equal protection & search and seizure consti digests

8/13/2019 equal protection & search and seizure Consti Digests

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EQUAL PROTECTIONPeople of the Philippines vs Cayat

EqualProtectionRequisites of a Valid Classification Bar

from Drinking Gin

In 1937, there exists a law (Act 1639) which bars native non-

Christians from drinking gin or any other liquor outside of

their customary alcoholic drinks. Cayat, a native of the

Cordillera, was caught with an A-1-1 gin in violation of this

Act. He was then charged and sentenced to pay P5.00 and to

be imprisoned in case of insolvency. Cayat admitted his guilt

but he challenged the constitutionality of the said Act. He

averred, among others, that it violated his right to equal

protection afforded by the constitution. He said this an

attempt to treat them with discrimination or mark them as

inferior or less capable race and less entitled will meet with

their instant challenge. The law sought to distinguish and

classify native non-Christians from Christians.

ISSUE: Whether or not the said Act violates the equalprotection clause.

HELD: The SC ruled that Act 1639 is valid for it met the

requisites of a reasonable classification. The SC emphasizedthat it is not enough that the members of a group have the

characteristics that distinguish them from others. The

classification must, as an indispensable requisite, not be

arbitrary. The requisites to be complied with are;

(1) must rest on substantial distinctions;

(2) must be germane to the purposes of the law;

(3) must not be limited to existing conditions only; and

(4) must apply equally to all members of the same class.

Act No. 1639 satisfies these requirements. The classificationrests on real or substantial, not merely imaginary or

whimsical, distinctions. It is not based upon accident of birth

or parentage. The law, then, does not seek to mark the non-

Christian tribes as an inferior or less capable race. On the

contrary, all measures thus far adopted in the promotion of

the public policy towards them rest upon a recognition of

their inherent right to equality in the enjoyment of those

privileges now enjoyed by their Christian brothers. But as

there can be no true equality before the law, if there is, in

fact, no equality in education, the government has

endeavored, by appropriate measures, to raise their culture

and civilization and secure for them the benefits of theirprogress, with the ultimate end in view of placing them with

their Christian brothers on the basis of true equality.

DUMLAO vs. COMELEC95 SCRA 392L-52245January 22, 1980

Facts: Petitioner Patricio Dumlao, is a former Governor ofNueva Vizcaya, who has filed his certificate of candidacy for

said position of Governor in the forthcoming elections of

January 30, 1980. Petitioner Dumlao specifically questions theconstitutionality of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 as

discriminatory and contrary to the equal protection and due

process guarantees of the Constitution which provides that

.Any retired elective provincial city or municipal officia

who has received payment of the retirement benefits to

which he is entitled under the law and who shall have been

65 years of age at the commencement of the term of office to

which he seeks to be elected shall not be qualified to run for

the same elective local office from which he has retired. He

likewise alleges that the provision is directed insidiously

against him, and is based on purely arbitrary grounds,

therefore, class legislation.

Issue:Whether or not 1st paragraph of section 4 of BP 22 isvalid.

Held: In the case of a 65-year old elective local official, whohas retired from a provincial, city or municipal office, there is

reason to disqualify him from running for the same office

from which he had retired, as provided for in the challenged

provision. The need for new blood assumes relevance. The

tiredness of the retiree for government work is present, and

what is emphatically significant is that the retired employee

has already declared himself tired and unavailable for the

same government work, but, which, by virtue of a change ofmind, he would like to assume again. It is for this very reason

that inequality will neither result from the application of the

challenged provision. Just as that provision does not deny

equal protection, neither does it permit of such denial.

The equal protection clause does not forbid all lega

classification. What is proscribes is a classification which is

arbitrary and unreasonable. That constitutional guarantee is

not violated by a reasonable classification based upon

substantial distinctions, where the classification is germane to

the purpose of the low and applies to all those belonging to

the same class.

WHEREFORE, the first paragraph of section 4 of Batas

Pambansa Bilang 52 is hereby declared valid.


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Ramon Ceniza et al vs COMELEC, COA & National Treasurer

EqualProtectionGerrymandering

Gerrymandering is a term employed to describe an

apportionment of representative districts so contrived as to

give an unfair advantage to the party in power.

Pursuant to Batas Blg 51 (enacted 22 Dec 1979), COMELEC

adopted Resolution No. 1421 which effectively bars voters in

chartered cities (unless otherwise provided by their charter),

highly urbanized (those earning above P40 M) cities, andcomponent cities (whose charters prohibit them) from voting

in provincial elections. The City of Mandaue, on the other

hand, is a component city NOT a chartered one or a highly

urbanized one. So when COMELEC added Mandaue to the list

of 20 cities that cannot vote in provincial elections, Ceniza, in

behalf of the other members of DOERS (Democracy or

Extinction: Resolved to Succeed) questioned the

constitutionality of BB 51 and the COMELEC resolution. They

said that the regulation/restriction of voting being imposed is

a curtailment of the right to suffrage. Further, petitioners

claim that political and gerrymandering motives were behind

the passage of Batas Blg. 51 and Section 96 of the Charter of

Mandaue City. They contend that the Province of Cebu is

politically and historically known as an opposition bailiwick

and of the total 952,716 registered voters in the province,

close to one-third (1/3) of the entire province of Cebu would

be barred from voting for the provincial officials of the

province of Cebu. Ceniza also said that the constituents of

Mandaue never ratified their charter. Ceniza likewise aver

that Sec 3 of BB 885 insofar as it classifies cities including

Cebu City as highly urbanized as the only basis for not

allowing its electorate to vote for the provincial officials is

inherently and palpably unconstitutional in that such

classification is not based on substantial distinctions germane

to the purpose of the law which in effect provides for andregulates the exercise of the right of suffrage, and therefore

such unreasonable classification amounts to a denial of equal

protection.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is a violation of equalprotection.

HELD: The thrust of the 1973 Constitution is towards thefullest autonomy of local government units. In the

Declaration of Principles and State Policies, it is stated that

The State shall guarantee and promote the autonomy of

local government units to ensure their fullest development as

self-reliant communities. The petitioners allegation of

gerrymandering is of no merit, it has no factual or legal basis.

The Constitutional requirement that the creation, division,

merger, abolition, or alteration of the boundary of a province,

city, municipality, or barrio should be subject to the approval

by the majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the

governmental unit or units affected is a new requirement

that came into being only with the 1973 Constitution. It is

prospective in character and therefore cannot affect the

creation of the City of Mandaue which came into existence

on 21 June 1969.

The classification of cities into highly urbanized cities and

component cities on the basis of their regular annual income

is based upon substantial distinction. The revenue of a city

would show whether or not it is capable of existence and

development as a relatively independent social, economic

and political unit. It would also show whether the city has

sufficient economic or industrial activity as to warrant its

independence from the province where it is geographically

situated. Cities with smaller income need the continued

support of the provincial government thus justifying thecontinued participation of the voters in the election of

provincial officials in some instances.

The petitioners also contend that the voters in Mandaue City

are denied equal protection of the law since the voters in

other component cities are allowed to vote for provincia

officials. The contention is without merit. The practice of

allowing voters in one component city to vote for provincia

officials and denying the same privilege to voters in another

component city is a matter of legislative discretion which

violates neither the Constitution nor the voters right of

suffrage.

Rufino Nuez vs Sandiganbayan & the People of thePhilippines

EqualProtectionCreation of the Sandiganbayan

Nuez assails the validity of the PD 1486 creating the

Sandiganbayan as amended by PD 1606. He was accused

before the Sandiganbayan of estafa through falsification of

public and commercial documents committed in connivance

with his other co-accused, all public officials, in several cases

It is the claim of Nuez that PD1486, as amended, is violative

of the due process, equal protection, and ex post facto

clauses of the Constitution. He claims that the Sandiganbayanproceedings violates Nuezs right to equal protection

becauseappeal as a matter of right became minimized into

a mere matter of discretion;appeal likewise was shrunk and

limited only to questions of law, excluding a review of the

facts and trial evidence; and there is only one chance to

appeal conviction, by certiorari to the SC, instead of the

traditional two chances; while all other estafa indictees are

entitled to appeal as a matter of right covering both law and

facts and to two appellate courts, i.e., first to the CA and

thereafter to the SC.

