconomic nature.

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Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654; 3) Family Medical Leave Act of 2000, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17; 4) Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964; and 5) Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34. Furthermore, and as we indicated above, Jane did not dispute the application of the FAA to the arbitration clause of the Agreement and, therefore, she waived any right to the contrary. See Caguas Satellite Corp. v. Echostar Satellite LLC, _ F.Supp.2d _, 2011 WL 5517037, n. 2 (D.P.R.) (“Plaintiffs [, the party opposing arbitration,] ... do not make any arguments about whether or not the agreement involves interstate commerce and therefore waive this argument”).

Given the clear language of Section 14 of the Agreement, the TPI manifestly erred by assuming jurisdiction over the dispute of whether Jane Doe’s claims are arbitrable or not. In the arbitration clause contained in the Agreement, Jane agreed that the arbitration would be conducted under the Commercial Arbitration Rules of the AAA.14 Section 14.04 of the Agreement stipulates insofar as pertinent: “[i]f mediation fails, the Claim shall be settled by arbitration under its Commercial Arbitration Rules ....” In turn, Rule 7(a) of that body of rules stipulates: [t]he arbitrator shall have the power to rule on his or her own jurisdiction, including any objections with respect to the existence, scope or validity of the arbitration agreement.” (Commercial Arbitration Rules of the AAA, Rule 7(a), Ap. TA. pgs. 116-118.) (emphasis ours). In view of the inclusion within the arbitration clause between Jane and LLC,

14 The AAA’s Rules of Commercial Arbitration enjoy the same generalness as the Rules of Civil Procedure of Puerto Rico.

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of a body of arbitration rules that delegates the authority to determine to the arbitrator, it was clear that it was not up to the TPI to determine whether Jane’s claims were arbitrable.

Every federal court that has had this dispute before it has decided that when the parties incorporate institutional rules such as those of the AAA into their arbitration agreement or clauses, which delegate to the arbitrator the authority to decide on his own jurisdiction – to decide arbitrability – that constitutes sufficient (clear and unmistakable) evidence in law that that was the intention of the parties. See Contec Corp. v. Remote Solution Co., 398 F.3d 205, 208 (2nd Cir. 2005) See Contec Corp. v. Remote Solution Co., 398 F.3d 205, 208 (2nd Cir. 2005) (“When … parties explicitly incorporate rules that empower an arbitrator to decide issues of arbitrability, the incorporation serves as clear and unmistakable evidence of the parties’ intent to delegate such issues to an arbitrator’); Sleeper Farms v. Agway, Inc., 211 F. Supp. 2d 197 (D. Me. 2002) (“[Since the AAA rules constitute] a clear and unmistakable delegation of scope-determining authority to an arbitrator, [the court] refers this dispute to the arbitrator [to determine [...] what issues [...] are covered by the arbitration clause.”)15

15 See, also: Terminix Int’l Col. v. Palmer Ranch Ltd., 432 F.3d 1327, 29, 33-34 (11th Cir. 2005) (Deciding that because the AAA’s Rules of Arbitration delegate the determination of arbitrability to the arbitrator, the plaintiff’s claim that the arbitration agreement illegally denied him of several statutory remedies, was a matter to be adjudicated by the arbitrator, not by the court); Qualcomm Inc. v. Nokia Corp., 466 F.3d 1366, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Apollo Computer. Inc. v. Berg, 886 F.2d 469, 473 (1st Cir. 1989) (“Ordinarily, [Plaintiff] would be entitled to have these

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Indeed, even when the parties have not agreed to submit substantive disputes on arbitrability to the arbitration forum, the courts tend to leave the dispute to be resolved initially by the arbitrator when the arbitrability cannot be determined without entering into the merits of the dispute. Elkouri & Elkouri, How Arbitrations Works, (BNA Books, 6th Edition 2003), at pg. 281. (“However, even though the agreement does not expressly leave the determination of arbitrability to the arbitrator, and in spite of the fact that the parties have first gone to court, courts have left the initial determination to the arbitrator. This was the result, for instance, where arbitrability could not be determined without delving into the merits ...”).

Thus, in Camden Indus. Co. v. Carpenters Local 1688, 353 F.3d 178, 180 (1st Cir. 1969), the First Court of Appeals decided:

In these circumstances we believe the matter should proceed to arbitration, where the arbitrator may determine the subsidiary facts upon which depend both the merits of the controversy and his jurisdiction to decide it. A finding of jurisdiction, unlike a finding on the merits when jurisdiction is not in question ... will not be insulated from subsequent judicial review... We believe full recognition of the role of labor arbitration requires court intervention

issues resolved by a court. [...] By contracting to have all disputes resolved according to the Rules of the ICC, however, [Plaintiff] agreed to be bound by Articles 8.3 and 8.4. These provisions clearly and unmistakably allow the arbitrator to determine her own jurisdiction when, as here, there exists a prima facie agreement to arbitrate whose continued existence and validity is being questioned.”).

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in a case such as this only when it has become absolutely necessary, viz., on a petition to vacate or enforce the award.

The federal case law cited is consistent with our local law as regards contracts. At the end of the day, “arbitration is an inherently contractual legal concept.” Méndez Acevedo, supra, at pg. 367; Municipio de Mayagüez, supra; U.C.P.R. v. Triangle Engineering Corp., 136 D.P.R. 133, 144 (1994).

Therefore, in terms of arbitration compliance with what has been agreed in writing can be enforced. See Crufon Const. v. Aut. Edif. Púbs., 156 D.P.R. 197, 204 (2002); Municipio de Ponce v. Gobernador, 136 D.P.R. 776, 783 (1994). In turn, when the terms of a contract are clear and unambiguous, its provisions will be applied according to the literal meaning that was given to it by the parties. Art. 1233 of the Civil Code, supra, §3471. Once it is determined what it was that the parties agreed, the court must decide the disputes between the parties as stipulated. See C.F.S.E. v. Unión de Médicos, 170 D.P.R. 443 (2007).

In summary, in the instant case, the arbitration clause expressly incorporates by reference the AAA’s Commercial Rules of Arbitration, which in turn delegate to the arbitrator – clearly and unmistakably – the authority to determine his own jurisdiction. Therefore, according to the authorities herein cited, it is appropriate for this Honorable Court to vacate the Decisions by the TPI and order Jane to continue with the arbitration proceeding that she agreed to, such that the arbitrator will be the one who decides whether he has authority to hear her claims on the merits. This is what the parties agreed, without any ambiguity whatsoever, and that constitutes the law

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between the parties. See HIETEL v. PRTC, 2011 T.S.P.R. 100. In the alternative, if this Honorable Court believes that the TPI did not commit the second error indicated, it must proceed to consider the next two (2) indications of errors.

B. SECOND INDICATION OF ERROR: THE TPI MANIFESTLY ERRED BY CONCLUDING THAT JANE DOE DOES NOT HAVE TO ARBITRATE HER ALLEGED CLAIMS AGAINST LLC AND THE OTHER DEFENDANTS-PETITIONERS GIVEN THAT THE ARBITRATION CLAUSE OF THE AGREEMENT IS BROAD, CLEAR, AND IT COVERS ANY CLAIM BETWEEN THE PARTIES.

The TPI also manifestly erred in deciding that the claims presented by Jane are not covered by the arbitration clause in the Agreement because they are allegedly of an “employment” or “labor” and “constitutional” nature. (Ap. TA., pgs. 486-498.) Essentially, the TPI based its decision on the erroneous conclusion that the Agreement does not govern the relationship between LLC and Jane for the purposes of the instant judicial action. (Ap. TA., pgs. 496-497.) To reach that result the TPI had to impose by fiat an unsustainable limitation on the scope of the arbitration clause in the Agreement, which according to its literal text is clearly broad and covers (“any claim”) between the parties – including those that do not arise from the Agreement. By doing so, the TPI not only erred, but it also made manifest a marked hostility to the arbitration forum, thus

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violating the postulates of the FAA and its case law interpretation.

From the face of the Decision it can be seen that the TPI ignored the broad language of the binding arbitration clause contained in the Agreement. An example of this is that not even the full text of the clause was quoted in the Decision as part of the TPI’s analysis. To facilitate the work of this Court, we reproduce the relevant section of the Agreement, which unquestionably evidences that the TPI should have compelled Jane to arbitrator her claims:

Intent and Purpose – It is the intent and purpose of the Firm and any Claimant to resolve any Claim by mediation or arbitration. The Claimant expressly agrees that the Claim shall be settled or resolved through the procedures set forth herein, and shall not in any way circumvent or otherwise challenge in any way these proceedings relative to mediation and arbitration.

See Section 14.01 of the Agreement (emphasis provided). (Ap. TA., pg. 97.)

Section 14.01 of the Agreement transcribed above shows that it was the intent and purpose of the parties, including Jane and the appearers, to resolve “any Claim” through mediation and arbitration. More revealing still is the fact that in the Agreement “Claim” is defined as, “any action, suit, complaint or demand of whatever nature and for whatever relief or remedy against the Firm or any of its Members or employees.” (Section 1.06 of the Agreement; emphasis added.) (Ap. TA. pg. 66). In other words, the term “any Claim” literally means

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any claim, complaint, demand, or action of any nature and requesting any remedy.

Given the text of Section 14.01 and the definition of “Claim” in the Agreement itself, “any Claim” can mean nothing other than “any claim,” and that includes all types of claims or requests for relief presented by Jane. That is, according to the foregoing terms (and without need of any interpretation whatsoever), any type of action, case, demand, or claim of any nature and on any type of relief or aid against LLC or any of its Members or employees is covered by the arbitration clause. As we indicated above, under Puerto Rican law when the terms of a contract are clear and unambiguous, its provisions will be applied according to the literal meaning that the parties gave to it. Art. 1233 of the Civil Code, supra, §3471. On this matter, in Marcial v. Tome, 144 D.P.R. 522 (1997), this Supreme Court recognized that the clear letter of the contract had to be followed, when it unmistakably reflects the will of the parties.

Even if there were any doubts on the scope of the arbitration clause and the meaning of “any Claim,” which is denied, the FAA requires that the doubt be resolved in favor of arbitration. See Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Const. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983) (“The [FAA] establishes that, as a matter of federal law, any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration, whether the problem at hand is the construction of the contract language itself or an allegation of waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability.”); Granite Rock Co. v. Int’l Broth. of Teamsters, 130 S.Ct. 2847, 2857 (2010) (likewise);

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Painewebber Incorporated of Puerto Rico v. Service Concepts, Inc., 151 D.P.R. 307, 311-12 (2000).

Therefore, for the determination of arbitrability it does not matter if the claim is of a labor or administrative, contractual, extracontractual, statutory or constitutional nature. Nor does it matter if the Capital Members of LLC can be classified as owners or employees or both. This is a very broad arbitration clause that the TPI should have backed pursuant to its terms under the FAA. These principles were grossly ignored by the TPI when it entered its Decision which is being appealed.

The conclusion that Jane must arbitrate her claims is necessary even if this Court were inclined to go beyond the text of Section 14 and the definitions of the Agreement to determine the scope of the obligation of the Capital Members (present and former) of LLC to arbitrate. That is so, inasmuch as what Jane basically questions and challenges is her compensation as a Capital Member of LLC (because of alleged discrimination), and her expulsion from the management body of LLC and as a Capital Member of LLC (for alleged retaliation). See the different claims that Jane has presented as part of this case, from her internal claim to the Third Amended Verified Complaint. (Ap. TA. pgs. 119-123; 1-13; 279-305; 456-481; and 505-528).

All of these are aspects of the relationship of Jane with LLC tha t are expressly governed by the Agreement. Indeed, such can be seen by the very determinations of fact by the Court. See Conclusion of Fact Number 7, Decision. (Ap. TA., pg. 492.) That translates into the fact that to be able to adjudicate

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Jane’s claims of alleged discrimination and retaliation, the corresponding forum – the arbitral forum – will necessarily have to refer to the Agreement.

As can certifiably be seen from the record, the compensation of the Capital Members of LLC is governed by sections 5.01-5.06 of the Agreement. (Ap. TA., pgs. 84-86.) A reading of such sections is enough to prove it. So much so that Jane herself admitted to the TPI that “the mechanism by which compensation is determined is governed by the [Agreement].” (See Opposition, at pg. 9, footnote 12, Ap. TA., pg. 144).

As a matter of reality, the TPI failed to consider the fact that from the internal claim that Jane Doe made before the managing body of LLC, she fundamentally claimed some alleged violations of the Agreement. (Ap. TA., pgs. 119-123.) (See Section V (B), paragraph 10, supra.)

Pursuant to the above, the TPI erred by not referring Jane Doe’s claims to arbitration. As we argued before the TPI, Jane Doe cannot escape the reality that her claims arise from alleged violations of the Agreement, whether for discriminatory reasons or not. Precisely, that is what it is up to the Arbitrator to settle.

The same thing happens with the alleged expulsions in retaliation against Jane as a Member of the managing body of LLC and a Capital Member of LLC. The expulsion of a Member of the managing body of LLC is governed by section 4.15 of the Agreement; whereas the expulsion of a Capital Member of LLC is governed by Section 12.02 of the Agreement. (Ap. TA., pgs. 83 and 94-95.) Therefore, any claim or challenge to those procedures must be

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handled through the dispute resolution process of Clause 14 of the Agreement, which includes the binding

arbitration that the parties agreed. That was the undertaking signed by Jane Doe and the TPI erred by allowing Jane Doe not to comply with what was agreed.

To conclude, neither the clear and broad language of the arbitration clause, nor the context provided by the matters governed by the Agreement and Jane Doe’s claims, can be interpreted as the obligation to arbitrate being limited to claims on the operational or administrative matters of LLC. The TPI not only erroneously assumed jurisdiction over the dispute on arbitrability but it also decided it in a manner completely contrary to the law.

C. THIRD INDICATION OF ERROR: THE TPI MANIFESTLY ERRED BY EXEMPTING JANE DOE FROM ARBITRATING HER CLAIMS BECAUSE OF THEIR ALLEGED “EMPLOYMENT” OR “LABOR” AND CONSTITUTIONAL” NATURE BECAUSE THE FAA DISPLACES (“PREEMPTS”) ALL STATE POLICY CONTRARY TO ARBITRATION.

Beyond ignoring the clear letter of the arbitration clause agreed in Section 14 of the Agreement, the TPI based its decision on the alleged “employment” or “labor” or “constitutional” nature of Jane Doe’s claims to exempt her from having to arbitrate them. According to the TPI:

…the law protecting employees in Puerto Rico is broad and unrestrictive in

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scope, and the exclusion of an employee from the benefits of labor law must be clear, and the courts must interpret those exclusions restrictively.

See Decision, at pg. 12. (Ap. TA., pg. 497.) Moreover the TPI stated its concern that if it accepted the “arguments” of the defendants-petitioners:

…it would allow the capital members to decide at another time to use protected criteria such as race or religion to deprive other capital members from their constitutional protection. According to the interpretation and position of the LLC, through the OA [the Agreement] it would be delegated to the arbitrator to decide the dispute in a confidential forum without a right to appeal for the affected parties.16

See Decision, at pg. 12. (Id.) These determinations by the TPI are impregnated with the hostility toward arbitration that the FAA came to eradicate and show that that forum based itself on the nature of Jane Doe’s alleged claims as well as on alleged state policies to refuse to compel arbitration. By acting thus, the TPI acted in open contradiction to the FAA and the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution. Once again, the TPI manifestly erred.

As can be seen from its § 2, of which we transcribe its pertinent text in footnote 11, the FAA does not establish any distinction

16 It is worth mentioning that under the FAA, the courts can review the decision of the arbitrator if it is believed that he exceeded his jurisdiction. See 9 U.S.C.A. § 10.

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whatsoever between the arbitrability of statutory rights or constitutional rights.17 All that the FAA requires is that the arbitration agreements be enforced pursuant to their own terms. See Concepcion, 131 S.Ct. 1745 (“courts must place arbitration agreements on an equal footing with other contracts, […] and enforce them according to their terms”) (citations omitted). That is to say, what is important is not the nature of the claim in question, but rather whether the parties agreed to arbitration such claim.18 Because the FAA does not differentiate between the arbitrability of statutory rights or constitutional rights, the TPI could not create that distinction by judicial fiat under the scope of their interpretation of Puerto Rican law.

It is an elemental principle of law that when a federal law is in conflict with a state law, including one of a constitutional nature, the state law is displaced by the federal one by virtue of the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution. The Supremacy Clause stipulates that:

17 Insofar as SCOTUS case law that requirements to arbitrate disputes that do not arise from the text of § 2 of the FAA, see Rent-A-Center v. Jackson, 130 S.Ct. 2772, 2778, n. 1 (“[§ 2] grounds do not include ... any requirement that its lack of unconscionability must be ‘clear and unmistakable.’”); Marmet v. Brown, 132 S.Ct. 1201, 1203 (2012) (“[The FAA’s] text includes no exception for personal-injury or wrongful-death claims. It ‘requires courts to enforce the bargain of the parties to arbitrate.”) (citation omitted). 18 As we have discussed above, Jane’s alleged constitutional claim is covered within the arbitration clause of the Agreement that requires that Jane Doe submit all of her claims (“any Claim”) to arbitration.

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This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States…, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in very State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.

U.S. Const., Art. VI, cl. 2 (emphasis ours). On this matter Professor Gorrín Peralta states the following:

[A] federal law takes precedence over the provisions of the Constitution of the [Commonwealth] of Puerto Rico. … In any situation in which a Puerto Rican legal precept conflicts with the “Supreme Law,” that is to say the [US] Constitution, [or] with a federal … law applicable in Puerto Rico, the federal Law must always take precedence over the Puerto Rican one.

Carlos I. Gorrin Peralta, Fuentes y proceso de investigación juridical 43 (1991) (emphasis supplied). See also, U.S. v. Georgia Public Service Comm., 371 U.S. 285, 293 (1983) (“a State is without power by reason of the Supremacy Clause to provide the conditions on which the Federal Government will effectuate its policies.”); U.S. v. Pérez, 465 F.Supp. 1284, 1286 (D.P.R. 1979) (“[The Constitution of Puerto Rico] cannot provide conditions on which Congress will effectuate its policies as to matters well within its province”).19

19 See also Dowling v. Davis, 840 F.Supp. 731, 734 (E.D. Cal.) (“The Supremacy Clause does not permit federal law to be

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As a result of these principles, it is an established and consistently repeated principle that when a State requires that a certain type of claim be settled exclusively in the courts, despite the fact that the parties agreed to arbitrate their disputes, such state rule is displaced by the FAA. That was specifically resolved by the SCOTUS in Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984), by indicating the following:

In enacting § 2 of the [FAA], Congress declared a national policy favoring arbitration and withdrew the power of the states to require a judicial forum for the resolution of claims which the contracting parties agreed to resolve by arbitration.

Id. at pg. 10 (emphasis ours).20

Recently, the SCOTUS reaffirmed this principle in Marmet Health Care Center, Inc. v. Brown, 132 S.Ct. (Op. of February 21, 2012). In Marmet, the SCOTUS, citing Concepcion, 131 S.Ct. 1740, 1747 (2011), decided the following:

superseded by state law, including state constitutional provisions.”); U.S. v. Spencer, 160 F.3d 413, 414 (7th Cir. 1998) (likewise); Keaveny v. Town of Brookline, 937 F.Supp. 975, 982 (D. Mass. 1996) (likewise). Prof. Gorrín Peralta also states the following regarding this matter: “The sources of law in Puerto Rico are, then: (1) The U.S. Constitution; (2) the federal laws…; …(5) the Constitution of the [Commonwealth] of Puerto Rico; (6) the ordinary laws approved by the Legislative Assembly [of Puerto Rico];….” Gorrín Peralta, supra, at pg. 43. 20 See Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 491 (“This clear federal policy places § 2 of the Act in unmistakable conflict with California's § 229 requirement that litigants be provided a judicial forum for resolving wage disputes.”)

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[W]hen state law prohibits outright the arbitration of a particular type of claim, the analysis is straightforward: The conflicting rule is displaced by the FAA. ... West Virginia's prohibition against predispute agreements to arbitrate personal-injury or wrongful death claims against nursing home is a categorical rule prohibiting arbitration of a particular type of claim, and that rule is contrary to the terms and coverage of the FAA.

Id. at pgs. 1203-04 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). In Marmet the SCOTUS decided that the Supreme Court of West Virginia had erred by applying the public policy of that State, which prohibits enforcement of an arbitration clause contained in an admission agreement to an old-age home signed prior to the occurrence of an event of negligence that results in death or bodily injury. In the case that concerns us, the TPI has sought to relieve an attorney with 38 years of experience from her obligation to arbitrate, and all of that without there even being a law in Puerto Rico to require that Jane’s claims be decided by a court, which would also infringe the FAA. Such that, if the FAA displaces any state legislation that conflicts with its provisions, it is even more clear that any decision by a court (such as the appealed Decision) that infringes the FAA also must be vacated.

This Supreme Court is fully aware of these principles. In World Films, Inc. v. Paramount Pict. Corp., supra, it recognized that the state laws that limit arbitration clauses are displaced (“preempted”)

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by the FAA. The dispute in World Films was whether the application of Article 3-B of Law 75, 10 L.P.R.A. 278b-2, which established the nullity of any stipulation in a distribution contract that forced a distributor to arbitrate outside of Puerto Rico any dispute that arose from such contract, had to take precedence over the FAA. This Supreme Court of Puerto Rico determined that insofar as Article 3-B of Law 75 conflicted in its application with the FAA, the latter would take precedence. Id., pg. 364. Indeed, the Supreme Court in effect determined that faced with the FAA, Article 3-B was ineffective and illegal. By deciding thus, the provisions of Walborg Corp. v. Tribunal Superior, 104 D.P.R. 184 (1975), which had determined that the state courts were not obligated to apply the LFA, were expressly revoked. In Walborg, the court had decided that an arbitration clause could not be given greater force than the policy established in Law 75, and that the state courts were not obligated to apply the LFA. That doctrine was revoked by World Films.

Pursuant to the above, there is no question that the TPI erred by denying the arbitration based on the alleged “constitutional” and “labor” nature of Jane Doe’s claims. The FAA displaces any statutory legal precept or precept under the Constitution of Puerto Rico that does not enforce and recognize the commitment assumed by Jane Doe and LLC to resolve all claims (“any Claim”) through the arbitration procedure agreed in Section 14 of the Agreement.

