consti ii digests - police power until non impairment clause

7/29/2019 Consti II Digests - Police Power Until Non Impairment Clause

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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IIRM 410 - CONSOLIDATED DIGESTS

- POLICE POWER -

WHO EXERCISES POLICE POWER?

GR No. 130239, April 15, 2005MMDA vs. GARIN

FACTS:

Respondent Garin was issued a traffic violation receipt (TVR) andhis driver’s license was confiscated for parking illegally. Garinwrote to then MMDA Chairman Prospero Oreta requesting thereturn of his license and expressed his preference for his case tobe file in Court. Without an immediate reply from the chairman,Garin filed for a preliminary injunction assailing among others thatSec 5 (f) of RA 7924 violates the constitutional prohibition againstundue delegation of legislative authority, allowing MMDA to fixand impose unspecified and unlimited fines and penalties. RTCrule in his favor, directing MMDA to return his license and for theauthority to desist from confiscating driver’s license without firstgiving the driver the opportunity to be heard in an appropriateproceeding. Thus this petition.

ISSUE: WON Sec 5(f) of RA 7924 which authorizes MMDA toconfiscate and suspend or revoke driver’s license in the enforcementof traffic rules and regulations constitutional?

HELD:

The MMDA is not vested with police power. It was concluded thatMMDA is not a local government unit of a public corporationendowed with legislative power and it has no power to enactordinances for the welfare of the community.

Police power, as an inherent attribute of sovereignty is the power vested in the legislature to make, ordain, establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes and ordinances either with penalties of without, not repugnant to the constitution, as theyshall judge to be for good and welfare of the commonwealth andfor subjects of the same.

There is no provision in RA 7924 that empowers MMDA or itscouncil to “enact ordinance, approve resolutions and appropriatefunds for the general welfare of the inhabitants of Metro Manila.” Itis an agency created for the purpose of laying down policies and

coordinating with the various national government agencies,People’s Organizations, NGOs and private sector for the efficientand expeditious delivery of services. All its functions areadministrative in nature.

LAWS

GR. No. L-38429 June 30, 1988BALACUIT vs. CFI

FACTS:

Ordinance No. 640 was passed by the Municipal Board of the Cityof Butuan on April 21, 1969 which penalizes “any person group of persons, entity or corporation engaged in the business of sellingadmission tickets to any movie or other public exhibitions, games,contests or other performances to require children between seven

(7) and twelve (12) years of age to pay full payment for ticketsintended for adults but should charge only one-half of the saidticket.”

The petitioners Carlos Balacuit, Lamberto Tan, and Sergio YuCarcel are managers of the Maya and Dalisay Theaters, theCrown Theater, and the Diamond Theater, respectively. Aggrievedby the effect of the said ordinance, they filed a complaint beforethe Court of First Instance of Agusan del Norte and Butuan Cityon June 30, 1969 praying that the subject ordinance be declaredunconstitutional and, therefore, void and unenforceable.

Subsequently, the respondent court rendered its decisiondeclaring Ordinance No. 640 as constitutional and valid.Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision of the

respondent court but was later on denied.

ISSUE: WON Ordinance No. 640 is unconstitutional and an invalidexercise of police power.

HELD:

(A)s to the question of the subject ordinance being a validexercise of police power, the same must be resolved in thenegative. While it is true that a business may be regulated, it isequally true that such regulation must be within the bounds of

reason, that is, the regulatory ordinance must be reasonable, andits provisions cannot be oppressive amounting to an arbitraryinterference with the business or calling subject of regulation. Alawful business or calling may not, under the guise of regulationbe unreasonably interfered with even by the exercise of policepower.

police measure for the regulation of the conduct, contro

and operation of a business should not encroach upon thelegitimate and lawful exercise by the citizens of their propertyrights.

right of the owner to fix a price at which his property shal

be sold or used is an inherent attribute of the property itself andas such, within the protection of the due process clause. Hencethe proprietors of a theater have a right to manage their propertyin their own way, to fix what prices of admission they think mosfor their own advantage, and that any person who did not approvecould stay away.

The exercise of police power by the local government is validunless it contravenes the fundamental law of the land, or an act o

the legislature, or unless it is against public policy or isunreasonable, oppressive, partial, discriminating or in derogationof a common right.

Ordinance No. 640 clearly invades the personal and propertyrights of petitioners for even if We could assume that, on its facethe interference was reasonable, from the foregoingconsiderations, it has been fully shown that it is an unwarrantedand unlawful curtailment of the property and personal rights ocitizens. For being unreasonable and an undue restraint of tradeit cannot, under the guise of exercising police power, be upheld asvalid.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court in Special Civil CaseNo. 237 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new

judgment is hereby rendered declaring Ordinance No. 640unconstitutional and, therefore, null and void. This decision isimmediately executory.

146 SCRA 323; G.R. No. L-63419; 18 Dec 1986LOZANO VS. MARTINEZ

FACTS: A motion to quash the charge against the petitioners for violation of theBP 22 was made, contending that no offense was committed, as thestatute is unconstitutional. Such motion was denied by the RTC. Thepetitioners thus elevate the case to the Supreme Court for relief. TheSolicitor General, commented that it was premature for the accused toelevate to the Supreme Court the orders denying their motions toquash. However, the Supreme Court finds it justifiable to intervene fothe review of lower court's denial of a motion to quash.

ISSUE: WON BP 22 is constitutional as it is a proper exercise of policepower of the State.

HELD: The enactment of BP 22 a valid exercise of the police power and

is not repugnant to the constitutional inhibition againsimprisonment for debt.

The offense punished by BP 22 is the act of making and issuing aworthless check or a check that is dishonored upon itspresentation for payment. It is not the non-payment of anobligation which the law punishes. The law is not intended ordesigned to coerce a debtor to pay his debt.

The law punishes the act not as an offense against property, buan offense against public order. The thrust of the law is to prohibitunder pain of penal sanctions, the making of worthless checksand putting them in circulation. An act may not be considered by

UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS / ROOM 4101




society as inherently wrong, hence, not malum in se but becauseof the harm that it inflicts on the community, it can be outlawedand criminally punished as malum prohibitum. The state can dothis in the exercise of its police power.

GR. No. 88265 December 21, 1989DEL ROSARIO vs. BENGZON

FACTS:

This is a class suit filed by the officers of the Philippine Medical

Association, the national organization of medical doctors in thePhilippines, on behalf of their professional brethren who are of kindred persuasion, wherein the Supreme Court is asked todeclare as unconstitutional, hence, null and void, some provisionsof the Generics Act of 1988 (Republic Act No. 6675), and of theimplementing Administrative Order No. 62 issued pursuantthereto.

The said law requires the use of generic terminology or genericnames in writing prescriptions by medical, dental, and veterinarydoctors. Government health agencies and their personnel as wellas other government agencies are likewise obliged to use genericnames “in all transactions related to purchasing, prescribing,dispensing and administering of drugs and medicines”. Certainpenalties are imposed for violation of the said provisions of thelaw.

ISSUE: WON the Generics Act of 1998 and its implementing

Administrative Order No. 62 are unconstitutional.

HELD:

The Court has been unable to find any constitutional infirmity inthe Generics Act. It, on the contrary, implements the constitutionalmandate for the State "to protect and promote the right to healthof the people" and "to make essential goods, health and other social services available to all the people at affordablecost" (Section 15, Art. II and Section 11, Art. XIII, 1987Constitution).

There is no merit in the petitioners' theory that the Generics Actimpairs the obligation of contract between a physician and hispatient, for no contract ever results from a consultation betweenpatient and physician. A doctor may take in or refuse a patient,

just as the patient may take or refuse the doctor's advice or prescription. As aptly observed by the public respondent, no

doctor has ever filed an action for breach of contract against apatient who refused to take prescribed medication, undergosurgery, or follow a recommended course treatment by his doctor ( p. 53, Rollo). In any event, no private contract between doctor and patient may be allowed to override the power of the State toenact laws that are reasonably necessary to secure the health,safety, good order, comfort, or general welfare of the community.This power can neither be abdicated nor bargained away. Allcontractual and property rights are held subject to its fair exercise.

152 SCRA 730; G.R. No. 78164; 31 July 1987TABLARIN VS. JUDGE GUTIERREZ

FACTS:

The petitioners sought to enjoin the Secretary of Education,Culture and Sports, the Board of Medical Education and theCenter for Educational Measurement from enforcing Section 5 (a)and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382, as amended, and MECS Order No. 52, series of 1985, dated 23 August 1985 and from requiringthe taking and passing of the NMAT as a condition for securingcertificates of eligibility for admission, from proceeding withaccepting applications for taking the NMAT and fromadministering the NMAT as scheduled on 26 April 1987 and in thefuture. The trial court denied said petition on 20 April 1987. TheNMAT was conducted and administered as previously scheduled.

Republic Act 2382, as amended by Republic Acts Nos. 4224 and5946, known as the "Medical Act of 1959" defines its basicobjectives in the following manner:

"SECTION 1. Objectives. — This Act provides for and

shall govern (a) the standardization and regulation of medical education; (b) the examination for registrationof physicians; and (c) the supervision, control andregulation of the practice of medicine in thePhilippines."

The statute, among other things, created a Board of Medical Education. Its functions as specified in Section5 of the statute include the following:

"(a) To determine and prescribe requirements for admission into a recognized college of medicine;x x x

(f) To accept applications for certification for admission to amedical school and keep a register of those issued saidcertificate; and to collect from said applicants the amount otwenty-five pesos each which shall accrue to the operating fund othe Board of Medical Education;”

Section 7 prescribes certain minimum requirements for applicantsto medical schools:

"Admission requirements. — The medical college mayadmit any student who has not been convicted by anycourt of competent jurisdiction of any offense involvingmoral turpitude and who presents (a) a record of completion of a bachelor's degree in science or arts; (b)

a certificate of eligibility for entrance to a medical schoolfrom the Board of Medical Education; (c) a certificate of good moral character issued by two former professorsin the college of liberal arts; and (d) birth certificate.Nothing in this act shall be construed to inhibit anycollege of medicine from establishing, in addition to thepreceding, other entrance requirements that may bedeemed admissible.”

MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, issued by the then Minister oEducation, Culture and Sports and dated 23 August 1985established a uniform admission test called the National Medica

Admission Test (NMAT) as an additional requirement for issuanceof a certificate of eligibility for admission into medical schools ofthe Philippines, beginning with the school year 1986-1987. ThisOrder goes on to state that: "2. The NMAT, an aptitude test, is

considered as an instrument toward upgrading the selection oapplicants for admission into the medical schools and itscalculated to improve the quality of medical education in thecountry. The cutoff score for the successful applicants, based onthe scores on the NMAT, shall be determined every year by theBoard of Medical Education after consultation with the Associationof Philippine Medical Colleges. The NMAT rating of eachapplicant, together with the other admission requirements aspresently called for under existing rules, shall serve as a basis fothe issuance of the prescribed certificate of eligibility foadmission into the medical colleges.

ISSUE: WON Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382, asamended, and MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985 are constitutional.

HELD: Yes. We conclude that prescribing the NMAT and requiringcertain minimum scores therein as a condition for admission to medica

schools in the Philippines, do not constitute an unconstitutionaimposition. The police power, it is commonplace learning, is the pervasive

and non-waivable power and authority of the sovereign to secureand promote all the important interests and needs — in a wordthe public order — of the general community. An importancomponent of that public order is the health and physical safetyand well being of the population, the securing of which no one candeny is a legitimate objective of governmental effort andregulation. Perhaps the only issue that needs some considerationis whether there is some reasonable relation between theprescribing of passing the NMAT as a condition for admission tomedical school on the one hand, and the securing of the health





and safety of the general community, on the other hand. Thisquestion is perhaps most usefully approached by recalling thatthe regulation of the practice of medicine in all its branches haslong been recognized as a reasonable method of protecting thehealth and safety of the public.

MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985 articulates the rationale of regulationof this type: the improvement of the professional and technicalquality of the graduates of medical schools, by upgrading thequality of those admitted to the student body of the medicalschools. That upgrading is sought by selectivity in the process of

admission, selectivity consisting, among other things, of limitingadmission to those who exhibit in the required degree the aptitudefor medical studies and eventually for medical practice. The needto maintain, and the difficulties of maintaining, high standards inour professional schools in general, and medical schools inparticular, in the current stage of our social and economicdevelopment, are widely known. We believe that the governmentis entitled to prescribe an admission test like the NMAT as ameans for achieving its stated objective of "upgrading theselection of applicants into [our] medical schools" and of "improv[ing] the quality of medical education in the country. Weare entitled to hold that the NMAT is reasonably related to thesecuring of the ultimate end of legislation and regulation in thisarea. That end, it is useful to recall, is the protection of the publicfrom the potentially deadly effects of incompetence and ignorancein those who would undertake to treat our bodies and minds for disease or trauma.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari is DISMISSED and theOrder of the respondent trial court denying the petition for a writ of preliminary injunction is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.

GR No. 166494, June 29, 2007CARLOS SUPERDRUG CORP. vs. DSWD, ET. AL

FACTS:

Petitioners, belonging to domestic corporations and proprietorsoperating drugstores in the Philippines, are praying for preliminaryinjunction assailing the constitutionality of Section 4(a) of Republic

Act (R.A.) No. 9257, otherwise known as the “Expanded Senior Citizens Act of 2003.” On February 26, 2004, R.A. No. 9257,amending R.A. No. 7432, was signed into law by President GloriaMacapagal-Arroyo and it became effective on March 21, 2004.Section 4(a) of the Act states:

SEC. 4. Privileges for the Senior Citizens. – Thesenior citizens shall be entitled to the following:

(a) the grant of twenty percent (20%) discount fromall establishments relative to the utilization of services in hotels and similar lodging establishments,restaurants and recreation centers, and purchase of medicines in all establishments for the exclusive useor enjoyment of senior citizens, including funeral andburial services for the death of senior citizens;

The establishment may claim the discounts granted under (a), (f),(g) and (h) as tax deduction based on the net cost of the goodssold or services rendered: Provided , That the cost of the discountshall be allowed as deduction from gross income for the sametaxable year that the discount is granted. Provided, further, That

the total amount of the claimed tax deduction net of value addedtax if applicable, shall be included in their gross sales receipts for tax purposes and shall be subject to proper documentation and tothe provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code, asamended.

The DSWD, on May 8, 2004, approved and adopted theImplementing Rules and Regulations of RA No. 9275, Rule VI,

Article 8 which contains the proviso that the implementation of thetax deduction shall be subject to the Revenue Regulations to beissued by the BIR and approved by the DOF. With the new law,the Drug Stores Association of the Philippines wanted aclarification of the meaning of tax deduction. The DOF clarifiedthat under a tax deduction scheme, the tax deduction on

discounts was subtracted from Net Sales together with othedeductions which are considered as operating expenses beforethe Tax Due was computed based on the Net Taxable Income. Onthe other hand, under a tax credit scheme, the amount odiscounts which is the tax credit item, was deducted directly fromthe tax due amount.

The DOH issued an Administrative Order that the twenty percendiscount shall include both prescription and non-prescriptionmedicines, whether branded or generic. It stated that suchdiscount would be provided in the purchase of medicines from al

establishments supplying medicines for the exclusive use of thesenior citizens. Drug store owners assail the law with the contention that granting

the discount would result to loss of profit and capital especiallythat such law failed to provide a scheme to justly compensate thediscount.

ISSUE: WON Section 4(a) of the Expanded Senior Citizens Act isunconstitutional or not violative of Article 3 Section 9 of the Constitutionwhich provides that private property shall not be taken for public usewithout just compensation and the equal protection clause of Article 3Section 1.

HELD:

The permanent reduction in their total revenues is a forcedsubsidy corresponding to the taking of private property for publicuse or benefit. This constitutes compensable taking for whichpetitioners would ordinarily become entitled to a juscompensation. Just compensation is defined as the full and faiequivalent of the property taken from its owner by theexpropriator. The measure is not the taker’s gain but the owner’sloss. The word just is used to intensify the meaning of the wordcompensation, and to convey the idea that the equivalent to berendered for the property to be taken shall be real, substantial, fuland ample.

The law grants a twenty percent discount to senior citizens fomedical and dental services, and diagnostic and laboratory feesadmission fees charged by theaters, concert halls, circusescarnivals, and other similar places of culture, leisure andamusement; fares for domestic land, air and sea travel; utilizationof services in hotels and similar lodging establishmentsrestaurants and recreation centers; and purchases of medicinesfor the exclusive use or enjoyment of senior citizens. As a form o

reimbursement, the law provides that business establishmentsextending the twenty percent discount to senior citizens mayclaim the discount as a tax deduction.

The law is a legitimate exercise of police power which, similar tothe power of eminent domain, has general welfare for its object.Police power is not capable of an exact definition, but has beenpurposely veiled in general terms to underscore itscomprehensiveness to meet all exigencies and provide enoughroom for an efficient and flexible response to conditions andcircumstances, thus assuring the greatest benefits.

Accordingly, i

has been described as “the most essential, insistent and the leaslimitable of powers, extending as it does to all the great publicneeds.” It is “[t]he power vested in the legislature by theconstitution to make, ordain, and establish all manner owholesome and reasonable laws, statutes, and ordinances, eithewith penalties or without, not repugnant to the constitution, asthey shall judge to be for the good and welfare of thecommonwealth, and of the subjects of the same.”

ZONING & REGULATORY ORDINANCES

20 SCRA 849; G.R. No.L-24693; 31 July 1967ERMITA-MALATE HOTEL AND MOTEL OPERATORS ASSO. VSMAYOR OF MANILA

FACTS:Petitioners Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association withone of its members, Hotel del Mar Inc., and Go Chiu, the president and





general manager of the second petitioner, filed a petition for prohibitionagainst Ordinance No. 4760 against the respondent Mayor of the Cityof Manila who was sued in his capacity as such charged with thegeneral power and duty to enforce ordinances of the City of Manila andto give the necessary orders for the execution and enforcement of such ordinances. It was alleged that the petitioner non-stockcorporation is dedicated to the promotion and protection of the interestof its eighteen members operating hotels and motels, characterized aslegitimate businesses duly licensed by both national and cityauthorities and regularly paying taxes. It was alleged that on June 13,

1963, the Municipal Board of the City of Manila enacted Ordinance No.4760, approved on June 14, 1963 by the then acting City Mayor, Vice-Mayor Herminio Astorga. After which the alleged grievances againstthe ordinance were set forth in detail. There was the assertion of itsbeing beyond the powers of the Municipal Board of the City of Manilato enact insofar as it regulate motels, on the ground that in the revisedcharter of the City of Manila or in any other law, no reference is madeto motels. it also being provided that the premises and facilities of suchhotels, motels and lodging houses would be open for inspection either by the City Mayor, or the Chief of Police, or their duly authorizedrepresentatives. The lower court on July 6, 1963 issued a writ of preliminary injunction ordering respondent Mayor to refrain fromenforcing said Ordinance No. 4760 from and after July 8, 1963.

ISSUE: Whether or Not Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila isunconstitutional, therefore, null and void.

HELD: A decent regard for constitutional doctrines of a fundamental

character ought to have admonished the lower court against sucha sweeping condemnation of the challenged ordinance. Its (theLower court’s) decision cannot be allowed to stand, consistentlywith what has been the accepted standards of constitutionaladjudication, in both procedural and substantive aspects.

Primarily what calls for a reversal of such a decision is theabsence of any evidence to offset the presumption of validity thatattaches to a challenged statute or ordinance. As was expressedcategorically by Justice Malcolm: "The presumption is all in favor of validity x x x . The action of the elected representatives of thepeople cannot be lightly set aside. The councilors must, in thevery nature of things, be familiar with the necessities of their particular municipality and with all the facts and circumstanceswhich surround the subject and necessitate action. The local

legislative body, by enacting the ordinance, has in effect givennotice that the regulations are essential to the well being of thepeople x x x . The Judiciary should not lightly set aside legislativeaction when there is not a clear invasion of personal or propertyrights under the guise of police regulation.

It admits of no doubt therefore that there being a presumption of validity, the necessity for evidence to rebut it is unavoidable,unless the statute or ordinance is void on its face which is not thecase here. The principle has been nowhere better expressed thanin the leading case of O'Gorman & Young v. Hartford FireInsurance Co. where the American Supreme Court throughJustice Brandeis tersely and succinctly summed up the matter thus: The statute here questioned deals with a subject clearlywithin the scope of the police power. We are asked to declare itvoid on the ground that the specific method of regulationprescribed is unreasonable and hence deprives the plaintiff of dueprocess of law. As underlying questions of fact may condition the

constitutionality of legislation of this character, the resumption of constitutionality must prevail in the absence of some factualfoundation of record for overthrowing the statute." No such factualfoundation being laid in the present case, the lower court decidingthe matter on the pleadings and the stipulation of facts, thepresumption of validity must prevail and the judgment against theordinance set aside.

123 SCRA 569 (1983)CRUZ vs. PARAS

FACTS:

Petitioners were night club operators in Bocaue Bulacan, who filed onNovember 5, 1975, two cases for prohibition with preliminaryinjunction. They contended that the enforcement of MunicipaOrdinance no. 84, an ordinance prohibiting the operation of nightclubscabarets, and dance halls in that municipality or the renewal olicenses to operate them, should be stopped as the municipal has nopower to prohibit a lawful business and that such ordinance is violativeto their right to due process and the equal protection of the law, as thelicense previously given to petitioners was in effect withdrawn without

judicial hearing. The lower court upheld the validity of the ordinance in

the name of police power and dismissed the petition. Hence, thispetition for certiorari.

ISSUE: WON a municipal corporation, Bocaue, Bulacan, representedby respondents, can, prohibit the exercise of a lawful trade, theoperation of night clubs, and the pursuit of a lawful occupation, suchclubs employing hostesses

HELD:Supreme Court states that reliance on the police power is insufficientto justify the enactment of the assailed ordinance. It is to be noted thathe municipal council shall enact such ordinances and make suchregulations, not repugnant to law, as may be necessary to carry intoeffect and discharge the powers and duties conferred upon it by lawand such as shall seem necessary and proper to provide for thehealth and safety, promote the prosperity, improve the moralspeace, good order, comfort, and convenience of the municipality

and the inhabitants thereof , and for the protection of propertytherein. However, it is only valid unless it contravenes thefundamental law of the Philippine Islands, or an Act of the PhilippineLegislature, or unless it is against public policy, or isunreasonable, oppressive, partial, discriminating, or in derogationof common right.

A municipal corporation, therefore, cannot prohibit the operation onightclubs. Nightclubs may be regulated but not prevented fromcarrying on their business. RA 938, as originally enactedgranted municipalities the power to regulate the establishmentmaintenance and operation of nightclubs and the like. While it is truethat on 5/21/54, the law was amended by RA 979 w/c purported to givemunicipalities the power not only to regulate but likewise to prohibit theoperation of nightclubs, the fact is that the title of the law remained thesame so that the power granted to municipalities remains that oregulation, not prohibition. To construe the amendatory act as grantingmunicipal corporations the power to prohibit the operation of nightclubswould be to construe it in a way that it violatesthe constitutional provision that "every bill shall embrace only onesubject which shall be expressed in the title thereof." Moreover, therecently-enacted LGC (BP 337) speaks simply of the power to regulatethe establishment, and operation of billiard pools, theatricaperformances, circuses and other forms of entertainment.Certiorari granted.

120 SCRA 568 (1983)VELASCO VS. VILLEGAS

FACTS:Ordinance No. 4964 was enacted for a two-fold purpose. (1) To enablethe City of Manila to collect a fee for operating massage clinicseparately from those operating barber shops and (2) To preven

immorality which might probably arise from the construction oseparate rooms. However, petitioner argues that such ordinanceamounts to a deprivation of property of petitioners-appellants of theimeans of livelihood without due process of law.

ISSUE: WON the ordinance was unconstitutional.

HELD:Considering the two-fold purpose of the ordinance, it is clear that suchlaw is a police power measure. This Court has been most liberal insustaining ordinances based on the general welfare clauseWHEREFORE, the appealed order of the lower court is affirmed.


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234 SCRA 255 (1994)MAGTAJAS VS. PRYCE PROPERTIES

FACTS:

On 1992, PAGCOR decided to expand its operation in Cagayande Oro City and to this end leased a portion of a buildingbelonging to Pryce Properties. Upon announcement of theopening of the casino, several organization in the said areaobjected, including Cagayan de Oro’s sangguniang panglungsodwho later enacted Ordinance no. 3353. Such ordinance was

entitled, AN ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE ISSUANCE OFBUSINESS PERMIT AND CANCELLING EXISTING BUSINESSPERMIT TO ANY ESTABLISHMENT FOR THE USING AND

ALLOWING TO BE USED ITS PREMISES OR PORTIONTHEREOF FOR THE OPERATION OF CASINO. Less than amonth from the passage of such ordinance, the sangguniangpanglusod of Cagayan de Oro adopted a sterner ordinance no.3375-93 which was an AN ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THEOPERATION OF CASINO AND PROVIDING PENALTY FORVIOLATION THEREFORE.

Pryce assailed the ordinances before the Court of Appeals, whereit was joined by PAGCOR as intervener and supplementalpetitioner. Their challenge succeeded. On March 31, 1993, theCourt of Appeals declared the ordinances invalid and issued thewrit prayed for to prohibit their enforcement.

Reconsideration of

this decision was denied on July 13, 1993.Cagayan de Oro Cityand its mayor are now before the court in this petition for review.

ISSUE/S:1. WON the ordinances enacted by the sangguniang panglusod of

Cagayan de Oro are valid.2. WON the Local Government Code should prevail over and above

an existing statute (in this case PD1869)

HELD:

First, it should be noted that the morality of gambling is not a justiciable issue. Gambling is not illegal per se. While it isgenerally considered inimical to the interests of the people, thereis nothing in the Constitution categorically proscribing or penalizing gambling or, for that matter, even mentioning it at all. Inthe exercise of its own discretion, the legislature may prohibitgambling altogether or allow it without limitation or it may prohibitsome forms of gambling and allow others for whatever reasons it

may consider sufficient. Although it is true that local government units are authorized to

prevent or suppress, among others, "gambling and other prohibited games of chance, it should be understood that,obviously, this provision excludes games of chance which are notprohibited but are in fact permitted by law. The apparent flaw inthe ordinances in question is that they contravene P.D. 1869 andthe public policy embodied therein insofar as they preventPAGCOR from exercising the power conferred on it to operate acasino in Cagayan de Oro City.

On the assumption of a conflict between P.D. 1869 and the Code,the proper action is not to uphold one and annul the other but togive effect to both by harmonizing them if possible. This ispossible in the case before us. The proper resolution of theproblem at hand is to hold that under the Local GovernmentCode, local government units may (and indeed must) prevent andsuppress all kinds of gambling within their territories except onlythose allowed by statutes like P.D. 1869.

Lastly, The rationale of the requirement that the ordinancesshould not contravene a statute is obvious. Municipalgovernments are only agents of the national government. Localcouncils exercise only delegated legislative powers conferred onthem by Congress as the national lawmaking body. The delegatecannot be superior to the principal or exercise powers higher thanthose of the latter. It is a heresy to suggest that the localgovernment units can undo the acts of Congress, from which theyhave derived their power in the first place, and negate by mereordinance the mandate of the statute.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the challengeddecision of the respondent Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED, with

costs against the petitioners.

GR No. 110249, August 27, 1997ALFREDOI TANO vs. GOV. SALVADOR P. SOCRATES

FACTS:

15 Dec 1992: Sangguniang Panlungsod of Puerto Princesa Cityenacted Ordinance No. 15-92 which banned the shipment of allive fish and lobster outside the city from 1993-1998.

22 Jan 1993: Acting Mayor Lucero issued Office Order No. 23. It

authorized officers to inspect cargoes containing live fish andlobster that are shipped out of Puerto Princesa. The purpose othe inspection is to check if the shipper had the required mayor’spermit issued by their office.

19 February 1993: Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Palawanenacted Resolution No. 33 which prohibited the catchinggathering, possession, etc. of live marine coral dwelling aquaticorganisms for a period of 5 yrs.

he respondents implemented the ordinances, depriving all thefishermen, marine merchants, and shippers of the entire provinceof their only means of livelihood.

The petitioners directly invoked the original jurisdiction of the SCarguing as follows:1. It deprived them of due process of law, their livelihood, and

unduly restricted them from the practice of their tradeviolating Section 2, Article XII and Sections 2 and 7 of the1987 Constitution.

2. Office Order No. 23 contained no regulation nor conditionunder which the Mayor’s permit could be granted or deniedie. Mayor had absolute authority in issuing the permit.

3. The Ordinance took away the right of the fishermen to earntheir livelihood in lawful ways.

The respondents contended that it was a valid exercise of theProvincial Government’s power under the general welfare clause(Sec. 16 of the LGC). The Ordinance, they argued, only coveredlive marine coral dwelling aquatic organisms and excluded thosenot dwelling in the coral reefs and that it shall only last for 5 yearsThe court must also distinguish between catching live fish andselling it live and those who have no intention at all of selling ilive.

ISSUE: WON the questioned ordinances enacted in the exercise opowers under the LGC relative to the protection and preservation o

the environment are a valid exercise of the police power of a municipacorporation.

HELD: Yes. Laws enjoy the presumption of constitutionality. Section 5 (c) of the LGC explicitly mandates that the genera

welfare provisions of the LGC “shall be liberally interpreted to givemore powers to the LGUs in accelerating economic developmenand upgrading the quality of l ife for the people of the community.

The LGC grants municipalities the power to grant fisheryprivileges in municipal waters and to impose rentals, fees, ocharges for their use.

The sanggunians are directed to enact ordinances for the generawelfare of the LGU and its inhabitants.

The centerpiece of the LGC is decentralization. Indispensable tothis is devolution. One of these powers is the enforcement ofishery laws in municipal waters including the conservation o

mangroves. The term “municipal waters” includes not onlystreams, lakes, and tidal waters within the municipality, but alsomarine waters included between two lines drawn perpendicularlyto the general coastline from points where the boundary lines othe municipality or city touch the sea at low tide and a third lineparallel with the general coastline and 15 km from it (Sec. 131 [rLGC).

Two principal objectives of the Ordinances:1. Establish a “closed season” for the species of fish covered

therein for 5 years (This falls within the devolved power toenforce fishery laws in municipal waters);

2. Protect the coral in the marine waters of the city and theprovince from further destruction due to illegal fishing





activities (this falls within the general welfare clause of theLGC and the express mandate there to cities and provincesto protect the environment and impose appropriate penaltiesfor acts which harm the environment.

G.R. No. 118127 April 12, 2005CITY OF MANILA vs. HON. PERFECTO A.S. LAGUIO, JR.

FACTS:

Private respondent Malate Tourist Development Corporation

(MTDC) is a corporation engaged in the business of operatinghotels, motels, hostels and lodging houses. On 28 June 1993, MTDC filed a RTC Petition with the lower court

praying that the Ordinance of the City of Manila be declaredinvalid and unconstitutional.8

MTDC argued that the Ordinance erroneously and improperlyincluded in its enumeration of prohibited establishments, motelsand inns such as MTDC's Victoria Court considering that thesewere not establishments for "amusement" or "entertainment" andthey were not "services or facilities for entertainment," nor didthey use women as "tools for entertainment," and neither did they"disturb the community," "annoy the inhabitants" or "adverselyaffect the social and moral welfare of the community."

The Ordinance ordered the removal of motels, inns, massageparlors, beer houses, nightclubs in the Ermita-Malate area.

MTDC further advanced that the Ordinance was invalid andunconstitutional for the following reasons:1. The City Council has no power to prohibit the operation of

motels as Section 458 (a) 4 (iv)12 of the Local GovernmentCode of 1991 (the Code) grants to the City Council only thepower to regulate the establishment, operation andmaintenance of hotels, motels, inns, pension houses,lodging houses and other similar establishments

2. The Ordinance is void as it is violative of Presidential Decree(P.D.) No. 49913 which specifically declared portions of theErmita-Malate area as a commercial zone with certainrestrictions

3. The Ordinance does not constitute a proper exercise of police power as the compulsory closure of the motelbusiness has no reasonable relation to the legitimatemunicipal interests sought to be protected

4. The Ordinance constitutes an ex post facto law by punishingthe operation of Victoria Court which was a legitimate

business prior to its enactment5. The Ordinance violates MTDC's constitutional rights in that:

(a) it is confiscatory and constitutes an invasion of plaintiff'sproperty rights; (b) the City Council has no power to find asa fact that a particular thing is a nuisance per se nor does ithave the power to extrajudicially destroy it; and

6. The Ordinance constitutes a denial of equal protection under the law as no reasonable basis exists for prohibiting theoperation of motels and inns, but not pension houses,hotels, lodging houses or other similar establishments, andfor prohibiting said business in the Ermita-Malate area butnot outside of this area.

Petitioners City of Manila and Lim maintained that the CityCouncil had the power to "prohibit certain forms of entertainmentin order to protect the social and moral welfare of the community"as provided for in Section 458 (a) 4 (vii) of the Local GovernmentCode.

Petitioners likewise asserted that the Ordinance was enacted bythe City Council of Manila to protect the social and moral welfareof the community in conjunction with its police power.

Hon. Laguio decided in favor of the private respondents anddeclared the Ordinance null and void.

Petitioners filed an appeal with the lower court alleging that thefollowing errors were committed by the lower court in its ruling: (1)It erred in concluding that the subject ordinance is ultra vires, or otherwise, unfair, unreasonable and oppressive exercise of policepower; (2) It erred in holding that the questioned Ordinancecontravenes P.D. 49931 which allows operators of all kinds of commercial establishments, except those specified therein; and

(3) It erred in declaring the Ordinance void and unconstitutional. Petitioners contend that the assailed Ordinance was enacted in

the exercise of the inherent and plenary power of the State andthe general welfare clause exercised by local government unitsprovided for in Art. 3, Sec. 18 (kk) of the Revised Charter oManila and conjunctively, Section 458 (a) 4 (vii) of the Code.3

They allege that the Ordinance is a valid exercise of police powerit does not contravene P.D. 499; and that it enjoys thepresumption of validity.

ISSUE: WON the Ordinance of the City of Manila shows a validexercise of police power.

HELD: No. The Ordinance was nullified barring the operation of motelsand inns within the Ermita-Malate area. The exercise of police power by the local government is valid

unless it contravenes the fundamental law of the land, or an act othe legislature, or unless it is against public policy, or isunreasonable, oppressive, partial, discriminating or in derogationof a common right.

The Ordinance invades fundamental personal and property rightsand impairs personal privileges.

It is discriminatory and unreasonable in its operation; it is notsufficiently detailed and explicit that abuses may attend theenforcement of its sanctions. And not to be forgotten, the CityCouncil under the Code had no power to enact the Ordinance andis therefore ultra vires, null and void.

Police power legislation of such character deserves the fuendorsement of the judiciary we reiterate our support for it. Buinspite of its virtuous aims, the enactment of the Ordinance hasno statutory or constitutional authority to stand on. Localegislative bodies, in this case, the City Council, cannot prohibithe operation of the enumerated establishments under Section 1thereof or order their transfer or conversion without infringing theconstitutional guarantees of due process and equal protection olaws not even under the guise of police power.

G.R. No. L-24670 December 14, 1979ORTIGAS & CO., LIMITED PARTNERSHIP vs. FEATI BANK ANDTRUST CO.

FACTS:

Plaintiff is engaged in real estate business, developing and selling

lots to the public, particularly the Highway Hills Subdivision alongEDSA. On March 4, 1952, plaintiff, as vendor, and AugustoPadilla and Natividad Angeles, as vendees, entered into separateagreements of sale on installments over two parcels of land of theSubdivision. On July 19, 1962, the said vendees transferred theirights and interests over the aforesaid lots in favor of one EmmaChavez. Upon completion of payment of the purchase price, theplaintiff executed the corresponding deeds of sale in favor oEmma Chavez. Both the agreements (of sale on installment) andthe deeds of sale contained the stipulations or restrictions that:

1. The parcel of land shall be used exclusively for residentiapurposes, and she shall not be entitled to take or removesoil, stones or gravel from it or any other lots belonging tothe Seller.

2. All buildings and other improvements (except the fencewhich may be constructed at any time in said lot must be, (aof strong materials and properly painted, (b) provided withmodern sanitary installations connected either to the publicsewer or to an approved septic tank, and (c) shall not be at adistance of less than two (2) meters from its boundary lines.

Eventually said lots were bought by defendant. Lot 5 directly fromChavez and Lot 6 from Republic Flour Mills by deed of exchangewith same restrictions. Plaintiff claims that restriction is for thebeautification of the subdivision. Defendant claimed of thecommercialization of western part of EDSA. Defendant beganconstructing a commercial bank building. Plaintiff demand to stopit, which forced him to file a case, which was later dismissedupholding police power. Motion for recon was denied, hence the





appeal.

ISSUE: WON Resolution No. 27 is a valid exercise of police power

HELD: Yes. Resolution is a valid exercise of police power. EDSA, a main traffic artery which runs through several cities and

municipalities in the Metro Manila area, supports an endlessstream of traffic and the resulting activity, noise and pollution arehardly conducive to the health, safety or welfare of the residentsin its route. Health, safety, peace, good order and general welfare

of the people in the locality are justifications for this. It should bestressed, that while non-impairment of contracts is constitutionallyguaranteed, the rule is not absolute, since it has to be reconciledwith the legitimate exercise of police power.

201 SCRA 13PRESLEY vs. BEL-AIR VILLAGE ASSOCIATION

FACTS:

A complaint for specific performance was filed by respondentagainst Teofilo & Rollo Almendras (both deceased and substitutedby petitioner) for violating a Bel-Air Subdivision restriction that thesubject house and lot shall be used only for residential and not for commercial purposes, and for non-payment of association dues toBAVA (respondent)

Deceased petitioners were the registered owners of the propertywhile Presley, as lessee of the property, is the owner and operator of “Hot Pan de Sal Store” located in the same address.

The RTC rendered decision in favor of respondent which wasaffirmed by the CA

Motion for reconsideration was denied hence this petition.

ISSUES:1. WON the ruling of respondent CA is in accordance with a recent

consolidated decision of the SC which applies in the case at bar in favor of the petitioner

2. WON the ruling of the CA adjudging the petitioner solidarily liabletogether with the Almendrases (deceased) to pay the allegedunpaid association dues is patently contrary to the evidence andfacts

3. WON respondent court adjudging petitioner solidarily liable to payattorney’s fees is without any legal or factual basis

Note: During the pendency of the case with this Court, petitioner Enedina Fox Presley died on January 4, 1991. She was substituted by her two daughters as heirs, namely Olivia V. Pizzaro and Consuelo V.Lacson.

HELD:

The issues raised in the instant petition have already been dealtwith in the consolidated cases decided by this Court promulgatedon December 22, 1988 Apparently, when the respondent courtpromulgated the questioned decision on November 28, 1988 theSangalang case had not yet been decided by this Court, etc.

Apparently, when the respondent court promulgated thequestioned decision on November 28, 1988 the Sangalang casehad not yet been decided by this Court.

The respondent court in the case at bar was not at all entirelywrong in upholding the Deed of Restrictions annotated in the title

of the petitioners. It held that the provisions of the Deed of Restrictions are in the nature of contractual obligations freelyentered into by the parties. Undoubtedly, they are valid and canbe enforced against the petitioner.

But they are, like all contracts, subject to the overriding demands,needs, and interests of the greater number as the State maydetermine in the legitimate exercise of police power. Our

jurisdiction guarantees sanctity of contract and is said to be the'law between the contracting parties,' (Civil Code, supra, art.1159) but while it is so, it cannot contravene 'law, morals, goodcustoms, public order, or public policy.' (supra, art. 1306). Aboveall, it cannot be raised as a deterrent to police power, designedprecisely to promote health, safety, peace, and enhance the

common good, at the expense of contractual rights, whenevenecessary.

With respect to the demand for payment of association dues inthe sum of P3,803.55, the records reveal that this issue is nowmoot and academic.

The demand for payment of attorney's fees is now without legal ofactual basis.

Petition granted.

GR Nos. 142359 & 142980, May 25, 2004

PASONG BAYABAS FARMERS vs. CA

FACTS:

Lakeview Development Corporation (LDC) bought a parcel oland, issued it in the name of its successor, the Credito AsiaticIncorporated (CAI) and subsequently subdivided it into twoparcels

LDC/CAI undertook to develop its 75-hectare property into aresidential and industrial estate

CAI embarked on the development of the housing project intothree phases and secured a locational clearance for the projecfrom the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission (HSRC

CAI decided to continue with the development of its HakoneHousing Project but the project was stymied by a Complaint foDamages with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order andPreliminary Injunction

The plaintiffs alleged that they had reached an agreements withthe respondent that they would remain in peaceful possession otheir farmholdings but notwithstanding such, the defendanordered the bulldozing of the property

In answer to the complaint, CAI denied that it allowed the plaintiffsto possess and cultivate the landholding with fixed rentals

Meanwhile, CAI and 6 of the 14 plaintiffs entered into acompromise agreement which eventually led to all of the otheplaintiffs entering into an agreement with CAI

CAI was stymied anew when a Petition for Compulsory Coverageunder Rep. Act No. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive

Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) was filed before the DAR byseventeen (17) individuals who alleged that they are farmers whohave occupied a parcel of public agricultural land adjacent toPasong Bayabas River

According to the petitioners, the said illegal bulldozing activitieswould convert the land from agricultural to non-agricultural landthereby depriving the members of the PBFAI of their tenancyrights over the property. For this reason, the petitioners prayedthat a temporary restraining order be issued ex-parte to stop thebulldozing of the property, and that a preliminary injunction or astatus quo order be later issued to enjoin the same.

ISSUES:1. Whether the property subject of the suit is covered by Rep. Act

No. 6657, the Agrarian Reform Law (CARL);2. whether the DARAB had original and appellate jurisdiction ove

the complaint of the petitioner PBFAI against the privaterespondent;

3. whether the petitioners-members of the PBFAI have a cause ofaction against the private respondent for possession andcultivation of the property in suit;

4. whether the dismissal by the RTC of the complaint in Civil Case

No. BCV-87-13 is a bar to the complaint of the petitionersmembers of the PBFAI; and5. whether the appellate court committed a reversible error in

dismissing the petition for review in CA-G.R. SP No. 49363.

HELD:

The contention of the petitioners has no merit. Rep. Act No. 6657 took effect only on June 15, 1988. But long

before the law took effect, the property subject of the suit hadalready been reclassified and converted from agricultural to non-agricultural or residential land.

With our finding that the property subject of the suit was classifiedas residential land since 1976, the DARAB had no original and





appellate jurisdiction over the property subject of the action of thepetitioner PBFAI and its members.

Since the members of the petitioner PBFAI were not the tenantsof the private respondent CAI, the petitioners and its membershad no cause of action against the private respondent for possession of the landholding to maintain possession thereof andfor damages.

When the complaint was filed, twenty-five (25) of the thirty -seven(37) members of the petitioners had already executed separatedeeds of quitclaim in favor of the private respondent CAI over the

portions of the landholding they respectively claimed, after receiving from the private respondent CAI varied sums of money.In executing the said deeds, the members of the petitioner PBFAIthereby waived their respective claims over the property. Hence,they have no right whatsoever to still remain in possession of thesame.

Petition denied.

ADMINISTRATIVE RULES & REGULATIONS

127 SCRA 329, 1984BAUTISTA vs. JUNIO

FACTS:

This prohibition proceeding filed by petitioners, spouses MaryConcepcion Bautista and Enrique D. Bautista, for being allegedly

violative of the due process and equal protection guarantees 1 of the Constitution as it was provided in LOI 869 that the use privatemotor vehicles with H and EH plates on week-ends and holidayswas banned from "[12:00] a.m. Saturday morning to 5:00 a.m.Monday morning, or 1:00 a.m. of the holiday to 5:00 a.m. of theday after the holiday."

It was then alleged by petitioners that "while the purpose for theissuance of the LOI 869 is laudable, to wit, energy conservation,the provision banning the use of H and EH [vehicles] is unfair,discriminatory, [amounting to an] arbitrary classification" and thusin contravention of the equal protection clause. 5 Moreover, for them, such Letter of Instruction is a denial of due process, morespecifically, "of their right to use and enjoy their private propertyand of their freedom to travel and hold family gatherings, reunionsand outings on week-ends and holidays," inviting attention to thefact that others not included in the ban enjoying "unrestrictedfreedom."

ISSUE: Whether or not the validity of an energy conservation measure,Letter of Instruction No. 869, issued on May 31, 1979 ― the responseto the protracted oil crisis that dates back to 1974 is constitutional

HELD:

'The statute here questioned deals with a subject clearly withinthe scope of the police power. We are asked to declare it void onthe ground that the specific method of regulation prescribed isunreasonable and hence deprives the plaintiff of due process of law. As underlying questions of fact may condition theconstitutionality of legislation of this character, the presumption of constitutionality must prevail in the absence of some factualfoundation of record for overthrowing the statute.'

It is true, of course, that there may be instances where a policepower measure may, because of its arbitrary, oppressive or unjust

character, be held offensive to the due process clause and,therefore, may, when challenged in an appropriate legalproceeding, be declared void on its face. This is not one of them.

In the interplay between such a fundamental right and policepower, especially so where the assailed governmental actiondeals with the use of one's property, the latter is accorded muchleeway. That is settled law. What is more, it is good law. Dueprocess, therefore, cannot be validly invoked.

Those adversely affected may under such circumstances invokethe equal protection clause only if they can show that thegovernmental act assailed, far from being inspired by theattainment of the common weal was prompted by the spirit of hostility, or at the very least, discrimination that finds no support in

reason. It suffices then that the laws operate equally anduniformly on all persons under similar circumstances or that alpersons must be treated in the same manner, the conditions nobeing different, both in the privileges conferred and the liabilitiesimposed.

Absent therefore the alleged infringement of constitutional rightsmore precisely the due process and equal protection guaranteesthis Court cannot adjudge Letter of Instruction No. 869 as taintedby unconstitutionality.

Petition dismissed.

119 SCRA 597, 1982TAXICAB OPERATORS OF METRO MANILA VS. BOT

FACTS:On 10 October 1977, the Board of Transportation (BT) issuedMemorandum Circular 77-42 phasing out old and dilapidated taxisrefusing registration to taxi units within the National Capitol Regionhaving year models over 6 years old. Pursuant to the above BOTcircular, the Director of the Bureau of Land Transportation (BLT) issuedImplementing Circular 52, dated 15 August 1980, instructing theRegional Director, the MV Registrars and other personnel of BLT, alwithin the National Capital Region (NCR), to implement said Circularand formulating a schedule of phase-out of vehicles to be allowed andaccepted for registration as public conveyances. In accordancetherewith, cabs of model 1971 were phased-out in registration year1978; those of model 1972, in 1979; those of model 1973, in 1980; and

those of model 1974, in 1981. On 27 January 1981, Taxicab Operatorsof Metro Manila, Inc. (TOMMI), including its members AceTransportation Corporation and Felicisimo Cabigao, filed a petition withthe BT (Case 80-7553), seeking to nullify Memorandum Circular 77-42or to stop its implementation; to allow the registration and operation in1981 and subsequent years of taxicabs of model 1974, as well asthose of earlier models which were phased-out, provided that, at thetime of registration, they are roadworthy and fit for operation. On 16February 1981, TOMMI, et. al. filed before the BT a “Manifestation andUrgent Motion”, praying for an early hearing of their petition. The casewas heard on 20 February 1981. On 28 November 1981, TOMMI, etal. filed before the same Board a “Manifestation and Urgent Motion toResolve or Decide Main Petition” praying that the case be resolved ordecided not later than 10 December 1981 to enable them, in case ofdenial, to avail of whatever remedy they may have under the law fothe protection of their interests before their 1975 model cabs are

phased-out on 1 January 1982. TOMMI, et. al., through its Presidentallegedly made personal follow-ups of the case, but was later informedthat the records of the case could not be located. On 29 Decembe1981, TOMMI, et. al., instituted a petition for certiorari, prohibition andmandamus with preliminary injunction and temporary restraining ordewith the Supreme Court.ISSUE: WON the implementation and enforcement of MemorandumCircular 77-42 violates the petioner’s constitutional rights to (1) Equaprotection of the law; (2) Substantive due process; and (3) Protectionagainst arbitrary and unreasonable classification and standard.