ISSUE: Whether or not the creation of Sandiganbayan violatesequal protection insofar as appeals would be concerned.

HELD: The SC ruled against Nuez. The 1973 Constitution hadprovided for the creation of a special court that shall have

original jurisdiction over cases involving public officials

charged with graft and corruption. The constitution

specifically makes mention of the creation of a special court

the Sandiganbayan, precisely in response to a problem, the

urgency of which cannot be denied, namely, dishonesty in the

public service. It follows that those who may thereafter be

tried by such court ought to have been aware as far back as

January 17, 1973, when the present Constitution came into


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force, that a different procedure for the accused therein,

whether a private citizen as petitioner is or a public official, is

not necessarily offensive to the equal protection clause of the

Constitution. Further, the classification therein set forth met

the standard requiring that it must be based on substantial

distinctions which make real differences; it must be germane

to the purposes of the law; it must not be limited to existing

conditions only, and must apply equally to each member of

the class. Further still, decisions in the Sandiganbayan are

reached by a unanimous decision from 3 justices - a showingthat decisions therein are more conceivably carefully reached

than other trial courts.

Justice Makasiar (concurring & dissenting)Persons who are charged with estafa or malversation of funds

not belonging to the government or any of its

instrumentalities or agencies are guaranteed the right to

appeal to two appellate courts first, to the CA, and

thereafter to the SC. Estafa and malversation of private funds

are on the same category as graft and corruption committed

by public officers, who, under the decree creating the

Sandiganbayan, are only allowed one appeal to the SC (par.3, Sec. 7, P.D. No. 1606).The fact that the Sandiganbayan is acollegiate trial court does not generate any substantial

distinction to validate this invidious discrimination. Three

judges sitting on the same case does not ensure a quality of

justice better than that meted out by a trial court presided by

one judge. The ultimate decisive factors are the intellectual

competence, industry and integrity of the trial judge. But a

review by two appellate tribunals of the same case certainly

ensures better justice to the accused and to the people.

Then again, par 3 of Sec 7 of PD 1606, by providing that the

decisions of the Sandiganbayan can only be reviewed by the

SC through certiorari, likewise limits the reviewing power ofthe SC only to question of jurisdiction or grave abuse of

discretion, and not questions of fact nor findings or

conclusions of the trial court. In other criminal cases involving

offenses not as serious as graft and corruption, all questions

of fact and of law are reviewed, first by the CA, and then by

the SC. To repeat, there is greater guarantee of justice in

criminal cases when the trial courts judgment is subject to

review by two appellate tribunals, which can appraise the

evidence and the law with greater objectivity, detachment

and impartiality unaffected as they are by views and

prejudices that may be engendered during the trial.

Limiting the power of review by the SC of convictions by the

Sandiganbayan only to issues of jurisdiction or grave abuse of

discretion, likewise violates the constitutional presumption of

innocence of the accused, which presumption can only be

overcome by proof beyond reasonable doubt (Sec. 19, Art. IV,

1973 Constitution).

PASEI vs DRILON163 SCRA 380

Facts:Petitioner, Phil association of Service Exporters, Inc., isengaged principally in the recruitment of Filipino workers,

male and female of overseas employment. It challenges the

constitutional validity of Dept. Order No. 1 (1998) of DOLE

entitled Guidelines Governing the Temporary Suspension of

Deployment of Filipino Domestic and Household Workers. It

claims that such order is a discrimination against males andfemales. The Order does not apply to all Filipino workers but

only to domestic helpers and females with similar skills, and

that it is in violation of the right to travel, it also being an

invalid exercise of the lawmaking power. Further, PASEI

invokes Sec 3 of Art 13 of the Constitution, providing for

worker participation in policy and decision-making processes

affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by law.

Thereafter the Solicitor General on behalf of DOLE submitting

to the validity of the challenged guidelines involving the

police power of the State and informed the court that the

respondent have lifted the deployment ban in some states

where there exists bilateral agreement with the Philippines

and existing mechanism providing for sufficient safeguards to

ensure the welfare and protection of the Filipino workers.

Issue:Whether or not there has been a valid classification inthe challenged Department Order No. 1.

Decision:SC in dismissing the petition ruled that there hasbeen valid classification, the Filipino female domestics

working abroad were in a class by themselves, because of the

special risk to which their class was exposed. There is no

question that Order No.1 applies only to female contract

workers but it does not thereby make an undue

discrimination between sexes. It is well settled hat equalitybefore the law under the constitution does not import a

perfect identity of rights among all men and women. It

admits of classification, provided that:

1. Such classification rests on substantial distinctions

2. That they are germane to the purpose of the law

3. They are not confined to existing conditions

4. They apply equally to al members of the same class

In the case at bar, the classifications made, rest on substantia

distinctions.

Dept. Order No. 1 does not impair the right to travel. The

consequence of the deployment ban has on the right to trave

does not impair the right, as the right to travel is subjects

among other things, to the requirements of public safety as

may be provided by law. Deployment ban of female domestic

helper is a valid exercise of police power. Police power as

been defined as the state authority to enact legislation that

may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to

promote general welfare. Neither is there merit in the

contention that Department Order No. 1 constitutes an

invalid exercise of legislative power as the labor code vest the

DOLE with rule making powers.


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Philippine Judges Association et al vs DOTC Secretary PetePrado et al

EqualProtectionFranking Privilege of the Judiciary

A report came in showing that available data from the Postal

Service Office show that from January 1988 to June 1992, the

total volume of frank mails amounted to P90,424,175.00, of

this amount, frank mails from the Judiciary and other

agencies whose functions include the service of judicial

processes, such as the intervenor, the Department of Justice

and the Office of the Ombudsman, amounted to P86,481,759.Frank mails coming from the Judiciary amounted to

P73,574,864.00, and those coming from the petitioners

reached the total amount of P60,991,431.00. The

postmasters conclusion is that because of this considerable

volume of mail from the Judiciary, the franking privilege must

be withdrawn from it. Acting from this, Prado implemented

Circ. No. 9228 as the IRR for the said law. PJA assailed the

said law complaining that the law would adversely impair the

communication within the judiciary as it may impair the

sending of judicial notices. PJA averred that the law is

discriminatory as it disallowed the franking privilege of the

Judiciary but has not disallowed the franking privilege of

others such as the executive, former executives and their

widows among others.

ISSUE: Whether or not there has been a violation of equalprotection before the law.

HELD: The SC ruled that there is a violation of the equalprotection clause. The judiciary needs the franking privilege

so badly as it is vital to its operation. Evident to that need is

the high expense allotted to the judiciarys franking needs.

The Postmaster cannot be sustained in contending that the

removal of the franking privilege from the judiciary is in order

to cut expenditure. This is untenable for if the Postmaster

would intend to cut expenditure by removing the frankingprivilege of the judiciary, then they should have removed the

franking privilege all at once from all the other departments.

If the problem of the respondents is the loss of revenues from

the franking privilege, the remedy is to withdraw it altogether

from all agencies of the government, including those who do

not need it. The problem is not solved by retaining it for some

and withdrawing it from others, especially where there is no

substantial distinction between those favored, which may or

may not need it at all, and the Judiciary, which definitely

needs it. The problem is not solved by violating the

Constitution.

The equal protection clause does not require the universal

application of the laws on all persons or things without

distinction. This might in fact sometimes result in unequal

protection, as where, for example, a law prohibiting mature

books to all persons, regardless of age, would benefit the

morals of the youth but violate the liberty of adults. What the

clause requires is equality among equals as determined

according to a valid classification. By classification is meant

the grouping of persons or things similar to each other in

certain particulars and different from all others in these same

particulars.

In lumping the Judiciary with the other offices from which the

franking privilege has been withdrawn, Sec 35 has placed the

courts of justice in a category to which it does not belong. If it

recognizes the need of the President of the Philippines and

the members of Congress for the franking privilege, there is

no reason why it should not recognize a similar and in fact

greater need on the part of the Judiciary for such privilege.