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VIII. CONCLUSION AND PRAYER FOR RELIEF

Jane Doe commenced the proceedings with the TPI in violation of the terms of the binding arbitration clause that all of the Capital Members of LLC agreed to in the Agreement. The TPI’s ruling must be overturned because it infringes the clear terms of Section 14 of the Agreement, the provisions of the Federal Arbitration Act, the Supremacy Clause of the United State Constitution and its interpretative case law.

WHEREFORE, we very respectfully ask that this Honorable Court grant this Petition for Certiorari, overturn the TPI’s Decision, order Jane Doe to submit her claims to the arbitration commenced before the AAA, and dismiss the Complaint.

Respectfully submitted.

In San Juan, Puerto Rico, today June 12, 2012.

I CERTIFY that I have notified a true and exact copy of this brief, simultaneously with its submission, by electronic mail and messenger to the attorneys for the plaintiff-respondent, Juan R. González, Esq. González Muñoz Law Office, 261 Tetuán, San Juan, Puerto Rico 00901-1916; jrgmlaw@gmail.com; and Manuel Porro Vizcarra, Esq., Manuel Porro Vizcarra Law Offices, 382 Ave. Escorial, Urb. Caparra Heights, San Juan, PR 00920; mpv@mpvlawpr.com.

MENDOZA LAW OFFICES

Attorney for the defendants-petitioners

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PO Box 9282

San Juan, Puerto Rico 00908-0282

Tel. (787) 722-5522; 5530; 5540

Fax: (787) 723-7057

Electronic mail:

mendozalo@yahoo.com

/s/ [signature]

Enrique J. Mendoza Méndez, Esq.

TSPR-8304

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APPENDIX H

EN EL TRIBUNAL SUPREMO DE PUERTO RICO

JANE DOE,

Demandante-Recurrida

v.

COMPAÑÍA DE RESPONSABILIDAD

LIMITADA (“CRL”); FULANO DE TAL, personalmente, en su carácter de patrono de JANE

DOE y como co-administrador de la Sociedad Legal de Bienes Gananciales (“SLG”) constituida con

FULANA DE TAL, quien es demandada como co-administradora de la SLG constituida con Fulano de Tal; “SLG Fulano y Fulana de Tal” constituida por

Fulano y Fulana de Tal; Sutano De Cual personalmente, en su carácter de patrono de JANE

DOE y como co-administrador de la SLG constituida con SUTANA DE CUAL, quien es demandada como co-administradora de la “SLG Sutano y Sutana de

Cual” constituida con Sutano de Cual; “SLG Sutano y Sutana” constituida por Sutano y Sutana de Cual;

Esperencejo Mas Cual personalmente, en su carácter de patrono de JANE DOE y como co-administrador de la SLG constituida con ESPERENCEJA MAS

CUAL, quien es demandada como coadministradora de la SLG constituida con Esperencejo Más Cual;

“SLG Esperencejo y Esperenceja Más Cual” constituida por Esperencejo y Esperenceja Más Cual;

Demandados Desconocidos A, B y C; Demandadas Compañías Aseguradoras, Desconocidas X, Y, Z,

Demandados-Peticionarios.

CERTIORARI NÚM:

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CC__________

Certiorari procedente del Tribunal de Apelaciones, Región Judicial de San Juan

___________

Núm. Caso TA: KLCE-2012-00821

___________

PETICIÓN DE CERTIORARI

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Abogados de la Demandante- Recurrida Jane Doe:

Lcdo.Juan Rafael González Muñoz. TSPR-8185

GONZALEZ MUÑOZ LAW OFFICE, P.S.C.

PO Box 9024055 San Juan, P.R. 00902-4055

Tel. (787) 766-5052 Fax: (787) 766-5551 jrgmlaw@gmail.com

polonorteprlaw@gmail.com

Lcdo Manuel Porro Vizcarra TSPR-7994

MANUEL PORRO VIZCARRA LAW OFFICES

382 Avenida Escorial Urb. Caparra Heights San Juan, P.R. 00920 Tel. (787) 774-8200 Fax: (787) 774-8297 mpv@mpvlawpr.com

Abogados de los Demandados Peticinarios

Lcdo Enrique J. Mendoza Méndez TSPR-8304

MENDOZA LAW OFFICES PO Box 9282

San Juan, P.R. 00908-0282 Tel. (787) 722-5522; 5530; 5540

Fax: (787) 723-7057 mendoza@yahoo.com

[

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EN EL TRIBUNAL SUPREMO DE PUERTO RICO

JANE DOE,

Demandante-Recurrida

v.

COMPAÑÍA DE RESPONSABILIDAD

LIMITADA (“CRL”); FULANO DE TAL, personalmente, en su carácter de patrono de JANE

DOE y como co-administrador de la Sociedad Legal de Bienes Gananciales (“SLG”) constituida con

FULANA DE TAL, quien es demandada como co-administradora de la SLG constituida con Fulano de Tal; “SLG Fulano y Fulana de Tal” constituida por

Fulano y Fulana de Tal; Sutano De Cual personalmente, en su carácter de patrono de JANE

DOE y como co-administrador de la SLG constituida con SUTANA DE CUAL, quien es demandada como co-administradora de la “SLG Sutano y Sutana de

Cual” constituida con Sutano de Cual; “SLG Sutano y Sutana” constituida por Sutano y Sutana de Cual;

Esperencejo Mas Cual personalmente, en su carácter de patrono de JANE DOE y como co-administrador de la SLG constituida con ESPERENCEJA MAS

CUAL, quien es demandada como coadministradora de la SLG constituida con Esperencejo Más Cual;

“SLG Esperencejo y Esperenceja Más Cual” constituida por Esperencejo y Esperenceja Más Cual;

Demandados Desconocidos A, B y C; Demandadas Compañías Aseguradoras, Desconocidas X, Y, Z,

Demandados – Peticionarios

CERTIORARI NÚM:

CC__________

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Certiorari procedente del Tribunal de Apelaciones, Región Judicial de San Juan

___________

Núm. Caso TA: KLCE 2012-00821

___________

PETICIÓN DE CERTIORARI

AL HONORABLE TRIBUNAL SUPREMO:

COMPARECEN los demandados-peticionarios, Compañía de Responsabilidad Limitada (“CRL”), Fulano de Tal y la Sociedad Legal de Bienes Gananciales (“SLG”) constituida con Fulana de Tal, Sutano de Cual y la SLG constituida con Sutana de Cual1 y Esperencejo Más Cual y la SLG constituida con Esperenceja Más Cual, y respetuosamente solicitan la expedición de la Petición de Certiorari.

I. INTRODUCCIÓN

La Petición de Certiorari de epígrafe busca vindicar el derecho de los demandados protegido por la § 2 del Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) y su jurisprudencia interpretativa de dilucidar los reclamos presentados en su contra por Jane Doe (“Jane”) mediante el procedimiento de arbitraje pactado. El referido pacto requiere, además, que dicho proceso sea privado y confidencial. A esos

1 Por razones de estricta confidencialidad las partes de este pleito no están identificadas con sus respectivos nombres. En la Declaración Jurada Bajo Sello de la demandante-recurrida sometida junto con la Demanda y las subsiguientes enmiendas, dicha parte identificó a cada uno de los demandados-recurridos con sus respectivos nombres, direcciones y teléfonos. (Apendice Peticion Certiorari Apéndice Petición Certiorari ("Ap. TS.", págs. 55-56; 346-348; y 549-571.)

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efectos, el presente recurso busca que se deje sin efecto la Resolución del Tribunal de Apelaciones (“TA”) que denegó la expedición del auto de certiorari por entender que el Tribunal de Primera Instancia (TPI”) resolvió correctamente la controversia sobre arbitraje presentada ante su consideración. Además, la Resolución del TA denegó la Moción en Auxilio de Jurisidicción presentada por los demandados que buscaba paralizar los procedimientos ante el TPI, debido a que dicho foro se apresta en cualquier momento a resolver en los méritos las controversias entre las partes que deberían ser adjudicadas mediante el arbitraje acordado.

II. DISPOSICIONES LEGALES QUE ESTABLECEN LA JURISDICCIÓN Y

COMPETENCIA DE ESTE TRIBUNAL

Este Honorable Tribunal tiene jurisdicción y competencia para entender en los méritos de este recurso conforme al Artículo V §§ 1 y 3 de la Constitución del Estado Libre Asociado de Puerto Rico; los Artículos 2.001 y 3.002(d) de la Ley de la Judicatura del Estado Libre Asociado de Puerto Rico de 2003 (4 L.P.R.A. §§ 24b, 24s(d)); la Regla 52.2(b) de las de Procedimiento Civil (32 L.P.R.A. Ap. V); el Artículo 670 del Código de Enjuiciamiento Civil (32 L.P.R.A § 3491); y las Reglas 20 y 30 del Reglamento del Tribunal Supremo de Puerto Rico, 2011 T.S.P.R. 174.

III. RESOLUCIÓN CUYA REVISIÓN SE SOLICITA

Los co-demandados-peticionarios solicitan la revisión de la Resolución dictada el 15 de junio de 2012 por el TA, Región Judicial de San Juan, Panel III integrado por los Honorables Jueces Ramírez Nazario, Piñero González y Surén Fuentes, en el Caso

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Núm. KLCE-2012-00821 (“Resolución”). (Ap. TS. págs. 707-724) La Resolución del TA denegó la expedición del auto de certiorari solicitado. El TA resolvió que el FAA no aplica y que el TPI resolvió correctamente la controversia sobre arbitrabilidad, y que no había circunstancia alguna que provoque efecto perjudicial a CRL en esta etapa del pleito. En su recurso, los demandados-peticionarios solicitaron del TA que revocara de la Resolución del TPI emitida el 4 de junio de 2012 (“Resolución del TPI”) en el caso Civil Núm. KPE 2012-1204 (904)(Hon. Juez Ángel R. Pagán Ocasio), Sala Superior de San Juan (Ap. TS., 527-541), que denegó La Solicitud de Desestimación por Falta de Jurisdicción y para Compeler Arbitraje Compulsorio en Vista de Acuerdo Vinculante de Arbitraje que había sido presentada por los comparecientes el 11 de abril de 2012 (Ap. TS., págs. 81-169.).

La Resolución recurrida se notificó el 15 de junio de 2012. (Ap. TS., págs. 707, 709 y 724) El término de 30 días que tienen los comparecientes para presentar el presente recurso vence el 16 de julio de 2012. Este recurso ha sido presentado a tiempo y el Tribunal tiene jurisdicción para entender en el mismo.

IV. OTROS RECURSOS PENDIENTES

Al presente no existe otro recurso sobre este caso pendiente ante este Honorable Tribunal ni ante el TA.

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V. PROCEDENCIA DE LA EXPEDICIÓN DEL RECURSO

Este recurso cumple con los criterios de la Regla 30 del Reglamento de este Honorable Tribunal, supra, (“Regla 30”) para su expedición.2 Veamos.

Según se discute en este escrito, las Resoluciones del TA y TPI son contrarias a derecho y, en particular, a las normas sobre arbitraje e interpretación de contratos, pues resuelven que Jane no está obligada a seguir el procedimiento de

2 Los criterios aquí relevantes son (1) Si el remedio y la disposición de la sentencia o resolución recurrida, a diferencia de sus fundamentos, son contrarios a derecho, tomando este último en su más amplia acepción. (2) ….. (3) Aun cuando no sea novel, si la expresión de la norma es importante para el interés public (4) Si los hechos expuestos presentan la situación más indicada para el análisis del problema planteado. (5) Si la norma existente debe ser redefinida o variada. (6) ….. (7) Si ha mediado prejuicio, parcialidad o error craso y manifiesto en la apreciación de la prueba por el tribunal de primera instancia. (8) .... (9) Si la etapa en que se presente el caso es la más propicia para su consideración. (10) Si la expedición del auto o de la orden de mostrar causa no causan un fraccionamiento indebido del pleito y una dilación indeseable respecto a la solución final del litigio. (11) Si la concesión del auto o la emisión de una orden de mostrar causa contribuyen de otro modo a las funciones de este Tribunal de vindicar la ley y pautar el derecho en el país. (12) Si se ha cumplido con los otros requisitos que establece el Reglamento de este Tribunal. (13) Si la expedición del auto o de la orden de mostrar causa evita un fracaso de la justicia.

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arbitraje que dio inicio el 22 de marzo de 2012 ante el American Arbitration Association (“AAA”) a pesar de que el acuerdo entre las partes requiere que Jane presente en el arbitraje todos sus reclamos contra los demandados (“resolve any Claim by ... arbitration”) independiente de la naturaleza de los mismos (“any action... of whatever nature... against the Firm or any of its Members...”). Evidentemente, se cometió error de Derecho y, en consecuencia, procede expedir el recurso de certiorari de conformidad con el inciso (1) de la Regla 30.

El presente recurso sirve además para aclarar la norma sobre qué significa un contrato en el comercio interestatal. Dicha determinación es importante para el interés público, pues sólo de esa forma las partes podrán estar en posición de conocer si sus contratos de arbitraje estarán cobijados por la fuerte política pública a favor del arbitraje que provee el FAA. Perry v. Thomas. 482 U.S. 483, 489 (1987) (‘‘[I]n enacting § 2 of [FAA], Congress declared a national policy favoring arbitration...”) (Énfasis nuestro). El hecho de que el TA resolviera incorrectamente que el Acuerdo no es un contrato en el comercio interestatal demuestra que este Honorable Tribunal debe establecer criterios claros sobre el particular para guiar a los tribunales inferiores. Véanse incisos (3), (5) y (11) de la Regla 30.

Además, el TA y TPI cometieron error craso en su interpretación y apreciación de la cláusula de arbitraje. Ello, pues, del texto de la cláusula de arbitraje en cuestión surge claramente que es el árbitro quien tiene la obligación de resolver las controversias planteadas por Jane ante el foro judicial. En consecuencia, procede expedir recurso de certiorari de conformidad con el inciso (7) de la Regla 30.

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Tampoco existe duda de que, de conformidad con el inciso (4) de la Regla 30, la situación de hechos que se plantea es la más indicada para el análisis de la controversia ante este Ilustrado Tribunal, pues para su resolución sólo se requiere que el Tribunal interprete la cláusula de arbitraje pactada de conformidad con el FAA y las normas de interpretación contractual.

La intervención del Honorable Tribunal en esta etapa es la más propicia, pues de no revocarse la Resolución del TA y paralizarse los trámites ante el TPI, se tornará académica la obligación de Jane de ventilar sus reclamos ante el foro arbitral y se causaría daño irreparable a los demandados-peticionarios al verse incumplidos los compromisos pactados de llevar a cabo un procedimiento de arbitraje confidencial, Véase City of Meridian Miss. v. Alaernon Blair. Inc.. 721 F.2d 525, 529 (5to Cir. 1983) (un injunction paralizando un arbitraje constituye daño irreparable debido a los costos de litigar). Sería impráctico y constituiría un fracaso irremediable de la justicia tener que esperar hasta la resolución final del caso ante el TPI para poder presentar un recurso ante los foros apelativos y plantear como error que los reclamos de Jane debieron ser adjudicados en un procedimiento confidencial de arbitraje. Además, de no expedirse el auto de certiorari, se le estaría permitiendo a Jane burlar su obligación de someter a arbitraje confidencial toda reclamación, de cualquier naturaleza, que pudiera tener en contra de los demandados, obligación que contrajo libre y voluntariamente.

En consecuencia, a los fines de evitar un fracaso de la justicia procede expedir el recurso de certiorari de conformidad con los incisos (9)-(10), (13) de la Regla 30. Máxime, cuando también se han cumplido

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con todos los requisitos que establece el Reglamento de este Honorable Tribunal para la expedición del auto solicitado. Véase inciso (12) de la Regla 30.

VI. RELACIÓN DE HECHOS PROCESALES Y SUSTANTIVOS

A. Relación de Hechos Procesales Pertinentes

1. El 2 de abril de 2012, Jane presentó ante el TPI Demanda Jurada y Solicitud de Sentencia Declaratoria e Injunction Preliminar y Permanente (“Demanda”), Jane alegó que no le es de aplicación la cláusula de arbitraje del “Operating Agreement” o Acuerdo Operacional de CRL (‘Acuerdo’’) arguyendo que ese contrato sólo regula las operaciones comerciales y administrativas de CRL. Jane alegó además que sus reclamaciones son de índole laboral y que éstas están cobijadas por la Constitución de Puerto Rico, la Ley Núm. 100 de 30 de junio de 1959 (edad), la Ley Núm. 69 de 6 de julio de 1985 (sexo y represalias), la Ley Núm, 115 de 20 de diciembre de 1991 (represalias) y el Manual de Empleados de CRL (“Manual”), el cual no contiene cláusula de arbitraje, A esos efectos, Jane solicitó que el TPI declare inaplicable la cláusula de arbitraje del Acuerdo a sus alegadas reclamaciones laborales y que se ordene a CRL a que solicite la paralización del arbitraje bajo la Regla 57 de Procedimiento Civil en lo que el TPI resuelve la controversia planteada sobre arbitrabilidad. (Ap. TS., págs. 44-56.)3

2. Junto con la Demanda, Jane presentó una Moción

3 Las alegaciones de Jane a los efectos de que el Acuerdo no tiene pertinencia a sus reclamos son abiertamente contradictorias a la reclamación extrajudicial que hizo Jane al Consejo Directo de CRL donde expresamente enmarcó los mismos reclamos como violaciones al Acuerdo. (Ap. TS., págs. 162-166.)

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Solicitando Injunction Preliminar y Permanente (“Solicitud de Injunction”), en la que solicitó igualmente una orden para paralizar el arbitraje en lo que el TPI resuelve la Sentencia Declaratoria, pero con el pedido de que una vez la misma sea resuelta a favor de Jane dicho foro convierta la orden de paralización en permanente y proceda a resolver en los méritos las controversias planteadas. (Ap. TS., págs. 57-62.)

3. Además, Jane presentó una Moción Urgente en Solicitud de Orden a los fines de que todos ios procedimientos se mantengan estrictamente confidenciales. (Ap. TS., págs. 63-64.)

4. El 3 de abril de 2012, el TPI emitió una Orden señalando una vista para el 11 de abril de 2012, para dilucidar la procedencia del recurso extraordinario solicitado. (Ap. TS., págs. 66.)

5. El 11 de abril de 2012, los demandados-peticionarios presentaron una Solicitud de Desestimación, en la que argumentaron que el Acuerdo es un contrato en el comercio interestatal, por lo que es de aplicación el FAA, que conforme a la cláusula de arbitraje del Acuerdo toda controversia sobre si los reclamos de Jane son arbitrables o no le corresponde resolverla al propio árbitro y no al TPI y que, en la alternativa, procede que el TPI reconozca que mediante la Sección 14.04 del Acuerdo Jane se obligó a tramitar todos su reclamos (“any Claim’’) de forma confidencial mediante el procedimiento de arbitraje independientemente de la naturaleza de los reclamos o si éstos surgen bajo el Acuerdo. Además, los demandados-peticionarios argumentaron que bajo la Cláusula de Supremacía de la Constitución de los Estados Unidos, independientemente de la alegada naturaleza constitucional y laboral de las

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reclamaciones de Jane, la § 2 del FAA requiere que dichos reclamos sean adjudicados en el procedimiento de arbitraje iniciado ante la AAA. (Ap. TS., págs. 81-169.)

6. Ese mismo día se celebró una vista en la cual se acordó que los demandados-peticionarios paralizarían sus gestiones en el caso de arbitraje en lo que el TPI resolvía las mociones presentadas sobre arbitrabilidad, que se mantendría la confidencialidad del expediente y que todo documento se presentaría bajo sello. Además, el TPI indicó que el primer asunto a resolver será la arbitrabilidad de los reclamos de Jane. Finalmente, el TPI señaló una vista de injunction preliminar para el 10 de mayo de 2012, de ser necesario el desfile de prueba.4 (Ap. TS., págs. 170-171.)

7. El 23 de abril de 2012, Jane presentó su Oposición a la Solicitud de Desestimación. En dicha Oposición Jane alegó, entre otras cosas, que la cláusula de arbitraje del Acuerdo no aplica a sus alegados reclamos de índole laboral pues dicho documento sólo aplica a asuntos relacionados con la administración de CRL, máxime cuando los reclamos de Jane son de rango constitucional. Además, Jane alegó que es el TPI el llamado a resolver todos sus reclamos.5 (Ap. TS., págs. 177-321.)

8. Luego de la presentación de varios escritos por las 4 El 8 de mayo de 2012, dicha vista fue re-señalada para el 5 de junio. (Ap. TS., págs. 493-494.) 5 Ese mismo día, Jane presentó una Demanda Enmendada y Jurada a los fines de incluir como demandadas a las cónyuges de los demandados en calidad de co-administradoras de las respectivas Sociedades Legales de Gananciales y enmendar sus causas de acción. (Ap. TS., págs. 322-348.) El 1 de mayo de 2012, los demandados se opusieron a la referida enmienda. (Ap. TS., págs. 349-356.)

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partes 6 y que Jane presentara una Segunda Demanda Enmendada, el 4 de junio de 2012, a las 11:41 a.m., el TPI notificó vía correo electrónico la Resolución objeto del recurso ante el TA, la cual, como mencionamos, resuelve contrario al FAA y su jurisprudencia interpretativa que es al TPI al que le compete resolver la controversia sobre arbitrabilidad y que, además, Jane no tiene que arbitrar sus reclamaciones de alegado discrimen laboral, represalias y daños por éstas no estar cobijadas por la cláusula de arbitraje del Acuerdo. (Ap. TS., págs. 527-541.) En la nota al calce 12 de la Resolución, el TPI hace las siguientes expresiones que hacen evidente su hostilidad hacia el procedimiento de arbitraje: “De acuerdo a la interpretación y postura de la CRL, mediante el [Acuerdo] se delegaría al árbitro resolver la controversia en un foro totalmente confidencial y sin derecho de apelación para los afectados.” (Ap. TS., pág. 540; énfasis nuestro.)

9. Además, el TPI indicó que se mantendría en pie la vista de injunction señalada para el día siguiente en donde las partes tendrán que presentar prueba en relación a la solicitud de remedio interdictal. Igualmente, autorizó la presentación de la Segunda Demanda Enmendada. (Ap. TS., pág. 541) De un análisis del formato, tipografía y estilo de la Resolución se puede razonablemente inferir que la misma probablemente es producto de un borrador de proyecto de Resolución sometido por Jane, por lo que,

6 El 1 de mayo de 2012, los demandados-peticionarios presentaron su Réplica a Oposición a la Solicitud de Desestimación por Falta de Jurisdicción y para Competer Arbitraje Compulsorio en Vista de Acuerdo Vinculante de Arbitraje. (Ap. TS., págs. 357- 459.) Por su parte, el 7 de mayo de 2012, Jane presentó un escrito intitulado Dúplica de la Demandante. (Ap. TS., págs. 460- 492.)