HELD:

Regarding the and Substantive Due Process, Presidential Decree101 grants to the Board of Transportation the power to fix just andreasonable standards, classification, regulations, practicesmeasurements, or service to be furnished, imposed, observedand followed by operators of public utility motor vehicles. The

overriding consideration in the issuance of Memorandum Circula77-42 is the safety and comfort of the riding public from thedangers posed by old and dilapidated taxis. The State, in theexercise of its police power, can prescribe regulations to promotethe health, morals, peace, good order, safety and general welfareof the people. It can prohibit all things hurtful to comfort, safetyand welfare of society. It may also regulate property rights. Thenecessities imposed by public welfare may justify the exercise ogovernmental authority to regulate even if thereby certain groupsmay plausibly assert that their interests are disregardedDispensing with a public hearing prior to the issuance of theCirculars is not violative of procedural due process. Previousnotice and hearing are not essential to the validity of general rules





or regulations promulgated to govern future conduct of a class or persons or enterprises, unless the law provides otherwise. It isimpractical to subject every taxicab to constant and recurringevaluation to determine its road-worthiness, not to speak of thefact that it can open the door to the adoption of multiplestandards, possible collusion, and even graft and corruption. Areasonable standard must be adopted to apply to all vehiclesaffected uniformly, fairly, and justly. The span of six years suppliesthat reasonable standard. The product of experience shows thatby that time taxis have fully depreciated, their cost recovered, and

a fair return on investment obtained. They are also generallydilapidated and no longer fit for safe and comfortable service tothe public specially considering that they are in continuousoperation practically 24 hours everyday in three shifts of eighthours per shift. With that standard of reasonableness andabsence of arbitrariness, the requirement of due process hasbeen met. alleged that the Circular in question violates their rightto equal protection of the law because the same is being enforcedin Metro Manila only and is directed solely towards the taxiindustry. At the outset it should be pointed out that implementationoutside Metro Manila is also envisioned in Memorandum Circular No. 77-42. In fact, the same is also implemented in Cebu City.The Board's reason for enforcing the Circular initially in MetroManila is that taxicabs in this city, compared to those of other places, are subjected to heavier traffic pressure and moreconstant use. This is of common knowledge. Considering thattraffic conditions are not the same in every city, a substantial

distinction exists so that infringement of the equal protectionclause can hardly be successfully claimed.

The overriding consideration is the safety and comfort of theriding public from the dangers posed by old and dilapidated taxis.The State, in the exercise, of its police power, can prescriberegulations to promote the health, morals, peace, good order,safety and general welfare of the people. It can prohibit all thingshurtful to comfort, safety and welfare of society may also regulateproperty rights the language of Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando"the necessities imposed by public welfare may justify theexercise of governmental authority to regulate even if therebycertain groups may plausibly assert that their interests aredisregarded".

GR No. 158793, June 8, 2006MIRASOL VS. DPWH

FACTS:

Petitioners filed before the trial court a petition seeking thedeclaration of nullity of Department Order (DO) 74, DO 215 andthe TRB Regulations contravene RA 2000. Petitioners alsosought to declare Department Order No. 123 (DO 123) and

Administrative Order No. 1 (AO 1) unconstitutional. Previously, pursuant to its mandate under R.A. 2000, DPWH

issued on June 25, 1998 Department Order (DO) No. 215declaring the Manila-Cavite (Coastal Road) Toll Expressway aslimited access facilities. Pursuant to Section 2 of Republic Act No.2000, a limited access facility is defined as "a highway or streetespecially designed for through traffic, and over, from, or to whichowners or occupants of abutting land or other persons have noright or easement or only a limited right or easement of access,light, air or view by reason of the fact that their property abutsupon such limited access facility or for any other reason.

Moreover, petitioners prayed for the issuance of a temporaryrestraining order and/or preliminary injunction to prevent theenforcement of the total ban on motorcycles along the entirebreadth of North and South Luzon Expressways and the Manila-Cavite (Coastal Road) Toll Expressway under DO 215. On July18, 2001, the DPWH acting thru the TRB, issued DepartmentOrder No. 123 allowing motorcycles with engine displacement of 400 cubic centimeters inside limited access facilities (toll ways).DO 123, as petitioner contends, is violative of equal protectionclause of the constitution.

Consequently, on March 10, 2003, the trial court issued theassailed decision dismissing the petition but declaring invalid DO123. Petitioners moved for a reconsideration of the dismissal of

their petition; but it was denied by the trial court in its Order datedJune 16, 2003.

ISSUE: WHETHER or not AO 1 AND DO 123 AREUNCONSTITUTIONAL.

HELD:

Under EO 546, it is the DOTC, not the DPWH, which hasauthority to regulate, restrict, or prohibit access to limited accessfacilities. Thus, DO 74 and DO 215 are void because the DPWHhas no authority to declare certain expressways as limited accessfacilities. Under the law, it is the DOTC which is authorized toadminister and enforce all laws, rules and regulations in the fieldof transportation and to regulate related activities.

Since the DPWH has no authority to regulate activities relative totransportation, the TRB cannot derive its power from the DPWHto issue regulations governing limited access facilities. TheDPWH cannot delegate a power or function which it does nopossess in the first place. Since DO 74 and DO 215 are void, ifollows that the rules implementing them are likewise void. DPWHhas no authority to regulate limited access highways since EO546 has devolved this function to the DOTC. Thus, DO 123 is voidfor want of authority of the DPWH to promulgate it.

Furthermore, the assailed portion of AO 1 states that on limitedaccess highways, it is unlawful for any person or group of personsto drive any bicycle, tricycle, pedicab, motorcycle or any vehicle

not motorized. Petitioners attacked this exercise of police poweas baseless and unwarranted.The use of public highways bymotor vehicles is subject to regulation as an exercise of the policepower of the state. The police power is far-reaching in scope andis the "most essential, insistent and illimitable" of all governmenpowers. The tendency is to extend rather than to restrict the useof police power. The sole standard in measuring its exercise isreasonableness. What is "reasonable" is not subject to exacdefinition or scientific formulation. No all-embracing test oreasonableness exists, for its determination rests upon human

judgment applied to the facts and circumstances of eachparticular case.

AO 1 does not impose unreasonable restrictions. It merelyoutlines several precautionary measures, to which toll way usersmust adhere. These rules were designed to ensure public safetyand the uninhibited flow of traffic within limited access facilitiesThey cover several subjects, from what lanes should be used by acertain vehicle, to maximum vehicle height. The prohibition ocertain types of vehicles is but one of these. None of these rulesviolates reason. The purpose of these rules and the logic behindthem are quite evident. A toll way is not an ordinary road. Thespecial purpose for which a toll way is constructed necessitatesthe imposition of guidelines in the manner of its use andoperation. Inevitably, such rules will restrict certain rights. But themere fact that certain rights are restricted does not invalidate therules.

The DPWH, through the Solicitor General, maintains that the tolways were not designed to accommodate motorcycles and thatheir presence in the toll ways will compromise safety and trafficconsiderations. The DPWH points out that the same study thepetitioners rely on cites that the inability of other drivers to detecmotorcycles is the predominant cause of accidents. Arguablyprohibiting the use of motorcycles in toll ways may not be the

"best" measure to ensure the safety and comfort of those who plythe toll ways. However, the means by which the government chooses to act is

not judged in terms of what is "best," rather, on simply whetherthe act is reasonable. The validity of a police power measuredoes not depend upon the absolute assurance that the purposedesired can in fact be probably fully accomplished, or upon thecertainty that it will best serve the purpose intended. Reason, notscientific exactitude, is the measure of the validity of thegovernmental regulation. Arguments based on what is "best" arearguments reserved for the Legislature’s discussion. Judiciaintervention in such matters will only be warranted if the assailedregulation is patently whimsical. We do not find the situation in





among others, for a 5-year exclusive operation by OTSI of stevedoringservices in the South Harbor, renewable for another 5 years. TheBoard of Directors of the PPA gave its approval on 27 June 1980. On23 July 1980, PIPSI instituted an action before the Court of FirstInstance (CFI) of Manila against PPA and OTSI for the nullification of the contract between the two, the annulment of the 10% of grossstevedoring revenue being collected by PPA, and injunction withpreliminary injunction. An ex-parte restraining order was issued. On 21

August 1980. with leave of court, Anglo-Fil, et al., filed their complaintin intervention. The motion was granted and on 22 August 1980, the

CFI issued another ex-parte restraining order in the case to include Anglo-Fil et. al., under the benefits of such order. On 30 August 1980,the PPA filed an urgent motion to lift the restraining orders “in view of the long delay in the resolution of the injunction incident and thecountervailing public interest involved.” On 1 September 1980, the CFIdissolved, lifted and set aside the restraining orders without prejudiceto the Court’s resolution on the propriety of issuing the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for. On 5 September 1980, PPA sent aletter to the General Manager of PIPSI informing him that due to thelifting of the temporary restraining order, it was withdrawing PIPSI’sholdover authority to operate or provide stevedoring services at SouthHarbor effective 7 September 1980. Anglo-Fil, et al., and PIPSI,therefore, filed the petitions for certiorari with preliminary injunctionalleging that the lifting of the restraining orders ex-parte by the CFI wasclearly effected with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of

jurisdiction.

ISSUE: Whether the issuance of a Permit to Operate (PTO) dependedon the sound discretion, and on the policies, rules and regulationsimplemented by the latter, or whether the non-issuance thereof is anunlawful deprivation of property rights.

HELD:From the viewpoint of procedure, there was no grave abuse of discretion or want of jurisdiction when the CFI judge lifted ex-parte thetemporary restraining order he had earlier issued also ex-parte.Subsequent to the issuance of the questioned order, the CFI heard theparties on the application for a writ of preliminary injunction and, after hearing the parties’ evidence and arguments, denied the application for the writ. It is also not grave abuse of discretion when a court dissolvesex-parte abuse of discretion when a court dissolves ex-parte arestraining order also issued ex-parte. Further, the contention that dueprocess was violated resulting to a confiscatory effect on privateproperty is likewise without merit. In the first place, Anglo-Fil, et. al.were operating merely on “hold-over” permits, which were based onPPA Memorandum Order 1 (19 January 1977). All hold-over permitswere by nature temporary and subject to subsequent policy guidelinesas may be implemented by PPA. Such should have served as sufficientnotice that, at any time, PIPSI’s and Anglo-Fil et.al.’s authorities maybe terminated. Whether PIPSI, and Anglo-Fil, et. al. would be issued aPermit to Operate (PTO) depended on the sound discretion of PPA andon the policies, rules and regulations that the latter may implement inaccordance with the statutory grant of power. The latter, therefore,cannot be said to have been deprived of property without due processbecause, in this respect, what was given them was not a property rightbut a mere privilege and they should have taken cognizance of the factthat since they have no vested right to operate in the South Harbor,their permits can be withdrawn anytime the public welfare deems itbest to do so. Thus, unless the case justifies it, the judiciary will not

interfere in purely administrative matters. Such discretionary power vested in the proper administrative body, in the absence of arbitrariness and grave abuse so as to go beyond the statutoryauthority, is not subject to the contrary judgment or control of others. Ingeneral, courts have no supervisory power over the proceedings andactions of the administrative departments of the government. This isparticularly true with respect to acts involving the exercise of judgmentor discretion, and to findings of fact.

G.R. NO. 145742 JULY 14, 2005PHILIPPINE PORTS AUTHORITY VS. CIPRES STEVEDORINGAND ARRASTRE INC. (CISAI)

FACTS:

Petitioner PPA is a govt. entity created by virtue of P.D. no. 857and is tasked to implement an integrated program for theplanning, development, financing, and operation of ports and pordistricts in the country. Respondent CISAI is a domesticcorporation primarily engaged in stevedoring, arrastre, andporterage business, including cargo handling and hauling servicesin Negros Oriental and Dumaguete and Bais. Since 1976, CISAhad been granted permits to operate the cargo handling

operations in Dumaguete. In 1991, PPA awarded an 8-yeacontract to CISAI to pursue its business endeavor. Upon this timePPA Administrative Order No. 03-90 took effect providing for theawarding of cargo handling services through public bidding.

Following the expiration of its contract, CISAI was able tocontinue with its business by virtue of hold-over permits given byPPA. During this time, another administrative order PPA AO No03-2000 took effect which amended PPA AO no. 03-90 expresslyprovided that all contract for cargo handling services of morethan 3 years shall be awarded through public bidding. CISAinitiated an action for specific performance, injunction withapplication for preliminary mandatory injunction, contending thaPPA’s action was I derogation of their vested right over theoperation of cargo handling enterprise. The lower court grantedCISAI’s prayer for a temporary restraining order. PPA filed amotion for reconsideration which was granted by the trial courtsetting aside the injunctive writ. CISAI filed a petition for certiorar

before the CA, and the CA granted the petition, ordering PPA todesist from conducting the scheduled public bidding for cargohandling operations in the port of Dumaguete. Thus, this instanappeal.

ISSUE: WON CISAI have acquired a vested right to the cargo handlingoperations at the Dumaguete Port.

HELD:

Supreme Court held that CISAI have no vested rights to the cargohandling operations because the continuance of their businesswas due to hold over permits given by PPA, and such may berevoked anytime by the granting authority. As held in the case of

Anglo-Fil Trading Corporation vs. Lazaro, hold over permits aremerely temporary subject to the policy and guidelines as may beimplemented by the authority granting it. Stevedoring services are

imbued with public interest and subject to the state’s police powertherefore, whatever proprietary right the CISAI may have acquiredmust necessarily give way to valid exercise of police power. PPAbeing created for the purpose of promoting the growth of regionaport bodies, it is empowered to make port regulations. With thismandate, the decision to bid out cargo holding services isproperly within the province and discretion of PPA. As for CISAI’sclaim that PPA AO No. 03-2000 violated the constitutionaprovision of non-impairment of contract, suffice it to state that alcontracts are subject to the overriding demands, needs, interestsof the greater number as the State may determine in thelegitimate exercise of its police power. Wherefore, Petition isgranted.

G.R. No. 157036 June 9, 2004FRANCISCO CHAVEZ VS. HON. ALBERTO ROMULO ASEXECUTIVE SECRETARY, PNP CHIEF HERMOGENES EBDANE

FACTS:

Chavez is a gun- owner who filed a petition for prohibition andinjunction seeking to enjoin the implementation of the “ Guidelinesin the Implementation of the Ban on the Carying of FirearmsOutside of Residence” issued by PNP Chief HermogenesEbdane, Jr. In January 2003, Pres. Arroyo delivered a speechbefore the members of the PNP stressing the need for anationwide gun ban in all public places to avert the rising crimeincidents. She directed PNP Chief Ebdane to suspend theissuance of permits to carry firearms outside of residence(PTCFOR). Thus, Chief Ebdane issued the assailed GuidelinesChavez contends that such guidelines was a derogation of his





constitutional right to life and to protect life as he, being a law-abiding licensed gun-owner is the only class subject to theimplementation while leaving the law-breakers (kidnappers, MILF,hold-uppers, robbers etc.) untouched. Petitioner also averred thatownership and carrying of firearms are constitutionally protectedproperty rights which cannot be taken away without due processof law.

ISSUES:1. WON the citizens’ right to bear arms is a constitutional right

2. WON the revocation of the PTCFOR pursuant to the assailedGuidelines is a violation of right to property3. WON the issuance of said Guidelines is a valid exercise of Police

power

HELD:1. SC ruled that nowhere fond in our Constitution is the provision on

bearing arms as a constitutional right. The right to bear arms,then, is a mere statutory privilege unlike in the AmericanConstitution which was the law invoked by petitioner. Right tobear arms is a mere statutory creation as was observed by thelaws passed to regulate the use, acquisition, transfer, importationof firearms; it cannot be considered an inalienable or absoluteright.

2. The bulk of jurisprudence is that a license authorizing a person toenjoy a certain privilege is neither a property nor property right. Alicense is merely a privilege to do what otherwise would be

unlawful, and is not a contract between the granting authority andthe person to whom it is granted; neither is it property right nor does it create a vested right. Such license may be revokedanytime when the authority deems it fit to do so, and suchrevocation does not deprive the holder of any property, or immunity.

3. The test to determine the validity of police measure , thus: The interests of the public generally, as distinguished from

those of a particular class, require the exercise of the policepower; and

The means employed are reasonably necessary for theaccomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressiveupon individuals. It is apparent from the assailed Guidelinesthat the basis for its issuance was the need for peace andorder in the society. Owing to the proliferation of crimes,particularly those committed by NPA, which tends to disturb

the peace of the community, Pres. Arroyo deemed it best toimpose a nationwide gun ban. Undeniably, the motivatingfactor in the issuance of guidelines is the interest of thepublic in general. Such means of revocation is, thus, a validexercise of police power.

Petition is hereby dismissed.





- EMINENT DOMAIN -

WHO EXERCISES THE POWER?

GR No 14355 Oct. 31, 1919CITY OF MANILA VS. CHINESE COMMUNITY CEMETERY

FACTS:

The City of Manila, in exercising the owner of Eminent Domain,presented a petition in the Court of First Instance of said Cityraying that certain lands described therein, be expropriated for thepurpose of constructing a public improvement, namely, theextension of Rizal Avenue, Manila. Herein respondents contendthat there are other parcels of land offered for such improvementproposed by the City at a lesser cost and that the chosen parcelof land by the City is a cemetery where the dead loved ones of the Chinese community were buried. Herien respondents alsoaverred that the City of Manila will have to spend a great dealamount of money in the relocation and rebuilding of sepulchres,tombstones and monuments of those affected by theexpropriation should they pursue to use the Chinese Cemetery.The trial judge, Hon. Del Rosario decided that there was nonecessity for the expropriation of the particular strip of land inquestion. The City of Manila appealed contending that under thelaw, it has the authority to expropriate any land it may desire and

neither the court not the land owners can inquire into theadvisable purpose of the expropriation or ask concerning thenecessities therefore; and that the courts are mere appraisers of the land involved.

ISSUE: May the courts inquire into, and hear proof upon, the necessityof the expropriation?

HELD:

Section 241 of Act no. 190 provides that “ the govt. of the Philislands, or of any province or department thereof, or of anymunicipality, and any person, or public or private corporationhaving, by law, the right to condemn private property for publicuse, shall exercise that right in the manner prescribed under Sec.242( a complaint in expropriation proceeding shall be presented;that the complaint shall state with certainty the right of condemnation, with a description of the property sought to becondemned together with the interest of each defendantseparately.). Section 243 provides that if the court shall find upontrial that the right to expropriate the land in question exists, it shallthen appoint commissioners. Thus, Sec. 243 means that whenthe legislature conferred upon the courts the right to ascertainupon trial whether the right exists for the exercise of eminentdomain, it intended that the courts should inquire into, and hear proof upon: 1. whether the purpose for the exercise of the right of eminent domain is public; and 2.whether the land is public or private. Supreme Court also averred that the exercise of the rightof eminent domain is necessary in derogation of private rights,and the rule in that case is that the authority must be strictlyconstrued. Therefore, if there is no greatest necessity existing for an expropriation, it should not be made for such purposes until itis fully established that such necessity exist. In the present case,even granting that a necessity exist for the opening of Rizal St.

through the cemetery, record shows that adjoining and adjacentlands have been offered to the city free of charge which willanswer every purpose of the City of Manila. The cemetery, then,still being under care and maintenance of the living should bespared from such expropriation where there are other landsoffered for expropriation at a much lesser expense to serve thesame purpose. The judgment of the lower court is herebyaffirmed.

268 SCRA 368 (1997)MODAY vs. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS:

On July 23, 1989, the Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality oBunawan in Agusan del Sur passed Resolution No. 43-89"Authorizing the Municipal Mayor to Initiate the Petition foExpropriation of a One (1) Hectare Portion of Lot No. 6138-Pls-4

Along the National Highway Owned by Percival Moday for theSite of Bunawan Farmers Center and Other Government SportsFacilities."

In due time, Resolution No. 43-89 was approved by thenMunicipal Mayor Anuncio C. Bustillo and transmitted to theSangguniang Panlalawigan for its approval. On September 11

1989, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan disapproved saidResolution and returned it with the comment that "expropriation isunnecessary considering that there are still available lots inBunawan for the establishment of the government center."

The Municipality of Bunawan, herein public respondentsubsequently filed a petition for Eminent Domain againspetitioner Percival Moday before the RTC at Prosperidad, Agusandel Sur.

On March 6, 1991, public respondent municipality filed a Motionto Take or Enter Upon the Possession of Subject Matter of ThisCase stating that it had already deposited with the municipatreasurer the necessary amount in accordance with Section 2Rule 67 of the Revised Rules of Court and that it would be in thegovernment's best interest for public respondent to be allowed totake possession of the property.

Despite petitioners' opposition and after a hearing on the meritsthe RTC granted respondent municipality's motion to takepossession of the land. Petitioners' motion for recon was deniedby the trial court. Petitioners elevated the case in a petition forcertiorari alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the triacourt, but was dismissed by appellate court. The CA held that thepublic purpose for the expropriation is clear from Resolution No43-89 and that since the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Agusandel Sur did not declare Resolution No. 43-89 invalid, expropriationof petitioners' property could proceed. Respondent appellate couralso denied petitioners' motion for recon.

Meanwhile, the Municipality of Bunawan had erected threebuildings on the subject property: 2 wooden structures, and onemade of concrete.

ISSUE: Whether or not the municipality to exercise the right to eminendomain, since the Sangguniang Panlalawigan disapproved ResolutionNo. 43-89.

HELD:

On December 8, 1993, the Court issued a temporary restrainingorder enjoining and restraining public respondent JudgeEvangeline Yuipco from enforcing her and respondenmunicipality from using and occupying all the buildingsconstructed and from further constructing any building on the landsubject of this petition.

Acting on petitioners' Omnibus Motion for Enforcement oRestraining Order and for Contempt, the Court issued aResolution on March 15, 1995, citing incumbent municipal mayo

Anuncio C. Bustillo for contempt, ordering him to pay the fine andto demolish the "blocktiendas" which were built in violation of therestraining order.

Former Mayor Anuncio C. Bustillo paid the fine and manifestedthat he lost in the May 8, 1995 election. The incumbent Mayo

Leonardo Barrios, filed a Manifestation, Motion to Resolve"Urgent Motion for Immediate Dissolution of the TemporaryRestraining Order" and Memorandum on June 11, 1996 for theMunicipality of Bunawan.

Petitioners contend that the CA erred in upholding the legality othe condemnation proceedings initiated by the municipality

According to petitioners, the expropriation was politicallymotivated and Resolution No. 43-89 was correctly disapproved bythe Sangguniang Panlalawigan.

The CA declared that the Sangguniang Panlalawigan's reason fodisapproving the resolution "could be baseless, because it failedto point out which and where are those available lots.'Respondent court also concluded that since the Sangguniang





Panlalawigan did not declare the municipal board's resolution asinvalid, expropriation of petitioners' property could proceed. TheCourt finds no merit in the petition and affirms the decision of theCA.

Eminent domain, the power which the Municipality of Bunawanexercised in the instant case, is a fundamental State power that isinseparable from sovereignty. It is government's right toappropriate, in the nature of a compulsory sale to the State,private property for public use or purpose. Inherently possessedby the national legislature, the power of eminent domain may be

validly delegated to local governments, other public entities andpublic utilities. For the taking of private property by thegovernment to be valid, the taking must be for public use andthere must be just compensation.

The Municipality of Bunawan's power to exercise the right of eminent domain is not disputed as it is expressly provided for inBatas Pambansa Blg. 337, the local Government Code in force atthe time expropriation proceedings were initiated. Section 9 of said law states:

Sec. 9. Eminent Domain. ― A local government unit may,through its head and acting pursuant to a resolution of itssanggunian, exercise the right of eminent domain and institutecondemnation proceedings for public use or purpose.

Section 153 of B.P. Blg. 337 provides:Sec. 153. Sangguniang Panlalawigan Review. ― (1) Withinthirty days after receiving copies of approved ordinances,resolutions and executive orders promulgated by the municipalmayor, the sangguniang panlalawigan shall examine thedocuments or transmit them to the provincial attorney, or if there be none, to the provincial fiscal, who shall examine thempromptly and inform the sangguniang panlalawigan in writingof any defect or impropriety which he may discover therein andmake such comments or recommendations as shall appear tohim proper.

(2) If the sangguniang panlalawigan shall find that any municipalordinance, resolution or executive order is beyond the power conferred upon the sangguniang bayan or the mayor, it shalldeclare such ordinance, resolution or executive order invalid inwhole or in part, entering its actions upon the minutes andadvising the proper municipal authorities thereof. The effect of such an action shall be to annul the ordinance, resolution or executive order in question in whole or in part. The action of thesangguniang panlalawigan shall be final. xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis

supplied.) The Sangguniang Panlalawigan's disapproval of Municipal

Resolution No. 43-89 is an infirm action which does not render said resolution null and void. The law, as expressed in Section153 of B.P. Blg. 337, grants the Sangguniang Panlalawigan thepower to declare a municipal resolution invalid on the sole groundthat it is beyond the power of the Sangguniang Bayan or theMayor to issue.

Thus, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan was without the authority todisapprove Municipal Resolution No. 43-89 for the Municipality of Bunawan clearly has the power to exercise the right of eminentdomain and its Sangguniang Bayan the capacity to promulgatesaid resolution, pursuant to the earlier-quoted Section 9 of B.P.Blg. 337. Perforce, it follows that Resolution No. 43-89 is validand binding and could be used as lawful authority to petition for the condemnation of petitioners' property.

As regards the accusation of political oppression, it is alleged thatPercival Moday incurred the ire of then Mayor Anuncio C. Bustillowhen he refused to support the latter's candidacy for mayor inprevious elections. Petitioners claim that then incumbent Mayor C. Bustillo used the expropriation to retaliate by expropriating their land even if there were other properties belonging to themunicipality and available for the purpose. Specifically, theyallege that the municipality owns a vacant seven-hectare propertyadjacent to petitioners' land, evidenced by a sketch plan.

The limitations on the power of eminent domain are that the usemust be public, compensation must be made and due process of law must be observed. The Supreme Court, taking cognizance of such issues as the adequacy of compensation, necessity of thetaking and the public use character or the purpose of the taking,

has ruled that the necessity of exercising eminent domain mustbe genuine and of a public character. Government may nocapriciously choose what private property should be taken.

After a careful study of the records of the case, however, we findno evidentiary support for petitioners' allegations. The uncertifiedphotocopy of the sketch plan does not conclusively prove that themunicipality does own vacant land adjacent to petitionersproperty suited to the purpose of the expropriation. In thequestioned decision, respondent appellate court similarly held thathe pleadings and documents on record have not pointed out any

of respondent municipality's "other available properties availablefor the same purpose." The accusations of political reprisal arelikewise unsupported by competent evidence. Consequently, theCourt holds that petitioners' demand that the former municipamayor be personally liable for damages is without basis.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. Thequestioned Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals are

AFFIRMED. The Temporary Restraining Order issued by theCourt is LIFTED.

GR No. 136349, January 23, 2006MASIKIP vs. CITY OF PASIG

FACTS:

Petitioner Lourdes Dela Paz Masikip is the registered owner of aparcel of land with an area of 4,521 square meters located a

Pag-Asa, Caniogan, Pasig City, Metro Manila. In a letter dated January 6, 1994, the then Municipality of Pasig,

now City of Pasig, respondent, notified petitioner of its intention toexpropriate a 1,500 square meter portion of her property to beused for the "sports development and recreational activities" othe residents of Barangay Caniogan. This was pursuant toOrdinance No. 42, Series of 1993 enacted by the thenSangguniang Bayan of Pasig.

Again, on March 23, 1994, respondent wrote another letter topetitioner, but this time the purpose was allegedly "in line with theprogram of the Municipal Government to provide landopportunities to deserving poor sectors of our community."

On May 2, 1994, petitioner sent a reply to respondent stating thathe intended expropriation of her property is unconstitutionalinvalid, and oppressive, as the area of her lot is neither sufficientnor suitable to "provide land opportunities to deserving poosectors of our community."

In its letter of December 20, 1994, respondent reiterated that thepurpose of the expropriation of petitioner’s property is "to providesports and recreational facilities to its poor residents."

Subsequently, on February 21, 1995, respondent filed with thetrial court a complaint for expropriation, docketed as SCA No873. Respondent prayed that the trial court, after due notice andhearing, issue an order for the condemnation of the property; thacommissioners be appointed for the purpose of determining the

just compensation; and that judgment be rendered based on thereport of the commissioners.

On April 25, 1995, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss and on May7, 1996, the trial court issued an Order denying the Motion toDismiss, on the ground that there is a genuine necessity toexpropriate the property for the sports and recreationaactivities of the residents of Pasig. As to the issue of juscompensation, the trial court held that the same is to be

determined in accordance with the Revised Rules of Court. Petitioner filed a motion for recon but it was denied by the tria

court. Forthwith, it appointed the City Assessor and City Treasureof Pasig City as commissioners to ascertain the juscompensation. This prompted petitioner to file with the Court of

Appeals a special civil action for certiorari . On October 31, 1997the Appellate Court dismissed the petition for lack of merit.

Petitioner’s Motion for Recon was denied.

ISSUE: What constitutes a genuine necessity for public use.

HELD:





Where the taking by the State of private property is done for thebenefit of a small community which seeks to have its own sportsand recreational facility, notwithstanding that there is such arecreational facility only a short distance away, such taking cannotbe considered to be for public use. Its expropriation is not valid. Inthis case, the Court defines what constitutes a genuine necessityfor public use.

In the early case of US v. Toribio, this Court defined the power of eminent domain as "the right of a government to take andappropriate private property to public use, whenever the public

exigency requires it, which can be done only on condition of providing a reasonable compensation therefor." It has also beendescribed as the power of the State or its instrumentalities to takeprivate property for public use and is inseparable from sovereigntyand inherent in government.

The power of eminent domain is lodged in the legislative branchof the government. It delegates the exercise thereof to localgovernment units, other public entities and public utilitycorporations, subject only to Constitutional limitations. Localgovernments have no inherent power of eminent domain and mayexercise it only when expressly authorized by statute. Section 19of the Local Government Code of 1991 (Republic Act No. 7160)prescribes the delegation by Congress of the power of eminentdomain to local government units and lays down the parametersfor its exercise, thus:

"SEC. 19. Eminent Domain. – A local government unit may,through its chief executive and acting pursuant to an ordinance,exercise the power of eminent domain for public use, purposeor welfare for the benefit of the poor and the landless, uponpayment of just compensation, pursuant to the provisions of theConstitution and pertinent laws: Provided, however , That, thepower of eminent domain may not be exercised unless a validand definite offer has been previously made to the owner andsuch offer was not accepted: Provided , further , That, the localgovernment unit may immediately take possession of theproperty upon the filing of expropriation proceedings and uponmaking a deposit with the proper court of at least fifteenpercent (15%) of the fair market value of the property based onthe current tax declaration of the property to be expropriated:Provided , finally , That, the amount to be paid for expropriatedproperty shall be determined by the proper court, based on thefair market value at the time of the taking of the property."

Judicial review of the exercise of eminent domain is limited to the

following areas of concern: (a) the adequacy of the compensation,(b) the necessity of the taking, and (c) the public use character of the purpose of the taking.

The right to take private property for public purposes necessarilyoriginates from "the necessity" and the taking must be limited tosuch necessity. In City of Manila v. Chinese Community of Manila ,we held that the very foundation of the right to exerciseeminent domain is a genuine necessity and that necessitymust be of a public character . Moreover, the ascertainment of the necessity must precede or accompany and not follow, thetaking of the land. In City of Manila v. Arellano Law College, weruled that "necessity within the rule that the particular property tobe expropriated must be necessary, does not mean an absolutebut only a reasonable or practical necessity, such as wouldcombine the greatest benefit to the public with the leastinconvenience and expense to the condemning party and theproperty owner consistent with such benefit."

Applying this standard, we hold that respondent City of Pasig hasfailed to establish that there is a genuine necessity to expropriatepetitioner’s property. Our scrutiny of the records shows that thebasis for the passage of the Ordinance authorizing theexpropriation, indicates that the intended beneficiary is theMelendres Compound Homeowners Association, a private, non-profit organization, not the residents of Caniogan. It can begleaned that the members of the said Association are desirous of having their own private playground and recreational facility.Petitioner’s lot is the nearest vacant space available. The purposeis, therefore, not clearly and categorically public. The necessityhas not been shown, especially considering that there exists analternative facility for sports development and community

recreation in the area, which is the Rainforest Park, available toall residents of Pasig City, including those of Caniogan.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is GRANTED. Thechallenged Decision and Resolution of the CA are REVERSEDThe complaint for expropriation filed before the trial court byrespondent City of Pasig, is DISMISSED.

GR No. 155746, October 03, 2004LAGCAO vs. JUDGE LABRA

FACTS:

In 1964, the Province of Cebu donated 210 lots to the City ofCebu. One of these lots was Lot 1029, situated in Capitol HillsCebu City, with an area of 4,048 square meters. In 1965petitioners purchased Lot 1029. But then, in late 1965, the 210lots, reverted to the Province of Cebu. Consequently, the provincetried to annul the sale of Lot by the City of Cebu to the petitionersThis prompted the latter to sue the province for specificperformance and damages in the then CFI.

On July 9, 1986, the court a quo ruled in favor of petitioners andon June 11, 1992, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision othe trial court. Pursuant to the ruling of the appellate court, theProvince of Cebu executed a deed of absolute sale over Lot 1029in favor of petitioners.

After acquiring title, petitioners tried to take possession of the loonly to discover that squatters already occupied it. Thus

petitioners instituted ejectment proceedings against the squattersThe MTCC, rendered a decision on April 1, 1998, ordering thesquatters to vacate the lot. On appeal, the RTC affirmed theMTCC’s decision and issued a writ of execution and order odemolition.

However, when the demolition order was about to beimplemented, Cebu City Mayor Alvin Garcia wrote two letters tothe MTCC, requesting the deferment of the demolition on theground that the City was still looking for a relocation site for thesquatters. Acting on the mayor’s request, the MTCC issued twoorders suspending the demolition for a period of 120 days fromFebruary 22, 1999. Unfortunately for petitioners, during thesuspension period, the Sangguniang Panlungsod (SP) of CebuCity passed a resolution which identified Lot 1029 as a socializedhousing site pursuant to RA 7279. Then, on June 30, 1999, theSP of Cebu City passed Ordinance No. 1772 which included Lot1029 among the identified sites for socialized housing. On July19, 2000, Ordinance No. 1843 was enacted by the SP of CebuCity authorizing the mayor of Cebu City to initiate expropriationproceedings for the acquisition of Lot 1029 which was registeredin the name of petitioners. The intended acquisition was to beused for the benefit of the homeless after its subdivision and saleto the actual occupants thereof. For this purpose, the ordinanceappropriated the amount of P6,881,600 for the payment of thesubject lot. This ordinance was approved by Mayor Garcia on

August 2, 2000. On August 29, 2000, petitioners filed with the RTC an action fo

declaration of nullity of Ordinance No. 1843 for beingunconstitutional. The trial court dismissed the complaint filed bypetitioners whose subsequent motion for recon was also denied.

In this appeal, petitioners argue that Ordinance No. 1843 isunconstitutional as it sanctions the expropriation of their propertyfor the purpose of selling it to the squatters, an endeavor contrary

to the concept of "public use" contemplated in the ConstitutionThey allege that it will benefit only a handful of people. Theordinance, according to petitioners, was obviously passed fopoliticking, the squatters undeniably being a big source of votes.

ISSUE: Whether or not the intended expropriation by the City of Cebuof a 4,048-square-meter parcel of land owned by petitionerscontravenes the Constitution and applicable laws.

HELD:

Local government units have no inherent power of eminendomain and can exercise it only when expressly authorized by the





legislature. By virtue of RA 7160, Congress conferred upon localgovernment units the power to expropriate. Ordinance No. 1843was enacted pursuant to Section 19 of RA 7160:

SEC. 19. Eminent Domain. － A local government unit may,through its chief executive and acting pursuant to an ordinance,exercise the power of eminent domain for public use, or purpose, or welfare for the benefit of the poor and the landless,upon payment of just compensation, pursuant to the provisionsof the Constitution and pertinent laws xxx. (italics supplied).

Ordinance No. 1843 which authorized the expropriation of

petitioners’ lot was enacted by the SP of Cebu City to providesocialized housing for the homeless and low-income residents of the City.

There are two legal provisions which limit the exercise of thispower: (1) no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or propertywithout due process of law, nor shall any person be denied theequal protection of the laws; and (2) private property shall not betaken for public use without just compensation. Thus, the exerciseby local government units of the power of eminent domain is notabsolute.

The foundation of the right to exercise eminent domain is genuinenecessity and that necessity must be of public character.Government may not capriciously or arbitrarily choose whichprivate property should be expropriated. In this case, there wasno showing at all why petitioners’ property was singled out for expropriation by the city ordinance or what necessity impelled theparticular choice or selection. Ordinance No. 1843 stated noreason for the choice of petitioners’ property as the site of asocialized housing project.

RA 7279 is the law that governs the local expropriation of propertyfor purposes of urban land reform and housing. Sections 9 and 10thereof provide:

SEC 9. Priorities in the Acquisition of Land . － Lands for socialized housing shall be acquired in the following order:(a) Those owned by the Government or any of its subdivisions,instrumentalities, or agencies, including government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries;(b) Alienable lands of the public domain;(c) Unregistered or abandoned and idle lands;(d) Those within the declared Areas or Priority Development,Zonal Improvement Program sites, and Slum Improvement andResettlement Program sites which have not yet been acquired;(e) Bagong Lipunan Improvement of Sites and Services or

BLISS which have not yet been acquired; and(f) Privately-owned lands.Where on-site development is found more practicable andadvantageous to the beneficiaries, the priorities mentioned inthis section shall not apply. The local government units shallgive budgetary priority to on-site development of governmentlands. (Emphasis supplied).

SEC. 10. Modes of Land Acquisition. － The modes of acquiringlands for purposes of this Act shall include, among others,community mortgage, land swapping, land assembly or consolidation, land banking, donation to the Government, jointventure agreement, negotiated purchase, and expropriation:Provided, however, That expropriation shall be resorted toonly when other modes of acquisition have been exhausted :Provided further, That where expropriation is resorted to, parcelsof land owned by small property owners shall be exempted for purposes of this Act: xxx. (Emphasis supplied).

In the recent case of Estate or Heirs of the Late Ex-Justice JoseB.L. Reyes et al. vs. City of Manila, we ruled that the above-quoted provisions are strict limitations on the exercise of thepower of eminent domain by local government units, especiallywith respect to (1) the order of priority in acquiring land for socialized housing and (2) the resort to expropriation proceedingsas a means to acquiring it. Private lands rank last in the order of priority for purposes of socialized housing. In the same vein,expropriation proceedings may be resorted to only after the other modes of acquisition are exhausted. Compliance with theseconditions is mandatory because these are the only safeguardsof oftentimes helpless owners of private property against whatmay be a tyrannical violation of due process when their property

is forcibly taken from them allegedly for public use. We have found nothing in the records indicating that the City o

Cebu complied strictly with Sections 9 and 10 of RA 7279Ordinance No. 1843 sought to expropriate petitioners’ propertywithout any attempt to first acquire the lands listed in (a) to (e) oSection 9 of RA 7279. Likewise, Cebu City failed to establish thathe other modes of acquisition in Section 10 of RA 7279 were firsexhausted. Moreover, prior to the passage of Ordinance No1843, there was no evidence of a valid and definite offer to buypetitioners’ property as required by Section 19 of RA 7160. We

therefore find Ordinance No. 1843 to be constitutionally infirm fobeing violative of the petitioners’ right to due process. It should also be noted that, as early as 1998, petitioners had

already obtained a favorable judgment of eviction against theillegal occupants of their property. The judgment in this ejectmencase had, in fact, already attained finality, with a writ of executionand an order of demolition. But Mayor Garcia requested the triacourt to suspend the demolition on the pretext that the City wasstill searching for a relocation site for the squatters. Howeverinstead of looking for a relocation site during the suspensionperiod, the city council suddenly enacted Ordinance No. 1843 fothe expropriation of petitioners’ lot. The unconscionable manner inwhich the questioned ordinance was passed clearly indicated tharespondent City transgressed the Constitution, RA 7160 and RA7279.

For an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within thecorporate powers of the city or municipality to enact but must alsobe passed according to the procedure prescribed by law. It musbe in accordance with certain well-established basic principles oa substantive nature. These principles require that an ordinance(1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute (2) mustnot be unfair or oppressive (3) must not be partial odiscriminatory (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade (5must be general and consistent with public policy, and (6) mustnot be unreasonable.

Ordinance No. 1843 failed to comply with the foregoingsubstantive requirements. A clear case of constitutional infirmityhaving been thus established, this Court is constrained to nullifythe subject ordinance. We recapitulate:

first , the questioned ordinance is repugnant to the pertinenprovisions of the Constitution, RA 7279 and RA 7160;second , the precipitate manner in which it was enacted wasplain oppression masquerading as a pro-poor ordinance;

third , the fact that petitioners’ small property was singled out foexpropriation for the purpose of awarding it to no more than afew squatters indicated manifest partiality against petitionersandfourth, the ordinance failed to show that there was areasonable relation between the end sought and the meansadopted. While the objective of the City of Cebu was to provideadequate housing to slum dwellers, the means it employed inpursuit of such objective fell short of what was legal, sensibleand called for by the circumstances.

G.R. No. 152230. August 9, 2005JESUS IS LORD CHRISTIAN SCHOOL FOUNDATION, INC. vsMUNICIPALITY (now CITY) OF PASIG, METRO MANILA

The assailed decision affirmed the order of the Regional Trial Cour(RTC) of Pasig, Branch 160, declaring the respondent Municipality(now City) of Pasig as having the right to expropriate and take

possession of the subject property.

FACTS:

The Municipality of Pasig needed an access road from E. RSantos Street, a municipal road near the Pasig Public Market, toBarangay Sto. Tomas Bukid, Pasig, where 60 to 70 housesmostly made of light materials, were located. The road had to beat least three meters in width, as required by the Fire Code, sothat fire trucks could pass through in case of conflagrationLikewise, the residents in the area needed the road for water andelectrical outlets.

The municipality then decided to acquire 51

square meters out of the 1,791-square meter property of LorenzoUNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS / ROOM 410

16




Ching Cuanco, Victor Ching Cuanco and Ernesto Ching CuancoKho.

On April 19, 1993, the Sangguniang Bayan of Pasig approved anOrdinance

authorizing the municipal mayor to initiate

expropriation proceedings to acquire the said property andappropriate the fund therefore. The ordinance stated that theproperty owners were notified of the municipality’s intent topurchase the property for public use as an access road but theyrejected the offer.On July 21, 1993, the municipality filed a

complaint, amended on August 6, 1993, against the Ching

Cuancos for the expropriation of the property under Section 19 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7160, otherwise known as the LocalGovernment Code. The plaintiff alleged that it already notified thedefendants, by letter, of its intention to construct an access roadon a portion of the property but they refused to sell the sameportion.

The plaintiff deposited with the RTC 15% of the market value of the property based on the latest tax declaration covering theproperty. On plaintiff’s motion, the RTC issued a writ of possession over the property sought to be expropriated. OnNovember 26, 1993, the plaintiff caused the annotation of a noticeof lis pendens at the dorsal portion under the name of the JesusIs Lord Christian School Foundation, Incorporated (JILCSFI)which had purchased the property.

Thereafter, the plaintiff

constructed therein a cemented road with a width of three meters;the road was called Damayan Street.

In their answer, the defendants claimed that, as early as February

1993, they had sold the said property to JILCSFI as evidenced bya deed of sale

bearing the signature of defendant Ernesto Ching

Cuanco Kho and his wife. JILCSFI averred, by way of special and affirmative defenses, that

the plaintiff’s exercise of eminent domain was only for a particular class and not for the benefit of the poor and the landless. Italleged that the property sought to be expropriated is not the bestportion for the road and the least burdensome to it.

The intervenor filed a crossclaim against its co-defendants for reimbursement in case the subject property is expropriated.

The petitioner asserts that the respondent must comply with therequirements for the establishment of an easement of right-of-way, more specifically, the road must be constructed at the pointleast prejudicial to the servient state, and that there must be noadequate outlet to a public highway. The petitioner asserts thatthe portion of the lot sought to be expropriated is located at the

middle portion of the petitioner’s entire parcel of land, therebysplitting the lot into two halves, and making it impossible for thepetitioner to put up its school building and worship center.

During the trial, the plaintiff presented witnesses, who wereresidents of the town, testifying that it was they who requested for the construction of the road.

The defendant, on the other hand, presented some residents whocounterclaimed that there are other roads leading to E. R. SantosStreet.

On September 3, 1997, the RTC issued an Order in favor of theplaintiff. The RTC held that there was substantial compliance withthe definite and valid offer requirement of Section 19 of R.A. No.7160, and that the expropriated portion is the most convenientaccess to the interior of Sto. Tomas Bukid.

Dissatisfied, JILCSFI elevated the case to the Court of Appeals. In a Decision dated March 13, 2001, the CA affirmed the order of

the RTC. The appellate court upheld the public necessity for thesubject property based on the findings of the trial court that theportion of the property sought to be expropriated appears to be,not only the most convenient access to the interior of Sto. TomasBukid, but also an easy path for vehicles entering the area,particularly fire trucks.

Moreover, the CA took into consideration the provision of Article33 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the LocalGovernment Code, which regards the “construction or extensionof roads, streets, sidewalks” as public use, purpose or welfare.

ISSUE: WON the subject property which is intended to be used for public purposes may be expropriated by the respondent.

HELD: No, the subject property, although intended for public cannot beexpropriated by the Municipality of Pasig. The Supreme Court held that failed to show the necessity for

constructing the road particularly in the petitioner’s property andnot elsewhere.

As correctly pointed out by the petitioner, there is no showing inthe record that an ocular inspection was conducted during thetrial. If, at all, the trial court conducted an ocular inspection of thesubject property during the trial, the petitioner was not notified.

The petitioner was, therefore, deprived of its right to due processIn this case, the petitioner was not notified of any oculainspection of the property, any factual finding of the court basedon the said inspection has no probative weight. The findings othe trial court based on the conduct of the ocular inspection musttherefore, be rejected.

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED.The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals areREVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The RTC is ordered to dismiss thecomplaint of the respondent without prejudice to the refilingthereof.

G.R. No. 163130, September 7, 2007SAN ROQUE REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION vs.REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (through the Armed Forces othe Philippines)

FACTS:

The subject parcels of land are located at Lahug, Cebu City andwere part of Lot No. 933. Lot No. 933 was covered by TransferCertificate of Title No. 11946. It was originally owned by Ismael DRosales, Pantaleon Cabrera and Francisco Racaza. On 5September 1938, subject parcels of land, together with seventeen(17) others, were the subject of an expropriation proceedinginitiated by the then Commonwealth of the Philippines docketedas Civil Case No. 781. On 19 October 1938, Judge Felix Martinezordered the initial deposit of P,500.00 as pre-condition for theentry on the lands sought to be expropriated. On 14 May 1940, aDecision was rendered condemning the parcels of land. Howeverthe title of the subject parcel of land was not transferred to thegovernment.

Eventually, the land was subdivided and T.C.T. No. 11946 wascancelled and new titles were issued by the Register of Deeds oCebu. Two parcels covered by T.C.T. Nos. 128197 (Lot No. 933B-3) and 128198 (Lot No. 933-B-4) were acquired by defendantappellee. In 1995, defendant-appellee begun construction otownhouses on the subject parcels of land.

On 22 February 1996, plaintiff-appellant filed the present casealleging that it is the owner of the subject parcels of land by virtueof the 1938 Decision in the expropriation case, thus, T.C.T. Nos128197 and 128198 are null and void. It argued that defendant-appellee, had no right to possess the subject properties becauseit was not its lawful owner.

In its Answer defendant-appellee claimed that it was a buyer ingood faith. It also claimed that there was no valid expropriationbecause it was initiated by the executive branch withoulegislative approval. It also alleged that the expropriation wasnever consummated because the government did not actuallyenter the land nor were the owners paid any compensation

On August 25, 1998, the RTC rendered a Decision dismissing the

Republic's complaint and upholding SRRDC's ownership over thesubject properties as supported by SRRDC's actual possessionthereof and its unqualified title thereto. The RTC ruled thaSRRDC's ownership is borne out by the original owner's title toLot No. 933 and the subsequent transferees’ respective titles alof which bore no annotation of the fact of expropriation and didnot indicate the Republic's favorable lien. It also found that therewas no valid expropriation since the records are bereft of ashowing that consideration was paid for the subject properties.

Aggrieved, the Republic appealed the decision to the CA insistingon its absolute ownership over the subject properties grounded onthe following: (1) the CFI Decision in the expropriation case, Civi





Case No. 781; (2) the ruling of this Court in Valdehueza v.Republic and (3) the expropriated properties, including Lot No.933, are devoted to public use.

The CA reversed the RTC Decision on the finding that the appealfrom the CFI Decision in the expropriation case was never perfected by the original owners of the subject properties andthus, the expropriation of Lot No. 933 became final and bindingon the original owners, and SRRDC, which merely stepped intothe latter's shoes, is similarly bound. The CA further held thatlaches and estoppel cannot work against the Republic despite its

failure from 1940 to register Lot No. 933 in its name, or to recordthe decree of expropriation on the title. Accordingly, the CA foundno necessity to rule on the applicability of Valdehueza v. Republic in the case.

Hence, the instant petition.

ISSUES:1. Whether respondent, claiming its right to eminent domain,

was the dutiful owner of the subject property, despite failureto register it.

2. Whether petitioner was a buyer of good faith

HELD: The Supreme Court ruled in favor of petitioner on both issues. Time and again, the SC declared that eminent domain cases are

to be strictly construed against the expropriator. The payment of just compensation for private property taken for public use is anindispensable requisite for the exercise of the State’s sovereignpower of eminent domain. Failure to observe this requirementrenders the taking ineffectual, notwithstanding the avowed publicpurpose. To disregard this limitation on the exercise of governmental power to expropriate is to ride roughshod over private rights.