Ormoc Sugar Company Inc. vs Ormoc City et al

EqualProtectionIn 1964, Ormoc City passed a bill which read: There shall be

paid to the City Treasurer on any and all productions of

centrifugal sugar milled at the Ormoc Sugar Company

Incorporated, in Ormoc City a municipal tax equivalent to one

per centum (1%) per export sale to the United States of

America and other foreign countries. Though referred to as a

production tax, the imposition actually amounts to a tax on

the export of centrifugal sugar produced at Ormoc Sugar

Company, Inc. For production of sugar alone is not taxable;

the only time the tax applies is when the sugar produced is

exported. Ormoc Sugar paid the tax (P7,087.50) in protest

averring that the same is violative of Sec 2287 of the Revised

Administrative Code which provides: It shall not be in the

power of the municipal council to impose a tax in any form

whatever, upon goods and merchandise carried into the

municipality, or out of the same, and any attempt to impose

an import or export tax upon such goods in the guise of an

unreasonable charge for wharfage, use of bridges or

otherwise, shall be void. And that the ordinance is violative

to equal protection as it singled out Ormoc Sugar As being

liable for such tax impost for no other sugar mill is found in

the city.

ISSUE: Whether or not there has been a violation of equa

protection.HELD: The SC held in favor of Ormoc Sugar. The SC noted thateven if Sec 2287 of the RAC had already been repealed by a

latter statute (Sec 2 RA 2264) which effectively authorized

LGUs to tax goods and merchandise carried in and out of thei

turf, the act of Ormoc City is still violative of equal protection

The ordinance is discriminatory for it taxes only centrifuga

sugar produced and exported by the Ormoc Sugar Company

Inc. and none other. At the time of the taxing ordinances

enactment, Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc., it is true, was the

only sugar central in the city of Ormoc. Still, the classification,

to be reasonable, should be in terms applicable to future

conditions as well. The taxing ordinance should not be

singular and exclusive as to exclude any subsequently

established sugar central, of the same class as plaintiff, from

the coverage of the tax. As it is now, even if later a simila

company is set up, it cannot be subject to the tax because the

ordinance expressly points only to Ormoc Sugar Company

Inc. as the entity to be levied upon.


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Francisco Tatad et al vs Secretary of Energy

EqualProtectionOil Deregulation Law

Considering that oil is not endemic to this country, history

shows that the government has always been finding ways to

alleviate the oil industry. The government created laws

accommodate these innovations in the oil industry. One such

law is the Downstream Oil Deregulation Act of 1996 or RA

8180. This law allows that any person or entity may import

or purchase any quantity of crude oil and petroleum products

from a foreign or domestic source, lease or own and operaterefineries and other downstream oil facilities and market

such crude oil or use the same for his own requirement,

subject only to monitoring by the Department of Energy.

Tatad assails the constitutionality of the law. He claims,

among others, that the imposition of different tariff rates on

imported crude oil and imported refined petroleum products

violates the equal protection clause. Tatad contends that the

3%-7% tariff differential unduly favors the three existing oil

refineries and discriminates against prospective investors in

the downstream oil industry who do not have their own

refineries and will have to source refined petroleum products

from abroad.3% is to be taxed on unrefined crude products

and 7% on refined crude products.

ISSUE: Whether or not RA 8180 is constitutional.HELD: The SC declared the unconstitutionality of RA 8180because it violated Sec 19 of Art 12 of the Constitution. It

violated that provision because it only strengthens oligopoly

which is contrary to free competition. It cannot be denied

that our downstream oil industry is operated and controlled

by an oligopoly, a foreign oligopoly at that. Petron, Shell and

Caltex stand as the only major league players in the oil

market. All other players belong to the lilliputian league. As

the dominant players, Petron, Shell and Caltex boast of

existing refineries of various capacities. The tariff differentialof 4% therefore works to their immense benefit. Yet, this is

only one edge of the tariff differential. The other edge cuts

and cuts deep in the heart of their competitors. It erects a

high barrier to the entry of new players. New players that

intend to equalize the market power of Petron, Shell and

Caltex by building refineries of their own will have to spend

billions of pesos. Those who will not build refineries but

compete with them will suffer the huge disadvantage of

increasing their product cost by 4%. They will be competing

on an uneven field. The argument that the 4% tariff

differential is desirable because it will induce prospective

players to invest in refineries puts the cart before the horse.

The first need is to attract new players and they cannot be

attracted by burdening them with heavy disincentives.

Without new players belonging to the league of Petron, Shell

and Caltex, competition in our downstream oil industry is an

idle dream.

RA 8180 is unconstitutional on the ground inter alia that it

discriminated against the new players insofar as it placed

them at a competitive disadvantage vis--vis the established

oil companies by requiring them to meet certain conditions

already being observed by the latter.

CENTRAL BANK (NOW BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS)EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., PETITIONER, vs. BANGKOSENTRAL NG PILIPINAS AND THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARYRESPONDENTS.

FACTS:

On July 3, 1993, R.A. No. 7653 (the New Central Bank Act)

took effect. It abolished the old Central Bank of the

Philippines, and created a new BSP.

On June 8, 2001, almost eight years after the effectivity of

R.A. No. 7653, petitioner Central Bank (now BSP) Employees

Association, Inc., filed a petition for prohibition against BSP

and the Executive Secretary of the Office of the President, to

restrain respondents from further implementing the last

proviso in Section 15(c), Article II of R.A. No. 7653, on the

ground that it is unconstitutional.

Article II, Section 15(c) of R.A. No. 7653 provides:

Section 15, Exercise of Authority -In the exercise of its

authority, the Monetary Board shall:

(c) Establish a human resource management system which

shall govern the selection, hiring, appointment, transfer

promotion, or dismissal of all personnel. Such system shal

aim to establish professionalism and excellence at all levels of

the Bangko Sentral in accordance with sound principles of

management.

A compensation structure, based on job evaluation studies

and wage surveys and subject to the Boards approval, shal

be instituted as an integral component of the Bangko

Sentrals human resource development program: ProvidedThat the Monetary Board shall make its own system conform

as closely as possible with the principles provided for unde

Republic Act No. 6758 [Salary Standardization Act]. Provided

however, that compensation and wage structure of

employees whose positions fall under salary grade 19 and

below shall be in accordance with the rates prescribed unde

Republic Act No. 6758. The thrust of petitioners challenge is

that the above proviso makes an unconstitutional cut

between two classes of employees in the BSP, viz: (1) the BSP

officers or those exempted from the coverage of the Salary

Standardization Law (SSL) (exempt class); and (2) the rank-

and-file (Salary Grade [SG] 19 and below), or those not

exempted from the coverage of the SSL (non-exempt class). It

is contended that this classification is a classic case of class

legislation, allegedly not based on substantial distinctions

which make real differences, but solely on the SG of the BSP

personnels position.

Petitioner also claims that it is not germane to the

purposes of Section 15(c), Article II of R.A. No. 7653, the most

important of which is to establish professionalism and

excellence at all levels in the BSP. Petitioner offers the

following sub-set of arguments:


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a. the legislative history of R.A. No. 7653 shows that the

questioned proviso does not appear in the original and

amended versions of House Bill No. 7037, nor in the original

version of Senate Bill No. 1235;

b. subjecting the compensation of the BSP rank-and-file

employees to the rate prescribed by the SSL actually defeats

the purpose of the law of establishing professionalism and

excellence eat all levels in the BSP;

c. the assailed proviso was the product of amendmentsintroduced during the deliberation of Senate Bill No. 1235,

without showing its relevance to the objectives of the law,

and even admitted by one senator as discriminatory against

low-salaried employees of the BSP;

d. GSIS, LBP, DBP and SSS personnel are all exempted from

the coverage of the SSL; thus within the class of rank-and-file

personnel of government financial institutions (GFIs), the BSP

rank-and-file are also discriminated upon; and

e. the assailed proviso has caused the demoralization

among the BSP rank-and-file and resulted in the gross

disparity between their compensation and that of the BSP

officers.

In sum, petitioner posits that the classification is not

reasonable but arbitrary and capricious, and violates the

equal protection clause of the Constitution. Petitioner also

stresses: (a) that R.A. No. 7653 has a separability clause,

which will allow the declaration of the unconstitutionality of

the proviso in question without affecting the other

provisions; and (b) the urgency and propriety of the petition,

as some 2,994 BSP rank-and-file employees have been

prejudiced since 1994 when the proviso was implemented.