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de ser ello correcto, ésta habría tenido conocimiento de la determinación del TPI mucho antes que los demandados-peticionarios.

10. De hecho, sorpresivamente, a tan sólo cuatro (4) horas de notificarse la Resolución, Jane presentó ante el TPI una Solicitud de Orden Sobre la Confidencialidad de los Procedimientos Ulteriores alegando que en vista de lo resuelto horas antes por el TPI no existía razón para que los procedimientos continuaran tramitándose de forma confidencial. (Ap. TS., págs. 542-547.) Además, Jane presentó bajo sello una Tercera Demanda Enmendada y Jurada donde se identifica a los demandados con sus respectivos nombres. (Ap. TS., págs. 548-571.)

11. Además, justo antes de que iniciara la vista señalada para el 5 de junio de 2012, Jane presentó en el TPI a las 8:47 a.m., una Solicitud de Reinstalación Como Remedio Adicional al Amparo de la Regla 59 4 de Procedimiento Civil mediante la cual solicita que se dicte Sentencia Parcial ordenando mediante un injunction preliminar y permanente su reinstalación a CRL. (Ap. TS.; págs. 572- 578.)

12. Minutos más tarde, las partes comparecieron a la vista de injunction preliminar señalada para ese día. Aunque no habían transcurrido ni tan siquiera 24 horas desde que los demandados-peticionarios advinieron en conocimiento de que la acción judicial de Jane no sería desestimada para que procediera el arbitraje, el TPI pretendía que éstos presentarán prueba sobre las alegaciones del caso para poder entrar a resolverlo en los méritos. En vista de lo atropellado que pretendía ser el proceso, los demandados-peticionarios objetaron el proceder del TPI amparándose en argumentos de razonabilidad y de Debido Proceso de Ley, entre otros. El TPI

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concedió entonces hasta el 8 de junio para que Jane presentara la propuesta de estipulaciones de hechos que no habían sido aceptadas por los demandados-peticionarios, para que los demandados presentaran propuestas de hechos y para que ambas partes presentaran los documentos que deberían ser considerados por el TPI.7 Además, el TPI consolidó la vista de injunction preliminar con la de injunction permanente e indicó que de ser necesario el desfile de prueba las partes serán notificadas sobre la celebración de la vista.8 (Ap. TS., págs. 591- 594.)

13. Inconformes con lo anterior, el 12 de junio de 2012, los demandados presentaron una Solicitud de Certiorari ante el TA, en la cual señalaron que el TPI había errado al: (1) asumir jurisdicción sobre la controversia de si Jane está obligada a arbitrar sus reclamos debido a que las partes inequívocamente pactaron que sería el árbitro quien determinará el alcance de su jurisdicción; (2) en la alternativa, concluir que Jane no tiene que arbitrar sus reclamos contra los demandados a pesar de que la cláusula de arbitraje pactada es amplia, ciara y abarca cualquier reclamo entre las partes; (3) eximir a Jane de arbitrar sus reclamos por la alegada naturaleza “de empleo” o “laboral” y “constitucional” de éstos ya que el FAA desplaza toda política estatal contraria al arbitraje. (Ap. TS., págs. 1-43.)

14. Junto con el Certiorari, los demandados presentaron una Moción Urgente en Auxilio de 7 El 8 de junio, los demandados cumplieron con la referida Orden del TPI. (Ap. TS., págs. 595 y 660). 8 El TPI también concedió 10 días para que los demandados-peticionarios presenten su posición en cuanto a la solicitud de Jane de que se deje sin efecto la orden de confidencialidad y 15 días para que se expresen sobre la solicitud de reinstalación de Jane a CRL. (Ap. TS., pags. 591-594)

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Jurisdicción. (Ap. TS., págs. 667-683; 684-686.)

15. El 15 de junio de 2012, el TA emitió una Resolución denegando la expedición del auto de certiorari y declarando, además, que el Acuerdo no es un contrato en el comercio interestatal, que la disputa en este caso no es un asunto relativo al Acuerdo por lo que la controversia no está gobernada por el mismo, y que el TPI debe resolver de forma prioritaria el tema sobre la confidencialidad de los procedimientos. (Ap. TS., págs. 707-724.) Es de esta Resolución que acudimos a este Honorable Tribunal.

2. Relación de Hechos Materiales.

16. En o alrededor de noviembre de 1979, Jane se unió a CRL como abogada. (Ap. TS., pág. 55.)

17. En aquel entonces, CRL era una sociedad civil. Desde entonces, CRL provee servicios en el comercio interestatal a su clientela foránea, mayormente de Estados Unidos, y local. (Ap. TS., págs. 98-99.)

18. En septiembre de 1987, Jane fue promovida a socia capital de CRL. (Ap. TS., págs. 90.) El contrato social requería que sus socios dirimieran sus disputas mediante arbitraje confidencial. (Ap. TS., págs. 312-313.)

19. El 13 de septiembre de 2007, CRL se convirtió en una compañía de responsabilidad limitada bajo las leyes de Puerto Rico. En consecuencia, Jane advino Miembro Capital de CRL. (Ap. TS., págs. 102, 108 y 145.)

20. Ese mismo día, Jane y los demás Miembros Capitales de CRL suscribieron un documento intitulado Operating Agreement (‘Acuerdo

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Operacional’ o ‘Acuerdo’).9 (Ap. TS., págs. 103-158 y 381- 396.) En vista de que siempre ha sido la práctica acordar que las disputas se resuelvan mediante arbitraje, el Acuerdo, al igual que el anterior pacto social, incluye una cláusula de arbitraje confidencial.

21. El Acuerdo rige entre otras materias, los procesos de admisión, compensación, y expulsión de los Miembros Capitales, asi como la elección de los Miembros del Consejo Directivo o “Policy Commitee”. (Ap. TS., págs. 77-78, 80-83, 127,132, 137-138.) Dicho Consejo formula las políticas y planes a largo plazo de CRL. El proceso de compensación de los Miembros Capitales concluye con una aprobación o desaprobación de la Compensación de los Miembros Capitales por el Consejo Directivo. Jane fue miembro del Consejo Directivo.

22. En lo pertinente, dicho Acuerdo (Ap. TS. 102-158) provee en sus Secciones relevantes lo siguiente:

A. Definitions. For the purposes of this Agreement, the following terms shall have the meaning set forth below:

1.06 “Claim” means any action, suit, complaint or demand of whatever nature and for whatever relief or remedy against the Firm or any of its Members or employees. ….

1.07 “Claimant” means any Member or Former Member asserting a Claim.

9 El 8 de junio, los demandados cumplieron con la referida Orden del TPI. (Ap. TS., págs. 595 y 660).

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5. Compensation.10

5.02 Salaries of Members- Each Capital Member shall be entitled to such annual salary as shall be determined pursuant to section 5.01 of this Agreement, to be paid in one (1) or more installments. ….

10. Fiduciary Duty and Duty of Loyalty of Members.

10.1 Fiduciary Duties of Members- Members owe the Firm and each other a fiduciary duty and a duty of loyalty, which requires each Member, among other things:

(f) To treat all Firm Documents as confidential ‘trade secrets’, except to the extent such Firm Documents are publicly available other than as a result of any violation of this or any other confidentiality obligation... and to treat as confidential all information relating to the deliberations of the Members and the business of the Firm while such Member is a Member of the Firm and, in the event the Member leaves the Firm, after such Member’s departure.

12. Withdrawal, Retirement, Suspension, Expulsion ... of a Member.

12.02 Suspension and/or Expulsion- The Firm may, upon the recommendation of the Policy Committee and the affirmative vote of three-

10 El TPI también concedió 10 días para que los demandados-peticionarios presenten su posición en cuanto a la solicitud de Jane de que se deje sin efecto la orden de confidencialidad y 15 días para que se expresen sobre la solicitud de reinstalación

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fourths (3/4) of the Capital Members, ...(b) expel any Member at any date specified by the Policy Committee with or without cause or prior notice to such Member. In the case of any such expulsion, the Member so expelled shall cease to be a Member on the date specified by the Policy Committee.

14. Resolution of Claim.

14.01 Intent and Purpose– It is the intent and purpose of the Firm and any Claimant to resolve any Claim by mediation or arbitration. The Claimant expressly agrees that the Claim shall be settled or resolved through the procedures set forth herein, and shall not in any way circumvent or otherwise challenge in any way these proceedings relative to mediation and arbitration.

14.04 Arbitration– If mediation fails, the Claim shall be settled by arbitration administered by the [AAA] under its Commercial Arbitration Rules, and judgment on the award rendered by the arbitrator(s) may be entered in any court having jurisdiction thereof. ...

14.05 Confidentiality– The Claimant and the Firm agree that the underlying purpose of the provisions set forth in section 14 of this Agreement is to provide a mechanism by which any Claim shall be resolved in a confidential manner, without publicity and the attendant distractions. …. The parties agree to maintain the confidentiality of such meetings and hearings, and of the documents produced or created in such meetings and hearings. Any and all actions taken by the

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parties shall be in conformity with the underlying purpose set forth in section 14 of this Agreement.

Nótese que Jane no disputa que el Acuerdo

es un contrato en el comercio interestatal a los fines del FAA. (Ap. TS., págs. 44-56; 81-101; 177-321; 357-459; 460-492.) Tampoco está en controversia la validez de la cláusula de arbitraje de la Sección 14 del Acuerdo, (id.)

23. El 22 de octubre de 2007, entró en vigor el Manual de Empleados de CRL el cual aplica a todos sus empleados y a los Miembros de CRL. Dicho Manual no convierte a un Miembro en empleado. Por el contrario, el Manual claramente mantiene la diferencia entre la clasificación de “Miembro” y “empleado”. (Ap. TS., págs. 233-300.) El Manual tampoco establece las políticas reiacionadas a la compensación de los Miembros, ni el proceso de terminación de su relación con CRL, ni el método para resolver disputas entre los Miembros y CRL. Dichas políticas están contenidas en las Secciones 5,12 y 14 del Acuerdo, respectivamente. (Ap. TS., págs. 127-129 y 137-141.)

24. CRL tiene oficinas en y fuera de Puerto Rico. Además, la gran mayoría de sus clientes están ubicados fuera de Puerto Rico (principalmente en ios Estados Unidos), lo cual requiere que CRL y sus clientes mantengan comunicación constante como parte de sus operaciones mediante el uso del correo, internet, teléfono y otros medios de comunicación interestatal, incluyendo viajes hacia y fuera de Puerto Rico. (Ap. TS., págs. 81-170.)

25. A mediados del 2009, Jane fue electa al Consejo Directivo de CRL, el cual es el organismo rector de

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mayor jerarquía de CRL.

26. La compensación de Jane tuvo que ser reducida porque llevaba varios años que no estaba generando suficiente trabajo para ella y para ocupar a otros, lo que es una función vital de los miembros capitales. Como resultado de ello, el 24 de enero de 2012, Jane presentó una reclamación extrajudicial a los Miembros del Consejo Directo de CRL, según requerido por a Sección 14.02 del Acuerdo. En su reclamación extrajudicial, Jane alegó en síntesis que su compensación había sido reducida en violación al Acuerdo. En ninguna parte de su reclamación Jane mencionó que se hubiera violado el Manual. El único contrato escrito que Jane alegó fue violado es el Acuerdo. En lo pertinente, la recurrida específicamente alegó amparándose en el Acuerdo lo siguiente:

...[L]es solicito formalmente que reconsideren la decisión de [Fulano de Tal] y pauten, lo más rápido posible y antes de los próximos 15 días, una reunión del Consejo Directivo a tenor con la cláusula 14 y siguiente del “Operating Agreement”, de manera que yo como Miembro Capital presente mi posición y objeciones. Quiero dejar claro que el someterme al procedimiento de la cláusula 14 no debe entenderse como una renuncia de los derechos que me amparan bajo las leyes locales y federales.

Procedo a reseñar brevemente mis objeciones:

1. La reducción de mi salario y beneficios se hizo (sic) infringe el “Operating Agreement” y el acuerdo entre [Fulano de Tal] y yo, y está en contravención con el acuerdo particular establecido conmigo.

2. Evidentemente, el procedimiento seguido fue inadecuado y en violación al

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“Operating Agreement”, a las decisiones del Consejo Directivo aprobadas al 31 de mayo de 2011 y la decisión del 20 de diciembre de 2011.

….

16. Igualmente me sentí ofendida cuando [Sutano de Cual] en una reunión del Consejo dijo que ‘para sentarse en esa mesa hay que traer negocio’ y nadie le aclaró lo impropio de su comentario. ¿Es ese un requisito en el Operating Agreement? ....

(Ap. TS., págs. 162-166; énfasis nuestro.)

27. De conformidad con la Sección 14.03 del Acuerdo, el 20 de marzo de 2012 las partes se sometieron al proceso de mediación el cual culminó sin lograrse acuerdo alguno.

28. Ante el fracaso de la mediación, el 22 de marzo de 2012, CRL presentó ante la AAA una Demanda de Arbitraje contra Jane para darle curso a la cláusula de arbitraje de la Sección 14.04 del Acuerdo que requiere que toda disputa (“any Claim”) entre las partes independientemente de su naturaleza o de si surge o no bajo el Acuerdo sea resuelta mediante dicho método de resolución de disputas y de forma confidencial. (Ap. TS., págs. 302-303.)

VII. SEÑALAMIENTO DE ERROR

1. ERRÓ EL TA AL CONCLUIR QUE EL FAA NO APLICA. LAS OPERACIONES DE CRL Y SU RELACION CON JANE TIENEN UN NEXO SUFICIENTE CON EL COMERCIO INTERESTATAL Y JANE NO DISPUTÓ LA APLICACIÓN DE DICHA LEY.

2. ERRÓ EL TA AL CONCLUIR QUE EL TPI

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ERA EL FORO CON PODER DE DETERMINAR EL ALCANCE DE LA CLÁUSULA DE ARBITRAJE PACTADA. JANE Y LOS DEMÁS MIEMBROS CAPITALES DE CRL CONFIARON DICHO PODER AL FORO ARBITRAL AL ADOPTAR LAS REGLAS DE ABRITRAJE COMERCIAL DEL AAA.

3. ERRÓ EL TA AL RESPALDAR LA CONCLUSIÓN DEL TPI DE QUE LOS RECLAMOS DE JANE ESTÁN FUERA DEL ALCANCE DE LA CLÁUSULA DE ARBITRAJE. DICHA CLÁUSULA ES AMPLIA, CLARA Y ABARCA CUALQUIER RECLAMACIÓN ENTRE LAS PARTES.

4. ERRÓ EL TA AL CONCLUIR QUE LAS RECLAMACIONES DE JANE NO SON ARBITRABLES POR VERSAR SOBRE ALEGACIONES DE DISCRIMEN, REPRESALIAS Y DERECHOS CONSTITUCIONALES. EL FAA IMPIDE (“PREEMPTS”) QUE LOS ESTADOS CATEGORIZEN RECLAMACIONES PARA EXCLUIRLAS DEL ARBITRAJE.

VIII. DISCUSIÓN DEL PRIMER SEÑALAMIENTO DE ERROR

No es correcta la determinación del TA de que el FAA no aplica porque alegadamente la transacción envuelta en la controversia no forma parte del comercio interestatal. (Ap. TS., pág. 722). Lo importante para que el FAA aplique es que el Acuerdo tenga un nexo suficiente con el comercio interestatal, criterio que es sumamente laxo y que como veremos se satisface ampliamente en el presente caso. SCI v. Fulmer. 883 So.2d 621, 629 (Ala. 2003)(“[A] trial court evaluating a contract connected to some economic or commercial activity would rarely, if ever, refuse to compel

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arbitration on the ground that the transactions lacked ‘involvement’ in interstate commerce.”)(énfasis suplido).

Es norma establecida que el FAA es de aplicación a los contratos en el comercio interestatal. Véase § 2 del FAA.11 El significado de lo que es un “contrato en el comercio interestatal” fue establecido por el Tribunal Supremo de los Estados Unidos (“TSEU”) en Allied-Bruce Terminix Companies. Inc. v. Dobson. 513 U.S. 265 (1995) (“Allied-Bruce”) y Citizens Bank v. Alafabco. Inc. 539 U.S. 52 (2003) (“Citizens”). Veamos lo resuelto en esos casos.

En Allied-Bruce un residente de Alabama adquirió en la sucursal de Allied-Bruce Terminix Companies (“Allied-Bruce”) en ese Estado un Plan de Protección contra Termitas para su hogar (el “Plan”). El Plan contenía una cláusula de arbitraje. El cumplimiento de dicho Plan fue garantizado por Terminix International Company (“Terminix’’), quien era el dueño de la franquicia bajo la cual Allied-Bruce operaba en Alabama. La residencia en cuestión fue vendida a un tercero, a quien le fue transferido el referido Plan. Dado que en la residencia había un enjambre de termitas, el tercero-adquirente reclamó judicialmente contra el vendedor de la propiedad, Allied-Bruce y Terminix. En respuesta, Allied-Bruce y Terminix solicitaron al tribunal que hiciera valer la cláusula de arbitraje por virtud de la § 2 del FAA. Dicha solicitud fue denegada. Allied-Bruce y

11 La § 2 del FAA, en lo pertinente, dispone como sigue A written provision in ... a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract... shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable ....

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Terminix apelaron hasta el Tnbunal Supremo de Alabama y luego al TSEU.

El TSEU revocó al Tribunal Supremo de Alabama porque el Plan era un contrato en el comercio interestatal independientemente de que la transacción sólo se realizó en Alabama. Específicamente, el TSEU señaló que el término “involving commerce” de la § 2 del FAA es el equivalente funcional del término “affecting commerce”, lo cual demuestra la intención del Congreso al promulgar el FAA de ejercer al máximo su poder bajo la Cláusula de Comercio. Id. en la pág. 277.12 En vista de ello y de que el propósito básico del FAA es superar la renuencia de los tribunales de poner en vigor los acuerdos de arbitraje, el TSEU resolvió que el término “involving commerce” debe ser interpretado ampliamente. Id., en la pág. 275 (“a broad interpretation of this language is consistent with the Act’s basic purpose”). Además, el TSEU aclaró que el término “involving commerce” no requiere que las partes hayan contemplado conexión alguna con el comercio interestatal, sino sólo que la transacción, de hecho (“in fact”), envuelva comercio interestatal. Id., en la pág. 281 (“we accept the ‘commerce in fact’ interpretation, reading the Act’s language as insisting that the ‘transaction’ in fact ‘involv[e]’

12 El poder del Congreso bajo la Cláusula de Comercio de la Constitución de los Estados Unidos es tan amplio que en los pasados 75 años sólo dos casos del TSEU han resuelto que el Congreso excedió sus poderes bajo la referida Cláusula de Comercio. Véanse U.S. v. Lopez. 514 U.S. 549 (1995); US v. Morrison. 529 U.S. 598 (2000). Nótese que ninguno de los estatutos en controversia en dichos casos iba dirigido a regular transacciones puramente económicas, sino conducta criminal de naturaleza no económica.

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interstate commerce, even if the parties did not contemplate an interstate commerce connection “).

En apoyo de la conclusión de que el Plan era un contrato en el comercio interestatal el TSEU consideró la naturaleza multi-estatal de las compañías Terminix y Allied-Bruce y el que los materiales utilizados para cumplir con los términos del Plan provenían de otros Estados. Id. en la pág. 282.

Posteriormente, en Citizens el TSEU nuevamente tuvo que determinar si ciertos acuerdos entre dos entidades de un mismo Estado eran contratos en el comercio interestatal. Dicho Tribunal contestó la pregunta en la afirmativa al señalar que las transacciones (i.e., restructuración de deuda) tenían nexo suficiente con el comercio interestatal.

Citizens envolvía una institución prestataria de Alabama de nombre The Citizens Bank (“Citizens”) y la compañía de construcción Alafabco, Inc., localizada en ese mismo Estado. Las referidas partes otorgaron varios acuerdos para restructurar la deuda de Alafabco con Citizens, los cuales contenían una cláusula que requería arbitrar las disputas qué surgieran entre ellos. Posteriormente, Alafabco instó demanda judicial contra Citizens por incumplimiento de contrato y otras causas de acción. En consecuencia, Citizens solicitó una orden para compeler el arbitraje. La solicitud fue concedida por el tribunal/ pero el Tribunal Supremo de Alabama la revocó. El TSEU a su vez revocó y ai así hacerlo expresó lo siguiente:

Because the statute provides for ‘the enforcement of arbitration agreements within the full reach of the Commerce Clause’,... it is perfectly clear that the FAA encompasses a wider

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range of transactions than those actually ‘in commerce’-that is, ‘within the flow of interstate commerce....

The Supreme Court of Alabama was therefore misguided in its search for evidence that a ‘portion of the restructured debt was actually attributable to interstate transactions’ or that the loans ‘originated out-of-state’ or that ‘the restructured debt was inseparable from any out-of- state projects.’ ... Such evidence might be required in the FAA were restricted to transactions actually ‘in commerce,’... but,... that is not the limit of the FAA reach.

Nor is application of the FAA defeated because the individual debt-restructuring transactions, taken alone, did not have a ‘substantial effect on interstate commerce.’ ... Congress’ Commerce Clause power ‘may be exercised in individual cases without showing any specific effect upon interstate commerce’ if in the aggregate the economic activity in question would represent ‘a general practice ... subject to federal control.’... Only that general practice need bear on interstate commerce in a substantial way.

Id. en las págs. 56-57 (citas omitidas, énfasis en negritas y subrayado suplido).

Así las cosas, el TSEU concluyó que los acuerdos en cuestión, a pesar de haber sido suscritos en Alabama por residentes de ese Estado, eran contratos en el comercio interestatal, como mínimo, por las siguientes tres razones; (a) Alafabco realizaba negocios en Carolina del Norte, Tennessee y Alabama; (b) los acuerdos de restructuración de deuda habían sido garantizados con los activos de

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Alafabco, incluyendo su inventario de bienes ensamblados con material proveniente fuera de Alabama, y; (c) el impacto en el comercio interestatal que representa la práctica general de la transacción económica en cuestión satisface el significado de “involving commerce” bajo la § 2 del FAA. Sobre este particular, el TSEU expresó lo siguiente;

No elaborate explanation is needed to make evident the broad impact of commercial lending on the national economy or Congress’ power to regulate that activity pursuant to the Commerce Clause.

