consti 2 due process digests

7/25/2019 Consti 2 Due Process Digests

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Trustees of Dartmouth College vs. Woodward

FACTS:Eleazar Wheelock set up an Indian charity school, with

the help of several established Americans, clothed,

maintained and educated a number of children of the

Indian natives, with a view of carrying the Gospel and

spreading the word of God. The school became reputable

among Indians in such a way that a vast number of

Indians would want their children to study in his institution

although his personal finances and estate could nolonger handle the same. Wheelock thought that the

undertaking should be accomplished by collecting funds

from well-off individuals from England. Wheelock

requested Reverend Nathaniel Whitacker for that purpose

and gave him a special power of attorney to solicit from

the worthy and generous contributors for the cause.

Eventually, Whitacker appointed several persons to be

trustees for the funds collected through a deed of trust

ratified and executed by Whitacker. Through the efforts of

the trustees alongside Wheelock and Whitacker,

Dartmouth College has been instituted with the Trustees

of Dartmouth College. Any heirs of the Trustees, as

granted by the courts, will be part of the body politic for

the furtherance of Darthmouth College.

[I tried to make a digest but the case was too long, sorry]

Villegas v Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho

FACTS:

The Municipal Board of Manila enacted Ordinance 6537

requiring aliens (except those employed in the diplomatic

and consular missions of foreign countries, in technical

assistance programs of the government and anothercountry, and members of religious orders or

congregations) to procure the requisite mayors permit so

as to be employed or engage in trade in the City of

Manila. Thus, a case was filed with CFI-Manila to stop

enforcement of the ordinance. CFI-Manila declared the

ordinance void. Thus, the present petition for certiorari.

ISSUES:(1) Is the ordinance violative of the cardinal rule of

uniformity of taxation?

(2) Does it violate the principle against undue

designation of legislative power?


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(3) Does it violate the due process and equal protection

clauses of the Constitution?

RULING:

(1) Yes. The P50 fee is unreasonable not only because it

is excessive but because it fails to consider valid

substantial differences in situation among individual

aliens who are required to pay it. The same amount of

P50 is being collected from every employed alien whether

he is casual or permanent, part time or full time or

whether he is a lowly employee or a highly paidexecutive.

(2) Yes. It does not lay down any criterion or standard to

guide the Mayor in the exercise of his discretion. It has

been held that where an ordinance of a municipality fails

to state any policy or to set up any standard to guide or

limit the action, thus conferring upon the Mayor arbitrary

and unrestricted power, such ordinance is invalid.

(3) Yes. Requiring a person before he can be employed

to get a permit from the City Mayor of Manila who may

withhold or refuse it at will is tantamount to denying him

the basic right of the people in the Philippines to engage

in a means of livelihood. The shelter of protection under

the due process and equal protection clause is given to

all persons, both aliens and citizens.

Thus, the ordinance is invalid.

Buck v. Bell 274 U.S. 200

FACTS: Carrie Buck is a feeble minded white woman

who was committed to the State Colony Epileptics and

Feeble Minded. She is the daughter of a feeble mindedmother in the same institution, and the mother of an

illegitimate feeble-minded child. She was eighteen years

old at the time of the trial of her case in the latter part of

1924. An Act of Virginia, approved March 20, 1924,

recites that the health of the patient and the welfare of

society may be promoted in certain cases by the

sterilization of mental defectives, under careful safeguard,

that the sterilization may be effected in males byvasectomy and in females by salpingectomy, without

serious pain or substantial danger to life; that the

Commonwealth issue supporting in various institutions

many defective persons who, if now discharged, would

become a menace, but, if incapable of procreating, might


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be discharged with safety and become self-supporting

with benefit to themselves and to society, and that

experience has shown that heredity plays an importantpart in the transmission of insanity, imbecility, etc. The

statute then enacts that, whenever the superintendent of

certain institutions, including the above-named State

Colony, shall be of opinion that it is for the best interests

of the patient sand of society that an inmate under his

care should be sexually sterilized, he may have the

operation performed upon any patient afflicted with

hereditary forms of insanity, imbecility, etc., on complyingwith the very careful provisions by which the act protects

the patients from possible abuse.

ISSUE: Whether or not the said statute authorizing

compulsory sterilization of the mentally retarded denies

the due process and equal protection of the laws.

HELD: The procedure can be no doubt had the due

process of law. Carrie Buck is the probable potential

parent of socially inadequate offspring, likewise afflicted,

the she may be sexually sterilized without detriment to

her general health, and that her welfare and that of

society will be promoted by her sterilization. We have

seen more than once that the public welfare may call

upon the best citizens for their lives. It is better for all the

world if, instead of waiting to execute degenerateoffspring for crime or to let them starve for their imbecility,

society can prevent those who are manifestly unfit from

continuing their kind.

IMBONG vs. OCHOA

FACTS:

The Reproductive Health Law is a consolidation and

enhancement of existing reproductive laws. It seeks to

enhance the population control program of thegovernment in order to promote public welfare. However,

when coercive measures are found within the law,

provisions must be removed or altered in order to ensure

that it does not defy the Constitution by infringing on the

rights of the people.


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Petition: to declare provisions of Republic Act No.10354 as unconstitutional

Factual Antecedents

December 21, 2012: Congress enacted RA No.

10354 also known as the Responsible

Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of

2012 (RH LAW)

The presidents imprimatur and support for the

said law lead to a range of petitions against the

law leading to iuris controversy in court.

Petitions for certiorari and prohibition were

placed by numerous parties. All in all, 14

petitions and 2 petitions-in-intervention were

filed.

March 15, 2013: the RH-IRR or enforcement

of the law took place

March 19, 2013: After deliberating the issues

and arguments raised, the court issued Status

Quo Ante Order (SQAO) which lead to a 120

day halt on the implementation of the

legislation

Due to further arguments and debates fromopposing parties, the SQAO was extended until

further orders of the court last July 16, 2013

Statute Involved:

Republic Act 10354, The Responsible

Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of

2012

Position of Petitioner:

o Petitioners claim that the provisions of RA

10354 are unconstitutional as they violate

the rights to life, to health, to freedom of

expression and speech, to the privacy offamilies, to academic freedom, to due

process of law, to equal protection, and

against involuntary servitude. They also

intrude on the autonomy of local

governments and the ARMM, and violate


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natural law. Furthermore, they claim that

Congress delegation of authority to the

FDA in determining which should beincluded in the EDL is invalid.

Position of Respondent

There is no actual case or controversy and,

therefore, the issues are not yet ripe for

judicial determination

Some petitioners lack standing to question

the RH Law

The petitions are essentially petitions for declaratory relief

over which the Court has no original jurisdiction.

ISSUE: Whether the provisions of RA 10354 infringe

upon the Right to Life, as in the Due Process, of every

person?

HELD:

Right to Life NO

Constitution intended that 1.) conception to refer to

the time of fertilization and 2.) the protection of the

unborn upon said fertilization Not all contraceptives are to be banned (only those

that kill a fertilized ovum)

Contraceptives that prevent union of sperm and egg

are thus permissible

It is the intended by the framers of the 1987

Constitution to prevent the enacting of a law that

legalizes abortion.

RH law prohibits abortion

RH law recognizes that abortion is a crime

RH law prohibits abortifacients.

Due Process - NO

The definitions of several terms pinpointed by thepetitioners in the RH Law are not vague.

Private health care institution = private health care

service provider.

service and methods are also broad enough to

include giving information and performing medical


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procedures, so hospitals run by religious groups can

be exempted.

incorrect information connotes a sense of maliceand ill motive to mislead the public.

Nebbia vs. State of New York

Facts. The New York legislature established a Milk

Control Board that was vested with the power to fix

minimum and maximum retail prices for milk sold within

the state. Appellant, Mr. Nebbia, an owner of a New York

grocery store, was convicted of selling milk for prices in

excess of the price set by the Board.

Issue. Whether the Constitution prohibits a state from

fixing the selling price of milk?

Previous

Held. No. Judgment affirmed. The production and

distribution of milk is a paramount industry of the state

and largely affects the health and prosperity of its people.

Property rights and contract rights are not absolute in

nature and may be subject to limitations. Since the price

controls were not arbitrary, discriminatory, or

demonstrably irrelevant to the policy adopted by the

legislature to promote the general welfare, it was

consistent with the Constitution.