Petitioner concludes that: (1) since the inequitable proviso

has no force and effect of law, respondents implementation

of such amounts to lack of jurisdiction; and (2) it has noappeal nor any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in

the ordinary course except through this petition for

prohibition, which this Court should take cognizance of,

considering the transcendental importance of the legal issue

involved.

Respondent BSP, in its comment, contends that the

provision does not violate the equal protection clause and

can stand the constitutional test, provided it is construed in

harmony with other provisions of the same law, such as

fiscal and administrative autonomy of BSP, and the

mandate of the Monetary Board to establish professionalism

and excellence at all levels in accordance with sound

principles of management.

The Solicitor General, on behalf of respondent Executive

Secretary, also defends the validity of the provision. Quite

simplistically, he argues that the classification is based on

actual and real differentiation, even as it adheres to the

enunciated policy of R.A. No. 7653 to establish

professionalism and excellence within the BSP subject to

prevailing laws and policies of the national government.

ISSUE:

Thus, the sole - albeit significant - issue to be resolved in

this case is whether the last paragraph of Section 15(c)

Article II of R.A. No. 7653, runs afoul of the constitutiona

mandate that "No person shall be . . . denied the equa

protection of the laws."

RULING:

A. UNDER THE PRESENT STANDARDS OF EQUAL

PROTECTION, SECTION 15(c), ARTICLE II OF R.A. NO. 7653 IS

VALID.

Jurisprudential standards for equal protection challenges

indubitably show that the classification created by the

questioned proviso, on its face and in its operation, bears no

constitutional infirmities.

It is settled in constitutional law that the "equal protection"

clause does not prevent the Legislature from establishing

classes of individuals or objects upon which different rules

shall operate - so long as the classification is not

unreasonable.

B. THE ENACTMENT, HOWEVER, OF SUBSEQUENT LAWS

EXEMPTING ALL OTHER RANK-AND-FILE EMPLOYEES OF GFIs

FROM THE SSL - RENDERS THE CONTINUED APPLICATION OF

THE CHALLENGED PROVISION A VIOLATION OF THE EQUAL

PROTECTION CLAUSE.

While R.A. No. 7653 started as a valid measure well within

the legislatures power, we hold that the enactment ofsubsequent laws exempting all rank-and-file employees o

other GFIs leeched all validity out of the challenged proviso.

The constitutionality of a statute cannot, in every instance

be determined by a mere comparison of its provisions with

applicable provisions of the Constitution, since the statute

may be constitutionally valid as applied to one set of facts

and invalid in its application to another.

A statute valid at one time may become void at another

time because of altered circumstances. Thus, if a statute in its

practical operation becomes arbitrary or confiscatory, its

validity, even though affirmed by a former adjudication, is

open to inquiry and investigation in the light of changed

conditions.

The foregoing provisions impregnably institutionalize in this

jurisdiction the long honored legal truism of "equal pay fo

equal work." Persons who work with substantially equa

qualifications, skill, effort and responsibility, under similar

conditions, should be paid similar salaries.


7/37

Congress retains its wide discretion in providing for a valid

classification, and its policies should be accorded recognition

and respect by the courts of justice except when they run

afoul of the Constitution. The deference stops where the

classification violates a fundamental right, or prejudices

persons accorded special protection by the Constitution.

When these violations arise, this Court must discharge its

primary role as the vanguard of constitutional guaranties, and

require a stricter and more exacting adherence to

constitutional limitations. Rational basis should not suffice.

Furthermore, concerns have been raised as to the propriety

of a ruling voiding the challenged provision. It has been

proffered that the remedy of petitioner is not with this Court,

but with Congress, which alone has the power to erase any

inequity perpetrated by R.A. No. 7653. Indeed, a bill

proposing the exemption of the BSP rank-and-file from the

SSL has supposedly been filed.

Under most circumstances, the Court will exercise judicial

restraint in deciding questions of constitutionality,

recognizing the broad discretion given to Congress in

exercising its legislative power. Judicial scrutiny would be

based on the rational basis test, and the legislative

discretion would be given deferential treatment.

But if the challenge to the statute is premised on the denial

of a fundamental right or the perpetuation of prejudice

against persons favored by the Constitution with special

protection, judicial scrutiny ought to be more strict. A weak

and watered down view would call for the abdication of this

Courts solemn duty to strike down any law repugnant to the

Constitution and the rights it enshrines. This is true whether

the actor committing the unconstitutional act is a private

person or the government itself or one of itsinstrumentalities. Oppressive acts will be struck down

regardless of the character or nature of the actor.

Accordingly, when the grant of power is qualified, conditional

or subject to limitations, the issue on whether or not the

prescribed qualifications or conditions have been met, or the

limitations respected, is justifiable or non-political, the crux of

the problem being one of legality or validity of the contested

act, not its wisdom. Otherwise, said qualifications, conditions

or limitations - particularly those prescribed or imposed by

the Constitution - would be set at naught. What is more, the

judicial inquiry into such issue and the settlement thereof are

the main functions of courts of justice under the Presidential

form of government adopted in our 1935 Constitution, and

the system of checks and balances, one of its basic

predicates. As a consequence, we have neither the authority

nor the discretion to decline passing upon said issue, but are

under the ineluctable obligation - made particularly more

exacting and peremptory by our oath, as members of the

highest Court of the land, to support and defend the

Constitution - to settle it.

In the case at bar, the challenged proviso operates on the

basis of the salary grade or officer-employee status. It is akin

to a distinction based on economic class and status, with the

higher grades as recipients of a benefit specifically withheld

from the lower grades. Officers of the BSP now receive highe

compensation packages that are competitive with the

industry, while the poorer, low-salaried employees are

limited to the rates prescribed by the SSL. The implications

are quite disturbing: BSP rank-and-file employees are paid

the strictly regimented rates of the SSL while employees

higher in rank - possessing higher and better education and

opportunities for career advancement - are given highercompensation packages to entice them to stay. Considering

that majority, if not all, the rank-and-file employees consist o

people whose status and rank in life are less and limited

especially in terms of job marketability, it is they - and not the

officers - who have the real economic and financial need for

the adjustment This is in accord with the policy of the

Constitution "to free the people from poverty, provide

adequate social services, extend to them a decent standard

of living, and improve the quality of life for all. Any act of

Congress that runs counter to this constitutional desideratum

deserves strict scrutiny by this Court before it can pass

muster.

To be sure, the BSP rank-and-file employees merit greater

concern from this Court. They represent the more impotent

rank-and-file government employees who, unlike employees

in the private sector, have no specific right to organize as a

collective bargaining unit and negotiate for better terms and

conditions of employment, nor the power to hold a strike to

protest unfair labor practices. These BSP rank-and-file

employees represent the politically powerless and they

should not be compelled to seek a political solution to their

unequal and iniquitous treatment. Indeed, they have waited

for many years for the legislature to act. They cannot be

asked to wait some more for discrimination cannot be givenany waiting time. Unless the equal protection clause of the

Constitution is a mere platitude, it is the Courts duty to save

them from reasonless discrimination.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, we hold that the continued operation

and implementation of the last proviso of Section 15(c),

Article II of Republic Act No. 7653 is unconstitutional.

LAO ICHONG VS JAIME HERNANDEZ

Constitutional Law Treaties May Be Superseded by

Municipal Laws in the Exercise of Police Power

Lao Ichong is a Chinese businessman who entered the

country to take advantage of business opportunities herein

abound (then) particularly in the retail business. For some

time he and his fellow Chinese businessmen enjoyed a

monopoly in the local market in Pasay. Until in June 1954

when Congress passed the RA 1180 or the Retail Trade

Nationalization Act the purpose of which is to reserve to

Filipinos the right to engage in the retail business. Ichong

then petitioned for the nullification of the said Act on the

ground that it contravened several treaties concluded by the

RP which, according to him, violates the equal protection

clause (pacta sund servanda). He said that as a Chinese


8/37

businessman engaged in the business here in the country

who helps in the income generation of the country he should

be given equal opportunity.

ISSUE: Whether or not a law may invalidate or supersedetreaties or generally accepted principles.

HELD: Yes, a law may supersede a treaty or a generallyaccepted principle. In this case, there is no conflict at all

between the raised generally accepted principle and with RA

1180. The equal protection of the law clause does notdemand absolute equality amongst residents; it merely

requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like

circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred

and liabilities enforced; and, that the equal protection clause

is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those

persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all

persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exist for

making a distinction between those who fall within such class

and those who do not.