Id. en la pág. 58 (énfasis en negritas y subrayado nuestro).

A base de lo anterior, podemos colegir que para determinar si cierto acuerdo constituye un contrato en el comercio interestatal hay que evaluar si la transacción afecta el comercio interestatal (“affects interestate commerce”) o si la actividad económica en cuestión representa una práctica general sujeta a control federal bajo la Cláusula de Comercio.

En cuanto a lo que constituyen para efectos del FAA prácticas sujetas a control federal bajo la Cláusula de Comercio se ha expresado lo siguiente: “‘No commercial enterprise of any kind which conducts its activities across state lines has been held to be wholly beyond the regulatory power of Congress under the Commerce Clause.’” BWI Comp, v. Beck, 910 S.W.2d 620, 623 (Tex. App. 1995)(citas omitidas).13 Sobre este particular, resultan 13 Véase además, Sewer v. Paragon Homes, Inc.,351 F.Supp. 596, 599 (D.V.I. 1972)(“Of more general importance, however, is the fact that Congress has the authority to regulate all transactions within the territories.”)

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ilustradoras las expresiones del mismo Tribunal Supremo de Alabama en su posterior aplicación de los casos Allied-Bruce y Citizens:

As the decisions of the [US] Supreme Court have made clear, there are few, if any economic or commercial transactions that are beyond the reach of Congress’s commerce power. Furthermore, virtually every kind of industry, small or large, is currently regulated by some sort of federal state enacted pursuant to Congress’s commerce power. See, e.g., 29, U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938); 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-78 (Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970); 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (Family Medical Leave Act of 2000); 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended).

SCI v. Fulmer, 883 So.2d 621, 628 (Ala. 2003)(énfasis suplido). Más adelante, el Tribunal añade lo siguiente:

The transaction underlying the contract between Fulmer and SCI-Alabama (for the sale of goods and services), is unquestionably economic in nature, and the nationwide aggregate effect of such a transaction on interstate commerce easily brings the practice of contracting to provide funeral services and associated goods within the reach of Congress through the FAA. ... This is true even though the effect of this particular transaction (Fulmer’s contract with SCI-Alabama) on interstate commerce may be considered trivial. See Wickward, 317 U.S. [111, 127-28 (1942)].14

14 En Wickard v, Filbum, 317 U.S. 111 (1942), el Tribunal Supremo de Estados Unidos expresó lo siguiente en cuanto a prácticas locales que podrían parecer triviales:

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Id, en la pág. 629-30 (énfasis suplido).

A la luz del marco legal anteriormente discutido, veamos porqué el Acuerdo es un contrato en el comercio interestatal bajo la § 2 del FAA.

El Acuerdo es un contrato en el comercio interestatal, pues, entre otras razones, el mismo gobierna la relación entre los miembros capitales de CRL, incluyendo la relación con Jane, y las operaciones de la firma en Puerto Rico y en su sucursal ubicada en Washington, D.C. Véase, SCI v. Fulmer, 883 So.2d 621, 629 (Ala. 2003)(“[i]t would be difficult indeed to give an example of an economic or commercial activity that one could ... declare beyond the reach of Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause, and, by extension, under the FAA.”)(énfasis suplido).15 Además, la

But even if appellee's activity be local and though it may not be regarded as commerce, it may still, whatever its nature, be reached by Congress if it exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce and this irrespective of whether such effect is what might at some earlier time have been defined as ‘direct' or ‘indirect.

Id. en la pág. 125. Más adelante Wickard añade io siguiente: That appellee's own contribution to the demand for wheat may be trivial by itself is not enough to remove him from the scope of federal regulation where, as here, his contribution, taken together with that of many others similarly situated, is far from trivial.

Id. en las págs. 127-28.

15 Véase además, Thomas H. Oehmke, Commercial Arbitration § 3:6 (2011 )(“A contract needs only the slightest nexus to interstate commerce to apply the FAA.''); 21 Willinston on Contracts § 57: (4th ed. 2011)(‘Consistent with the broad approach to interpreting the term 'involving commerce’ in the [FAA], it has been said that a contract containing an arbitration provision need only be related to commerce

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gran mayoría de los clientes de CRL están ubicados fuera de Puerto Rico (principalmente en los Estados Unidos), lo cual requiere que CRL y sus clientes mantengan comunicación constantemente como parte de sus operaciones mediante el uso del correo, Internet, teléfono y otros medios de comunicación interestatal, incluyendo viajes hacia y fuera de Puerto Rico. Igualmente, resulta significativa la naturaleza económica del Acuerdo y que los siguientes estatutos federales, entre otros, aplican a la relación de CRL con aquellos que son propiamente considerados empleados: 1) Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§651-78; 2) Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601- 2654; 3) Family Medical Leave Act of 2000, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17; 4) Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964; y 5) Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34. Además, y según señalamos previamente, Jane no disputó la aplicación del FAA a la cláusula de arbitraje del Acuerdo y, por ende, ésta renunció cualquier argumento al contrarío. Véase Caquas Satellite Corp. v. Echostar Satellite LLC. _ F.Supp.2d, 2011 WL 5517037, n. 2 (D. P.R.)(“Plaintiffs [,the party opposing arbitration,] ... do not make any arguments about whether or not the agreement involves interstate commerce and therefore waive this argument’’).

De lo anterior surge, que el FAA es de aplicación al Acuerdo dado su carácter económico y nexo con el comercio interestatal. Los hechos anteriormente relatados, evidencian que el Acuerdo afecta el

to fall within the coverage of the Act")(énfasis suplido); Bowen v. Security Pest Control. Inc., 879 So.2d 1139,1142 (Ala. 2003)(resuelve que la transacción envolvía el comercio interestatal, en parte, porque una de las partes en la transacción realizaba negocios en dos Estados).

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comercio interestatal (“affects interestate commerce”) y que la actividad económica en cuestión representa una práctica general que afecta el comercio interestatal substancialmente y que está sujeta a control federal bajo el poder amplio que le provee al Congreso la Cláusula de Comercio. En consecuencia, erró el TA al resolver que no aplica el FAA.

IX. DISCUSIÓN DEL SEGUNDO SEÑALAMIENTO PE ERROR

El TA erró manifiestamente al no expedir el auto solicitado y revocar la Resolución del TPI, pues dicho foro no tenía jurisdicción para decidir si Jane tiene que arbitrar sus supuestos reclamos contra los demandados-peticionarios.

Las controversias sobre arbitrabilidad comportan tres (3) modalidades: (i) si existe un convenio de arbitraje; (ii) el alcance de un convenio de arbitraje (“si tal convenio alcanza determinada controversia”); (iii) y si tal convenio alcanza una disputa sobre la duración o expiración del contrato. Véase Méndez Acevedo v. Nieves Rivera, 179 D.P.R. 359,367-68 (2010): Municipio de Mayagüez v. Lebrón, 167 D.P.R. 713, 720-21 (2006); World Films. Inc. v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 125 D.P.R. 352 (1990).

Como regla general, la determinación de si un acuerdo crea el deber de las partes de arbitrar determinada controversia es tarea judicial. Méndez Acevedo, supra; World Films. Inc. supra, en la pág. 361. No obstante lo anterior, el asunto de la arbitrabilidad no será de competencia judicial si las partes pactaron en el convenio de arbitraje que tal facultad se delega al árbitro. Es decir, convenido en un acuerdo de arbitraje que es el árbitro quien resolverá las cuestiones de arbitrabilidad, procede que sea éste y no el tribunal el

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que determine si existe la obligación de arbitrar determinada controversia. U.G.T. v. Corp. Difusión Pub., 168 D.P.R. 674, 684 (2006) (“De ordinario y salvo que el convenio colectivo disponga otra cosa, los asuntos de arbitrabilidad sustantiva deben ser resueltos por los tribunales..,”) (énfasis nuestro).

Consistente con lo anterior, es un principio bien sentado en el ámbito federal y bajo el FAA que cualquier impugnación a la validez de un acuerdo de arbitraje, incluyendo cualquier controversia sobre arbitrabilidad (si determinada controversia es arbitrable o no), debe ser referida al árbitro si hay evidencia clara e inequívoca (“clear and unmistakable evidence”) de que las partes asi lo pactaron-de que esa fue su intención. First Options of Chicago, inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 945 (1995). La anterior es precisamente la situación que presenta el caso de autos. El FAA aplica al Acuerdo entre Jane y CRL y las partes delegaron al foro arbitral la determinación de arbitrabilidad por lo que el TPI erró al asumir jurisdicción.

Dado el lenguaje claro de la Sección 14 del Acuerdo, el TPI erró manifiestamente al asumir jurisdicción sobre la controversia de si los reclamos de Jane Doe son arbitrables o no. En la cláusula de arbitraje contenida en el Acuerdo, Jane se comprometió a que el arbitraje se condujera bajo las Reglas de Arbitraje Comercial de la AAA.16 La Sección 14.04 del Acuerdo dispone en lo pertinente “[i]f mediation fails, the Claim shall be settled by arbitration under its Commercial Arbitration Rules...”. A su vez, la Regla 7(a) de dicho cuerpo de

16 Las Reglas de Arbitraje Comercial de la AAA gozan de la misma generalidad que las Regias de Procedimiento Civil de Puerto Rico.

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Reglas dispone: “[t]he arbitrator shall have the power to rule on his or her own jurisdiction, including any objections with respect to the existence, scope or validity of the arbitration agreement” (Commercial Arbitration Rules de la AAA, Regla 7(a), Ap. TS., págs. 116-118.) (énfasis nuestro). Ante la incorporación en la cláusula de arbitraje entre Jane y CRL de un cuerpo de reglas de arbitraje que delega al árbitro la facultad de determinar, era claro que no le competía al TPI determinar si los reclamos de Jane eran arbitrables.

Los tribunales federales han resuelto consistentemente que cuando las partes incorporan a sus acuerdos o cláusulas de arbitraje regias institucionales de entidades como la AAA en las que se delega al árbitro la facultad de decidir sobre su propia jurisdicción - decidir arbitrabilidad - ello constituye evidencia suficiente en Derecho (clara e inequívoca) de que esa era la intención de las partes. Véase Contec Corp. v. Remote Solution Co., 398 F.3d 205, 208 (2nd Cir. 2005) (“When...parties explicitly incorporate rules that empower an arbitrator to decide issues of arbitrability, the incorporation serves as clear and unmistakable evidence of the parties’ intent to delegate such issues to an arbitrator”)] Sleeper Farms v. Agway, Inc., 211 F. Supp. 2d 197 (D. Me. 2002) (“[Since the AAA rules constitute] a clear and unmistakable delegation of scope-determining authority to an arbitrator, [the court] refers this dispute [to the arbitrator] to determine [...] what issues [...] are covered by the arbitration clause.”)17

17 Véase, además; Terminix Int'l. Co. v. Palmer Ranch Ltd, 432 F.3d 1327, 29, 33-34(11th Cir. 2005) (Resolviendo que toda vez que las Reglas de Arbitraje de la AAA delegan al árbitro la determinación de arbitrabilidad, la reclamación del demandante

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De hecho, aun cuando las partes no han acordado el someter las controversias de arbitrabilidad sustantivas al foro arbitral, los tribunales tienden a dejar la controversia para que sea resuelta inicialmente por el árbitro cuando la arbitrabilidad no puede ser determinada sin entrar en los méritos de la controversia. Elkouri & Elkouri. How Arbitrations Works, (BNA Books. 6ta Edición 2003) en la pág. 281. (“However, even though the agreement does not expressly leave the determination of arbitrability to the arbitrator, and in spite of the fact that the parties have first gone to court, courts have left the initial determination to the arbitrator. This was the result, for instance, where arbitrability could not be determined without delving into the merits...”)

Así, en Camden Indus. Co. v. Carpenters Local 1688. 353 F.3d 178,180 (1st Cir. 1969) el Primer Circuito de Apelaciones resolvió:

In these circumstances we believe the matter should proceed to arbitration, where the arbitrator may determine the subsidiary facts upon which depend both the merits of the controversy and his jurisdiction to decide it. A finding of jurisdiction, unlike a finding on the merits when jurisdiction is not in question... will not be insulated from

de que el acuerdo de arbitraje lo despojaba ilegalmente de varios remedios estatutarios, era materia a ser adjudicada por el árbitro, no por el tribunal); Qualcomm Inc. v. Nokia Corp., 466 F.3d 1366, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Apollo Computer. Inc. v. Berq. 886 F. 2d 469, 473 (1s1 Cir. 1989)(“Ordinarily, [Plaintiff] would be entitled to have these issues resolved by a court. [...] By contracting to have all disputes resolved according to the Rules of the ICC, however, [Plaintiff] agreed to be bound by Articles 8.3 and 8.4. These provisions clearly and unmistakably allow the arbitrator to determine her own jurisdiction when, as here, there exists a prima facie agreement to arbitrate whose continued existence and validity is being questioned.”).

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subsequent judicial review... We believe full recognition of the role of labor arbitration requires court intervention in a case such as this only when it has become absolutely necessary, viz., on a petition to vacate or enforce the award.

La casuística federal citada es consistente con nuestro ordenamiento local en materia de contratos. A fin de cuentas, “el arbitraje es una figura jurídica inherentemente contractual.” Méndez Acevedo, supra, en la pág, 367; Municipio de Mayaqüez. Supra; U.C.P.R. v. Triangle Engineering Corp., 136 D.P.R. 133. 144 (1994).

Por lo tanto, en materia de arbitraje puede exigirse el cumplimiento de aquello que se haya pactado por escrito. Véase Crufon Const, v. Aut. Edif. Púbs., 156 D.P.R. 197.204 (2002); Municipio de Ponce v. Gobernador, 136 D.P.R. 776, 783 (1994). A su vez, cuando los términos de un contrato son claros y no presentan ambigüedad, sus disposiciones se aplicarán según el sentido literal que le dieron las partes. Art, 1233 del Código Civil, supra, § 3471. Una vez se determina qué fue lo que las partes acordaron, el juzgador debe resolver las controversias entre las partes de conformidad con lo estipulado. Véase C.F.S.E. v. Unión de Médicos, 170 D.P.R. 443 (2007).

En resumen, en el presente caso, la cláusula de arbitraje incorpora por referencia expresamente las Reglas de Arbitraje Comercial de la AAA, las cuales a su vez delegan en el árbitro -de forma clara e inequívoca- la autoridad para determinar su propia jurisdicción. Por tanto, conforme a las autoridades aquí citadas, procede que este Honorable Tribunal revoque la Resoluciones del TA y TPI y ordene a Jane continuar con el procedimiento de arbitraje que pactó, de suerte

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que sea el árbitro el que resuelva si tiene autoridad para entender en los méritos las reclamaciones de ésta. Así lo pactaron las partes, sin ambigüedad alguna, y ello constituye la ley entre las partes. Véase HIETEL v. PRTC, 2011 T.S.P.R. 100. En la alternativa, de este Honorable Tribunal entender que el TA no cometió el segundo error señalado, debe pasar considerar los próximos dos (2) señalamientos de error.

X. DISCUSIÓN DEL TERCER SEÑALAMIENTO DE ERROR

El TA también erró manifiestamente al resolver que las reclamaciones presentadas por Jane no están cobijadas por la cláusula de arbitraje del Acuerdo porque éstas son supuestamente de naturaleza “de empleo” o “laboral” y “constitucional”. (Ap. TS., págs. 723-724.) Esencialmente, el TA fundamentó su decisión en la conclusión errada de que el Acuerdo no rige la relación entre CRL y Jane para fines de la presente acción judicial. (Ap. TS., pág. 722.) Para llegar a este resultado, el TA tuvo que imponer por fíat una limitación insostenible al alcance de la cláusula de arbitraje del Acuerdo, la cual según su texto literal es claramente amplia y cubre toda reclamación (“any Claim”) entre las partes -incluyendo aquellas que no surgen del Acuerdo. Al así hacerlo, el TPI no tan sólo erró, sino que hizo manifiesta una marcada hostilidad al foro arbitral, violando así los postulados del FAA y su jurisprudencia interpretativa.

De la faz de la Resolución surge que el TA hizo caso omiso al lenguaje amplio de la cláusula de arbitraje compulsorio contenida en el Acuerdo. Muestra de ello, es el hecho de que ni siquiera el texto íntegro de la cláusula fue citado en el

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cuerpo de la Resolución como parte del análisis del TA. Para facilitar la labor de este Tribunal, reproducimos la sección relevante del Acuerdo, que evidencia sin lugar a dudas que el TA debió haber competido a Jane a arbitrar sus reclamos:

Intent and Purpose -It is the intent and purpose of the Firm and any Claimant to resolve any Claim by mediation or arbitration. The Claimant expressly agrees that the Claim shall be settled or resolved through the procedures set forth herein, and shall not in any way circumvent or otherwise challenge in any way these proceedings relative to mediaiion and arbitration.

Véase Sección 14.01 del Acuerdo (énfasis suplido). (Ap. TS., páq. 140;)

La Sección 14.01 del Acuerdo antes transcrita demuestra que era la intención y el propósito de las partes, incluyendo Jane y los comparecientes, el resolver cualquier reclamación (“any Claim”) mediante mediación y arbitraje. Más revelador aún es el hecho de que en el Acuerdo se define “Claim” como “... any action, suit, complaint or demand of whatever nature and for whatever relief or remedy against the Firm or any of its Members or employees” (Sección 1.06 del Acuerdo’, énfasis suplido.) (Ap. TS., pág. 109.) En otras palabras, el término “any Cliaim” significa literalmente cualquier reclamación, queja, demanda o pleito de cualquier naturaleza y solicitando cualquier remedio.

Dado el texto de la Sección 14.01 y la definición de “Claim” del propio Acuerdo, “any Claim” no puede significar otra cosa que no sea “cualquier reclamación”, y ello abarca todo tipo de reclamo y solicitud de remedio presentado por Jane. O sea,

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según los antedichos términos (y sin necesidad de interpretación alguna), cualquier tipo de acción, caso, demanda o reclamación de cualquier naturaleza y sobre cualquier tipo de remedio o auxilio en contra de CRL o cualquiera de sus Miembros o empleados está cubierta por la cláusula de arbitraje. Según señalamos anteriormente, bajo el derecho puertorriqueño cuando los términos de un contrato son claros y no presentan ambigüedad, sus disposiciones se aplicarán según el sentido literal que le dieron las partes. Art. 1233 del Código Civil, supra, § 3471. Sobre este particular, en Marcial v. Tome, 144 D.P.R. 522 (1997), este Tribunal Supremo reconoció que se debe seguir la letra clara del contrato, cuando la misma refleja inequívocamente la voluntad de las partes.

Aún si hubiera alguna duda sobre el alcance de la cláusula de arbitraje y el significado de “any Claim”, lo cual se niega, el FAA requiere que la duda sea resuelta a favor del arbitraje. Véase Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Const. Corp., 460 U.S. 1,24-25 {1983)(“The [FAA] establishes that, as a matter of federal law, any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration, whether the problem at hand is the construction of the contract language itself or an allegation of waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability.”); Granite Rock Co. v. Int’l Broth, of Teamsters, 130 S. Ct. 2847, 2857 (2010) (igual); Painewebber incorporated of Puerto Rico v. Service Concepts. Inc., 151 D.P.R. 307, 311-12 (2000)(“Una vez acordado el arbitraje, los tribunales carecen de discreción en cuanto a su eficacia y tienen que dar cumplimiento al arbitraje acordado. [Además], cualquier duda sobre el alcance de las controversias que pueden ser llevadas a

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arbitraje debe resolverse en favor del arbitraje. “)

Por consiguiente, no importa para la determinación de arbitrabilidad si el reclamo es de naturaleza laboral o administrativo, contractual, extracontractual, estatutario o constitucional. Tampoco importa si los Miembros Capitales de CRL pueden clasificarse como dueño o empleados o ambos. Se trata de una cláusula de arbitraje amplísima que el TA debió avalar conforme a sus términos bajo el FAA. Estos principios fueron crasamente ignorados por el TA al emitir la Resolución de la cual se recurre. No debemos olvidar que el FAA fue promulgado como respuesta a la hostilidad que tradicionalmente los Tribunales han mostrado hacia los acuerdos de arbitraje. Véase Circuit City Stores v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105,111 (2001 ) (resolviendo que los contratos de empleo en el comercio interestatal están cubiertos por el FAA salvo aquellos de ciertos empleados de transportación).

La conclusión de que Jane tiene que arbitrar sus reclamos se impone aún si este Tribunal estuviese inclinado a ir más allá del texto de la Sección 14 y las definiciones del Acuerdo para determinar el alcance de la obligación de arbitrar de los Miembros Capitales (presentes y antiguos) de CRL. Ello es así, toda vez que lo que Jane cuestiona e impugna fundamentalmente es su compensación como Miembro Capital de CRL (por alegado discrimen), y su expulsión del ente directivo de CRL y como Miembro Capital de CRL (por alegadas represalias). Véase las distintas alegaciones que Jane ha presentado como parte de este caso, desde su reclamación interna, hasta la Tercera Demanda Enmendada y Jurada. (Ap. TS., págs. 162-166; 44-64; 322-348; 499-524; 548-571.)

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Todos estos son aspectos de la relación de Jane con CRL que están regidos expresamente por el Acuerdo. De hecho, así surge de las propias determinaciones de hecho del TPI. Véase Determinación de Hecho Número 7, Resolución. (Ap. TS., pág. 535.) Ello se traduce en que para poder adjudicar los reclamos de Jane de alegado discrimen o de represalia, el foro correspondiente -el arbitral-tendrá que necesariamente referirse al Acuerdo.

Según surge fehacientemente del récord, la compensación de los Miembros Capitales de CRL se rige por las secciones 5.01-5.06 del Acuerdo. (Ap. TS., págs. 127-129.) Basta una lectura de dichas secciones para constatarlo. Tan es así, que la propia Jane admitió ante el TPI que “el mecanismo mediante el cual se determina la compensación lo rige el [Acuerdo]”. (Véase Oposición, en la pág. 9, nota al pie 12., Ap. TS., pág. 187.)

Como cuestión de realidad, el TA omitió considerar el hecho que desde la reclamación interna que Jane Doe presentó ante el ente directivo de CRL, ésta alegó fundamentalmente unas supuestas violaciones al Acuerdo. (Ap. TS., págs. 162-166.) (Véase Sección VI(B), párrafo 11, supra).