From the records of this case and our previous findings in therelated cases, the Republic manifestly failed to present clear andconvincing evidence of full payment of just compensation andreceipt thereof by the property owners.

Section 251 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the law in force at thetime of the Commonwealthcase likewise provides for therecording of the judgment of expropriation in the Registry of Deeds. Said provision reads, to wit:SEC. 251. Final Judgment, Its Record and Effect . – The record of the final judgment in such action shall state definitely by metes

and bounds and adequate description. The particular land or interest in land condemned to the public use, and the nature of the public use. A certified copy of the record of judgment shallbe recorded in the office of the registrar of deeds for theprovince in which the estate is situated, and its effect shallbe to vest in the plaintiff for the public use stated the landand estate so described. (Emphasis supplied)

From the foregoing, it is clear that it was incumbent upon theRepublic to cause the registration of the subject properties in itsname or record the decree of expropriation on the title. Yet, notonly did the Republic fail to register the subject properties in itsname, it failed to do so for fifty-six (56) years.

Another basic question is whether or not SRRDC is a buyer ingood faith.

The CA found SRRDC wanting in good faith because it should beimputed with constructive knowledge, or at least, sufficiently

warned that the Republic had claims over the property in view of indications that the subject land belonged to a military reservation. An innocent purchaser for value is one who, relying on the

certificate of title, bought the property from the registered owner,without notice that some other person has a right to, or interest in,such property, and pays a full and fair price for the same, at thetime of such purchase, or before he has notice of the claim or interest of some other person in the property.

In the instant case, the Republic’s adverse claim of ownershipover the subject properties may have given SRRDC’spredecessors-in-interest, the sellers, voidable title to the subjectproperties. However, we stress that prior to SRRDC’s acquisitionof the subject properties, Lot No. 933 had already been

subdivided and covered by separate titles of the subsequentransferees. These titles, including the titles to the subjecproperties, had not been voided at the time of the sale to SRRDCin 1994. As such, SRRDC acquired good title to the subjecproperties, having purchased them in good faith, for value, andwithout notice of the seller’s defect of title, if any.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTEDThe August 15, 2003 Decision of the Court of Appeals is herebyREVERSEDand the August 25, 1998 Decision of the RegionaTrial Court is REINSTATED. TCT Nos. 128197 and 128198, in the

name of petitioner San Roque Realty and DevelopmenCorporation, are upheld and declared valid.

OBJECTS OF EXPROPRIATION

G.R. No. L-18841, January 27, 1969RP vs. PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE COMPANY

FACTS:

Sometime in 1933, the defendant, PLDT, and the RCACommunications, Inc., entered into an agreement wherebytelephone messages, coming from the United States and receivedby RCA's domestic station, could automatically be transferred tothe lines of PLDT; and vice-versa, for calls collected by the PLDTfor transmission from the Philippines to the United States.

The arrangement was later extended to radio-telephonemessages to and from European and Asiatic countries. Theicontract contained a stipulation that either party could terminate ion a 24-month notice to the other. On 2 February 1956, PLDTgave notice to RCA to terminate their contract on 2 February1958.

Soon after its creation in 1947, the Bureau of Telecommunicationsset up its own Government Telephone System by utilizing its ownappropriation and equipment and by renting trunk lines of thePLDT to enable government offices to call private parties. TheBureau has extended its services to the general public since1948, using the same trunk lines owned by, and rented from, thePLDT, and prescribing its (the Bureau's) own schedule of ratesThrough these trunk lines, a Government Telephone System(GTS) subscriber could make a call to a PLDT subscriber in thesame way that the latter could make a call to the former.

On 5 March 1958, the plaintiff, through the Director oTelecommunications, entered into an agreement with RCACommunications, Inc., for a joint overseas telephone servicewhereby the Bureau would convey radio-telephone overseas callsreceived by RCA's station to and from local residents.

On 7 April 1958, the defendant Philippine Long DistanceTelephone Company, complained to the Bureau oTelecommunications that said bureau was violating the conditionsunder which their Private Branch Exchange (PBX) is interconnected with the PLDT's facilities, referring to the rented trunklines, for the Bureau had used the trunk lines not only for the useof government offices but even to serve private persons or thegeneral public, in competition with the business of the PLDT; andgave notice that if said violations were not stopped by midnight o12 April 1958, the PLDT would sever the telephone connectionsWhen the PLDT received no reply, it disconnected the trunk linesbeing rented by the Bureau at midnight on 12 April 1958. The

result was the isolation of the Philippines, on telephone servicesfrom the rest of the world, except the United States. The Bureau of Telecommunications had proposed to the PLDT on

8 January 1958 that both enter into an interconnectingagreement, with the government paying (on a call basis) for alcalls passing through the interconnecting facilities from theGovernment Telephone System to the PLDT. The PLDT repliedthat it was willing to enter into an agreement on overseastelephone service to Europe and Asian countries provided that theBureau would submit to the jurisdiction and regulations of thePublic Service Commission.

On 12 April 1958, plaintiff Republic commenced suit against thedefendant, in the Court of First Instance of Manila (Civil Case No





35805), praying in its complaint for judgment commanding thePLDT to execute a contract with plaintiff, through the Bureau, for the use of the facilities of defendant's telephone systemthroughout the Philippines under such terms and conditions asthe court might consider reasonable, and for a writ of preliminaryinjunction against the defendant company to restrain theseverance of the existing telephone connections and/or restorethose severed.

PLDT, on the other hand denied any obligation on its part toexecute a contrary of services with the Bureau of

Telecommunications; contested the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance to compel it to enter into interconnectingagreements, and averred that it was justified to disconnect thetrunk lines heretofore leased to the Bureau of Telecommunications under the existing agreement because itsfacilities were being used in fraud of its rights. PLDT further claimed that the Bureau was engaging in commercial telephoneoperations in excess of authority, in competition with, and to theprejudice of, the PLDT, using defendants own telephone poles,without proper accounting of revenues.

After trial, the lower court rendered judgment that it could notcompel the PLDT to enter into an agreement with the Bureaubecause the parties were not in agreement; that under ExecutiveOrder 94, establishing the Bureau of Telecommunications, saidBureau was not limited to servicing government offices alone, nor was there any in the contract of lease of the trunk lines, since thePLDT knew, or ought to have known, at the time that their use by

the Bureau was to be public throughout the Islands, hence theBureau was neither guilty of fraud, abuse, or misuse of the polesof the PLDT; and, in view of serious public prejudice that wouldresult from the disconnection of the trunk lines, declared thepreliminary injunction permanent, although it dismissed both thecomplaint and the counterclaims.

Both parties appealed.

ISSUE: WON PLDT is compelled to enter into a contract compulsoryrendering the company to provide inter-connectivity services, despiteits objection.

HELD:

The Supreme Court agreed with the court below that partiescannot be coerced to enter into a contract where no agreement is

had between them as to the principal terms and conditions of thecontract. Freedom to stipulate such terms and conditions is of theessence of our contractual system, and by express provision of the statute, a contract may be annulled if tainted by violence,intimidation, or undue influence (Articles 1306, 1336, 1337, CivilCode of the Philippines).

But the court a quohas apparently overlooked that while theRepublic may not compel the PLDT to celebrate a contract with it,the Republic may, in the exercise of the sovereign power of eminent domain, require the telephone company to permitinterconnection of the government telephone system and that of the PLDT, as the needs of the government service may require,subject to the payment of just compensation to be determined bythe court.

While the defendant telephone company is a public utilitycorporation whose franchise, equipment and other properties areunder the jurisdiction, supervision and control of the Public

Service Commission (Sec. 13, Public Service Act), yet theplaintiff's telecommunications network is a public service ownedby the Republic and operated by an instrumentality of the NationalGovernment, hence exempt, under Section 14 of the PublicService Act, from such jurisdiction, supervision and control.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of First Instance, nowunder appeal, is affirmed, except in so far as it dismisses thepetition of the Republic of the Philippines to compel the PhilippineLong Distance Telephone Company to continue servicing theGovernment telephone system upon such terms, and for acompensation, that the trial court may determine to be just,including the period elapsed from the filing of the originalcomplaint or petition. And for this purpose, the records are

ordered returned to the court of origin for further hearings andother proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. No costs.

G.R. No. L-14355, October 31, 1919THE CITY OF MANILA vs. CHINESE COMMUNITY OF MANILA, ETAL.

FACTS:On the 11th day of December, 1916, the city of Manila presented apetition in the Court of First Instance of said city, praying that certain

lands be expropriated for the purpose of constructing a publicimprovement namely, the extension of Rizal Avenue, Manila. Thedefendant, the Comunidad de Chinos de Manila [Chinese Communityof Manila] opposed the expropriation alleging that the Chinesecemetery has for its purpose the benefit and general welfare of theChinese Community of the City of Manila and that the expropriation, infact, was not necessary as a public improvement for other routes wereavailable which would fully satisfy the plaintiff's purposes, at much lessexpense and without disturbing the resting places of the dead.The trial court decided that there was no necessity for the expropriationof the particular strip of land in question, and absolved each and all ofthe defendants from all liability under the complaint, without any findingas to costs. The City of Manila then appealed the trial court’s decision.

ISSUE: WON the Chinese Cemetery may be validly expropriated bythe City of Manila.

HELD: The exercise of the right of eminent domain, whether directly by

the State, or by its authorized agents, is necessarily in derogationof private rights, and the rule in that case is that the authority musbe strictly construed. No species of property is held by individualswith greater tenacity, and none is guarded by the constitution andlaws more sedulously, than the right to the freehold of inhabitantsWhen the legislature interferes with that right, and, for greaterpublic purposes, appropriates the land of an individual without hisconsent, the plain meaning of the law should not be enlarged bydoubtly interpretation.

The right of expropriation is not an inherent power in a municipacorporation, and before it can exercise the right some law mustexist conferring the power upon it. When the courts come todetermine the question, they must only find (a) that a law oauthority exists for the exercise of the right of eminent domain, bu

(b) also that the right or authority is being exercised in accordancewith the law. In the present case there are two conditions imposedupon the authority conceded to the City of Manila: First , the landmust be private; and, second , the purpose must be public.

It is a well known fact that cemeteries may be public or privateThe former is a cemetery used by the general community, orneighborhood, or church, while the latter is used only by a familyor a small portion of the community or neighbourhood. Where acemetery is open to public, it is a public use and no part of theground can be taken for other public uses under a generaauthority. And this immunity extends to the unimproved andunoccupied parts which are held in good faith for future use. Thecemetery in question is used by the general community oChinese, which fact, in the general acceptation of the definition oa public cemetery, would make the cemetery in question publicproperty. The petition of the plaintiff must be denied, for thereason that the city of Manila has no authority or right under the

law to expropriate public property. In the present case, evengranting that a necessity exists for the opening of the street inquestion, the record contains no proof of the necessity of openingthe same through the cemetery. The record shows that adjoiningand adjacent lands have been offered to the city free of chargewhich will answer every purpose of the plaintiff.

For all of the foregoing, the judgment of the lower court should beand is hereby affirmed, with costs against the appellant.

WHERE EXPROPRIATION SUIT IS FILED





G.R. No. 138896, June 20, 2000RGY. SAN ROQUE vs. HEIRS OF PASTOR

FACTS:

Petitioner filed before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Talisay,Cebu (Branch 1) a Complaint to expropriate a property of therespondents. In an Order dated April 8, 1997, the MTC dismissedthe Complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. It reasonedthat "[e]minent domain is an exercise of the power to take privateproperty for public use after payment of just compensation. In an

action for eminent domain, therefore, the principal cause of actionis the exercise of such power or right. The fact that the action alsoinvolves real property is merely incidental. An action for eminentdomain is therefore within the exclusive original jurisdiction of theRegional Trial Court and not with this Court."

The RTC also dismissed the Complaint when filed before it,holding that an action for eminent domain affected title to realproperty; hence, the value of the property to be expropriatedwould determine whether the case should be filed before the MTCor the RTC. Concluding that the action should have been filedbefore the MTC since the value of the subject property was lessthan P20,000.

Aggrieved, petitioner appealed directly to this Court, raising apure question of law.

ISSUE: Which court, MTC or RTC, has jurisdiction over cases for eminent domain or expropriation where the assessed value of thesubject property is below Twenty Thousand (P20,000.00) Pesos?

HELD:

An expropriation suit is incapable of pecuniary estimation thusRTCs shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over expropriation case as provided for by Section 19 (1) of BP 129,which states that RTCs shall exercise exclusive original

jurisdiction over "all civil actions in which the subject of thelitigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation;…”.

If the issue is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, theclaim is considered capable of pecuniary estimation, and whether

jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in the courts of firstinstance would depend on the amount of the claim. However,where the basic issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of money, or where the money claim is purely incidental to,or a consequence of, the principal relief sought, like in suits to

have the defendant perform his part of the contract (specificperformance) and in actions for support, or for annulment of a judgment or to foreclose a mortgage, this Court has consideredsuch actions as cases where the subject of the litigation may notbe estimated in terms of money, and are cognizable exclusivelyby courts of first instance.

In the present case, an expropriation suit does not involve therecovery of a sum of money. Rather, it deals with the exercise bythe government of its authority and right to take private propertyfor public useHence, the courts determine the authority of thegovernment entity, the necessity of the expropriation, and theobservance of due process. The subject matter of anexpropriation suit is the government’s exercise of eminentdomain, a matter that is incapable of pecuniary estimation.

REQUISITES OF TAKING

G.R. No. L-20620 August 15, 1974RP vs. CASTELVI

FACTS:

The Castellvi property had been occupied by the Philippine Air Force since 1947 under a contract of lease. It was stipulated bythe parties, that "the foregoing contract of lease is 'similar in termsand conditions, including the date', with the annual contractsentered into from year to year between defendant Castellvi andthe Republic of the Philippines. It is undisputed, therefore, thatthe Republic occupied Castellvi's land from July 1, 1947, by virtue

of the above-mentioned contract, on a year to year basis (fromJuly 1 of each year to June 30 of the succeeding year). Before theexpiration of the contract of lease on June 30, 1956 the Republicsought to renew the same but Castellvi refused. When the AFPrefused to vacate the leased premises after the termination of thecontract, on July 11, 1956, Castellvi wrote to the Chief of Staff,

AFP, informing the latter that the heirs of the property had decidednot to continue leasing the property in question because they haddecided to subdivide the land for sale to the general publicdemanding that the property be vacated within 30 days from

receipt of the letter, and that the premises be returned insubstantially the same condition as before occupancy .OnJanuary 30, 1957, Lieutenant General Alfonso Arellano, Chief ofStaff, answered the letter of Castellvi, saying that it was difficulfor the army to vacate the premises in view of the permanentinstallations and other facilities worth almost P500,000.00 thawere erected and already established on the property, and thatthere being no other recourse, the acquisition of the property bymeans of expropriation proceedings would be recommended tothe President. Defendant Castellvi then brought suit in the Courof First Instance of Pampanga to eject the Philippine Air Forcefrom the land. While this ejectment case was pending, theRepublic instituted these expropriation proceedings.

The Republic argues that the "taking" should be reckoned fromthe year 1947 when by virtue of a special lease agreemenbetween the Republic and appellee Castellvi, the former wasgranted the "right and privilege" to buy the property should the

lessor wish to terminate the lease. Castellvi, on the other hand, maintains that the "taking" o

property under the power of eminent domain requires twoessential elements, to wit: (1) entrance and occupation bycondemn or upon the private property for more than a momentaryor limited period, and (2) devoting it to a public use in such a wayas to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoymenof the property. This appellee argues that in the instant case thefirst element is wanting, for the contract of lease relied uponprovides for a lease from year to year; that the second element isalso wanting, that the contract of lease does not grant theRepublic the "right and privilege" to buy the premises "at thevalue at the time of occupancy."

ISSUE: WON the “Taking” of properties under expropriationcommenced with the filing of the action. (What are the requisites of

“Taking” of property of eminent domain?)HELD:

It is clear that the "taking" of Catellvi's property for purposes oeminent domain cannot be considered to have taken place in1947 when the Republic commenced to occupy the property aslessee thereof. We find merit in the contention of Castellvi thatwo essential elements in the "taking" of property under the poweof eminent domain, namely: (1) that the entrance and occupationby the condemnor must be for a permanent, or indefinite periodand (2) that in devoting the property to public use the owner wasousted from the property and deprived of its beneficial use, werenot present when the Republic entered and occupied the Castellvproperty in 1947.

Untenable also is the Republic's contention that although thecontract between the parties was one of lease on a year to yeabasis, it was "in reality a more or less permanent right to occupy

the premises under the guise of lease with the 'right and privilegeto buy the property should the lessor wish to terminate the lease,"and "the right to buy the property is merged as an integral part othe lease relationship ... so much so that the fair market value hasbeen agreed upon, not, as of the time of purchase, but as of thetime of occupancy". We cannot accept the Republic's contentionthat a lease on a year to year basis can give rise to a permanenright to occupy, since by express legal provision a lease made foa determinate time, as was the lease of Castellvi's land in theinstant case, ceases upon the day fixed, without need of ademand (Article 1669, Civil Code). Neither can it be said that theright of eminent domain may be exercised by simply leasing thepremises to be expropriated (Rule 67, Section 1, Rules of Court).





To sustain the contention of the Republic is to sanction a practicewhereby in order to secure a low price for a land which thegovernment intends to expropriate (or would eventuallyexpropriate) it would first negotiate with the owner of the land tolease the land (for say ten or twenty years) then expropriate thesame when the lease is about to terminate, then claim that the"taking" of the property for the purposes of the expropriation bereckoned as of the date when the Government started to occupythe property under the lease, and then assert that the value of theproperty being expropriated be reckoned as of the start of the

lease, in spite of the fact that the value of the property, for manygood reasons, had in the meantime increased during the period of the lease.

The lower court did not commit an error when it held that the"taking" of the property under expropriation commenced with thefiling of the complaint in this case.

In the instant case, it is undisputed that the Republic was placedin possession of the Castellvi property, by authority of the court,on August 10, 1959. The "taking" of the Castellvi property for thepurposes of determining the just compensation to be paid must,therefore, be reckoned as of June 26, 1959 when the complaintfor eminent domain was filed.

G.R. No. L-34915 June 24, 1983CITY GOVERNMENT OF QUEZON CITY and CITY COUNCIL OFQUEZON CITY vs.HON. JUDGE VICENTE G. ERICTA

FACTS:The city government of Quezon tried to enforce Ordinance No. 6118,S-64, entitled "ORDINANCE REGULATING THE ESTABLISHMENT,MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION OF PRIVATE MEMORIAL TYPECEMETERY OR BURIAL GROUND WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OFQUEZON CITY AND PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR THE VIOLATIONTHEREOF" through the passing of a resolution wchich reads:RESOLVED by the council of Quezon assembled, to request, as itdoes hereby request the City Engineer, Quezon City, to stop anyfurther selling and/or transaction of memorial park lots in Quezon Citywhere the owners thereof have failed to donate the required 6% spaceintended for paupers burial. But Respondent Himlayang Pilipinoquestioned the validity of the ordinance specifically its sec9 w/cprovides that “At least six (6) percent of the total area of the memorialpark cemetery shall be set aside for charity burial of deceased personswho are paupers and have been residents of Quezon City for at least 5

years prior to their death, to be determined by competent City Authorities. The area so designated shall immediately be developedand should be open for operation not later than six months from thedate of approval of the application.” . respondent alleged that this iscontrary to law and further contended that contends that the taking or confiscation of property is obvious because the questioned ordinancepermanently restricts the use of the property such that it cannot beused for any reasonable purpose and deprives the owner of allbeneficial use of his property and stressed that the general welfareclause is not available as a source of power for the taking of theproperty in this case because it refers to "the power of promoting thepublic welfare by restraining and regulating the use of liberty andproperty. After the examining the facts, respondent court ruled that“The power to regulate does not include the power to prohibit” anddeclared the ordinance null and void.

ISSUE: WON the trial court is correct in declaring the ordinance null

and void?

HELD:

SC ruled that “police power is usually exercised in the form of mere regulation or restriction in the use of liberty or property for the promotion of the general welfare. It does not involve the takingor confiscation of property with the exception of a few caseswhere there is a necessity to confiscate private property in order to destroy it for the purpose of protecting the peace and order andof promoting the general welfare as for instance, the confiscationof an illegally possessed article, such as opium and firearms.

It seems to the court that Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, Seriesof 1964 of Quezon City is not a mere police regulation but an

outright confiscation. It deprives a person of his private propertywithout due process of law, nay, even without compensationThere is no reasonable relation between the setting aside of aleast six (6) percent of the total area of an private cemeteries focharity burial grounds of deceased paupers and the promotion ohealth, morals, good order, safety, or the general welfare of thepeople. The ordinance is actually a taking without compensationof a certain area from a private cemetery to benefit paupers whoare charges of the municipal corporation. Instead of building ormaintaining a public cemetery for this purpose, the city passes the

burden to private cemeteries.” WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby DISMISSED. The

decision of the respondent court is affirmed.

TAKING: DEPRIVATION OF USE

104 PHIL 443 (1958)RP vs. FAJARDO*no digested case submitted*

193 SCRA 1 (1991)NAPOCOR vs. GUTIERREZ

FACTS:

Plaintiff National Power Corporation, a government owned and

controlled entity, planned to construct 230 KV Mexico-Limaytransmission lines but the lines have to pass the lands belongingto defendants Matias Cruz, Heirs of Natalia Paule and spousesMisericordia Gutierrez and Ricardo Malit and filed an eminendomain proceedings against the defendants.

The defendant spouses were authorized to withdraw the fixedprovisional value of their land in the sum of P973.00 by the courtafter NPC deposited the amount upon filing the complaint. Theonly controversy existing between the parties litigants is thereasonableness and adequacy of the disturbance ocompensation fee of the expropriated properties. the courappointed three commissioners in determining the fair and justcompensation due the defendants.

With the reports submitted by the three commissioners and on theevidence adduced by the defendants as well as the plaintiff for thepurpose of proving the fair market value of the property sought tobe expropriated, the lower court rendered a decision that NationaPower Corporation has to pay defendant spouses Ricardo Maliand Misericordia Gutierrez the sum P5.00 per square meter asthe fair and reasonable market value of the 760 square metersbelonging to the said spouses and that decision was affirmed bythe court of appeals.

ISSUE: WHETHER PETITIONER SHOULD BE MADE TO PAYSIMPLE EASEMENT FEE OR FULL COMPENSATION FOR THELAND TRAVERSED BY ITS TRANSMISSION LINES

HELD:

“While it is true that plaintiff are (sic ) only after a right-of-wayeasement, it nevertheless perpetually deprives defendants of theiproprietary rights as manifested by the imposition by the plaintiffupon defendants that below said transmission lines no planhigher than three (3) meters is allowed. Furthermore, because ofthe high-tension current conveyed through said transmissionlines, danger to life and limbs that may be caused beneath saidwires cannot altogether be discounted, and to cap it all plaintifonly pays the fee to defendants once, while the latter shacontinually pay the taxes due on said affected portion of theiproperty……………n the case at bar, the easement of right-of-way is definitely a taking under the power of eminent domainConsidering the nature and effect of the installation of the 230 KVMexico-Limay transmission lines, the limitation imposed by NPCagainst the use of the land for an indefinite period deprives privaterespondents of its ordinary use………For these reasons, theowner of the property expropriated is entitled to a juscompensation, which should be neither more nor less, wheneve





it is possible to make the assessment, than the money equivalentof said property. Just compensation has always been understood to be the just and complete equivalent of the loss which theowner of the thing expropriated has to suffer by reason of theexpropriation

WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.

G.R. No. 170945, September 26, 2006NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION vs. MARIA MENDOZA SAN

PEDRO

FACTS:

The National Power Corporation (NPC) is a government-owned-and-controlled corporation created to undertake the developmentof hydro-electric generation of power and the production of electricity from any and all sources; and particularly theconstruction, operation, and maintenance of power plants,auxiliary plants, dams, reservoirs, pipes, mains, transmissionlines, power stations and substations, and other works for thepurpose of developing hydraulic power from any river, lake, creek,spring and waterfalls in the Philippines and supplying such power

to the inhabitants thereof.# Under Republic Act No. 6395, asamended, the NPC is authorized to enter private propertyprovided that the owners thereof shall be indemnified for anyactual damage caused thereby.

For the construction of its San Manuel-San Jose 500 KVTransmission Line and Tower No. SMJ-389, NPC negotiated withMaria Mendoza San Pedro, then represented by her son, Vicente,for an easement of right of way over her property, Lot No. 2076.The property, which was partly agricultural and partly residentialland, was located in Barangay Partida, Norzagaray, Bulacan andcovered by Tax Declaration No. 00386. On June 19, 1997, Maria

executed a Right of Way Grant# in favor of NPC over the lot for P1,277,886.90. The NPC paid her P524,635.50 for the damagedimprovements thereon.

The payment voucher for the residential portion of the lot valuedat P6,000,000.00 (at P600.00 per square meter) was then

processed.# However, the NPC Board of Directors approvedBoard Resolution No. 97-246 stating that it would pay onlyP230.00 per sq m for the residential portion and P89.00 per sq m

for the agricultural portion. On July 12, 1999, Atty. Baltazar and Engr. Cruz submitted their

report,# recommending as payment for just compensationP800.00 per sq m for the residential lot and P700.00 per sq m for the agricultural lot. On October 28, 1999, the RTC rendered

judgment,# declaring as well-grounded, fair and reasonable thecompensation for the property as recommended by Atty. Baltazar and Engr. Cruz.

ISSUE: Whether or not the just compensation was achieved withregards to the fair market value of the residential and agriculturalproperty?

HELD:

The trial court fixed the just compensation for the property as

follows: (1) P499.00 per sq m on the 17,195 sq m agriculturalportion of the subject land; and (2) P800.00 per sq m on the 6,565sq m residential portion of the lot. Noticeably, the trial court did notblindly accept the recommendation of majority of thecommissioners of P800.00 per sq m for the residential lot andP700.00 per sq m for the agricultural lot. Indeed, the trial courttook into account the evidence of the parties, in tandem with thefindings and recommendation of the majority of thecommissioners. Considering that such valuation of the trial courtas affirmed by the CA is reasonable as it is and supported by theevidence on record, we find no compelling reason to disturb thesame.

The constant loud buzzing and exploding sounds emanating from

the towers and transmission lines, especially on rainy days; theconstant fear on the part of the landowners that the largetransmission lines looming not far above their land and the hugetower in front of their lot will affect their safety and health; and theslim chance that no one would be interested to buy the remainingportions on each side of the residential lot affected by the projectto the damage of the landowners, both as to future actual use othe land and financial gains to be derived therefrom, makes theinstant case fall within the ambit of expropriation.

328 U.S. 256, May 27, 1946UNITED STATES v. CAUSBY

FACTS:

Military airplanes are subject to rules of Civil Aeronautics BoardRespondents own 2.8 acres near an airport outside oGreensboro, North Carolina. It has on it a dwelling house, andalso various outbuildings which were mainly used for raisingchickens. The end of the airport's northwest-southeast runway is2,220 feet from respondents' barn and 2,275 feet from their house

United States began operations in May, 1942, its four-motoredheavy bombers, other planes of the heavier type, and its fighterplanes have frequently passed over respondents' land buildings inconsiderable numbers and rather close together. They comeclose enough at times to appear barely to miss the tops of thetrees and at times so close to the tops of the trees as to blow the

old leaves off. The noise is startling. And at night the glare fromthe planes brightly lights up the place. As a result of the noiserespondents had to give up their chicken business. As many assix to ten of their chickens were killed in one day by flying into thewalls from fright. The total chickens lost in that manner was abou150. Production also fell off. The result was the destruction of theuse of the property as a commercial chicken farm. Respondentsare frequently deprived of their sleep and the family has becomenervous and frightened. Although there have been no airplaneaccidents on respondents' property, there have been severaaccidents near the airport and close to respondents' place

The United States relies on the Air Commerce Act of 1926, 44Stat. 568, 49 U.S.C. 171 et seq., 49 U.S.C.A. 171 et seq., asamended by the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, 52 Stat. 973, 49U.S.C. 401 et seq., 49 U. S.C.A. 401 et seq. Under those statutesthe United States has 'complete and exclusive nationasovereignty in the air space' over this country. the planes neve

touched the surface would be as irrelevant as the absence in thisday of the feudal livery of seisin on the transfer of real estate.

The Fifth Amendment provides that 'private property' shall not 'betaken for public use, without just compensation.' The Court holdstoday that the Government has 'taken' respondents' property byrepeatedly flying Army bombers directly above respondents' landat a height of eighty-three feet where the light and noise fromthese planes caused respondents to lose sleep and their chickensto be killed

ISSUE: Whether respondents' property was taken within the meaningof the Fifth Amendment by frequent and regular flights of army andnavy aircraft over respondents' land at low altitudes.

HELD:

The Constitution entrusts Congress with full power to control al

navigable airspace. Congress has already acted under thapower. It has by statute, 44 Stat. 568, 52 Stat. 973, provided that'the United States of America is ... to possess and exercisecomplete and exclusive national sovereignty in the [328 U.S. 256272] air space (over) the United States.' navigable airspacewhich Congress has placed in the public domain is 'airspaceabove the minimum safe altitudes of flight prescribed by the Civi

Aeronautics Authority. Airspace, apart from the immediatereaches above the land, is part of the public domain.

The contribution of courts must be made through the awarding odamages for injuries suffered from the flying of planes, or by thegranting of injunctions to prohibit their flying

The judgment is reversed and the cause is remanded to the Cour


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of Claims so that it may make the necessary findings inconformity with this opinion.

244 SCRA 272; G.R. No. 119694; 22 May 1995PHILIPPINE PRESS INSTITUTE VS. COMELEC

FACTS:

Respondent Comelec promulgated Resolution No. 2772 directingnewspapers to provide free Comelec space of not less than one-half page for the common use of political parties and candidates.

The Comelec space shall be allocated by the Commission, free of charge, among all candidates to enable them to make known their qualifications, their stand on public Issue and their platforms of government. The Comelec space shall also be used by theCommission for dissemination of vital election information.

Petitioner Philippine Press Institute, Inc. (PPI), a non-profitorganization of newspaper and magazine publishers, asks theSupreme Court to declare Comelec Resolution No. 2772unconstitutional and void on the ground that it violates theprohibition imposed by the Constitution upon the governmentagainst the taking of private property for public use without justcompensation. On behalf of the respondent Comelec, the Solicitor General claimed that the Resolution is a permissible exercise of the power of supervision (police power) of the Comelec over theinformation operations of print media enterprises during theelection period to safeguard and ensure a fair, impartial andcredible election.

ISSUE: Whether or not Comelec Resolution No. 2772 isunconstitutional.

HELD:

The Supreme Court declared the Resolution as unconstitutional. Itheld that to compel print media companies to donate “Comelecspace” amounts to “taking” of private personal property withoutpayment of the just compensation required in expropriation cases.Moreover, the element of necessity for the taking has not beenestablished by respondent Comelec, considering that thenewspapers were not unwilling to sell advertising space. Thetaking of private property for public use is authorized by theconstitution, but not without payment of just compensation. AlsoResolution No. 2772 does not constitute a valid exercise of thepolice power of the state. In the case at bench, there is no

showing of existence of a national emergency to take privateproperty of newspaper or magazine publishers.

G.R. No. 137152 January 29, 2001CITY OF MANDALUYONG vs. FRANCISCO

FACTS:

The petitioner sought to expropriate the three (3) adjoining landwith and area of 1,847 sq. meter registered under the name of thedefendants namely Francisco, Thelma, Eusebio, Rodulfo,

Antonio, and Virginia wherein they constructed residential housesseveral decades ago which they had leased out to tenants untilthe present. In 1983, the lots were classified by the Board of theHousing and Urban Development Council as an Area of PriorityDevelopment for Urban Land Reform under Proclamation Number of then President Marcos. As a result of this classification, the

tenants and occupants offered to purchase the lots but therespondents refused to sell. On November 1996, upon petition of the Kapitbisig, an association of tenants and occupants of thesubject land adopted a resolution authorizing Mayor Abalos of theCity of Mandaluyong to initiate action for expropriation of thesubject lots and construction of a medium-rise condominium for qualified occupants of the land. On January 1996, Mayor Abalosallegedly sent a letter to the respondents offering to purchase thesaid property at P3, 000.00 per sq. meter; respondents did notanswer the letter. Petitioner thus prayed for the expropriation of the said lots and the fixing of just compensation at the fair marketvalue of P3, 000.00 per sq. meter.

The respondents except Eusebio Aguilar who died in 1995,

claimed that they did not received a copy of Mayor Abalos letter topurchase their lots. They alleged that the expropriation of theiland is arbitrary and capricious, and is not for a public purposethe subject lots are their only real property and are too small forexpropriation, while petitioner has several properties inventoriedfor socialized housing; the fair market value of P3,000.00 persquare meter is arbitrary because the zonal valuation set by theBureau of Internal Revenue is P7,000.00 per square meter. On1997, Petitioner filed an amended complaint and named as anadditional defendant Virginia Aguilar and at the same time

substituted Eusebio Aguilar with his five (5) heirs. Petitioner alsoreduced the area sought to be expropriated to 1, 636 squaremeters. The Trial Court’s decision was in favor of therespondents, dismiss the amended complaint and declaredrespondents as “small property owners” whose land are exempfrom expropriation under RA 7279. Also found out that theexpropriation was not for public purpose for petitioner’s failure topresent evidence that the intended beneficiaries of theexpropriation are landless and homeless.

ISSUES:1. W/N the respondents are qualified as small property owners and

are thus exempt from expropriation under RA no. 7972.2. W/N the subject property is the only real property of respondents

for them to comply with the second requisite for small propertyowners.

HELD:

The acquisition of lands for socialized housing are governed withseveral provisions of the law. Thus, Section 9 and 10 of RA No7279 provides for the priorities in the acquisition of lands andenumerates the type of lands to be acquired and the hierarchy intheir acquisition, and the modes of land acquisition or the processof acquiring lands for socialized housing, respectively.

Under Section 9, lands for socialized housing are to be acquiredin the following order: (1) government lands; (2) alienable lands othe public domain; (3) unregistered or abandoned or idle lands(4) lands within the declared Areas for Priority Developmen(APD), Zonal Improvement Program (ZIP) sites, SlumImprovement and Resettlement (SIR) sites which have not yebeen acquired; (5) BAgong Lipunan Improvement of Sites andServices or BLISS sites which have not yet been acquired; and(6) privately-owned lands.

There is no dispute that the two lots in litigation are privately-owned and therefore last in the order of priority acquisitionHowever, the law also provides that lands within the declared

APD's which have not yet been acquired by the government arefourth in the order of priority. According to petitioner, since thesubject lots lie within the declared APD, this fact mandates thathe lots be given priority in acquisition.

Also, Lands for socialized housing under Section 10 are to beacquired in the following modes: (1) community mortgage; (2)land swapping, (3) land assembly or consolidation; (4) landbanking; (5) donation to the government; (6) joint ventureagreement; (7) negotiated purchase; and (8) expropriation. Themode of expropriation is subject to two conditions: (a) it shall beresorted to only when the other modes of acquisition have beenexhausted; (b) parcels of land owned by small property ownersare exempt from such acquisition.

These means that the types of lands that may be acquired in theorder of priority in Section 9 are to be acquired only in the modesauthorized under Section 10.

Petitioner claims that it had faithfully observed the different modesof land acquisition for socialized housing under R.A. 7279 andadhered to the priorities in the acquisition for socialized housingunder said law. It, however, did not state with particularity whetheit exhausted the other modes of acquisition in Section 10 of thelaw before it decided to expropriate the subject lots. The lawstates "expropriation shall be resorted to when other modes oacquisition have been exhausted." Petitioner alleged only onemode of acquisition, i.e., by negotiated purchase. Petitionerthrough the City Mayor, tried to purchase the lots from





respondents but the latter refused to sell. As to the other modesof acquisition, no mention has been made. The Resolution of theSangguniang Panlungsod authorizing the Mayor of Mandaluyongto effect the expropriation of the subject property did not evenstate whether the city government tried to acquire the same bycommunity mortgage, land swapping, land assembly or consolidation, land banking, donation to the government, or jointventure agreement under Section 10 of the law. The lawexpressly exempted "small property owners" from expropriation of their land for urban land reform.

Under Section 3 of RA 7279, “Small-property owners" are definedby two elements: (1) those owners of real property whoseproperty consists of residential lands with an area of not morethan 300 square meters in highly urbanized cities and 800 squaremeters in other urban areas; and (2) that they do not own realproperty other than the same.

In the case at bar involves two (2) residential lots MandaluyongCity, a highly urbanized City. The lot totalled 1, 636 square meterswas issued in the names of the herein five (5) respondents. Therespondents are co-owners of the said lot. Under Article 493 of the Civil Code, every co-owner has the absolute ownership of hisundivided interest in the common property. The co-owner is freeto alienate, assign or mortgage his interest, except as to purelypersonal rights. He may also validly lease his undivided interest toa third party independently of the other co-owners. The effect of any such transfer is limited to the portion which may be awardedto him upon the partition of the property. The partition in 1998, six

(6) months after the filing of the expropriation case, terminated theco-ownership by converting into certain and definite parts therespective undivided shares of the co-owners. The rights of theco-owners to have the property partitioned and their share in thesame delivered to them cannot be questioned for "no co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership." The partition wasmerely a necessary incident of the co-ownership; and absent anyevidence to the contrary, this partition is presumed to have beendone in good faith. Upon partition, only Eusebio Aguilar wasgranted 347 square meters, which is 47 sq. meters more than themaximum of 300 square meters allowed by law set by RA 7279for small property owners. However, after Eusebio died, his fiveheirs became co-owners of his 347 square meter portion. Dividingthe 347 square meters among the five entitled each heir to 69.4square meters of the land subject of litigation. The share of eachco-owner did not exceed the 300 square meter limit set in R.A.

7279. The second issue is whether the subject property is the only real

property of respondents for them to comply with the secondrequisite for small property owners which Antonio Aguilar testifiedthat he and most of the original co-owners do not reside on thesubject property but in their ancestral home in Paco, Manila.Respondents therefore appear to own real property other than thelots in litigation. Nonetheless, the records do not show that theancestral home in Paco, Manila and the land on which it standsare owned by respondents or anyone of them. Petitioner did notpresent any title or proof of this fact despite Antonio Aguilar'stestimony. Respondents claim that the subject lots are their onlyreal property and that they, particularly two of the five heirs of Eusebio Aguilar, are merely renting their houses and therefore donot own any other real property in Metro Manila.

Finally, this court notes that the subject lots are now in thepossession of respondents. Antonio Aguilar testified that he and

the other co-owners filed ejectment cases against the occupantsof the land before the Metropolitan Trial Court, Mandaluyong.Orders of eviction were issued and executed on September 17,1997 which resulted in the eviction of the tenants and other occupants from the land in question.

GR No. 155746, October 3, 2004LAGCAO vs. JUDGE LABRA* repeated case *

GR No. 152230, August 09, 2005JIL vs. MUNICIPALITY OF PASIG

* repeated case *

PRIORITY IN EXPROPRIATION

284 SCRA 716 (1998)FILSTREAM INTERNATIONAL INCORPORATED VS. COURT OFAPPEALS

FACTS:Filstream is the registered owner of the subject land which filed anejectment suit against the occupants of the parcels of land on thegrounds of termination of the lease contract and non-payment orentals. The MTC rendered decision in favor of the petitioner andordered private respondents to vacate the premises and pay backrentals to the petitioner. The RTC and CA affirmed this decision. It wasat this stage that respondent City of Manila approved an Ordinanceauthorizing Mayor Lim to initiate the acquisition by negotiationexpropriation, purchased and other legal means certain parcels of landwhich formed part of the properties of the petitioner then occupied byprivate respondents. The said properties were to be sold and to bedistributed to the qualified tenants of the area pursuant to the LandUse Development Program of the City of Manila. The Trial Courtissued a writ of possession in favor of the City of Manila.

ISSUE: W/N the City of Manila complies with the conditions under RANo. 7279 when it expropriated petitioner Filstream properties.

HELD:

The court found nothing that would indicate that respondent Cityof Manila complied with Section 9 and 10 of RA No. 7279. UndeSection 9, lands for socialized housing are to be acquired in thefollowing order: (1) government lands; (2) alienable lands of thepublic domain; (3) unregistered or abandoned or idle lands; (4lands within the declared Areas for Priority Development (APD)Zonal Improvement Program (ZIP) sites, Slum Improvement andResettlement (SIR) sites which have not yet been acquired; (5)BAgong Lipunan Improvement of Sites and Services or BLISSsites which have not yet been acquired; and (6) privately-ownedlands.

The provisions are the limitations with respect to the order opriority in acquiring private lands and in resorting to expropriationPrivate lands rank the last in the order of priority for purposes o

socialized housing. Expropriation proceedings are to be resortedto only when the other modes of acquisition have beenexhausted. Compliance with these conditions must be deemedmandatory because these are the only safeguards on securingthe right of owners of private property to due process when theirproperty is expropriated for public use.

Petitioner Filstream’s properties were expropriated and orderedcondemned in favor of the City of Manila sans any showing tharesort to the acquisition of other lands listed under Section 9 oR.A. no. 7279 have proved futile. There was a violation oPetitioner Filstream’s right to due process which must accordinglybe ratified. The state has the paramount interest in exercising hispower of eminent domain for the general welfare considering thathe right of the State to expropriate private property as long as it isfor public use always takes precedence over the interest oprivate property owners. But we must not lost sight of the fact thathe individual rights affected by the exercise of such rights are

also entitled for protection, bearing in mind that the exercise othis right cannot override the guarantee of due process extendedby the law to owners of the property to be expropriated.

PUBLIC USE

G.R. Nos. L-60549, 60553 to 60555 , October 26, 1983HEIRS OF JUANCHO ARDONA VS. REYES

FACTS:

This is a petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction





challenging the constitutionality of Presidential Decree No. 564,the Revised Charter of the Philippine Tourism Authority, andProclamation No. 2052 declaring the barangays of Sibugay,Malubog, Babag and Sirao including the proposed Lusaran Damin the City of Cebu and in the municipalities of Argao andDalaguete in the province of Cebu as tourist zones. Thepetitioners ask that we restrain respondent Court of First Instanceof Cebu and the Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA) from enforcingand implementing the writs of possession issued in four (4)expropriation cases filed by PTA against the petitioners.

The Philippine Tourism Authority filed four (4) Complaints with theCourt of First Instance of Cebu City for the expropriation of some282 hectares of rolling land situated in barangays Malubog andBabag, Cebu City, under PTA's express authority "to acquire bypurchase, by negotiation or by condemnation proceedings anyprivate land within and without the tourist zones" for the purposesindicated in Section 5, paragraph B(2), of its Revised Charter (PD564), more specifically, for the development into integrated resortcomplexes of selected and well-defined geographic areas withpotential tourism value.

The defendants filed their respective Opposition with Motion toDismiss and/or Reconsideration. The defendants, now petitioners,had a common allegation in that the taking is allegedly notimpressed with public use under the Constitution. They further alleged, in addition to the issue of public use, that there is nospecific constitutional provision authorizing the taking of privateproperty for tourism purpose.

ISSUE: Whether expropriation of several barangays for provocation of tourism and construction of sports and hotel complexes constitutesexpropriation for public use.

HELD: YES. The petitioners' contention that the promotion of tourism is not

"public use" because private concessioners would be allowed tomaintain various facilities such as restaurants, hotels, stores, etc.inside the tourist complex is impressed with even less merit. Theexpropriation of private land for slum clearance and urbandevelopment is for a public purpose even if the developed area islater sold to private homeowners, commercial firms, entertainmentand service companies, and other private concerns. Private busfirms, taxicab fleets, roadside restaurants, and other private

businesses using public streets end highways do not diminish inthe least bit the public character of expropriations for roads andstreets. The lease of store spaces in underpasses of streets builton expropriated land does not make the taking for a privatepurpose. Airports and piers catering exclusively to private airlinesand shipping companies are still for public use.

G.R. No. L-48685, September 30, 1987SUMULONG VS. GUERRERO

FACTS:

The National Housing Authority (NIIA) filed a complaint for expropriation of parcels of land covering approximately twenty five(25) hectares, (in Antipolo, Rizal) including the lots of petitionersLorenzo Sumulong and Emilia Vidanes-Balaoing with an area of 6,667 square meters and 3,333 square meters respectively. The

land sought to be expropriated were valued by the NHA at onepeso (P1.00) per square meter adopting the market value fixed bythe provincial assessor in accordance with presidential decreesprescribing the valuation of property in expropriation proceedings.

Together with the complaint was a motion for immediatepossession of the properties. The NHA deposited the amount of P158,980.00 with the Philippine National Bank, representing the"total market value" of the subject twenty five hectares of land,pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1224 which defines "thepolicy on the expropriation of private property for socializedhousing upon payment of just compensation."

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration on the ground thatthey had been deprived of the possession of their property without

due process of law. This was however, denied. Hence, this petition challenging the orders of respondent Judge

and assailing the constitutionality of Pres. Decree No. 1224, asamended.

ISSUE: Whether socialized housing constitutes “public use” fopurposes of expropriation.

HELD: YES. This Court is satisfied that "socialized housing" fans within the

confines of "public use". As long as the purpose of the taking ispublic, then the power of eminent domain comes into play. As jusnoted, the constitution in at least two cases, to remove any doubtdetermines what is public use. One is the expropriation of lands tobe subdivided into small lots for resale at cost to individuals. Theother is in the transfer, through the exercise of this power, ofutilities and other private enterprise to the government. isaccurate to state then that at present whatever may bebeneficially employed for the general welfare satisfies therequirement of public use

In the case at bar, the use to which it is proposed to put thesubject parcels of land meets the requisites of "public use". Thelands in question are being expropriated by the NHA for theexpansion of Bagong Nayon Housing Project to provide housingfacilities to low-salaried government employees.

G.R. No. 103125, May 17, 1993PROVINCE OF CAMARINES SUR VS. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS:

This is an appeal by certiorari from the decision of the Court of Appeals.

The Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Camarines Supassed Resolution No. 129, Series of 1988, authorizing theProvincial Governor to purchase or expropriate propertycontiguous to the provincial capitol site, in order to establish apilot farm for non-food and non-traditional agricultural crops and ahousing project for provincial government employees.

Pursuant to the Resolution, the Province of Camarines Surthrough its Governor, Hon. Luis R.Villafuerte, filed two separatecases for expropriation against Ernesto N. San Joaquin and EfrenN. San Joaquin.

The Province of Camarines Sur then filed a motion for theissuance of writ of possession, but the San Joaquins failed toappear at the hearing of the motion.

The San Joaquins moved to dismiss the complaints on the groundof inadequacy of the price offered for their property. The trial courdenied the motion to dismiss and authorized the Province ofCamarines Sur to take possession of the property upon thedeposit with the Clerk of Court of the amount of P5,714.00, theamount provisionally fixed by the trial court to answer fodamages that private respondents may suffer in the event that theexpropriation cases do not prosper. The trial court issued a writ opossession.

The San Joaquins filed a motion for relief from the orderauthorizing the Province of Camarines Sur to take possession otheir property and a motion to admit an amended motion todismiss. Both motions were denied.

In their petition before the Court of Appeals, the San Joaquinsasked: (a) that Resolution No. 129 of the SangguniangPanlalawigan be declared null and void; (b) that the complaints foexpropriation be dismissed; and (c) that the order denying themotion to dismiss and allowing the Province of Camarines Sur totake possession of the property subject of the expropriation andthe order denying the motion to admit the amended motion todismiss, be set aside. They also asked that an order be issued torestrain the trial court from enforcing the writ of possession, andthereafter to issue a writ of injunction.

In its answer to the petition, the Province of Camarines Suclaimed that it has the authority to initiate the expropriation andthat the expropriations are for a public purpose.





Asked by the Court of Appeals to give his Comment to thepetition, the Solicitor General stated that under Section 9 of theLocal Government Code (B.P. Blg. 337), there was no need for the approval by the Office of the President of the exercise by theSangguniang Panlalawigan of the right of eminent domain.However, the Solicitor General expressed the view that theProvince of Camarines Sur must first secure the approval of theDepartment of Agrarian Reform of the plan to expropriate thelands of petitioners for use as a housing project.

The Court of Appeals set aside the order of the trial court,

allowing the Province of Camarines Sur to take possession of private respondents' lands and the order denying the admission of the amended motion to dismiss. It also ordered the trial court tosuspend the expropriation proceedings until after the Province of Camarines Sur shall have submitted the requisite approval of theDepartment of Agrarian Reform to convert the classification of theproperty of the private respondents from agricultural to non-agricultural land.

Hence this petition.

ISSUE: Whether the expropriation of property intended for theestablishment of a pilot development center and housing project of theProvince of Camarines Sur is in consonance with the public purposerequirement of the Constitution.

HELD: YES.