For the sake of argument, even if it would be assumed that a

treaty would be in conflict with a statute then the statute

must be upheld because it represented an exercise of the

police power which, being inherent could not be bargained

away or surrendered through the medium of a treaty. Hence,

Ichong can no longer assert his right to operate his market

stalls in the Pasay city market.

PEOPLE VS. DELA PIEDRA

FACTS: On the afternoon of January 30, 1994, Maria LourdesModesto and Nancy Araneta together with her friends

Jennelyn Baez, and Sandra Aquino went to the house of

Jasmine Alejandro, after having learned that a woman is

there to recruit job applicants for Singapore. Carol dela

Piedra was already briefing some people when they arrived.Jasmine, on the other hand, welcomed and asked them to sit

down.

They listened to the recruiter who was then talking

about the breakdown of the fees involved: P30,000 for the

visa and the round trip ticket, and P5,000 as placement fee

and for the processing of the papers. The initial payment was

P2,000, while P30,000 will be by salary deduction. The

recruiter said that she was recruiting nurses for Singapore.

Araneta, her friends and Lourdes then filled up bio-

data forms and were required to submit pictures and a

transcript of records. After the interview, Lourdes gave theinitial payment of P2,000 to Jasmine, who assured her that

she was authorized to receive the money.

Meanwhile, in the morning of the said date, Erlie

Ramos, Attorney II of the Philippine Overseas Employment

Agency (POEA), received a telephone call from an

unidentified woman inquiring about the legitimacy of the

recruitment conducted by a certain Mrs. Carol Figueroa.

Ramos, whose duties include the surveillance of suspected

illegal recruiters, immediately contacted a friend, a certain

Mayeth Bellotindos, so they could both go the place where

the recruitment was reportedly being undertaken. Upon

arriving at the reported area at around 4:00 p.m., Bellotindos

entered the house and pretended to be an applicant. Ramos

remained outside and stood on the pavement, from where he

was able to see around six (6) persons in the sala. Ramos

even heard a woman, identified as Carol Figueroa, talk about

the possible employment she has to provide in Singapore and

the documents that the applicants have to comply with

Fifteen (15) minutes later, Bellotindos came out with a bio

data form in hand.

Thereafter, Ramos conferred with a certain Capt

Mendoza of the Criminal Investigation Service (CIS) to

organize the arrest of the alleged illegal recruiter. A

surveillance team was then organized to confirm the report

After which, a raid was executed.

Consequently, Carol was charged and convicted by

the trial court of illegal recruitment.

Upon appeal, accused questions her conviction for

illegal recruitment in large scale and assails, as well, the

constitutionality of the law defining and penalizing said crimeFirst, accused submits that Article 13 (b) of the Labor Code

defining recruitment and placement is void for vagueness

and, thus, violates the due process clause.

The provision in question reads:

ART. 13. Definitions.(a) x x x.

(b) Recruitment andplacement refers to any

act of canvassing, enlisting,

contracting, transporting,

utilizing, hiring orprocuring workers, and

includes referrals, contract

services, promising or

advertising for

employment, locally or

abroad, whether for profit

or not: Provided, That anyperson or entity which, inany manner, offers orpromises for a feeemployment to two ormore persons shall be

deemed engaged inrecruitment andplacement.

ISSUES: (1) Whether or not sec. 13 (b) of P.D. 442, asamended, otherwise known as the illegal recruitment law is

unconstitutional as it violates the due process clause. (2Whether or not accused was denied equal protection and

therefore should be exculpated


9/37

HELD:

(1) For the First issue, dela Piedra submits that Article13 (b) of the Labor Code defining recruitment andplacement is void for vagueness and, thus,

violates the due process clause.Due process requires that the terms of a

penal statute must be sufficiently explicit to inform

those who are subject to it what conduct on their

part will render them liable to its penalties.

In support of her submission, dela Piedra

invokes People vs. Panis, where the Supreme Court

criticized the definition of recruitment and

placement.

The Court ruled, however, that her

reliance on the said case was misplaced.

The issue in Panis was whether, under the

proviso of Article 13 (b), the crime of illegal

recruitment could be committed only whenever

two or more persons are in any manner promised oroffered any employment for a fee. In this case, the

Court merely bemoaned the lack of records that

would help shed light on the meaning of the proviso.

The absence of such records notwithstanding, the

Court was able to arrive at a reasonable

interpretation of the proviso by applying principles

in criminal law and drawing from the language and

intent of the law itself. Section 13 (b), therefore, is

not a perfectly vague act whose obscurity is

evident on its face. If at all, the proviso therein is

merely couched in imprecise language that was

salvaged by proper construction. It is not void for

vagueness.

Dela Piedra further argues that the acts thatconstitute recruitment and placement suffer from

overbreadth since by merely referring a person

for employment, a person may be convicted ofillegal recruitment.

That Section 13 (b) encompasses what appellant

apparently considers as customary and harmless acts

such as labor or employment referral (referring

an applicant, according to appellant, foremployment to a prospective employer) does not

render the law overbroad. Evidently, Dela Piedra

misapprehends concept of overbreadth.

A statute may be said to be overbroad where it

operates to inhibit the exercise of individual

freedoms affirmatively guaranteed by the

Constitution, such as the freedom of speech or

religion. A generally worded statute, when

construed to punish conduct which cannot be

constitutionally punished is unconstitutionally vague

to the extent that it fails to give adequate warning o

the boundary between the constitutionally

permissible and the constitutionally impermissible

applications of the statute.

(2) Anent the second issue, Dela Piedra invokes theequal protection clause in her defense. Shepoints out that although the evidence purportedly

shows that Jasmine Alejandro handed out

application forms and even received Lourdes

Modestos payment, appellant was the only one

criminally charged. Alejandro, on the other hand,

remained scot-free. From this, she concludes that

the prosecution discriminated against her on

grounds of regional origins. Appellant is a

Cebuana while Alejandro is a Zamboanguea, and

the alleged crime took place in Zamboanga City.

The Supreme Court held that the

argument has no merit.

The prosecution of one guilty person whileothers equally guilty are not prosecuted, is not, by

itself, a denial of the equal protection of the laws.

The unlawful administration by officers of a statute

fair on its face, resulting in its unequal application

to those who are entitled to be treated alike, is not

a denial of equal protection unless there is shown

to be present in it an element of intentional or

purposeful discrimination. But a discriminatory

purpose is not presumed, there must be a showing

of clear and intentional discrimination.

In the case at bar, Dela Piedra has failed to

show that, in charging her, there was a clear and

intentional discrimination on the part of the

prosecuting officials.

Furthermore, the presumption is that the

prosecuting officers regularly performed their

duties, and this presumption can be overcome only

by proof to the contrary, not by mere speculation.

As said earlier, accused has not presented any

evidence to overcome this presumption. The mere

allegation that dela Piedra, a Cebuana, was charged

with the commission of a crime, while a

Zamboanguea, the guilty party in appellants eyes,

was not, is insufficient to support a conclusion that

the prosecution officers denied appellant equal

protection of the laws.


10/37

SEARCHES & SEIZURES

Amarga v. Abbas, 98 Phil. 739 (1956)

F: Municipal Judge Samulde conducted a preliminary

investigation (PI) of Arangale upon a complaint for robbery

filed by complainant Magbanua, alleging that Arangale

harvested palay from a portion of her land directly adjoining

Arangales land. After the PI, Samulde transmitted therecords of the case to Provincial Fiscal Salvani with his finding

that there is prima facie evidence of robbery as charged in

the complaint. Fiscal Salvani returned the records to Judge

Samulde on the ground that the transmittal of the records

was premature because Judge Samulde failed to include

the warrant of arrest (WA) against the accused. Judge

Samulde sent the records back to Fiscal Salvani stating that

although he found that a probable cause existed, he did not

believe that Arangale should be arrested. Fiscal Salvani filed a

mandamus case against Judge Samulde to compel him to

issue a WA. RTC dismissed the petition on the ground that the

fiscal had not shown that he has a clear, legal right to the

performance of the act to be required of the judge and that

the latter had an imperative duty to perform it. Neverhteless,

Judge Samulde was ordered to issue a WA in accordance with

Sec. 5, Rule 112 of the 1985 Rules of Court. ISSUE: Whether it

is mandatory for the investigating judge to issue a WA of the

accused in view of his finding, after conducting a PI, that

there exists prima facie evidence that the accused commited

the crime charged.

