consti 2 session digests

8/10/2019 Consti 2 Session Digests

1/131

El Banco Espanol-Filipino vs. Vicente Palanca G.R. No. L-11390, March 26, 1918El Banco Espanol-Filipino vs. PalancaG.R. No. L-11390, March 26, 1918

* JURISDICTION, HOW ACQUIRED: Jurisdiction over the property which is the subject of the litigation may resulteither from a seizure of the property under legal process, whereby it is brought into the actual custody of the law,or it may result from the institution of legal proceedings wherein, under special provisions of law, the power of thecourt over the property is recognized and made effective.* The action to foreclose a mortgage is said to be a proceeding quasi in rem, by which is expressed the idea that

while it is not strictly speaking an action in rem yet it partakes of that nature and is substantially such.* DUE PROCESS IN FORECLOSURE PROCEEDINGS: Property is always assumed to be in the possession ofits owner, in person or by agent; and he may be safely held, under certain conditions, to be affected withknowledge that proceedings have been instituted for its condemnation and sale.

FACTS:

Engracio Palanca Tanquinyeng y Limquingco mortgaged various parcels of real property in Manila to El BancoEspanol-Filipino. Afterwards, Engracio returned to China and there he died on January 29, 1810 without returningagain to the Philippines. The mortgagor then instituted foreclosure proceeding but since defendant is a non-resident, it was necessary to give notice by publication. The Clerk of Court was also directed to send copy of thesummons to the defendants last known address, which is in Amoy, China. It is not shown whether the Clerk

complied with this requirement. Nevertheless, after publication in a newspaper of the City of Manila, the causeproceeded and judgment by default was rendered. The decision was likewise published and afterwards sale bypublic auction was held with the bank as the highest bidder. On August 7, 1908, this sale was confirmed by thecourt. However, about seven years after the confirmation of this sale, a motion was made by Vicente Palanca, asadministrator of the estate of the original defendant, wherein the applicant requested the court to set aside theorder of default and the judgment, and to vacate all the proceedings subsequent thereto. The basis of thisapplication was that the order of default and the judgment rendered thereon were void because the court hadnever acquired jurisdiction over the defendant or over the subject of the action.

ISSUE:

* Whether or not the lower court acquired jurisdiction over the defendant and the subject matter of the action* Whether or not due process of law was observed

RULING:

On Jurisdiction

The word jurisdiction is used in several different, though related, senses since it may have reference (1) to theauthority of the court to entertain a particular kind of action or to administer a particular kind of relief, or it mayrefer to the power of the court over the parties, or (2) over the property which is the subject to the litigation.

The sovereign authority which organizes a court determines the nature and extent of its powers in general andthus fixes its competency or jurisdiction with reference to the actions which it may entertain and the relief it maygrant.

How Jurisdiction is Acquired

Jurisdiction over the person is acquired by the voluntary appearance of a party in court and his submission to itsauthority, or it is acquired by the coercive power of legal process exerted over the person.

Jurisdiction over the property which is the subject of the litigation may result either from a seizure of the propertyunder legal process, whereby it is brought into the actual custody of the law, or it may result from the institution oflegal proceedings wherein, under special provisions of law, the power of the court over the property is recognizedand made effective. In the latter case the property, though at all times within the potential power of the court, maynever be taken into actual custody at all. An illustration of the jurisdiction acquired by actual seizure is found inattachment proceedings, where the property is seized at the beginning of the action, or some subsequent stage ofits progress, and held to abide the final event of the litigation. An illustration of what we term potential jurisdiction


2/13

2

over the res, is found in the proceeding to register the title of land under our system for the registration of land.Here the court, without taking actual physical control over the property assumes, at the instance of some personclaiming to be owner, to exercise a jurisdiction in rem over the property and to adjudicate the title in favor of thepetitioner against all the world.

In the terminology of American law the action to foreclose a mortgage is said to be a proceeding quasi in rem, bywhich is expressed the idea that while it is not strictly speaking an action in rem yet it partakes of that nature andis substantially such. The expression "action in rem" is, in its narrow application, used only with reference tocertain proceedings in courts of admiralty wherein the property alone is treated as responsible for the claim orobligation upon which the proceedings are based. The action quasi rem differs from the true action in rem in thecircumstance that in the former an individual is named as defendant, and the purpose of the proceeding is tosubject his interest therein to the obligation or lien burdening the property. All proceedings having for their soleobject the sale or other disposition of the property of the defendant, whether by attachment, foreclosure, or otherform of remedy, are in a general way thus designated. The judgment entered in these proceedings is conclusiveonly between the parties.

It is true that in proceedings of this character, if the defendant for whom publication is made appears, the actionbecomes as to him a personal action and is conducted as such. This, however, does not affect the propositionthat where the defendant fails to appear the action is quasi in rem; and it should therefore be considered withreference to the principles governing actions in rem.