Kwong Sing vs. City of Manila

Facts: Kwong Sing, in his own behalf and of other

Chinese laundrymen who has general and the same

interest, filed a complaint for a preliminary injunction. The

Plaintiffs also questioned the validity of enforcingOrdinance No. 532 by the city of Manila. Ordinance No.

532 requires that the receipt be in duplicate in English

and Spanish duly signed showing the kind and number of

articles delivered by laundries and dyeing and cleaning

establishments. The permanent injunction was denied by

the trial court. The appellants claim is that Ordinance No.

532 savors of class legislation; putting in mind that they

are Chinese nationals. It unjustly discriminates betweenpersons in similar circumstances; and that it constitutes

an arbitrary infringement of property rights. They also

contest that the enforcement of the legislation is an act

beyond the scope of their police power. In view of the

foregoing, this is an appeal with the Supreme Court.


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Issues:

(1) Whether or Not the enforcement of Ordinance no, 532

is an act beyond the scope of police power

(2) Whether or Not the enforcement of the same is a

class legislation that infringes property rights.

Held: Reasonable restraints of a lawful business for such

purposes are permissible under the police power. The

police power of the City of Manila to enact Ordinance No.

532 is based on Section 2444, paragraphs (l) and (ee) of

the Administrative Code, as amended by Act No. 2744,

authorizes the municipal board of the city of Manila, with

the approval of the mayor of the city:

(l) To regulate and fix the amount of the license fees for

the following: xxxx xxxxx laundries xxxx.

(ee) To enact all ordinances it may deem necessary and

proper for the sanitation and safety, the furtherance of the

prosperity, and the promotion of the morality, peace, good

order, comfort, convenience, and general welfare of the

city and its inhabitants.

The court held that the obvious purpose of Ordinance No.

532 was to avoid disputes between laundrymen and their

patrons and to protect customers of laundries who are not

able to decipher Chinese characters from being

defrauded. (Considering that in the year 1920s, people of

Manila are more familiar with Spanish and maybe

English.)

In whether the ordinance is class legislation, the court

held that the ordinance invades no fundamental right, and

impairs no personal privilege. Under the guise of police

regulation, an attempt is not made to violate personal

property rights. The ordinance is neither discriminatory

nor unreasonable in its operation. It applies to all public

laundries without distinction, whether they belong to

Americans, Filipinos, Chinese, or any other nationality.

All, without exception, and each every one of them

without distinction, must comply with the ordinance. The

obvious objection for the implementation of the ordinance

is based in sec2444 (ee) of the Administrative Code.

Although, an additional burden will be imposed on the

business and occupation affected by the ordinance such


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as that of the appellant by learning even a few words in

Spanish or English, but mostly Arabic numbers in order to

properly issue a receipt, it seems that the same burdensare cast uponthem. Yet, even if private rights of person or

property are subjected to restraint, and even if loss will

result to individuals from the enforcement of the

ordinance, this is not sufficient ground for failing to uphold

the power of the legislative body. The very foundation of

the police power is the control of private interests for the

public welfare.

Finding that the ordinance is valid, judgment is affirmed,

and the petition for a preliminary injunction is denied, with

costs against the appellants.

Yu Cong Eng vs. Trinidad

Facts: On 1921, Act No. 2972 or the Chinese

Bookkeeping Law was passed, regulating that the

account books should not be in any other language exc.

English, Spanish or any dialect, otherwise a penalty of

fine of not more than 10K or imprisonment for not more

than 2 years will be imposed

- fiscal measure intended to facilitate the work of thegovernment agents and to prevent fraud in the returns of

merchants, in conformity with the sales tax and the

income tax

On March 1923, BIR inspected the books of

account of Yu Cong Eng where it was found out that it is

not in accordance with Act 2972

A criminal case was filed against Yu Cong Eng

before the CFI Manila for keeping his books of account in

Chinese

Yus defense:

Yu Cong Eng et al are Chinese merchants,

claiming that they represent the other 12K filed a petition

for prohibition and injunction against the CIR, questioning

the constitutionality of Act No. 2972 or the Chinese

Bookkeeping Law

Issue: W/N Act No. 2972 is constitutional?

Ruling:

As a general rule, the question of constitutionality

must be raised in the lower court and that court must be


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given an opportunity to pass upon the question before it

may be presented to the appellate court for resolution

Power of taxation- strongest of all the powers of government,

practically absolute and unlimited

- It is a legislative power. All its incidents are within

the control of the legislature. It is the Legislature which

must questions of state necessarily involved in ordering a

tax, which must make all the necessary rules and

regulations which are to be observed in order to produce

the desired results, and which must decide upon the

agencies by means of which collections shall be made

The power to tax is not judicial power and that a

strong case is required for the judiciary to declare a law

relating to taxation invalid. If, of course, so great an

abuse is manifest as to destroy natural and fundamental

rights, it is the duty of the judiciary to hold such an Act

unconstitutional

The Chinese petitioners are accorded treaty rights

of the most favored nation

Their constitutional rights are those accorded all

aliens, which means that the life, liberty, or property of

these persons cannot be taken without due process of

law, and that they are entitled to the equal protection of

the laws, without regard to their race

Act No. 2972 is a fiscal measure which seeks to

prohibit not only the Chinese but all merchants of

whatever nationality from making entries in the books ofaccount or forms subject to inspection for taxation

purposes in any other language than either the English or

Spanish language or a local dialect

the law only intended to require the keeping of

such books as were necessary in order to facilitate

governmental inspection for tax purposes

The Chinese will not be singled out as a special

subject for discriminating and hostile legislation since

there are other aliens doing business in the Phils. There

will be no arbitrary deprivation of liberty or arbitrary

spoliation of property. There will be no unjust and illegal

discrimination between persons in similar circumstances.

The law will prove oppressive to the extent that all tax

laws are oppressive, but not oppressive to the extent of

confiscation

Act No. 2972 as meaning that any person,

company, partnership, or corporation, engaged in

commerce, industry, or any other activity for the purpose

of profit in the Philippine Islands, shall keep its account

books, consisting of sales books and other records and

returns required for taxation purposes by regulations of

the Bureau of Internal Revenue, in effect when this action


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was begun, in English, Spanish, or a local dialect, thus

valid and constitutional

Ichong vs. Hernandez

Facts: Petitioner, for and in his own behalf and on behalf

of other alien residents corporations and partnerships

adversely affected by the provisions of Republic Act. No.

1180, An Act to Regulate the Retail Business, filed to

obtain a judicial declaration that said Act isunconstitutional contending that: (1) it denies to alien

residents the equal protection of the laws and deprives of

their liberty and property without due process of law ; (2)

the subject of the Act is not expressed or comprehended

in the title thereof; (3) the Act violates international and

treaty obligations of the Republic of the Philippines; (4)

the provisions of the Act against the transmission by

aliens of their retail business thru hereditary succession,

and those requiring 100% Filipino capitalization for a

corporation or entity to entitle it to engage in the retail

business, violate the spirit of Sections 1 and 5, Article XIII

and Section 8 of Article XIV of the Constitution.

Issue: Whether RA 1180 denies to alien residents the

equal protection of the laws and deprives of their liberty

and property without due process of law

Held: No. The equal protection of the law clause is

against undue favor and individual or class privilege, as

well as hostile discrimination or the oppression of

inequality. It is not intended to prohibit legislation, which

is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by

territory within which is to operate. It does not demand

absolute equality among residents; it merely requires that

all persons shall be treated alike, under like

circumstances and conditions both as to privileges

conferred and liabilities enforced. The equal protection

clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only to

those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies

alike to all persons within such class, and reasonable

grounds exists for making a distinction between those

who fall within such class and those who do not. (2

Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 824-825.)

The due process clause has to do with the

reasonableness of legislation enacted in pursuance of the

police power. Is there public interest, a public purpose; is

public welfare involved? Is the Act reasonably necessary


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for the accomplishment of the legislatures purpose; is it

not unreasonable, arbitrary or oppressive? Is there

sufficient foundation or reason in connection with thematter involved; or has there not been a capricious use of

the legislative power? Can the aims conceived be

achieved by the means used, or is it not merely an

unjustified interference with private interest? These are

the questions that we ask when the due process test is

applied.