The expropriation of the property authorized by the questionedresolution is for a public purpose. The establishment of a pilotdevelopment center would insure to the direct benefit andadvantage of the people of the Province of Camarines Sur. Onceoperational, the center would make available to the communityinvaluable information and technology on agriculture, fishery andthe cottage industry. Ultimately, the livelihood of the farmers,fishermen and craftsmen would be enhanced. The housingproject also satisfies the public purpose requirement of theConstitution. As held in Sumulong v. Guerrero, 154 SCRA 461,"Housing is a basic human need. Shortage in housing is a matter of state concern since it directly and significantly affects publichealth, safety, the environment and in sum the general welfare."

252 SCRA 412, 1996MANOSCA VS. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS: A petition for review on certiorari, from the decision of the Court of Appeals, dated 15 January 1992, in CA-G.R. SP No. 24969 (entitled“Alejandro Manosca, et al. v. Hon. Benjamin V. Pelayo, et al.”)Wherein, Petitioners inherited a piece of land located at P. BurgosStreet, Calzada, Taguig, Metro Manila, with an area of about four hundred ninety-two (492) square meters. When the parcel wasascertained by the NHI to have been the birthsite of Felix Y. Manalo,the founder of Iglesia Ni Cristo, it passed Resolution No. 1, Series of 1986, pursuant to Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 260, declaringthe land to be a national historical landmark. The resolution was, on 06January 1986, approved by the Minister of Education, Culture andSports. Later, the opinion of the Secretary of Justice was asked on thelegality of the measure. Thus the assailment of this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the “public use” requirement of Eminent

Domain is extant in the attempted expropriation by the Republic of a492-square-meter parcel of land so declared by the National HistoricalInstitute (“NHI”) as a national historical landmark.

HELD:

The term “public use,” not having been otherwise defined by theconstitution, must be considered in its general concept of meetinga public need or a public exigency. The validity of the exercise of the power of eminent domain for traditional purposes is beyondquestion; it is not at all to be said, however, that public use shouldthereby be restricted to such traditional uses. The idea that “publicuse” is strictly limited to clear cases of “use by the public” haslong been discarded.

Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando states: “The taking to be validmust be for public use. There was a time when it was felt that aliteral meaning should be attached to such a requirementWhatever project is undertaken must be for the public to enjoy, asin the case of streets or parks. Otherwise, expropriation is noallowable. It is not so any more. As long as the purpose of thetaking is public, then the power of eminent domain comes intoplay. As just noted, the constitution in at least two cases, toremove any doubt, determines what is public use. One is theexpropriation of lands to be subdivided into small lots for resale a

cost to individuals. The other is the transfer, through the exerciseof this power, of utilities and other private enterprise to thegovernment. It is accurate to state then that at present whatevermay be beneficially employed for the general welfare satisfies therequirement of public use.”

Chief Justice Fernando, writing the ponencia in J.M. Tuason &Co. vs. Land Tenure Administration, has viewed the Constitution adynamic instrument and one that “is not to be construed narrowlyor pedantically” so as to enable it “to meet adequately whateveproblems the future has in store.” Fr. Joaquin Bernas, a notedconstitutionalist himself, has aptly observed that what, in fact, hasultimately emerged is a concept of public use which is just asbroad as “public welfare. Petitioners, finally, would faulrespondent appellate court in sustaining the trial court’s ordewhich considered inapplicable the case of Noble v. City of ManilaBoth courts held correctly. The Republic was not a party to thealleged contract of exchange between the Iglesia ni Cristo and

petitioners which (the contracting parties) alone, not the Republiccould properly be bound.

All considered, the Court finds the assailed decision to be inaccord with law and jurisprudence. WHEREFORE, the petition isDENIED.

GR No. 137285, January 15, 2001ESTATE OF JIMENEZ VS. PEZA

FACTS:

On May 15, 1981, private respondent Philippines ExporProcessing Zone (PEZA), then called as the Export ProcessingZone Authority (EPZA), initiated before the Regional Trial Court oCavite expropriation proceedings on three (3) parcels of irrigatedriceland in Rosario, Cavite. One of the lots, Lot 1406 (A and B) othe San Francisco de Malabon Estate, with an approximate area

of 29,008 square meters, is registered in the name of SaludJimenez under TCT No. T-113498 of the Registry of Deeds oCavite.

More than ten (10) years later, the said trial court in an Ordedated July 11, 1991 upheld the right of private respondent PEZAto expropriate, among others, Lot 1406 (A and B)Reconsideration of the said order was sought by petitionecontending that said lot would only be transferred to a privatecorporation, Philippines Vinyl Corp., and hence would not beutilized for a public purpose.

In an Order dated October 25, 19997, the trial court reconsideredthe Order dated July 11, 1991 and released Lot 1406-A fromexpropriation while the expropriation of Lot 1406-B wasmaintained. Finding the said order unacceptable, privaterespondent PEZA interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals.

Meanwhile, petitioner wrote a letter to private respondent offering

two (2) proposals, namely:

1. Withdrawal of private respondent's appeal with respect toLot 1406-A I consideration of the waiver of claim fodamages and lass of income for the possession of said loby private respondent.

2. The swap of Lot 1406-B with Lot 434 covered by TCT NoT-14772 since private respondent has no money yet to payfor the lot.

Private respondent's Board approved the "proposal" and the





compromise agreement was signed by private respondentthrough its then administrator Tagumpay Jadiniano assisted byGovernment Corporate Counsel Oscar I. Garcia. Said

compromise agreement9 dated January 4, 1993 is quotedhereunder:

1. That plaintiff agrees to withdraw its appeal from the Order of the Honorable Court dated October 25, 1991 whichreleased lot 1406-A from the expropriation proceedings. Onthe other hand, defendant Estate of Salud Jimenez agrees towaive, quit claim and forfeit its claim for damages and loss of income which it sustained by person of the possession of said lot by plaintiff from 1981 up to the present.

2. That the parties agree that defendant Estate of SaludJimenez shall transfer lot 1406-B with an area of 13,118square meters which forms part of the lot registered under TCT No. 113498 of the Registry of Deeds of Cavite to thename of the plaintiff and the same shall be swapped andexchanged with lot 434 with an area of 14,167 squaremeters and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.14772 of the Registry of Deeds of Cavite which lot will betransferred to the name of Estate of Salud Jimenez.

3. That the swap arrangement recognized the fact that the

lot 1406-B covered by TCT No. T-113498 of the state of defendant Salud Jimenez is considered expropriated in favor of the government based on Order of the Honorable Courtdated July 11, 1991. However, instead of being paid the justcompensation for said lot, the estate of said defendant shallbe paid with lot 434 covered by TCT No. T-14772.

4. That the parties agree that they will abide by the terms of the foregoing agreement in good faith and the Decision to berendered based on this Compromise Agreement isimmediately final and executory.

The Court of Appeals remanded the case to the trial court for theapproval of the said compromise agreement entered into betweenthe parties, consequent with the withdrawal of the appeal with theCourt of Appeals. In the Order dated August 23, 1993, the trialcourt approved the compromise agreement.

However, private respondent failed to transfer the title of Lot 434to petitioner inasmuch as it was not the registered owner of thecovering TCT No. T-14772 but Progressive Realty Estate, Inc.Thus, on March 13, 1997, petitioner Estate filed a "Motion toPartially Annul the Order dated August 23, 1993."

In the Order dated August 4, 1997, the trial court annulled thesaid compromise agreement entered into between the parties anddirected private respondent to peacefully turn over Lot 1406-A tothe petitioner. Disagreeing with the said Order of the trial court,

respondent PEZA moved13 for its reconsideration. The sameproved futile since the trial court denied reconsideration in its

Order 14 dated November 3, 1997. On December 4, 1997, the trial court, at the instance of petitioner,

corrected the Orders dated August 4, 1997 and November 3,1997 by declaring that it is Lot 1406-B and Lot 1406-A that shouldbe surrendered and returned to petitioner.

On November 27, 1997, respondent interposed before the Courtof Appeals a petition for certiorari and prohibition seeking to nullifythe Orders dated August 4, 1997 and November 3, 1997 of the

court. Petitioner filed its Comment17 on January 16, 1998.

ISSUE: The petition anchored on the following assignment of errors:

1. Whether or not, the Court of Appeals committed grave andreversible error in giving due course to the special Civil Action filed byrespondent PEZA in CA-G.R. SP. No. 46112 when it was madesubstitute for lost appeal in clear contravention of the Honorable

Court’s ruling in Sempio v. Court of Appeals (263 SCRA 617) andOngsitco v. Court of Appeals (255 SCRA 703) .

2. Granting in Gratia Argumenti that the Special Civil Action oCertiorari is proper, the Court of Appeals nevertheless wronglyinterpreted the phrase “Original Demand” contained in Article 2041 opetitioner estate is the return of the subject lot (Lot 1406-B) whichsought to be expropriated and not the determination of juscompensation for the lot. Furthermore, even if the interpretation of thecourt of appeals or the import of the phrase in question is correct, it is

Article 2039 of the Civil Code and not Article 2041 which is applicableto compromise agreements approved by the courts.

HELD:

This court therefore finds that the Court of Appeals did not err ininterpreting "original demand" to mean the fixing of juscompensation. The authority of respondent and the nature of thepurpose thereof have been put to rest when the ExpropriationOrder dated July 11, 1991 became final and was duly admitted bypetitioner in the compromise agreement. The only issue foconsideration is the manner and amount of payment due topetitioner. In fact, aside from the withdrawal of privaterespondent's appeal to the Court of Appeals concerning Lot 1406

A, the matter of payment of just compensation was the onlysubject of the compromise agreement dated January 4, 1993Under the compromise agreement, petitioner was supposed to

receive respondent's Lot No. 434 in exchange for Lot 1406-BWhen respondent failed to fulfill its obligation to deliver Lot 434,petitioner can again demand for the payment but not the return othe expropriated Lot 1406-B. This interpretation by the Court of

Appeals is in according with Section 4 to 8, Rule 67 of the Rulesof Court.

This court holds that respondent has the legal authority toexpropriate the subject Lot 1406-B and that the same was for a

valid public purpose. In Sumulong v. Guerrero41 , this Court hasruled that, the "public use" requirement for a valid exercise of thepower of eminent domain is a flexible and evolving concepinfluenced by changing conditions.

We have rules that the concept of just compensation embracesnot only the correct determination of the amount to be paid to theowners of the land, but also the payment of the land within areasonable time from its taking. Without prompt payment

compensation cannot be considered "just" inasmuch as theproperty owner is made to suffer the consequences of beingimmediately deprived of his land while being made to wait for adecade or more before actually receiving the amount necessaryto cope with his loss. We find that respondent capriciously evadedits duty of giving what is due to petitioner. In the case at bar, theexpropriation order was issued by the trial court in 1991. Thecompromise agreement between the parties was approved by thetrial court in 1993. However, from 1993 up to the presentrespondent has failed in its obligation to pay petitioner to theprejudice of the latter. Respondent caused damage to petitioner inmaking the latter to expect that it had a good title to the propertyto be swapped with Lot 1406-B; and meanwhile, respondent hasbeen reaping benefits from the lease or rental income of the saidexpropriated lot. However, it is high time that the petitioner bepaid what was due him eleven years ago. It is high time that thepetitioner be paid what was due him eleven years ago. It isarbitrary and capricious for a government agency to initiateexpropriation proceedings, seize a person's property, allow the

judgment of the court to become final and executory and thenrefuse to pay on the ground that there are no appropriations forthe property earlier taken and profitably used. Though therespondent has committed a misdeed to petitioner, we cannothowever, grant the petitioner's prayer for the return of theexpropriated Lot No. 1406-B. The Order of expropriation datedJuly 11, 1991, has long become final and executory.

In view of all the foregoing, justice and equity dictate that thiscase be remanded to the trial court for hearing of theexpropriation proceedings on the determination of juscompensation for Lot 1406-B and for its prompt payment to the





petitioner. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby denied. The

Regional Trial Court of Cavite City is hereby ordered to proceedwith the hearing of the expropriation proceedings, docketed asCivil Case No. N-4029, regarding the determination of justcompensation for Lot 1406-B, covered and described in TCT No.T-113498-Cavite, and to resolve the same with dispatch.

GR No. 147511, January 20, 2003REYES VS. NHA

FACTS:

In 1977, respondent National Housing Authority (NHA) filedseparate complaints for the expropriation of sugarcane lands,particularly Lot Nos. 6450, 6448-E, 6198-A and 6199 of thecadastral survey of DasmariÒas, Cavite belonging to thepetitioners, before the then Court of First Instance of Cavite, anddocketed as Civil Case Nos. T.G.-392, T.G.-396 and T.G.-417.The stated public purpose of the expropriation was the expansionof the Dasmarinas Resettlement Project to accommodate thesquatters who were relocated from the Metropolitan Manila area.The trial court rendered judgment ordering the expropriation of these lots and the payment of just compensation. This wasaffirmed by the Supreme Court in a decision rendered on October

29, 1987 in the case of NHA vs. Zaballero2 and which becamefinal on November 26, 1987.

On February 24, 1989, the expropriation court (now Branch 18,Regional Trial Court of Tagaytay City) issued an Order 4 thedispositive portion of which reads:

"WHEREFORE, and resolving thus, let an Alias Writ of Executionbe immediately issued and that:(1) The Register of Deeds of the Province of Cavite is herebyordered to transfer, in the name of the plaintiff National Housing

Authority, the following:(a) Transfer Certificate No. RT-638 containing an area of 79,167 square meters situated in Barrio Bangkal,DasmariÒas, Cavite;(b) Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-55702 containing anarea of 20,872 square meters situated in Barrio Bangkal,DasmariÒas, Cavite;(c) Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-639 and RT-4641covering Lot Nos. 6198-A and 6199 with an aggregate areaof 159,985 square meters also situated in Barrio Bangkal,DasmariÒas, Cavite.

(2) Plaintiff National Housing Authority is likewise hereby ordered,under pain of contempt, to immediately pay the defendants, theamounts stated in the Writ of Execution as the adjudicatedcompensation of their expropriated properties, which process wasreceived by it according to the records, on September 26, 1988,segregating therefrom, and in separate check, the lawyer's fees infavor of Atty. Bobby P. Yuseco, in the amount of P322,123.05, assustained by their contract as gleaned from the records, with noother deduction, paying on its own (NHA) account, the necessarylegal expenses incident to the registration or issuance of newcertificates of title, pursuant to the provisions of the PropertyRegistration Law (PD 1529);(3) Defendants, however, are directed to pay the correspondingcapital gains tax on the subject properties, directing themadditionally, to coordinate with the plaintiff NHA in this regard, in

order to facilitate the termination of this case, put an end to thiscontroversy and consign the same to its final rest."

ISSUE: The petitioners raise the following assignment of errors:1. The Honorable Court of Appeals had decided a question of

substance not in accord with justice and equity when it ruled that,as the judgment of the expropriation court did not contain acondition that should the expropriated property be not used for the intended purpose it would revert to the condemnee, the actionto declare the forfeiture of rights under the expropriation judgmentcan not prosper;

2. The Honorable Court of Appeals decided a question of substancenot in accord with jurisprudence, justice and equity when it ruled

that the non-payment is not a ground for forfeiture;3. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in not declaring the

judgment of expropriation forfeited in light of the failure orespondent to use the expropriated property for the intendedpurpose but for a totally different purpose."

HELD:

The 1987 Constitution explicitly provides for the exercise of thepower of eminent domain over private properties upon payment o

just compensation. More specifically, section 9, Article III states

that private property shall not be taken for public use without juscompensation. The constitutional restraints are public use and just compensation.

Petitioners cannot insist on a restrictive view of the eminendomain provision of the Constitution by contending that thecontract for low cost housing is a deviation from the stated publicuse. It is now settled doctrine that the concept of public use is nolonger limited to traditional purposes. Here, as elsewhere, theidea that "public use" is strictly limited to clear cases of "use bythe public" has been abandoned. The term "public use" has nowbeen held to be synonymous with "public interest," "publicbenefit," "public welfare," and "public convenience."

The restrictive view of public use may be appropriate for a nationwhich circumscribes the scope of government activities and publicconcerns and which possesses big and correctly located publiclands that obviate the need to take private property for publicpurposes. Neither circumstance applies to the Philippines. Wehave never been a laissez faire State. And the necessities whichimpel the exertion of sovereign power are all too often found inareas of scarce public land or limited government resources.

The act of respondent NHA in entering into a contract with a reaestate developer for the construction of low cost housing on theexpropriated lots to be sold to qualified low income beneficiariescannot be taken to mean as a deviation from the stated publicpurpose of their taking. Jurisprudence has it that the expropriationof private land for slum clearance and urban development is for apublic purpose even if the developed area is later sold to privatehomeowners, commercials firms, entertainment and servicecompanies, and other private concerns.

Moreover, the Constitution itself allows the State to undertake, fothe common good and in cooperation with the private sector, acontinuing program of urban land reform and housing whichwill make at affordable cost decent housing and basic services to

underprivileged and homeless citizens in urban centers andresettlement areas.11 The expropriation of private property fothe purpose of socialized housing for the marginalized sector is infurtherance of the social justice provision under Section 1, ArticleXIII of the Constitution which provides that:

"SECTION 1. The Congress shall give highest priority to theenactment of measures that protect and enhance the right of althe people to human dignity, reduce social, economic, andpolitical inequalities, and remove cultural inequities by equitablydiffusing wealth and political power for the common good.

To this end, the State shall require the acquisition, ownership, useand disposition of property and its increments."

THEREFORE, The appealed judgment is modified as follows:1. Ordering respondent National Housing Authority to paypetitioners the amount of P1,218,574.35 with legal interesthereon at 12% per annum computed from the taking of the

expropriated properties in 1997 until the amount due shall havebeen fully paid;2. Ordering petitioners to pay the capital gains tax; and3. Ordering petitioners to surrender to respondent NationaHousing Authority the owners' duplicate certificates of title of theexpropriated properties upon full payment of just compensation.

268 SCRA 368MODAY vs. COURT OF APPEALS*repeated case*

GOVVERNMENT WITHDRAWAL





GR No. 154411, June 19, 2003NHA vs. HEIRS OF ISIDRO GUIVELONDO

FACTS:

On February 23, 1999, petitioner filed with the RTC of Cebu City,an Amended Complaint for eminent domain against respondents.It alleged that defendant Associacion Benevola de Cebu was theclaimant of a Lot located in Banilad, Cebu City; that defendantEngracia Urot was the claimant of parcels of Lots, in the samearea; that defendant Heirs of Isidro Guivelondo were claimants of

lots in Carreta, Mabolo, Cebu City; and that the lands are in theurban center which petitioner intends to develop as a socializedhousing project.

On November 12, 1999, the Heirs of Guivelondo filed aManifestation waiving their objections to petitioner’s power toexpropriate their properties. Thus the RTC issued an order to thateffect. Thereafter, the RTC appointed three Commissioners toascertain the just compensation of the properties of respondents.The Commissioners submitted their report recommending the justcompensation be fixed at P11,200.00 per square meter, whichwas favored by the RTC.

Petitioner, however, filed a Motion to Dismiss alleging that theimplementation of its socialized housing project was renderedimpossible because the value of the land sought to beexpropriated was too high, and the intended beneficiaries cannotafford. The Motion was denied since the prior case was decidedon already.

After petitioner’s appeal was denied by the CA, the Landbankexecuted garnishment proceedings against the funds of NHA.

ISSUES:1. WON THE STATE CAN BE COMPELLED BY THE COURTS TO

CONTINUE WITH THE EXERCISE OF ITS INHERENT POWEROF EMINENT DOMAIN;

2. WON JUDGMENT HAS BECOME FINAL AND EXECUTORY AND IF ESTOPPEL APPLIES TO GOVERNMENT;

3. WON WRITS OF EXECUTION AND GARNISHMENT MAY BEISSUED AGAINST THE STATE.

HELD:

There are two (2) stages in every action for expropriation. Thefirst is concerned with the determination of the authority of theplaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain. The second is

concerned with the determination by the Court of the justcompensation. The outcome of the first phase is final since it disposes of the

case. On the other hand, the second phase fixes the amount of just compensation. Both orders, being final, are however,appealable. Once the first order becomes final and no appealthereto is taken, the authority to expropriate and its public use canno longer be questioned.

In the case at bar, petitioner did not appeal the Order of the RTC,which declared the lawful right to expropriate the properties hencethe Order became final.

Socialized housing has been recognized as public use for purposes of exercising the power of eminent domain. The need toprovide housing to the urban poor was not lost by fact that theland cost more than petitioner had expected. The public purposeof is not diminished by the amount of just compensation the court

has fixed. On the issue of the garnishment against petitioner’s funds, thereis a need to determine if it is a government entity. Generally,funds and properties of the government cannot be the object of garnishment proceedings.

However, if the funds belong to a public corporation or a GOCCwith a personality of its own, then its funds are not exempt fromgarnishment.

Hence, it is clear that NHA is not exempt from garnishment. WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition for

review is DENIED.

GR No. 106804, August 12, 2004

NPC & POBRE vs. CA

FACTS:

Petitioner NPC is a public corporation created to generategeothermal, hydroelectric, nuclear and other power and totransmit electric power nationwide. NPC is authorized by law toexercise the right of eminent domain.

Private respondent Pobre is the owner of property located in Tiwi Albay.

In 1963, Pobre began developing the Property as a resort

subdivision, which he named as “Tiwi Hot Springs ResorSubdivision.” On August 1965, the Commission on Volcanology certified tha

thermal mineral water and steam were present beneath theProperty. The commission found it suitable for domestic use andpotentially for commercial or industrial use.

NPC then became involved with Pobre’s Property in threeinstances.

First was on February 1972 when Pobre leased to NPC for oneyear eleven lots frof the subdivision. Second was sometime in1977, the first time that NPC filed its expropriation case againsPobre to acquire an 8,311.60 sqm portion of the Property. On1979, the trial court ordered the expropriation of the lots uponNPC’s payment of P25/sqm. NPC began drilling operations andconstruction of steam wells. While the first case was pendingNPC dumped waste materials beyond the site agreed upon by

NPC with Pobre. It altered the topography o the Property. Noaction was done on Pobre’s complaints, dumping continuedThird was on September 1979, when NPC filed its secondexpropriation case. NPC needed more lots for the constructionand maintenance of a Well Site. NPC immediately depositedP5,546.36 with the Philippine National Bank. The deposrepresented 10% of the total market value of the lots covered bythe second expropriation. NPC entered the 5,554 sqm lot uponthe trial court’s issuance of a writ of possession to NPC.

Pobre filed a motion to dismiss the second complaint and claimedthat NPC damaged his Property. He prayed for just compensationof all the lots affected.

On April 1987, the trial court decided in favor of Pobre, orderedthe whole property to be paid off by NPC.

NPC filed its motion for reconsideration of the decision, which wasdenied by the trial courts. NPC appealed to CA. CA upheld thetrial court’s decision and denied NPC’s motion for reconsideration

ISSUES: WON, CA erred:1. In holding that NPC had “taken” the entire Property of Pobre;2. In not excluding from the Property portions of which NPC had

previously expropriated and paid for;3. In holding that the amount of just compensation fixed by the tria

court at P3,448,450.00 with interest from September 1979 untfully paid, is just and fair;

4. In not holding that the just compensation should be fixed aP25/sqm only as what had been previously agreed upon;

HELD:

Even before the first case, Pobre had established his property asa resort-subdivision. NPC had wrought so much damage to theproperty that it made it uninhabitable as a resort-subdivision.Questions of facts are beyond the pale of the SC as a petition for

review may only raise questions of law. NPC points out that it didnot take Pobre’s 68,969 sqm property. NPC argues that assumingthat it is liable for damages, the 8,311.60 sqm portion that it hadsuccessfully expropriated and fully paid for should have beenexcluded from the 68,969 sqm property that Pobre claims NPChad damaged.

It was clearly established that the property originally had a totaarea of 141,300 sqm. Pobre identified the lots forming the 68,969sqm property that comprised the undeveloped area. NPC had theopportunity to object to the identification of the lots, but failed todo so. Thus, the trial and appellate courts’ finding on the totaland area NPC had damaged cannot be disturbed.

When possession of the land cannot be turned over to the





landowner because it is not anymore convenient or feasible to doso, the only remedy available to the aggrieved landowner is todemand payment of just compensation.

In this case, the property is no longer habitable as a resort-subdivision. The Property is worthless is now only useful toNPC. NPC moved for the dismissal of the complaint for thesecond expropriation on the ground that it had found analternative site and there was stiff opposition from Pobre. NPCabandoned the second expropriation case five years after it hadalready deprived the Property virtually of all its value. NPC has

demonstrated its utter disregard for Pobre’s property rights. Thus, it would now be futile to compel NPC to institute

expropriation proceedings to determine the just compensation for Pobre’s 68,969 square-meter Property. Pobre must be sparedany further delay in his pursuit to receive just compensation fromNPC. Just compensation is the fair and full equivalent of the loss.

The lesson in this case must not be lost on entities with eminentdomain authority. Such entities cannot trifle with a citizen’sproperty rights. The power of eminent domain is an extraordinarypower they must wield with circumspection and utmost regard for procedural requirements.

WHEREFORE, the petition is denied for lack of merit.

RECOVERY OF EXPROPRIATED LAND

GR No. 158563, June 30, 2005ATO vs. GOPUCO

FACTS:

Respondent was the owner of lots consisting of 995 sqm locatedin the vicinity of the Lahug Airport in Cebu City. The airport hadbeen turned over by the U.S. Army to the Philippines sometime in1947 through the Surplus Property Commission. In 1947, theCommission was succeeded by the Bureau of Aeronautics, whichwas supplanted by the National Airport Corporation (NAC). TheNAC was then dissolved and replaced with the Civil Aeronautics

Administration (CAA). Sometime in 1949, the NAC informed the various lot-owners

surrounding the Lahug Airport, including respondent, that thegovernment was acquiring their lands for purposes of expansion.Some landowners sold their properties on the assurance that theywould be able to repurchase the same when these would nolonger be used by the airport. Others, including respondent,refused to do so.

Thus, on April 1952, the CAA filed a complaint with the Court of First Instance (CFI) for the expropriation of the lots, which the CFIdecided in favor of CAA. No appeal was made.

Subsequently, when the Mactan International Airport beganoperations, the Lahug Airport was ordered closed by thenPresident Aquino. On March 1990, respondent wrote the manager of the Lahug Airport, seeking the return of his lot and offered toreturn the money previously paid. This letter was ignored.

On 08 May 1992, ownership of the Lahug lots were transferred toMactan-Cebu International Airport Authority (MCIAA).Respondent filed recovery of ownership of his Lot with the RTC of Cebu and maintained that since the Lahug Airport has beenclosed, the purpose of the property had ceased and title to the

property had therefore reverted to him. Respondent however failed to present evidence on entering the

previous compromise agreement made. Lastly, Gopuco asserted that there were several announcements

that the Lahug Airport was soon to be developed into acommercial complex, which he took to be a scheme of theProvince of Cebu to make permanent the deprivation of hisproperty.

The RTC dismissed the complaint and directed the respondent topay exemplary damages, litigation expenses and costs.

Aggrieved by the decision, respondent appealed to CA, whichoverturned the RTC decision, ordered petitioners to reconvey lotsto respondent upon payment of the reasonable price as

determined by it, and deleted the costs of damages.

ISSUES:1. WON THE CA ERRED IN HOLDING THAT RESPONDENT HAS

THE RIGHT TO RECLAIM OWNERSHIP OF THE LOT.2. WON THE CA ERRED IN DELETING THE AWARD OF

LITIGATION EXPENSES AND COSTS IN FAVOR OFPETITIONERS.

HELD:

When land has been acquired for public use in fee simpleunconditionally, either by the exercise of eminent domain or bypurchase, the former owner retains no rights in the land, and thepublic use may be abandoned or the land may be devoted to adifferent use, without any impairment of the estate or titleacquired, or any reversion to the former owner.

It was ruled that a compromise agreement, when not contrary tolaw, public order, public policy, morals, or good customs, is a validcontract which is the law between the parties. Indeed, anyonewho is not a party to a contract or agreement cannot be bound byits terms, and cannot be affected by it. Since respondent was noa party to the compromise agreements, he cannot legally invokethe same.

Eminent domain is generally described as “the highest and mosexact idea of property remaining in the government” that may beacquired for public purpose through a method in the nature of aforced purchase by the State. Also often referred to asexpropriation or condemnation, it is, like police power andtaxation, an inherent power of sovereignty and need not beclothed with any constitutional gear to exist; instead, provisions inour Constitution on the subject are meant more to regulate, rathethan to grant, the exercise of the power.

The only direct constitutional qualification is thus that “privateproperty shall not be taken for public use without juscompensation.” This prescription is intended to provide asafeguard against possible abuse. In this case, the judgment onthe propriety of the taking of the compensation received have longbecome final. Neither has respondent, in the present caseadduced any evidence at all concerning a right of repurchase inhis favor.

The trial court was thus correct in denying respondent’s claim.However, the petitioner’s claim of harassment or that therespondent acted in bad faith is unfounded, the imposition o

litigation expenses and costs has no basis. WHEREFORE, thepetition is GRANTED.

GENUINE NECESSITY

G.R. No. 161656. June 29, 2005REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. VICENTE G. LIM

FACTS:

The Republic of the Philippines (Republic) instituted a special civiaction for expropriation with the Court of First Instance (CFI) oCebu, docketed as Civil Case No. 781, involving Lots 932 and939 of the Banilad Friar Land Estate, Lahug, Cebu City, for thepurpose of establishing a military reservation for the Philippine

Army. Lot 932 was registered in the name of Gervasia Denzonunder Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 14921 with an area o25,137 square meters, while Lot 939 was in the name of EulaliaDenzon and covered by TCT No. 12560 consisting of 13,164square meters.

After depositing P9,500.00 with the Philippine National Bankpursuant to the Order of the CFI dated October 19, 1938, theRepublic took possession of the lots. Thereafter, or on May 141940, the CFI rendered its Decision ordering the Republic to paythe Denzons the sum of P4,062.10 as just compensation.

The Denzons interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals but itwas dismissed

For failure of the Republic to pay for the lots, the Denzons





successors-in-interest, Francisca Galeos-Valdehueza andJosefina Galeos-Panerio, filed with the same CFI an action for recovery of possession with damages against the Republic andofficers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines in possession of the property. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. R-7208.

In the interim, TCT Nos. 23934 and 23935 covering Lots 932 and939 were issued in the names of Francisca Valdehueza andJosefina Panerio, respectively. Annotated thereon was thephrase “subject to the priority of the National Airports Corporationto acquire said parcels of land, Lots 932 and 939 upon previous

payment of a reasonable market value.” The CFI promulgated its Decision in favor of Valdehueza and

Panerio, holding that they are the owners and have retained their right as such over Lots 932 and 939 because of the Republic’sfailure to pay the amount of P4,062.10, adjudged in theexpropriation proceedings. However, in view of the annotation ontheir land titles, they were ordered to execute a deed of sale infavor of the Republic. In view of “the differences in money valuefrom 1940 up to the present,” the court adjusted the market valueat P16,248.40, to be paid with 6% interest per annum from April 5,1948, date of entry in the expropriation proceedings, until fullpayment.

After their motion for reconsideration was denied, Valdehueza andPanerio appealed from the CFI Decision, in view of the amount incontroversy, directly to this Court. The case was docketed as No.L-21032. On May 19, 1966, this Court rendered its Decisionaffirming the CFI Decision. It held that Valdehueza and Panerioare still the registered owners of Lots 932 and 939, there havingbeen no payment of just compensation by the Republic.

Apparently, this Court found nothing in the records to show thatthe Republic paid the owners or their successors-in-interestaccording to the CFI decision. While it deposited the amount of P9,500,00, and said deposit was allegedly disbursed, however,the payees could not be ascertained.

Meanwhile, Valdehueza and Panerio mortgaged Lot 932 toVicente Lim, herein respondent, as security for their loans. For their failure to pay Lim despite demand, he had the mortgageforeclosed in 1976. Thus, TCT No. 23934 was cancelled, and inlieu thereof, TCT No. 63894 was issued in his name.

Respondent Lim filed a complaint for quieting of title with theRegional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 10, Cebu City, againstGeneral Romeo Zulueta, as Commander of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, Commodore Edgardo Galeos, as Commander of

Naval District V of the Philippine Navy, Antonio Cabaluna,Doroteo Mantos and Florencio Belotindos, herein petitioners.Subsequently, he amended the complaint to implead theRepublic.

RTC rendered a decision in favor of respondent, thus declaringplaintiff Vicente Lim the absolute and exclusive owner of Lot No.932 with all the rights of an absolute owner including the right topossession. The monetary claims in the complaint and in thecounter claims contained in the answer of defendants are orderedDismissed.

Petitioners elevated the case to the Court of Appeals, docketedtherein as CA-G.R. CV No. 72915. In its Decision datedSeptember 18, 2003, the Appellate Court sustained the RTCDecision, thus:

An action to quiet title is a common law remedy for the removal of any cloud or doubt or uncertainty on the title to real property. It is

essential for the plaintiff or complainant to have a legal or equitable title or interest in the real property, which is the subjectmatter of the action. Also the deed, claim, encumbrance or proceeding that is being alleged as cloud on plaintiff’s title mustbe shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facieappearance of validity or legal efficacy (Robles vs. Court of

Appeals, 328 SCRA 97). In view of the foregoing discussion,clearly, the claim of defendant-appellant Republic constitutes acloud, doubt or uncertainty on the title of plaintiff-appellee VicenteLim that can be removed by an action to quiet title.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, and finding no reversibleerror in the appealed May 4, 2001 Decision of Branch 9, RegionalTrial Court of Cebu City, in Civil Case No. CEB-12701, the said

decision is UPHELD AND AFFIRMED. Accordingly, the appeal isDISMISSED for lack of merit.”

ISSUE: The basic issue is whether the Republic has retainedownership of Lot 932 despite its failure to pay respondent’spredecessors-in-interest the just compensation

HELD:

From the taking of private property by the government under thepower of eminent domain, there arises an implied promise tocompensate the owner for his loss

Significantly, the above-mentioned provision of Section 9, ArticleIII of the Constitution is not a grant but a limitation of power. Thislimiting function is in keeping with the philosophy of the Bill ofRights against the arbitrary exercise of governmental powers tothe detriment of the individual’s rights. Given this function, theprovision should therefore be strictly interpreted against theexpropriator, the government, and liberally in favor of the propertyowner.

“Title to property which is the subject of condemnationproceedings does not vest the condemnor until the judgmenfixing just compensation is entered and paid, but the condemnor’stitle relates back to the date on which the petition under theEminent Domain Act, or the commissioner’s report under theLocal Improvement Act, is filed.

Clearly, without full payment of just compensation, there can beno transfer of title from the landowner to the expropriatorOtherwise stated, the Republic’s acquisition of ownership isconditioned upon the full payment of just compensation within areasonable time

WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals inCA-G.R. CV No. 72915 is AFFIRMED

G.R. No. 72126, January 29, 1988MUNICIPALITY OF MEYCAUAYAN vs. INTERMEDIATEAPPELLATE COURT

FACTS:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the resolution dated April 24,1985 by the former Intermediate Appellate Court, nowCourt of Appeals, setting aside its earlier decision dated January10, 1985 and dismissing the special civil action for expropriationfiled by the petitioner.

Respondent Philippine Pipes and Merchandising Corporation filedwith the Office of the Municipal Mayor of Meycauayan, Bulacanan application for a permit to fence a parcel of land with a width o26.8 meters and a length of 184.37 meters covered by TransferCertificates of Title Nos. 215165 and 37879. The fencing of saidproperty was allegedly to enable the storage of the respondent'sheavy equipment and various finished products such as largediameter steel pipes, pontoon pipes for ports, wharves, andharbors, bridge components, pre-stressed girders and piles, largediameter concrete pipes, and parts for low cost housing.

The Municipal Council of Meycauayan, headed by then MayorCelso R. Legaspi, passed Resolution No. 258, Series of 1975manifesting the intention to expropriate the respondent's parcel oland covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 37879.

An opposition to the resolution was filed by the respondent with

the Office of the Provincial Governor, which, in turn, created aspecial committee of four members to investigate the matter.

The Special Committee recommended that the Provincial Boardof Bulacan disapprove or annul the resolution in question becausethere was no genuine necessity for the Municipality oMeycauayan to expropriate the respondent's property for use as apublic road.

On the basis of this report, the Provincial Board of Bulacanpassed Resolution No. 238, Series of 1976, disapproving andannulling Resolution No. 258, Series of 1975, of the MunicipaCouncil of Meycauayan. The respondent, then, reiterated to theOffice of the Mayor its petition for the approval of the permit tofence the aforesaid parcels of land.





However, the Municipal Council of Meycauayan, now headed byMayor Adriano D. Daez, passed Resolution No. 21, Series of 1983, for the purpose of expropriating anew the respondent'sland. The Provincial Board of Bulacan approved the aforesaidresolution on January 25, 1984.

Thereafter, the petitioner, on February 14, 1984, filed with theRegional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch VI, a special civilaction for expropriation.

Upon deposit of the amount of P24,025.00, which is the marketvalue of the land, with the Philippine National Bank, the trial court

on March 1, 1984 issued a writ of possession in favor of thepetitioner. The trial court issued an order declaring the taking of the property

as lawful and appointing the Provincial Assessor of Bulacan ascourt commissioner who shall hold the hearing to ascertain the

just compensation for the property. The respondent went to the Intermediate Appellate Court on

petition for review. The appellate court affirmed the trial court'sdecision. However, upon motion for reconsideration by therespondent, the decision was re-examined and reversed. Theappellate court held that there is no genuine necessity toexpropriate the land for use as a public road as there wereseveral other roads for the same purpose and another moreappropriate lot for the proposed public road. The court, taking intoconsideration the location and size of the land, also opined thatthe land is more Ideal for use as storage area for respondent'sheavy equipment and finished products.

ISSUE: Whether the Municipality of Meycauayan was right to exerciseits power of eminent domain to expropriate the respondent's propertyfor use as a public road?

HELD:

This Court held that the foundation of the right to exercise thepower of eminent domain is genuine necessity and that necessitymust be of a public character. Condemnation of private property is

justified only if it is for the public good and there is a genuinenecessity of a public character. Consequently, the courts have thepower to inquire into the legality of the exercise of the right of eminent domain and to determine whether there is a genuinenecessity thereof. There is absolutely no showing in the petitionwhy the more appropriate lot for the proposed road which wasoffered for sale has not been the subject of the petitioner's

attempt to expropriate assuming there is a real need for another connecting road.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. The questioned resolution of the respondent court is

AFFIRMED.

G.R. No. L-51078, October 30, 1980CRISTINA DE KNECHT, vs. HON. PEDRO JL. BAUTISTA

FACTS:

A petition for certiorari and prohibition was filed by Cristina deKnecht against the Honorable Pedro JL. Bautista, as Judgepresiding over Branch III of the Court of First Instance of Rizal(Pasay City), and the Republic of the Philippines pines seekingthat judgment be rendered annulling the order for immediate

possession issued by respondent court in the expropriationproceedings and commanding respondents to desist from further proceedings in the expropriation action or the order for immediatepossession issued in said action, with costs.

And that a restraint order or writ of preliminary injunction beissued ex-parte enjoining respondents, their representativerepresentative and agents from enforcing the here questionedorder for mediate posession petitioner offering to post a bondexecuted to the parties enjoined in an amount to be fixed by theCourt to the effect that she will pay to such parties all damageswhich they may sustain by reason of the injunction if the Courtshould finally decide she is not entitled there.

Ten years ago, the government through the Department of Public

Workmen's and Communication prepared a to Epifanio de losSantos Avenue (EDSA) to Roxas Boulevard; that the proposedextension, an adjunct of building program, the project would passthrough Cuneta Avenue up to Roxas Boulevard that this routewould be a straight one taking into account the direction of EDSAThen Secretary Baltazar Aquino of the Department of PublicHighways directed the City Engineer of Pasay City not to issuetemporary or permanent permits for the construction and/oimprovement of buildings and other structures located within theproposed extension through Cuneta Avenue.

Department of Public Highways decided to make the proposedextension go through Fernando Rein and Del Pan Streets whichare lined with old substantial houses; that upon learning of thechanged the owners of the residential houses that would beaffected, the herein petitioner being one of them.

Petitioner filed a formal petition to President Ferdinand E. Marcosasking him to order the Ministry of Public Highways to adoptionthe original plan of making the extension of EDSA through

Araneta Avenue instead of the new plan going through FernandoRein and Del Pan Streets; that President Marcos directed thenMinister Baltazar Aquino to explain within twenty-four (24) hourswhy the proposed project should not be suspended.

Minister Aquino submitted his explanation defending the newproposed route; that the President then referred the matter to theHuman Settlements Commission for investigation andrecommendation; that after formal hearings to which all theparties proponents and oppositors were given full opportunity toventilate their views and to present their evidence, theSettlements Commission submitted a report recommending thereversion of the extension of EDSA to the original plan passingthrough Cuneta Avenue; and that notwithstanding the said reporand recommendation, the Ministry of Public Highways insisted onimplementing the plan to make the extension of EDSA go throughFernando Rein and Del Pan Streets.

The Republic of the Philippines filed a motion for the issuance oa writ of possession of the property sought to be expropriated onthe ground that said Republic had made the required deposit withthe Philippine National Bank.

The respondent judge issued a writ of possession authorizing theRepublic of the Philippines to take and enter upon the possessionof the properties sought be condemned.

ISSUES:1. Whether the plan to make the extension of EDSA to Roxas

Boulevard through Fernando Rein and Del Pan Street be made?2. Whether the respondent judge committed a grave abuse o

discretion in allowing the Republic of the Philippines to takeimmediate possession of the properties sought to beexpropriated?

HELD:

From all the foregoing, the facts of record and recommendationsof the Human Settlements Commission, it is clear that the choiceof Fernando Rein — Del Pan Streets as the line through whichthe Epifanio de los Santos Avenue should be extended to RoxasBoulevard is arbitrary and should not receive judicial approvalThe respondent judge committed a grave abuse of discretion inallowing the Republic of the Philippines to take immediatepossession of the properties sought to be expropriated.

The petition for certiorari and prohibition is hereby granted. Theorder authorizing the Republic of the Philippines to take or enterupon the possession of the properties sought to be condemned isset aside and the respondent Judge is permanently enjoined fromtaking any further action except to dismiss said case.

GR No. 87351, February 12, 1990RP vs. DE KNECHT*no case digest submitted*

G.R. No. 136349, January 23, 2006





LOURDES DE LA PAZ MASIKIP vs. HON. MARIETTA A. LEGASPI

FACTS:

Petitioner Lourdes Dela Paz Masikip is the registered owner of aparcel of land with an area of 4,521 square meters located atPag-Asa, Caniogan, Pasig City , Metro Manila. In a letter datedJanuary 6, 1994, the then Municipality of Pasig, now City of Pasig, respondent, notified petitioner of its intention to expropriatea 1,500 square meter portion of her property to be used for the"sports development and recreational activities" of the residents of

Barangay Caniogan. This was pursuant to Ordinance No. 42,Series of 1993 enacted by the then Sangguniang Bayan of Pasig . Again, on March 23, 1994, respondent wrote another letter to petitioner, but this time the purpose was allegedly "in line withthe program of the Municipal Government to provide landopportunities to deserving poor sectors of our community." OnMay 2, 1994, petitioner sent a reply to respondent stating that theintended expropriation of her property is unconstitutional, invalid,and oppressive, as the area of her lot is neither sufficient nor suitable to "provide land opportunities to deserving poor sectorsof our community." In its letter of December 20, 1994, respondentreiterated that the purpose of the expropriation of petitioner’sproperty is "to provide sports and recreational facilities to its poor residents."

Subsequently, on February 21, 1995, respondent filed with thetrial court a complaint for expropriation, docketed as SCA No.873. Respondent prayed that the trial court, after due notice and

hearing, issue an order for the condemnation of the property; thatcommissioners be appointed for the purpose of determining the

just compensation; and that judgment be rendered based on thereport of the commissioners.

On May 7, 1996, the trial court issued an Order denying theMotion to Dismiss, on the ground that there is a genuine necessityto expropriate the property for the sports and recreationalactivities of the residents of Pasig . As to the issue of justcompensation, the trial court held that the same is to bedetermined in accordance with the Revised Rules of Court.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied bythe trial court in its Order of July 31, 1996. Forthwith, it appointedthe City Assessor and City Treasurer of Pasig City ascommissioners to ascertain the just compensation. This promptedpetitioner to file with the Court of Appeals a special civil action for certiorari, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 41860. On October 31,

1997, the Appellate Court dismissed the petition for lack of merit.Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration was denied in aResolution dated November 20, 1998.

ISSUES: THE QUESTIONED DECISION DATED 31 OCTOBER 1997(ATTACHMENT "A") AND RESOLUTION DATED 20 NOVEMBER1998 (ATTACHMENT "B") ARE CONTRARY TO LAW, THE RULES OFCOURT AND JURISPRUDENCE CONSIDERING THAT:I

A. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE TO PROVE THAT THERE IS GENUINENECESSITY FOR THE TAKING OF THE PETITIONER’S PROPERTY.B. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE TO PROVE THAT THE PUBLIC USEREQUIREMENT FOR THE EXERCISE OF THE POWER OFEMINENT DOMAIN HAS BEEN COMPLIED WITH.C. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE TO PROVE THAT RESPONDENT CITYOF PASIG HAS COMPLIED WITH ALL CONDITIONS PRECEDENTFOR THE EXERCISE OF THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN.

THE COURT A QUO’S ORDER DATED 07 MAY 1996 AND 31 JULY1996, WHICH WERE AFFIRMED BY THE COURT OF APPEALS,EFFECTIVELY AMOUNT TO THE TAKING OF PETITIONER’SPROPERTY WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF LAW:IITHE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN APPLYING OFRULE ON ACTIONABLE DOCUMENTS TO THE DOCUMENTS

ATTACHED TO RESPONDENT CITY OF PASIG ’S COMPLAINTDATED 07 APRIL 1995 TO JUSTIFY THE COURT A QUO’S DENIALOF PETITIONER’S RESPONSIVE PLEADING TO THE COMPLAINTFOR EXPROPRIATION (THE MOTION TO DISMISS DATED 21

APRIL 1995).III

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN APPLYING THERULE ON HYPOTHETICAL ADMISSION OF FACTS ALLEGED IN ACOMPLAINT CONSIDERING THAT THE MOTION TO DISMISSFILED BY PETITIONER IN THE EXPROPRIATION CASE BELOWWAS THE RESPONSIVE PLEADING REQUIRED TO BE FILEDUNDER THE THEN RULE 67 OF THE RULES OF COURT AND NOT

AN ORIDNARY MOTION TO DISMISS UNDER RULE 16 OF THERULES OF COURT.

HELD:

On the two main issues – one substantive and one procedural Petitioner filed her Motion to Dismiss the complaint fo

expropriation on April 25, 1995. It was denied by the trial court onMay 7, 1996. At that time, the rule on expropriation was governedby Section 3, Rule 67 of the Revised Rules of Court whichprovides:

"SEC. 3. Defenses and objections. – Within the time specified inthe summons, each defendant, in lieu of an answer, shall presenin a single motion to dismiss or for other appropriate relief, all hisobjections and defenses to the right of the plaintiff to take hisproperty for the use or purpose specified in the complaint. All suchobjections and defenses not so presented are waived. A copy ofthe motion shall be served on the plaintiff’s attorney of record andfiled with the court with proof of service."

The motion to dismiss contemplated in the above Rule clearlyconstitutes the responsive pleading which takes the place of ananswer to the complaint for expropriation. Such motion is thepleading that puts in issue the right of the plaintiff to expropriatethe defendant’s property for the use specified in the complaint. Althat the law requires is that a copy of the said motion be servedon plaintiff’s attorney of record. It is the court that at itsconvenience will set the case for trial after the filing of the saidpleading.

The Court of Appeals therefore erred in holding that the motion todismiss filed by petitioner hypothetically admitted the truth of thefacts alleged in the complaint, "specifically that there is a genuinenecessity to expropriate petitioner’s property for public use." Whathe trial court should have done was to set the case for thereception of evidence to determine whether there is indeed agenuine necessity for the taking of the property, instead osummarily making a finding that the taking is for public use andappointing commissioners to fix just compensation.

Significantly, the above Rule allowing a defendant in an

expropriation case to file a motion to dismiss in lieu of an answewas amended by the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which tookeffect on July 1, 1997. Section 3, Rule 67 now expresslymandates that any objection or defense to the taking of theproperty of a defendant must be set forth in an answer.

The fact that the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 41860 on October 31, after the 1997 Rules of CiviProcedure took effect, is of no moment. It is only fair that the Ruleat the time petitioner filed her motion to dismiss should governThe new provision cannot be applied retroactively to heprejudice.

We now proceed to address the substantive issue. The power of eminent domain is lodged in the legislative branch

of the government. It delegates the exercise thereof to locagovernment units, other public entities and public utilitycorporations, subject only to Constitutional limitations. Locagovernments have no inherent power of eminent domain and mayexercise it only when expressly authorized by statute. Section 19of the Local Government Code of 1991 (Republic Act No. 7160prescribes the delegation by Congress of the power of eminentdomain to local government units and lays down the parametersfor its exercise, thus: Judicial review of the exercise of eminendomain is limited to the following areas of concern: (a) theadequacy of the compensation, (b) the necessity of the takingand (c) the public use character of the purpose of the taking.