Pollution Adjudication Board vs. CA et al.G.R. No. 93891, 11 March 1991Third Division, Feliciano (J), 4 concur

FACTS:Respondent, Solar Textile Finishing Corporation was involved in bleaching, rinsing and dyeing textileswith wastewater being directly discharged into a canal leading to the adjacent Tullahan- Tinerejos River.Petitioner Board, an agency of the Government charged with the task of determining whether the effluents of aparticular industrial establishment comply with or violate applicable anti-pollution statutory and regulatoryprovisions, have been remarkably forbearing in its efforts to enforce the applicable standards vis-a-vis Solar.Solar, on the other hand, seemed very casual about its continued discharge of untreated, pollutive effluents intothe river. Petitioner Board issued an ex parte Order directing Solar immediately to cease and desist from utilizingits wastewater pollution source installations. Solar, however, with preliminary injunction against the Board, went tothe Regional Trial Court on petition for certiorari, but it was dismissed upon two (2) grounds, i.e., that appeal and

not certiorari from the questioned Order of the Board as well as the Writ of Execution was the proper remedy, andthat the Board's subsequent Order allowing Solar to operate temporarily had rendered Solar's petition moot andacademic. Dissatisfied, Solar went on appeal to the Court of Appeals, which reversed the Order of dismissal ofthe trial court and remanded the case to that court for further proceedings. In addition, the Court of Appealsdeclared the Writ of Execution null and void. At the same time, the CA said that certiorari was a proper remedysince the Orders of petitioner Board may result in great and irreparable injury to Solar; and that while the casemight be moot and academic, "larger issues" demanded that the question of due process be settled. PetitionerBoard moved for reconsideration, without success.

Arguing that that the ex parte Order and the Writ of Execution were issued in accordance with law and were notviolative of the requirements of due process; and the ex parte Order and the Writ of Execution are not the propersubjects of a petition for certiorari, Oscar A. Pascua and Charemon Clio L. Borre for petitioner asked the SupremeCourt to review the Decision and Resolution promulgated by the Court of Appeals entitled "Solar Textile Finishing

Corporation v. Pollution Adjudication Board," which reversed an order of the Regional Trial Court. In addition,petitioner Board claims that under P.D. No. 984, Section 7(a), it has legal authority to issue ex parte orders tosuspend the operations of an establishment when there is prima facie evidence that such establishment isdischarging effluents or wastewater, the pollution level of which exceeds the maximum permissible standards setby the NPCC (now, the Board). Petitioner Board contends that the reports before it concerning the effluentdischarges of Solar into the River provided prima facie evidence of violation by Solar of Section 5 of the 1982Effluent Code. Solar, on the other hand, contends that under the Board's own rules and regulations, an ex parteorder may issue only if the effluents discharged pose an "immediate threat to life, public health, safety or welfare,or to animal and plant life." In the instant case, according to Solar, the inspection reports before the Board madeno finding that Solar's wastewater discharged posed such a threat.

ISSUE:Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the trial court on the ground that Solar had beendenied due process by the Board.
http://xyckriz.blogspot.com/2010/11/pollution-adjudication-board-v-ca-et-al.htmlhttp://xyckriz.blogspot.com/2010/11/pollution-adjudication-board-v-ca-et-al.htmlhttp://xyckriz.blogspot.com/2010/11/pollution-adjudication-board-v-ca-et-al.html


3/13

3

HELD:The Court found that the Order and Writ of Execution were entirely within the lawful authority of petitionerBoard. Ex parte cease and desist orders are permitted by law and regulations in situations like here. The relevantpollution control statute and implementing regulations were enacted and promulgated in the exercise of thatpervasive, sovereign power to protect the safety, health, and general welfare and comfort of the public, as well asthe protection of plant and animal life, commonly designated as the police power. It is a constitutionalcommonplace that the ordinary requirements of procedural due process yield to the necessities of protecting vitalpublic interests like those here involved, through the exercise of police power. Hence, the trial court did not errwhen it dismissed Solar's petition for certiorari. It follows that the proper remedy was an appeal from the trial courtto the Court of Appeals, as Solar did in fact appeal. The Court gave due course on the Petition for Review and theDecision of the Court of Appeals and its Resolution were set aside. The Order of petitioner Board and the Writ ofExecution, as well as the decision of the trial court were reinstated, without prejudice to the right of Solar tocontest the correctness of the basis of the Board's Order and Writ of Execution at a public hearing before theBoard.

US vs Toribio

license to have his carabao be slaughtered. His request was denied because his carabao is found not to be unfitfor work. He nevertheless slaughtered his carabao without the necessary license. He was eventually sued andwas sentenced by the trial court. His counsel in one way or the other argued that the law mandating that oneshould acquire a permit to slaughter his carabao is not a valid exercise of police power.ISSUE: Whether or not the said law is valid.

HELD: The SC ruled against Toribio. The SC explained that it is not a taking of the property for public usewithin the meaning of the constitution, but is a just and legitimate exercise of the power of the legislature toregulate and restrain such particular use of the property as would be inconsistent with or injurious to the rights ofthe publics. All property is acquired and held under the tacit condition that it shall not be so used as to injure theequal rights of others or greatly impair the public rights and interests of the community.