HELD: THE PURPOSE OF A PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION

DOES NOT CONTEMPLATE THE ISSUANCE OF A WA BY THE

INVESTIGATING JUDGE OR OFFICER. Under Rule 112 of the

1985 ROC, a PI is conducted on the basis of affidavits to

determine whether or not there is sufficient ground to holdthe accused for trial. To determine whether a WA should

issue, the investigating judge must have examined in writing

and under oath the complainant and his wirtnesses by

searching questions and answers; he must be satisfied that a

probable cause exists; and there must be a need to place the

accused under immediate custody in order not to frustrate

the ends of justice. It is not obligatory, but merely

discretionary, upon the investigating judge to issue a WA, for

the determination of whether it is necessary to arrest the

accused in order not to frustrate the ends of justice, is left to

his sound judgment or discretion. The fiscal should, instead,

have filed an information immediately so that the RTC may

issue a warrant for the arrest of the accused.

PLACER VS. JUDGE VILLANUEVA [126 SCRA 463; G.R. NOS. L-

60349-62; 29 DEC 1983]

Tuesday, February 03, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes

Labels:Case Digests,Political Law

Facts: Petitioners filed informations in the city court and theycertified that Preliminary Investigation and Examination had

been conducted and that prima facie cases have been found.

Upon receipt of said informations, respondent judge set the

hearing of the criminal cases to determine propriety of

issuance of warrants of arrest. After the hearing, respondent

issued an order requiring petitioners to submit to the court

affidavits of prosecution witnesses and other documentary

evidence in support of the informations to aid him in the

exercise of his power of judicial review of the findings of

probable cause by petitioners. Petitioners petitioned for

certiorari and mandamus to compel respondent to issue

warrants of arrest. They contended that the fiscals

certification in the informations of the existence of probable

cause constitutes sufficient justification for the judge to issuewarrants of arrest

Issue: Whether or Not respondent city judge may, for thepurpose of issuing warrants of arrest, compel the fiscal to

submit to the court the supporting affidavits and other

documentary evidence presented during the preliminary

investigation.

Held: Judge may rely upon the fiscals certification for theexistence of probable cause and on the basis thereof, issue a

warrant of arrest. But, such certification does not bind the

judge to come out with the warrant. The issuance of a

warrant is not a mere ministerial function; it calls for the

exercise of judicial discretion on the part of issuing

magistrate. Under Section 6 Rule 112 of the Rules of Court

the judge must satisfy himself of the existence of probable

cause before issuing a warrant of arrest. If on the face of the

information, the judge finds no probable cause, he may

disregard the fiscals certification and require submission of

the affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at the

conclusion as to existence of probable cause

Petition dismissed.

Soliven vs Makasiar

on October 29, 2011

Constitutional Law PresidentsImmunity From Suit Must

Be Invoked by the President

Beltran is among the petitioners in this case. He together with

others was charged for libel by the president. Cory herself

filed a complaint-affidavit against him and others. Makasia

averred that Cory cannot file a complaint affidavit because

this would defeat her immunity from suit. He grounded his

contention on the principle that a president cannot be sued

However, if a president would sue then the president wouldallow herself to be placed under the courts jurisdiction and

conversely she would be consenting to be sued back. Also,

considering the functions of a president, the president may

not be able to appear in court to be a witness for herself thus

she may be liable for contempt.

ISSUE: Whether or not such immunity can be invoked byBeltran, a person other than the president.

HELD: The rationale for the grant to the President of theprivilege of immunity from suit is to assure the exercise of

Presidential duties and functions free from any hindrance or
http://cofferette.blogspot.com/2009/02/placer-vs-judge-villanueva-126-scra-463.htmlhttp://cofferette.blogspot.com/2009/02/placer-vs-judge-villanueva-126-scra-463.htmlhttp://cofferette.blogspot.com/search/label/Case%20Digestshttp://cofferette.blogspot.com/search/label/Political%20Lawhttp://cofferette.blogspot.com/search/label/Political%20Lawhttp://cofferette.blogspot.com/search/label/Case%20Digestshttp://cofferette.blogspot.com/2009/02/placer-vs-judge-villanueva-126-scra-463.htmlhttp://cofferette.blogspot.com/2009/02/placer-vs-judge-villanueva-126-scra-463.html


11/37

distraction, considering that being the Chief Executive of the

Government is a job that, aside from requiring all of the

office-holders time, also demands undivided attention.

But this privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to the

President by virtue of the office and may be invoked only by

the holder of the office; not by any other person in the

Presidents behalf. Thus, an accused like Beltran et al, in a

criminal case in which the President is complainant cannot

raise the presidential privilege as a defense to prevent the

case from proceeding against such accused.

Moreover, there is nothing in our laws that would prevent

the President from waiving the privilege. Thus, if so minded

the President may shed the protection afforded by the

privilege and submit to the courts jurisdiction. The choice of

whether to exercise the privilege or to waive it is solely the

Presidents prerogative. It is a decision that cannot be

assumed and imposed by any other person.

Enrile vs Salazar

on October 30, 2011

Constitutional Law Political Question Restriction to the

exercise of judicial power

In February 1990, Sen Enrile was arrested. He was charged

together with Mr. & Mrs. Panlilio, and Honasan for the crime

of rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder

which allegedly occurred during their failed coup attempt.

Enrile was then brought to Camp Karingal. Enrile later filed

for the habeas corpus alleging that the crime being charged

against him is non existent. That he was charged with a

criminal offense in an information for which no complaint

was initially filed or preliminary investigation was conducted,hence was denied due process; denied his right to bail; and

arrested and detained on the strength of a warrant issued

without the judge who issued it first having personally

determined the existence of probable cause.

ISSUE: Whether or Enriles arrest is valid. HELD: Enrile filed for habeas corpus because he was deniedbail although ordinarily a charge of rebellion would entitle

one for bail. The crime of rebellion charged against him

however is complexed with murder and multiple frustrated

murders the intention of the prosecution was to make

rebellion in its most serious form so as to make the penalty

thereof in the maximum. The SC ruled that there is no such

crime as Rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated

murder. What Enrile et al can be charged of would be Simple

Rebellion because other crimes such as murder or all those

that may be necessary to the commission of rebellion is

absorbed hence he should be entitiled for bail. The SC

however noted that a petition for habeas corpus was not the

proper remedy so as to avail of bail. The proper step that

should have been taken was for Enrile to file a petition to be

admitted for bail. He should have exhausted all other efforts

before petitioning for habeas corpus. The SC further notes

that there is a need to restructure the law on rebellion as it is

being used apparently by others as a tool to disrupt the peace

and espouse violence. The SC can only act w/in the bounds of

the law. Thus SC said There is an apparent need to

restructure the law on rebellion, either to raise the penalty

therefor or to clearly define and delimit the other offenses to

be considered as absorbed thereby, so that it cannot be

conveniently utilized as the umbrella for every sort of illega

activity undertaken in its name. The Court has no power to

effect such change, for it can only interpret the law as it

stands at any given time, and what is needed lies beyondinterpretation. Hopefully, Congress will perceive the need for

promptly seizing the initiative in this matter, which is properly

within its province.

HO vs PEOPLE (1997)Panganiban, J.

FACTS On August 8, 1991, the Anti-Graft League of thePhilippines, represented by its chief prosecutor Atty

Reynaldo L. Bagatsing, filed with the Office of the

Ombudsman a complaint against Doris Teresa Ho, Rolando S

Narciso (petitioners in G.R. Nos. 106632 and 106678

respectively), Anthony Marden, Arsenio Benjamin Santos and

Leonardo Odoo. The complaint was for alleged violation o

Section 3 (g) of Republic Act 3019 prohibiting a public officer

from entering into any contract or transaction on behalf of

the government if it is manifestly and grossly

disadvantageous to the latter, whether or not the public

officer profited or will profit thereby.