In this case, petitioner contends that respondent City of Pasigfailed to establish a genuine necessity which justifies thecondemnation of her property. While she does not dispute theintended public purpose, nonetheless, she insists that there musbe a genuine necessity for the proposed use and purposes





Evidently, there is no "genuine necessity" to justify theexpropriation.

The right to take private property for public purposes necessarilyoriginates from "the necessity" and the taking must be limited tosuch necessity. In City of Manila v. Chinese Community of Manila,we held that the very foundation of the right to exercise eminentdomain is a genuine necessity and that necessity must be of apublic character. Moreover, the ascertainment of the necessitymust precede or accompany and not follow, the taking of the land.

Applying this standard, we hold that respondent City of Pasig has

failed to establish that there is a genuine necessity to expropriatepetitioner’s property. Our scrutiny of the records shows that theCertification issued by the Caniogan Barangay Council datedNovember 20, 1994, the basis for the passage of Ordinance No.42 s. 1993 authorizing the expropriation, indicates that theintended beneficiary is the Melendres Compound Homeowners

Association, a private, non-profit organization, not the residents of Caniogan. It can be gleaned that the members of the said

Association are desirous of having their own private playgroundand recreational facility. Petitioner’s lot is the nearest vacantspace available. The purpose is, therefore, not clearly andcategorically public.

Unless the requisite of genuine necessity for the expropriation of one’s property is clearly established, it shall be the duty of thecourts to protect the rights of individuals to their private property.Important as the power of eminent domain may be, the inviolablesanctity which the Constitution attaches to the property of theindividual requires not only that the purpose for the taking of private property be specified. The genuine necessity for thetaking, which must be of a public character, must also be shownto exist.

The petition for review is GRANTED. The challenged Decisionand Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 41860are REVERSED. The complaint for expropriation filed before thetrial court by respondent City of Pasig , docketed as SCA No. 873,is ordered DISMISSED.

JUST COMPENSATION: DEFINED

G.R. No. 146062, June 28, 2001SANTIAGO ESLABAN, JR. vs. CLARITA VDA. DE ONORIO

FACTS:

This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appealswhich affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch26, Surallah, South Cotabato, ordering the National Irrigation

Administration (NIA for brevity) to pay respondent the amount of P107,517.60 as just compensation for the taking of the latter’sproperty.

Respondent Clarita Vda. de Enorio is the owner of a lot inBarangay M. Roxas, Sto. Niño, South Cotabato with an area of 39,512 square meters. On October 6, 1981, Santiago Eslaban,Jr., Project Manager of the NIA, approved the construction of themain irrigation canal of the NIA on the said lot, affecting a 24,660square meter portion thereof. Respondent’s husband agreed tothe construction of the NIA canal provided that they be paid by thegovernment for the area taken after the processing of documentsby the Commission on Audit.

Sometime in 1983, a Right-of-Way agreement was executedbetween respondent and the NIA (Exh. 1). The NIA then paidrespondent the amount of P4,180.00 as Right-of-Way damages.Respondent subsequently executed an Affidavit of Waiver of Rights and Fees whereby she waived any compensation for damages to crops and improvements which she suffered as aresult of the construction of a right-of-way on her property (Exh.2). The same year, petitioner offered respondent the sum of P35,000.00 by way of amicable settlement pursuant to ExecutiveOrder No. 1035, §18, which provides in part that ―

Financial assistance may also be given to owners of landsacquired under C.A. 141, as amended, for the area or portionsubject to the reservation under Section 12 thereof in such

amounts as may be determined by the implementingagency/instrumentality concerned in consultation with theCommission on Audit and the assessor’s office concerned.

Respondent demanded payment for the taking of her property, bupetitioner refused to pay. Accordingly, respondent filed onDecember 10, 1990 a complaint against petitioner before theRegional Trial Court, praying that petitioner be ordered to pay thesum of P111,299.55 as compensation for the portion of heproperty used in the construction of the canal constructed by theNIA, litigation expenses, and the costs.

Petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor-General, filed an Answer, in which he admitted that NIA constructed an irrigationcanal over the property of the plaintiff and that NIA paid a certainlandowner whose property had been taken for irrigation purposesbut petitioner interposed the defense that: (1) the government hadnot consented to be sued; (2) the total area used by the NIA for itsirrigation canal was only 2.27 hectares, not 24,600 square metersand (3) respondent was not entitled to compensation for thetaking of her property considering that she secured title over theproperty by virtue of a homestead patent under C.A. No. 141.

At the pre-trial conference, the following facts were stipulatedupon: (1) that the area taken was 24,660 square meters; (2) that iwas a portion of the land covered by TCT No. T-22121 in thename of respondent and her late husband (Exh. A); and (3) thatthis area had been taken by the NIA for the construction of anirrigation canal.

On October 18, 1993, the trial court rendered a decision, thedispositive portion of which reads:

TRIAL COURT RULING: In view of the foregoing, decision ishereby rendered in favor of plaintiff and against the defendanordering the defendant, National Irrigation Administration, to payto plaintiff the sum of One Hundred Seven Thousand FiveHundred Seventeen Pesos and Sixty Centavos (P107,517.60) as

just compensation for the questioned area of 24,660 squaremeters of land owned by plaintiff and taken by said defendant NIAwhich used it for its main canal plus costs.

On November 15, 1993, petitioner appealed to the Court o Appeals which, on October 31, 2000, affirmed the decision of theRegional Trial Court. Hence this petition.

ISSUES:1. WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITION IS DISMISSIBLE FORFAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 5

RULE 7 OF THE REVISED RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.2. WHETHER OR NOT LAND GRANTED BY VIRTUE OF AHOMESTEAD PATENT AND SUBSEQUENTLY REGISTEREDUNDER PRESIDENTIAL DECREE 1529 CEASES TO BE PART OFTHE PUBLIC DOMAIN.3. WHETHER OR NOT THE VALUE OF JUST COMPENSATIONSHALL BE DETERMINED FROM THE TIME OF THE TAKING ORFROM THE TIME OF THE FINALITY OF THE DECISION.4. WHETHER THE AFFIDAVIT OF WAIVER OF RIGHTS AND FEESEXECUTED BY RESPONDENT EXEMPTS PETITIONER FROMMAKING PAYMENT TO THE FORMER.

HELD:

First. Rule 7, 5 of the 1997 Revised Rules on Civil Procedureprovides ― Certification against forum shopping. ― The plaintiffor principal party shall certify under oath in the complaint or otheinitiatory pleading asserting a claim for relief, or in a sworncertification annexed thereto and simultaneously filed therewith(a) that he has not theretofore commenced any action or filed anyclaim involving the same issues in any court, tribunal or quasi-

judicial agency and, to the best of his knowledge, no such otheaction or claim is pending therein; (b) if there is such otherpending action or claim, a complete statement of the presentstatus thereof; and (c) if he should thereafter learn that the sameor similar action or claim has been filed or is pending, he shalreport the fact within five (5) days therefrom to the court whereinhis aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading has been filed.

Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not becurable by mere amendment of the complaint or other initiatorypleading but shall be cause for the dismissal of the case withou





prejudice, unless otherwise provided, upon motion and after hearing . . . .

By reason of Rule 45, 4 of the 1997 Revised Rules on CivilProcedure, in relation to Rule 42, 2 thereof, the requirement of acertificate of non-forum shopping applies to the filing of petitionsfor review on certiorari of the decisions of the Court of Appeals,such as the one filed by petitioner.

As provided in Rule 45, 5, "The failure of the petitioner to complywith any of the foregoing requirements regarding . . . the contentsof the document which should accompany the petition shall be

sufficient ground for the dismissal thereof." The requirement in Rule 7, 5 that the certification should be

executed by the plaintiff or the principal means that counselcannot sign the certificate against forum-shopping. The reason for this is that the plaintiff or principal knows better than anyone elsewhether a petition has previously been filed involving the samecase or substantially the same issues. Hence, a certificationsigned by counsel alone is defective and constitutes a valid causefor dismissal of the petition.

In this case, the petition for review was filed by Santiago Eslaban,Jr., in his capacity as Project Manager of the NIA. However, theverification and certification against forum-shopping were signedby Cesar E. Gonzales, the administrator of the agency. The realparty-in-interest is the NIA, which is a body corporate. Withoutbeing duly authorized by resolution of the board of thecorporation, neither Santiago Eslaban, Jr. nor Cesar E. Gonzalescould sign the certificate against forum-shopping accompanyingthe petition for review. Hence, on this ground alone, the petitionshould be dismissed.

Second. Coming to the merits of the case, the land under litigation, as already stated, is covered by a transfer certificate of title registered in the Registry Office of Koronadal, SouthCotabato on May 13, 1976. This land was originally covered byOriginal Certificate of Title No. (P-25592) P-9800 which wasissued pursuant to a homestead patent granted on February 18,1960. We have held:

Whenever public lands are alienated, granted or conveyed toapplicants thereof, and the deed grant or instrument of conveyance [sales patent] registered with the Register of Deedsand the corresponding certificate and owner’s duplicate of titleissued, such lands are deemed registered lands under theTorrens System and the certificate of title thus issued is asconclusive and indefeasible as any other certificate of title issued

to private lands in ordinary or cadastral registration proceedings. The Solicitor-General contends, however, that an encumbrance is

imposed on the land in question in view of 39 of the LandRegistration Act (now P.D. No. 1529, 44) which provides:

Every person receiving a certificate of title in pursuance of adecree of registration, and every subsequent purchaser of registered land who takes a certificate of title for value in goodfaith shall hold the same free from all encumbrances except thosenoted on said certificate, and any of the following encumbranceswhich may be subsisting, namely:

Third. Any public highway, way, private way established by law, or any government irrigation canal or lateral thereof, where thecertificate of title does not state that the boundaries of suchhighway, way, irrigation canal or lateral thereof, have beendetermined.

As this provision says, however, the only servitude which a private

property owner is required to recognize in favor of the governmentis the easement of a "public highway, way, private wayestablished by law, or any government canal or lateral thereof where the certificate of title does not state that the boundariesthereof have been pre-determined." This implies that the sameshould have been pre-existing at the time of the registration of theland in order that the registered owner may be compelled torespect it. Conversely, where the easement is not pre-existing andis sought to be imposed only after the land has been registeredunder the Land Registration Act, proper expropriation proceedingsshould be had, and just compensation paid to the registeredowner thereof.6

In this case, the irrigation canal constructed by the NIA on the

contested property was built only on October 6, 1981, severayears after the property had been registered on May 13, 1976

Accordingly, prior expropriation proceedings should have beenfiled and just compensation paid to the owner thereof before icould be taken for public use.

Indeed, the rule is that where private property is needed forconversion to some public use, the first thing obviously that thegovernment should do is to offer to buy it. If the owner is willing tosell and the parties can agree on the price and the otheconditions of the sale, a voluntary transaction can then be

concluded and the transfer effected without the necessity of a judicial action. Otherwise, the government will use its power oeminent domain, subject to the payment of just compensation, toacquire private property in order to devote it to public use.

Third. With respect to the compensation which the owner of thecondemned property is entitled to receive, it is likewise settledthat it is the market value which should be paid or "that sum omoney which a person, desirous but not compelled to buy, and anowner, willing but not compelled to sell, would agree on as a priceto be given and received therefore." Further, just compensationmeans not only the correct amount to be paid to the owner of theland but also the payment of the land within a reasonable timefrom its taking. Without prompt payment, compensation cannot beconsidered "just" for then the property owner is made to suffer theconsequence of being immediately deprived of his land whilebeing made to wait for a decade or more before actually receivingthe amount necessary to cope with his loss. Nevertheless, as

noted in Ansaldo v. Tantuico, Jr., there are instances where theexpropriating agency takes over the property prior to theexpropriation suit, in which case just compensation shall bedetermined as of the time of taking, not as of the time of filing ofthe action of eminent domain.

Before its amendment in 1997, Rule 67, 4 provided: Order of condemnation. When such a motion is overruled or when

any party fails to defend as required by this rule, the court mayenter an order of condemnation declaring that the plaintiff has alawful right to take the property sought to be condemned, for thepublic use or purpose described in the complaint upon thepayment of just compensation to be determined as of the date othe filing of the complaint. . . .

It is now provided that ― SEC. 4. Order of expropriation. ― If the objections to and the

defense against the right of the plaintiff to expropriate the property

are overruled, or when no party appears to defend as required bythis Rule, the court may issue an order of expropriation declaringthat the plaintiff has a lawful right to take the property sought to beexpropriated, for the public use or purpose described in thecomplaint, upon the payment of just compensation to bedetermined as of the date of the taking of the property or the filingof the complaint, whichever came first.

A final order sustaining the right to expropriate the property maybe appealed by any party aggrieved thereby. Such appeahowever, shall not prevent the court from determining the juscompensation to be paid.

After the rendition of such an order, the plaintiff shall not bepermitted to dismiss or discontinue the proceeding except onsuch terms as the court deems just and equitable. (Emphasisadded)

Thus, the value of the property must be determined either as of

the date of the taking of the property or the filing of the complaint"whichever came first." Even before the new rule, however, it wasalready held in Commissioner of Public Highways v. Burgos thathe price of the land at the time of taking, not its value after thepassage of time, represents the true value to be paid as justcompensation. It was, therefore, error for the Court of Appeals torule that the just compensation to be paid to respondent shouldbe determined as of the filing of the complaint in 1990, and notthe time of its taking by the NIA in 1981, because petitioner wasallegedly remiss in its obligation to pay respondent, and it wasrespondent who filed the complaint. In the case of Burgos , it wasalso the property owner who brought the action for compensationagainst the government after 25 years since the taking of his





December 19, 2005RP VS GINGOYON

FACTS:The construction of the NAIA 3 had spawned controversies that had itsroots with the promulgation of the Court’s decision in Agan vs PIATCO(2003 decision), which nullified the contract between the Governmentand the contractor (PIATCO) for being contrary to law and public policy.

At the time of the promulgation of the 2003 decision, the NAIA 3

facilities had already been built by PIATCO and were nearingcompletion. and several respondents filed their respective motions for the reconsideration of the 2003 Decision but were denied by the Courtin its Resolution dated 21 January 2004. However, the Court this timesquarely addressed the issue of the rights of PIATCO to refund,compensation or reimbursement for its expenses in the construction of the NAIA 3 facilities. After the promulgation of the rulings in Agan, theNAIA 3 facilities have remained in the possession of PIATCO. OnDecember 21, 2004, the Government filed a Complaint for expropriation with the Pasay City Regional Trial Court (RTC).TheGovernment sought for the issuance of a writ of possession authorizingit to take immediate possession and control over the NAIA 3 facilities.The Government also declared that it had deposited 3 Billion in cashwith the Land Bank of the Philippines, representing the assessed valuefor taxation purposes. This was the case now presided by HonorableGingoyon. On the same day that the complaint was filed, the RTCissued an Order directing the issuance of a writ of possession to the

Government, authorizing it to "take or enter upon the possession" of the NAIA 3 facilities. This decision was based on Section 2, Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which prescribes that the initialdeposit be equivalent to the assessed value of the property for purposes of taxation, however this was amended by Republic Act No.8974. RA 8974 provides that as the relevant standard for initialcompensation, the market value of the property as stated in the taxdeclaration or the current relevant zonal valuation of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR), whichever is higher, and the value of theimprovements and/or structures using the replacement cost method.On the basis of RA 8974, the RTC directed first, that the Land Bank of the Philippines, Baclaran Branch, immediately release the amount of US$62,343,175.77 to PIATCO. Second, the Government was directedto submit to the RTC a Certificate of Availability of Funds signed byauthorized officials to cover the payment of just compensation. Third,the Government was directed "to maintain, preserve and safeguard"the NAIA 3 facilities or "perform such as acts or activities in preparationfor their direct operation" of the airport terminal, pending expropriationproceedings and full payment of just compensation. The Governmentwas also not allowed to perform acts of ownership like leasing any partof NAIA 3 to other parties. The Government then filed an UrgentMotion for Reconsideration on the assailed January 4, 2005 order. On7 January 2005, the RTC issued another Order, the second nowassailed before this Court, which appointed 3 Commissioners toascertain the amount of just compensation for the NAIA 3 Complex.

And on the same day the Government issued a Motion for Inhibition of Hon. Gingoyon. These motions were heard by the RTC but weredenied in an Omnibus Order dated January 10, 2005. Thus the presentpetition for Certiorari for the nullification of the RTC orders datedJanuary 4, 7 and 10, 2005 and for the inhibition of Hon. Gingoyon fromtaking further action on the expropriation case.

ISSUE:

Whether Rule 67 of the Rules of Court or Rep. Act No. 8974 governsthe expropriation proceedings in this case

HELD:

Rep. Act No. 8974 applies in this case, particularly insofar as itrequires the immediate payment by the Government of at leastthe proffered value of the NAIA 3 facilities to PIATCO andprovides certain valuation standards or methods for thedetermination of just compensation.

Since funds have been spent by PIATCO in their construction, for the to take over the said facility, it has to compensate respondentPIATCO as builder of the said structures. The compensation mustbe just and in accordance with law and equity for the government

cannot unjustly enrich itself at the expense of PIATCO and itsinvestors.

Sec 2 Rule 67, states that plaintiff shall have the right to take orenter upon the possession of the real property involved if hedeposits with the authorized government depositary an amounequivalent to the assessed value of the property for purposes oftaxation to be held by such bank subject to the orders of thecourt.

In contrast, Section 4 of Rep. Act No. 8974 relevantly states:Upon the filing of the complaint, and after due notice to the

defendant, the implementing agency shall immediately pay theowner of the property the amount equivalent to the sum of onehundred percent of the value of the property based on the currenrelevant zonal valuation of the Bureau of Internal Revenue; andthe value of the improvements and/or structures as determinedunder Section 7.

If Sec2 Rule 67 applies then PIATCO would be enjoined fromreceiving a single centavo as just compensation before theGovernment takes over the NAIA 3 facility by virtue of a writ opossession.

Hence the Court ruled that just compensation should be madebefore the Government may take over the NAIA 3.

GR No. 148512, June 26, 2006CMSR. OF INTERNAL REVENUE VS CENTRAL LUZON DRUGCORPORATION

FACTS:

From January 1995 to December 1995, Central Luzon DrugCorporation has been granting 20% discount on the sale omedicines to qualified senior citizens amounting to P219,778.00Pursuant to Revenue Regulations No. 2-94 implementing R.ANo. 7432, which states that the discount given to senior citizensshall be deducted by the establishment from its gross sales fovalue-added tax and other percentage tax purposes, respondendeducted the total amount of P219, 778.00 from its gross incomefor the taxable year 1995. Subsequently on December 27, 1996the Central Luzon Drug Corporation claimed for a tax crediamounting to P150, 193.00 (P219, 778.00 20% sales discoungiven to senior citizen – P69, 585.00 income tax).

Since the Commissioner of Internal Revenue was not able todecide the claim for refund on time, respondent filed a Petition foReview with the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) on March 18, 1998

However, this was dismissed by CTA declaring that even if the20% sales discount is granted to senior citizens as a credit, thiscannot be applied when there is no tax liability or the tax credit isgreater than the tax due. The respondent then filed with the CA apetition for Review on August 3, 2000. The petition for the P 150193.00 tax credit was granted and the decision of the CTA seaside, thus this instant petition.

ISSUE: Whether the 20% sales discount granted by respondent toqualified senior citizens pursuant to Sec. 4(a) of R.A. No. 7432 may beclaimed as a tax credit or as a deduction from gross sales inaccordance with Sec. 2(1) of Revenue Regulations No. 2-94.

HELD:

The 20% sales discount given to senior citizens may be claimedas a tax credit and not as a deduction from the gross sales.

Wherefore the petition is DENIED and the decision of the CA is AFFIRMED. Legal Basis:

Sec. 4(a) of R.A. No. 7432 provides:

Sec. 4. Privileges for the Senior citizens. – The senior citizensshall be entitled to the following:

(a) The grant of twenty percent (20%) discountfrom all establishments relative to utilizationof transportations services, hotels and similar lodging establishments, restaurants andrecreation centers and purchase of medicines





anywhere in the country: Provided, that private establishments may claim the cost astax credit.

The above provision explicitly employed the word “taxcredit.” Nothing in the provision suggests for it to mean a“deduction” from gross sales. To construe it otherwise would be adeparture from the clear mandate of the law.

It is a fundamental rule in statutory construction that the legislativeintent must be determined from the language of the statute itself

especially when the words and phrases therein are clear andunequivocal. The statute in such a case must be taken to meanexactly what it says. Its literal meaning should be followed todepart from the meaning expressed by the words is to alter thestatute.

The tax credit benefit granted to the establishments can bedeemed as their just compensation for private property taken bythe State for public use. The privilege enjoyed by the senior citizens does not come directly from the State, but rather from theprivate establishments concerned.

GR No. 148083, July 21, 2006CMSR. OF INTERNAL REVENUE VS BICOLANDIA DRUG CORP.*no case digest submitted*

JUST COMPENSATION: DETERMINATION OF JUST

COMPENSATION

149 SCRA 305 (1987)EPZA vs. DULAY

FACTS:

On January 15, 1979, the President of the Philippines, issuedProclamation No. 1811, reserving a certain parcel of land of thepublic domain situated in the city of Lapu-Lapu, Island of Mactan,Cebu and covering a total area of 1,193,669 square meters, moreor less, for the establishment of an export processing zone bypetitioner Export Processing Zone Authority (EPZA).

Not all the reserved area, however, was public land. it includedfour parcel of land registered in the name of private individual.The petitioner, therefore offered to purchase the parcels of landfrom the respondent in accordance with the valuation set forth insection 92, Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 464, as amended. Theparties failed to reach an agreement regarding the sale of theproperty.

The petitioner filed with the then Court of First Instance of Cebu,Branch Lapu-Lapu City, a complaint for expropriation with aprayer for the issuance of a writ of possession against the privaterespondent, to expropriate the parcel of land in pursuant to P.D.66, as amended, which empowers the petitioner to acquire bycondemnation proceedings any property for the establishment of export processing zones in relation to Proclamation No. 1811.

On October 21, 1980, the respondent judge issued a writ of possession authorizing the petitioner to take immediatepossession of the premises. On December 23, 1980, the privaterespondent filed its answer.

At the pre-trial conference, the respondent judge issued an order stating that the parties have agreed that the only issue to be

resolved is the just compensation for the properties and that thepre-trial is thereby terminated and the hearing on the merits is seton April 2, 1981.

The respondent judge issued the order appointing certain personsas commissioners to ascertain and report to the court the justcompensation for the properties sought to be expropriated.

Subsequently the three commissioners submitted their consolidated report recommending a certain amount of P15.00per square meter as the fair and reasonable value of justcompensation of the properties.

The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the order andobjection to commissioner’s report on the grounds that P.D. No1533 has superseded Sections 5 to 8 Rule 67 of the rules of court

on the ascertainment of just compensation must not exceed themaximum amount set by P.D. No. 1533. In addition the petitionerfiled a petition for certiorari and mandamus with temporaryrestraining order, enjoining the trial court from enjoining the order.

ISSUE: Whether or not Sections 5 to 8, Rule 67 of the revised rules ocourt had been repealed or deemed amended by P.D. NO. 1533insofar as appointment of commissioners are concerned. Stated inanother way, is the exclusive and mandatory mode of determining juscompensation in P.D. NO. 1533 valid and constitutional?

HELD:

The method of ascertaining just compensation under theaforecited decrees constitutes impermissible encroachment on

judicial prerogatives. It tends to render this court inutile in a mattewhich under the constitution is reserved to it for finadetermination. The courts task would be relegated to simplystating the lower value of the property as declared either by theowner or the assessor and its choice must be limited to the lowerof the two. However, the strict application of the decrees duringthe proceedings would be nothing short of a mere formality or acharade.the court cannot exercise its discretion or independencein determining what is just or fair. The court is empowered toappoint commissioners to assess the just compensation of theseproperties under eminent domain proceedings in order for theowner of the property is entitled to recover the fair and full valueof the lot. In fine, the decree only establishes a uniform basis fo

determining just compensation which the court may consider asone of the factors in arriving at just compensation, as envisage inthe constitution. The executive department or the legislature maymake the initial determinations but when a party claims a violationof the guarantee in the Bill of Rights, no statute, decree oexecutive order can mandate that its own determination shalprevail over the court’s findings. The determination of “juscompensation in eminent domain cases is a judicial function.

We, therefore, hold that P.D. No. 1533, which eliminates thecourt’s discretion to appoint commissioners pursuant to Rule 67 othe Rules of Court, is unconstitutional and void.

WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition ishereby DISMISSED. The temporary restraining order issued onFebruary 16, 1982 is LIFTED and SET ASIDE.

263 SCRA 708

PANES vs. VISAYAS STATE COLLEGE OF AGRICULTURE*no case digest submitted

195 SCRA 59BELEN vs. CA

FACTS:

A small portion of land measuring a hundred (100) square metersmore or less, belonging to the Manotoc Services, Inc. was leasedto Pedro M. Belen. That piece of land is known as Lot No. 10,Block 18 and is situated at Sunog Apog, Tondo, Manila. On istood a house built by Belen.

Part of the land came to be occupied by Alfredo Juliano and hisfamily in the early part of 1978; Juliano bought a house standingthereon, not belonging to Belen, and move in without the latter’sknowledge. On learning of this, Belen had a talk with Juliano, andthey came to an agreement that Juliano could continue staying onthe land temporarily and would pay one half of the rental toManotoc Reality, inc. Later a fire razed both Belen ’s and Juliano’shouses to the ground. Belen told Juliano not to build anything onthe land anymore. However, on juliano’s pleas, Belen acceded toJuliano’s continued stay on the land on the explicit condition thahis occupancy should not be longer than two and a half yearsWhen Juliano failed to leave the premises after the stipulatedterm despite demand, Belen brought suit in the Metropolitan TriaCourt sometime in September, 1982, and succeeded in obtaining

judgment dated September 5, 1984, a order of the MTC to thedefendant to vacate the subject lot and pay plaintiff the amount oP3,000.00 as a attorney’s fees, plus cost of suit.

Juliano appealed to the Regional Trial Court of manila. That courUNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS / ROOM 410

38




reversed the judgment of the Metropolitan Trial Court, but thedecision was made to rest on the expropriation of the ManotocEstate effected by Presidential Decree No. 1670, where the

Manotoc Reality Incorporated ceased to be the owner of the land. Belen has perfected an appeal by certiorari to SC and prays for

judgment on the following essential propostions that ManotocReality Services has been denied of its right of just compensation,not having receive any money as payment for the subjectproperty, and the NHA not having taken possession thereof in anappropriate action of eminent domain.

ISSUE: Is the passage of Presidential Decree No. 1670 constitutional,whereas it disregarded the right of compensation and due process of law?

HELD:

Presidential Decree No 1670, together with the companiondecree, numbered 1669 was struck down by this court asunconstitutional and therefore, null and void. The Court found thatboth decrees, being “violative of the petitioners’ (owners) right todue process of law.

The court said on the determination of just compensation: “Thedecrees do not by themselves, provide for any form of hearing or procedure by which the petitioners can question the propriety of the expropriation of their properties or the reasonableness of the

just compensation. Having failed to provide for a hearing, the government should

have filed an expropriation case under Rule 67 of the RevisedRules of Court.

WHEREFORE, PD 1670 being void ab initio, all acts done inreliance thereon and in accordance therewith must also be viodab initio, including particularly the taking of possession of propertyby the National Housing Authority and its attempts to convert thesame into a housing project and the selection of the beneficiariesthereof.

The decision of the Court of Appeals of October 2, 1986 and thatof Regional Trial Court thereby affirmed, are REVERSED ANDSET ASIDE, and the decision of the Metropolitan TrialCourt(Branch VII), Manila, rendered on September 5, 1984 in CivilCase No. 078756-cv is REINSTATED AND AFFIRMED, with costagainst the private respondents. SO ORDERED.

227 SCRA 401

REPUBLIC VS CA*no case digest submitted*

206 SCRA 196MANILA ELECTRIC CO. VS. PINEDA*no case digest submitted*

263 SCAR 758DAR VS. CA*no case digest submitted*

G. R. No. L-57524 January 8, 1986REPUBLIC VS.,SANTOS

FACTS:The case is an expropriation case which involved the 66,096 square

meters of land claimed by 44 persons, located in Paranaque andMuntinlupa, Rizal. The expropriation was necessary for the wideningof, and construction of interchanges in the Manila South DiversionRoad. The Appraisal Committee for the province of Rizal fixed at fortypesos (P40) per square meter, or an amount of P2, 641,190. TheGovernment deposited that amount with the provincial treasurer whodeposited it in the Philippine National Bank but some of therespondents withdrew including Maura Santos. The Court of FirstInstance at Pasig, Rizal in its order of June 19, 1969 granted thefiscal's motion fixing the provisional value at P2, 641,190. Fourteen(14) claimants did not object to the valuation of P40 a square meter. Asto those who did not settle at the price of P40 a square meter, the trialcourt, pursuant to section 5, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, appointed

three commissioners to determine the just compensation: BenjaminMorales for the court as chairman; Pacifico Javier, the provinciaassessor, for the Republic, and Pacifico I. Guzman for the claimantsThe commissioners in their report dated October 2, 1970recommended that the just compensation for the lands should be P100a square meter except the land of Maura Santos with an area of25,909 square meters. The trial court in its decision dated May 131972 modified that recommendation. It fixed P100 a square meter asthe uniform price to be paid to the claimants. The Court of Appeals inits decision of June 29, 1981 in turn modified the trial court's decision

and adopted the commissioners' report and it added 6% legal rate ointerest.

ISSUES:1. Whether or not the just compensation to be paid by the

Government is 40 or 100, as recommended by thecommissioners.

2. Whether or not the Appellate Court erred in not holding that thecommissioners should not have relied on the price of P100 for theland of Jose Alcaraz which was sold in November, 1969 and onother irrelevant evidence.

3. Whether or not Appellate Court erred in disregarding the fact tha14 out of the 44 claimants already sold their lots to the Republic aP40 a square meter.

HELD:

We hold that the trial court and the Appellate Court erred in

relying on the commissioners' report whose recommendation wasnot substantiated by trustworthy evidence. As pointed out by the

Assistant Solicitor General, the appraisal of P100 a square metefor the land of Alcaraz was made about eight months after thefiling of the instant expropriation case. In Presidential Decree No1533 provides that just compensation should be the value of theland "prior to the recommendation or decision of the appropriateGovernment office to acquire the property." In the case, it shouldbe noted that the expropriation undeniably increased the value othe remainder of her land with an area of 121,700 square metersShe was already paid P1, 036,360 for her expropriated land.

Furthermore, the commissioners should not have glossed overthe undisputed fact that 14 claimants out of 44 had winningly soldtheir lands to the Government at P40 a square meter as fixed bythe provincial Appraisal Committee of which the provinciaassessor was a member. Evidently, they were satisfied that that

was a reasonable price. According to section 8 of Rule 67, thecourt is not bound by the commissioners' report. It may makesuch order or render such judgment as shall secure to the plaintifthe property essential to the exercise of his right of condemnationand to the defendant just compensation for the propertyexpropriated.

As noted in the Velasquez case, the moment a parcel of land issought to be condemned, the price, for some occult reasonimmediately soars far beyond what the owner would think ofasking or receiving in the open market. Owners ask fabulousprices for it and neighbours look on with an indulgent smile oreven persuade themselves that the land is worth the price forwhich the owner holds out in view of the fact that it is wanted byan entity whose financial resources are supposed to beinexhaustible. Consequently, the petitioner should pay only P40per square meter for the expropriated lands. CMC (CMSInvestments, Inc. was paid P35 a square meter for its 530 square

meters. It is entitled to a deficiency on which 6% legal rate ofinterest per annum should be paid from the time the petitionertook possession of its land up to the date of payment. Thedecisions of the trial court and the Court of Appeals are reversedand set aside. The just compensation for the lands described inparagraph 2 of petitioner's complaint is forty pesos (P40) persquare meter.

GR No. 170422, March 07, 2008SPS. LEE VS LBP*please read full text*





JUST COMPENSATION: WHEN DETERMINED

G. R. No. L-50147 August 3, 1990ANSALDO VS. TANTUICO

FACTS:Two lots of private ownership were taken by the Government and usedfor the widening of a road for more than forty-three years, withoutbenefit of an action of eminent domain or agreement with its owners.

The owners of the land are Jose Ma. Ansaldo and Maria Angela Ansaldo, are covered by title in their names and have an aggregatearea of 1,041 square meters. These lots were taken from the Ansaldossometime in 1947 by the Department of Public Work Transportationand Communication and made part of what used to be Sta. MesaStreet and is now Ramon Magsaysay Avenue at San Juan, MetroManila. The said owners did not make any action until twenty six yearslater asking for the compensation of their land. The case was referredto the Secretary of Justice who rendered an opinion that the justcompensation be made in accordance with Presidential Decree 76which provide that the basis for the payment of just compensation of property taken for public use should be the current and fair marketvalue thereof as declared by the owner or administrator, or suchmarket value as determined by the assessor, whichever was lower.Commissioner of Public Highways requested the Provincial Assessor of Rizal to make a redetermination of the market value of the Ansaldos'property in accordance with PD 76. The new valuation was made, after which the Auditor of the Bureau of Public Highways forwarded the

Ansaldos' claim to the Auditor General with the recommendation thatpayment be made on the basis of the current and fair market value andnot on the fair market value at the time of taking. The Commission on

Audit declined the recommendation and decided that thecompensation be from the actual time of the taking of the land.

ISSUE: (As to the precise time the just compensation be based)Whether or not the just compensation be based on the time of theactual taking of the possession or PD 76.

HELD:

In the context of the State's inherent power of eminent domain,there is a taking when the owner is actually deprived or dispossessed of his property; when there is a practical destructionor a material impairment of the value of his property or when he is

deprived of the ordinary use thereof. There is a taking in thissense when the expropriator enters private property not only for amomentary period but for a more permanent duration, for thepurpose of devoting the property to a public use in such a manner as to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoymentthereof. For ownership, after all, "is nothing without the inherentrights of possession, control and enjoyment. Where the owner isdeprived of the ordinary and beneficial use of his property or of itsvalue by its being diverted to public use, there is taking within theConstitutional sense. Under these norms, there was undoubtedlya taking of the Ansaldos' property when the Government obtainedpossession thereof and converted it into a part of a thoroughfarefor public use.

It is as of the time of such a taking, to repeat, that the justcompensation for the property is to be established. As stated inRepublic v. Philippine National Bank;

When plaintiff takes possession before the institution of thecondemnation proceedings, the value should be fixed as of thetime of the taking of said possession, not of filing of the complaintand the latter should be the basis for the determination of thevalue, when the taking of the property involved coincides with or is subsequent to, the commencement of the proceedings. Indeed,otherwise, the provision of Rule 69, Section 3, directing thatcompensation be determined as of the date of the filing of thecomplaint' would never be operative. As intimated in Republic v.Lara (supra), said provision contemplates normal circumstances,under which the complaint coincides or even precedes the takingof the property by the plaintiff.

The reason for the rule, as pointed out in Rpublic v. Larae, is that;Where property is taken ahead of the filing of the

condemnation proceedings, the value thereof may be enchancedby the public purpose for which it is taken; the entry by the plaintifupon the property may have depreciated its value thereby; orthere may have been a natural increase in the value of theproperty from the time the complaint is filed, due to generaeconomic conditions. The owner of private property should becompensated only for what he actually loses; it is not intendedthat his compensation shall extend beyond his loss or injury . Andwhat he loses is only the actual value of his property at the time iis taken. This is the only way that compensation to be paid can be

truly just i.e.,"just; not only to the individual whose property istaken but, to the public, which is to pay for it.

Clearly, then, the value of the Ansaldos' property must beascertained as of the year 1947, when it was actually taken, andnot at the time of the filing of the expropriation suit, which, by theway, still has to be done. It is as of that time that the real measureof their loss may fairly be adjudged. The value, once fixed, shalearn interest at the legal rate until full payment is effectedconformably with other principles laid down by case law. Thepetition is denied and the challenged decision of the Commissionon Audit is affirmed, and the Department of Public Works andHighways is directed to forthwith institute the appropriateexpropriation action over the land in question so that the juscompensation due its owners may be determined in accordancewith the Rules of Court, with interest at the legal rate of sixpercent (6%) per annum from the time of taking until full paymen

is made.

G.R. No. 170846 February 6, 2007NAPOCOR, vs. TIANGCO

FACTS:

Respondents are owners of a parcel of land with an area o152,187 square meters at Barangay Sampaloc, Tanay, Rizal.

NPC requires 19,423 square meters of the respondentsaforementioned property, across which its 500Kv Kalayaan-SanJose Transmission Line Project will traverse.

NPC’s Segregation Plan# for the purpose shows that the desiredright-of-way will cut through the respondents’ land. Within theportion sought to be expropriated stand fruit-bearing tress, suchas mango, avocado, jackfruit, casuy , santol , calamansi , sintonesand coconut trees.

After repeated unsuccessful negotiations, NPC filed anexpropriation complaint against the land of the respondent in theRTC of Tanay, Rizal. The RTC issued a writ of possession in favorof NPC after paying the deposit requirement.

The trial court rendered its decision on the value of the propertyusing the 1984 tax declaration. (which is incorrect as stated in thedecision of the supreme court)

The respondents filed a motion for recon. but it was denied byRTC. So They filed an appeal and the CA gave merit to thecontention of the respondents and made its revised valuationusing the 1993 tax declaration (increasing the value of theproperty). The case went up to the SC.

ISSUE:1. Whether or not the property should be valued using the 1984

or the 1993 tax declarations.2. Whether or not Sec. 3-A of R.A. No. 6395, as amended by

P.D. 938 will apply.

HELD1. In eminent domain cases, the time of taking is the filing o

the complaint, if there was no actual taking prior theretoHence, in this case, the value of the property at the time ofthe filing of the complaint on November 20, 1990 should beconsidered in determining the just compensation due therespondents. Normally, the time of taking coincides with thefiling of complaint for expropriation as ruled in the case ofPower Corporation v. Court of Appeals, et al.Theexpropriation proceedings in this case having been initiated


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Villarin to withdraw and collect from the bank the amount of P90,125.50 under Savings Account No. 9204 and to deliver thesame to Atty. Gil de Guzman upon proper receipt, pending finaldetermination of just compensation.

Private respondents filed another motion dated January 8, 1982praying that petitioner be ordered to pay the sum of P169, 200.00.

On January 12, 1982 petitioner filed a motion for reconsiderationof the Orders dated December 4, 1981 and December 21, 1981and to declare private respondents in contempt of court for forgingor causing to be forged the receiving stamp of petitioner's counsel

and falsifying or causing to be falsified the signature of itsreceiving clerk in their Omnibus Motion. In response to private respondents' motion for payment dated

January 8, 1982, petitioner filed an opposition alleging that privaterespondents are not entitled to payment of just compensation atthis stage of the proceeding because there is still no appraisaland valuation of the property.

On February 9, 1982 the respondent court denied the petitioner'smotion for reconsideration and motion for contempt, thedispositive portion of which is hereunder quoted as follows:

Viewed in the light of the foregoing, this Court hereby adjudges infavor of defendants Teofilo Arayon, Sr., Lucito Santiago, TeresitaBautista and Atty. Gil de Guzman the fair market value of their property taken by MERALCO at P40.00 per square meter for atotal of P369,720.00, this amount to bear legal interest fromFebruary 24, 1975 until fully paid plus consequential damages interms of attorney's fees in the sum of P10,000.00, all these sumsto be paid by MERALCO to said defendants with costs of suit,minus the amount of P102,800.00 already withdrawn bydefendants.

For being moot and academic, the motions for contempt areDENIED; for lack of merit, the motion for reconsideration of theorders of December 4, 1981 and December 21, 1981 is alsoDENIED.

Furthermore, the respondent court stressed in said order that "atthis stage, the Court starts to appoint commissioners to determine

just compensation or dispenses with them and adopts thetestimony of a credible real estate broker, or the judge himself would exercise his right to formulate an opinion of his own as tothe value of the land in question. Nevertheless, if he formulatessuch an opinion, he must base it upon competent evidence."

ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent court can dispense with the

assistance of a Board of Commissioners in an expropriationproceeding and determine for itself the just compensation.

HELD: The applicable laws in the case at bar are Sections 5 and 8 of

Rule 67 of the Revised Rules of Court. The said sectionsparticularly deal with the ascertainment of compensation and thecourt's action upon commissioners' report, to wit:

Sec. 5. Upon the entry of the order of condemnation, the courtshall appoint not more than three (3) competent and disinterestedpersons as commissioners to ascertain and report to the court the

just compensation for the property sought to be taken. The order of appointment shall designate the time and place of the firstsession of the hearing to be held by the commissioners andspecify the time within which their report is to be filed with thecourt.

Sec. 8. Upon the expiration of the period of ten (10) days referredto in the preceding section, or even before the expiration of suchperiod but after all the interested parties have filed their objectionsto the report or their statement of agreement therewith, the courtmay, after hearing, accept the report and render judgment inaccordance therewith; or, for cause shown, it may recommit thesame to the commissioners for further report of facts; or it may setaside the report and appoint new commissioners, or it may acceptthe report in part and reject it in part; and it may make such order or render such judgment as shall secure to the plaintiff theproperty essential to the exercise of his right of condemnation,and to the defendant just compensation for the property so taken.

We already emphasized in the case of Municipality of Biñan v.

Hon. Jose Mar Garcia (G.R. No. 69260, December 22, 1989, 180SCRA 576, 583-584) the procedure for eminent domain, to wit:

There are two (2) stages in every action of expropriation. The firsis concerned with the determination of the authority of the plaintifto exercise the power of eminent domain and the propriety of itsexercise in the context of the facts involved in the suit. It ends withan order, if not of dismissal of the action, "of condemnationdeclaring that the plaintiff has a lawful right to take the propertysought to be condemned, for the public use or purpose describedin the complaint, upon the payment of just compensation to be

determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint". An ordeof dismissal, if this be ordained, would be a final one, of coursesince it finally disposes of the action and leaves nothing more tobe done by the Court on the merits. So, too, would an order ofcondemnation be a final one, for thereafter, as the Rulesexpressly state, in the proceedings before the Trial Court, "noobjection to the exercise of the right of condemnation (or thepropriety thereof) shall be filed or heard."

The second phase of the eminent domain action is concernedwith the determination by the Court of "the just compensation fothe property sought to be taken." This is done by the Court withthe assistance of not more than three (3) commissioners. Theorder fixing the just compensation on the basis of the evidencebefore, and findings of, the commissioners would be final, too. Iwould finally dispose of the second stage of the suit, and leavenothing more to be done by the Court regarding the issueObviously, one or another of the parties may believe the order to

be erroneous in its appreciation of the evidence or findings of facor otherwise. Obviously, too, such a dissatisfied party may seekreversal of the order by taking an appeal therefrom.

Respondent judge, in the case at bar, arrived at the valuation ofP40.00 per square meter on a property declared for real estatetax purposes at P2.50 per hectare on the basis of a "Joint Venture

Agreement on Subdivision and Housing Projects" executed by A.B.A Homes and private respondents on June 1, 1972. Thisagreement was merely attached to the motion to withdraw frompetitioner's deposit. Respondent judge arrived at the amount o

just compensation on its own, without the proper reception oevidence before the Board of Commissioners. Privaterespondents as landowners have not proved by competenevidence the value of their respective properties at a properhearing. Likewise, petitioner has not been given the opportunity torebut any evidence that would have been presented by private

respondents. In an expropriation case such as this one where theprincipal issue is the determination of just compensation, a triabefore the Commissioners is indispensable to allow the parties topresent evidence on the issue of just compensation. Contrary tothe submission of private respondents, the appointment of at leasthree (3) competent persons as commissioners to ascertain juscompensation for the property sought to be taken is a mandatoryrequirement in expropriation cases. While it is true that thefindings of commissioners may be disregarded and the court maysubstitute its own estimate of the value, the latter may only do sofor valid reasons, i.e., where the Commissioners have appliedillegal principles to the evidence submitted to them or where theyhave disregarded a clear preponderance of evidence, or wherethe amount allowed is either grossly inadequate or excessive(Manila Railroad Company v. Velasquez, 32 Phil. 286). Thus, triawith the aid of the commissioners is a substantial right that maynot be done away with capriciously or for no reason at al

Moreover, in such instances, where the report of thecommissioners may be disregarded, the trial court may make itsown estimate of value from competent evidence that may begathered from the record. The aforesaid joint venture agreemenrelied upon by the respondent judge, in the absence of any otheproof of valuation of said properties, is incompetent to determine

just compensation. Prior to the determination of just compensation, the property

owners may rightfully demand to withdraw from the deposit madeby the condemnor in eminent domain proceedings. Upon anaward of a smaller amount by the court, the property owners aresubject to a judgment for the excess or upon the award of a largesum, they are entitled to a judgment for the amount awarded by





correctly pointed out, however, the Commissioners' Report reliedheavily on newspaper advertisements of offers of sale of properties inthe vicinity. It must be noted, though, that the interest of Petitioner Lecais distinct and separate from and will in no way affect the settled rightsand interests of the other parties that did not appeal the judgment of the trial court. WHEREFORE, the Petition of Leca Realty Corporationis REMANDED to the trial court for the proper determination of theamount of just compensation.

JUST COMPENSATION: LEGAL INTEREST FOR

EXPROPRIATION CASES

G.R. No. 60225-26. May 8, 1992NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION VS. ANGAS

FACTS:National Power Corporation, a government-owned and controlledcorporation and the agency through which the government undertakesthe on-going infrastructure and development projects throughout thecountry, filed two complaints for eminent domain against privaterespondents with the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court)of Lanao del Sur. The complaint which sought to expropriate certainspecified lots situated at Limogao, Saguiaran, Lanao del Sur was for the purpose of the development of hydro-electric power and productionof electricity as well as the erection of such subsidiary works and

constructions as may be necessarily connected therewith. aconsolidated decision was rendered by the lower court, declaring andconfirming that the lots mentioned and described in the complaintshave entirely been lawfully condemned and expropriated by thepetitioner, and ordering the latter to pay the private respondents certainsums of money as just compensation. Petitioner moved for areconsideration of the lower court's alleging that the main decision hadalready become final and executory with its compliance of depositingthe sums of money as just compensation for the lands condemned,with legal interest at 6% per annum; that the said main decision can nolonger be modified or changed by the lower court; and that PresidentialDecree No. 116 is not applicable to this case because it is Art. 2209 of the Civil Code which applies.

ISSUE: Whether or not, in the computation of the legal rate of intereston just compensation for expropriated lands, the law applicable is

Article 2209 of the Civil Code which prescribes a 6% legal interest rateor Central Bank Circular No. 416 which fixed the legal interest rate at12% per annum.

HELD:the transaction involved is clearly not a loan or forbearance of money,goods or credits but expropriation of certain parcels of land for a publicpurpose, the payment of which is without stipulation regarding interest,and the interest adjudged by the trial court is in the nature of indemnityfor damages. The legal interest required to be paid on the amount of

just compensation for the properties expropriated is manifestly in theform of indemnity for damages for the delay in the payment thereof.Therefore, since the kind of interest involved in the joint judgment of the lower court sought to be enforced in this case is interest by way of damages, and not by way of earnings from loans, etc. Art. 2209 of theCivil Code shall apply. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. It wasdeclared that the computation of legal interest at 6% per annum is the

correct and valid legal interest allowed in payments of justcompensation for lands expropriated for public use to herein privaterespondents by the Government through the National Power Corporation.

G.R. No. 146733, January 13, 2004WYCOCO V. JUDGE CASPILLO

FACTS:

Felciano Wycoco owned 94.1690 hectares unirrigated anduntenanted rice land- TCT No. NT.206422 and voluntarily offeredto sell the land to Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) in linewith the ( CARP) for P14.9M

A notice of intention to acquire 84.5690 hectares for P1, 342667.46 by the DAR sent to him. The amount raised toP2,594,045.39 and later modified to P2,280,159.82 excluded theidle areas.

He refused and prompted the DAR to indorse the case to DARABfixing the just compensation.

DARAB requested the LBP to open a trust account for Wycocoand deposited the compensation offered by the DAR and theproperties were distributed to the beneficiaries.

On April 30, 93 he filed a manifestation in VOS case no. 232 NE

93. While Cabanatuan Court acting as the Special Agrarian Court.

ISSUES:1. Whether or not the RTC of Cabanatuan has jurisdiction over the

case.2. Whether or not there was a just compensation offered to the

plaintiff.

HELD:

Point out that there’s no need for Wycoco to present an evidencein support of the land valuation in as much as it is in publicknowledge that the prevailing market value of agricultural lands inNueva Ecija is from P135,000.00 to P150,000.00 per hectare. Sothe curt fixed the compensation of:

P142,500.00- per hectare

94.1690 - hectares (land size)P13,428,082- total compensation + actual damagesP29,663,235.00 for unrealized profits and P8,475,210.00legal interest

This must be paid by DAR . DAR and LBP filed a separate petition before the CA and

dismissed on May 29,97=Final execution June6,07 and Feb. 9,99respectively. The dismissal prompted Wycoco to file a petition fomandamus before SC praying the execution of Cabanatuancourt’s decision and compelled Judge Caspillon to inhibit himsefrom the hearing of the case.