Concepcion Bautista vs juinio et al

Bautista is assailing the constitutionality of LOI 869 issued in 1979 which classified vehicles into Heavy and ExtraHeavy. The LOI further banned these vehicles during weekends and holidays that is from 5am Saturday until 5amMonday. Purpose of this law is to curb down petroleum consumption as bigger cars consume more oil. Bautistaclaimed the LOI to be discriminatory as it made an assumption that H and EH cars are heavy on petroleum

consumption when in fact there are smaller cars which are also big on oil consumption. Further, the law restrictstheir freedom to enjoy their car while others who have smaller cars may enjoy theirs. Bautista avers that there isno rational justification for the ban being imposed on vehicles classified as heavy (H) and extra-heavy (EH), forprecisely those owned by them fall within such category.ISSUE: Whether or not the LOI violates equal protection.HELD: The SC held that Bautista was not able to make merit out of her contention. The classification on cars onits face cannot be characterized as an affront to reason. The ideal situation is for the laws benefits to be availableto all, that none be placed outside the sphere of its coverage. Only thus could chance and favor be excluded andthe affairs of men governed by that serene and impartial uniformity, which is of the very essence of the idea oflaw. The actual, given things as they are and likely to continue to be, cannot approximate the ideal. Nor is the lawsusceptible to the reproach that it does not take into account the realities of the situation. . . . To assure that thegeneral welfare be promoted, which is the end of law, a regulatory measure may cut into the rights to liberty andproperty. Those adversely affected may under such circumstances invoke the equal protection clause only if theycan show that the governmental act assailed, far from being inspired by the attainment of the common weal wasprompted by the spirit of hostility, or at the very least, discrimination that finds no support in reason. It sufficesthen that the laws operate equally and uniformly on all persons under similar circumstances or that all personsmust be treated in the same manner, the conditions not being different, both in the privileges conferred and theliabilities imposed. Favoritism and undue preference cannot be allowed. For the principle is that equaprotection and security shall be given to every person under circumstances, which if not identical are analogous. Iflaw be looked upon in terms of burden or charges, those that fall within a class should be treated in the samefashion, whatever restrictions cast on some in the group equally binding on the rest.


4/13


5/13

5

White Light Corporation vs City of Manila

Police Power Not Validly Exercised Infringement of Private RightsOn 3 Dec 1992, then Mayor Lim signed into law Ord 7774 entitled An Ordinance prohibiting shorttimeadmission in hotels, motels, lodging houses, pension houses and similar establishments in the City of ManilaWhite Light Corp is an operator of mini hotels and motels who sought to have the Ordinance be nullified as thesaid Ordinance infringes on the private rights of their patrons. The RTC ruled in favor of WLC. It ruled that theOrdinance strikes at the personal liberty of the individual guaranteed by the Constitution. The City maintains that

the ordinance is valid as it is a valid exercise of police power. Under the LGC, the City is empowered to regulatethe establishment, operation and maintenance of cafes, restaurants, beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns, pensionhouses, lodging houses and other similar establishments, including tourist guides and transports. The CA ruled infavor of the City.ISSUE: Whether or not Ord 7774 is valid.HELD: The SC ruled that the said ordinance is null and void as it indeed infringes upon individual liberty. It alsoviolates the due process clause which serves as a guaranty for protection against arbitrary regulation or seizureThe said ordinance invades private rights. Note that not all who goes into motels and hotels for wash up rate arereally there for obscene purposes only. Some are tourists who needed rest or to wash up or to freshen upHence, the infidelity sought to be avoided by the said ordinance is more or less subjected only to a limited groupof people. The SC reiterates that individual rights may be adversely affected only to the extent that may fairly berequired by the legitimate demands of public interest or public welfare.

Philippine Blooming Mills Employment Organization vs. Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc. and Court of Industrial Relations

(1973)

Facts

Union officers of the Philippine Blooming Mills Co. Inc. (PBM) were dismissed for allegedly violating the no strike-no

lockout provision of their collective bargaining agreement (CBA) after staging a mass demonstration at Malacaang. PBMEO

was set to stage a mass demonstration at Malacaang on March 4, 1969 against abuses of the Pasig police, where

employees on the first, regular, and third shifts will participate. PBMEO informed company two days before the said

demonstration and asked to excuse all the workers participating. But a day before the demonstration, PBM said the rally

should not prejudice normal office operations, thus employees without prior filing of a leave of absence who fail to report

for the first and regular shifts on March 4 shall be dismissed for violating their CBA. However, union officers said there was

no violation because the demonstration was against the Pasig police and not the company. They added that the rally was anexercise of their freedom of speech. In a decision penned by Judge Joaquin Salvador of the Court of Industrial Relations,

eight of the Philippine Blooming Mills Employment Organization (PBMEO) officers were found guilty of bargaining in bad

faith and were thus removed as employees of PBM. PBMEO filed a motion for reconsideration, which CIR dismissed the

motion for passing two days late from the 10-day deadline the court allowed.

Issue

Whether or not CIR and PBM Co. Inc. violated PBMEOs freedom of expression and assembly on the grounds that PBM Co.

illegally dismissed its employees for participating in a mass demonstration.