The conflict, therefore, between police power and the

guarantees of due process and equal protection of the

laws is more apparent than real. Properly related, the

power and the guarantees are supposed to coexist. The

balancing is the essence or, shall it be said, the

indispensable means for the attainment of legitimate

aspirations of any democratic society. There can be no

absolute power, whoever exercise it, for that would be

tyranny. Yet there can neither be absolute liberty, for that

would mean license and anarchy. So the State can

deprive persons of life, liberty and property, provided

there is due process of law; and persons may be

classified into classes and groups, provided everyone is

given the equal protection of the law. The test or

standard, as always, is reason. The police power

legislation must be firmly grounded on public interest and

welfare, and a reasonable relation must exist between

purposes and means. And if distinction and classificationhas been made, there must be a reasonable basis for

said distinction.

The law does not violate the equal protection clause of

the Constitution because sufficient grounds exist for the

distinction between alien and citizen in the exercise of the

occupation regulated, nor the due process of law clause,

because the law is prospective in operation and

recognizes the privilege of aliens already engaged in the

occupation and reasonably protects their privilege; that

the wisdom and efficacy of the law to carry out its

objectives appear to us to be plainly evident as a

matter of fact it seems not only appropriate but actually

necessary and that in any case such matter falls within

the prerogative of the Legislature, with whose power and

discretion the Judicial department of the Government

may not interfere; that the provisions of the law are

clearly embraced in the title, and this suffers from no

duplicity and has not misled the legislators or the

segment of the population affected; and that it cannot be

said to be void for supposed conflict with treaty

obligations because no treaty has actually been entered


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into on the subject and the police power may not be

curtailed or surrendered by any treaty or any other

conventional agreement.

NO ESPINA VS ZAMORA DIGEST

SERRANO v. GALLANT MARITIME SERVICES INC. &

MARLOWE NAVIGATION CO., INC.

Facts:

Petitioner was hired by Gallant Maritime Services, Inc.

and Marlow Navigation Co., Ltd. (respondents) under a

POEA-approved Contract of Employment. On March 19,

1998, the date of his departure, petitioner was

constrained to accept a downgraded employment

contract for the position of Second Officer with a monthlysalary of US$1,000.00, upon the assurance and

representation of respondents that he would be made

Chief Officer by the end of April. However, respondents

did not deliver on their promise to make petitioner Chief

Officer. Hence, petitioner refused to stay on as Second

Officer and was repatriated to the Philippines on May.

Petitioner's employment contract was for a period of 12

months or from March 19, 1998 up to March 19, 1999,

but at the time of his repatriation on May 26, 1998, he

had served only two (2) months and seven (7) days of his

contract, leaving an unexpired portion of nine (9) months

and twenty-three (23) days.

Petitioner filed with the Labor Arbiter (LA) a Complaint

against respondents for constructive dismissal and forpayment of his money claims. LA rendered the dismissal

of petitioner illegal and awarding him monetary benefits.

Respondents appealed to the NLRC to question the

finding of the LA. Likewise, petitioner also appealed to

the NLRC on the sole issue that the LA erred in not

applying the ruling of the Court in Triple Integrated

Services, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission

that in case of illegal dismissal, OFWs are entitled to theirsalaries for the unexpired portion of their contracts.

Petitioner also appealed to the NLRC on the sole

issue that the LA erred in not applying the ruling of the

Court in Triple Integrated Services, Inc. v. National Labor


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Relations Commission that in case of illegal dismissal,

OFWs are entitled to their salaries for the unexpired

portion of their contracts. Petitioner filed a Motion for

Partial Reconsideration; he questioned the

constitutionality of the subject clause. Petitioner filed a

Petition for Certiorari with the CA, reiterating the

constitutional challenge against the subject clause. CA

affirmed the NLRC ruling on the reduction of the

applicable salary rate; however, the CA skirted the

constitutional issue raised by petitioner.

The last clause in the 5th paragraph of Section 10,

Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8042, to wit:

Sec. 10. Money Claims. - x x x In case of termination of

overseas employment without just, valid or authorized

cause as defined by law or contract, the workers shall be

entitled to the full reimbursement of his placement fee

with interest of twelve percent (12%) per annum, plus his

salaries for the unexpired portion of his employment

contract or for three (3) months for every year of the

unexpired term, whichever is less.

Applying the subject clause, the NLRC and the CA

computed the lump-sum salary of petitioner at the

monthly rate of US$1,400.00 covering the period of three

months out of the unexpired portion of nine months and

23 days of his employment contract or a total of

US$4,200.00.

Impugning the constitutionality of the subject clause,

petitioner contends that, in addition to the US$4,200.00

awarded by the NLRC and the CA, he is entitled to

US$21,182.23 more or a total of US$25,382.23,

equivalent to his salaries for the entire nine months and

23 days left of his employment contract, computed at the

monthly rate of US$2,590.00

Issue:

1.) Is petitioner entitled to his monetary claim which is

the lump-sum salary for the entire unexpired portion of

his 12-month employment contract, and not just for a

period of three months?

2.) Should petitioners overtime and leave pay form

part of the salary basis in the computation of his

monetary award, because these are fixed benefits that

have been stipulated into his contract?

Held:


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1.) Yes. Petitioner is awarded his salaries for the entire

unexpired portion of his employment contract consisting

of nine months and 23 days computed at the rate of

US$1,400.00 per month. The subject clause or for three

months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is

less in the 5th paragraph of Section 10 of Republic Act

No. 8042 is declared unconstitutional.

In sum, prior to R.A. No. 8042, OFWs and local workers

with fixed-term employment who were illegally discharged

were treated alike in terms of the computation of their

money claims: they were uniformly entitled to their

salaries for the entire unexpired portions of their

contracts. But with the enactment of R.A. No. 8042,

specifically the adoption of the subject clause, illegally

dismissed OFWs with an unexpired portion of one year or

more in their employment contract have since been

differently treated in that their money claims are subject

to a 3-month cap, whereas no such limitation is imposed

on local workers with fixed-term employment.

The Court concludes that the subject clause contains a

suspect classification in that, in the computation of the

monetary benefits of fixed-term employees who are

illegally discharged, it imposes a 3-month cap on the

claim of OFWs with an unexpired portion of one year or

more in their contracts, but none on the claims of other

OFWs or local workers with fixed-term employment. The

subject clause singles out one classification of OFWs and

burdens it with a peculiar disadvantage.

The Court further holds that the subject clause violates

petitioner's right to substantive due process, for it

deprives him of property, consisting of monetary benefits,

without any existing valid governmental purpose. The

subject clause being unconstitutional, petitioner is entitled

to his salaries for the entire unexpired period of nine

months and 23 days of his employment contract,

pursuant to law and jurisprudence prior to the enactment

of R.A. No. 8042.

2.) No. The word salaries in Section 10(5) does not

include overtime and leave pay. For seafarers like

petitioner, DOLE Department Order No. 33, series 1996,

provides a Standard Employment Contract of Seafarers,

in which salary is understood as the basic wage,

exclusive of overtime, leave pay and other bonuses;

whereas overtime pay is compensation for all work

performed in excess of the regular eight hours, and


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holiday pay is compensation for any work performed on

designated rest days and holidays.

By the foregoing definition alone, there is no basis for the

automatic inclusion of overtime and holiday pay in the

computation of petitioner's monetary award; unless there

is evidence that he performed work during those periods.

CLAUDIO S. YAP,

Petitioner, vs.

THENAMARIS SHIP'S MANAGEMENT and

INTERMARE MARITIME AGENCIES, INC.,

Respondents.

Facts:

Claudio S. Yap was employed as electrician of the vessel,

M/T SEASCOUT on 14 August 2001 by Intermare

Maritime Agencies, Inc. in behalf of its principal, Vulture

Shipping Limited. for a duration of 12 months. On 23

August 2001, Yap boarded M/T SEASCOUT and

commenced his job as electrician. However, on or about

08 November 2001, the vessel was sold. Yap, along with

the other crewmembers, was informed by the Master of

their vessel that the same was sold and will be scrapped.