According to the information, Rolando Narciso, being then

the Vice-President of the National Steel Corporation (NSC), a

government-owned or controlled corporation organized and

operating under the Philippine laws, and Doris Ho, the

President of National Marine Corporation (NMC), a private

corporation organized and operating under our Corporationlaw, was said to have entered without legal justification into a

negotiated contract of affreightment disadvantageous to the

NSC for the haulage of its products at the rate of

P129.50/MT, from Iligan City to Manila. Such contract was

entered into despite their full knowledge that the rate they

have agreed upon was much higher than those offered by the

Loadstar Shipping Company, Inc. (LSCI) and Premier Shipping

Lines, Inc. (PSLI), in the amounts of P109.56 and P123.00 pe

Metric Ton, respectively, in the public bidding, thereby giving

unwarranted benefits to the National Marine Corporation.

Ho and Narciso alleged that the Sandiganbayan, in

determining probable cause for the issuance of the warrant

for their arrest, merely relied on the information and the

resolution attached thereto, filed by the Ombudsman without

other supporting evidence, in violation of the requirements of

Section 2, Article III of the Constitution, and settled

jurisprudence. They contend that a judge, in personally

determining the existence of probable cause, must have

before him sufficient evidence submitted by the parties

other than the information filed by the investigating

prosecutor, to support his conclusion and justify the issuance


12/37

of an arrest warrant. Such evidence should not be merely

described in a prosecutors resolution.

Sandiganbayans Denial: Considering, therefore, that this

Court did not rely solely on the certification appearing in the

information in this case in the determination of whether

probable cause exists to justify the issuance of the warrant of

arrest but also on the basis predominantly shown by the facts

and evidence appearing in the resolution/memorandum of

responsible investigators/ prosecutors, then the recall of thewarrant of arrest, or the reconsideration sought for, cannot

be granted. More so, when the information, as filed, clearly

shows that it is sufficient in form and substance based on the

facts and evidence adduced by both parties during the

preliminary investigation. To require this Court to have the

entire record of the preliminary investigation to be produced

before it, including the evidence submitted by the

complainant and the accused-respondents, would appear to

be an exercise in futility.

ISSUE May a judge determine probable cause and issue awarrant of arrest solely on the basis of the resolution of the

prosecutor (in the instant case, the Office of the Special

Prosecutor of the Ombudsman) who conducted the

preliminary investigation, without having before him any of

the evidence (such as complainants affidavit, respondents

counter-affidavit, exhibits, etc.) which may have been

submitted at the preliminary investigation?

DECISION & RATIO NO.

Art III Section 2, 1987 Constitution: The right of thepeople to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and

effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of

whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable,

and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issueexcept upon probable cause to be determined personally

by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation

of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce

and particularly describing the place to be searched and

the persons or things to be seized. (Art III Section 2, 1987

Constitution)

The word personally does not appear in the

corresponding provisions of our previous

Constitutions. This emphasis shows the present

Constitutions intent to place a greater degree of

responsibility upon trial judges than that imposed

under the previous Charters.

Soliven vs. Makasiar: In satisfying himself of theexistence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant

of arrest, the judge is not required to personally examine

the complainant and his witnesses. Following

established doctrine and procedure, he shall: (1)

personally evaluate the report and the supporting

documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the

existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof,

issue a warrant of arrest; or (2) if on the basis thereof he

finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscals

report and require the submission of supporting

affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a

conclusion as to the existence of probable cause.

People vs. Inting: There is a difference between thejudges goal from that of the prosecutors.

First, the determination of probable cause is a

function of the Judge. It is not for the Provincia

Fiscal or Prosecutor or for the Election Supervisor to

ascertain.Second, the preliminary inquiry made by a

Prosecutor does not bind the Judge. It merely assists

him to make the determination of probable cause.

Third, Judges and Prosecutors alike should

distinguish the preliminary inquiry which determines

probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of

arrest from the preliminary investigation proper

which ascertains whether the offender should be

held for trial or released. Even if the two inquiries

are conducted in the course of one and the same

proceeding, there should be no confusion about the

objectives.

The Court, in this case, reiterated and elaborated on thedoctrine laid down in People vs. Inting and ruled that:

First, as held in Inting, the determination o

probable cause by the prosecutor is for a purpose

different from that which is to be made by the judge

Whether there is reasonable ground to believe that

the accused is guilty of the offense charged and

should be held for trial is what the prosecutor passes

upon. The judge, on the other hand, determine

whether a warrant of arrest should be issued against

the accused, i.e. whether there is a necessity for

placing him under immediate custody in order not tofrustrate the ends of justice. Thus, even if both

should base their findings on one and the same

proceeding or evidence, there should be no

confusion as to their distinct objectives.

Second, since their objectives are different, the

judge cannot rely solely on the report of the

prosecutor in finding probable cause to justify the

issuance of a warrant of arrest. Obviously and

understandably, the contents of the prosecutors

report will support his own conclusion that there is

reason to charge the accused of an offense and hold

him for trial. However, the judge must decide

independently. Hence, he must have supporting

evidence, other than the prosecutors bare report

upon which to legally sustain his own findings on the

existence (or nonexistence) of probable cause to

issue an arrest order. This responsibility o

determining personally and independently the

existence or nonexistence of probable cause is

lodged in him by no less than the most basic law o

the land. Parenthetically, the prosecutor could ease

the burden of the judge and speed up the litigation

process by forwarding to the latter not only the


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information and his bare resolution finding probable

cause, but also so much of the records and the

evidence on hand as to enable His Honor to make his

personal and separate judicial finding on whether to

issue a warrant of arrest

Lastly, it is not required that the complete or

entire records of the case during the preliminary

investigation be submitted to and examined by the

judge. We do not intend to unduly burden trial

courts by obliging them to examine the completerecords of every case all the time simply for the

purpose of ordering the arrest of an accused. What

is required, rather, is that the judge must have

sufficient supporting documents (such as the

complaint, affidavits, counter-affidavits, sworn

statements of witnesses or transcripts of

stenographic notes, if any) upon which to make his

independent judgment or, at the very least, upon

which to verify the findings of the prosecutor as to

the existence of probable cause. The point is: he

cannot rely solely and entirely on the prosecutors

recommendation, as Respondent Court did in this

case. Although the prosecutor enjoys the legal

presumption of regularity in the performance of his

official duties and functions, which in turn gives his

report the presumption of accuracy, the

Constitution, we repeat, commands the judge to

personally determine probable cause in the issuance

of warrants of arrest. This Court has consistently

held that a judge fails in his bounden duty if he relies

merely on the certification or the report of the

investigating officer.

IN THE INSTANT CASE, the public respondent relied fully and

completely upon the resolution of the graft investigationofficer and the memorandum of the reviewing prosecutor,

attached to the information filed before it, and its conjecture

that the Ombudsman would not have approved their

recommendation without supporting evidence. It had no

other documents from either the complainant (the Anti-Graft

League of the Philippines) or the People from which to

sustain its own conclusion that probable cause exists.

Respondent Court palpably committed grave abuse of

discretion in ipso facto issuing the challenged warrant of

arrest on the sole basis of the prosecutors findings and

recommendation, and without determining on its own the

issue of probable cause based on evidence other than such

bare findings and recommendation.

Salazar Vs. Achacoso Case DigestSalazar Vs. Achacoso183 SCRA 145G.R. No. 81510March 14, 1990

Facts: Rosalie Tesoro of Pasay City in a sworn statement filedwith the POEA, charged petitioner with illegal recruitment.

Public respondent Atty. Ferdinand Marquez sent petitioner a

telegram directing him to appear to the POEA regarding the

complaint against him. On the same day, after knowing that

petitioner had no license to operate a recruitment agency,

public respondent Administrator Tomas Achacoso issued a

Closure and Seizure Order No. 1205 to petitioner. It stated

that there will a seizure of the documents and paraphernalia

being used or intended to be used as the means of

committing illegal recruitment, it having verified that

petitioner has (1) No valid license or authority from the

Department of Labor and Employment to recruit and deployworkers for overseas employment; (2) Committed/are

committing acts prohibited under Article 34 of the New Labor

Code in relation to Article 38 of the same code. A team was

then tasked to implement the said Order. The group,

accompanied by mediamen and Mandaluyong policemen

went to petitioners residence. They served the order to a

certain Mrs. For a Salazar, who let them in. The team

confiscated assorted costumes. Petitioner filed with POEA a

letter requesting for the return of the seized properties,

because she was not given prior notice and hearing. The said

Order violated due process. She also alleged that it violated

sec 2 of the Bill of Rights, and the properties were confiscated

against her will and were done with unreasonable force and

intimidation.