Held

VIOLATED. The rally was not against the company and therefore there is no violation of the no strike-no lockoutprovision of their CBA. To charge PBMEO of bargaining in bad faith extends the jurisdiction of the CBA and inhibits freedom

ofspeech. The company failed to protect its employees from the Pasig polices abuse ofpower, went to the extent of

dismissing their employees, and instead prioritized material losses. Moreover, CIR could have easily accepted the motion

for reconsideration. Procedural rules do not supersede the Constitution and may be overruled in a bid to achieve justice,

especially in cases of free speech.

Concepts and Terminologies CBA


6/13

6

collective bargaining agreement; a contract between a company and its employees that lays out work hours, wages, and

other terms and conditions of employment Strike

right of employees to refuse to go to work; cessation of work Lockout

right of employers to suspend work and to refuse to hire workers

Diosdado Guzman vs. National University

Facts:

Petitioners Diosdado Guzman, Ulysses Urbiztondo and Ariel Ramacula, students of respondent National University,

have come to this Court to seek relief from what they describe as their school's "continued and persistent refusal to allow

them to enrol." In their petition "for extraordinary legal and equitable remedies with prayer for preliminary mandatory

injunction" dated August 7, 1984, they alleged that they were denied due to the fact that they were active participation in

peaceful mass actions within the premises of the University.

The respondents on the other hand claimed that the petitioners failure to enroll for the first semester of the

school year 1984-1985 is due to their own fault and not because of their alleged exercise of their constitutional and human

rights. That as regards to Guzman, his academic showing was poor due to his activities in leading boycotts of classes. That

Guzman is facing criminal charges for malicious mischief before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila in connection with

the destruction of properties of respondent University. The petitioners have failures in their records, and are not of good

scholastic standing.

Held:


7/13

7

Immediately apparent from a reading of respondents' comment and memorandum is the fact that they had never

conducted proceedings of any sort to determine whether or not petitioners-students had indeed led or participated "in

activities within the university premises, conducted without prior permit from school authorities, that disturbed or

disrupted classes therein" 3 or perpetrated acts of "vandalism, coercion and intimidation, slander, noise barrage and other

acts showing disdain for and defiance of University authority." 4 Parenthetically, the pendency of a civil case for damages

and a criminal case for malicious mischief against petitioner Guzman, cannot, without more, furnish sufficient warrant for

his expulsion or debarment from re-enrollment. Also apparent is the omission of respondents to cite this Court to any duly

published rule of theirs by which students may be expelled or refused re-enrollment for poor scholastic standing.

There are withal minimum standards which must be met to satisfy the demands of procedural due process; and these are,that

(1) the students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any accusation against them;

(2) they shag have the right to answer the charges against them, with the assistance of counsel, if desired;

(3) they shall be informed of the evidence against them;

(4) they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and

(5) the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee or official designated by the school authorities to

hear and decide the case.

THE PETITION WAS GRANTED AND THE RESPONDENTS ARE DIRECTED TO ALLOW THE PETITIONERS TO RE-ENROLL

WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO ANY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS.

Case Digest: People vs NazarioFacts:

Eusebio Nazario was charged in violation of refusal and failure to pay his municipal taxes amounting to Php362.62 because of his fishpond operation provided under Ordinance 4, Series of 1955, as amended. He is aresident of Sta. Mesa Manila and just leases a fishpond located at Pagbilao, Quezon with the Philippine FisheriesCommission. The years in question of failure to pay was for 1964, 1965, and 1966. Nazario did not pay because

he was not sure if he was covered under the ordinance. He was found guilty thus this petition.

Issues:

1. Whether or not Ordinance 4, Series of 1955, as amended null and void for being ambiguous and uncertain2. Whether or not the ordinance was unconstitutional for being ex post facto

Held:

1. No, the coverage of the ordinance covers him as the actual operator of the fishpond thus he comes with theterm Manager. He was the one who spent moneyin developing and maintaining it, so despite only leasing itfrom the national government, the latter does not get any profit as it goes only to Nazario. The dates of paymentare also clearly stated Beginnin and taking effect from 1964 if the fishpond started operating in 1964.

2. No, it is not ex post facto. Ordinance 4 was enacted in 1955 so it cant be that the amendment under Ordinance12 is being made to apply retroactively. Also, the act of non-payment has been made punishable since 1955 so itmeans Ordinance 12 is not imposing a retroactive penalty

The appeal is DISMISSED with cost against the appellant.