Yap received his seniority bonus, vacation bonus, extra

bonus along with the scrapping bonus. However, with

respect to the payment of his wage, he refused to accept

the payment of one-month basic wage. He insisted that

he was entitled to the payment of the unexpired portion of

his contract since he was illegally dismissed from

employment. He alleged that he opted for immediate

transfer but none was made.

The Labor Arbiter

Thus, Claudio S. Yap (petitioner) filed a complaint for

Illegal Dismissal with Damages and Attorneys Fees

before the Labor Arbiter (LA). On July 26, 2004, the LA

rendered a decision in favor of petitioner, finding the latter

to have been constructively and illegally dismissed by

respondents.

LA opined that since the unexpired portion of petitioners

contract was less than one year, petitioner was entitled to

his salaries for the unexpired portion of his contract for a

period of nine months.

The NLRC

Aggrieved, respondents sought recourse from the NLRC.

The NLRC affirmed the LAs findings that petitioner was


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indeed constructively and illegally dismissed. However,

the NLRC held that instead of an award of salaries

corresponding to nine months, petitioner was only entitled

to salaries for three months as provided under Section

108 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8042,9 as enunciated in

our ruling in Marsaman Manning Agency, Inc. v. National

Labor Relations Commission .Respondents filed a Motion

for Partial Reconsideration. Finding merit in petitioners

arguments, the NLRC reversed its earlier Decision,

holding that "there can be no choice to grant only three

(3) months salary for every year of the unexpired term

because there is no full year of unexpired term which this

can be applied."

The Court of Appeals

The CA affirmed the findings and ruling of the LA and the

NLRC that petitioner was constructively and illegally

dismissed. However, the

CA ruled that the NLRC erred in sustaining

the LAs interpretation of Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042. In

this regard, the CA relied on the clause "or for three

months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is

less" provided in the 5th paragraph of Section 10 of R.A.

No. 8042.

Issue:

Whether or not Section 10 of R.A. [No.] 8042, to the

extent that it affords an illegally dismissed migrant worker

the lesser benefit of "salaries for [the] unexpired portion

of his employment contract or for three (3) months for

every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less" is

unconstitutional. - YES

Whether or not the Court of Appeals gravely erred in

granting petitioner only three (3) months backwages

when his unexpired term of 9 months is far short of the

"every year of the unexpired term" threshold. YES

Held:

The said provision of law has long been a source of

abuse by callous employers against migrant workers; and

that said provision violates the equal protection clause

under the Constitution because, while illegally dismissed

local workers are guaranteed under the Labor Code of

reinstatement with full backwages computed from the

time compensation was withheld from them up to their

actual reinstatement. It imposes a 3-month cap on the

claim of OFWs with an unexpired portion of one year or

more in their contracts, but none on the claims of other

OFWs or local workers with fixed-term employment.


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Respondents, aware of our ruling in Serrano, aver that

our pronouncement of unconstitutionality should not

apply in this case because Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042 is

a substantive law that deals with the rights and

obligations of the parties incase of Illegal Dismissal of a

migrant worker and is not merely procedural in character.

Thus, pursuant to the Civil Code, there should be no

retroactive application of the law in this case.

As a general rule, an unconstitutional act is not a law; it

confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no

protection; it creates no office; it is inoperative as if it has

not been passed at all. The doctrine of operative fact

serves as an exception to the aforementioned general

rule. The doctrine of operative fact, as an exception to the

general rule, only applies as a matter of equity and fair

play. It nullifies the effects of an unconstitutional law by

recognizing that the existence of a statute prior to a

determination of unconstitutionality is an operative fact

and may have consequences which cannot always be

ignored.

The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial

declaration.

The doctrine is applicable when a declaration of

unconstitutionality will impose an undue burden on those

who have relied on the invalid law.

Following Serrano, we hold that this case should not be

included in the aforementioned exception. To rule

otherwise would be iniquitous to petitioner and other

OFWs, and would, in effect, send a wrong signal that

principals/employers and recruitment/manning agencies

may violate an OFWs security of tenure which an

employment contract embodies and actually profit from

such violation based on an unconstitutional provision of

law. Invoking Serrano, respondents claim that the tanker

allowance should be excluded from the definition of the

term "salary." Fair play, justice, and due process dictate

that this Court cannot now, for the first time on appeal,

pass upon this question. Matters not taken up below

cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. A close

perusal of the contract reveals that the tanker allowance

of US$130.00 was not categorized as a bonus but was

rather encapsulated in the basic salary clause, hence,

forming part of the basic salary of petitioner.

White Light Corp. vs. City of Manila


18/53

FACTS:

On 3 Dec 1992, then Mayor Lim signed into law Ord 7774

entitled An Ordinance prohibiting short time admission

in hotels, motels, lodging houses, pension houses and

similar establishments in the City of Manila. White Light

Corp is an operator of mini hotels and motels who sought

to have the Ordinance be nullified as the said Ordinance

infringes on the private rights of their patrons. The RTC

ruled in favor of WLC. It ruled that the Ordinance strikes

at the personal liberty of the individual guaranteed by the

Constitution. The City maintains that the ordinance is

valid as it is a valid exercise of police power. Under the

LGC, the City is empowered to regulate the

establishment, operation and maintenance of cafes,

restaurants, beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns, pension

houses, lodging houses and other similar establishments,

including tourist guides and transports. The CA ruled in

favor of the City.

ISSUE: Whether or not Ord 7774 is valid.

HELD: The SC ruled that the said ordinance is null and

void as it indeed infringes upon individual liberty. It also

violates the due process clause which serves as a

guaranty for protection against arbitrary regulation or

seizure. The said ordinance invades private rights. Note

that not all who goes into motels and hotels for wash up

rate are really there for obscene purposes only. Some are

tourists who needed rest or to wash up or to freshen up.

Hence, the infidelity sought to be avoided by the said

ordinance is more or less subjected only to a limited

group of people. The SC reiterates that individual rights

may be adversely affected only to the extent that may

fairly be required by the legitimate demands of public

interest or public welfare.

Tanada v. Tuvera

GR L-63915, 29 December 1986 (146 SCRA 446)

Facts:

On 24 April 1985, the Court affirmed the necessity for the

publication to the Official Gazette all unpublished


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presidential issuances which are of general application,

and unless so published, they shall have no binding force

and effect. Decision was concurred only by 3 judges.

Petitioners move for reconsideration / clarification of the

decision on various questions. Solicitor General avers

that the motion is a request for advisory opinion.

February Revolution took place, which subsequently

required the new Solicitor General to file a rejoinder on

the issue (under Rule 3, Section 18 of the Rules of

Court).

Issue:

Whether publication is still required in light of the clause

unless otherwise provided.

Held:

The clause unless it is otherwise provided, in Article 2

of the Civil Code, refers to the date of effectivity and not

to the requirement of publication itself, which cannot in

any event be omitted. This clause does not mean that the

legislature may make the law effective immediately upon

approval, or on any other date, without its previous

publication. The legislature may in its discretion provide

that the usual fifteen-day period shall be shortened or

extended. Publication requirements applies to (1) all

statutes, including those of local application and private

laws; (2) presidential decrees and executive orders

promulgated by the President in the exercise of legislative

powers whenever the same are validly delegated by the

legislature or directly conferred by the Constitution; (3)

Administrative rules and regulations for the purpose of

enforcing or implementing existing law pursuant also to a

valid delegation; (4) Charter of a city notwithstanding that

it applies to only a portion of the national territory and

directly affects only the inhabitants of that place; (5)

Monetary Board circulars to fill in the details of the

Central Bank Act which that body is supposed to enforce.

Further, publication must be in full or it is no publication at

all since its purpose is to inform the public of the contents

of the laws.

Reasoning:

The Supreme Court declared that all laws as above

defined shall immediately upon their approval, or as soon

thereafter as possible, be published in full in the Official

Gazette, to become effective only after 15 days from their

publication, or on another date specified by the

legislature, in accordance with Article 2 of the Civil Code.


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Ynot v IAC(1987) 148 SCRA 659

Facts:

Petitioner transported 6 caracbaos from Masbate to Iloilo

in 1984 and these wer confiscated by the station

commander in Barotac, Iloilo for violating E.O. 626 A

which prohibits transportation of a carabao or carabeef

from one province to another. Confiscation will be a result

of this.