CA modified the decision, deducted the compensation due toWycoco the amount corresponding to 3.372 hectares for it wasfound to have been previously sold to Republic.

Sec 50and 57 of R.A. 6657 (Comprehensive Agrarian Reform lawof 1988)

DAR as an administrative agency cannot be granted jurisdictionover the cases of eminent domain and over criminal cases. Thevaluation of property in eminent domain is essentially a judiciafunction which is vested with the Special Agrarian Courts andcannot lodge with administrative agencies.

Rule XIII Sec.II of New Rules of Procedures of DARAB Sec.II… just compensation shall not be appealable to the Board

but shall be brought directly to the RTC designated as Specia Agrarian Court…

So RTC or Cabanatuan has jurisdiction over the case at babecause it is the designated as SAC.

RTC should have allowed the parties to present evidences so afair compensation shall be determined. There are factors to beconsidered such as the cost of acquisition, size, shape, locationand tax declaration, for ignoring the said factors, remand of thecase for determination is necessary.

“THIS CASE BE REMANDED TO RTC FOR THE

DETERMINATION OF JUST COPENSATION.

JUST COMPENSATION: WRIT OF POSSESSION

G.R. No. 142304, June 20, 2001CITY OF MANILA V. OSCAR SERRANO

FACTS:

Ordinance No. 7833, enacted by the City Council of Manilaauthorizing the expropriation of certain properties in Manila’s FirsDistrict in Tondo: TCT Nos. 70869,105201, 105202, and 138273





of the Register of the Deeds of Manila, which are to be sold toqualified occupants pursuant to Land Use Development Programof the City.

Lot 1-COne of the lots to be expropriatedConsists of 343.10 square meters / 7 = produced 49 squaremeters for each personCovered by TCT No. 138272 from TCT No. 70869This lot belongs to Feliza De Guia, upon her death, said lotwas transferred to Alberto De Guia and then to Edgardo de

Guia heir of Alberto, after the former’s death.The said lot was again transferred to Lee Kuan Hui-TCT No.217018 and subsequently sold to Demetria De Guia – TCT No.226048.

ISSUE: Whether or not the expropriation of the property is proper inrelation to R.A. 7279.

HELD:

On Sept 26, 1997 the petitioner filed an amended complaint for expropriation (RTC) to the supposed owners of the lots with TCTNos. 70869 (including 1-c), 105201,105202 and 138273, theSerranos, heirs of late Demetria De Guia.

RTC issued an order to the petitioner to deposite P 1,825,241.00equivalent to the assessed value of the lot and the issuance of awrit of possession in their favor.

CA reversed RTC’s decision and rather favored the respondents,in the reason that the petitioner failed to do the other modes of acquisition of property, that is to tried first in the city governmentbefore it can resort to expropriation, under R.A.7279

SC reinstated the decision of RTC, because in this case it is veryearly to determine if the petitioner has been granted the right toexpropriate the property, since what has been issued by the RTCto them is just a writ of possession, which is not a right of anownership. Under R.A. 7279 there are requirements that thepetitioner’s need to complied with before expropriating a property.To determine whether or not the petitioner complied it and theexpropriation of the property is proper in relation to R.A. 7279,further proceeding must be made in RTC.

Thus the case was remanded back to RTC.

G. R. No. 166429, December 19, 2005REPUBLIC VS. GINGOYON

FACTS: A dispute occurred after the contract between the government andPIATCO has been nullified for its being contrary to law and publicpolicy. PIATCO and other investors who funded the facilities for NAIA 3cannot operate it and the government as well cannot took it over, for doing so the government would enrich itself unjustly by the PIATCOand other investor’s expense. The government wanted to expropriateNAIA 3, but isn’t it illogical that a government would expropriate theproperty it already owned? So, the expropriation would only be limitedto the facilities and improvement that have been introduced to NAIA 3,with its equivalent just compensation.

ISSUE:1. Whether R.A. No.8974 or Rule 67 is applicable in property

expropriation in the case at bar.2. Whether Judge Gingoyon can be compelled to inhibit himself in

the case

HELD:

Prior to this case a decision to Agan v PIATCO has beenrendered by the court, the 2004 Resolution: the governmentshould fully paid first the owner of the properties subject for expropriation before it took the properties in its possession andownership. This decision is final and executor.

Rule 67 stated:SEC. 2. Entry of plaintiff upon depositing value with authorizedgovernment depository. - Upon the filing of the complaint or at anytime thereafter and after due notice to the defendant, the plaintiff shall have the right to take or enter upon the possession of the

real property involved if he deposits with the authorizedgovernment depositary an amount equivalent to the assessedvalue of the property for purposes of taxation to be held by suchbank subject to the orders of the court. Such deposit shall be inmoney, unless in lieu thereof the court authorizes the deposit of acertificate of deposit of a government bank of the Republic of thePhilippines payable on demand to the authorized governmendepositary.

R.A. No. 8974SEC. 4. Guidelines for Expropriation Proceedings.- Whenever it is

necessary to acquire real property for the right-of-way, site orlocation for any national government infrastructure project throughexpropriation, the appropriate proceedings before the propecourt under the following guidelines:

a) Upon the filing of the complaint, and after due notice to thedefendant, the implementing agency shall immediately pay theowner of the property the amount equivalent to the sum of (1)one hundred percent (100%) of the value of the property basedon the current relevant zonal valuation of the Bureau of InternaRevenue (BIR); and (2) the value of the improvements and/orstructures as determined under Section 7 hereof; . . .c) In case the completion of a government infrastructure projecis of utmost urgency and importance, and there is no existingvaluation of the area concerned, the implementing agency shalimmediately pay the owner of the property its proffered valuetaking into consideration the standards prescribed in Section 5hereof.

Upon completion with the guidelines abovementioned, the courshall immediately issue to the implementing agency an order totake possession of the property and start the implementation ofthe project.

Before the court can issue a Writ of Possession, the implementingagency shall present to the court a certificate of availability ofunds from the proper official concerned. . . .

Clearly that, applying Rule 67 would be a direct rebuke to 2004Resolution in Agan and the court cannot sanction deviation fromits own final and executor orders. It would violate 2004Resolution. Thus, it would be R.A.No. 8974 the applicable law fothe expropriation- in which the government must pay first the juscompensation to the property owner before it can took and use it.

R.A. No. 8974 well complemented with 2004 Resolution. Judge Gingoyon cannot be compelled to inhibit himself, fo

incompetency may be ground for administrative sanction but no

for inhibition, which requires lack of objectivity or impartiality tosit on a case.

JUST COMPENSATION: EXPROPRIATION OF UTILITIES,

LANDED ESTATES, AND MUNICIPAL PROPERTY

G.R. No. L-12032, August 31, 1959CITY OF BAGUIO vs. THE NATIONAL WATERWORKS ANDSEWERAGE AUTHORITY

FACTS:

On April 25, 1956 a municipal corporation filed a complaint in theCourt of First Instance of Baguio for declaratory relief againsdefendant, a public corporation created by Republic Act No. 1383

which contends that said Act does not include within its previewthe Baguio Workshop System. In which the said Act isunconstitutional because it has the effect of depriving plaintiff ofthe ownership, control and operation of said waterworks systemwithout compensation and without due process of law, and that iis oppressive, unreasonable and unjust to plaintiff and other citiesmunicipalities and municipal districts similarly situated.

On May 22, 1956, defendant filed a motion to dismiss on theground that Republic Act No. 1383 is a proper exercise of thepolice power of the State, that assuming that said Accontemplates an act of expropriation, it is still a constitutionaexercise of the power of eminent domain, that at any rate theBaguio Waterworks System is not a private property but a "public





works of public service" over which the Legislature has controland that the provision of the said Act being clear andunambiguous, there is no necessity for construction.

On June 21, 1956, the Court, acting on the motion to dismiss aswell as on the answer and rejoinder filed by both parties, deniedthe motion and ordered defendant to file its answer to thecomplaint. On July 6, 1956, defendant filed its answer reiteratingand amplifying the ground already advanced in this motion todismiss, adding thereto that the action for the declaratory relief isimproper for the reason that the Baguio waterworks System has

already been transferred to defendant pursuant to Republic ActNo. 1383 or, if such has not been done, there has already been abreach of said Act.

ISSUES:1. Plaintiff's action for Declaratory relief is improper because there

has already been a breach by plaintiff of Republic Act No. 13832. Republic Act No. 1383 does not contemplates the exercise of the

power of eliminate domain but the exertion of the police power of the State; and

3. Assuming arguendo that Republic Act No. 1383 involves theexercise of the power of eminent domain the same does notviolate our Constitution.

HELD:

The decision maintain that the property held by a municipalcorporation units private capacity is not subject to the unrestricted

control of the legislature, and the municipality cannot be deprivedof such property against its will, except by the exercise of eminentdomain with payment of full compensation. (McQuillin MunicipalCorporation, 2nd Ed., Vol. I, pp. 670-681).

In its private capacity a municipal corporation is wholly different.The people of a compact community usually require certainconveniences which cannot be furnished without a franchise fromthe State and which are either unnecessary in the rural districts,such as a system of sewers, or parks and open spaces, or whichon account of the expenses it would be financially impossible tosupply except where the population is reasonably dense, such aswater or gas. But in so far as the municipality is thus authorized toexercise the functions of a private corporation, it is clothed withthe capacities of a private corporation and may claim its rightsand immunities, even as against the sovereign, and is subject tothe liabilities of such a corporation, even as against third parties.

(19 R.C. L. p. 698) The attempt of appellant in having waterworks considered as

public property subject to the control of Congress or one whichcan be regulated by the exercise of police power having failed,that question that now arises is: Does Republic Act No. 1383provide for the automatic expropriation of the waterworks inquestion in the light of our Constitution? In other words, does saidlaw comply with the requirements of section 6, Article XIII, inrelation to section 1(2), Article III, of our Constitution?

Section 6, Article XIII of our Constitution provides:SEC. 6. The State may, in the interest of National Welfare anddefense, establish and operate industries and means of transportation and communication, and, upon payment of justcompensation, transfer to public ownership utilities and other private enterprises to be operated by the Government.

Section 1 (2), Article III, of our Constitution provides:(2) Private property shall not be taken for public use without justcompensation.

It is clear that the State may, in the interest of National welfare,transfer to public ownership any private enterprise upon paymentof just compensation. At the same time, one has to bear in mindthat no person can be deprived of his property except for publicuse and upon payment of just compensation. There is an attemptto observe this requirement in Republic Act No. 1383 when inproviding for the transfer of appellee's waterworks system to anational agency it was directed that the transfer be made uponpayment of an equivalent value of the property. Has this beenimplemented? Has appellant actually transferred to appellee anyasset of the NAWASA that may be considered just compensationfor the property expropriated? There is nothing in the record to

show that such was done. Neither is there anything to this effectin Office Memorandum No. 7 issued by the NAWASA inimplementation of the provision of the Republic Act No. 1383. Thelaw speaks of assets of the NAWASA by they are not specified.While the Act empowers the NAWASA to contract indebtednessand issue bonds subject to the approval of the Secretary oFinance when necessary for the transaction of its business (sec2, par. (L), sec. 5, Act No. 1383), no such action has been takento comply with appellant's commitment in so far as payment ofcompensation of appellee is concerned. As to when such action

should be taken no one knows. And unless this aspect of the lawis clarified and appellee is given its due compensation, appelleecannot be deprived of its property even if appellant desires to takeover its administration in line with the spirit of the law. We aretherefore persuaded to conclude that the law, insofar as iexpropriates the waterworks in question without providing for aneffective payment of just compensation, violates our ConstitutionIn this respect, the decision of the trial court is correct.

Wherefore, the decision appealed from is affirmed, withoupronouncement as to costs.

G.R. No. L-24440, March 28, 1968THE PROVINCE OF ZAMBOANGA DEL NORTE vs. CITY OFZAMBOANGA

FACTS: Prior to its incorporation as a chartered city, the Municipality o

Zamboanga used to be the provincial capital of the thenZamboanga Province. On 12 October 1936, Commonwealth Ac39 was approved converting the Municipality of Zamboanga intoZamboanga City. Section 50 of the Act also provided tha"buildings and properties which the province shall abandon uponthe transfer of the capital to another place will be acquired andpaid for by the City of Zamboanga at a price to be fixed by the

Auditor General." The properties and buildings referred toconsisted of 50 lots and some buildings constructed thereonlocated in the City of Zamboanga and covered individually byTorrens certificates of title in the name of Zamboanga ProvinceThe lots are utilized as the Capitol Site (1 lot), School site (3 lots)Hospital site (3 lots), Leprosarium (3 lots), Curuan school (1 lot)Trade school (1 lot), Burleigh school (2 lots), burleigh (9 lots), highschool playground (2 lots), hydro-electric site (1 lot), san roque (1lot), and another 23 vacant lots. In 1945, the capital o

Zamboanga Province was transferred to Dipolog and on 16 June1948, RA 286 created the municipality of Molave and making ithe capital of Zamboanga Province. On 26 May 1949, the

Appraisal Committee formed by the Auditor General, pursuant toCA 39, fixed the value of the properties and buildings in questionleft by Zamboanga Province in Zamboanga City aP1,294,244.00. However, on 14 July 1951, a Cabinet Resolutionwas passed, conveying all the said 50 lots and buildings thereonto Zamboanga City for P1.00, effective as of 1945, when theprovincial capital of the Zamboanga Province was transferred toDipolog.

On 6 June 1952, RA 711 was approved dividing the province ofZamboanga into Zamboanga del Norte and Zamboanga del Sur

As to how the assets and obligations of the old province were tobe divided between the two new ones, Section 6 of the lawprovided that “upon the approval of the Act, the funds, assets andother properties and the obligations of the province of Zamboanga

shall be divided equitably between the Province of Zamboangadel Norte and the Province of Zamboanga del Sur by thePresident of the Philippines, upon the recommendation of the

Auditor General." On 11 January 1955, the Auditor Generaapportioned the assets and obligations of the defunct Province oZamboanga, apportioning 54.39% for Zamboanga del Norte and45.61% for Zamboanga del Sur. On 17 March 1959, the ExecutiveSecretary, by order of the President, issued a ruling holding thaZamboanga del Norte had a vested right as owner (should be co-owner pro-indiviso) of the properties mentioned in Section 50 oCA 39, and is entitled to the price thereof, payable by ZamboangaCity. This effectively revoked the Cabinet Resolution of 14 July1951. The Secretary of Finance then authorized the





Commissioner of Internal Revenue to deduct an amount equal to25% of the regular internal revenue allotment for the City of Zamboanga for the quarter ending 31 March 1960, then for thequarter ending 30 June 1960, and again for the first quarter of thefiscal year 1960-1961. The deductions, all aggregatingP57,373.46 was credited to the province of Zamboanga del Norte,in partial payment of the P704,220,05 due it.

However, on 17 June 1961, RA 3039 was approved amendingSection 50 of CA 39 by providing that "all buildings, propertiesand assets belonging to the former province of Zamboanga and

located within the City of Zamboanga are hereby transferred, freeof charge, in favor of the said City of Zamboanga." On 12 July1961, the Secretary of Finance ordered the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to stop from effecting further payments toZamboanga del Norte and to return to Zamboanga City the sumof P57,373.46 taken from it out of the internal revenue allotmentof Zamboanga del Norte. Zamboanga City admits that since theenactment of RA 3039, P43,030.11 of the P57,373.46 has alreadybeen returned to it.

ISSUES:1. Whether or not Republic Act 3039 be declared unconstitutional for

depriving plaintiff province of property without due process and just compensation

2. Whether or not the City of Zamboanga be ordered to continuepaying the balance of P704,220.05 in quarterly installments of 25% of its internal revenue allotments to Zamboanga del Norte.

HELD:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring Republic Act No. 3039 unconstitutional insofar as it deprives plaintiff Zamboanga del Norte of its private properties, consisting of 50parcels of land and the improvements thereon under certificatesof title (Exhibits "A" to "A-49") in the name of the defunct provinceof Zamboanga; ordering defendant City of Zamboanga to pay tothe plaintiff the sum of P704,220.05 payment thereof to bededucted from its regular quarterly internal revenue allotmentequivalent to 25% thereof every quarter until said amount shallhave been fully paid; ordering defendant Secretary of Finance todirect defendant Commissioner of Internal Revenue to deduct25% from the regular quarterly internal revenue allotment for defendant City of Zamboanga and to remit the same to plaintiff Zamboanga del Norte until said sum of P704,220.05 shall have

been fully paid; ordering plaintiff Zamboanga del Norte to executethrough its proper officials the corresponding public instrumentdeeding to defendant City of Zamboanga the 50 parcels of landand the improvements thereon under the certificates of title(Exhibits "A" to "A-49") upon payment by the latter of theaforesaid sum of P704,220.05 in full; dismissing the counterclaimof defendant City of Zamboanga; and declaring permanent thepreliminary mandatory injunction issued on June 8, 1962,pursuant to the order of the Court dated June 4, 1962. No costsare assessed against the defendants.

It is SO ORDERED.





- DUE PROCESS -

PURPOSE OF GUARANTY

110 US 516, 1884HURTADO VS CALIFORNIA*no case digest submitted*

MEANING OF LIFE, LIBERTY, AND PROPERTY

431 SCRA 534CHAVEZ VS. ROMULO*no case digest submitted*

233 SCRA 163LIBANAN VS. SANDIGANBAYAN*no case digest submitted*

SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS

86 SCRA 275, 1978VILLEGAS VS. HU CHONG TSAI PAO HO*no case digest submitted*

39 Phil 660; No. 14078; March 7, 1919RUBI VS. PROVINCIAL BOARD OF MINDORO

FACTS: The provincial board of Mindoro adopted resolution No. 25

wherein non-Christian inhabitants (uncivilized tribes) will bedirected to take up their habitation on sites on unoccupied publiclands. It is resolved that under section 2077 of the AdministrativeCode, 800 hectares of public land in the sitio of Tigbao on NaujanLake be selected as a site for the permanent settlement of Mangyanes in Mindoro. Further, Mangyans may only solicithomesteads on this reservation providing that said homestead

applications are previously recommended by the provincialgovernor. In that case, pursuant to Section 2145 of the Revised

Administrative Code, all the Mangyans in the townships of Naujanand Pola and the Mangyans east of the Baco River includingthose in the districts of Dulangan and Rubi's place in Calapan,were ordered to take up their habitation on the site of Tigbao,Naujan Lake. Also, that any Mangyan who shall refuse to complywith this order shall upon conviction be imprisoned not exceed insixty days, in accordance with section 2759 of the revised

Administrative Code. Said resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro were claimed as

necessary measures for the protection of the Mangyanes of Mindoro as well as the protection of public forests in which theyroam, and to introduce civilized customs among them.

It appeared that Rubi and those living in his rancheria have notfixed their dwelling within the reservation of Tigbao and are liableto be punished.

It is alleged that the Manguianes are being illegally deprived of their liberty by the provincial officials of that province. Rubi and hiscompanions are said to be held on the reservation established atTigbao, Mindoro, against their will, and one Dabalos is said to beheld under the custody of the provincial sheriff in the prison atCalapan for having run away form the reservation.

ISSUES: 1. Whether or Not Section 2145 of the Administrative Code deprives

a person of his liberty?2. Thus, whether or not Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of

1917 is constitutional?

HELD: The Court held that section 2145 of the Administrative Code does

not deprive a person of his liberty of abode and does not deny tohim the equal protection of the laws, and that confinement inreservations in accordance with said section does not constituteslavery and involuntary servitude. The Court is further of theopinion that section 2145 of the Administrative Code is alegitimate exertion of the police power. Section 2145 of the

Administrative Code of 1917 is constitutional.

Assigned as reasons for the action: (1) attempts for theadvancement of the non-Christian people of the province; and (2the only successfully method for educating the Manguianes wasto oblige them to live in a permanent settlement. The Solicitor-General adds the following; (3) The protection of the Manguianes(4) the protection of the public forests in which they roam; (5) thenecessity of introducing civilized customs among the Manguianes

One cannot hold that the liberty of the citizen is unduly interferedwithout when the degree of civilization of the Manguianes isconsidered. They are restrained for their own good and thegeneral good of the Philippines.

“Liberty regulated by law": Implied in the term is restraint by lawfor the good of the individual and for the greater good of thepeace and order of society and the general well-being. No mancan do exactly as he pleases.

None of the rights of the citizen can be taken away except by dueprocess of law.

Therefore, petitioners are not unlawfully imprisoned or restrainedof their liberty. Habeas corpus can, therefore, not issue.

VOID FOR VAGUENESS/OVERBREADTH

292 SCRA 141 (1998)BLAS OPLE VS RUBEN TORRES

FACTS:

On December 12, 1996 President Fidel V. Ramos issued Administrative Order 308 entitled “Adoption of National andComputerized Identification Reference System”. The purposes othe said order are: (a) it will provide the Filipino and foreignresidents with the convenience to transact businesses with basic

service and social security providers and other governmeninstrumentalities (b) it will reduce if not totally eradicate fraudulentransactions and misrepresentations because it will require acomputerized system to properly and efficiently identify personseeking basic services on social security.

Petitioner Senator Blas Ople prays to invalidate A.O. 308 for twovital constitutional grounds: (a) it is a usurpation of power oCongress to legislate (b) it intrudes the citizenry’s protected zoneof privacy.

ISSUE: Whether or not Administrative Order 308 is unconstitutional fobeing overbreadth?

HELD:

The Supreme Court ruled that it is inarguable that the broadnessvagueness and overbreadth of A.O. 308 will put the people’s righto privacy in clear and present danger.

Administrative Order 308 does not state: (a) what specificbiological characteristics will be gathered (b) what particulabiometrics technology will be employed (c) whether data is limitedto use for identification purposes only (d) how data will be handled(e)who shall control and access the data.

Thus A.O 308 does not assure the individual of a reasonableexpectation of privacy because, as technology advances, thelevel of reasonable expected privacy decreases.

G.R. No. 148560 November 19, 2001JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA VS. SANDIGANBAYAN

FACTS:UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS / ROOM 410

51




The Office of the Ombudsman accuses President Joseph EjercitoEstrada together with Jinggoy Estrada, Charlie Atong Ang,Edward Serapio, Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Alma Alfaro Eleuterio Tan,and Delia Rajsas of the crime of plunder defined and penalizedunder R.A. No. 7080 as amended by Sec. 12 R.A. No. 7659.

During the term of President Estrada, he together with theindividuals mentioned above wilfully, unlawfully and criminallyamass, accumulate and acquire by himself, directly or indirectlyill-gotten wealth amounting to four billion ninety seven millioneight hundred four thousand one hundred seventy three pesos

and seventeen centavos (4,097,804,173.17), thereby unjustlyenriching himself or themselves at the expense and to thedamage of the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines.

Under RA 7080 “An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder” as amended by RA 7659 Section 2, the crime of plunder is defined as an act of any public officer who, by himself or inconnivance with members of his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons, amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealththrough a combination or a series of overt or criminal actsdescribed in Section 1(d) hereof in the aggregate amount or totalvalue of at least fifty million pesos (50,000,000) and shall bepunished by reclusion perpetua to death.

Section 1. x x x x (d) "Ill-gotten wealth" means any asset,property, business, enterprise or material possession of anyperson within the purview of Section Two (2) hereof, acquired byhim directly or indirectly through dummies, nominees, agents,subordinates and/or business associates by any combination or series of the following means or similar schemes:

(1) Through misappropriation, conversion, misuse,or malversation of public funds or raids on the publictreasury;

(2) By receiving, directly or indirectly, anycommission, gift, share, percentage, kickbacks or anyother form of pecuniary benefit from any person and/or entity in connection with any government contract or project or by reason of the office or position of the publicoffice concerned;

(3) By the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets belonging to the NationalGovernment or any of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities, or government owned or controlledcorporations and their subsidiaries;

(4) By obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any shares of stock, equity or any other form of interest or participation including the promise of futureemployment in any business enterprise or undertaking;

(5) By establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or other combinations and/or implementation of decrees and orders intended to benefitparticular persons or special interests; or

(6) By taking advantage of official position, authority,relationship, connection or influence to unjustly enrichhimself or themselves at the expense and to the damageand prejudice of the Filipino people and the Republic of thePhilippines.

Petitioner Estrada questions the validity of the law for it is void for vagueness. He bewails the failure of the law to provide for thestatutory definition of the terms and “combination” and “series” inthe key phrase “a combination or a series of overt or criminalacts” found in Section 1 par. d, and the word “pattern” in Section4.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Plunder Law is unconstitutional for it suffersfrom the vice of vagueness?

HELD:

The Supreme Court ruled that a statute or act may be said to bevague when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning anddiffer in its application. In such instance, the statute is repugnantto the Constitution in two (2) respects - it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair

notice of what conduct to avoid; and, it leaves law enforcersunbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes anarbitrary flexing of the Government muscle. But the doctrine doesnot apply as against legislations that are merely couched inimprecise language but which nonetheless specify a standardthough defectively phrased; or to those that are apparentlyambiguous yet fairly applicable to certain types of activities. Thefirst may be "saved" by proper construction, while no challengemay be mounted as against the second whenever directedagainst such activities. With more reason, the doctrine cannot be

invoked where the assailed statute is clear and free fromambiguity, as in this case. The test in determining whether a criminal statute is void fo

uncertainty is whether the language conveys a sufficiently definitewarning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by commonunderstanding and practice. It must be stressed, however, that the"vagueness" doctrine merely requires a reasonable degree ocertainty for the statute to be upheld - not absolute precision ormathematical exactitude, as petitioner seems to suggestFlexibility, rather than meticulous specificity, is permissible as longas the metes and bounds of the statute are clearly delineated. Anact will not be held invalid merely because it might have beenmore explicit in its wordings or detailed in its provisions, especiallywhere, because of the nature of the act, it would be impossible toprovide all the details in advance as in all other statutes.

GR No. 171390, May 3, 2006

DAVID VS. ARROYO*no case digest submitted*

GR No. 126858, September 16, 2005ONG VS. SANDIGANBAYAN

FACTS:Congressman Bonifacio Gallego executed a complaint againspetitioner Ong, a former Commissioner of the BIR claiming thapetitioner has amassed properties worth disproportionately more thanhis lawful income. The Director of the Fact Finding Committee of theoffice of the Ombudsman ordered the conduct of investigation on thematter; of which petitioner was required to submit counter affidavit andcontroverting evidence. Petitioner filed a counter-affidavit submittinghis Statements of Assets and Liabilities, income tax return, bankcertificates showing that he obtained a loan from Allied Banking

Corporation, certificate from SGV and company and other documentsexplaining the sources of funds with which he acquired the questionedassets. Ombudsman finds and recommend for recovery of ill-gottenwealth under Ra 1379, in relation to RA’s 3019 and 6770 against Ongand all other person’s concerned.

ISSUE/S:1. WON, the right to preliminary investigation is withheld by RA 1379

from a co-respondent Nelly Ong, who is not herself a public officeor employee.

2. WON, petitioner is correct in his contention that the office of theOmbudsman is disqualified to file a petition for forfeitureconsidering of the duality of function, as investigator andprosecutor of the case.

3. WON, petitioner is correct in the contention that RA1379 isunconstitutional since it violates the presumption of innocenceand the right against self incrimination.

HELD:1. No, even if RA 1379 appears to be directed only against the

public officer or employee who has acquired during hisincumbency an amount of property which is manifestly out ofproportion to his salary and his other lawful income and theincome from legitimately acquired property, the reality thst theapplication of the law is such that the conjugal share of Nelly Ongstands to be subjective to the penalty of forfeiture grants her theright, in line with the due process clause of the constitution, to apreliminary investigation.

2. No, Supreme Court declared that the office of the Ombudsmanhas the correlative powers to investigate and initiate the proper





his discretion to revoke a passport already issued, cannot be heldto have acted whimsically or capriciously in withdrawing andcancelling such passport. Due process does not necessarilymean or require a hearing. When discretion is exercised by anofficer vested with it upon an undisputed fact, such as the filing of a serious criminal charge against the passport holder, hearingmaybe dispensed with by such officer as a prerequisite to thecancellation of his passport; lack of such hearing does not violatethe due process of law clause of the Constitution; and theexercise of the discretion vested in him cannot be deemed

whimsical and capricious of because of the absence of suchhearing. If hearing should always be held in order to comply withthe due process of law clause of the Constitution, then a writ of preliminary injunction issued ex parte would be violative of thesaid clause.

The petition is denied.

8 SCRA 244 (1963)DE BISSHOP VS GALANG FACTS:

Petitioner-appellee George de Bisschop, an American citizen, wasallowed to stay in this country for three years as the prearrangedemployee of the Bissmag Production, Inc., of which he ispresident and general manager. He applied for extension of staywith the Bureau of Immigration, in a letter dated 10 July 1959. Inview, however, of confidential and damaging reports of

Immigration Officer Benjamin de Mesa to the effect that theBissmag Production, Inc., is more of a gambling front than theenterprise for promotion of local and imported shows that itpurports to be, and that de Bisschop is suspect of having evadedpayment of his income tax.

The Commissioner of Immigration advised him that his applicationfor extension of stay as a prearranged employee has been deniedby the Board of Commissioners, and that he should depart within5 days.

De Bisshop filed the present case for prohibition to desist fromarresting and detaining him.

ISSUE: WON the Commissioners of Immigration are required by law toconduct formal hearings on all applications for extension of stay of aliens.

HELD: The administration of immigration laws is the primary and

exclusive responsibility of the Executive branch of thegovernment. Extension of stay of aliens is purely discretionary onthe part of the immigration authorities. Since Commonwealth ActNo. 613, otherwise known as the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, is silent as to the procedure to be followed in these cases,we are inclined to uphold the argument that courts have no

jurisdiction to review the purely administrative practice of immigration authorities of not granting formal hearings incertain cases as the circumstances may warrant, for reasonsof practicability and expediency. This would not violate the dueprocess clause if we take into account that, in this particular case,the letter of appellant-commissioner advising de Bisschop todepart in 5 days is a mere formality, a preliminary step, and,therefore, far from final, because, as alleged in paragraph 7 of appellant's answer to the complaint, the "requirement to leavebefore the start of the deportation proceedings is only an adviceto the party that unless he departs voluntarily, the State will becompelled to take steps for his expulsion". It is already a settledrule in this jurisdiction that a day in court is not a matter of right in administrative proceedings.

The fact should not be lost sight of that we are dealing with anadministrative proceeding and not with a judicial proceeding. AsJudge Cooley, the leading American writer on Constitutional Law,has well said, due process of law is not necessarily judicialprocess; much of the process by means of which the Governmentis carried on, and the order of society maintained, is purelyexecutive or administrative, which is as much due process of law,as is judicial process. While a day in court is a matter of right in

judicial proceedings, in administrative proceedings, it is otherwisesince they rest upon different principles. . . . In certainproceedings, therefore, of all administrative character, it may bestated, without fear of contradiction, that the right to a notice andhearing are not essential to due process of law.

161 SCRA 232 (1988)VAR ORIENT SHIPPING CO., INC. VS. ACHACOSO

FACTS:

The petitioners filed a complaint with the Workers' Assistance and Adjudication Office, Philippine Overseas Employmen Administration (POEA) against the private respondents Edgar TBunyog, Vedasto Navarro, Eugenio Capalad, Raul Tumasis

Antonio Tanioan, Celestino Cason, Danilo Manela and RobertoGenesis, crew members of the MPV "Silver Reefer," for havingallegedly violated their Contracts of Employment with thepetitioners which supposedly resulted in damages arising from theinterdiction of the vessel by the International Transport WorkersFederation (ITF) at Kiel Canal, Germany, in March 1986.

After joinder of the issues, the case was heard on March 4, 1987where the parties agreed to submit their respective positionpapers and thereafter the case would be submitted for decisionOnly the private respondents submitted a position paper.

Public respondent rendered judgment and dismissed the case fosome of the employees; other employees were entitled topayments by the complainant. A copy of the decision was sent byregistered mail and delivered by the postman to the petitionerscounsel at his address, through the receptionist. According to

Attorney Figura, he did not receive the envelope containing thedecision

Petitioners allegedly learned about the decision only when the wriof execution was served. On November 23,1987, petitionersthrough new counsel, filed an 'urgent Motion to Recall Writ oExecution' on the ground that the decision had not been receivedby the petitioners, hence, it was not yet final and executory.

Hence, this petition to annul the judgment by public respondenand the writ of execution be set aside.

ISSUE: WON the petitioner was denied due process of law because Administrator resolved the case without any formal hearing.

HELD:

Equally unmeritorious is the petitioners 'allegation that they weredenied due process because the decision was rendered without aformal hearing. The essence of due process is simply anopportunity to be heard or, as applied to administrativeproceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side or anopportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or rulingcomplained of.

The fact is that at the hearing of the case on March 4, 1987, itwas agreed by the parties that they would file their respectivememoranda and thereafter consider the case submitted fodecision. This procedure is authorized by law to expedite thesettlement of labor disputes. However, only the privaterespondents submitted memoranda. The petitioners did not. OnJune 10, 1987, the respondents filed a motion to resolve. Thepetitioners' counsel did not oppose either the "Motion to Resolveor the respondents "Motion for Execution of Decision" datedOctober 19, 1987, both of which were furnished them throughcounsel. If it were true, as they now contend, that they had beendenied due process in the form of a formal hearing, they shouldhave opposed both motions.

The petition for certiorari is denied for lack of merit.

PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS - ADMINISTRATIVE DUE

PROCESS

[GR 46496, 27 February 1940]ANG TIBAY VS CIR





proper decorum, and civility, that such behavior subjected him asa student to the university's disciplinary regulations' action andsanction and that the university has the sole prerogative andauthority at any time to drop from the school a student found to beundesirable in order to preserve and maintain its integrity anddiscipline so indispensable for its existence as an institution of learning.

After due trial, the lower court ruled in favor of the Guanzons andordered the university to pay them P92.00 (actual damages);P50,000.00 (moral damages); P5,000.00 (attorney's fees) and to

pay the costs of the suit Upon appeal to the Court of Appeals by the university, the trial

court's decision was initially reversed and set aside. Thecomplaint was dismissed.

However, upon motion for reconsideration filed by the Guanzons,the appellate court reversed its decision and set it aside through aspecial division of five. In the resolution issued by the appellatecourt, the lower court's decision was reinstated. The motion for reconsideration had to be referred to a special division of five inview of the failure to reach unanimity on the resolution of themotion, the vote of the regular division having become 2 to 1.

The petitioner now asks to review and reverse the resolution of the division of five

ISSUE/S:1. WON Juan Ramon Guanzon was not accorded due process of

law2. WON respondent’s complaint for recovery of damages was

premature because administrative remedies have not yet beenexhausted

3. WON private respondents are entitled to damages

HELD: Petition granted in favor of Ateneo. CA ruling reversed.1. No, he was accorded due process. Exceptions to the rule on finality of factual findings of trial

courts and administrative agencies

The appellate court resolution invoked the rule that findings of facts by administrative officers in matters falling within their competence will not generally be reviewed by the courts, and theprinciple that findings of facts of the trial court are entitled to greatweight and should not be disturbed on appeal.

The court does not agree. The statement regarding the finalitygiven to factual findings of trial courts and administrative

tribunals is correct as a general principle. However, it issubject to well established exceptions. Factual findings of trial courts are disregarded when - (1) the conclusion is afinding grounded on speculations, surmises, andconjectures; (2) the inferences made are manifestlymistaken, absurd, or impossible; (3) there is a grave abuse of discretion; (4) there is a misapprehension of facts; and (5)the court, in arriving at its findings, went beyond the issuesof the case and the same are contrary to the admissions of the parties or the evidence presented.

A similar rule applies to administrative agencies. By reason of their special knowledge and expertise, we ordinarily accordrespect if not finality to factual findings of administrativetribunals. However, there are exceptions to this rule and

judicial power asserts itself whenever (1) the factual findingsare not supported by evidence; (2) where the findings are

vitiated by fraud, imposition, or collusion; (3) where theprocedure which led to the factual findings is irregular; (4)when palpable errors are committed; or when a grave abuseof discretion, arbitrariness, or capriciousness is manifest

Why he is deemed to have been accorded due process

When the letter-complaint was read to Juan Ramon, he admittedthe altercation with the waitress and his slapping her on the face.Rev. Welsh (Dean of men) did not stop with the admission. Heinterviewed Eric Tagle, Danny Go, Roberto Beriber, and JoseReyes, friends of Juan Ramon who were present during theincident.

The Board of Discipline was made up of distinguished membersof the faculty -Fr. Francisco Perez, Biology Department Chairman;

Dr. Amando Capawan, a Chemistry professor; Assistant DeanPiccio of the College; and Dr. Reyes of the same College. Thereis nothing in the records to cast any doubt on their competenceand impartiality insofar as this disciplinary investigation isconcerned.

Juan Ramon himself appeared before the Board of Discipline. Headmitted the slapping incident, then begged to be excused so hecould catch the boat for Bacolod City. Juan Ramon, thereforewas given notice of the proceedings; he actually appeared topresent his side; the investigating board acted fairly and

objectively; and all requisites of administrative due process weremet. The claim that there was no due process because the private

respondents, the parents of Juan Ramon were not given anynotice of the proceedings will also not stand. Juan Ramon, who athe time was 18 years of age, was already a college studentintelligent and mature enough to know his responsibilities. In factin the interview with Rev. Welsh, he even asked if he would beexpelled because of the incident. He was fully cognizant of thegravity of the offense he committed. When informed about theDecember 19, 1967 meeting of the Board of Discipline, he wasasked to seek advice and assistance from his guardian and orparents. Juan Ramon is assumed to have reported this seriousmatter to his parents. The fact that he chose to remain silent anddid not inform them about his case was not the fault of thepetitioner university.

Moreover, notwithstanding the non-participation of the privaterespondents, the university, as stated earlier, undertook a fair andobjective investigation of the slapping incident. Due process inadministrative proceedings also requires consideration of theevidence presented and the existence of evidence to support thedecision (Halili v. Court of Industrial Relations, 136 SCRA 112).

Carmelita Mateo was not entirely blameless for what happened toher because she also shouted at Juan Ramon and tried to hit himwith a cardboard box top, but this did not justify Juan Ramon'sslapping her in the face. The evidence clearly shows that thealtercation started with Juan Ramon's utterance of the offensivelanguage "bilat ni bay," an Ilongo phrase which means sex organof a woman. It was but normal on the part of Mateo to react to thenasty remark. Moreover, Roberto Beriber, a friend of Juan Ramonwho was present during the incident told Rev. Welsh during theinvestigation of the case that Juan Ramon made threateninggestures at Mateo prompting her to pick up a cardboard box top

which she threw at Juan Ramon. The incident was in public thusadding to the humiliation of Carmelita Mateo. There was"unbecoming conduct" and pursuant to the Rules of Disciplineand Code of Ethics of the university, specifically under the 1967-1969 Catalog containing the rules and academic regulation(Exhibit 19), this offense constituted a ground for dismissal fromthe college. The action of the petitioner is sanctioned by law.Section 107 of the Manual of Regulations for Private Schoolsrecognizes violation of disciplinary regulations as valid ground forrefusing re-enrollment of a student (Tangonan v. Paño, 137 SCRA245).

Before Juan Ramon was admitted to enroll, he received (1) theCollege of Arts and Sciences Handbook containing the generaregulations of the school and the 1967-1969 catalog of theCollege of Arts and Sciences containing the disciplinary rules andacademic regulations and (2) a copy of the Rules andRegulations of the Cervini-Elizo Halls of the petitioner university

one of the provisions of which is as follows: under the title "DiningRoom" -"The kitchen help and server should always be treatedwith civility." Miss Mateo was employed as a waitress and

precisely because of her service to boarders, not to mention hersex, she deserved more respect and gracious treatment.

The petitioner is correct in stating that there was a serious error oflaw in the appellate court's ruling on due process.

2. No, complaint was not premature. The petitioner raises the issue of "exhaustion of administrative

remedies" in view of its pending appeal from the decision of theMinistry of Education to the President of the Philippines. It arguesthat the private respondents' complaint for recovery of damages





filed in the lower court was premature. The issue raised in court was whether or not the private

respondents can recover damages as a result of the dismissal of their son from the petitioner university. This is a purely legalquestion and nothing of an administrative nature is to or can bedone. The case was brought pursuant to the law on damagesprovided in the Civil Code. The jurisdiction to try the case belongsto the civil courts.

3. No, there is no basis for recovery of damages.

There is no basis for the recovery of damages. Juan Ramon wasafforded due process of law. The penalty is based on reasonablerules and regulations applicable to all students guilty of the sameoffense. He never was out of school. Before the decision could beimplemented, Juan Ramon asked for an honorable dismissalwhich was granted. He then enrolled at the De la Salle Universityof Bacolod City and later transferred to another Jesuit school.Moreover, his full and complete tuition fees for the secondsemester were refunded through the representation of Mr. RomeoGuanzon, Juan Ramon's father.

There was no bad faith on the part of the university. In fact, thecollege authorities deferred any undue action until a definitivedecision had been rendered. The whole procedure of thedisciplinary process was get up to protect the privacy of thestudent involved. There is absolutely no indication of malice,fraud, and improper or wilful motives or conduct on the part of the

Ateneo de Manila University in this case.

161 SCRA 7, 1988ALCUAZ vs. PSBA

FACTS:

Students and some teachers of PSBA rallied and barricaded theschool because they wanted to admin to hear their grievanceswith regards to “not being able to participate in the policy-makingof the school”, despite the regulations set by the admin withregards to protest actions

During the regular enrollment period, petitioners and other students similarly situated were allegedly blacklisted and deniedadmission for the second semester of school year 1986-1987.

Court ordered the school authorities to create a specialinvestigating committee to conduct an investigation, who maderecommendations which the school adopted

A lot of procedural crap, petitioners and respondents filing andanswering the complaints

Petitioners claim that they have been deprived of due processwhen they were barred from re-enrollment and for intervenorsteachers whose services have been terminated as facultymembers, on account of their participation in the demonstration or protest charged by respondents as "anarchic" rallies, and aviolation of their constitutional rights of expression and assembly.

Petitioners allege that they have been deprived of procedural dueprocess which requires that there be due notice and hear hearingand of substantive due process which requires that the person or body to conduct the investigation be competent to act and decidefree from bias or prejudice.

ISSUE/S:1. Whether or not there has been deprivation of due process ?2.

WON there was contempt of Court by the respondentsHELD:1. NO. there was no deprivation of due process. There is no existing contract between the two parties. Par 137 of

Manual of Regulations for Private Schools states that when acollege student registers in a school, it is understood that he isenrolling for the entire semester. Likewise, it is provided in theManual, that the "written contracts" required for college teachersare for 'one semester. after the close of the first semester, thePSBA-QC no longer has any existing contract either with thestudents or with the intervening teachers. It is a time-honoredprinciple that contracts are respected as the law between the

contracting parties The contract having been terminated, thereis no more contract to speak of. The school cannot becompelled to enter into another contract with said studentsand teachers. "The courts, be they the original trial court or theappellate court, have no power to make contracts for the parties."

The Court has stressed, that due process in disciplinary casesinvolving students does not entail proceedings and hearingssimilar to those prescribed for actions and proceedings incourts of justice.Standards of procedural due process are:

a. the students must be informed in writing of the nature andcause of any accusation against them;b. they shall have the right to answer the charges againsthem, with the assistance of counsel, if desired:c. they shall be informed of the evidence against them;d. they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their ownbehalf ande.the evidence must be duly considered by the investigatingcommittee or official designated by the school authorities tohear and decide the case.

Printed Rules and Regulations of the PSBA-Q.C. were distributedat the beginning of each school

Enrollment in the PSBA is contractual in nature and uponadmission to the School, the Student is deemed to have agreedto bind himself to all rules/regulations promulgated by theMinistry of Education, Culture and Sports. Furthermore, he agreesthat he may be required to withdraw from the School at anytime for reasons deemed sufficiently serious by the Schoo

Administration. Petitioners clearly violated the rules set out by the school with

regard to the protest actions. Necessary action was taken by theschool when the court issued a temporary mandatory injunction toaccept the petitioners for the first sem & the creation of aninvestigating body.

The Court, to insure that full justice is done both to the studentsand teachers on the one hand and the school on the otherordered an investigation to be conducted by the schooauthorities, in the resolution of November 12, 1986.

Findings of the investigating committee:1. students disrupted classes2. petitioners involved were found to be academically

deficient & the teachers are found to have committedvarious acts of misconduct.

The right of the school to refuse re-enrollment of students foacademic delinquency and violation of disciplinary regulations hasalways been recognized by this Court Thus, the Court has ruledthat the school's refusal is sanctioned by law . Sec. 107 of theManual of Regulations for Private Schools considers academicdelinquency and violation of disciplinary regulations vs as validgrounds for refusing re-enrollment of students. The opposite viewwould do violence to the academic freedom enjoyed by the schooand enshrined under the Constitution.

Court ordinarily accords respect if not finality to factual findings oadministrative tribunals, unless :1. the factual findings are not supported by evidence;2. where the findings are vitiated by fraud, imposition or collusion;3. where the procedure which led to the factual findings isirregular;4. when palpable errors are committed; or

5. when a grave abuse of discretion, arbitrariness, ocapriciousness is manifest. Investigation conducted was fair, open, exhaustive and

adequate.

2. No. The urgent motion of petitioners and intervenors to citerespondents in contempt of court is likewise untenable.

No defiance of authority by mere filing of MOR coz respondenschool explained that the intervenors were actually reinstatedas such faculty members after the issuance of the temporarymandatory injunction.

Respondent school has fully complied with its duties underthe temporary mandatory injunction The school manifested





that while the investigation was going on, the intervenors-facultymembers were teaching and it was only after the investigation,that the recommendations of the Committee were adopted by theschool and the latter moved for the dismissal of the case for having become moot and academic.

GR No. 89317, May 30, 1990NON vs. DANES

FACTS:

Petitioner students of Mabini Colleges were not allowed to re-enroll because they participated in student mass actions againsttheir school the preceding sem

On Feb 22, 1988, the date of the resumption of classes at MabiniCollege, petitioners continued their rally picketing, even thoughwithout any renewal permit, physically coercing students not toattend their classes, thereby disrupting the scheduled classes anddepriving a great majority of students of their right to be present intheir classes

Together with the abovementioned fact, the lower courtconsidered that in signing their enrollment forms, they waived theprivilege to be re-enrolled. “The Mabini College reserves the rightto deny admission of students xxx whose activities undulydisrupts or interfere with the efficient operation of the college xxx”

In addition the students signed pledges saying they respect their alma matter, that they will conduct themselves in a manner thatwould not put the college in a bad light.

Judge Dames’ decision considering these facts said that what thestudents assert is a mere privileges not a legal right. RespondentMabini College is free to admit or not to admit the petitioners for re-enrollment in view of the academic freedom enjoyed by theschool.

ISSUE/HELD: WON the doctrine laid down in Alcuaz insofar as itallowed schools to bar the re-admission or re-enrollment of students onthe ground of termination of contract should be reversed. The re-admission or re-enrollment of students on the ground of termination of contract should be reversed. àYES

RATIO:

In Alcuaz, it was said that enrollment is a written contract for onesemester and contracts are respected as the law between thecontracting parties. At the end of each sem, the contract is

deemed terminated. However, this case is not a simple case about a school refusing

re-admission. The refusal to readmit or to re-enroll petitioners wasdecided upon and implemented by school authorities as areaction to student mass action.

This is a case that focuses on the right to speech and assemblyas exercised by students vis-à-vis the right of school officials todiscipline them.

The student does not shed his constitutionally protected rights at the schoolgate. In protesting grievances disorder is more or lessexpected because emotions run high. That the protection to thecognate rights of speech and assembly guaranteed by the Constiis similarly available to students is well-settled in our jurisdiction.Right to discipline cannot override constitutional safeguards.Citing Malabanan and Villar the court reiterated that the exerciseof the freedom of assembly could not be a basis for barring

students from enrolling. Under academic freedom, students my bebarred from re-enrollment based on academic deficiencies. Permissible limitations on student exercise of constitutional rights

within the school. Constitutional freedom of free speech andassembly also not absolute. However, imposition of disciplinarysanctions requires observance of procedural due process andpenalty imposed must be proportionate to the offense committed.(procedural due process: right to be informed in writing, right toans the charges, right to be informed of the charges against them,right to adduce evidence, and for this evidence to be dulyconsidered)

The nature of contract between a school and its students is not an ordinary contract but is imbued with public interest. The Consti

allows the State supervisory and regulatory powers over aeducational institutions. [see art XIV sec1-2, 4(1) ]. According topar 107 and 137 of the respondent school’s manual, a student isenrolled not just for one sem but for the entire period necessaryfor the student to complete his/her course. BP blg 232 gives thestudents the right to continue their course up to graduation.

Academic freedom not a ground for denying students’ rights. InVillar, the right of an institution of higher learning to seacademic standards cannot be utilized to discriminateagainst students who exercise their constitutional rights to

speech and assembly, for otherwise there will be a violationof their right to equal protection.