People vs Cayat

Equal ProtectionRequisites of a Valid Classification Bar from Drinking GinIn 1937, there exists a law (Act 1639) which bars native non-Christians from drinking gin or any other liquoroutside of their customary alcoholic drinks. Cayat, a native of the Cordillera, was caught with an A-1-1 gin inviolation of this Act. He was then charged and sentenced to pay P5.00 and to be imprisoned in case of


8/13

8

insolvency. Cayat admitted his guilt but he challenged the constitutionality of the said Act. He averred, amongothers, that it violated his right to equal protection afforded by the constitution. He said this an attempt to treatthem with discrimination or mark them as inferior or less capable race and less entitled will meet with theirinstant challenge. The law sought to distinguish and classify native non-Christians from Christians.ISSUE: Whether or not the said Act violates the equal protection clause.HELD: The SC ruled that Act 1639 is valid for it met the requisites of a reasonable classification. The SCemphasized that it is not enough that the members of a group have the characteristics that distinguish them fromothers. The classification must, as an indispensable requisite, not be arbitrary. The requisites to be complied withare;(1) must rest on substantial distinctions;(2) must be germane to the purposes of the law;(3) must not be limited to existing conditions only; and(4) must apply equally to all members of the same class.Act No. 1639 satisfies these requirements. The classification rests on real or substantial, not merely imaginary orwhimsical, distinctions. It is not based upon accident of birth or parentage. The law, then, does not seek to markthe non-Christian tribes as an inferior or less capable race. On the contrary, all measures thus far adopted in thepromotion of the public policy towards them rest upon a recognition of their inherent right to equality in theenjoyment of those privileges now enjoyed by their Christian brothers. But as there can be no true equality beforethe law, if there is, in fact, no equality in education, the government has endeavored, by appropriate measures, toraise their culture and civilization and secure for them the benefits of their progress, with the ultimate end in viewof placing them with their Christian brothers on the basis of true equality.

Tanada vs Tuvera

Publication Presidential Proclamations etc What unlessotherwise providedmeans in Article 2 of the CivilCode

With theSupreme Courts decisionthat ordered Tuvera et al to publish in the Official Gazette the unpublishedpresidential issuances which are of general application, and unless so published, they shall have no bindingforce and effect, Tuvera et al move for reconsideration and clarification.ISSUE: Whether or not publication should be made in the Official Gazette or elsewhere as long as the peoplewere sufficiently informed.HELD: The Supreme Court cannot rule upon the wisdom of a law or repeal or modify it if it finds the same asimpractical. That is not its function for such is the function of the legislature. The task of the Supreme Court ismerely to interpret and apply the law as conceived and approved by the political departments of the government

in accordance with prescribed procedure. Hence, the Court declared that all laws shall immediately upon theiapproval or as soon thereafter as possible, be published in full in the Official Gazette, to become effective onlyafter 15 days from their publication, or on another date specified by the legislature, in accordance with Article 2 ofthe Civil Code. The clause unless otherwise provided pertains to the date of publication and not the requirementof publication.

Ormoc Sugar Company

EqualProtectionIn 1964, Ormoc City passed a bill which read: There shall be paid to the City Treasurer on any and alproductions of centrifugal sugar milled at the Ormoc Sugar Company Incorporated, in Ormoc City a municipal taxequivalent to one per centum (1%) per export sale to the United States of America and other foreign countries.

Though referred to as a production tax, the imposition actually amounts to a tax on the export ofcentrifugal sugaproduced at Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. For production of sugar alone is not taxable; the only time the taxapplies is when the sugar produced is exported. Ormoc Sugar paid the tax (P7,087.50) in protest averring thathe same is violative of Sec 2287 of the Revised Administrative Code which provides: It shall not be in the powerof the municipal council to impose a tax in any form whatever, upon goods and merchandise carried into themunicipality, or out of the same, and any attempt to impose an import or export tax upon suchgoods in the guiseof an unreasonable charge for wharfage, use of bridges or otherwise, shall be void. And that the ordinance isviolative to equal protection as it singled out Ormoc Sugar As being liable for such tax impost for no other sugarmill is found in the city.ISSUE: Whether or not there has been a violation of equal protection.HELD: The SC held in favor of Ormoc Sugar. The SC noted that even if Sec 2287 of the RAC had already beenrepealed by a latter statute (Sec 2 RA 2264) which effectively authorized LGUs to tax goods and merchandisecarried in and out of their turf, the act of Ormoc City is still violative of equal protection. The ordinance is
http://www.uberdigests.info/2012/07/lorenzo-tanada-vs-tuvera/http://www.uberdigests.info/2012/07/lorenzo-tanada-vs-tuvera/http://www.uberdigests.info/2012/07/lorenzo-tanada-vs-tuvera/http://www.uberdigests.info/2012/07/lorenzo-tanada-vs-tuvera/http://www.uberdigests.info/2012/07/lorenzo-tanada-vs-tuvera/http://www.uberdigests.info/2012/07/lorenzo-tanada-vs-tuvera/


9/13

9

discriminatory for it taxes only centrifugal sugar produced and exported by the Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. andnone other. At the time of the taxing ordinances enactment, Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc., it is true, was the onlysugar central in the city of Ormoc. Still, the classification, to be reasonable, should be in terms applicable to futureconditions as well. The taxing ordinance should not be singular and exclusive as to exclude any subsequentlyestablished sugar central, of the same class as plaintiff, from the coverage of the tax. As it is now, even if later asimilar company is set up, it cannot be subject to the tax because the ordinance expressly points only to OrmocSugar Company, Inc. as the entity to be levied upon.