Conforme a lo anterior, el TA y TPI erraron al no referir a arbitraje los reclamos de Jane. Ésta no puede escapar la realidad de que sus reclamos se originan de alegadas violaciones al Acuerdo, sea por razones discriminatorias o no. Precisamente, ello es lo que le compete al Árbitro dirimir.

De igual forma sucede con la alegada expulsión en represalias de Jane como Miembro del ente directivo de CRL y Miembro Capital de CRL. La expulsión de un Miembro del ente directivo de CRL está regida por la sección 4.15 del Acuerdo; mientras que la expulsión

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de un Miembro Capital de CRL está regida por la Sección 12.02 del Acuerdo. (Ap. TS., págs. 126 y 137-138.) Por tanto, cualquier reclamación o impugnación de dichos procedimientos debe atenderse mediante el proceso de resolución de disputas de la sección 14 del Acuerdo, el cual incluye el arbitraje compulsorio que las partes pactaron. Ese fue el compromiso suscrito por Jane y erraron ios foros inferiores al permitir que Jane no cumpliera con lo pactado.

Para concluir, ni del lenguaje claro y amplio de la cláusula de arbitraje, ni del contexto provisto por las materias gobernadas por el Acuerdo y los reclamos de Jane, se puede interpretar como que la obligación de arbitrar se limita a reclamaciones sobre asuntos operativos o administrativos de CRL. El TPI no sólo asumió jurisdicción erróneamente sobre la controversia de arbitrafailidad sino que la resolvió de forma completamente contraria a derecho.

XI. DISCUSIÓN DEL CUARTO SEÑALAMIENTO DE ERROR

Además de hacer caso omiso de la letra clara de la cláusula de arbitraje pactada en la Sección 14 del Acuerdo, el TA amparó su determinación en la alegada naturaleza “de empleo” o “laboral” y “constitucional” de los reclamos de Jane para eximirla de tener que arbitrarlos. De acuerdo al TA:

..la reclamación que Jane Doe interesa que el foro Judicial adjudique es una que imputa a la CRL el haberla separado de manera discriminatoria y por represalias. Además, dicha controversia trata de una conducta imputada a la CRL en violación de sus derechos constitucionales fundamentales, por lo que nuestro estado de derecho le reconoce a la recurrida vindicar tales derechos mediante una acción de injunction. (Ap. TS., págs. 723-724.)

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Esta determinación del TA evidencia la hostilidad al arbitraje que el FAA vino a erradicar y demuestra que dicho foro se amparó en la naturaleza de los alegados reclamos de Jane así como en supuestas políticas estatales para rehusarse a compeler el arbitraje. Al así proceder, el TA actuó en abierta contradicción al FAA y a la Cláusula de Supremacía de la Constitución de los Estados Unidos. Nuevamente, el TA erró manifiestamente.

Como se desprende de su § 2, de la cual transcribimos su texto pertinente en la nota al calce 11, el FAA no establece distinción alguna entre la arbitrabilidad de derechos estatutarios o derechos constitucionales.18 Todo lo que el FAA requiere es que los pactos de arbitraje se pongan en vigor conforme a sus propios términos. Véase AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion. 131 S. Ct. 1745 (“courts must place arbitration agreements on an equal footing with other contracts, [...] and enforce them according to their terms”)(citas omitidas). Es decir, lo importante no es la naturaleza del reclamo en cuestión, sino si las partes acordaron arbitrar dicho reclamo.19 Como el FAA no distingue entre la

18 En cuanto a jurisprudencia del TSEU indicativa de que no se deben incluir requisitos para arbitrar controversias que no surjan del texto de la §2 del FAA, véase Rent-A-Center v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772, 2778, n. 1 (“[§ 2] grounds do not include ... any requirement that its lack of unconscionability must be 'clear and unmistakable.) Marmet v Brown, 132 S. Ct. 1201, 1203 (2012)(The FAA’s] text includes no exception for personal-injury or wrongful-death claims. It requires courts to enforce the bargain of the parties to arbitrate.”)(cita omitida). 19 Como hemos discutido anteriormente, el alegado reclamo constitucional de Jane está cobijado dentro de la cláusula de arbitraje del Acuerdo que requiere que Jane Doe presente en arbitraje todos sus reclamos contra los demandados (“any Claim").

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arbitrabilidad de derechos estatutarios o derechos constitucionales los foros inferiores no podían crear dicha distinción por fiat judicial al amparo de su interpretación del derecho puertorriqueño.

Es un principio elemental de derecho que cuando una norma federal está en conflicto con una norma estatal, incluso de rango constitucional, la norma estatal queda desplazada por la federal por virtud de la Cláusula de Supremacía de la Constitución de los Estados Unidos. La Cláusula de Supremacía dispone que:

This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States ..., shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.

Const. E.U.A., Art. VI, cl. 2 (énfasis nuestro). Sobre este particular el Profesor Gorrín Peralta expresa lo siguiente:

[U]na ley federal prevalece sobre lo dispuesto en la Constitución del [ELA] de Puerto Rico. ... En cualquier situación en que conflija una norma jurídica puertorriqueña con la Ley Suprema,’ es decir con la Constitución de [EU], [o] con una ley... federal aplicable en Puerto Rico,... siempre debe prevalecer el Derecho federal sobre el puertorriqueño.

Carlos I. Gorrín Peralta, Fuentes y proceso de investigación jurídica 43 (1991) (énfasis suplido). Véase además, U.S. v. Georgia Public Service Comm., 371 U.S. 285, 293 (1983)(“a State is without power by reason of the Supremacy Clause to provide the conditions on which the Federal Government will effectuate its policies.”); U.S. v. Pérez, 465 F.Supp.

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1284, 1286 (D.P.R. 1979) (“[The Constitution of Puerto Rico] cannot provide conditions on which Congress will effectuate its policies as to matters well within its province’).20

Como consecuencia de estos principios, es norma establecida y consistentemente reiterada que cuando un Estado requiere que cierto tipo de reclamo se dilucide exclusivamente en los tribunales, a pesar de que las partes acordaron arbitrar sus disputas, dicha norma estatal queda desplazada por el FAA. Ello fue resuelto específicamente por el TSEU en Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984), al indicar lo siguiente:

In enacting § 2 of the [FAA], Congress declared a national policy favoring arbitration and withdrew the power of the states to require a judicial forum for the resolution of claims which the contracting parties agreed to resolve by arbitration.

Id. en la pág. 10 (énfasis nuestro). 21

20 Véase además Dowling v. Davis, 840 F.Supp. 731,734(E.D. Cal.)(“The Supremacy Clause does not permit federal law to be superseded by state law, including state constitutional provisions.”); U.S. v. Spencer, 160 F. 3d 413, 414 (7th Cir. 1998)(igual); Keaveney v. Town of Brookline, 937 F.Supp. 975, 982 (D. Mass. 1996)(igual). El Prof. Gorrín Peralta también expresa sobre este particular lo siguiente: "Las fuentes legales en Puerto Rico son, pues: (1) la Constitución de EE.UU.; (2) las leyes federales...;... (5) la Constitución del [ELA] de Puerto Rico; (6) las leyes ordinarias aprobadas por la Asamblea Legislativa [de Puerto Ricol:Gorrín Peralta, supra, en la pág. 43. 21 Véase Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 491 (“This clear federal policy places ss 2 of the Act in unmistakable conflict with California ss 229 requirement that litigants be provided a judicial forum for resolving wage disputes.)”

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Recientemente, el TSEU reafirmó esta norma en Marmet Health Care Center, Inc. v. Brown, 132 S.Ct. 1201 (Op. del 21 de febrero 2012). En Marmet, el TSEU. citando a Concepción, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1747 (2011), resolvió lo siguiente:

[W]hen state law prohibits outright the arbitration of a particular type of claim, the analysis is straightforward: The conflicting rule is displaced by the FAA. ... West Virginia’s prohibition against predispute agreements to arbitrate personal-injury or wrongfut-death claims against nursing home is a categorical rule prohibiting arbitration of a particular type of claim, and that rule is contrary to the terms and coverage of the FAA.

Id. en las págs. 1203-04 (citas y comillas internas omitidas). En ese caso se resolvió que el Tribunal Supremo de West Virginia había errado al aplicar la política pública de ese Estado, la cual prohíbe dar validez a una cláusula de arbitraje contenida en un acuerdo de admisión a un asilo de ancianos suscrita previo a la ocurrencia de un evento de negligencia que resulte en muerte o daños corporales. De manera que, si el FAA desplaza cualquier legislación estatal que conflija con sus disposiciones, es aún más claro que cualquier determinación de un tribunal (como la Resolución recurrida) que atente contra el FAA también se tiene que dejar sin efecto.

Este Honorable Tribunal Supremo es plenamente consciente de estos principios. En World Films. Inc. v. Paramount Pict. Corp., supra, reconoció que las leyes estatales que limitan las claúsuia de arbitraje quedan desplazadas (“preempted’) por el FAA. La controversia en World Films giraba en torno asi la aplicación del Artículo 3-B de la Ley 75,10 L.P.R.A. 278b-2, que establecía la nulidad de cualquier

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estipulación en un contrato de distribución que obligue a un distribuidor a arbitrar fuera de Puerto Rico cualquier controversia que surja de dicho contrato, había de prevalecer por encima del FAA. Este Tribunal Supremo determinó que en la medida que el Artículo 3-B de la Ley 75 conflija en su aplicación con la FAA, prevalecerá esta última. Id., pág. 364. En efecto, este Tribunal determinó que ante el FAA, el Artículo 3-B era inoficioso y contrario a derecho. Al resolver de esta manera, se revocó de manera expresa los pronunciamientos de Walborg Corp. v. Tribunal Superior, 104 D.P.R. 184 (1975), en el cual se había determinado que los tribunales estatales no venían obligados a aplicar el FAA. En Walborq, el Tribunal había resuelto que no podía concedérsele a una cláusula de arbitraje mayor fuerza que la política establecida en la Ley 75, y que los tribunales estatales no estaban obligados a aplicar el FAA. Dicha doctrina quedó revocada por World Films.

Conforme lo anterior, no hay duda de que los tribunales inferiores erraron al denegar el arbitraje basado en la supuesta naturaleza “constitucional” y “laboral” de los reclamos de Jane Doe. El FAA desplaza cualquier disposición legal estatutaria o bajo la Constitución de Puerto Rico que no haga valer y reconozca el compromiso asumido por Jane Doe y CRL de resolver toda reclamación (“any Claim”) mediante el procedimiento de arbitraje pactado en la Sección 14 del Acuerdo.

XII. CONCLUSIÓN Y SÚPLICA

EN MÉRITO DE LO ANTERIORMENTE EXPUESTO, muy respetuosamente solicitamos de este Honorable Tribuna que expida el auto de certiorari solicitado y revoque la Resolución del TA a

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los fines de ordenar a Jane a que presente mediante el arbitraje confidencial iniciado ante el AAA todos sus reclamos contra los demandados.

Respetuosamente sometido.

En San Juan, Puerto Rico, hoy 19 de junio de 2012.

CERTIFICO que he notificado copia fiel y exacta del presente escrito, simultáneamente con su presentación, por correo electrónico y mensajero a los abogados de la parte demandante-recurrida, el Ledo. Juan R. González Muñoz, González Muñoz Law Office, 261 Tetuán, San Juan, Puerto Rico 00901- 1916; jrgmlaw@gmail.com; y el Ledo. Manuel Porro Vizcarra, Manuel Porro Vizcarra Law Offices, 382 Ave. Escorial, Urb. Caparra Heights, San Juan, PR 00920; mpv@mpvlawpr.com.

MENDOZA LAW OFFICES Abogado de los demandados-peticionarios PO Box 9282 San Juan, Puerto Rico 00908-0282 Tel. (787) 722-5522; 5530; 5540 Fax (787) 723-7057 Correo electrónico: mendozalo@vahoo.com

/s/ Enrique J. Mendoza Mendez TSPR-8304

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APPENDIX H

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PUERTO RICO JANE DOE

Plaintiff –

Respondent v.

LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY (LLC); JOHN DOE, in his personal capacity and as employer of JANE DOE and as co-administrator of the Conjugal Partnership (“CP”) constituted with JEAN DOE, who is sued as co-administrator of the CP constituted with John Doe; “CP John and Jean Doe”; JACK JOE in his personal capacity and as employer of Jane Doe and

CERTIORARI NO.

CC___________

Certiorari from Court of Appeals, San Juan Judicial Region Case No. TA: KLCE-2012-00821

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as co-administrator of the “CP” constituted with JACKY JOE, who is sued as co-administrator of the “CP Jack and Jacky Joe” constituted by Jack and Jacky Joe; LARRY LOE in his personal capacity and as employer of Jane Doe, and as co-administrator of the CP constituted with LARISSA LOE, who is sued as co-administrator of the CP constituted with Larry Loe; “CP Larry and Larissa Loe” constituted by Larry and Larissa Loe; Unknown Defendants A, B and C; Unknown Insurance Companies Defendants,

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X,Y,Z, Defendants – Petitioners,

PETITION FOR CERTIORARI

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Attorneys for the Plaintiff –

Respondent Jane Doe:

Juan Rafael González Muñoz, Esq.

TSPR-8185 GONZALEZ MUÑOZ LAW

OFFICE, P.S.C.

PO Box 9024055 San Juan, P.R. 00902-4055

Tel. (787) 766-5052 Fax: (787) 766-5551 jrgmlaw@gmail.com

polonorteprlaw@gmail.com

Manuel Porro Vizcarra, Esq. TSPR-7994

MANUEL PORRO VIZCARRA LAW

OFFICES 382 Avenida Escorial Urb. Caparra Heights San Juan, P.R. 00920 Tel. (787) 774-8200 Fax: (787) 774-8297 mpv@mpvlawpr.com

Attorneys for the Defendants – Petitioners

Enrique J. Mendoza

Méndez, Esq. TSPR-8304

MENDOZA LAW OFFICES PO Box 9282

San Juan, P.R. 00908-0282 Tel. (787) 722-5522; 5530;

5540 Fax: (787) 723-7057 mendoza@yahoo.com

[Puerto Rico Tax Stamp:]

[Puerto Rico Tax Stamp Receipt:]

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PUERTO RICO JANE DOE

Plaintiff –

Respondent v.

LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY (LLC); JOHN DOE, in his personal capacity and as employer of JANE DOE and as co-administrator of the Conjugal Partnership (“CP”) constituted with JEAN DOE, who is sued as co-administrator of the CP constituted with John Doe; “CP John and Jean Doe”; JACK JOE in his personal capacity and as employer of Jane Doe and as co-administrator of

CERTIORARI NO.:

CC

Certiorari from the Court of Appeals, Judicial Region of San Juan TA Case No.: KLCE-2012-00821

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the “CP” constituted with JACKY JOE, who is sued as co-administrator of the “CP Jack and Jacky Joe” constituted by Jack and Jacky Joe; LARRY LOE in his personal capacity and as employer of Jane Doe, and as co-administrator of the CP constituted with LARISSA LOE, who is sued as co-administrator of the CP constituted with Larry Loe; “CP Larry and Larissa Loe” constituted by Larry and Larissa Loe; Unknown Defendants A, B and C; Unknown Insurance Companies Defendants,

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X,Y,Z, Defendants – Petitioners.

PETITION FOR CERTIORARI

TO THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT: APPEAR defendants–petitioners, Limited

Liability Company (“LLC”), John Doe and the conjugal partnership (“CP”) established by Jean Doe, Jack Joe and the CP established with Jacky Joe and Larry Loe and the conjugal partnership established by Larissa Loe,1 and they very respectfully request the granting of the Petition for Certiorari.

I. INTRODUCTION

The Petition for Certiorari of reference seeks to vindicate the right of the defendants protected by §2 of the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) and its interpretative case law to settle claims submitted against them by Jane Doe (“Jane”) through the agreed arbitration procedure. The aforementioned agreement further requires that such procedure be private and confidential. To that end, this petition seeks to vacate the Decision of the Court of Appeals (“TA”) that denied the issuance of a writ of certiorari because it believed that the Court of First Instance

1 For reasons of strict confidentiality, the parties to this action are not identified by their respective names. In the Affidavit Under Seal by the plaintiff-appellee submitted together with the Complaint and subsequent amendments, that party identified each one of the defendants-appellees by their respective names, addresses and telephone numbers. (Exhibit Petition Certiorari (“Ap. TS.,” pgs. 55-56; 346-348; and 549-571.)

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(“TPI”) correctly decided the controversy on arbitration submitted for its consideration. Furthermore, the decision by the TA denied the Motion in Aid of Jurisdiction submitted by the defendants that sought to stay the proceedings before the TPI, due to the fact that such forum is ready at any time to decide on the merits of the controversies between the parties which should be adjudged through the agreed arbitration.

II. LEGAL PROVISIONS ESTABLISHING THE JURISDICTION AND VENUE OF THIS COURT

This Honorable Court has jurisdiction and venue to hear the merits of this petition pursuant to Article V §§ 1 and 3 of the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico; Articles 2.001 and 3.002(d) of the Judiciary Act of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico of 2003 (4 L.P.R.A. §§24b, 24s(d)); Rule 52.2(b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure (32 L.P.R.A. Ap. V); Article 670 of the Code of Civil Procedure (32 L.P.R.A. § 3491); and Rules 20 and 30 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico, 2011 T.S.P.R. 174.

III. DECISION OF WHICH REVIEW IS SOUGHT

The co-defendants – petitioners request the review of the Decision entered on June 15, 2012 by the TA, Judicial Region of San Juan, Panel III comprised of the Honorable Judges Ramírez Nazario, Piñero González and Surén Fuentes, in Case No. KLCE-2012-00821 (“Decision”). (Ap. Ts., pgs. 707-724)[.] The Decision by the TA denied the issuance of the writ of certiorari requested. The TA determined that the FAA is not applicable and that the TPI decided the dispute on arbitrability correctly, and that there was no circumstance whatsoever that could cause a prejudicial effect on the LLC at this stage of the

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action. In their petition, the defendants-petitioners asked the TA to vacate the Decision by the TPI entered on June 4, 2012 (“Decision by the TPI”) in Civil Case No. KPE 2012-1204 (904) (Hon. Judge Ángel R. Pagán Ocasio), Superior Court of San Juan (Ap. TS., 527-541), which denied the Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction and to Compel Compulsory Arbitration in Light of Binding Arbitration Agreement which had been submitted by the appearing parties on April 11, 2012 (Ap. TS, pgs. 81-169).

The appealed Decision was noticed on June 15, 2012. (Ap. TS., pgs. 707, 709, and 724.) The 30-day period that the appearing parties have to submit this petition expired on July 16, 2012. This petition was submitted on time and the Court has jurisdiction to entertain it..

IV. OTHER PENDING APPEALS

At present, there is no other appeal on this case pending before this Honorable Court or before the TA.

V. GROUNDS FOR GRANTING THIS PETITION

This petition meets the requirements of Rule 30 of the Rules of this Honorable Court, supra, (“Rule 30”) to grant it.2 Let us see.

2 The relevant criteria here are: (1) If the remedy and the dispositive part of the judgment or

decision appealed, unlike the bases thereof, infringe the law, taking the latter in its broadest sense.

(2) … (3) Even if it is not novel, if the expression of the precept is

important for the public interest.

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As discussed herein , the Decisions of the TA and the TPI infringe the law and, in particular, the rules on arbitration and the interpretation of contracts, because they determine that Jane is not obligated to continue the arbitration proceeding that commenced on March 22, 2012 before the American Arbitration Association (“AAA”) despite the fact that the agreement between the parties requires that Jane submit to arbitration all of her claims against the defendants (“resolve any Claim by … arbitration”) regardless of the nature thereof (“any action … of whatever nature … against the Firm or any of its Members…”). Evidently, an error of Law was committed and, as a result, it is necessary to

(4) If the facts stated present a situation more indicative for an

analysis of the problem put forth. (5) If the existing precept must be redefined or changed. (6) … (7) If there has been prejudice, partiality or a gross and

manifest error in the evaluation of the evidence by the court of first instance.

(8) … (9) If the phase that the case is in is the most appropriate one

for its consideration. (10) If the issuance of the writ or the order to show cause do not

cause an improper division of the action and an undesirable delay with respect to the final resolution of the litigation.

(11) If the granting of the writ or the issuance of an order to show cause otherwise contribute to the functions of this Court to vindicate the law and to set guidelines for the law in the country.

(12) If the other requirements established by the Regulation of this Court have been met.

(13) If the issuance of the writ or the order to show cause prevent a miscarriage of justice.

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grant the petition for certiorari pursuant to subsection (1) of Rule 30.

This petition also serves to clarify the rule on what an interstate commerce contract means. Thais determination is important for the public interest, because only in that way may the parties be in a position to know whether their arbitration agreements are covered by the strong public policy in favor of arbitration provided by the FAA. Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 489 (1987) (“[I]n enacting § 2 of [FAA], Congress declared a national policy favoring arbitration…”) (Emphasis ours). The fact that the TA incorrectly determined that the Agreement is not a contract in the interstate commerce proves that this Honorable Court must establish clear criteria on the matter to guide the lower courts. See subsections (3), (5) and (11) of Rule 30.

Furthermore, the TA and TPI committed a gross error in their interpretation and evaluation of the arbitration clause. That, inasmuch as from the text of the arbitration clause in question it is clearly seen that it is the arbitrator who has the obligation of resolving the controversies put forth by Jane in the judicial forum. As a result, it is appropriate to grant the petition for certiorari pursuant to subsection (7) of Rule 30.

Nor is there a question that, pursuant to subsection (4) of Rule (30), the factual situation established is the most indicative one for an analysis of the controversy before this Honorable Court, because for it to be decided only requires that the Court interpret the arbitration clause agreed

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pursuant to the FAA and the rules of contract interpretation.

The intervention of the Honorable Court at this phase is most propitious, because if the Decision by the TA is not vacated and the proceedings before the TPI stayed, Jane’s obligation to prosecute her claims before the arbitral forum would become moot and irreparable harm would be caused to the defendant-petitioners because the commitments made to undertake a confidential arbitral proceeding would not be met. See City of Meridian Miss. v. Algernon Blair, Inc., 721 F.2d 525, 529 (5th Cir. 1983) (an injunction halting arbitration constitutes irreparable harm due to the litigation costs). It would be impractical and would constitute an irreparable miscarriage of justice to have to wait for the final judgment in the case before the TPI to be able to file an appeal in the appeals forums and to establish as an error that Jane’s claims should have been adjudicated in a confidential arbitral proceeding. Furthermore, if the writ of certiorari is not issued, it would allow Jane to ignore her obligation to submit all claims, of any nature, that she might have against the defendants, to confidential arbitration, which obligation she freely and voluntarily contracted.