The petitioner sued for recovery, and the Regional Trial

Court of Iloilo City issued a writ of replevin upon his filing

of a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00. After considering

the merits of the case, the court sustained the

confiscation of the carabaos and, since they could no

longer be produced, ordered the confiscation of the bond.

The court also declined to rule on the constitutionality of

the executive order, as raise by the petitioner, for lack of

authority and also for its presumed validity.

The same result was decided in the trial court.

In the Supreme Court, he then petitioned against the

constitutionality of the E.O. due to the outright

confiscation without giving the owner the right to heard

before an impartial court as guaranteed by due process.

He also challenged the improper exercise of legislative

power by the former president under Amendment 6 of the

1973 constitution wherein Marcos was given emergency

powers to issue letters of instruction that had the force of

law.

Issue: Is the E.O. constitutional?

Holding: The EO is unconstitutional. Petition granted.

Ratio:

The lower courts are not prevented from examining the

constitutionality of a law.

Constitutional grant to the supreme court to review.

Justice Laurel's said, courts should not follow the path of

least resistance by simply presuming the constitutionality

of a law when it is questioned. On the contrary, they

should probe the issue more deeply, to relieve the

abscess, and so heal the wound or excise the affliction.

The challenged measure is denominated an executive

order but it is really presidential decree, promulgating a

new rule instead of merely implementing an existing law


21/53

due to the grant of legislative authority over the president

under Amendment number 6.

Provisions of the constitution should be cast in precise

language to avoid controversy. In the due process clause,

however, the wording was ambiguous so it would remain

resilient. This was due to the avoidance of an iron rule

laying down a stiff command for all circumstances. There

was flexibility to allow it to adapt to every situation with

varying degrees at protection for the changing conditions.

Courts have also refrained to adopt a standard definition

for due process lest they be confined to its interpretation

like a straitjacket.

There must be requirements of notice and hearing as a

safeguard against arbitrariness.

There are exceptions such as conclusive presumption

which bars omission of contrary evidence as long as

such presumption is based on human experience or

rational connection between facts proved and fact

presumed. An examples is a passport of a person with a

criminal offense cancelled without hearing.

The protection of the general welfare is the particular

function of police power which both restrains and is

restrained by due process. This power was invoked in

626-A, in addition to 626 which prohibits slaughter of

carabaos with an exception.

While 626-A has the same lawful subject as the original

executive order, it cant be said that it complies with the

existence of a lawful method. The transport prohibition

and the purpose sought has a gap.

Summary action may be taken in valid admin

proceedings as procedural due process is not juridical

only due to the urgency needed to correct it.

There was no reason why the offense in the E.O. would

not have been proved in a court of justice with the

accused acquired the rights in the constitution.

The challenged measure was an invalid exercise of police

power because the method to confiscate carabaos was

oppressive.

Due process was violated because the owner was denied

the right to be heard or his defense and punished

immediately.

This was a clear encroachment on judicial functions and

against the separation of powers.


22/53

The policeman wasnt liable for damages since the law

during that time was valid.

Evelio Javier vs COMELEC and Arturo Pacificador

Facts:

Javier and Pacificador, a member of the KBL under

Marcos, were rivals to be members of the Batasan in

May 1984 in Antique. During election, Javier complained

of massive terrorism, intimidation, duress, vote-buying,

fraud, tampering and falsification of election returns under

duress, threat and intimidation, snatching of ballot boxes

perpetrated by the armed men of Pacificador. COMELEC

just referred the complaints to the AFP. On the same

complaint, the 2nd Division of the Commission on

Elections directed the provincial board of canvassers of

Antique to proceed with the canvass but to suspend the

proclamation of the winning candidate until further orders.

On June 7, 1984, the same 2nd Division ordered the

board to immediately convene and to proclaim the winner

without prejudice to the outcome of the case before the

Commission. On certiorari before the SC, the

proclamation made by the board of canvassers was set

aside as premature, having been made before the lapse

of the 5-day period of appeal, which the Javier had

seasonably made. Javier pointed out that the

irregularities of the election must first be resolved before

proclaiming a winner. Further, Opinion, one of the

Commissioners should inhibit himself as he was a former

law partner of Pacificador. Also, the proclamation was

made by only the 2nd Division but the Constitute requires

that it be proclaimed by the COMELEC en banc. In Feb

1986, during pendency, Javier was gunned down. The

Solicitor General then moved to have the petition close it

being moot and academic by virtue of Javiers death.

ISSUE: Whether or not there had been due process in

the proclamation of Pacificador.

HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Javier and has overruled

the Sol-Gens tenor. The SC has repeatedly and

consistently demanded the cold neutrality of an impartial

judge as the indispensable imperative of due process.

To bolster that requirement, we have held that the judge

must not only be impartial but must also appear to be

impartial as an added assurance to the parties that his

decision will be just. The litigants are entitled to no less

than that. They should be sure that when their rights are


23/53

violated they can go to a judge who shall give them

justice. They must trust the judge, otherwise they will not

go to him at all. They must believe in his sense of

fairness, otherwise they will not seek his judgment.

Without such confidence, there would be no point in

invoking his action for the justice they expect.

Due process is intended to insure that confidence by

requiring compliance with what Justice Frankfurter calls

the rudiments of fair play. Fair play calls for equal justice.

There cannot be equal justice where a suitor approaches

a court already committed to the other party and with a

judgment already made and waiting only to be formalized

after the litigants shall have undergone the charade of a

formal hearing. Judicial (and also extrajudicial)

proceedings are not orchestrated plays in which the

parties are supposed to make the motions and reach the

denouement according to a prepared script. There is no

writer to foreordain the ending. The judge will reach his

conclusions only after all the evidence is in and all the

arguments are filed, on the basis of the established facts

and the pertinent law.

Criselda Gacad vs. Judge Hilarion P. Clapis, Jr., RTC

Branch 3, Nabunturan, Compostela Valley

FACTS:

Petitioner filed a Verified Complaint against Judge

Clapis for Grave Misconduct and Corrupt Practices,

Grave Abuse of Discretion, Gross Ignorance of the Law,

and violations of Canon 1 (Rule 1.01, 1.02), Canon 2

(Rule 2.01), and Canon 3 (Rule 3.05) of the Code of

Judicial Conduct relative to a criminal case.

Petitioner alleged that she met Judge Clapis at

the Golden Palace Hotel in Tagum City to talk about the

case of her brother. The prosecutor of the said case,

Graciano Arafol, informed the petitioner that the Judge

will do everything for her favor but on the pretext that in

return she has to give P50,000.00 to the Judge. During

the meeting, the Judge, after being satisfied of the

promise of the petitioner for that amount, told her "Sige,

kay ako na bahala, gamuson nato ni sila." (Okay, leave it

all to me, we shall crush them.)

When the case was set on hearing, the Notices of

Hearings were mailed to the petitioner only after the date

of hearing. Judge Clapis started conducting the bail


24/53

hearings without an application for bail and granting the

same without affording the prosecution the opportunity to

prove that the guilt of the accused is strong. He set a

preliminary conference seven months from the date it

was set, patently contrary to his declaration of speedy

trial for the case. However, the judge claimed that notices

were made verbally because of time constraints.

Nevertheless, he stressed that both sides were given the

opportunity to be heard since in almost all proceedings,

petitioner was in court and the orders were done in open

court. He admitted that his personnel inadvertently

scheduled the preliminary conference of the case.

ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent Judge is guilty of

the charges.

HELD: YES.

Misconduct means intentional wrongdoing or

deliberate violation of a rule of law or standard of

behavior in connection with ones performance of official

functions and duties. For grave or gross misconduct to

exist, the judicial act complained of should be corrupt or

inspired by the intention to violate the law, or a persistent

disregard of well-known rules. The misconduct must

imply wrongful intention and not a mere error of

judgment.

The acts of Judge Clapis in meeting the petitioner,

a litigant in a case pending before his sala and telling

those words, constitute gross misconduct. Judge Clapis

wrongful intention and lack of judicial reasoning are made

overt by the circumstances on record. Judge Clapis

cannot escape liability by shifting the blame to his court

personnel. He ought to know that judges are ultimately

responsible for order and efficiency in their courts, and

the subordinates are not the guardians of the judges

responsibility.