Taxicab Operators

Police PowerPetitioner Taxicab Operators of Metro Manila, Inc. (TOMMI) is a domestic corporation composedof taxicaboperators, who are grantees of Certificates of Public Convenience to operate taxicabs within the City ofManila and to any other place in Luzon accessible to vehicular traffic.On October 10, 1977, respondent Board of Transportation (BOT) issued Memorandum Circular No. 77-42 whichreads:SUBJECT: Phasing out and Replacement of Old and Dilapidated TaxisOn January 27, 1981, petitioners filed a Petition with the BOT, docketed as Case No. 80-7553, seeking to nullifyMC No. 77-42 or to stop its implementation; to allow the registration and operation in 1981 and subsequent yearsof taxicabs of model 1974, as well as those of earlier models which were phased-out, provided that, at the time ofregistration, they are roadworthy and fit for operation.ISSUES:

A. Did BOT and BLT promulgate the questioned memorandum circulars in accord with the manner required byPresidential Decree No. 101, thereby safeguarding the petitioners constitutional right to procedural due process? B. Granting arguendo, that respondents did comply with the procedural requirements imposed by PresidentiaDecree No. 101, would the implementation and enforcement of the assailed memorandum circulars violate thepetitioners constitutional rights to.(1) Equal protection of the law;(2) Substantive due process; and(3) Protection against arbitrary and unreasonable classification and standard?HELDAs enunciated in the preambular clauses of the challenged BOT Circular, the overriding consideration is thesafety and comfort of the riding public from the dangers posed by old and dilapidated taxis. The State, in theexercise of its police power, can prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, good order, safetyand general welfare of the people. It can prohibit all things hurtful to comfort, safety and welfare of society. It may

also regulate property rights. In the language of Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando the necessities imposed bypublic welfare may justify the exercise of governmental authority to regulate even if thereby certain groups mayplausibly assert that their interests are disregarded.

Himagan vs People

Equal ProtectionSuspension of PNP Members Charged with Grave FeloniesHimagan is a policeman assigned in Camp Catititgan, Davao City. He was charged for the murder of BenjaminMachitar Jr and for the attempted murder of Benjamins younger brother, Barnabe. Pursuant to Sec 47 of RA6975, Himagan was placed into suspension pending the murder case. The law provides that Upon the filing of acomplaint or information sufficient in form and substance against a member of the PNP for grave felonies wherethe penalty imposed by law is six (6) years and one (1) day or more, the court shall immediately suspend the

accused from office until the case is terminated. Such case shall be subject to continuous trial and shall beterminated within ninety (90) days from arraignment of the accused. Himagan assailed the suspension averringthat Sec 42 of PD 807 of the Civil Service Decree, that his suspension should be limited to ninety (90) days. Heclaims that an imposition of preventive suspension of over 90 days is contrary to the Civil Service Law and wouldbe a violation of his constitutional right to equal protection of laws.ISSUE: Whether or not Sec 47, RA 6975 violates equal protection guaranteed by the Constitution.HELD: The language of the first sentence of Sec 47 of RA 6975 is clear, plain and free from ambiguity. It gives noother meaning than that the suspension from office of the member of the PNP charged with grave offense wherethe penalty is six years and one day or more shall last until the termination of the case. The suspension cannot belifted before the termination of the case. The second sentence of the same Section providing that the trial must beterminated within ninety (90) days from arraignment does not qualify or limit the first sentence. The two can standindependently of each other. The first refers to the period of suspension. The second deals with the time fromwithin which the trial should be finished.


10/13

10

The reason why members of the PNP are treated differently from the other classes of persons charged criminallyor administratively insofar as the application of the rule on preventive suspension is concerned is that policemencarry weapons and the badge of the law which can be used to harass or intimidate witnesses against them, assuccinctly brought out in the legislative discussions.If a suspended policeman criminally charged with a serious offense is reinstated to his post while his case ispending, his victim and the witnesses against him are obviously exposed to constant threat and thus easily cowedto silence by the mere fact that the accused is in uniform and armed. the imposition of preventive suspension forover 90 days under Sec 47 of RA 6975 does not violate the suspended policemans constitutional right to equaprotection of the laws.

Suppose the trial is not terminated within ninety days from arraignment, should the suspension of accused belifted?The answer is certainly no. While the law uses the mandatory word shall before the phrase be terminated withinninety (90) days, there is nothing in RA 6975 that suggests that the preventive suspension of the accused will belifted if the trial is not terminated within that period. Nonetheless, the Judge who fails to decide the case within theperiod without justifiable reason may be subject to administrative sanctions and, in appropriate cases where thefacts so warrant, to criminal or civil liability. If the trial is unreasonably delayed without fault of the accused suchthat he is deprived of his right to a speedy trial, he is not without a remedy. He may ask for the dismissal of thecase. Should the court refuse to dismiss the case, the accused can compel its dismissal by certiorari, prohibitionor mandamus, or secure his liberty by habeas corpus.

Central bank Employees

GR No 148208


11/13

11

Puno, J.