As a result, in order to avoid a miscarriage of justice, it is necessary to grant the petition of certiorari pursuant to subsections (9)-(10), (13) of Rule 30. Moreover, when all of the requirements established by the Rules of this Honorable Court for issuing the requested writ have also been met. See subsection (12) of Rule 30.

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VI. LIST OF PROCEDURAL AND SUBSTANTIVE FACTS

A. List of Pertinent Procedural Facts

1. On April 2, 2012, Jane submitted a Verified

Complaint and Application for Declaratory Judgment

and Preliminary and Permanent Injunction

(“Complaint”) to the TPI. Jane claimed that the

arbitral clause of the “Operating Agreement” of the

LLC (“Agreement”) is not applicable to her, arguing

that that agreement only governs the commercial and

administrative operations of the LLC. Jane further

claimed that her claims are of a labor nature and that

they are covered by the Constitution of Puerto Rico,

Law No. 100 of June 30, 1959 (age), Law No. 69 of

July 6, 1985 (sex and retaliation), Law No. 115 of

December 20, 1991 (retaliation) and the LLC’s

Employee Manual (“Manual”), which does not contain

an arbitration clause. To that end, Jane asked the

TPI to declare the arbitration clause of the

Agreement inapplicable to her alleged labor claims

and that the LLC be ordered to cease the arbitration

under Rule 57 of Civil Procedure until the TPI can

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resolve the controversy set forth on arbitrability. (Ap.

TS., pgs. 44-56)3

2. Together with the Complaint, Jane submitted a Motion Requesting a Preliminary and Permanent Injunction (“Motion for Injunction”), in which she likewise requested an order to stay the arbitration until the TPI could decide on the Declaratory Judgment, but with the request that once it was decided in favor of Jane that such forum make the cease and desist order permanent and proceed to decide on the merits of the controversies set forth. (Ap. TS., pgs. 57-62.)

3. Jane also submitted an Emergency Motion in Request of an Order in order for all the proceedings to remain strictly confidential. (Ap. TS., pgs. 63-64.)

4. On April 3, 2012, the TPI issued an Order setting a hearing for April 11, 2012, to determine the appropriateness of the extraordinary motion requested. (Ap. TS., pgs. 66.)

5. On April 11, 2012, the defendants-petitioners submitted a Motion to Dismiss, arguing that the Agreement is a contract in the interstate commerce, and therefore the FAA is applicable to it, that pursuant to the arbitration clause of the Agreement all disputes on whether Jane’s claims are arbitrable or not are up to the arbitrator himself to decide and not the TPI and that, in the alternative, it would be appropriate for the TPI to recognize that through 3 Jane’s claims with respect to the Agreement not being pertinent to her claims openly contradict the extrajudicial claim that Jane made to the Managing Board of LLC where she expressly stated that those claims are violations of the Agreement. (Ap. TS., pgs. 162-166.)

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Section 14.04 of the Agreement Jane undertook to prosecute all of her claims (“any Claim”) confidentially through the arbitration procedure regardless of the nature of the claims or whether they arise under the Agreement. Furthermore, the defendants-petitioners argued that under the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, regardless of the alleged constitutional and labor nature of the Jane’s claims, § 2 of the FAA requires that such claims be adjudicated under the arbitration proceeding initiated before the AAA. (Ap. TS., pgs. 81-169.)

6. On that same day a hearing was held in which it was agreed that the defendants-petitioners would stay their actions in the arbitration case until the TPI could resolve the motions submitted on arbitrability, that the confidentiality of the case would be maintained and that all documents would be submitted under seal. Furthermore, the TPI indicated that the first matter to be decided would be the arbitrability of Jane’s claims. Finally, the TPI set a preliminary injunction hearing for May 10, 2012, if the production of evidence would be necessary.4 (Ap. TS., pgs. 170-171.)

7. On April 23, 2012, Jane submitted her Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss. In that Opposition Jane claimed, among other things, that the arbitration clause of the Agreement was not applicable to her alleged labor claims because that document only applies to matters related to the management of the LLC, especially because Jane’s claims are constitutional in nature. Furthermore, 4 On May 8, 2012, that hearing was rescheduled for June 5. (Ap. TS., pgs. 493-494.)

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Jane claimed that the TPI is the one that must resolve all of her claims.5 (Ap. TS., pgs. 177-321.)

8. After the submission of several memoranda by the parties,6 and the submission by Jane of a Second Amended Complaint, on June 4, 2012, at 11:41 a.m., the TPI notified by electronic mail the Decision under appeal before the TA which, as we stated, decides, in violation of the FAA and its interpretative case law, that the TPI is the one that has jurisdiction to decide the controversy on arbitrability and that, furthermore, Jane does not have to arbitrate her claims of alleged employment discrimination, retaliation, and damages because they are not covered by the arbitration clause of the Agreement. (Ap. TS., pgs. 527-541). In footnote 12 of the Decision, the TPI makes the following statements that make evident its hostility toward the arbitration proceeding: “According to the interpretation and position of the LLC, through the [Agreement] the arbitrator would be delegated a decision on the dispute in a completely confidential forum without a right for the affected parties to appeal.” (Ap. TS., pg. 540; emphasis ours.) 5 On that same day, Jane submitted an Amended Verified Complaint in order to include the spouses of the defendants as defendants themselves, in their capacities as co-managers of the respective conjugal partnership, and to amend her causes of action. (Ap. TS., pgs. 322-348.) On May 1, 2012, defendants opposed the aforementioned amendment. (Ap. TS., pgs. 349-356.) 6 On May 1, 2012, defendants-petitioners submitted their Reply to ‘Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss Due to Lack of Jurisdiction and to Compel Binding Arbitration in View of a Binding Arbitration Agreement.’ (Ap. TS., pgs. 357-459.) For her part, on May 7, 2012, Jane submitted a brief called Plaintiff’s Sur-reply. (Ap. TS., pgs. 460-492.)

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9. Furthermore, the TPI indicated that the injunction hearing scheduled for the next day would remain in effect, where the parties would have to submit evidence in relation to the application for injunctive relief. Likewise, it authorized the submission of the Second Amended Complaint. (Ap. TS., pg. 541.) From an analysis of the format, typography and style of the Decision it can be reasonably inferred that it is most like the result of a draft Decision submitted by Jane, and if that is correct, she would have had knowledge of the decision by the TPI significantly in advance of the defendant-petitioners.

10. Indeed, surprisingly, only four (4) hours after the Decision was notified, Jane submitted to the TPI a Motion for an Order on the Confidentiality of Further Proceedings, claiming that in view of the decision hours earlier by the TPI there was no reason for the proceedings to continue to be prosecuted confidentially. (Ap. TS., pgs. 542-547.) Also, Jane submitted a Third Amended Verified Complaint under seal, which identifies the defendants with their respective names. (Ap. TS., pgs. 548-571.)

11. Furthermore, right before the hearing set for June 5, 2012 was to begin, Jane submitted to the TPI, at 8:47 a.m., a Request for Reinstatement as an Additional Remedy under the Scope of Rule 59.4 of Civil Procedure by means of which she asked that she be reinstated at the LLC through a Partial Decision issued by means of a preliminary and permanent injunction. (Ap. TS., pgs. 572-578.)

12. Minutes later, the parties appeared at the preliminary injunction hearing set for that day. Although not even 24 hours had elapsed from the

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time the defendant-petitioners became aware that Jane’s legal action would not be dismissed to proceed to arbitration, the TPI asked them to submit evidence on the claims in the case to be able to begin to decide it on the merits. In view of how hurried the proceeding was becoming, the defendant-petitioners objected to the action by the TPI, using arguments of reasonability and Due Process of Law, among others. The TPI then granted until June 8 for Jane to submit the proposed stipulations of fact that had not been accepted by the defendant-petitioners, for the defendants to submit proposed facts and for both parties to submit the documents that should be considered by the TPI.7 Furthermore, the TPI consolidated the preliminary injunction hearing with the permanent injunction hearing and it indicated that if it was necessary to produce evidence the parties would be notified on the holding of the hearing.8 (Ap. TS., pgs. 591-594.)

13. Being in disagreement with the foregoing, on June 12, 2012, the defendants submitted a Petition for Certiorari with the TA, in which they indicated that the TPI had erred by: (1) assuming jurisdiction over the controversy of whether Jane is obligated to arbitrate her claims due to the fact that the parties unequivocally agreed that the arbitrator would be the one who would determine the scope of his jurisdiction; (2) in the alternative, concluding that Jane did not have to arbitrate her claims against the 7 On June 8, the defendants complied with the aforementioned order by the TPI. (Ap. TS., pgs. 595 and 660.) 8 The TPI also granted 10 days for the defendant-petitioners to present their position regarding Jane’s request to vacate the order of confidentiality and 15 days to state on the request for reinstatement of Jane at the LLC. (Ap. TS., pgs. 591-594.)

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defendants despite the fact that the arbitration clause is broad, clear, and covers any claim between the parties; (3) exempting Jane from arbitrating her claims because of the alleged “employment” or “labor” and “constitutional” nature thereof because the FAA displaces all state policy contrary to arbitration. (Ap. TS., pgs. 1-43.)

14. Together with the Certiorari, the defendants submitted an Emergency Motion in Aid of Jurisdiction. (Ap. Ts., pgs. 667-683; 684-686.)

15. On June 15, 2012, the TA entered a Decision denying the issuance of the writ of certiorari and further stating that the Agreement is not an interstate commerce contract, that the dispute in this case is not a matter related to the Agreement and, therefore, the dispute is not governed by it, and that the TPI must decide as a priority on the matter of the confidentiality of the proceedings. (Ap. TS., pgs. 707-724.) It is because of this Decision that we appeal to this Honorable Court.

B. List of Material Facts

1. In or around November 1979, Jane joined the LLC as an attorney. (Ap. TS., pg. 55.)

2. At that time, LLC was a civil-law partnership. Since then, LLC provides interstate commerce services to its foreign clientele, mainly in the United States, and locally. (Ap. TS., pgs. 98-99.)

3. In September 1987, Jane was promoted to Capital Partner of the LLC. (Ap. TS., pgs. 90.) The articles of organization require that its members settle disputes through confidential arbitration. (Ap. TS., pgs. 312-313.)

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4. On September 13, 2007, LLC became a limited liability company under the laws of Puerto Rico. As a result, Jane became a Capital Member of LLC. (Ap. TS., pgs. 102, 108, and 145.)

5. On that same day, Jane and the other LLC Capital Members signed a document titled Operating Agreement (“Operating Agreement” or “Agreement”).9 (Ap. TS., pgs. 103-158 and 381-396.) In view of the fact that it was always the practice to agree that disputes be resolved through arbitration, the Agreement, like the prior partnership agreement, includes a confidential arbitration clause.

6. The Agreement governs, among other matters, admission procedures, compensation, and expulsion of the Capital Members, as well as the election of the Members of the Managing Board or “Policy Committee.” (Ap. TS. pgs. 77-78, 80-83, 127, 132, 137-138.) That Board formulates the long-term polices and plans of LLC. The compensation process for Capital Members concludes with the approval or disapproval of the Compensation of the Capital Members by the Managing Board. Jane was a member of the Managing Board.

7. Insofar as pertinent, such Agreement (Ap. TS. 102-158) stipulates the following in its relevant Sections:

1. Definitions. For the purposes of this Agreement, the following terms shall have the meaning set forth below:

9 The Agreement establishes that its effectiveness is retroactive to June 1, 2007.

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1.06 “Claim” means any action, suit, complaint or demand of whatever nature and for whatever relief or remedy against the Firm or any of its Members or employees…

1.07 “Claimant” means any Member or Former Member asserting a Claim.

5. Compensation.10

5.02 Salaries of Members – Each Capital Member shall be entitled to such annual salary as shall be determined pursuant to section 5.01 of this Agreement, to be paid in one (1) or more installments.....

10. Fiduciary Duty and Duty of Loyalty of Members.

10.1 Fiduciary Duties of Members – Members owe the Firm and each other a fiduciary duty and a duty of loyalty, which requires each Member, among other things:

(f) To treat all Firm Documents as confidential ‘trade secrets’, except to the extent such Firm Documents are publicly available other than as a result of any violation of this or any other confidentiality obligation ... and to treat as confidential all information relating to the deliberations of the Members and the business of the Firm while such Member is a Member of the Firm and, in the event the Member leaves the Firm, after such Member’s departure.

12. Withdrawal. Retirement. Suspension. Expulsion ... of a Member.

10 For the rest of the relevant clauses on compensation see Section 5 of the Agreement. (Ap. TS., pgs. 127-129.)

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12.02 Suspension and/or Expulsion – The Firm may, upon the recommendation of the Policy Committee and the affirmative vote of three-fourths (%) of the Capital Members, ... (b) expel any Member at any date specified by the Policy Committee with or without cause or prior notice to such Member. In the case of any such expulsion, the Member so expelled shall cease to be a Member on the date specified by the Policy Committee.

14. Resolution of Claim.

14.01 Intent and Purpose – It is the intent and purpose of the Firm and any Claimant to resolve any Claim by mediation or arbitration. The Claimant expressly agrees that the Claim shall be settled or resolved through the procedures set forth herein, and shall not in any way circumvent or otherwise challenge in any way these proceedings relative to mediation and arbitration.

14.04 Arbitration – If mediation fails, the Claim shall be settled by arbitration administered by the [AAA] under its Commercial Arbitration Rules, and judgment on the award rendered by the arbitrator(s) may be entered in any court having jurisdiction thereof. ...

14.05 Confidentiality – The Claimant and the Firm agree that the underlying purpose of the provisions set forth in section 14 of this Agreement is to provide a mechanism by which any Claim shall be resolved in a confidential manner, without publicity and the attendant distractions. ... The parties agree to maintain the confidentiality of such meetings and hearings, and of the documents produced or

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created in such meetings and hearings. Any and all actions taken by the parties shall be in conformity with the underlying purpose set forth in section 14 of this Agreement.

Note that Jane does not dispute that the Agreement is an interstate commerce contract for the effects of the FAA. (Ap. TS., pgs. 44-56; 81-101; 177-321; 357-459; 460-492.) Nor is the validity of the arbitration clause in Section 14 of the Agreement in dispute. (Id.)

8. On October 22, 2007, the LLC’s Employee Manual took effect, which manual applies to all employees and Members of LLC. That Manual does not make a Member an employee. Rather, the Manual clearly maintains the difference between the classification of “Member” and “employee.” (Ap. TS., pgs. 233-300.) The Manual also does not establish the policies related to the compensation of Members, or the process of terminating their relationship with LLC, or the method to resolve disputes between Members and LLC. Those policies are contained in Sections 5, 12 and 14 of the Agreement, respectively. (Ap. TS., pgs. 127-129 and 137-141.)

9. LLC has offices within and outside of Puerto Rico. Furthermore, the great majority of its clients are located outside of Puerto Rico (principally in the United States), which requires that LLC and its clients remain in constant communication as part of its operations through the use of mail, Internet, telephone and other means of interstate communications, including trips to and from Puerto Rico. (Ap. TS., pgs. 81-170.)

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10. In the middle of 2009, Jane was elected to the Managing Board of LLC, which is the highest governing body of LLC.

11. Jane’s compensation had to be reduced because, for several years, she had not been generating enough work for herself and for others, which is a vital function of the capital members. As a result of that, on January 24, 2012, Jane filed an extrajudicial claim against the Members of LLC’s Managing Board, as required under Section 14.02 of the Agreement. In her extrajudicial t claim, Jane alleged, in summary, that her compensation had been reduced in violation of the Agreement. In no part of her claim did Jane mention that the Manual had been violated. The only written contract that Jane claimed was violated was the Agreement. Insofar as pertinent, the appellee specifically claimed the following, based on the Agreement:

…I formally ask you to reconsider the decision by [John Doe] and to schedule, as soon as possible and within the next 15 days, a meeting of the Managing Board pursuant to Clause 14 et seq. of the “Operating Agreement,” such that I, as a Capital Member, can present my position and objections. I want to make clear that subjecting myself to the procedure under Clause 14 should not be construed as a waiver of the rights that protect me under local and federal laws.

I will now proceed to summarize my objections briefly.

1. The reduction in my salary and benefits was done (sic) violates the

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“Operating Agreement” and the agreement between [John Doe] and me, and it violates the specific agreement established with me.

2. …Evidently, the procedure followed was inadequate and in violation of the “Operating Agreement,” the decisions by the Managing Board approved on May 31, 2011, and the decision of December 20, 2011.

…

16. Likewise I was offended when [Jack Joe], in a meeting of the Board stated that “to sit at that desk means having to bring in business” and no one clarified the impropriety of his comment. Is that a requirement in the Operating Agreement?...

(Ap. TS., pgs. 162-166; emphasis ours.)

12. Pursuant to Section 14.03 of the Agreement, on March 20, 2012, the parties submitted to the mediation process which ended without achieving any agreement whatsoever.

13. Faced with the failure of mediation, on March 22, 2012, LLC submitted an Arbitration Complaint against Jane with the AAA in execution of the arbitral clause of Section 14.04 of the Agreement which requires that all disputes (“any Claim”) between the parties regardless of the nature thereof or whether or not it arises under the Agreement shall be resolved through such dispute resolution method, and confidentially. (Ap. TS., pgs. 302-303.)

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VII. INDICATION OF ERROR

1. THE TA ERRED BY CONCLUDING THAT THE FAA IS NOT APPLICABLE. THE LLC OPERATIONS AND ITS RELATIONSHIP WITH JANE HAVE A SUFFICIENT CONNECTION TO INTERSTATE COMMERCE AND JANE DID NOT DISPUTE THE APPLICATION OF THAT LAW.

2. THE TA ERRED BY CONCLUDING THAT THE TPI WAS THE FORUM WITH AUTHORITY TO DETERMINE THE SCOPE OF THE ARBITRATION CLAUSE AGREED. JANE AND THE OTHER CAPITAL MEMBERS OF LLC ENTRUSTED THAT AUTHORITY TO THE ARBITRAL FORUM BY ADOPTING THE AAA’S RULES OF COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION.

3. THE TA ERRED BY SUPPORTING THE CONCLUSION OF THE TPI THAT JANE’S CLAIMS ARE BEYOND THE SCOPE OF THE ARBITRATION CLAUSE. THAT CLAUSE IS BROAD, CLEAR, AND INCLUDES ANY CLAIM BETWEEN THE PARTIES.

4. THE TA ERRED BY CONCLUDING THAT JANE’S CLAIMS ARE NOT ARBITRABLE BECAUSE THEY DEAL WITH ALLEGATIONS OF DISCRIMINATION, RETALIATION, AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS. THE FAA PROHIBITS (“PREEMPTS”) STATES FROM CATEGORIZING CLAIMS TO EXCLUDE THEM FROM ARBITRATION.

VIII. DISCUSSION OF THE FIRST INDICATION OF ERROR

The decision of the TA that the FAA is not applicable allegedly because the transaction involved

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in the dispute does not form part of interstate commerce is not correct. (Ap. TS., pg. 722.) What is important for the FAA to be applicable is that the Agreement have a sufficient connection to interstate commerce, which criterion is exceedingly lax and, as we shall see, is broadly satisfied in this instant case. SCI v. Fulmer, 833 So.2d 621, 629 (Ala. 2003) (“[A] trial court evaluating a contract connected to some economic or commercial activity would rarely, if ever, refuse to compel arbitration on the ground that the transactions lacked ‘involvement’ in interstate commerce.”) (emphasis added.)

It is an established standard that the FAA is applicable to contracts in interstate commerce. See §2 of the FAA.11 The meaning of what a “contract in interstate commerce” is was established by the Supreme Court of the United States (“SCOTUS”) in Allied-Bruce Terminix Companies, Inc. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265 (1995) (“Allied-Bruce”) and Citizens Bank v. Alfabaco, Inc., 539 U.S. 52 (2003) (“Citizens”). Let us see what was decided in those cases.

In Allied-Bruce, an Alabama resident acquired a Termite Protection Plan for his home (the “Plan”) at the Allied-Bruce Terminix Companies (“Allied-Bruce”) branch in that State. The plan included an arbitration clause. The performance of that Plan was guaranteed by Terminix International Company (“Terminix”), which was the owner of the franchise under which Allied-Bruce operated in Alabama. The

11 §2 of the FAA, insofar as pertinent, stipulates as follows:

A written provision in ... a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract. .. shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable .... 9 USCA § 2 (emphases added)

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residence in question was sold to a third party, to whom the aforementioned Plan was transferred. Given that there was a swarm of termites in that residence, the third party acquirer sued the vendor of the property, Allied-Bruce, and Terminix in court. In response, Allied-Bruce and Terminix asked the court to enforce the arbitration clause by virtue of § 2 of the FAA. That request was denied. Allied-Bruce and Terminix appealed to the Supreme Court of Alabama and then to the SCOTUS.

The SCOTUS overturned the Supreme Court of Alabama because the Plan was an interstate commerce contract regardless of the fact that the transaction only took place in Alabama. Specifically, the SCOTUS indicated that the term “involving commerce” of § 2 of the FAA is the functional equivalent of the term “affecting commerce,” which proves the intention of Congress when passing the FAA to exercise to the utmost its power under the Commerce Clause. Id. at pg. 277.12 In view of that and the fact that the basic purpose of the FAA is to overcome the reluctance of courts to enforce arbitration agreements, the SCOTUS decided that the term “involving commerce” should be interpreted broadly. Id., at pg. 275 (“a broad interpretation of this language is consistent with the Act’s basic purpose”). Furthermore, the SCOTUS

12 The power of Congress under the Commerce Clause of the United States is so broad that, in the last 75 years, only two SCOTUS cases have decided that Congress exceeded its powers under the aforementioned Commerce Clause. See U.S. v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995); US v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000). Note that none of the statutes in dispute in those cases was aimed at regulating purely economic transactions, but rather criminal conduct of a noneconomic nature.