The arbitrary actions of respondent judge, taken

together, give doubt as to his impartiality, integrity and

propriety. His acts amount to gross misconduct

constituting violations of the New Code of Judicial

Conduct, particularly: Canon 2, Section 1 and 2; Canon

3, Section 2 and 4; and Canon 4, Section 1.

We also find Judge Clapis liable for gross ignorance

of the law for conducting bail hearings without a petition

for bail being filed by the accused and without affording


25/53

the prosecution an opportunity to prove that the guilt of

the accused is strong. Here, the act of Judge Clapis is

not a mere deficiency in prudence, discretion and

judgment but a patent disregard of well-known rules.

When an error is so gross and patent, such error

produces an inference of bad faith, making the judge

liable for gross ignorance of the law. If judges are allowed

to wantonly misuse the powers vested in them by the law,

there will not only be confusion in the administration of

justice but also oppressive disregard of the basic

requirements of due process.

Tumey vs. Ohio[273 US 510, 7 March 1927]

Taft (CJ):

Facts: Tumey was arrested at White Oak, and was

brought before Mayor Pugh, of the village of North

College Hill, charged with unlawfully possessing

intoxicating liquor. He moved for his dismissal because of

the disqualification of the mayor to try him under the 14th

Amendment. The mayor denied the motion, proceeded to

the trial, convicted Tumey of unlawfully possessing

intoxicating liquor within Hamilton county as charged,

fined him $100, and ordered that he be imprisoned until

the fine and costs were paid. Tumey obtained a bill of

exceptions and carried the case on error to the court of

common pleas of Hamilton county. That court heard the

case and reversed the judgment, on the ground that the

mayor was disqualified as claimed. The state sought

review by the Court of Appeals of the First Appellate

District of Ohio, which reversed the common pleas and

affirmed the judgment of the mayor. On 4 May 1926, the

state Supreme Court refused Tumeys application to

require the Court of Appeals to certify its record in the

case. Tumey then filed a petition in error in that court as

of right, asking that the judgment of the mayors court and

of the appellate court be reversed on constitutional

grounds. On 11 May 1926, the Supreme Court adjudged

that the petition be dismissed for the reason that no

debatable constitutional question was involved in the

cause. The judgment was then brought to the US

Supreme Court upon a writ of error allowed by the Chief

Justice of the state Supreme Court, to which it was rightly

directed.

Issue: Whether the pecuniary interest of the Mayor and

his village, and the system of courts in prosecuting

violations of the Prohibition Act, renders the mayor

disqualified from hearing the case.


26/53

Held: All questions of judicial qualification may not involve

constitutional validity. Thus matters of kinship, personal

bias, state policy, remoteness of interest would seem

generally to be matters merely of legislative discretion.

But it certainly violates the 14th Amendment and deprives

a defendant in a criminal case of due process of law to

subject his liberty or property to the judgment of a court,

the judge of which has a direct, personal, substantial

pecuniary interest in reaching a conclusion against him in

his case. Herein, the mayor has authority, which he

exercised in the case, to order that the person sentenced

to pay a fine shall remain in prison until the fine and costs

are paid. The mayor thus has a direct personal pecuniary

interest in convicting the defendant who came before him

for trial, in the $12 of costs imposed in his behalf, which

he would not have received if the defendant had been

acquitted. This was not exceptional, but was the result of

the normal operation of the law and the ordinance. The

system by which an inferior judge is paid for his service

only when he convicts the defendant has not become so

embedded by custom in the general practice, either at

common law or in this country, that it can be regarded as

due process of law, unless the costs usually imposed are

so small that they may be properly ignored as within the

maxim de minimis non curat lex. The Court cannot

regard the prospect of receipt or loss of such an

emolument in each case as a minute, remote, trifling, or

insignificant interest. It is certainly not fair to each

defendant brought before the mayor for the careful and

judicial consideration of his guilt or innocence that the

prospect of such a prospective loss by the mayor should

weigh against his acquittal. But the pecuniary interest of

the mayor in the result of his judgment is not the only

reason for holding that due process of law is denied to

the defendant here. The statutes were drawn to stimulate

small municipalities, in the country part of counties in

which there are large cities, to organize and maintain

courts to try persons accused of violations of the

Prohibition Act everywhere in the county. The inducement

is offered of dividing between the state and the village the

large fines provided by the law for its violations. The trial

is to be had before a mayor without a jury, without

opportunity for retrial, and with a review confined to

questions of law presented by a bill of exceptions, with no

opportunity by the reviewing court to set aside the

judgment on the weighing of evidence, unless it should

appear to be so manifestly against the evidence as to

indicate mistake, bias, or willful disregard of duty by the

trial court. Thus, no matter what the evidence was


27/53

against him, the defendant had the right to have an

impartial judge. He seasonably raised the objection, and

was entitled to halt the trial because of the disqualification

of the judge, which existed both because of his direct

pecuniary interest in the outcome, and because of his

official motive to convict and to graduate the fine to help

the financial needs of the village. There were thus

presented at the outset both features of the

disqualification. The judgment of the Supreme Court of

Ohio is reversed, and the cause remanded for further

proceedings not inconsistent with the present opinion.

Pedro Azul vs. Judge Jose Castro & Rosalinda

Tecson

Azul owns and operates a construction shop. To finance

it he entered a loan agreement with Tecson in the amount

of P391k. Tecson was only able to collect P141k thus

leaving about P250k as a balance. She filed a petition for

collection of sum of money before the Rizal RTC and the

case was given to J Sarmiento. On 27 Mar 79, Azul

received the copy of the complaint. On 10 Apr 79, Azul

filed a motion for a 15 day extension to file for responsive

pleading. Azul was unaware that J Sarmiento retired and

was temporarily substituted by J Aover who granted the

extension but only for 5 days starting the next day. But

Azul only received the notice granting such on the 23rd of

the same month way passed the 5 day period. On the

17th of April, Tecson already filed a motion to dismiss

averring that Azuls 5 day extension has already lapsed.

On the 18th of the same month, J Castro, the permanent

judge to replace J Sarmiento took office and he ordered

Azul to be in default due to the lapse of the 5 day

extension. J Castro proceeded with the reception of

evidence the next day and of course without Azuls

evidence as he was still unaware of him being in default.

On April 27th, J Castro ruled in favor Tecson. On May

2nd Azul, unaware that J Castro already decided the

case appealed to remove his default status. On May 7th

Azul received the decision rendered by the court on Apr

27th (but on record the date of receipt was May 5th). Azul

filed a motion for new trial on June 6th. The lower court

denied the same on the 20th of the same month. On Aug

1st, Azul filed a notice of appeal it was denied on the 3rd

but was reconsidered on the 7th hence Azul filed his

record on appeal on the 21st and J Castro approved it on

the 27th but surprisingly upon motion of Tecson on the

30th, J Castro set aside its earlier decisaion on the 27th.


28/53

Finally, J Castro denied the appeal on the 7th of

September.

ISSUE: Whether or not Azul has been denied due

process.

HELD: The SC agreed with the Azul that he was denied

due process. The constitutional provision on due process

commands all who wield public authority, but most

peremptorily courts of justice, to strictly maintain

standards of fundamental fairness and to insure that

procedural safeguards essential to a fair trial are

observed at all stages of a proceeding. It may be argued

that when the Azuls counsel asked for a fifteen (15) day

extension from April 11, 1979 to file his answer, it was

imprudent and neglectful for him to assume that said first

extension would be granted. However, the records show

that Atty. Camaya personally went to the session hall of

the court with his motion for postponement only to be

informed that J Sarmiento had just retired but that his

motion would be considered submitted for resolution.

Since the sala was vacant and pairing judges in Quezon

City are literally swamped with their own heavy loads of

cases, counsel may be excused for assuming that, at the

very least, he had the requested fifteen (15) days to file

his responsive pleading. It is likewise inexplicable why J

Aover, who had not permanently taken over the sala

vacated by the retired judge, should suddenly rule that

only a five-day extension would be allowed. And to

compound the Azuls problems, the order was sent by

mail and received only twelve (12) days later or after the

five-day period. Before the much publicized Project

Mercury of the Bureau of Posts, a court should have

known that court orders requiring acts to be done in a

matter of days should not be sent by mail. Meanwhile, the

petitioner was declared in default. The motion to declare

defendant in default is dated April 17, 1979. No copy was

furnished the petitioner. It was acted upon on April 18,

1979, the very first day in office of J Castro in Quezon

City.