Facts:

RA 7653 otherwise known as the New Central Bank Act took effect July 3 1993, effectively replacing the earlierCentral Bank of the Philippines (established 1949) by the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas. On June 8 2001, petitionerCentral Bank (now BSP) Employees Association Inc. filed a petition against the Executive Secretary of the Officeof the President to restrain BSP from implementing the last proviso in Section 15 (i), Article II of RA 7653 whichpertains to establishment of a Human resource management system and a compensation structure as part of theauthority of the Monetary Board. Employees whose positions fall under SG 19 and below shall be in accordance

with the rates in the salary standardization act. Petitioner contends that the classifications is not reasonable,arbitrary and violates the equal protection clause. The said proviso has been prejudicial to some 2994 rank- and file BSP employees. Respondent on the other hand contends that the provision does not violate the equalprotection clause, provided that it is construed together with other provisions of the same law such as the fiscaland administrative autonomy of the Bangko Sentral and the mandate of its monetary board. The SolicitorGeneral, as counsel of the Executive Secretary defends the provision, that the classification of employees is basedon real and actual differentiation and it adheres to the policy of RA 7653 to establish professionalism andexcellence within the BSP subject to prevailing laws and policies of the government.

Issue: Whether or not the contended proviso if RA 7653 violates the equal protection of laws, henceunconstitutional.

Held: Yes the proviso is unconstitutional as it operate on the salary grade or the officer employee status, it

distinguishes between economic class and status with the higher salary grade recipients are of greater benefitabove the law than those of mandated by the Salary Standardization Act. Officers of the BSP receive higher wagesthat those of rank-and-file employees because the former are not covered by the salary standardization act asprovided by the proviso.

- See more at:http://polnix.com/?p=86#sthash.xwPCrbxs.dpuf

RODOLFO FARINAS VS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY [G.R. No. 147387. December 10, 2003]

NATURE OF THE CASE:

Petitions under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as amended, seeking to declare as unconstitutional Section 14 ofRepublic Act No. 9006 (The Fair Election Act), insofar as it expressly repeals Section 67 of Batas Pambansa Blg881 (The Omnibus Election Code) which provides:

SEC. 67. Candidates holding elective office. Any elective official, whether national or local, running for any office other

than the one which he is holding in a permanent capacity, except for President and Vice-President, shall be considered ipso

factoresigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.

FACTS:

The petitioners now come to the Court alleging in the main that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006, insofar as itrepeals Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, is unconstitutional for being in violation of Section 26(1), ArticleVI of the Constitution, requiring every law to have only one subject which should be expressed in its title.

According to the petitioners, the inclusion of Section 14 repealing Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code inRep. Act No. 9006 constitutes a proscribed rider.

They point out the dissimilarity in the subject matter of Rep. Act No. 9006, on the one hand, and Section 67 of theOmnibus Election Code, on the other. Rep. Act No. 9006 primarily deals with the lifting of the ban on the use omedia for election propaganda and the elimination of unfair election practices, while Section 67 of the OmnibusElection Code imposes a limitation on elective officials who run for an office other than the one they are holding ina permanent capacity by considering them as ipso factoresigned therefrom upon filing of the certificate ocandidacy. The repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code is thus not embraced in the title, nor germaneto the subject matter of Rep. Act No. 9006.
http://polnix.com/?p=86#sthash.xwPCrbxs.dpufhttp://polnix.com/?p=86#sthash.xwPCrbxs.dpufhttp://polnix.com/?p=86#sthash.xwPCrbxs.dpufhttp://www.incentria.com/index.php?ref=pinaynetizenhttp://polnix.com/?p=86#sthash.xwPCrbxs.dpuf


12/13

12

The petitioners also assert that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 violates the equal protection clause of theConstitution because it repeals Section 67 only of the Omnibus Election Code, leaving intact Section 66 thereofwhich imposes a similar limitation to appointive officials, thus:

SEC. 66. Candidates holding appointive office or position. Any person holding a public appointive office or position

including active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and officers and employees in government-owned or

controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso factoresigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.

They contend that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 discriminates against appointive officials. By the repeal ofSection 67, an elective official who runs for office other than the one which he is holding is no longerconsidered ipso factoresigned therefrom upon filing his certif icate of candidacy. Elective officials continue inpublic office even as they campaign for reelection or election for another elective position. On the other hand,Section 66 has been retained; thus, the limitation on appointive officials remains - they are still considered ipsofactoresigned from their offices upon the filing of their certificates of candidacy.

The petitioners assert that Rep. Act No. 9006 is null and void in its entirety as irregularities attended its enactmentinto law. The law, not only Section 14 thereof, should be declared null and void. Even Section 16 of the law whichprovides that [t]his Act shall take effect upon its approval is a violation of the due process clause of theConstitution, as well as jurisprudence, which require publication of the law before it becomes effective.

Finally, the petitioners maintain that Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code is a good law; hence, should nothave been repealed. The petitioners cited the ruling of the Court in Dimaporo v. Mitra, Jr.,[13]that Section 67 othe Omnibus Election Code is based on the constitutional mandate on the Accountability of Public Officers:

Sec. 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve

them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.