School said most of them had failing grades anyway. In answerstudents say they are graduating students and if there are anydeficiencies these do not warrant non-readmission. Also there aremore students with sores deficiencies who are re-admitted. Andsome of the petitioners had no failing marks.

The court held that the students were denied due process in thatthere was no due investigation. In fact it would appear from thepleadings that the decision to refuse them re-enrollment becauseof failing grades was a mere afterthought.

Discipline may be warranted but penalty shld be commensurate tothe offense committed with due process.

But penalty, if any is deserved should not anymore be enforcedMoot and academic. They’ve already suffered enough.





- TAXATION -

PURPOSE

G.R. No. L-28896 February 17, 1988COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE VS. ALGUE

FACTS:

The Philippine Sugar Estate Development Company (PSEDC)appointed Algue Inc. as its agent, authorizing it to sell its land,factories, and oil manufacturing process. The Vegetable Oil InvestmentCorporation (VOICP) purchased PSEDC properties. For the sale,

Algue received a commission of P125,000 and it was from thiscommission that it paid Guevara, et. al. organizers of the VOICP,P75,000 in promotional fees. In 1965, Algue received an assessmentfrom the Commissioner of Internal Revenue in the amount of P83,183.85 as delinquency income tax for years 1958 amd 1959.

Algue filed a protest or request for reconsideration which was not actedupon by the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR). The counsel for Alguehad to accept the warrant of distrant and levy. Algue, however, filed apetition for review with the Coourt of Tax Appeals.

ISSUE: Whether the assessment was reasonable.

HELD: Taxes are the lifeblood of the government and so should be

collected without unnecessary hindrance. Every person who isable to pay must contribute his share in the running of thegovernment. The Government, for his part, is expected to respondin the form of tangible and intangible benefits intended to improvethe lives of the people and enhance their moral and materialvalues. This symbiotic relationship is the rationale of taxation andshould dispel the erroneous notion that is an arbitrary method of exaction by those in the seat of power.

Tax collection, however, should be made in accordance with lawas any arbitrariness will negate the very reason for governmentitself. For all the awesome power of the tax collector, he may stillbe stopped in his tracks if the taxpayer can demonstrate that thelaw has not been observed. Herein, the claimed deduction(pursuant to Section 30 [a] [1] of the Tax Code and Section 70 [1]of Revenue Regulation 2: as to compensation for personal

services) had been legitimately by Algue Inc. It has further proventhat the payment of fees was reasonable and necessary in light of the efforts exerted by the payees in inducing investors (in VOICP)to involve themselves in an experimental enterprise or a businessrequiring millions of pesos.

The assessment was not reasonable.

177 SCRA 27, 1989COMMISSIONER VS. MAKASIAR*no case digest submitted*

TAX EXEMPTIONS

33 PHIL 217, 1916 YMCA VS. CIR

*no case digest submitted*

51 PHIL 352, 1927BISHOP OF NUEVA SEGOVIA VS PROVINCIAL BOARD*no case digest submitted*

14 SCRA 292, 1965LLADOC VS CIR*no case digest submitted*

107 SCRA 104, 1981THE PROVINCE OF ABRA VS HONORABLE HAROLD M.

HERNANDO

FACTS:

In this case the provincial city assessor of Abra filed a certiorarand mandamus against the ruling made by Judge Harold MHernando of the Court of First Instance of Abra, it was becauserespondent denied a motion for declaratory relief by RomanCatholic Bishop of Bangued desirous of being exempted from areal estate tax followed by a summary judgment granting suchexemption without even hearing the side of the petitioner

Petitioner further argued that clearly the judge ignored thepertinent provisions of the Rules of Court and disregards thebasic laws of procedure and basic provisions of due process inthe constitution. The important argument made by the petitioner isthat the judge failed to abide by the provisions of PresidentiaDecree No. 464 which states that" No court shall entertain anysuit assailing the validity of a tax assessed under this Code untilthe taxpayer, shall have paid, under protest, the tax assessedagainst him nor shall any court declare any tax invalid by reasonof irregularities or informalities in the proceedings of the officerscharged with the assessment or collection of taxes, or of failure toperform their duties within this time herein specified for theiperformance unless such irregularities, informalities or failureshall have impaired the substantial rights of the taxpayer; noshall any court declare any portion of the tax assessed under theprovisions of this Code invalid except upon condition that thetaxpayer shall pay the just amount of the tax, as determined by

the court in the pending proceeding." The judge responded by saying there is no dispute that the

properties including their procedure are actually, directly andexclusively used by the Roman Catholic Bishop of Bangued, Incfor religious or charitable purposes."

HELD:

The Supreme Court ruled that the petition be granted since the judge would not have made such a grave mistake i f he had onlymade a clear distinction between the present provisions of theconstitution to the provisions of the 1935 constitution regardingtax exemptions on land, buildings and improvements. The maindifference is that in order for a land, building, or improvement tobe tax exempt, there must be and exclusive, actual and direct useof the enumerated for religious or charitable purposes. It is also arule that tax exemption is not favored nor presumed so that if

granted it must be strictly construed against the taxpayer Affirmatively put, the law frowns on exemption from taxationhence, an exempting provision should be construed strictissim

juris

The petition was also justly invoked on the grounds for theprotection of due process to clearly show i f the respondents reallydid not violate any constitutional provisions in regards to taxexemption but instead, what respondent judge did was directlyruled on the case of declaratory relief on the basis that it wasexclusive, actual, and directly as sources of support of the parishpriest and his helpers and also of private respondent Bishop ascompared to the motion to dismiss the case due to lack o

jurisdiction since the validity of a tax assessment may bequestioned before the Local Board of Assessment Appeals andnot with a court. There was also mention of a lack of a cause ofaction, but only because, in its view, declaratory relief is notproper, as there had been breach or violation of the right o

government to assess and collect taxes on such property. Iclearly appears, therefore, that in failing to accord a hearing topetitioner Province of Abra and deciding the case immediately infavor of private respondent, respondent Judge failed to abide bythe constitutional command of procedural due process.

162 SCRA 106, 1988ABRA VALLEY COLLEGE, INC. VS. HON. JUAN P. AQUINO

FACTS:

This is a case for a review or certiorari on the decision made bythe defunct Court of First Instance of Abra Branch I, dated June14, 1974, rendered in Civil Case No. 656. In this case the cour





decided that the seizure and sale by the Municipal Treasurer of Bangued, Abra and Provincial Treasurer of the said province of the lot and building of Abra Valley College, Inc. to be valid sincethe said school was not tax exempt. What transpired was theschool was issued a “Notice of Seizure” of the lot and building of the school covered by Original Certificate of Title No. Q-83 dulyregistered in the name of petitioner for failure to pay the amountof P5,140.31 back taxes by the respondent The "Notice of Sale"was caused to be served upon the petitioner by the respondenttreasurers on July 8, 1972 for the sale at public auction of said

college lot and building, which sale was held on the same date.Dr. Paterno Millare, then Municipal Mayor of Bangued, Abra,offered the highest bid of P6,000.00 which was duly accepted.The certificate of sale was correspondingly issued to him.

After the sale Dr. Paterno filled a case for the dismissal of thecase and after exchange of pleadings the court ordered therespondent treasurers to deliver the proceeds of the auction sale.Finally the parties involved entered into a Stipulation of Factsadministered by the court dismissing the notice of seizure andnotice of sale in favor of Dr. Paterno and relieving him of all theback taxes of the school upon the payment of the auction price.

Despite the Stipulation of Facts the trial courts found out that theschool was recognized by the government offering Primary HighSchool and College courses and has a population of more than100,000 students all in all; that the school was situated right in theheart of town of Bangued, Abra a few meters from the plaza andabout 120 meters from the Court of First Instance building; that

the elementary pupils are housed in a two-storey building acrossthe street; that the high school and college students are housed inthe main building; that the Director with his family is in the secondfloor of the main building; and that the annual gross income of theschool reaches more than one hundred thousand pesos. In lightof the evidences it was left after the courts to determine whether the said school was exclusively for educational purposes.

The succeeding Provincial Fiscal, Hon. Jose A. Solomon and his Assistant, Hon. Eustaquio Z. Montero, filed a Memorandum for the Government on March 25, 1974, and a SupplementalMemorandum on May 7, 1974, wherein they opined "that basedon the evidence, the laws applicable, court decisions and

jurisprudence, the school building and school lot used for educational purposes of the Abra Valley College, Inc., areexempted from the payment of taxes.

The trial court disagreed because of the use of the second floor

by the Director of petitioner school for residential purposes. Hethus ruled for the government and rendered the assailed decision. After having been granted by the trial court ten (10) days from August 6, 1974 within which to perfect its appeal petitioner instead availed of the instant petition for review on certiorari withprayer for preliminary injunction before this Court, which petitionwas filed on August 17, 1974. In the resolution dated August 16,1974, this Court resolved to give DUE COURSE to the petitionRespondents were required to answer said petition. Thepetitioners raised the arguments that the courts a quo: 1. madean error in sustaining a valid seizure and sale of the college lotand building used for educational purpose 2. Made an error indeclaring that the college was not exclusively for educationalpurposes merely because the college president resides in it 3.made an error in declaring the college not tax exempt fromproperty taxes and in ordering petitioner to pay P5,140.31 asrealty taxes. 4. made an error in ordering the confiscation of the

P6,000.00 deposit made in the court by petitioner as payment of the P5,140.31 realty taxes.

ISSUE: Whether Abra Valley College Inc. subject to tax exemption asstated in the constitution that a school should be “exclusively for educational purpose” despite the proof that there are other purposeattached to the lot and building such as a residence of the Collegepresident?

HELD:

In the case at bar the Supreme Court used Section 22, paragraph3, Article VI, of the then 1935 Philippine Constitution, whichexpressly grants exemption from realty taxes for "Cemeteries,

churches and parsonages or convents appurtenant thereto, andall lands, buildings, and improvements used exclusively foreligious, charitable or educational purposes ... Relative theretoSection 54, paragraph c, Commonwealth Act No. 470 asamended by Republic Act No. 409, otherwise known as the

Assessment Law, provides that churches and parsonages oconvents appurtenant thereto, and all lands, buildings, andimprovements used exclusively for religious, charitable, scientificor educational purposes

The Supreme court ruled that the exemption in favor of property

used exclusively for charitable or educational purposes is 'nolimited to property actually indispensable but extends to facilitieswhich are incidental to and reasonably necessary for theaccomplishment of said purposes and that while this Court allowsa more liberal and non-restrictive interpretation of the phrase"exclusively used for educational purposes" as provided for in

Article VI, Section 22, paragraph 3 of the 1935 PhilippineConstitution, reasonable emphasis has always been made thaexemption extends to facilities which are incidental to andreasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the mainpurposes.

While the use of the second floor of the main building in the caseat bar for residential purposes of the Director and his family, theymay find justification under the concept of incidental use, which iscomplimentary to the main or primary purpose—educational, thelease of the first floor thereof to the Northern MarketingCorporation cannot by any stretch of the imagination be

considered incidental to the purpose of education. Under the 1935 Constitution, the trial court correctly arrived at the

conclusion that the school building as well as the lot where it isbuilt should be taxed, not because the second floor of the same isbeing used by the Director and his family for residential purposesbut because the first floor thereof is being used for commerciapurposes. However, since only a portion is used for purposes ocommerce, it is only fair that half of the assessed tax be returnedto the school involved.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision of the Court of FirsInstance of Abra, Branch I, is hereby AFFIRMED subject to themodification that half of the assessed tax be returned to thepetitioner

101 PHIL 386, 1957AMERICAN BIBLE SOCIETY vs. CITY OF MANILA

FACTS:

In this case the plaintiff is a foreign, non-stock, religiousmissionary organization duly registered in the Philippines anddoing business through its agency here in Manila. In the course otheir ministry, their Philippine agency has been distributing andselling bibles and/or gospel portions thereof (except during theJapanese occupation) throughout the Philippines and translatingthe same into several Philippine dialect Upon knowledge theacting City Treasurer of the City of Manila informed plaintiff that iwas conducting the business of general merchandise sinceNovember, 1945, without providing itself with the necessaryMayor's permit and municipal license, requiring the plaintiff tosecure, within three days, the corresponding permit and licensefees, together with compromise covering the period from the 4thquarter of 1945 to the 2nd quarter of 1953, in the total sum oP5,821.45 To avoid the closing of its business as well as furthefines and penalties in the premises on October 24, 1953, plaintifpaid to the defendant under protest the said permit and licensefees in the aforementioned amount, giving at the same time noticeto the City Treasurer that suit would be taken in court to questionthe legality of the ordinances under which, the said fees werebeing collected which was done on the same date by filing thecomplaint that gave rise to this action. The plaintiff prays tha

judgment be rendered declaring the said Municipal Ordinance No3000, as amended, and Ordinances Nos. 2529, 3028 and 3364illegal and unconstitutional, and a refund should be made by thedefendant of the payments made and the legal costs. Thedefendant replied that, maintaining in turn that said ordinanceswere enacted by the Municipal Board of the City of Manila by





virtue of the power granted to it by section 2444, subsection (m-2)of the Revised Administrative Code, superseded on June 18,1949, by section 18, subsection (1) of Republic Act No. 409,known as the Revised Charter of the City of Manila, and prayingthat the complaint be dismissed, with costs against plaintiff. Thisanswer was replied by the plaintiff reiterating theunconstitutionality of the often-repeated ordinances

Before the trial the party submitted a stipulation of facts statingthe sales made by the petitioner from 1945 to 1953. When thecase was set for hearing the plaintiff argued that it never made

any profit from the sale of its bibles, which are disposed of for aslow as one third of the cost, and that in order to maintain itsoperating cost it obtains substantial remittances from its New Yorkoffice and voluntary contributions and gifts from certain churches,both in the United States and in the Philippines, which areinterested in its missionary work. The defendant answered thatdue to the cross-examination of the lone witness of plaintiff it wasproven that the claim of plaintiff that if having no profit from thesales is evidently untenable. This made the judge to dismiss thecase for lack of merit on the grounds thatfrom the repealedsection (m-2) of the Revised Administrative Code and therepealing portions (o) of section 18 of Republic Act No. 409,although they seemingly differ in the way the legislative intent isexpressed, yet their meaning is practically the same for thepurpose of taxing the merchandise mentioned in said legalprovisions, and that the taxes to be levied by said ordinances is inthe nature of percentage graduated taxes (Sec. 3 of Ordinance

No. 3000, as amended, and Sec. 1, Group 2, of Ordinance No.2529, as amended by Ordinance No. 3364).

Not satisfied with the decision, they took up the matter to theCourt of Appeals which was certified to the Supreme Court wherethe petitioner argued these points 1. In holding that OrdinancesNos. 2529 and 3000, as respectively amended, are notunconstitutional 2. In holding that subsection m-2 of Section 2444of the Revised Administrative Code under which Ordinances Nos.2592 and 3000 were promulgated, was not repealed by Section18 of Republic Act No. 409; 3. In not holding that an ordinanceproviding for taxes based on gross sales or receipts, in order tobe valid under the new Charter of the City of Manila, must first beapproved by the President of the Philippines; and 4. In holdingthat, as the sales made by the plaintiff-appellant have assumedcommercial proportions, it cannot escape from the operation of said municipal ordinances under the cloak of religious privilege.

ISSUE: Whether or not the ordinances of the City of Manila, Nos.3000, as amended, and 2529, 3028 and 3364, are constitutional andvalid; and (2) whether the provisions of said ordinances are applicableor not to the case at bar.

HELD:

In the case at bar the Supreme court held that that Ordinance No.3000 cannot be considered unconstitutional, even if applied toplaintiff Society. But as Ordinance No. 2529 of the City of Manila,as amended, is not applicable to plaintiff-appellant and defendant-appellee is powerless to license or tax the business of plaintiff Society involved herein for, as stated before, it would impair plaintiff's right to the free exercise and enjoyment of its religiousprofession and worship, as well as its rights of dissemination of religious beliefs, We find that Ordinance No. 3000, as amended isalso inapplicable to said business, trade or occupation of the

plaintiff. Wherefore, and on the strength of the foregoing considerations,

We hereby reverse the decision appealed from, sentencingdefendant return to plaintiff the sum of P5,891.45 unduly collectedfrom it. Without pronouncement as to costs. It is so ordered.

DOUBLE TAXATION

95 PHIL 46, 1954PUNZALAN VS MUNICIPAL BOARD OF MANILA*no case digest submitted*

LICENSE FEES

GR No. 10448, August 30, 1957PHYSICAL THERAPY ORG. VS MUNICIPAL BOARD*no case digest submitted*





- EQUAL PROTECTION -

SEXUAL DISCRIMNINATION

163 SCRA 386, 1988PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE EXPORTERS vs. DRILON

FACTS: The Department of Labor and Employment issued Department

Order No. 1, Series of 1988 in the character of "GUIDELINESGOVERNING THE TEMPORARY SUSPENSION OFDEPLOYMENT OF FILIPINO DOMESTIC AND HOUSEHOLDWORKERS”.

The petitioner, Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc.(PASEI, for short), a firm "engaged principally in the recruitment of Filipino workers, male and female, for overseas placement,"challenges its Constitutional validity.

On May 25, 1988, the Solicitor General, on behalf of therespondents Secretary of Labor and Administrator of thePhilippine Overseas Employment Administration, filed a Commentinforming the Court that on March 8, 1988, the respondent Labor Secretary lifted the deployment ban in the states of Iraq, Jordan,Qatar, Canada, Hongkong, United States, Italy, Norway, Austria,

and Switzerland. * In submitting the validity of the challenged"guidelines," the Solicitor General invokes the police power of thePhilippine State.

ISSUE:WON Department Order No. 1 in the nature of a police power measureis valid under the Constitution, assailing:

• "discrimination against males or females;"• that it "does not apply to all Filipino workers but only to

domestic helpers and females with similar skills;"• and that it is violative of the right to travel• it is held likewise to be an invalid exercise of the lawmaking

power, police power being legislative, and not executive, incharacter.

HELD:

The petitioner has shown no satisfactory reason why thecontested measure should be nullified. There is no question thatDepartment Order No. 1 applies only to "female contractworkers," but it does not thereby make an undue discriminationbetween the sexes. It is well-settled that "equality before the law"under the Constitution does not import a perfect Identity of rightsamong all men and women. It admits of classifications, providedthat (1) such classifications rest on substantial distinctions; (2)they are germane to the purposes of the law; (3) they are notconfined to existing conditions; and (4) they apply equally to allmembers of the same class.

As a matter of judicial notice, the Court is well aware of theunhappy plight that has befallen our female labor force abroad,especially domestic servants, amid exploitative working conditionsmarked by, in not a few cases, physical and personal abuse. Thesordid tales of maltreatment suffered by migrant Filipina workers,even rape and various forms of torture, confirmed by testimonies

of returning workers, are compelling motives for urgentGovernment action. As precisely the caretaker of Constitutionalrights, the Court is called upon to protect victims of exploitation. Infulfilling that duty, the Court sustains the Government's efforts.

The consequence the deployment ban has on the right to traveldoes not impair the right. The right to travel is subject, amongother things, to the requirements of "public safety," "as may beprovided by law." Department Order No. 1 is a validimplementation of the Labor Code, in particular, its basic policy to"afford protection to labor," pursuant to the respondentDepartment of Labor's rule-making authority vested in it by theLabor Code. The petitioner assumes that it is unreasonablesimply because of its impact on the right to travel, but as we have

stated, the right itself is not absolute. The disputed Order is avalid qualification thereto.

Neither is there merit in the contention that Department Order No1 constitutes an invalid exercise of legislative power. It is true thapolice power is the domain of the legislature, but it does not meanthat such an authority may not be lawfully delegated. As we havementioned, the Labor Code itself vests the Department of Laborand Employment with rulemaking powers in the enforcemenwhereof.

"Protection to labor" does not signify the promotion o

employment alone. What concerns the Constitution moreparamountly is that such an employment be above all, decent just, and humane. It is bad enough that the country has to sendits sons and daughters to strange lands because it cannot satisfytheir employment needs at home. Under these circumstances, theGovernment is duty-bound to insure that our toiling expatriateshave adequate protection, personally and economically, whileaway from home. In this case, the Government has evidence, anevidence the petitioner cannot seriously dispute, of the lack orinadequacy of such protection, and as part of its duty, it hasprecisely ordered an indefinite ban on deployment.

The non-impairment clause of the Constitution, invoked by thepetitioner, must yield to the loftier purposes targetted by theGovernment. 31 Freedom of contract and enterprise, like all othefreedoms, is not free from restrictions, more so in this jurisdictionwhere laissez faire has never been fully accepted as a controllingeconomic way of life.

Petition dismissed.

ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE

99 PHIL, 1856PEOPLE vs. HERNANDEZ

FACTS:

This is a case of kidnapping with murder involving the Huks,members of the Hukbong Mapagpalaya ng Bayan, the militaryarm of the Communist Party of the Philippines.

Counsel for Faustino del Mundo, alias Commander Sumulongadmits that the said accused ordered the killing of the victimMarciano T. Miranda, 41, the barrio captain of Barrio Balitucan

Magalang, Pampanga, who was an alleged army informer andwho was opposed to the candidacy of Rogelio Tiglao, a provinciaboard member.

The kidnapping and killing were politically motivated. Mirandarefused to support Tiglao, the candidate for Congressman of theHuks. He supported Rafael Lazatin, the Nacionalista candidate.

ISSUE: Del Mundo contends that he should be convicted only ofhomicide and sentenced to reclusion temporal medium and that thetrial court erred in convicting him of the said complex crime and insentencing him to reclusion perpetua.

HELD:

Del Mundo did not testify in his defense. As already stated, thetrial court convicted him of kidnapping with murder together withPangilinan, Macasaquit and Cabrera, sentenced him to reclusionperpetua and ordered him to pay an indemnity of P17,000 toMiranda's heirs. Macalino and Meneses were acquitted. Salasdied during the pendency of the case. Only Del Mundo appealedHis counsel de oficio contends that there was no intention todeprive Miranda of his liberty and no premeditated plan to kill him

That contention is not well-taken. The fact is that Miranda wasforcibly removed from his barrio and deprived of his liberty forseveral hours and was then brought to another place where hewas killed. While under interrogation, his grave was already beingprepared. The fatal blow, which was inflicted upon him, causedhim to fall into his grave.

We find that there was a conspiracy to liquidate Miranda and thathe kidnapping was utilized as a means to attain that objectiveFrom the surrounding circumstances, it maybe inferred that De





Mundo masterminded the kidnapping or induced it and that, asobserved by the Solicitor General, the killing was intended toterrorize the supporters of Lazatin.

Miranda was a public officer. His kidnapping is covered by article267(4) of the Revised Penal Code which imposes the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death for that offense.

The killing of Miranda was murder because his hands were boundwhen he was mortally assaulted (U.S. vs. Elicanal, 35 Phil. 209and other cases).

Even without taking into account evident premeditation, the death

penalty has to be imposed because article 48 of the RevisedPenal Code requires that the graver penalty for kidnapping, whichis more serious than murder, has to be meted out to Del Mundo

However, inasmuch as Del Mundo is now seventy-eight (78)years old, the death penalty cannot be imposed upon him.

WHEREFORE, the trial court's judgment is modified in the sensethat the death penalty imposable on Del Mundo is commuted toreclusion perpetua with the accessory penalties provided in article40. In all other respects, the trial court's judgment is affirmed.

85 PHIL 648, 1950PEOPLE vs. ISNAIN

FACTS:

Accused was caught in the act of stealing coconut while his twoother companions managed to ran away.

Accused admitted to committing the said crimeISSUE: The only question raised with much earnestness by hisattorney de oficio is that article 310 of the Revised Penal Codeclassifying as qualified theft, the stealing of coconut is unconstitutional,because it punishes the larceny of such products more heavily than thetaking away of similar produce, such as rice and sugar, and therebydenies him the equal protection of the laws.

HELD:

In the matter of theft of coconuts, the purpose of the heavier penalty is to encourage and protect the development of thecoconut industry as one of the sources of our national economy.3Unlike rice and sugar cane farms where the range of vision isunobstructed, coconut groves can not be efficiently watchedbecause of the nature of the growth of coconut trees; and withouta special measure to protect this kind of property, it will be, as it

has been in the past the favorite resort of thieves.4 There istherefore, some reason for the special treatment accorded theindustry; and as it can not be said that the classification is entirelywithout basis, the plea of unconstitutionality must be denied

The crime is punished by article 309, paragraph 5, in connectionwith article 310 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended byCommonwealth Act No. 417. (Republic Act No. 120, enacted after the offense, is not applicable.) The penalty is prision correccional to its full extent. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence law, theappellant should be sentenced to imprisonment for not less than 4years and 2 months of arresto mayor nor more than 4 years and 2months of prision correccional. Thus modified, the appealeddecision will be affirmed, with costs. so ordered.

GR No. 130716, December 09, 1998CHAVES VS. PCGG

FACTS:

Petitioner Francisco I. Chavez, as "taxpayer, citizen and former government official who initiated the prosecution of the Marcosesand their cronies who committed unmitigated plunder of the publictreasury and the systematic subjugation of the country'seconomy," alleges that what impelled him to bring this action wereseveral news reports bannered in a number of broadsheetssometime in September 1997. These news items referred to (1)the alleged discovery of billions of dollars of Marcos assetsdeposited in various coded accounts in Swiss banks; and (2) thereported execution of a compromise, between the government(through PCGG) and the Marcos heirs, on how to split or share

these assets. Petitioner, invoking his constitutional right to information and the

correlative duty of the state to disclose publicly all its transactionsinvolving the national interest, demands that respondents makepublic any and all negotiations and agreements pertaining toPCGG's task of recovering the Marcoses' ill-gotten wealth. Heclaims that any compromise on the alleged billions of ill-gottenwealth involves an issue of "paramount public interest," since ihas a "debilitating effect on the country's economy" that would begreatly prejudicial to the national interest of the Filipino people.

ISSUE: WON the government, through the Presidential Commissionon Good Government (PCGG), be required to reveal the proposedterms of a compromise agreement with the Marcos heirs as regardstheir alleged ill-gotten wealth.

HELD:

In general, writings coming into the hands of public officers inconnection with their official functions must be accessible to thepublic, consistent with the policy of transparency of governmentaaffairs. This principle is aimed at affording the people anopportunity to determine whether those to whom they haveentrusted the affairs of the government are honesty, faithfully andcompetently performing their functions as public servantsUndeniably, the essence of democracy lies in the free flow othought; but thoughts and ideas must be well-informed so that thepublic would gain a better perspective of vital issues confronting

them and, thus, be able to criticize as well as participate in theaffairs of the government in a responsible, reasonable andeffective manner.

With such pronouncements of our government, whose authorityemanates from the people, there is no doubt that the recovery ofthe Marcoses' alleged ill-gotten wealth is a matter of publicconcern and imbued with public interest. We may also add tha"ill-gotten wealth," by its very nature, assumes a public characterClearly, the assets and properties referred to supposedlyoriginated from the government itself. To all intents and purposestherefore, they belong to the people. As such, upon reconveyancethey will be returned to the public treasury, subject only to thesatisfaction of positive claims of certain persons as may beadjudged by competent courts. Another declared overridingconsideration for the expeditious recovery of ill-gotten wealth isthat it may be used for national economic recovery. The foregoing

disquisition settles the question of whether petitioner has a right torespondents' disclosure of any agreement that may be arrived aconcerning the Marcoses' purported ill-gotten wealth. Petitiongranted.

111 SCRA 433, 1982NUNEZ VS. SANDIGANBAYAN

FACTS: Petitioner in this certiorari and prohibition proceeding assails the

validity of the Presidential Decree creating the SandiganbayanHe was accused before such respondent Court of estafa throughfalsification of public and commercial documents committed inconnivance with his other co-accused, all public officials, inseveral cases. Upon being arraigned, he filed a motion to quashon constitutional and jurisdictional grounds. Respondent Courdenied such motion. There was a motion for reconsideration filed

the next day; it met the same fate. Hence this petition for certiorarand prohibition

ISSUE: WON Presidential Decree No. 1486, as amended, creating therespondent Court is violative of the due process and equal protectionclauses of the Constitution.

HELD:

To assure that the general welfare be promoted, which is the endof law, a regulatory measure may cut into the rights to liberty andproperty. Those adversely affected may under suchcircumstances invoke the equal protection clause only if they canshow that the governmental act assailed, far from being inspired





by the attainment of the common weal was prompted by the spiritof hostility, or at the very least, discrimination that finds no supportin reason. To quote from the Tuason decision anew "that the lawsoperate equally and uniformly on all persons under similar circumstances or that all persons must be treated in the samemanner, the conditions not being different, both in the privilegesconferred and the liabilities imposed. Favoritism and unduepreference cannot be allowed. For the principle is that equalprotection and security shall be given to every person under circumstances which, if not Identical, are analogous.

The premise underlying petitioner's contention on this point is setforth in his memorandum thus: " 1. The Sandiganbayanproceedings violates petitioner's right to equal protection,because - appeal as a matter of right became minimized into amere matter of discretion; - appeal likewise was shrunk andlimited only to questions of law, excluding a review of the factsand trial evidence; and - there is only one chance to appealconviction, by certiorari to the Supreme Court, instead of thetraditional two chances; while all other estafa indictees areentitled to appeal as a matter of right covering both law and factsand to two appellate courts, i.e., first to the Court of Appeals andthereafter to the Supreme Court." ,that is hardly convincing,considering that the classification satisfies the test requiring that it"must be based on substantial distinctions which make realdifferences; it must be germane to the purposes of the law; it mustnot be limited to existing conditions only, and must apply equallyto each member of the class. The Constitution specifically

mentions the creation of a special court, the Sandiganbayanprecisely in response to a problem, the urgency of which cannotbe denied, namely, dishonesty in the public service. It follows thatthose who may thereafter be tried by such court ought to havebeen aware as far back as January 17, 1973, when the presentConstitution came into force, that a different procedure for theaccused therein, whether a private citizen as petitioner is or apublic official, is not necessarily offensive to the equal protectionclause of the Constitution. WHEREFORE, the petition isdismissed.

GR No. 142030, April 21, 2005GALLARDO VS. PEOPLE

FACTS: Atty. Victor dela Serna, for and in behalf of the Public Health

Workers (PHWs) of Bansalan, Davao del Sur, filed with the Officeof the Ombudsman-Mindanao a sworn letter-complaint chargingherein petitioners Mayor Gallardo, the vice mayor, SanggunianBayan members, all public officers of the Municipality of Bansalan, Davao del Sur, with violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 for their alleged refusal to appropriate inthe municipal budget the amount representing payment of themandatory statutory obligations of the Municipality of Bansalanaccruing to the complaining PHWs in the nature of unpaid salarydifferential and magna carta benefits.

The information filed with the Sandiganbayan stated that hereinpetitioners caused undue injury to the Public Health Workers(PHWs) of the Municipality of Bansalan, by refusing to performtheir duties to include an appropriation in the municipal budget for the payment of the mandatory statutory obligations of theMunicipality of Bansalan due to the complaining PHWs in thenature of unpaid salary differential and magna carta benefits in

the aggregate amount of P3,833,798.10. Petitioners filed a Motion for Reinvestigation. The Sandiganbayan

granted the motion. A special prosecutor recommended thedismissal of the case but Ombudsman Aniano A. Desiertodisapproved the recommendation. The Sandiganbayan deniedpetitioners’ motion.

ISSUE: WON the petitioners are denied due process and not accordedthe equal protection of laws.

HELD: Petitioners claimed that they were denied due process because

Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto disapproved the

recommendation of the special prosecutor. The Ombudsman, contrary to the investigating prosecutor’s

conclusion, was of the conviction that petitioners are probablyguilty of the offense charged, and for this, he is not required toconduct an investigation anew. Whatever course of action that theOmbudsman may take, whether to approve or to disapprove therecommendation of the investigating prosecutor, is but anexercise of his discretionary powers based upon constitutionamandate.[17] Generally, courts should not interfere in suchexercise.

The equal protection clause requires that the law operatesuniformly on all persons under similar circumstances or that alpersons are treated in the same manner, the conditions not beingdifferent, both in privileges conferred and the liabilities imposed. Iallows reasonable classification. If the classification ischaracterized by real and substantial differences, one class maybe treated differently from another. Simply because therespondent Ombudsman dismissed some cases allegedly similato the case at bar is not sufficient to impute arbitrariness ocaprice on his part, absent a clear showing that he gravelyabused his discretion in pursuing the instant case. TheOmbudsman dismissed those cases because he believed therewere no sufficient grounds for the accused therein to undergotrial. On the other hand, he recommended the filing oappropriate information against petitioners because there areample grounds to hold them for trial. He was only exercising hispower and discharging his duty based upon the constitutiona

mandate of his office. WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSEDfor lack of merit

PUBLIC POLICY

[G.R. No. 157279. August 9, 2005.]PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK vs. GIOVANNI PALMA ET AL.

FACTS:

PNB was formerly a government owned and controlledcorporation but on 26 May 1996, it was already privatized andincorporated as a private commercial bank.

R.A. 6758, 'An Act Prescribing a Revised Compensation andPosition Classification System in the Government' took effect on 1July 1989 covering all government owned corporations. Section12 thereof provides for the consolidation of allowances andadditional compensation into standardized salary rates, bucertain additional compensation were exempted fromconsolidation. In the present case, the Salary StandardizationLaw clearly provides that the claimed benefits shall continue to begranted only to employees who were "incumbents" as of July 11989.

"The Department of Budget and Management (DBM) issuedCorporate Compensation Circular No. 10 (DBM-CCC No. 10) toimplement R.A. 6758. On 12 August 1998, the Supreme Court, inthe case of Rodolfo S. de Jesus, et al. of the Local Water Utilities

Administration (LWUA) vs. Commission on Audit held that DBMCCC No. 10 was ineffective due to its non-publication in theOfficial Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation.

"In view of the declaration made by the Supreme Court in theabove-mentioned case, a petition for mandamus was filed byrespondents on 20 December 1999. Respondents alleged, tha

they are employees hired by PNB on various dates after 30 June1989; that from the dates of their respective appointments until 1January 1997 they were unjustly deprived and denied of theallowances being enjoyed by other employees of PNB. Accordingto respondents, the declaration that DBM-CCC No. 10 wasineffective paved the way to their entitlement to theallowances/fringe benefits. The withholding of their entitlement tothe same benefits is an unfair discrimination and a violation ofrespondents' rights to the equal protection clause of theConstitution since incumbents or employees of PNB who werealready in the service as of 1 July 1989 received the benefits andallowances. To rectify the injustice against respondents issuedGeneral Circular No. 1-312/97 on 14 March 1997, extending the





benefits to respondents effective 1 January 1997. ButRespondents contend that extending to them theallowances/fringe benefits meant that they are entitled to thepayment of the same and, hence, they should be given their allowances reckoned not only from 1 January 1997 but from thedate of their respective appointment, to which PNB did not accedeto. The trial court ruled in favor of the Respondents, and the Courtof Appeals denied petitioner’s appeal. Thus, this instant petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondents are entitled to the questioned

fringe benefitsHELD:

The respondents were not entitled to the benefits because theywere hired only after JUNE 30 1989. An incumbent is a personwho is in present possession of an office.

Finally, to explain what July 1, 1989 pertained to, we held in theprior cases as follows: The date July 1, 1989 becomes crucialonly to determine that as of said date, the officer was anincumbent and was receiving the RATA, for purposes of entitlinghim to its continued grant." Respondents were not deemedincumbents as defined by settled jurisprudence. Petitioner wascorrect in contending that by extending the assailed benefits torespondents on January 1, 1997, it was not thereby admitting thatthe latter were priorly entitled to them. It contends that itsprivatization on May 27, 1996 enabled it to grant benefits as itdeemed fit. It could not have granted them while it was still a

government agency, because RA 6758 barred such grant as anillegal disbursement of public funds. It allegedly accorded themthose benefits, not because it had finally acceded to their interpretation of the law, but because it was only then that — as aprivate entity — it could legally do so.

The collateral attack on the constitutionality of RA 6758 due toalleged violation of the equal protection clause cannot prosper,because constitutionality issues must be pleaded directly — notcollaterally. Furthermore, the constitutional issue was not raised inthe trial court; hence, it cannot now be availed of on appeal to thisCourt. Besides, the arguments of respondents rest upon thevalidity of Section 12 of RA 6758. How then can they nowchallenge the very basis of their arguments?

A law is deemed valid unless declared null and void by acompetent court; more so when the issue has not been dulypleaded in the trial court. The question of constitutionality must be

raised at the earliest opportunity. Respondents not only failed tochallenge the constitutionality of RA 6758; worse, they used it inseeking compensation from petitioner. The settled rule is thatcourts will not anticipate a question of constitutional law inadvance of the necessity of deciding it.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED.

[G.R. No. 148208. December 15, 2004.]CENTRAL BANK (now Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas) EMPLOYEESASSOCIATION, INC., vs. BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS andthe EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

FACTS: Almost eight years after the effectivity of R.A. No. 7653 or the NewCentral Bank Act, petitioner Central Bank Employees Association, Inc.,filed a petition for prohibition against respondents Bangko Sentral ngPilipinas (BSP) and the Executive Secretary of the Office of thePresident, to restrain them from further implementing the last proviso inSection 15(c), Article II of R.A. No. 7653, on the ground that it isunconstitutional because the classification of BSP employees providedby law is unreasonable, arbitrary, capricious, and violative of the equalprotection clause of the Constitution. The thrust of petitioner'schallenge is that the assailed proviso makes an unconstitutional cutbetween two classes of employees in the BSP, viz: (1) the BSP officersor those exempted from the coverage of R.A. No. 6758 or the SalaryStandardization Law (SSL) (exempt class); and (2) the rank-and-file(Salary Grade [SG] 19 and below), or those not exempted from thecoverage of the SSL (non-exempt class). Petitioner contended that theclassification is "a classic case of class legislation," allegedly not basedon substantial distinctions which make real differences, but solely on

the SG of the BSP personnel's position. Petitioner further contendedthat the assailed proviso is also violative of the equal protection clausebecause after it was enacted, the charters of the Government ServiceInsurance System, Land Bank of the Philippines, Development Bank othe Philippines and Social Security System were also amended, andtheir respective personnel were all exempted from the coverage of theSSL. Thus, within the class of rank-and-file personnel of GovernmenFinancial Institutions (GFI), the BSP rank-and-file employees are alsodiscriminated upon.

ISSUE: Whether or not a provision of law, initially valid, can becomesubsequently unconstitutional, on the ground that its continuedoperation would violate the equal protection of the law

HELD:

Supreme Court held that with the passage of the subsequent lawsamending the charter of seven (7) other governmental financiainstitutions (GFIs), the continued operation of the last proviso ofSection 15(c), Article II of R.A. No. 7653, constitutes invidiousdiscrimination on the 2,994 rank-and-file employees of the BSP.

The Supreme Court struck down the assailed proviso and heldthat with the passage of the subsequent laws amending thecharter of seven (7) other governmental financial institutions(GFIs), the continued operation of the last proviso of Section15(c), Article II of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7653, constitutesinvidious discrimination on the 2,994 rank-and-file employees ofthe Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas. The disparity of treatmen

between BSP rank-and-file and the rank-and-file of the otheseven GFIs definitely bears the unmistakable badge of invidiousdiscrimination. No one can, with candor and fairness, deny thediscriminatory character of the subsequent blanket and totaexemption of the seven other GFIs from the SSL when such waswithheld from the BSP. Alikes are being treated as unalikeswithout any rational basis. The Court emphasized that the equaprotection clause does not demand absolute equality but irequires that all persons shall be treated alike, under likecircumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred andliabilities enforced. Favoritism and undue preference cannot beallowed. For the principle is that equal protection and securityshall be given to every person under circumstances which, if notidentical, are analogous. If law be looked upon in terms of burdenor charges, those that fall within a class should be treated in thesame fashion; whatever restrictions cast on some in the group is

equally binding on the rest. With the lack of real and substantiadistinctions that would justify the unequal treatment between therank-and-file of BSP from the seven other GFIs, it is clear that theenactment of the seven subsequent charters has rendered thecontinued application of the challenged proviso anathema to theequal protection of the law, and the same should be declared asan outlaw.

Wherefor, the continued operation and implementation of the lasproviso of Section 15(c), Article II of Republic Act No. 7653 is heldunconstitutional.

[G.R. No. 56515. April 3, 1981.]UNITED DEMOCRATIC OPPOSITION (UNIDO), vs. COMMISSIONON ELECTIONS

FACTS:Petitioner United Democratic Opposition (UNIDO), in two letter

requests to the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) dated March 10and 17,1981, asked for exactly the same opportunity, the same primetime and the same number of television and radio stations all over thecountry to be used in its campaign for "NO" votes in the plebiscite forthe amendments to the 1973 Constitution proposed by the BatasangPambansa as that utilized by President Marcos in his nationwide"Pulong-Pulong sa Pangulo" in campaigning for "YES" votes on theproposed constitutional amendments. The Commission, in itsResolution of March 18, 1981 denied petitioner's "demand'' being othe view that the President's remarks on the proposed amendments inthe forementioned radio-television program carried live by twenty-six(26) television and two hundred forty-eight (248) radio stationsthroughout the country were initiated under his leadership and capacity





as President/prime Minister in the exercise of his constitutionalprerogative to determine the program and guidelines of national policypursuant to Article IX, Section 2 of the Constitution and not as the headof any political party. Petitioner's Motion for reconsideration provedfutile, hence this present action, assailing the Comelec's resolutions ascontrary to the Constitution, unjust, unfair and inequitable for violatingthe basic principles of equality, good faith and fair play, the same notconducive to insure a free, orderly and honest elections.

ISSUE: Whether or not COMELEC violated the equal protection clause

for denying UNIDO the same air time in Media as that of the Presidentin campaigning for the “NO” votes in the plebiscite for the amendmentsto the 1973 Contstitution.

HELD:The Supreme Court, in dismissing the appeal, held that when thePresident spoke in the nation-wide program "Pulong-Pulong saPangulo" on March 21, 1981, he did so in his capacity as President-Prime Minister and not as the head of the KBL; and that what petitioner asks cannot be granted for being beyond what the charter, the lawsand pertinent Comelec regulations contemplate, for being more thanwhat the opposition is duly entitled vis-a-vis the duty, obligation and/or privilege inherent in the head of state to directly dialogue with thesovereign people when the occasion demands, for being impracticalunder prevailing circumstance, and for its failure to join in the petitionthe television and radio stations as indispensable parties, therebydepriving the Court of jurisdiction to act.

Appeal dismissed.

227 SCRA 703 (1993)PJA VS PRADO*no case digest submitted*

248 SCRA 700, 1995OLIVAREZ VS. SANDIGANBAYAN*no case digest submitted*

GR No. 127410, January 20, 1999TIU VS. COURT OF APPEALS*no case digest submitted*

G.R. No. 132527. July 29, 2005COCONUT OIL REFINERS ASSOCIATION, INC. et al vs. RUBENTORRES, as Executive Secretary, et al

FACTS:On March 13, 1992, RA No. 7227 was enacted, providing for, amongother things, the sound and balanced conversion of the Clark andSubic military reservations and their extensions into alternativeproductive uses in the form of special economic zones in order topromote the economic and social development of Central Luzon inparticular and the country in general. The law contains provisions ontax exemptions for importations of raw materials, capital andequipment. After which the President issued several Executive Ordersas mandated by the law for the implementation of RA 7227. Hereinpetitioners contend the validity of the tax exemption provided for in thelaw.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Executive Orders issued by President for the implementation of the tax exemptions constitutes executive

legislation.

HELD:

To limit the tax-free importation privilege of enterprises locatedinside the special economic zone only to raw materials, capitaland equipment clearly runs counter to the intention of theLegislature to create a free port where the “free flow of goods or capital within, into, and out of the zones” is insured.The phrase “tax and duty-free importations of raw materials,capital and equipment” was merely cited as an example of incentives that may be given to entities operating within the zone.Public respondent SBMA correctly argued that the maximexpressio unius est exclusio alterius, on which petitioners

impliedly rely to support their restrictive interpretation, does noapply when words are mentioned by way of example. It is obviousfrom the wording of RA No. 7227, particularly the use of thephrase “such as,” that the enumeration only meant to illustrateincentives that the SSEZ is authorized to grant, in line with itsbeing a free port zone.

The Court finds that the setting up of such commerciaestablishments which are the only ones duly authorized to selconsumer items tax and duty-free is still well within the policyenunciated in Section 12 of RA No. 7227 that “. . .the Subic

Special Economic Zone shall be developed into a self-sustainingindustrial, commercial, financial and investment center togenerate employment opportunities in and around the zone andto attract and promote productive foreign investments.” Howeverthe Court reiterates that the second sentences of paragraphs 1.2and 1.3 of Executive Order No. 97-A, allowing tax and duty-freeremoval of goods to certain individuals, even in a limited amountfrom the Secured Area of the SSEZ, are null and void for beingcontrary to Section 12 of RA No. 7227. Said Section clearlyprovides that “exportation or removal of goods from the territory othe Subic Special Economic Zone to the other parts of thePhilippine territory shall be subject to customs duties and taxesunder the Customs and Tariff Code and other relevant tax laws othe Philippines.”

G.R. No. 128845. June 1, 2000ISAE v. Hon. Leonardo A. Quisumbing

FACTS:Private respondent, International School Inc. is a domestic educationainstitution established primarily for dependents of foreign diplomaticpersonnel and other temporary residents. The school hires both foreignand local teachers as members of its faculty, classifying them asforeign-hires and local-hires. The local-hire faculty members of saidInternational School, mostly Filipinos, complained against the bettetreatment of their colleagues who have been hired abroad. Theseforeign-hires enjoy certain benefits not accorded the local-hires whichinclude housing, transportation, shipping costs, taxes, home leavetravel allowance and a salary rate 25% higher than that of the local-hires. Petitioner claims that the point-of-hire classification employed bythe school is discriminatory to Filipinos and that the grant of highersalaries to foreign-hires constitutes racial discrimination.

ISSUE: Whether or not the classification employed by the respondenschool constitutes racial discrimination.

Held: YES. The Constitution in the Article on Social Justice and Human

Rights exhorts Congress to "give highest priority to the enactmenof measures that protect and enhance the right of all people tohuman dignity, reduce social, economic, and political inequalities.The very broad Article 19 of the Civil Code requires every person"in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties[to] act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honestyand good faith."

The Constitution also directs the State to promote "equality oemployment opportunities for all." Similarly, the Labor Codeprovides that the State shall "ensure equal work opportunitiesregardless of sex, race or creed." It would be an affront to both

the spirit and letter of these provisions if the State, in spite of itsprimordial obligation to promote and ensure equal employmenopportunities, closes its eyes to unequal and discriminatory termsand conditions of employment.

In this case, the point-of-hire classification employed byrespondent school to justify the distinction in the salary rates oforeign-hires and local hires is an invalid classification. There isno reasonable distinction between the services rendered byforeign-hires and local-hires. The practice of the School oaccording higher salaries to foreign-hires contravenes publicpolicy and, certainly, does not deserve the sympathy of this Court

The foregoing provisions impregnably institutionalize in this jurisdiction the long honored legal truism of "equal pay for equa





work." Persons who work with substantially equal qualifications,skill, effort and responsibility, under similar conditions, should bepaid similar salaries. This rule applies to the School, its"international character" notwithstanding. If an employer accordsemployees the same position and rank, the presumption is thatthese employees perform equal work. This presumption is borneby logic and human experience. If the employer pays oneemployee less than the rest, it is not for that employee to explainwhy he receives less or why the others receive more. That wouldbe adding insult to injury. The employer has discriminated against

that employee; it is for the employer to explain why the employeeis treated unfairly.

GR. No. 143076. June 10, 2003PHILRECA vs. DILG

FACTS:On May 23, 2003, a class suit was filed by petitioners in their ownbehalf and in behalf of other electric cooperatives organized andexisting under PD 269 which are members of petitioner PhilippineRural Electric Cooperatives Association, Inc. (PHILRECA). The other petitioners, electric cooperatives of Agusan del Norte (ANECO), Iloilo 1(ILECO 1) and Isabela 1 (ISELCO 1) are non-stock, non-profit electriccooperatives organized and existing under PD 269, as amended, andregistered with the National Electrification Administration (NEA).Under Sec. 39 of PD 269 electric cooperatives shall be exempt fromthe payment of all National Government, local government, and

municipal taxes and fee, including franchise, fling recordation, licenseor permit fees or taxes and any fees, charges, or costs involved in anycourt or administrative proceedings in which it may be party.From 1971to 1978, in order to finance the electrification projectsenvisioned by PD 269, as amended, the Philippine Government, actingthrough the National Economic council and the NEA, entered into sixloan agreements with the government of the United States of America,through the United States Agency for International Development(USAID) with electric cooperatives as beneficiaries. The loanagreements contain similarly worded provisions on the tax applicationof the loan and any property or commodity acquired through theproceeds of the loan.Petitioners allege that with the passage of the Local Government Codetheir tax exemptions have been validly withdrawn. Particularly,petitioners assail the validity of Sec. 193 and 234 of the said code.Sec. 193 provides for the withdrawal of tax exemption privilegesgranted to all persons, whether natural or juridical, except cooperativesduly registered under RA 6938, while Sec. 234 exempts the samecooperatives from payment of real property tax.