Mayor Miguel Paderanga vs. Judge Cesar Azura

Paderanga was the mayor of Gingoog City, Misamis

Oriental. He petitioned that J Azura inhibits himself from

deciding on pending cases brought before him on the

grounds that they have lost confidence in him, that he

entertained tax suits against the city and had issued


29/53

TROs on the sales of properties when it is clearly

provided for by law (Sec 74 PD 464) that the remedy to

stop auction is to pay tax, that J Azura is bias, oppressive

and is abusive in his power.

ISSUE: Whether or not J Azura should inhibit himself

from the trial.

HELD: The SC ruled that Azura must. As decided in the

Pimentel Case (21 SCRA 160), All the foregoing

notwithstanding, this should be a good occasion as any

to draw attention of all judges to appropriate guidelines in

a situation where their capacity to try and decide fairly

and judiciously comes to the fore by way of challenge

from any one of the parties. A judge may not be legally

prohibited from sitting in a litigation But when suggestion

is made of record that he might be induced to act in favor

of one party or with bias or prejudice against a litigant

arising out of circumstances reasonably capable of

inciting such a state of mind, he should conduct a careful

self-examination. He should exercise his discretion in a

way that the peoples faith in the courts of justice is not

impaired.

The reminder is also apropos that next in importance to

the duty of rendering a righteous judgment is that of

doing it in such a manner as will beget no suspicion of

the fairness and integrity of the judge.

NO CONCIO VS. DOJ CASE

PROSPERO A. PICHAY, JR. v. OFFICE OF THE

DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY FOR LEGALAFFAIRS, et al. G.R. No. 196425, 24 July 2012, EN

BANC(Perlas-Bernabe, J.)

Executive Order No. 13 which abolishes the Presidential

Anti-Graft Commission and transfers its functions to the

Investigative and Adjudicatory Division of the Office of the

Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs, is

constitutional pursuant to the Presidents continuing

authority to reorganize the administrative structure of the

Office of the President in order to achieve simplicity,

economy and efficiency.


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In 2010, President Benigno S. Aquino III issued

Executive Order No. 13 (E.O. 13), abolishing the

Presidential Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC) and

transferring its functions to the Investigative and

Adjudicatory Division of the Office of the Deputy

Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs (IAD-ODESLA).

Finance Secretary Cesar V. Purisima later on filed before

the IAD-ODESLA a complaint affidavit for grave

misconduct against Prospero A. Pichay, Jr. (Pichay),

Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the Local Water

Utilities Administration (LWUA) for the purchase by the

LWUA of shares of stock of Express Savings Bank, Inc.

In defense, Pichay filed a Motion to Dismiss Ex

Abundante Ad Cautelam manifesting that a case

involving the same transaction is already pending before

the Office of the Ombudsman. Alleging that no other

plain, speedy and adequate remedy is available, Pichay

has resorted to the instant petition for certiorari and

prohibition assailing the constitutionality of E.O. 13.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not E.O. 13 is constitutional

2. Whether or not there is usurpation of legislative power

to appropriate

public funds in view of such reorganization

3. Whether or not the IAD-ODESLA encroaches upon the

powers and

duties of the Ombudsman

4. Whether or not Executive Order No. 13 violates

Pichays right to due

process and the equal protection of the laws

HELD:

E.O. 13 is constitutional

Section 31 of Executive Order No. 292 (E.O. 292),

otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987,

vests in the President the continuing authority to

reorganize the offices under him to achieve simplicity,

economy and efficiency.

The Office of the President must, in order to remain

effective and efficient, be capable of being shaped and

reshaped by the President in the manner he deems fit to

carry out his directives and policies.

Clearly, the abolition of the PAGC and the transfer of its

functions to a division specially created within the

ODESLA is properly within the prerogative of the

President under his continuing delegated legislative

authority to reorganize his own office. Since both of these

offices belong to the Office of the President Proper, the


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reorganization by way of abolishing the PAGC and

transferring its functions to the IAD-ODESLA is allowable

under Section 31 (1) of E.O. 292.

There is no usurpation of the legislative power to

appropriate public funds.

There is an express recognition under Section 78 of

Republic Act No. 9970 or the General Appropriations Act

of 2010 of the Presidents authority to direct changes in

the organizational units or key positions in any

department or agency. This recognizes the extent of the

Presidents power to reorganize the executive offices and

agencies under him, which is, even to the extent of

modifying and realigning appropriations for that purpose.

Thus, while there may be no specific amount earmarked

for the IAD-ODESLA from the total amount appropriated

by Congress in the annual budget for the Office of the

President, the necessary funds for the IAD-ODESLA may

be properly sourced from the Presidents own office

budget without committing any illegal appropriation. After

all, the President simply allocates the existing funds

previously appropriated by Congress for his office.

The IAD-ODESLA does not encroach upon the powers

and duties of the Ombudsman

The primary jurisdiction of the Ombudsman to investigate

and prosecute cases refers to criminal cases cognizable

by the Sandiganbayan and not to administrative cases. It

is only in the exercise of its primary jurisdiction that the

Ombudsman may, at any time, take over the investigation

being conducted by another investigatory agency. Since

the case filed before the IAD-ODESLA is an

administrative disciplinary case for grave misconduct,

Pichay may not invoke the primary jurisdiction of the

Ombudsman to prevent the IAD-ODESLA from

proceeding with its investigation. In any event, the

Ombudsmans authority to investigate both elective and

appointive officials in the government, extensive as it may

be, is by no means exclusive. It is shared with other

similarly authorized government agencies.

Moreover, as the function of the Ombudsman goes into

the determination of the existence of probable cause and

the adjudication of the merits of a criminal accusation, the

investigative authority of the IAD-ODESLA is limited to

that of a fact-finding investigator whose determinations

and recommendations remain so until acted upon by the


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President. As such, it commits no usurpation of the

Ombudsmans constitutional duties.

Executive Order No. 13 does not violate Pichays right to

due process and the equal protection of the laws.

Pichays right to due process was not violated when the

IAD-ODESLA took cognizance of the administrative

complaint against him. In administrative proceedings, the

filing of charges and giving reasonable opportunity for the

person so charged to answer the accusations against him

constitute the minimum requirements of due process,

which simply means having the opportunity to explain

ones side. Hence, as long as Pichay was given the

opportunity to explain his side and present evidence, the

requirements of due process are satisfactorily complied

with because what the law abhors is an absolute lack of

opportunity to be heard.

Also, Pichay is a presidential appointee occupying the

high-level position of Chairman of the LWUA. Necessarily,

he comes under the disciplinary jurisdiction of the

President, who is well within his right to order an

investigation into matters that require his informed

decision. There are substantial distinctions that set apart

presidential appointees occupying upper-level positions in

government from non-presidential appointees and those

that occupy the lower positions in government.

Erminita Muoz v. Atty. Victoriano Yabut

Petition for review on certiorari of the decisions and

resolutions of the CA. The subject is a house and lot sold

Munoz which she sold to her sister Emilia Ching, who in

turn sold it to the Go spouses. When the Go spouses

defaulted on their loan to BPI the property was

foreclosed. BPI won as the highest bidder at the auction

and the property was sold to the Chan spouses. Munoz

registered her adverse claim and filed a complaint with

the RTC for annulment of a deed of absolute sale,

cancellation of TCT in the spouses Gos names and for

revival of the TCT under her name. She also caused the

annotation of a lis pendens.

The RTC granted Gos motion for a writ of preliminary

mandatory injunction and Munoz was driven out of the

property. Munoz, meanwhile, filed a petition for certiorari

and prohibition with the CA assailing the writ of

preliminary mandatory injunction granted by the RTC, but


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it was dismissed. The RTC rendered its judgment against

Emilia Ching and the Go spouses. It

found that Munozs signature and the absolute deed of

sale was forged.