Consequently, the respondents Speaker and Secretary General of the House of Representatives acted with graveabuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction for not considering those members of the Housewho ran for a seat in the Senate during the May 14, 2001 elections as ipso factoresigned therefrom, upon thefiling of their respective certificates of candidacy.

ISSUES:

W/N Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 Is a Rider.

W/N Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 Is Violative of the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution.

W/N Section 16 of the law which provides that [t]his Act shall take effect upon its approval is a violation of thedue process clause of the Constitution, as well as jurisprudence, which require publication of the law before itbecomes effective.

HELD:

To determine whether there has been compliance with the constitutional requirement that the subject of an actshall be expressed in its title, the Court laid down the rule that

Constitutional provisions relating to the subject matter and titles of statutes should not be so narrowly construedas to cripple or impede the power of legislation. The requirement that the subject of an act shall be expressed inits title should receive a reasonable and not a technical construction. It is sufficient if the title be comprehensiveenough reasonably to include the general object which a statute seeks to effect, without expressing each andevery end and means necessary or convenient for the accomplishing of that object. Mere details need not be setforth. The title need not be an abstract or index of the Act.The title of Rep. Act No. 9006 reads: An Act to Enhance the Holding of Free, Orderly, Honest, Peaceful andCredible Elections through Fair Election Practices.

The Court is convinced that the title and the objectives of Rep. Act No. 9006 are comprehensive enough toinclude the repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code within its contemplation. To require that the saidrepeal of Section 67 of the Code be expressed in the title is to insist that the title be a complete index of itscontent.
http://www.blogger.com/blogger.g?blogID=616460101091868470http://www.blogger.com/blogger.g?blogID=616460101091868470http://www.blogger.com/blogger.g?blogID=616460101091868470http://www.blogger.com/blogger.g?blogID=616460101091868470


13/13

The purported dissimilarity of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, which imposes a limitation on electiveofficials who run for an office other than the one they are holding, to the other provisions of Rep. Act No. 9006which deal with the lifting of the ban on the use of media for election propaganda, does not violate the onesubject-one title rule. This Court has held that an act having a single general subject, indicated in the title, maycontain any number of provisions, no matter how diverse they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with orforeign to the general subject, and may be considered in furtherance of such subject by providing for the methodand means of carrying out the general subject.

The legislators considered Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code as a form of harassment or discriminationthat had to be done away with and repealed. The executive department found cause with Congress when thePresident of the Philippines signed the measure into law. For sure, some sectors of society and in governmentmay believe that the repeal of Section 67 is bad policy as it would encourage political adventurism. But policymatters are not the concern of the Court. Government policy is within the exclusive dominion of the politicalbranches of the government. It is not for this Court to look into the wisdom or propriety of legislativedetermination. Indeed, whether an enactment is wise or unwise, whether it is based on sound economic theory,whether it is the best means to achieve the desired results, whether, in short, the legislative discretion within itsprescribed limits should be exercised in a particular manner are matters for the judgment of the legislature, andthe serious conflict of opinions does not suffice to bring them within the range of judicial cognizance. Congress isnot precluded from repealing Section 67 by the ruling of the Court in Dimaporo v. Mitraupholding the validity othe provision and by its pronouncement in the same case that the provision has a laudable purpose. Over time,Congress may find it imperative to repeal the law on its belief that the election process is thereby enhanced andthe paramount objective of election laws the fair, honest and orderly election of truly deserving members of

Congressis achieved.

Substantial distinctions clearly exist between elective officials and appointive officials. The former occupy theiroffice by virtue of the mandate of the electorate. They are elected to an office for a definite term and may beremoved therefrom only upon stringent conditions. On the other hand, appointive officials hold their office byvirtue of their designation thereto by an appointing authority. Some appointive officials hold their office in apermanent capacity and are entitled to security of tenure while others serve at the pleasure of the appointingauthority.

Finally, the Effectivity clause (Section 16) of Rep. Act No. 9006 which provides that it shall take effectimmediately upon its approval, is defective. However, the same does not render the entire law invalid. In Taadav. Tuvera, this Court laid down the rule:

... the clause unless it is otherwise provided refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of publication itselfwhich cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not mean that the legislator may make the law effective immediately

upon approval, or on any other date without its previous publication.

Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion provide that the usual fifteen-period shall be shortened or extended.

Following Article 2 of the Civil Code and the doctrine enunciated in Taada, Rep. Act No. 9006, notwithstandingits express statement, took effect fifteen days after its publication in the Official Gazette or a newspaper of generacirculation.

In conclusion, it bears reiterating that one of the firmly entrenched principles in constitutional law is that the courtsdo not involve themselves with nor delve into the policy or wisdom of a statute. That is the exclusive concern ofthe legislative branch of the government. When the validity of a statute is challenged on constitutional grounds,the sole function of the court is to determine whether it transcends constitutional limitations or the limits oflegislative power. No such transgression has been shown in this case.

consti 2 session digests

Documents