ISSUES:1. WON the Local Government Code (under Sec. 193 and 234)

violated the equal protection clause since the provisions undulydiscriminate against petitioners who are duly registeredcooperatives under PD 269, as amended, and no under RA 6938or the Cooperatives Code of the Philippines?

2. Is there an impairment of the obligations of contract under theloan entered into between the Philippine and the USGovernments?

HELD:1. No. The guaranty of the equal protection clause is not violated by

a law based on a reasonable classification. Classification, to be

reasonable must (a) rest on substantial classifications; (b)germane to the purpose of the law; c) not limited to the existingconditions only; and (d) apply equally to all members of the sameclass. We hold that there is reasonable classification under theLocal Government Code to justify the different tax treatmentbetween electric cooperatives covered by PD 269 and electriccooperatives under RA 6938.First, substantial distinctions exist between cooperatives under PD 269 and those under RA 6938. In the former, the governmentis the one that funds those so-called electric cooperatives, whilein the latter, the members make equitable contribution as sourceof funds.a. Capital Contributions by Members – Nowhere in PD 269 does it

require cooperatives to make equitable contributions to capitalPetitioners themselves admit that to qualify as a member of anelectric cooperative under PD 269, only the payment of a P5.00membership fee is required which is even refundable the momenthe member is no longer interested in getting electric service fromthe cooperative or will transfer to another place outside the areacovered by the cooperative. However, under the CooperativeCode, the articles of cooperation of a cooperative applying forregistration must be accompanied with the bonds of theaccountable officers and a sworn statement of the treasure

elected by the subscribers showing that at least 25% of theauthorized share capital has been subscribed and at least 25% othe total subscription has been paid and in no case shall the paidup share capital be less than P2,000.00.b. Extent of Government Control over Cooperatives – The extenof government control over electric cooperatives covered by PD269 is largely a function of the role of the NEA as a primarysource of funds of these electric cooperatives. Amendments wereprimarily geared to expand the powers of NEA over the electriccooperatives to ensure that loans granted to them would berepaid to the government. In contrast, cooperatives under RA6938 are envisioned to be self-sufficient and independenorganizations with minimal government intervention or regulation.Second, the classification of tax-exempt entities in the LocaGovernment Code is germane to the purpose of the law. TheConstitutional mandate that “every local government unit shalenjoy local autonomy,” does not mean that the exercise of the

power by the local governments is beyond the regulation oCongress. Sec. 193 of the LGC is indicative of the legislativeintent to vet broad taxing powers upon the local government unitsand to limit exemptions from local taxation to entities specificallyprovided therein.Finally, Sec. 193 and 234 of the LGC permit reasonableclassification as these exemptions are not limited to existingconditions and apply equally to all members of the same class.

2. No. It is ingrained in jurisprudence that the constitutionaprohibition on the impairment of the obligations of contracts doesnot prohibit every change in existing laws. To fall within theprohibition, the change must not only impair the obligation of theexisting contract, but the impairment must be substantialMoreover, to constitute impairment, the law must affect a changein the rights of the parties with reference to each other and nowith respect to non-parties.The quoted provision under the loan agreement does not purporto grant any tax exemption in favor of any party to the contractincluding the beneficiaries thereof. The provisions simply shift thetax burden, if any, on the transactions under the loan agreementsto the borrower and/or beneficiary of the loan. Thus, thewithdrawal by the Local Government Code under Sec. 193 and234 of the tax exemptions previously enjoyed by petitioners doesnot impair the obligation of the borrower, the lender or thebeneficiary under the loan agreements as, in fact, no taxexemption is granted therein.

GR Nos. 133640, 133661 and 139147, 25 November 2005,RODOLFO S. BELTRAN vs. SECRETARY OF HEALTH

FACTS:

Republic Act No. 7719 or the National Blood Services Act of 1994was enacted into law on April 2, 1994. The Act seeks to provide

an adequate supply of safe blood by promoting voluntary blooddonation and by regulating blood banks in the country. It wasapproved by then President Fidel V. Ramos on May 15, 1994 andwas subsequently published in the Official Gazette on August 181994. The law took effect on August 23, 1994. On April 28, 1995

Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1995, constituting theImplementing Rules and Regulations of said law was promulgatedby respondent Secretary of the Department of Health (DOH).

Section 7 of R.A. 7719 provides, Phase-out of CommerciaBlood Banks - All commercial blood banks shall be phased-ouover a period of two (2) years after the effectivity of this Actextendable to a maximum period of two (2) years by theSecretary.”





Section 23. Process of Phasing Out. -- The Department shalleffect the phasing-out of all commercial blood banks over a periodof two (2) years, extendible for a maximum period of two (2) yearsafter the effectivity of R.A. 7719. The decision to extend shall bebased on the result of a careful study and review of the bloodsupply and demand and public safety.”

Years prior to the passage of the National Blood Services Act of 1994, petitioners have already been operating commercial bloodbanks under Republic Act No. 1517, entitled “An Act Regulatingthe Collection, Processing and Sale of Human Blood, and the

Establishment and Operation of Blood Banks and BloodProcessing Laboratories.” The law, which was enacted on June 16, 1956, allowed the

establishment and operation by licensed physicians of bloodbanks and blood processing laboratories.

On May 20, 1998, prior to the expiration of the licenses granted topetitioners, they filed a petition for certiorari with application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction or temporaryrestraining order under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assailing theconstitutionality and validity of the aforementioned Act and itsImplementing Rules and Regulations.

ISSUES:1. Whether or not Section 7 of RA 7719 constitutes undue

delegation of legislative powers2. Whether or not Section 7 of RA 7719 and its implementing rules

violate the equal protection clause3. Whether or not RA 7719 is a valid exercise of police power

HELD:

Petition granted. The assailed law and its implementing rules areconstitutional and valid.

Republic Act No. 7719 or the National Blood Services Act of 1994is complete in itself.

It is clear from the provisions of the Act that the Legislatureintended primarily to safeguard the health of the people and hasmandated several measures to attain this objective. One of theseis the phase out of commercial blood banks in the country.

The law has sufficiently provided a definite standard for theguidance of the Secretary of Health in carrying out its provisions,that is, the promotion of public health by providing a safe andadequate supply of blood through voluntary blood donation. The

Secretary of Health has been given, under Republic Act No. 7719,broad powers to execute the provisions of said Act. In this regard,the Secretary did not go beyond the powers granted to him by the

Act when said phase-out period was extended in accordance withthe Act as laid out in Section 2.

What may be regarded as a denial of the equal protection of thelaws is a question not always easily determined. No rule that willcover every case can be formulated. Class legislation,discriminating against some and favoring others is prohibited butclassification on a reasonable basis and not made arbitrarily or capriciously is permitted. The classification, however, to bereasonable: (a) must be based on substantial distinctions whichmake real differences; (b) must be germane to the purpose of thelaw; (c) must not be limited to existing conditions only; and, (d)must apply equally to each member of the class.

We deem the classification to be valid and reasonable for the

following reasons: First, it was based on substantial distinctions.Second, the classification, and the consequent phase out of commercial blood banks is germane to the purpose of the law,that is, to provide the nation with an adequate supply of safeblood by promoting voluntary blood donation and treating bloodtransfusion as a humanitarian or medical service rather than acommodity. Third, the Legislature intended for the generalapplication of the law. Its enactment was not solely to address thepeculiar circumstances of the situation nor was it intended toapply only to the existing conditions. Lastly, the law appliesequally to all commercial blood banks without exception.

The promotion of public health is a fundamental obligation of theState. The health of the people is a primordial governmental

concern. Basically, the National Blood Services Act was enactedin the exercise of the State’s police power in order to promote andpreserve public health and safety.

Based on the grounds raised by petitioners to challenge theconstitutionality of the National Blood Services Act of 1994 and itsImplementing Rules and Regulations, the Court finds thapetitioners have failed to overcome the presumption oconstitutionality of the law. As to whether the Act constitutes awise legislation, considering the issues being raised bypetitioners, is for Congress to determine.

GR No. 158793, June 8, 2006Mirasol v. Department of Public Works and Highways

FACTS:

On January 10, 2001, petitioners filed before the trial court aPetition for Declaratory Judgment with Application for TemporaryRestraining Order and Injunction docketed as Civil Case No. 01034. The petition sought the declaration of nullity of the followingadministrative issuances for being inconsistent with the provisionsof Republic Act 2000, entitled "Limited Access Highway Actenacted in 1957:

a. DPWH Administrative Order No. 1, Series of 1968;b. DPWH Department Order No. 74, Series of 1993;c. Art. II, Sec. 3(a) of the Revised Rules on Limited AccessFacilities promulgated in 199[8] by the DPWH thru the TolRegulatory Board (TRB).

Previously, pursuant to its mandate under R.A. 2000, DPWHissued on June 25, 1998 Department Order (DO) No. 215declaring the Manila-Cavite (Coastal Road) Toll Expressway aslimited access facilities.

Accordingly, petitioners filed an Amended Petition on February 82001 wherein petitioners sought the declaration of nullity of thesaid administrative issuances. Moreover, petitioners prayed fothe issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or preliminaryinjunction to prevent the enforcement of the total ban onmotorcycles along the entire breadth of North and South LuzonExpressways and the Manila-Cavite (Coastal Road) ToExpressway under DO 215.

On June 28, 2001, the trial court, thru then Presiding JudgeTeofilo Guadiz, after due hearing, issued an order grantingpetitioners’ application for preliminary injunction. On July 162001, a writ of preliminary injunction was issued by the trial court

conditioned upon petitioners’ filing of cash bond in the amount oP100,000.00, which petitioners subsequently complied with. On July 18, 2001, the DPWH acting thru the TRB, issued

Department Order No. 123 allowing motorcycles with enginedisplacement of 400 cubic centimeters inside limited accessfacilities (toll ways).

Upon the assumption of Honorable Presiding Judge Ma. CristinaCornejo, both the petitioners and respondents were required tofile their respective Memoranda. Petitioners likewise filed [theirSupplemental Memorandum. Thereafter, the case was deemedsubmitted for decision.

Consequently, on March 10, 2003, the trial court issued theassailed decision dismissing the petition but declaring invalid DO123. Petitioners moved for a reconsideration of the dismissal oftheir petition; but it was denied by the trial court in its Order datedJune 16, 2003.

Hence, this petition.ISSUES:1. Whether DO 74, DO 215 and the TRB regulations contravene RA

20002. Whether AO 1 and DO 123 are unconstitutional

HELD:

The Supreme Court declared constitutional AO 1, issued by thethen Department of Public Works and Communications onFebruary 19, 1968, that bans the use of bicycles, tricyclespedicabs, motorcycles, or any nonmotorized vehicle on limitedaccess highways. The Court explained that since the tollway is





not an ordinary road, the same “necessitates the imposition of guidelines in the manner of its use and operation.”

On the other hand, the Court declared unconstitutional and inviolation of “The Limited Access Highway Act” (RA 2000)Department Orders 74 and 215 released by the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) as well as the RevisedRules and Regulations on Limited Access Facilities of the TollRegulatory Board (TRB). Department Orders 74 and 215, dated

April 5, 1993 and June 25, 1998, respectively, declared the Northand South Luzon (DO 74), and the Manila-Cavite Toll

Expressways (DO 215) as limited access facilities. The Courtexplained that at the time DPWH issued these orders, it no longer had authority to regulate activities related to transportation.

In contrast, AO 1 was issued in 1968 by the then Department of Public Works and Communications when it had the authority toregulate limited access facilities.

Likewise, the Court upheld the decision of the Makati CityRegional Trial Court, Branch 147 declaring DO 123, which limitsaccess to the above expressways to only 400cc motorcycles, asunconstitutional for want of authority of the DPWH to promulgatethe said order.

G.R. No. 132875-76, February 3, 2000People vs. Jalosjos

FACTS:The accused-appellant, Romeo Jalosjos, is a full-fledged member of Congress who is confined at the national penitentiary while hisconviction for statutory rape and acts of lasciviousness is pendingappeal. The accused-appellant filed a motion asking that he be allowedto fully discharge the duties of a Congressman, including attendance atlegislative sessions and committee meetings despite his having beenconvicted in the first instance of a non-bailable offense on the basis of popular sovereignty and the need for his constituents to berepresented.

ISSUE: Whether or not accused-appellant should be allowed todischarge mandate as member of House of Representatives

HELD:

Election is the expression of the sovereign power of the people.However, inspite of its importance, the privileges and rights

arising from having been elected may be enlarged or restricted bylaw. The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and members

of the House of Representatives arises from a provision of theConstitution. The privilege has always been granted in arestrictive sense. The provision granting an exemption as aspecial privilege cannot be extended beyond the ordinarymeaning of its terms. It may not be extended by intendment,implication or equitable considerations.

The accused-appellant has not given any reason why he shouldbe exempted from the operation of Sec. 11, Art. VI of theConstitution. The members of Congress cannot compel absentmembers to attend sessions if the reason for the absence is alegitimate one. The confinement of a Congressman charged witha crime punishable by imprisonment of more than six years is notmerely authorized by law, it has constitutional foundations. Toallow accused-appellant to attend congressional sessions andcommittee meetings for 5 days or more in a week will virtuallymake him a free man with all the privileges appurtenant to hisposition. Such an aberrant situation not only elevates accused-appellant’s status to that of a special class, it also would be amockery of the purposes of the correction system.

GR No. 179817, June 27, 2008Trillanes vs Pimentel

FACTS:

At the wee hours of July 27, 2003, a group of more than 300heavily armed soldiers led by junior officers of the Armed Forcesof the Philippines (AFP) stormed into the Oakwood Premier

Apartments in Makati City and publicly demanded the resignationof the President and key national officials.

Later in the day, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo issuedProclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4 declaring a stateof rebellion and calling out the Armed Forces to suppress therebellion.[1] A series of negotiations quelled the teeming tensionand eventually resolved the impasse with the surrender of themilitant soldiers that evening.

In the aftermath of this eventful episode dubbed as the "Oakwood

Incident," petitioner Antonio F. Trillanes IV was charged, alongwith his comrades, with coup d'etat defined under Article 134-A othe Revised Penal Code before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) oMakati.

Close to four years later, petitioner, who has remained indetention, threw his hat in the political arena and won a seat inthe Senate with a six-year term commencing at noon on June 302007.

Before the commencement of his term or on June 22, 2007petitioner filed with the RTC, Makati City, Branch 148, an"Omnibus Motion for Leave of Court to be Allowed to AttendSenate Sessions and Related Requests”

The trial court denied all the requests in the Omnibus Motion.Petitioner moved for reconsideration in which he waived hisrequests in paragraphs (b), (c) and (f) to thus trim them down tothree.[7] The trial court just the same denied the motion.

The present petition for certiorari to set aside the two Orders othe trial court, and for prohibition and mandamus.

ISSUE: Whether or not the "Omnibus Motion for Leave of Court to be Allowed to Attend Senate Sessions and Related Requestsconstitutional.

HELD:

The functions and duties of the office are not substantiadistinctions which lift one from the class of prisoners interrupted intheir freedom and restricted in liberty of movement.

It cannot be gainsaid that a person charged with a crime is takeninto custody for purposes of the administration of justice. No lessthan the Constitution provides.

All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable byreclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, beforeconviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on

recognizance as may be provided by law. It is uncontroverted that petitioner's application for bail and fo

release on recognizance was denied. The determination that theevidence of guilt is strong, whether ascertained in a hearing of anapplication for bail or imported from a trial court's judgment ofconviction, justifies the detention of an accused as a validcurtailment of his right to provisional liberty.

He must be detained in jail during the pendency of the caseagainst him, unless he is authorized by the court to be releasedon bail or on recognizance. Let it be stressed that all prisonerswhether under preventive detention or serving final sentence cannot practice their profession nor engage in any business ooccupation, or hold office, elective or appointive, while indetention. This is a necessary consequence of arrest anddetention.

Petitioner pleads for the same liberal treatment accorded certain

detention prisoners who have also been charged with nonbailable offenses, like former President Joseph Estrada andformer Governor Nur Misuari who were allowed to attend "sociafunctions." Finding no rhyme and reason in the denial of the moreserious request to perform the duties of a Senator, petitioneharps on an alleged violation of the equal protection clause.

In arguing against maintaining double standards in the treatmenof detention prisoners, petitioner expressly admits that heintentionally did not seek preferential treatment in the form obeing placed under Senate custody or house arrest, yet he at thesame time, gripes about the granting of house arrest to others.\

Allowing accused-appellant to attend congressional sessions andcommittee meetings for five (5) days or more in a week wil


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virtually make him a free man with all the privileges appurtenantto his position. Such an aberrant situation not only elevatesaccused-appellant's status to that of a special class, it also wouldbe a mockery of the purposes of the correction system.

G.R. No. 148571. September 24, 2002USA vs PURGANAN

FACTS:

Pursuant to the existing RP-US Extradition Treaty,# the United

States Government, through diplomatic channels, sent to thePhilippine Government Note Verbale No. 0522 dated June 16,1999, supplemented by Note Nos. 0597, 0720 and 0809 andaccompanied by duly authenticated documents requesting theextradition of Mark B. Jimenez, also known as Mario BatacanCrespo. Upon receipt of the Notes and documents, the secretaryof foreign affairs (SFA) transmitted them to the secretary of justice(SOJ) for appropriate action, pursuant to Section 5 of PresidentialDecree (PD) No. 1069, also known as the Extradition Law.

Upon learning of the request for his extradition, Jimenez soughtand was granted a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) by theRTC of Manila, Branch 25.# The TRO prohibited the Departmentof Justice (DOJ) from filing with the RTC a petition for hisextradition. The SOJ was ordered to furnish private respondentcopies of the extradition request and its supporting papers and togrant the latter a reasonable period within which to file a comment

and supporting evidence. The Court held that private respondent was bereft of the right to

notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the extraditionprocess.

Finding no more legal obstacle, the Government of the UnitedStates of America, represented by the Philippine DOJ, filed withthe RTC on May 18, 2001, the appropriate Petition for Extradition

In order to prevent the flight of Jimenez, the Petition prayed for the issuance of an order for his “immediate arrest” pursuant toSection 6 of PD No. 1069.

Before the RTC could act on the Petition, Respondent Jimenezfiled before it an “Urgent Manifestation/Ex-Parte Motion,”# whichprayed that petitioner’s application for an arrest warrant be set for hearing. The RTC granted the Motion of Jimenez and set thecase for hearing on June 5, 2001. In that hearing, petitioner manifested its reservations on the procedure adopted by the trial

court allowing the accused in an extradition case to be heard prior to the issuance of a warrant of arrest. In his Memorandum, Jimenez sought an alternative prayer: that in

case a warrant should issue, he be allowed to post bail in theamount of P100,000.

The Court directed the issuance of a warrant for his arrest andfixing bail for his temporary liberty at one million pesos in cash. #

After he had surrendered his passport and posted the requiredcash bond, Jimenez was granted provisional liberty via thechallenged Order dated July 4, 2001.

ISSUE: Whether or not being an elected member of the House of Representatives is compelling enough for the Court to grant hisrequest for provisional release on bail.

HELD:

After being taken into custody, potential extraditees may apply for bail. Since the applicants have a history of absconding, theyhave the burden of showing that (a) there is no flight risk and nodanger to the community; and (b) there exist special,humanitarian or compelling circumstances. The grounds used bythe highest court in the requesting state for the grant of bailtherein may be considered, under the principle of reciprocity as aspecial circumstance. In extradition cases, bail is not a matter of right; it is subject to judicial discretion in the context of the peculiar facts of each case.

In the ultimate analysis, the issue before us boils down to aquestion of constitutional equal protection.

The Constitution guarantees: ‘x x x nor shall any person be

denied the equal protection of laws.’ This simply means that apersons similarly situated shall be treated alike both in rightsenjoyed and responsibilities imposed. The organs of governmenmay not show any undue favoritism or hostility to any person.Neither partiality nor prejudice shall be displayed.

The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by publicofficers has never been an excuse to free a person validly [fromprison. The duties imposed by the ‘mandate of the people’ aremultifarious. The accused-appellant asserts that the duty tolegislate ranks highest in the hierarchy of government. The

accused-appellant is only one of 250 members of the House oRepresentatives, not to mention the 24 members of the Senatecharged with the duties of legislation. Congress continues tofunction well in the physical absence of one or a few of itsmembers.

A police officer must maintain peace and order. Never has thecall of a particular duty lifted a prisoner into a differenclassification from those others who are validly restrained by law.

A strict scrutiny of classifications is essential lest[,] wittingly ootherwise, insidious discriminations are made in favor of oagainst groups or types of individuals.

The Court cannot validate badges of inequality. The necessitiesimposed by public welfare may justify exercise of governmentauthority to regulate even if thereby certain groups may plausiblyassert that their interests are disregarded.

We, therefore, find that election to the position of Congressman isnot a reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement. Thefunctions and duties of the office are not substantial distinctionswhich lift him from the class of prisoners interrupted in theirfreedom and restricted in liberty of movement. Lawful arrest andconfinement are germane to the purposes of the law and apply toall those belonging to the same class.

GR No. 147387, December 10, 2003Farinas vs Executive Secretary

FACTS:

The petitioners come to the Court alleging in the main thaSection 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006, insofar as it repeals Section 67of the Omnibus Election Code, is unconstitutional for being inviolation of Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution, requiringevery law to have only one subject which should be expressed inits title.

According to the petitioners, the inclusion of Section 14 repealingSection 67 of the Omnibus Election Code in Rep. Act No. 9006constitutes a proscribed rider.

Rep. Act No. 9006 primarily deals with the lifting of the ban on theuse of media for election propaganda and the elimination of unfaielection practices, while Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Codeimposes a limitation on elective officials who run for an officeother than the one they are holding in a permanent capacity byconsidering them as ipso facto resigned therefrom upon filing othe certificate of candidacy. The repeal of Section 67 of theOmnibus Election Code is thus not embraced in the title, nogermane to the subject matter of Rep. Act No. 9006.

The petitioners also assert that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution because irepeals Section 67 only of the Omnibus Election Code, leavingintact Section 66 thereof which imposes a similar limitation to

appointive officials, thus: SEC. 66. Candidates holding appointive office or position. – Any

person holding a public appointive office or position, includingactive members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, andofficers and employees in government-owned or controlledcorporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from hisoffice upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.

They contend that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 discriminatesagainst appointive officials. By the repeal of Section 67, anelective official who runs for office other than the one which he isholding is no longer considered ipso facto resigned therefromupon filing his certificate of candidacy. Elective officials continuein public office even as they campaign for reelection or election


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for another elective position. On the other hand, Section 66 hasbeen retained; thus, the limitation on appointive officials remains -they are still considered ipso facto resigned from their officesupon the filing of their certificates of candidacy.

The respondents petitions contending, preliminarily, that thepetitioners have no legal standing to institute the present suit.

Invoking the “enrolled bill” doctrine. The signatures of the SenatePresident and the Speaker of the House, appearing on the billand the certification signed by the respective Secretaries of bothhouses of Congress, constitute proof beyond cavil that the bill

was duly enacted into law. The respondents contend that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006,

as it repeals Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, is not aproscribed rider nor does it violate Section 26(1) of Article VI of the Constitution. The title of Rep. Act No. 9006, “An Act toEnhance the Holding of Free, Orderly, Honest, Peaceful andCredible Elections through Fair Election Practices,” is so broadthat it encompasses all the processes involved in an electionexercise, including the filing of certificates of candidacy byelective officials.

ISSUE: Whether or not Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 violates theequal protection clause of the Constitution.

HELD:

The petitioners’ contention, that the repeal of Section 67 of theOmnibus Election Code pertaining to elective officials gives unduebenefit to such officials as against the appointive ones andviolates the equal protection clause of the constitution, is tenuous.

The equal protection of the law clause in the Constitution is notabsolute, but is subject to reasonable classification. If thegroupings are characterized by substantial distinctions that makereal differences, one class may be treated and regulateddifferently from the other.# The Court has explained the nature of the equal protection guarantee in this manner:

The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor andindividual or class privilege, as well as hostile discrimination or theoppression of inequality. It is not intended to prohibit legislationwhich is limited either in the object to which it is directed or byterritory within which it is to operate. It does not demand absoluteequality among residents; it merely requires that all persons shallbe treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both asto privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. The equal

protection clause is not infringed by legislation which applies onlyto those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies aliketo all persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exist for making a distinction between those who fall within such class andthose who do not.

Substantial distinctions clearly exist between elective officials andappointive officials. The former occupy their office by virtue of themandate of the electorate. They are elected to an office for adefinite term and may be removed therefrom only upon stringentconditions.# On the other hand, appointive officials hold their office by virtue of their designation thereto by an appointingauthority. Some appointive officials hold their office in apermanent capacity and are entitled to security of tenure # whileothers serve at the pleasure of the appointing authority.

Another substantial distinction between the two sets of officials isthat appointive officials, as officers and employees in the civil

service, are strictly prohibited from engaging in any partisanpolitical activity or take part in any election except to vote. Under the same provision, elective officials, or officers or employeesholding political offices, are obviously expressly allowed to takepart in political and electoral activities.

By repealing Section 67 but retaining Section 66 of the OmnibusElection Code, the legislators deemed it proper to treat these twoclasses of officials differently with respect to the effect on their tenure in the office of the filing of the certificates of candidacy for any position other than those occupied by them. Again, it is notwithin the power of the Court to pass upon or look into the wisdomof this classification.

Since the classification justifying Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006,

i.e., elected officials vis-a-vis appointive officials, is anchoredupon material and significant distinctions and all the personsbelonging under the same classification are similarly treated, theequal protection clause of the Constitution is, thus, not infringed.

In conclusion, it bears reiterating that one of the firmly entrenchedprinciples in constitutional law is that the courts do not involvethemselves with nor delve into the policy or wisdom of a statute.That is the exclusive concern of the legislative branch of thegovernment. When the validity of a statute is challenged onconstitutional grounds, the sole function of the court is to

determine whether it transcends constitutional limitations or thelimits of legislative power .# No such transgression has beenshown in this case.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED

GR No. 1288845, June 01, 2000INT’L SCHOOL ALLIANCE OF EDUCATORS VS QUISUMBING*no case digest submitted*


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enforceable and the answer is definitely in the affirmative.

HELD:

The salary check of a government officer or employee such as ateacher does not belong to him before it is physically delivered tohim. Until that time the check belongs to the Government.

Accordingly, before there is actual delivery of the check, thepayee has no power over it; he cannot assign it without theconsent of the Government. On this basis Circular No. 21 stands

on firm legal footing. Zafra's claim that the Circular impairs the obligation of contracts

with the teachers is baseless. For the Circular does not preventZafra from collecting the loans. The Circular merely makes theGovernment a non-participant in their collection which is within itscompetence to do.

ADMIN REG - RENTAL LAWS

G.R. No. 77365 April 7, 1992Caleon vs. Agus Development Corporation

FACTS:Respondent is the owner of a parcel of land which it leased topetitioner Rita Caleon for a monthly rental of P180.00. Petitioner

constructed on the lot leased a 4-door apartment building. Without theconsent of the private respondent, the petitioner sub-leased two of thefour doors of the apartment for a monthly rental of P350.00 each. Uponlearning of the sub-lease, private respondent through counseldemanded in writing that the petitioner vacate the leased premises. For failure of petitioner to comply with the demand, private respondent fileda complaint for ejectment against the petitioner citing as groundtherefor the provisions of Batas Pambansa Blg. 25, Section 5, which isthe unauthorized sub-leasing of part of the leased premises to thirdpersons without securing the consent of the lessor within the requiredsixty (60)-day period from the promulgation of the new law (B.P. 25).The petitioner argued that the said law cannot be applied becausethere is a perfected contract of lease without any express prohibition insubleasing which had been in effect between the parties long beforethe enactment of BP 25.

ISSUES:1. WON the petitioner violated the provisions of Section 5, Batas

Pambansa Blg. 25 which is a ground for Ejectment.2. WON Batas Pambansa Blg. 25 in application to the case at bar, is

unconstitutional as an impairment of the obligation of contracts.3. WON the petitioner can invoke the promotion of social justice

policy of the New Constitution.

HELD:

The issue has already been laid to rest in the case of Duellomevs. Gotico where the court ruled that the leased of the buildingnaturally includes the lease of the lot, and the rentals of thebuilding to the lot. Under our Civil Code, the occupancy of abuilding or house not only suggests or implies the tenancy or possession in fact on the land on which they are constructed. Inthe case at bar, it is beyond dispute that petitioner in leasing her apartment has also subleased the lot on which it is constructed

which lot belongs to private respondent. Consequently, she hasviolated the provisions of Section 5, Batas Pambansa Blg. 25which enumerates the grounds for judicial ejectment, amongwhich is the subleasing of residential units without the writtenconsent of the owner/lessor.

Well settled that all presumptions are indulged in favor of constitutionality; one who attacks a statute, allegingunconstitutionality must prove its invalidity beyond a reasonabledoubt.

In any event, it is now beyond question that the constitutionalguaranty of non-impairment of obligations of contract is limited byand subject to the exercise of police power of the state in theinterest of public health, safety, morals and general welfare. This

power can be activated at anytime to change the provisions of thecontract, or even abrogate it entirely, for the promotion oprotection of the general welfare. Such an act will not militateagainst the impairment clause, which is subject to and limited bythe paramount police power.

Batas Pambansa Blg. 25 is derived from P.D. No. 20 which hasbeen declared by this Court as a police power legislationapplicable to leases entered into prior to July 14, 1971 (effectivitydate of RA 6539), so that the applicability thereof to existingcontracts cannot be denied.

Finally, petitioner invokes, among others, the promotion of socia justice policy of the New Constitution. Like P.D. No. 20, theobjective of Batas Pambansa Blg. 25 is to remedy the plight olessees, but such objective is not subject to exploitation by thelessees for whose benefit the law was enacted. Thus, theprohibition provided for in the law against the sublease of thepremises without the consent of the owner. As enunciated by thisCourt, it must be remembered that social justice cannot beinvoked to trample on the rights of property owners, who undeour Constitution and laws are also entitled to protection. Thesocial justice consecrated in our Constitution was not intended totake away rights from a person and give them to another who isnot entitled thereto.

The petition is denied for lack of merit.

ADMIN REG - TAX EXEMPTIONS

G.R. No. 131359 May 5, 1999MERALCO vs. Province of Laguna and Benito Balazo

FACTS:

Province of Laguna by virtue of existing laws issued resolutionsthrough their respective municipal councils granting franchise infavor of petitioner Manila Electric Company (“MERALCO”) for thesupply of electric light, heat and power within their concernedareas.

On 1991, Republic Act No. 7160 was enacted to take effect on1992 enjoining local government units to create their own sourcesof revenue and to levy taxes, fees and charges, subject to thelimitations expressed therein, consistent with the basic policy oflocal autonomy. Pursuant to the provisions of the Code

respondent province enacted an Ordinance imposing a tax onbusiness enjoying a franchise, at a rate of fifty percent (50%) oone percent (1%) of the gross annual receipts, which shall includeboth cash sales and sales on account realized during thepreceding calendar year within this province, including theterritorial limits on any city located in the province.

Based on the ordinance, respondent Provincial Treasurer sent ademand letter to MERALCO for the corresponding tax paymentPetitioner paid the tax which is under protest. A formal claim forefund was thereafter sent by MERALCO to the ProvinciaTreasurer of Laguna claiming that the franchise tax it had paidand continued to pay to the National Government pursuant to P.D551 already included the franchise tax imposed by the ProvinciaTax Ordinance. MERALCO contended that the imposition of afranchise tax under Laguna Provincial Ordinance, contravenedthe provisions of Section 1 of P.D. 551 which provides, “Any

provision of law or local ordinance to the contrary

notwithstanding, the franchise tax payable by all grantees offranchises to generate, distribute and sell electric current for lightheat and power shall be two per cent (2%) of their gross receiptsreceived from the sale of electric current and from transactionsincident to the generation, distribution and sale of electriccurrent.*** Such franchise tax shall be payable…be in lieu of altaxes and assessments of whatever nature imposed by anynational or local authority on earnings, receipts, income andprivilege of generation, distribution and sale of electric current.”

The claim was denied; respondents relied on a more recent lawRepublic Act No. 7160 than the old decree invoked by petitioner.

Petitioner MERALCO filed a complaint for refund.





ISSUE: WON Laguna Provincial ordinance is violative of the non-impairment clause of the Constitution and of PD No. 551.

HELD:

Local governments do not have the inherent power to tax exceptto the extent that such power might be delegated to them either by the basic law or by statute. Under the now prevailingConstitution, where there is neither a grant nor a prohibition bystatute, the tax power must be deemed to exist althoughCongress may provide statutory limitations and guidelines. The

basic rationale for the current rule is to safeguard the viability andself-sufficiency of local government units by directly granting themgeneral and broad tax powers. Nevertheless, the fundamentallaw did not intend the delegation to be absolute andunconditional; the constitutional objective obviously is to ensurethat, while the local government units are being strengthened andmade more autonomous, the legislature must still see to it that (a)the taxpayer will not be over-burdened or saddled with multipleand unreasonable impositions; (b) each local government unit willhave its fair share of available resources; (c) the resources of thenational government will not be unduly disturbed; and (d) localtaxation will be fair, uniform, and just.

Indicative of the legislative intent to carry out the Constitutionalmandate of vesting broad tax powers to local government units,the Local Government Code has effectively withdrawn under Section 193 of RA 7160, tax exemptions or incentives enjoyed bycertain entities.

In the recent case the Court has held that the phrase in lieu of alltaxes “have to give way to the peremptory language of the LocalGovernment Code specifically providing for the withdrawal of suchexemptions, privileges,” and that “upon the effectivity of the LocalGovernment Code all exemptions except only as provided thereincan no longer be invoked by MERALCO to disclaim liability for thelocal tax.” In fine, the Court has viewed its previous rulings aslaying stress more on the legislative intent of the amendatory law

– whether the tax exemption privilege is to be withdrawn or not –rather than on whether the law can withdraw, without violating theConstitution, the tax exemption or not.

While the Court has, not too infrequently, referred to taxexemptions contained in special franchises as being in the natureof contracts and a part of the inducement for carrying on thefranchise, these exemptions are far from being strictly contractualin nature. Contractual tax exemptions, in the real sense of the

term and where the non-impairment clause of the Constitution canrightly be invoked, are those agreed to by the taxing authority incontracts, such as those contained in government bonds or debentures, lawfully entered into by them under enabling laws inwhich the government, acting in its private capacity, sheds itscloak of authority and waives its governmental immunity. Truly,tax exemptions of this kind may not be revoked without impairingthe obligations of contracts.

These contractual tax exemptions are not to be confusedwith tax exemptions granted under franchises. A franchisepartakes the nature of a grant which is beyond the purview of the non-impairment clause of the Constitution. Article XII,Section 11, of the 1987 Constitution, like its precursor provisionsin the 1935 and the 1973 Constitutions, is explicit that nofranchise for the operation of a public utility shall be grantedexcept under the condition that such privilege shall be subject toamendment, alteration or repeal by Congress as and when thecommon good so requires.

Petition is dismissed.

G.R. No. L-13307 February 3, 1919La Insular vs. Machuca

FACTS:

La Insular is a commercial partnership engaged in themanufacture of cigars and cigarettes in the city of Manila. On1913, a contract was entered into between its general agent andthe two defendants, Manuel Nubla Co-Siong and Rafael MachucaGo-Tauco, whereby the plaintiff became obliged to supplycigarettes daily to Manuel Nubla. The price was fixed at 172 per

box. Manuel is the principal obligor while Rafael Machuca boundhimself as surety, jointly and severally with Manuel Nubla. Iappears that when the contract was executed cigarettes weresubject to a specific tax of the peso for each thousand cigarettesThis tax was, under the law then prevailing, paid by themanufacturer, and the liability for said tax naturally fell upon theplaintiff. By Act No. 2432, enacted December 23, 1914, thePhilippine Legislature increased the specific tax on cigarettesfrom P1 to P1.20 per thousand cigarettes, and by amendatory AcNo. 2445, effective from January 1, 1915, it was declared that, as

regards contracts already made for future delivery, the burden ofthe increased tax should, unless the parties should haveotherwise agreed, be borne by the person to whom the articletaxed should be furnished.

After this provision become effective, the plaintiff continued, asbefore, to pay the internal-revenue taxes and in order toreimburse itself to the extent of the outlay incident to the increasein the tax added the amount of P10 per box to the price of thecigarettes. The monthly statements thereafter submitted to thepurchaser by the plaintiff showed this increase; and as paymentswere from time to time made by Nubla, they were credited by theplaintiff upon account, with the result that, upon the showing othe plaintiff's books and assuming that Nubla had been properlycharged with the increased tax, all cigarettes delivered prior to

August 1, 1916, had been fully paid for. During the months o August and September, however, fifty-six cases of cigarettes weretaken by Nubla, for which no payment has been made; and for the

recovery of the amount alleged to be due for these cigarettes thisaction was instituted by the plaintiff in the Court of First InstanceJudgment having been there rendered in favor of the plaintiff, bothdefendants have appealed. The trial court ruled that as asurety, Machura’s liability was limited to the payment of the pricestipulated in the original contract.

ISSUE: WON Legislative Acts mentioned altered the obligation of thecontract in question as to release the surety in his indebtedness.

HELD:

Article 1827 of the Civil Code declares that the liability of a suretyis not to be extended, by implication, beyond the terms of hiscontract. Well-recognized rule of jurisprudence, that if anymaterial alteration or change in the obligation of the principaobligator is effected by the immediate parties to the contract

without the asset of the surety, the latter is discharged. In order toeffect a release of the surety, the change in the contract must, asa general rule, be made by the principal parties to the contractIndeed, no valid or effective change in the contract can, generallyspeaking, be made by any other person than the actual partiesthereto. A recognized exception — more apparent than real — isfound in cases where sureties on official bonds have been held tobe released as a result of changes effected by the Legislature inthe duration of the official term or in the duties of the officer whosefidelity is intended to be secured by the bond. The law isparticularly watchful over the rights of sureties. To permit partiesto alter and modify their contracts as they please, and to hold thesureties answerable for the performance of such parts as werenot altered, would be transferring their responsibility, without theiconsent, from one contract to another. The contract, by themodification and alternation, becomes a new and differencontract, and one for which the sureties never become

responsible. Based on the recognized exemption, the Acts of the Legislature

by which the increased tax on cigarettes was imposed neitherimpaired, in a constitutional sense, the obligation of the contracwhich is the basis of this action nor changed that obligation insuch sense as to occasion the discharge of the surety.

The surety is clearly bound by the application of the paymentsmade by the creditor with the assent of the principal debtor, andno doubt that when Manuel Nubla from time to time paid the billssubmitted by the plaintiff, and which, after January 1, 1915showed an increased of P10 per case in the price of thecigarettes, he very well knew that this additional amount was dueto the inclusion of the new tax paid by the plaintiff.





The judgment appealed from is affirmed.

ADMIN REG - POLICE POWER

GR L-63419, 18 December 1986LOZANO VS. MARTINEZ

FACTS:

Lozano vs. Martinez (GR L-63419), Lobaton vs. Cruz (GR L-66839-42), Datuin vs. Pano (GR 71654), Violago vs. Pano (GR74524-25), Abad vs. Gerochi (GR 75122-49), Aguiliz vs. PresidingJudge of Branch 154 (GR 75812-13), Hojas vs. Penaranda (GR75765-67) and People vs. Nitafan (GR 75789) are cases involvingprosecution of offenses under BP 22 which were consolidatedherein as the parties (defendants) thereto question theconstitutionality of the statute, BP 22.

The defendants in those cases moved seasonably to quash theinformations on the ground that the acts charged did notconstitute an offense, the statute being unconstitutional. Themotions were denied by the respondent trial courts, except in onecase, which is the subject of G. R. No. 75789, wherein the trialcourt declared the law unconstitutional and dismissed the case.The parties adversely affected asked for relief.

ISSUE: Whether BP 22 is constitutional.HELD: YES.The language of BP22 is broad enough to cover all kinds of checks,whether present dated or post dated, whether issued in payment of pre-existing obligations or given in mutual or simultaneous exchangefor something of value. BP 22 is aimed to put a stop or to curb thepractice of issuing worthless checks, which is proscribed by the Statebecause of the injury it causes to public interests. The gravamen of theoffense punished by BP 22 is the act of making or issuing a worthlesscheck or a check which is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. it is not the non-payment of an obligation which the lawpunishes. The law publishes the act not as an offense against propertybut an offense against public order. The enactment of BP 22 is a validexercise of police power and is not repugnant to the constitutionalinhibition against imprisonment for debt. The statute is notunconstitutional.

G.R. No. L-20344 May 16, 1966ILUSORIO VS. CAR

FACTS:

Petitioners assail the constitutionality of Section 14 of Republic Act No. 1199, as amended, upon the ground that it violates thefreedom of contract and impairs property rights, as well as theobligation of contracts.

Petitioners herein, Potenciano Ilusorio and Teresa Ilusorio, are co-owners of a parcel of land situated in the Barrio of Bantug,Municipality of San Miguel, Province of Bulacan. The mainrespondents herein have for years worked on said land under theshare tenancy system. Before the beginning of the agriculturalyear 1960-1961, they gave notice to the petitioners, in conformitywith the provisions of Section 14 of Republic Act No. 1199, asamended, that they (respondents) wanted to change their tenancycontract from said system to leasehold tenancy. The Ilusorioshaving refused to agree thereto, said respondents — and threeother tenants whose claims were dismissed by the Court of

Agrarian Relations — instituted this proceedings, in said court, onNovember 16, 1960. The main defense set up by petitionersherein, as respondents in said court, is that the aforementionedSection 14 of Republic Act No. 1199, as amended, isunconstitutional, which was rejected by the lower court. Hencethis appeal in which the Ilusorios maintain: (1) that said provisionis unconstitutional; and (2) that the lower court had actedarbitrarily in fixing the rentals collectible by them fromrespondents herein at 20% of the average harvest for theagricultural years 1959-1960, 1960-1961, and 1961-1962.

ISSUES:1. Whether the prohibition against impairment of contracts is

absolute.2. Whether R.A. 1199 is constitutional.

HELD:1. NO. The prohibition contained in constitutional provisions agains

impairing the obligation of contracts is not an absolute one. Suchprovisions are restricted to contracts with respect property, o

some object of value, and confer rights which may be asserted ina court of justice, and have no application to statute relating topublic subjects within the domain of the general legislative powersof the State, and involving the public right and public welfare othe entire community affected by it. They do not prevent properexercise by the State of its police powers. By enacting regulationsreasonably necessary to secure the health, safety, moralscomfort, or general welfare of the community, even the contractsmay thereby be affected; for such matter cannot be placed bycontract beyond the power of the State to regulate and controthem.

2. YES. Republic Act 1199m including Section 14 thereof, whichpermits the tenants to change the nature of their relation with theilandlord from tenancy system to leasehold tenancy, isconstitutional. It is a remedial legislation promulgated pursuant tothe social justice precepts of the Constitution and in the exerciseof the police power of the State to promote the common weal. It is

a statute relating to public subjects within the domain of thegeneral legislative powers of the State and involving the publicrights and public welfare of the entire community affected by itRepublic Act 1199, like the previous tenancy law enacted by oulaw-making body, was passed by Congress in compliance withthe constitutional mandate that "the promotion of social justice toinsure the well-being and economic security of all the peopleshould be the concern of the State " (Art. II, sec. 5) and that "theState shall regulate the relations between landlord and tenant ..in agriculture ... ." (Art. XIV, see. 6).

G.R. No. L-32312 November 25, 1983TIRO VS. HONTANOSAS

FACTS:

Zafra Financing Enterprise sued Aurelio Tiro in his official capacity

as Superintendent of Schools in Cebu City. It appears that Zafrahad extended loans to public school teachers in Cebu City andthe teachers concerned executed promissory notes and speciapowers of attorney in favor of Zafra to take and collect their salarychecks from the Division Office in Cebu City of the Bureau oPublic Schools. However, Tiro forbade the collection of the checkson the basis of Circular No. 21, series 1969, dated December 5,1969, of the Director of Public Schools.

Zafra sought to compel Tiro to honor the special powers oattorney; to declare Circular No. 21 to be illegal; and to make Tiropay attorney's fees and damages. The trial court granted theprayer of Zafra but the claim for money was disallowed on theground that he acted in good faith in implementing Circular No21.

Tiro now seeks in this petition for review a reversal of the triacourt's decision.

ISSUE: Whether Circular No. 21 impairs the obligation of contracts.

HELD: NO. Zafra's claim that the Circular impairs the obligation of contracts

with the teachers is baseless. For the Circular does not prevenZafra from collecting the loans. The Circular merely makes theGovernment a non-participant in their collection which is within itscompetence to do.

The salary check of a government officer or employee such as ateacher does not belong to him before it is physically delivered tohim. Until that time the check belongs to the Government

Accordingly, before there is actual delivery of the check, thepayee has no power over it; he cannot assign it without the


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consent of the Government. On this basis Circular No. 21 standson firm legal footing.

207 SCRA 748CANLEON VS AGUS DEVELOPMENT CORP.*no case digest submitted*

GR No. 109405, September 11, 1998BLAQUERA VS ALCALA*no case digest submitted*

123 SCRA 713GANZON VS INSTERTO*no case digest submitted*

ADMIN REG - EMINENT DOMAIN POWER

156 SCRA 623Kabilang vs. NHA

FACTS:On May 21, 1986, petitioners filed an Amended Petition, accompaniedby a motion to admit said amended petition. In the Amended Petition,the petitioners (only four of whom are original petitioners, the restbeing newly impleaded) invoke as an additional ground the alleged

non-publication of P.D. No. 1808. On May 29,1981, the Court admittedthe Amended Petition and required respondents to comment thereon.The Court further required the Republic of the Philippines to move inthe premises within ten (10) days from notice, considering thesupervening events that had transpired since the filing of therespective memoranda of the petitioners and the respondent Republicof the Philippines. Respondent NHA submitted its comment on June11, 1986, stating that contrary to petitioners' allegation in the AmendedPetition, P.D. No. 1808 was published in the Official Gazette of October 4, 1982 (Volume 78, No. 40, pp. 5481-4 to 5486-8) and reiterating itsarguments discussed in its comment dated September 4, 1981 on theoriginal petition and its later comment/opposition dated March 19,1982. On July 2, 1986, the NHA filed a manifestation by way of reporton the current status of the subject property, stating inter alia 1) that allavailable workable areas in the subject property, totallingapproximately 3.1 hectares and consisting of 378 lots averaging 50square meters each, have been substantially developed, except for

some minor repair work still to be undertaken; 2) that the NHA hasalready invested P3 million representing the cost of implementing thedevelopment plans in the workable areas of the project site; 3) that inaccordance with the provisions of P.D. No. 1808, the N HA has alreadydeposited with the Philippine National Bank the amount equivalent tothe cost of all subdivision lots in the project site; 4) that 76 landownershave already withdrawn the corresponding compensation for their respective lots, totalling Pl,919,402.44, while 72 landowners includingthe petitioners Robidante L. Kabiling, et al. have not yet claimed thecompensation for their respective lots totalling Pl,581,676.52; and 5)that all titles to the homelots, except the lost title of Cresencio Deboma,which is undergoing reconstitution, have already been transferred torespondent NHA pursuant to the provision of P.D. No. 1808.

ISSUE: The petitioners' challenge to the constitutionality of P.D. No.1808.

HELD:

The stated objective of the decree, namely, to resolve the landtenure problem in the Agno-Leveriza area to allow theimplementation of the comprehensive development plans for thisdepressed community, provides the justification for the exercise of the police power of the State. The police power of the State hasbeen described as "the most essential, insistent and illimitable of powers.1 It is a power inherent in the State, plenary, "suitablyvague and far from precisely defined, rooted in the conceptionthat man in organizing the state and imposing upon thegovernment limitations to safeguard constitutional rights did notintend thereby to enable individual citizens or group of citizens to

obstruct unreasonably the enactment of such salutary measure toensure communal peace, safety, good order and welfare.

The objection raised by petitioners that P.D. No. 1808 impairs theobligations of contract is without merit. The constitutional guarantyof non-impairment of obligations of contract is limited by andsubject to the exercise of the police power of the State in theinterest of public health, safety, morals and general welfare. Fothe same reason, petitioners can not complain that they are beingdeprived of their property without due process of law.

Nor can petitioners claim that their properties are being

expropriated without just compensation, since Sec. 3 of P.D. No1808 provides for just compensation to lot owners who have fullypaid their obligations to the City of Manila under their respectivecontracts before the issuance of the decree. However, inaccordance with our decision in Export Processing Zone Authorityvs. Hon. Ceferino Dulay, etc., et al., G.R. No. 59603, April 291987, which declared P.D. No. 1533 unconstitutional, those loowners who have not yet received compensation under thedecree are entitled to a judicial determination of the juscompensation for their lots.

ADMIN REG - FRANCHISES, PRIVILEGES, LICENSES

GR No. 162243, November 29, 2006ALVAREZ VS PICOP RESOURCES*no case digest submitted*


consti ii digests - police power until non impairment clause

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