Issue: Whether or Not the Philippine Overseas EmploymentAdministration (or the Secretary of Labor) can validly issue

warrants of search and seizure (or arrest) under Article 38 of

the Labor Code

Held: Under the new Constitution, . . . no search warrant orwarrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to

be determined personally by the judge after examination

under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the

witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing theplace to be searched and the persons or things to be seized

Mayors and prosecuting officers cannot issue warrants of

seizure or arrest. The Closure and Seizure Order was based on

Article 38 of the Labor Code. The Supreme Court held, We

reiterate that the Secretary of Labor, not being a judge, may

no longer issue search or arrest warrants. Hence, the

authorities must go through the judicial process. To that

extent, we declare Article 38, paragraph (c), of the Labor

Code, unconstitutional and of no force and effect The

power of the President to order the arrest of aliens fo

deportation is, obviously, exceptional. It (the power to orde

arrests) cannot be made to extend to other cases, like the

one at bar. Under the Constitution, it is the sole domain of

the courts. Furthermore, the search and seizure order was in

the nature of a general warrant. The court held that the

warrant is null and void, because it must identify specifically

the things to be seized.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Article 38, paragraph

(c) of the Labor Code is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL and

null and void. The respondents are ORDERED to return al

materials seized as a result of the implementation of Search

and Seizure Order No. 1205.


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ALVAREZ VS. COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF TAYABASG.R. No. L-45358, January 29 1937

FACTS:

The chief of the secret service of the Anti-Usury Board, of the

Department of Justice, presented to Judge Eduardo Gutierrez

David, an affidavit alleging that according to reliable

information, the petitioner kept in his house, books,

documents, receipts, lists, chits and other papers used by him

in connection with his activities as a money-lender chargingusurious rates of interest in violation of the law.

He did not swear to the truth of his statements upon his own

knowledge of the facts but upon the information received by

him from a reliable person. Upon the affidavit in question the

Judge, on said date, issued the warrant which is the subject

matter of the petition.

With said warrant, several agents of the Anti-Usury Board

entered the petitioner's store and residence at seven o'clock

on the night, and seized and took possession of the following

articles: internal revenue licenses for the years 1933 to 1936,

one ledger, two journals, two cashbooks, nine order books,

four notebooks, four checks stubs, two memorandums, three

bankbooks, two contracts, four stubs, forty-eight stubs of

purchases of copra, two inventories, two bundles of bills of

lading, one bundle of credit receipts, one bundle of stubs of

purchases of copra, two packages of correspondence, one

receipt book belonging to Luis Fernandez, fourteen bundles

of invoices and other papers many documents and loan

contracts with security and promissory notes, 504 chits,

promissory notes and stubs of used checks of the Hongkong

& Shanghai Banking Corporation.

The search for and a seizure of said articles were made withthe opposition of the petitioner who stated his protest below

the inventories on the ground that the agents seized even the

originals of the documents.

As the articles had not been brought immediately to the

judge who issued the search warrant, the petitioner, through

his attorney, filed a motion, praying that the agent, be

ordered immediately to deposit all the seized articles in the

office of the clerk of court and that said agent be declared

guilty of contempt for having disobeyed the order of the

court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there was a valid search and seizure.

HELD:

No. That the search and seizure made are illegal for the

following reasons: (a) Because the warrant was based solely

upon the affidavit of the petitioner who had no personal

knowledge of the facts of probable cause, and (b) because

the warrant was issued for the sole purpose of seizing

evidence which would later be used in the criminal

proceedings that might be instituted against the petitioner

for violation of the Anti-Usury Law.

That as the warrant had been issued unreasonably, and as it

does not appear positively in the affidavit that the articles

were in the possession of the petitioner and in the place

indicated, neither could the search and seizure be made at

night.

Mata vs Bayona

G.R. No. L-50720, 26 March 1984

ARRESTS, SEARCHES AND SEIZURES > Examination ofwitnessesFACTS:Soriano Mata was accused under Presidential Decree(PD) 810, as amended by PD 1306, the information against

him alleging that Soriano Mata offered, took and arranged

bets on the Jai Alai game by selling illegal tickets known as

Masiao tickets without any authority from the Philippine Jai

Alai & Amusement Corporation or from the government

authorities concerned. Mata claimed that during the hearing

of the case, he discovered that nowhere from the records of

the said case could be found the search warrant and other

pertinent papers connected to the issuance of the same, so

that he had to inquire from the City Fiscal its whereabouts,

and to which inquiry Judge Josephine K. Bayona, presiding

Judge of the City Court of Ormoc replied, it is with the

court. The Judge then handed the records to the Fiscal who

attached them to the records. This led Mata to file a motion

to quash and annul the search warrant and for the return of

the articles seized, citing and invoking, among others, Section4 of Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court. The motion was

denied by the Judge on 1 March 1979, stating that the court

has made a thorough investigation and examination under

oath of Bernardo U. Goles and Reynaldo T. Mayote, members

of the Intelligence Section of 352nd PC Co./Police District II

INP; that in fact the court made a certification to that effect;

and that the fact that documents relating to the search

warrant were not attached immediately to the record of the

criminal case is of no moment, considering that the rule does

not specify when these documents are to be attached to the

records. Matas motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid

order having been denied, he came to the Supreme Court,

with the petition for certiorari, praying, among others, that

the Court declare the search warrant to be invalid for its

alleged failure to comply with the requisites of the

Constitution and the Rules of Court, and that all the articles

confiscated under such warrant as inadmissible as evidence in

the case, or in any proceedings on the matter.

ISSUE:WON the judge must before issuing the warrantpersonally examine on oath or affirmation the complainant

and any witnesses he may produce and take their depositions

in writing, and attach them to the record, in addition to any

affidavits presented to him?


15/37

HELD:YES. Under the Constitution no search warrantshallissue but upon probable cause to be determined by the Judge

or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law

after examination under oath or affirmation of the

complainant and the witnesses he may produce. More

emphatic and detailed is the implementing rule of the

constitutional injunction, The Rules provide that thejudgemust before issuing the warrant personally examine on oathor affirmation the complainant and any witnesses he may

produce and take their depositions in writing, and attachthem to the record, in addition to any affidavits presentedto him. Mere affidavits of the complainant and his witnessesare thus not sufficient. The examining Judge has to takedepositions in writing of the complainant and the witnesses

he may produce and to attach them to the record. Such

written deposition is necessary in order that the Judge may

be able to properly determine the existence or nonexistence

of the probable cause, to hold liable for perjury the person

giving it if it will be found later that his declarations are false.

We, therefore, hold that the search warrant is tainted with

illegality by the failure of the Judge to conform with the

essential requisites of taking the depositions in writing and

attaching them to the record, rendering the search warrant

invalid.

Jose Burgos vs. Chief of Staff

G.R. No L-64261

December 26, 1984

Facts:

Two warrants were issued against petitioners for the search

on the premises of MetropolitanMailand WeForum

newspapers and the seizure of items alleged to have been

used in subversive activities. Petitioners prayed that a writ of

preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction be issuedfor the return of the seized articles, and that respondents be

enjoined from using the articles thus seized as evidence

against petitioner.

Petitioners questioned the warrants for the lack of probable

cause and that the two warrants issued indicated only one

and the same address. In addition, the items seized subject to

the warrant were real properties.

Issue:

Whether or not the two warrants were valid to justify seizure

of the items.

Held:

The defect in the indication of the same address in the two

warrants was held by the court as a typographical error and

immaterial in view of the correct determination of the place

sought to be searched set forth in the application. The

purpose and intent to search two distinct premises was

evident in the issuance of the two warrant.

As to the issue that the items seized were real properties,

the court applied the principle in the case of Davao Sawmill

Co. v. Castillo,ruling thatmachinery which is movable by

nature becomes immobilized when placed by the owner of

the tenement, property or plant, but not so when p

equal protection & search and seizure consti digests

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