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clarified that the term “involving commerce” does not require that the parties have contemplated any connection whatsoever with interstate commerce, but only that the transaction, “in fact,” involve interstate commerce. Id., at pg. 281 (“we accept the ‘commerce in fact’ interpretation, reading the Act’s language as insisting that the ‘transaction’ in fact involve[e]’ interstate commerce, even if the parties did not contemplate an interstate commerce connection.”).

In support of the conclusion that the Plan was a contract in interstate commerce the SCOTUS considered the multistate natures of the companies Terminix and Allied-Bruce and the fact that the materials used to comply with the terms of the Plan came from other States. Id. at pg. 282.

Subsequently, in Citizens, the SCOTUS once again had to determine whether certain agreements between two entities in the same State were contracts in interstate commerce. That Court answered the question affirmatively by indicating that the transactions (i.e., debt restructuring) had a sufficient connection to interstate commerce.

Citizens involved a lending institution in Alabama named The Citizens Bank (“Citizens’) and the construction company Alafabco, Inc., located in that same State. The aforementioned parties entered into several agreements to restructure Alafabco’s debt with Citizens, which contained a clause that required arbitration of such disputes as arose between them. Subsequently, Alafabco filed legal action against Citizens for breach of contract and other causes of action. As a result, Citizens requested an order to compel arbitration. The request was granted by the court, but the Supreme Court of Alabama overturned

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it. The SCOTUS then overturned and when it did it stated the following:

Because the statute provides for ‘the enforcement of arbitration agreements within the full reach of the Commerce Clause’, ... it is perfectly clear that the FAA encompasses a wider range of transactions than those actually ‘in commerce’ - that is, ‘within the flow of interstate commerce ....

The Supreme Court of Alabama was therefore misguided in its search for evidence that a ‘portion of the restructured debt was actually attributable to interstate transactions’ or that the loans ‘originated out-of-state’ or that ‘the restructured debt was inseparable from any out-of-state projects.’ … Such evidence might be required if the FAA were restricted to transactions actually ‘in commerce,’ … but … that is not the limit of the FAA’s reach.

Nor is application of the FAA defeated because the individual debt-restructuring transactions, taken alone, did not have a ‘substantial effect on interstate commerce.’ … Congress’ Commerce Clause power ‘may be exercised in individual cases without showing any specific effect upon interstate commerce’ if in the aggregate the economic activity in question would represent ‘a general practice … subject to federal control.’ … Only that general practice need bear on interstate commerce in a substantial way.

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Id. on pgs. 56-57 (citations omitted, bold and underlining added).

Therefore, the SCOTUS concluded that the agreements in question, despite having been signed in Alabama by residents of that State, were contracts in interstate commerce, at least, for the following three reasons: (a) Alafabco engaged in business in North Carolina, Tennessee, and Alabama; (b) debt restructuring agreements had been guaranteed with Alafabco’s assets, including its inventory of products assembled from material coming from without Alabama; and (c) the impact on interstate commerce that is represented by the general practice of the economic transaction in question satisfies the meaning of “involving commerce” under §2 of the FAA. On this matter, the SCOTUS stated the following:

No elaborate explanation is needed to make evident the broad impact of commercial lending on the national economy or Congress’ power to regulate that activity pursuant to the Commerce Clause.

Id. on pg. 58 (emphases in bold and underlining ours.)

Based on the foregoing, we can conclude that, to determine whether a certain agreement constitutes a contract in interstate commerce, it is necessary to evaluate whether the transaction “affects interstate commerce” or whether the economic activity in question represents a general practice subject to federal control under the Commerce Clause.

In terms of what constitutes practices subject to federal control under the Commerce Clause for

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purposes of the FAA, the following has been stated: “No commercial enterprise of any kind which conducts its activities across state lines has been held to be wholly beyond the regulatory power of Congress under the Commerce Clause.” BWI Comp. v. Beck, 910 S.W.2d 620, 623 (Tex. App. 1994) (citations omitted).13 On this matter, the statements of the Supreme Court of Alabama in its subsequent application of the Allied-Bruce and Citizens cases are illustrative:

As the decisions of the [US] Supreme Court have made clear, there are few, if any economic or commercial transactions that are beyond the reach of Congress’s commerce power.

Furthermore, virtually every kind of industry, small or large, is currently regulated by some sort of federal state enacted pursuant to Congress’s commerce power. See, e.g., 29, U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938); 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-78 (Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970); 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (Family Medical Leave Act of 2000); 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended).

SCI v. Fulmer, 833 So.2d 621, 628 (Ala. 2003) (emphasis added). Later, the Court adds the following:

The transaction underlying the contract between Fulmer and SCI-Alabama (for the sale of goods and services), is unquestionably

13 See also, Sewer v. Paragon Homes, Inc., 351 F.Supp. 596, 599 (D.V.I. 1972) (“Of more general importance, however, is the fact that Congress has the authority to regulate all transactions within the territories.”)

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economic in nature, and the nationwide aggregate effect of such a transaction on interstate commerce easily brings the practice of contracting to provide funeral services and associated goods within the reach of Congress through the FAA .... This is true even though the effect of this particular transaction (Fulmer’s contract with SCI-Alabama) on interstate commerce may be considered trivial. See Wickward, 317 U.S. [111, 127-28 (1942)].14

Id., at pg. 629-30 (emphasis added).

In light of the legal framework discussed above, let us see why the Agreement is a contract in interstate commerce under §2 of the FAA.

The Agreement is a contract in the interstate commerce because, among other reasons, it governs the relationship among the capital members of LLC,

14 In Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942), the United States Supreme Court stated the following regarding local practices that might seem trivial:

But even if appellee’s activity be local and though it may not be regarded as commerce, it may still, whatever its nature, be reached by Congress if it exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce and this irrespective of whether such effect is what might at some earlier time have been defined as ‘direct’ or ‘indirect.’

Id., at pg. 125. Later in Wickard it adds the following: That appellee’s own contribution to the demand for wheat may be trivial by itself is not enough to remove him from the scope of federal regulation where, as here, his contribution, taken together with that of many others similarly situated, is far from trivial.

Id., at pgs. 127-128.

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including the relationship with Jane, and the operations of the firm in Puerto Rico and at its branch located in Washington, D.C. See, SCI v. Fulmer, 883 So.2d 621, 629 (Ala. 2003) (“[I]t would be difficult indeed to give an example of an economic or commercial activity that one could ... declare beyond the reach of Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause, and, by extension, under the FAA.”) (emphasis added).15 Furthermore, the great majority of LLC’s clients are located outside of Puerto Rico (principally in the United States), which means that the LLC and its clients must remain in constant communication as part of its operations through the use of mail, Internet, telephone, and other means of interstate communications, including trips to and from Puerto Rico. Likewise, the economic nature of the Agreement and the fact that the following federal statutes, among others, apply to the relationship of LLC with those who are considered employees per se, is significant: 1) Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-78; 2) Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654; 3) Family Medical Leave Act of 2000, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to

15 See also, Thomas H. Oehmke, Commercial Arbitration § 3:6 (2011) (2011) (“A contract needs only the slightest nexus to interstate commerce to apply the FAA.”); 21 Willinston on Contracts §57: (4th ed. 2011) (“Consistent with the broad approach to interpreting the term ‘involving commerce’ in the [FAA], it has been said that a contract containing an arbitration provision need only be related to commerce to fall within the coverage of the Act “) (emphasis added); Bowen v. Security Pest Control, Inc., 879 So.2d 1139, 1142 (Ala. 2003) (decides that the transaction involved interstate commerce, in part, because one of the parties to the transaction engaged in business in two States).

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2000e-17; 4) Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964; y 5) Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34. Furthermore, and as we indicated above, Jane did not dispute the application of the FAA to the arbitration clause of the Agreement and, therefore, she waived any right to the contrary. See Caguas Satellite Corp. v. Echostar Satellite LLC, _ F.Supp.2d _, 2011 WL 5517037, n. 2 (D.P.R.) (“Plaintiffs [,the party opposing arbitration,] ... do not make any arguments about whether or not the agreement involves interstate commerce and therefore waive this argument”).

From the foregoing it can be seen that the FAA is applicable to the Agreement given its economic nature and nexus to interstate commerce. The facts indicated above evidence that the Agreement “affects interstate commerce” and that the economic activity in question represents a general practice that materially affects interstate commerce and that is subject to federal control under the broad power that is given to Congress by the Commerce Clause. As a result, the TA erred by deciding that the FAA was not applicable.

IX. DISCUSSION OF THE SECOND INDICATION OF ERROR

The TA manifestly erred by not issuing the writ requested and overturning the TPI’s decision, because that forum did not have jurisdiction to decide whether Jane must arbitrate her alleged claims against the defendants-petitioners.

Disputes on arbitrability take three (3) forms: (i) whether there is an arbitration agreement; (ii) the scope of an arbitration agreement (“whether such agreement covers a certain dispute”); (iii) and

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whether such agreement covers a dispute on the duration or expiration of the contract. See Méndez Acevedo v. Nieves Rivera, 179 D.P.R. 359, 367-68 (2010); Municipio de Mayagüez v. Lebrón, 167 D.P.R. 713, 720-21 (2006); World Films, Inc. v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 125 D.P.R. 352 (1990).

As a general rule, the determination of whether an agreement creates the duty of the parties to arbitrate a certain dispute is a judicial task. Méndez Acevedo, supra; World Films, Inc., supra, at pg. 361. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the matter of arbitrability shall not be under the jurisdiction of a court if the parties agreed in the arbitration agreement that such authority is delegated to the arbitrator. That is to say, if it is agreed in an arbitration agreement that the arbitrator is the one who will decide matters of arbitrability, it is appropriate that he, and not the court, be the one to determine whether there is an obligation to arbitrate a certain dispute. U.G.T. v. Corp. Difusión Pub., 168 D.P.R. 674, 684 (2006) (“Ordinarily and except if the collective agreement stipulates otherwise, matters of substantive arbitrability must be resolved by the courts…”) (emphasis ours).

Consistent with the foregoing, it is a well-settled principle in the federal arena and under the FAA that any challenge to the validity of an arbitration agreement, including any dispute over arbitrability (if a certain dispute is arbitrable or not), must be referred to the arbitrator if there is “clear and unmistakable evidence” that the parties so agreed – that that was their intention. First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 945 (1995). The

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foregoing is precisely the situation in the case at bar. The FAA is applicable to the Agreement between Jane and LLC, and the parties delegated the determination of arbitrability to the arbitral forum and, therefore, the TPI erred in assuming jurisdiction.

Given the clear language of Section 14 of the Agreement, the TPI manifestly erred by assuming jurisdiction over the dispute of whether Jane Doe’s claims are arbitrable or not. In the arbitration clause contained in the Agreement, Jane agreed that the arbitration would be conducted under the Commercial Arbitration Rules of the AAA.16 Section 14.04 of the Agreement stipulates insofar as pertinent: “[i]f mediation fails, the Claim shall be settled by arbitration under its Commercial Arbitration Rules ....” In turn, Rule 7(a) of that body of rules stipulates: [t]he arbitrator shall have the power to rule on his or her own jurisdiction, including any objections with respect to the existence, scope or validity of the arbitration agreement.” (Commercial Arbitration Rules of the AAA, Rule 7(a), Ap. TS. pgs. 116-118.) (emphasis ours). In view of the inclusion within the arbitration clause between Jane and LLC, of a body of arbitration rules that delegates the power to determine to the arbitrator, it was clear that it was not up to the TPI to determine whether Jane’s claims were arbitrable.

The federal courts have consistently decided that when the parties incorporate in their arbitration agreements or rules the institutional rules of entities such as the AAA in which the right to decide on his 16 The AAA’s Rules of Commercial Arbitration enjoy the same generalness as the Rules of Civil Procedure of Puerto Rico.

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own jurisdiction – decide arbitrability – is delegated to the arbitrator, that constitutes sufficient (clear and unequivocal) evidence in Law that that was the intention of the parties. See Contec Corp. v. Remote Solution Co., 398 F.3d 205, 208 (2nd Cir. 2005) (“When … parties explicitly incorporate rules that empower an arbitrator to decide issues of arbitrability, the incorporation serves as clear and unmistakable evidence of the parties’ intent to delegate such issues to an arbitrator”); Sleeper Farms v. Agway, Inc., 211 F. Supp. 2d 197 (D. Me. 2002) (“[Since the AAA rules constitute] a clear and unmistakable delegation of scope-determining authority to an arbitrator, [the court] refers this dispute to the arbitrator [to determine [...] what issues [...] are covered by the arbitration clause.”)17

Indeed, even when the parties have not agreed to submit substantive disputes on arbitrability to the arbitral forum, the courts tend to leave the dispute to be resolved initially by the arbitrator when the

17 See, also: Terminix Int’l Col. v. Palmer Ranch Ltd., 432 F.3d 1327, 29, 33-34 (11th Cir. 2005) (Deciding that, because the AAA’s Rules of Arbitration delegate the determination of arbitrability to the arbitrator, the plaintiff’s claim that the arbitration agreement illegally denied him of several statutory remedies, was a matter to be adjudicated by the arbitrator, not by the court); Qualcomm Inc. v. Nokia Corp., 466 F.3d 1366, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Apollo Computer. Inc. v. Berg, 886 F.2d 469, 473 (1st Cir. 1989) (“Ordinarily, [Plaintiff] would be entitled to have these issues resolved by a court. [...] By contracting to have all disputes resolved according to the Rules of the ICC, however, [Plaintiff] agreed to be bound by Articles 8.3 and 8.4. These provisions clearly and unmistakably allow the arbitrator to determine her own jurisdiction when, as here, there exists a prima facie agreement to arbitrate whose continued existence and validity is being questioned.”).

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arbitrability cannot be determined without entering into the merits of the dispute. Elkouri & Elkouri, How Arbitrations Works, (BNA Books, 6th Edition 2003), at pg. 281. (“However, even though the agreement does not expressly leave the determination of arbitrability to the arbitrator, and in spite of the fact that the parties have first gone to court, courts have left the initial determination to the arbitrator. This was the result, for instance, where arbitrability could not be determined without delving into the merits ...”).

Thus, in Camden Indus. Co. v. Carpenters Local 1688, 353 F.3d 178, 180 (1st Cir. 1969), the First Court of Appeals decided:

In these circumstances we believe the matter should proceed to arbitration, where the arbitrator may determine the subsidiary facts upon which depend both the merits of the controversy and his jurisdiction to decide it. A finding of jurisdiction, unlike a finding on the merits when jurisdiction is not in question ... will not be insulated from subsequent judicial review... We believe full recognition of the role of labor arbitration requires court intervention in a case such as this only when it has become absolutely necessary, viz., on a petition to vacate or enforce the award.

The federal case law cited is consistent with our local law as regards contracts. At the end of the day, “arbitration is an inherently contractual legal concept.” Méndez Acevedo, supra, at pg. 367; Municipio de Mayagüez, supra; U.C.P.R. v. Triangle Engineering Corp., 136 D.P.R. 133, 144 (1994).

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Therefore, in terms of arbitration, compliance with what has been agreed in writing can be enforced. See Crufon Const. v. Aut. Edif. Púbs., 156 D.P.R. 197, 204 (2002); Municipio de Ponce v. Gobernador, 136 D.P.R. 776, 783 (1994). In turn, when the terms of a contract are clear and unambiguous, its provisions will be applied according to the literal meaning that was given to it by the parties. Art. 1233 of the Civil Code, supra, §3471. Once it is determined what it was that the parties agreed, the court must decide the disputes between the parties as stipulated. See C.F.S.E. v. Unión de Médicos, 170 D.P.R. 443 (2007).

In summary, in the instant case, the arbitration clause expressly incorporates by reference the AAA’s Commercial Rules of Arbitration, which in turn delegate to the arbitrator – clearly and unmistakably – the authority to determine his own jurisdiction. Therefore, according to the authorities cited herein, it is appropriate for this Honorable Court to vacate the Decisions by the TA and TPI and order Jane to continue with the arbitration proceeding that she agreed to, such that the arbitrator will be the one who decides whether he has authority to hear her claims on the merits. This is what the parties agree, without any ambiguity whatsoever, and that constitutes the law between the parties. See HIETEL v. PRTC, 2011 T.S.P.R. 100. In the alternative, if this Honorable Court believes that the TA did not commit the second error indicated, it must proceed to consider the next two (2) indications of errors.

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X. DISCUSSION OF THE THIRD INDICATION OF ERROR

The TA also manifestly erred in deciding that the claims presented by Jane are not covered by the arbitration clause in the Agreement because they are allegedly of an “employment” or “labor” and “constitutional” nature. (Ap. TS., pgs. 723-724.) Essentially, the TA based its decision on the erroneous conclusion that the Agreement does not govern the relationship between LLC and Jane for the purposes of the instant judicial action. (Ap. TS., pg. 722.) To reach that result the TA had to impose by fiat an unsustainable limitation on the scope of the arbitration clause in the Agreement, which according to its literal text is clearly broad and covers “any Claim” between the parties – including those that do not arise from the Agreement. By doing so, the TA not only erred, but it also made manifest a marked hostility to the arbitral forum, thus violating the postulates of the FAA and its case law interpretation.

From the face of the Decision it can be seen that the TA ignored the broad language of the binding arbitration clause contained in the Agreement. An example of this is that not even the full text of the clause was quoted in the Decision as part of the TA’s analysis. To facilitate the work of this Court, we reproduce the relevant section of the Agreement, which unquestionably evidences that the TA should have compelled Jane to arbitrate her claims:

Intent and Purpose – It is the intent and purpose of the Firm and any Claimant to resolve any Claim by mediation or arbitration. The Claimant expressly agrees

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that the Claim shall be settled or resolved through the procedures set forth herein, and shall not in any way circumvent or otherwise challenge in any way these proceedings relative to mediation and arbitration.

See Section 14.01 of the Agreement (emphasis provided). (Ap. TS., pg. 140.)

Section 14.01 of the Agreement transcribed above shows that it was the intent and purpose of the parties, including Jane and the appearing parties, to resolve any Claim through mediation and arbitration. More revealing still is the fact that, in the Agreement, “Claim” is defined as, “any action, suit, complaint or demand of whatever nature and for whatever relief or remedy against the Firm or any of its Members or employees.” (Section 1.06 of the Agreement; emphasis added.) (Ap. TS. pg. 109). In other words, the term “any Claim” literally means any claim, complaint, demand, or action of any nature and requesting any remedy.

Given the text of Section 14.01 and the definition of “Claim” in the Agreement itself, “any Claim” can mean nothing other than “any claim,” and that includes all types of claims or requests for relief presented by Jane. That is, according to the foregoing terms (and without need of any interpretation whatsoever), any type of action, case, demand, or claim of any nature and on any type of relief or aid against LLC or any of its Members or employees is covered by the arbitration clause. As we indicated above, under Puerto Rico law when the terms of a contract are clear and unambiguous, its provisions will be applied according to the literal meaning that the parties gave to it. Art. 1233 of the Civil Code,

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supra, §3471. On this matter, in Marcial v. Tome, 144 D.P.R. 522 (1997), this Supreme Court recognized that the clear letter of the contract had to be followed, when it unmistakably reflects the will of the parties.

Even if there were any doubts on the scope of the arbitration clause and the meaning of “any Claim,” which is denied, the FAA requires that the doubt be resolved in favor of arbitration. See Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Const. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983) (“The [FAA] establishes that, as a matter of federal law, any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration, whether the problem at hand is the construction of the contract language itself or an allegation of waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability.”); Granite Rock Co. v. Int’l Broth. of Teamsters, 130 S. Ct. 2847, 2857 (2010) (likewise); Painewebber Incorporated of Puerto Rico v. Service Concepts, Inc., 151 D.P.R. 307, 311-12 (2000) (“Once arbitration is agreed to, the courts lack discretion in terms of its efficacy and they have to comply with the arbitration agreed. [Furthermore], any question on the scope of the disputes that might be taken to arbitration must be resolved in favor of arbitration.”).

Therefore, for the determination of arbitrability it does not matter if the claim is of a labor or administrative, contractual, extracontractual, statutory or constitutional nature. Nor does it matter if the Capital Members of LLC can be classified as owners or employees or both. This is a very broad arbitration clause that the TA should have backed pursuant to its terms under the FAA. These principles were grossly ignored by the TA when it

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entered its Decision which is being appealed. We must not forget that the FAA was passed as a response to the hostility that the Courts have traditionally shown toward arbitration agreements. See Circuit City Stores v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 111 (2011) (deciding that employment contracts in interstate commerce are covered by the FAA except for certain transportation employees).

The conclusion that Jane must arbitrate her claims is necessary even if this Court were inclined to go beyond the text of Section 14 and the definitions of the Agreement to determine the scope of the obligation of the Capital Members (present and former) of LLC to arbitrate. That is so, inasmuch as what Jane basically questions and challenges is her compensation as a Capital Member of LLC (because of alleged discrimination), and her expulsion from the management body of LLC and as a Capital Member of LLC (for alleged retaliation). See the different claims that Jane has presented as part of this case, from her internal claim, through the Third Amended Verified Complaint. (Ap. TS. pgs. 162-166; 44-64; 322-348; 499-524; 548-571).

All of these are aspects of the relationship of Jane with LLC that are expressly governed by the Agreement. Indeed, such can be seen by the very conclusions of fact by the TPI. See Conclusion of Fact Number 7, Decision. (Ap. TS., pg. 535.) That translates into the fact that, to be able to adjudicate Jane’s claims of alleged discrimination and retaliation, the corresponding forum – the arbitral forum – will necessarily have to refer to the Agreement.

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As can certifiably be seen from the record, the compensation of the Capital Members of LLC is governed by sections 5.01-5.06 of the Agreement. (Ap. TS., pgs. 127-129.) A reading of such sections is enough to prove it. So much so that Jane herself admitted to the TPI that “the mechanism by which compensation is determined is governed by the [Agreement].” (See Opposition, at pg. 9, footnote 12, Ap. TS., pg. 187).

As a matter of reality, the TA failed to consider the fact that, from the internal claim that Jane Doe made before the managing body of LLC, she fundamentally claimed some alleged violations of the Agreement. (Ap. TS., pgs. 162-166.) (See Section VI(B), paragraph 11, supra.)

Pursuant to the above, the TA and TPI erred by not referring Jane’s claims to arbitration. She cannot escape the reality that her claim arises from alleged violations of the Agreement, whether for discriminatory reasons or not. Precisely, that is what it is up to the Arbitrator to settle.