Munoz never sold the subject property to her sister and

that the Go spouses were not innocent purchasers for

value. The sale was null and void. Emilia Ching appealed

the decision, but the appellate court not only affirmed the

decision of the RTC, it ordered the spouses Go and their

successors in interest to vacate the premises. After the

RTC filed a writ of execution implementing its judgment,

the spouses Chan came forward and filed an urgent

motion to stop the execution against them. They asserted

ownership and possession on the basis of a clean title

registered in their names, also contending that the final

judgment cannot be executed against them as they were

not parties to the case and that they purchased the

property from BPI without any defects to the title.

Munoz discovered the cancellation of her adverse claim

and notice of lis pendens, plus the subsequent events

that led to transfer and registration from Go, to BPI then

to the Chans.

It was denied by the RTC. The photocopy of BPIs TCT

could hardly be regarded as proof that Munozs adverse

claim and notice of lis pendens were missing from the

original, also pointing out that the registration in the day

book is what serves as sufficient notice to the world.

There was no more need to annotate the title. They were

deemed to have taken the property subject to the final

outcome of the present dispute. The RTC then issued an

alias writ of execution and the subject property was taken

from the spouses and returned to Munoz. Their motion

for reconsideration was denied. Munoz then instituted a

complaint for forcible entry with a prayer for preliminary

mandatory injunction alleging that with the aid of armed

men, Chan and Atty. Yabut forcibly ousted Munoz of

possession. They claim Chan to be the true owner that

his possession was never interrupted, and the men were

there to attend services at the Buddhist Temple on the

fourth floor of the building on the property. Munozs claim

of

forcible entry should be dismissed for lack of merit and

legal basis. The MeTC granted Munozs petition and

restored possession to her.

Yabut and Chan questioned the MeTCs decision through

a petition for certiorari with a prayer for a TRO and writ of


34/53

preliminary injunction before the RTC. They asserted that

they were not bound by the final judgment between Go

and Munoz. Munoz on the other hand argued that the

MeTC order was an interlocutory order, and is thus a

prohibited pleading under the rules of summary

procedure. The RTC issued a writ of preliminary

injunction to enjoin the implementation of the MeTC

order. The RTC found that the MeTC had committed

grave abuse of discretion for not dismissing the complaint

for forcible entry on the ground of lis pendens as the

issue to who had a better right to possession between

Chan and Munoz was the subject of a pending

proceeding. The RTC dismissed the ejectment suit.

Munoz appealed to the CA, but the CA sustained the

RTC orders holding that the Chans right to due process

was vitiated by impleading them only at the execution

stage of the civil case. The order of the RTC in the civil

case was null and void, and considering they are

strangers to the case and they are innocent purchasers

for value. Thereafter Munoz filed a motion for contempt

with the RTC against the Chan spouses and Atty. Yabut.

Munoz also filed a Motion for an alias writ of execution

and application for surrender of the owners duplicate

TCT, in which she prayed to direct the RD not only to

cancel the TCT of Go, but all documents declared null

and void, and to restore her TCT free from all liens and

encumbrances.

In its order the RTC denied Munozs motion for contempt,

but ordering an alias writ of execution to deliver the

property to Munoz, ordering Go to vacate. It also ordered

the RD to cancel from the records all documents

determined void and to restore Munozs TCT.

Unrelenting Munoz filed a motion for clarificatory order,

pointing out that the spouses Chan are the present

occupants and that the property could not be delivered

unless the spouses Chan are evicted. The motion was

denied reiterating the rule that once a judgment has

become final only clerical errors may be corrected.

Munoz elevated the complaint to the SC, but it was

remanded to the CA in observance of the hierarchy. The

CA dismissed Munozs petition agreeing with the RTC

that the Chan spouses could not be covered by the writ of

execution considering they were not impleaded in the civil

case. Munoz claims that the decision in the civil case

binds not only Ching, the Go spouses and BPI, but their

successors in interest, assigns or persons acting on their


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behalf, hence they cannot be considered as innocent

purchasers for value.

Issue:

Held:

The SC denies Munozs petition for contempt and motion

for clarificatory order seeking that the Chans be executed

against because the prior civil case against Go is an

action for reconveyance which is an action in personam.

Since the Chans and BPI were not impleaded as parties,

the effect of the judgment cannot bind or be extended to

them by simply issuing alias writs of execution. No man

shall be affected by any proceeding to which he is a

stranger, and strangers to a case are not bound by any

judgment rendered to the court. Although the titles of

Ching and Go were deemed void, there was no similar

determination as to the titles that BPI and Chan had.

Munoz cannot collateraly attack the title that the Chans

have; they must be given their day in court in a

proceeding designated for that purpose.

Filemon David vs. Judge Gregorio Aquilizan, et. al.

Facts:

David has a large parcel of land in Polomolok, Cotabato.

He let Felomeno Jugar and Ricardo Jugar tend and

caretake separate portions of his land in 1971. The land

is estimated to be yielding 60-70 cavans of corn cobs and

the share agreed upon is 50-50. In 1973, David withdrew

the land from the brothers and has not allowed them to

go back there. The brothers prayed for reinstatement but

David refused to do so. David denied that the brothers

were his tenants. He said that Ricardo was his tractor

driver before but he resigned to take care of his dad and

to work for DOLE. Filemon on the other hand

surrendered the portion of the land he was tending to

continue his faith healing. J Aquilizan handled the case

filed by the brothers against David and after three months

he rendered a decision in favor of the brothers without

any hearing. David averred he was denied due process. J

Aquilizan admitted that there was indeed no hearing

conducted but he said the decision has already become

final and executory as the period for appeal has already

lapsed.

ISSUE: Whether or not David is entitled to an appeal.


36/53

HELD: The SC ruled in favor of David. A decision

rendered without a hearing is null and void and may be

attacked directly or collaterally. The decision is null and

void for want of due process. And it has been held that a

final and executory judgment may be set aside with a

view to the renewal of the litigation when the judgment is

void for lack of due process of law. In legal

contemplation, it is as if no judgment has been rendered

at all.

Anita Lorenzana vs. Polly Cayetano

FACTS:

Lorenzana was renting a parcel of land from the Manila

Railroad Company (later from the Bureau of Lands). She

later purchased the land (San Lazaro Estate). She had

the property be rented to tenants occupying stalls. Due to

nonpayment of rents, she filed 12 ejectment cases

against her tenant. On the other hand, Cayetano was an

occupant of a parcel of land adjacent to that of

Lorenzanas land. Cayetano was renting the same from

the Bureau of Lands. The lower court granted

Lorenzanas ejectment cases. Lorenzana then secured a

writ of execution to forcibly eject her tenants but she

included to eject Cayetanos property. Cayetano was not

a party to the ejectment cases so she prayed for the

lower court that her property be not touched. The lower

court denied Cayetanos petition. The CA, upon appeal,

favored Cayetano. Lorenzana averred that Cayetano is

now a party to the ejectment cases as she already

brought herself to the Courts jurisdiction by virtue of her

appeal.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Cayetanos right to due process has been

violated.

HELD:

The SC ruled in favor of Cayetano and has affirmed the

CA. It must be noted that respondent was not a party to

any of the 12 ejectment cases wherein the writs of

demolition had been issued; she did not make her

appearance in and during the pendency of these

ejectment cases. Cayetano only went to court to protect

her property from demolition after the judgment in the

ejectment cases had become final and executory. Hence,

with respect to the judgment in said ejectment cases,


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Cayetano remains a third person to such judgment, which

does not bind her; nor can its writ of execution be

informed against her since she was not afforded her day

in court in said ejectment cases.

NO CAOILE VS. VIVO DIGEST

NO LOBETE VS. SUNDIAM DIGEST

NO MARVEL BLDG. CORP. VS OPLE DIGEST

NO VALLADOLID VS. INCIONG DIGEST

Anglo-Fil Trading Corp. v. Lazaro, 124 SCRA 494

(1983)

F: The petitioners were among 23 stevedoring and

arrastre operators at the Manila South Harbor. Their

licenses had expired but they were allowed to continue to

operate on the strength of temporary permits. On May 4,

1976, the Phil Ports Authority decided to allow only one

org. to operate the arrastre and stevedoring services. On

April 28, 1980, based on the report and recommendation

of an evaluation committee, the PPA awarded the

exclusive contract for stevedoring services to the Ocean

Terminal Services Inc (OTSI). The petitioners brought suit

in the

consti 2 due process digests

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