The same thing happens with the alleged expulsions in retaliation against Jane as a Member of the managing body of LLC and a Capital Member of LLC. The expulsion of a Member of the managing body of LLC is governed by section 4.15 of the Agreement, whereas the expulsion of a Capital Member of LLC is governed by Section 12.02 of the Agreement. (Ap. TS., pgs. 126 and 137-138.) Therefore, any claim or challenge to those procedures must be handled through the dispute resolution process of section 14 of the Agreement, which includes the binding arbitration that the parties agreed. That was the undertaking signed by Jane and the lower

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forums erred by allowing Jane not to comply with what was agreed.

To conclude, neither the clear and broad language of the arbitral clause, nor the context provided by the matters governed by the Agreement and Jane’s claims, can be interpreted as the obligation to arbitrate being limited to claims on the operational or administrative matters of LLC. The TPI not only erroneously assumed jurisdiction over the dispute on arbitrability but it also decided it in a manner completely contrary to the law.

XI. DISCUSSION OF THE FOURTH INDICATION OF ERROR

Beyond ignoring the clear letter of the arbitration clause agreed in Section 14 of the Agreement, the TA based its decision on the alleged “employment” or “labor” and “constitutional” nature of Jane’s claims to exempt her from having to arbitrate them. According to the TA:

…the claim that Jane Doe wants the Judicial forum to adjudicate is one that holds that the LLC fired her discriminatorily and because of reprisals. Furthermore, that dispute relates to conduct attributed to the LLC in violation of her basic constitutional rights, and therefore our state of law grants the appellee the ability to vindicate those rights through a motion for injunction. (Ap. TS., pgs. 723-724.)

This determination by the TA evidences the hostility to arbitration that the FAA came to eradicate and shows that such forum based itself on the nature of the alleged claims by Jane was well as on alleged state policies to refuse to compel

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arbitration. By acting thus, the TA acted in open violation of the FAA and the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution. Once again, the TA manifestly erred.

As can be seen from its § 2, of which we transcribe its pertinent text in footnote 11, the FAA does not establish any distinction whatsoever between the arbitrability of statutory rights or constitutional rights.18 All that the FAA requires is that the arbitration agreements be enforced pursuant to their own terms. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1745 (“courts must place arbitration agreements on an equal footing with other contracts, […] and enforce them according to their terms”) (citations omitted). That is to say, what is important is not the nature of the claim in question, but rather whether the parties agreed to arbitrate such claim.19 Because the FAA does not differentiate between the arbitrability of statutory rights or constitutional rights, the lower forums could not create that distinction by judicial fiat under the scope of their interpretation of Puerto Rican law.

18 Insofar as SCOTUS case law that requirements to arbitrate disputes that do not arise from the text of § 2 of the FAA, see Rent-A-Center v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772, 2778, n. 1 (“[§ 2]grounds do not include ... any requirement that its lack of unconscionability must be ‘clear and unmistakable.’”); Marmet v. Brown, 132 S. Ct. 1201, 1203 (2012) (“[The FAA’s] text includes no exception for personal-injury or wrongful-death claims. It ‘requires courts to enforce the bargain of the parties to arbitrate.’”) (citation omitted). 19 As we have discussed above, Jane’s alleged constitutional claim is covered within the arbitral clause of the Agreement that requires that Jane Doe submit all of her claims (“any claim”) to arbitration.

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It is an elemental principle of law that when a federal law is in conflict with a state law, including one of a constitutional nature, the state law is displaced by the federal one in virtue of the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution. The Supremacy Clause stipulates that:

This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States…, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in very State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.

U.S. Const., Art. VI, cl. 2 (emphasis ours). On this matter, Professor Gorrín Peralta states the following:

[A] federal law takes precedence over the provisions of the Constitution of the [Commonwealth] of Puerto Rico. … In any situation in which a Puerto Rican legal precept conflicts with the “Supreme Law,” that is, the [US] Constitution, [or] with a federal … law applicable in Puerto Rico, the federal Law must always take precedence over the Puerto Rican one.

Carlos I. Gorrin Peralta, Fuentes y proceso de investigación juridical 43 (1991) (emphasis supplied). See also, U.S. v. Georgia Public Service Comm., 371 U.S. 285, 293 (1983) (“a State is without power by reason of the Supremacy Clause to provide the conditions on which the Federal Government will effectuate its policies.”); U.S. v. Pérez, 465 F.Supp. 1284, 1286 (D.P.R. 1979) (“[The Constitution of Puerto Rico] cannot provide conditions on which Congress

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will effectuate its policies as to matters well within its province”).20

As a result of these principles, it is an established and consistently repeated principle that when a State requires that a certain type of claim be settled exclusively in the courts, despite the fact that the parties agreed to arbitrate their disputes, such state rule is displaced by the FAA. That was specifically resolved by the SCOTUS in Southland Corp. v. Keating,

465 U.S. 1 (1984), by indicating the following:

In enacting § 2 of the [FAA], Congress declared a national policy favoring arbitration and withdrew the power of the states to require a judicial forum for the resolution of claims which the contracting parties agreed to resolve by arbitration.

Id. at pg. 10 (emphasis ours).21

20 See also Dowling v. Davis, 840 F.Supp. 731, 734 (E.D. Call.) (“The Supremacy Clause does not permit federal law to be superseded by state law, including state constitutional provisions.”); U.S. v. Spencer, 160 F.3d 413, 414 (7th Cir. 1998) (likewise); Keaveny v. Town of Brookline, 937 F.Supp. 975, 982 (D. Mass. 1996) (likewise). Prof. Gorrín Peralta also states the following regarding this matter: “The sources of law in Puerto Rico are, then: (1) The U.S. Constitution; (2) the federal laws…; (5) the Constitution of the [Commonwealth] of Puerto Rico; (6) the ordinary laws approved by the Legislative Assembly [of Puerto Rico];…” Gorrín Peralta, supra, at pg. 43. 21 See Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 491 (“This clear federal policy places § 2 of the Act in unmistakable conflict with California's § 229 requirement that litigants be provided a judicial forum for resolving wage disputes.”)

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Recently, the SCOTUS reaffirmed this principle in Marmet Health Care Center, Inc. v. Brown, 132 S. Ct. (Op. of February 21, 2012). In Marmet, the SCOTUS, citing Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1747 (2011), decided the following:

[W]hen state law prohibits outright the arbitration of a particular type of claim, the analysis is straightforward: The conflicting rule is displaced by the FAA. ... West Virginia's prohibition against predispute agreements to arbitrate personal-injury or wrongful-death claims against nursing home is a categorical rule prohibiting arbitration of a particular type of claim, and that rule is contrary to the terms and coverage of the FAA.

Id. at pgs. 1203-04 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). In that case, it was decided that the Supreme Court of West Virginia had erred by applying the public policy of that State, which prohibits enforcement of an arbitral clause contained in an admission agreement to an old-age home signed prior to the occurrence of an event of negligence that results in death or bodily injury. Such that, if the FAA displaces any state legislation that conflicts with its provisions, it is even more clear that any decision by a court (such as the appealed Decision) that violates the FAA also must be vacated.

This Honorable Supreme Court is fully aware of these principles. In World Films, Inc. v. Paramount Pict. Corp., supra, it recognized that the state laws that limit arbitration clauses are displaced (“preempted”) by the FAA. The dispute in World Films was whether the application of Article 3-B of Law 75, 10 L.P.R.A. 278b-2, which established the

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nullity of any stipulation in a distribution contract that forced a distributor to arbitrate outside of Puerto Rico any dispute that arose from such contract, had to take prevalence over the FAA. This Supreme Court determined that insofar as Article 3-B of Law 75 conflicted in its application with the FAA, the latter would take precedence. Id., pg. 364. Indeed, this Court determined that faced with the FAA, Article 3-B was ineffective and illegal. By deciding thus, the provisions of Walborg Corp. v. Tribunal Superior, 104 D.P.R. 184 (1975), which had determined that the state courts were not obligated to apply the FAA, were expressly revoked. In Walborg, the court had decided that an arbitral clause could not be given greater force than the policy established in Law 75, and that the state courts were not obligated to apply the FAA. That doctrine was revoked by World Films.

Pursuant to the above, there is no question that the lower courts erred by denying the arbitration based on the alleged “constitutional” and “labor” nature of Jane Doe’s claims. The FAA displaces any statutory legal precept or precept under the Constitution of Puerto Rico that does not enforce and recognize the commitment assumed by Jane Doe and LLC to resolve all claims (“any Claim”) through the arbitration procedure agreed in Section 14 of the Agreement.

XII. CONCLUSION AND PRAYER FOR RELIEF

IN VIEW OF THE AFORESAID, we very respectfully request that this Honorable Court issue the writ of certiorari requested and vacate the Decision of the TA for the purposes of ordering Jane to present through the confidential arbitration

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instituted before the AAA all of her claims against the defendants.

Respectfully submitted.

In San Juan, Puerto Rico, today June 19, 2012.

I CERTIFY that I have provided notice of a true and exact copy of this writing, simultaneously with its submission, by electronic mail and courier to the attorneys for the plaintiff-appellee, Juan R. González Muñoz, Esq., González Muñoz Law Office, 261 Tetuán, San Juan, Puerto Rico 00901-1916; jrgmlaw@gmail.com; and Manuel Porro Vizcarra, Esq., Manuel Porro Vizcarra Law Offices, 382 Ave. Escorial, Urb. Caparra Heights, San Juan, PR 00920; mpv@mpvlawpr.com.

MENDOZA LAW OFFICES

Attorney for the defendant-petitioners

PO Box 9282

San Juan, Puerto Rico 00908-0282

Tel. (787) 722-5522; 5530; 5540

Fax: (787) 723-7057

Electronic mail:

mendozalo@yahoo.com

/s/ [signature]

Enrique J. Mendoza Méndez

TSPR-8304

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APPENDIX I

McCONNELL VALDÉS LLC

OPERATING AGREEMENT

Amended and Restated

June 1, 2007, as further amended on December 15, 2010

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1.01 “Absolute Majority” means that more than half of all of the Capital Members of the Firm (including those absent and those present but not voting) must vote affirmatively in favor of a proposition in order for it to be passed.

1.02 “Accumulated Earnings” means all the earnings of the Firm that have been retained and not distributed to the Capital Members.

1.03 “Assigned Capital” means the cumulated capital contribution a Capital Member has to make each Fiscal Year under the Capital Program, as of the end of the Fiscal Year for which the net earnings (or losses) of the Firm are to be determined. For purposes of this definition, the Paid-In Capital of each Capital Member as of Fiscal Year 2007 shall also be considered “Assigned Capital.”

1.04 “Capital Member” means each of the parties to this Agreement, and any other person who is hereinafter admitted to membership in the Firm as a Capital Member pursuant to section 7.01 of this Agreement.

1.05 “Capital Program” means the method whereby Capital Members make capital contributions to the Firm.

1.06 “Claim” means any action, suit, complaint or demand of whatever nature and for whatever relief or remedy against the Firm or any of its Members or employees. However, it excludes any action, suit, complaint or demand by the Firm for declaratory, injunctive or any other equitable relief for unfair competition or the use or unauthorized disclosure of trade secrets or confidential information of the Firm,

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as to which the Firm may seek and obtain equitable or legal relief from a court of competent jurisdiction.

1.07 “Claimant” means any Member or Former Member asserting a Claim. The term “Claimant” also covers any person or entity asserting a Claim directly or indirectly through any Member or Former Member.

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5. Compensation.

5.01 Compensation Review Process

Not later than sixty (60) days before the end of each Fiscal Year, the Managing Director shall request each Member to fill-out a Compensation Self- Evaluation Form. The information provided in the Compensation Self-Evaluation Form, together with other data, will be analyzed by the Managing Director in consultation with the Practice Management Committee and the Chief Administrative and Financial Officer. Not later than thirty (30) days before the end of each Fiscal Year, the Managing Director shall prepare and deliver to each member of the Policy Committee a unified compensation schedule, which may include bonuses for the current Fiscal Year, and compensation and other benefits for the next Fiscal Year. Not later than five (5) days after receipt of the unified compensation schedule, the members of the Policy Committee shall provide their comments to the Managing Director. Not later than fifteen (15) days before the end of the Fiscal Year, the Managing Director shall prepare a final unified compensation schedule and, upon reasonable notice, call a meeting

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of the Policy Committee for the purpose of adopting the final unified compensation schedule. Not later than five (5) days before the end of the Fiscal Year, the Policy Committee, by a majority vote of the members present, shall approve or reject the final unified compensation schedule as a whole.

5.02 Salaries of Members

Each Capital Member shall be entitled to such annual salary as shall be determined pursuant to section 5.01 of this Agreement, to be paid in one (1) or more installments. Each Income Member shall initially be entitled to such salary as shall be fixed in the agreement pursuant to which he/she shall be admitted as an Income Member. Salaries of Income Members shall ordinarily be paid on a monthly basis. The Managing Director may at any time, with the consent of the Policy Committee, increase or reduce the salary of any Member.

5.03 Bonus of Members

In addition to the salary, the Firm may award a bonus to any Member in respect of any Fiscal Year, which bonus, if paid, shall be paid at such time and in such amounts as shall be fixed pursuant to section 5.01 of this Agreement. The bonus of any Member shall be entirely discretionary on the part of the Firm, however, and no Member shall have the right to receive a bonus, regardless of the earnings of the Firm for the Fiscal Year concerned.

5.04 Additional Perquisites of Members

Each Member shall be entitled to the following benefits, determined pursuant to the procedures set forth in section 5.01 of this Agreement:

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(a) An allowance for such ordinary travel and entertainment expenses, as shall be incurred by a Member from time to time. The amount shall be

fixed pursuant to section 5.01 of this Agreement, and payable subject to the applicable standard operating

instructions of the Firm, as amended from time to time.

(b) An allowance for Capital Members for automobile expense, which amount shall be fixed pursuant to

section 5.01 of this Agreement, and payable subject to the applicable standard operating instructions of the

Firm, as amended from time to time.

(c) An allowance for Members for automobile lease expense, which amount shall be fixed pursuant to

section 5.01 of this Agreement, and payable subject to the applicable standard operating instructions of the Firm, as amended from time to time. This allowance

shall be used for the lease of an automobile only.

(d) An allowance for Members for automobile insurance, which amount shall be fixed pursuant to

section 5.01 of this Agreement, and payable subject to the applicable standard operating instructions of the

Firm, as amended from time to time.

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10. Fiduciary Duty and Duty of Loyalty.

10.01 Violations of Fiduciary Duties

A Member who violates any of his or her duties to the Firm will be liable to the Firm in damages and/or for compensation for the use of the Firm’s services or resources, and will be subject to other remedies

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including, but not limited to, injunctive relief, where such relief would not prejudice a client.

10.03 Policy Committee’s Authority to Adopt Regulations

The Policy Committee shall have the authority to adopt regulations clarifying and defining the type of conduct that violates a Member’s duty of loyalty and fiduciary duty.

11. No Liability of Members.

11.01 No personal Liabilities of Members for Obligation and Liabilities of Firm Solely by Reason of Being a Member

As a limited liability company under Puerto Rico law, all debts, obligations and liabilities of the Firm, whether arising in contract, tort or otherwise, shall be solely the debts, obligations and liabilities of the Firm, and no Member shall be obligated personally for any such debt, obligation or liability solely by reason of being a Member.

12. Withdrawal, Retirement, Suspension, Expulsion or Death of a Member.

12.01 Withdrawal and/or Retirement

A Member may withdraw or retire from the Firm as of a specified date by giving the Managing Director not less than thirty (30) days written notice to that effect. Upon receipt of any such notice, the Managing Director may specify an earlier date (than the date specified in such notice) as of which such withdrawal or retirement shall be effective. As of the date specified in such withdrawal or retirement notice or as of such earlier date as shall be specified by the

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Managing Director, the withdrawing or retiring Member shall cease to be a Member.

12.02 Suspension and/or Expulsion

The Firm may, upon the recommendation of the Policy Committee and the affirmative vote of three-fourths (3/4) of the Capital Members, which vote shall be cast by secret ballot, either (a) suspend the membership of any Member in the Firm at any date and for any period of time, or for an indefinite period of time until action shall be taken to terminate the suspension, as may be specified by the Policy Committee, or (b) expel any Member at any date specified by the Policy Committee with or without cause or prior notice to such Member. In the case of any such expulsion, the Member so expelled shall cease to be a Member on the date specified by the Policy Committee.

12.03 Bankruptcy

If a Member is adjudicated bankrupt or insolvent by a court of competent jurisdiction, or voluntarily files a petition under the Bankruptcy Code, such Member shall thereupon automatically be deemed to have withdrawn from the Firm and shall cease to be a Member as of the date of such event or filing, subject to applicable provisions of law.

12.05 Failure to Pay a Capital Call

If a Capital Member fails to timely pay the capital contribution required by a capital call pursuant to section 3.08 of this Agreement, such Capital Member shall thereupon automatically be deemed to have withdrawn from the Firm and shall cease to be a Member as of the date of such event.

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12.05 Pledge or Hypothecate

If a Member attempts to pledge, hypothecate, or in any manner transfer his or her interest in the Firm, or his or her interest in any of its assets, receivables, records, documents, files or clientele, such Member shall thereupon automatically be deemed to have withdrawn from the Firm and shall cease to be a Member as of the date of such event.

12.06 Payments in the Events of Withdrawal. Retirement. Expulsion or Death of a Capital Member

In the event of the withdrawal, retirement, expulsion or death of a Capital Member, the Capital Member or his or her personal representative or heirs shall be entitled to receive from the Firm, within thirty (30) days after the effective date of such withdrawal, retirement, expulsion or death and in full payment of all liabilities of the Firm to the Capital Member (except with respect to the amount of his or her capital account in the Firm), a cash payment equal to the amount, if any, of his or her salary accrued to the date of such withdrawal, retirement, expulsion or death and not previously paid, less all liabilities of such Capital Member to the Firm. At the close of such Fiscal Year, the capital account of such Capital Member shall be credited with his or her share in the net earnings of the Firm for the Fiscal Year in which such withdrawal, retirement, or expulsion becomes effective or such death occurs, or shall be charged with his or her share in the losses of the Firm for such Fiscal Year, based upon the portion of such Fiscal Year prior to the date of such withdrawal, retirement, expulsion or death, in accordance with the provisions of section 3.03 of this agreement.

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13. Dissolution, Liquidation or Merger.

13.01 Procedure Sale of Assets, Dissolutions or Merger

Upon the recommendation of the Policy Committee and the affirmative vote of the Capital Members holding a majority of the Paid-In Capital of the Firm, the assets and business of the Firm may be sold, or the Firm may be merged with any other firm, or liquidated and dissolved at any time.

13.02 Withdrawal of Members upon Liquidation and Dissolution of the Firm

In case of the liquidation and dissolution of the Firm, each Member shall be deemed to have withdrawn from the Firm as of the date of such liquidation and dissolution, and the Firm shall be absolutely obligated to pay in full, in cash, the balance of the capital account of each Capital Member. Provided, however, that if upon liquidation and dissolution the assets of the Firm, less its liabilities, are insufficient to pay in full the balance of the capital account of each Capital Member, a pro rata portion of each such balance shall be paid.

14. Resolution of Claim.

14.01 Intent and Purpose

It is the intent and purpose of the Firm and any Claimant to resolve any Claim by mediation or arbitration. The Claimant expressly agrees that the Claim shall be settled or resolved through the procedures set forth herein, and shall not in any way circumvent or otherwise challenge in any way these proceedings relative to mediation and arbitration.

14.02 Submission to Policy Committee

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As a prerequisite to bringing any Claim, the Claimant shall first submit the Claim to the Policy Committee. The Claim must be in writing, stating the nature of the Claim and the relief requested. The Claimant shall provide to the Policy Committee such other information as the Policy Committee deems necessary and reasonable for the proper consideration of the Claim. If the Claimant does not submit the Claim to the Policy Committee or fails to provide within thirty (30) days the information requested by the Policy Committee, the Claim shall be void and deemed waived.

14.03 Mediation

The Claimant and the Firm shall in good faith attempt to resolve the Claim amicably. If the Claim cannot be resolved amicably within a reasonable period of time, the parties agree first to try in good faith to settle the Claim by mediation administered by the American Arbitration Association under its Commercial Mediation Procedures before resorting to arbitration or some other dispute resolution procedure.

14.04 Arbitration

If mediation fails, the Claim shall be settled by arbitration administered by the American Arbitration Association under its Commercial Arbitration Rules, and judgment on the award rendered by the arbitrator(s) may be entered in any court having jurisdiction thereof. The Claimant and the Firm further agree that the Claim be submitted to one (1) arbitrator to be mutually selected. If the parties fail to appoint an arbitrator, either party may then appoint an arbitrator and notify the other party of such appointment. The Claim will be submitted to

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this arbitrator. However, if within thirty (30) days of such notice, the other party appoints an arbitrator, then the two (2) arbitrators will select a third arbitrator, and the Claim will be submitted to the three (3) arbitrators for resolution, which resolution shall be final, binding and unappealable.

14.05 Confidentiality

The Claimant and the Firm agree that the underlying purpose of the provisions set forth in section 14 of this Agreement is to provide a mechanism by which any Claim shall be resolved in a confidential manner, without publicity and the attendant distractions. Accordingly, all mediation meetings and arbitration hearings shall be private and confidential, and attended by the parties, counsel, and witnesses only. The parties agree to maintain the confidentiality of such meetings and hearings, and of the documents produced or created in such meetings and hearings. Any and all actions taken by the parties shall be in conformity with the underlying purpose set forth in section 14 of this Agreement.

15. Miscellaneous.

15.01 Meetings

(e) Capital Members shall meet at least once each quarter of the Fiscal Year, on the day called by the

Managing Director. Special meetings shall be held at any time if called by the Managing Director or a majority of the Capital Members voting on a per capita basis. At the discretion of the Managing

Director, Income Members may be invited to any meeting of the Capital Members.

(f) Only Capital Members present in person at a

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meeting shall have the right to vote thereat. Each Capital Member shall cast only one (1) vote on any matter to be decided by the Capital Members at the meeting. Ordinarily, the vote is public. However, at the request of any Capital Member, or whenever it is expressly required in this Agreement, the vote on any

matter may be taken by secret ballot.

(g) Notwithstanding sub-section (b) above, if for any reason any Capital Member is unable to attend a

meeting of the Capital Members at which a vote by ballot is to be taken on any matter requiring a vote, the Capital Member may vote by mail or by proxy,

subject to the following conditions:

(i) The Capital Member shall timely notify the Managing Director of the intention to vote by proxy, and the name of the Capital Member who will have the proxy.