Thursday, October 18, 2007

La Bugal-B'Laan Tribal Assn vs Ramos Case Digest

G.R. No 127882

Facts :

On July 25, 1987, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued Executive Order (E.O.) No. 2796 authorizing the DENR Secretary to accept, consider and evaluate proposals from foreign-owned corporations or foreign investors for contracts or agreements involving either technical or financial assistance for large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of minerals, which, upon appropriate recommendation of the Secretary, the President may execute with the foreign proponent.

On March 3, 1995, then President Fidel V. Ramos approved R.A. No. 7942 to "govern the exploration, development, utilization and processing of all mineral resources." R.A. No. 7942 defines the modes of mineral agreements for mining operations, outlines the procedure for their filing and approval, assignment/transfer and withdrawal, and fixes their terms. Similar provisions govern financial or technical assistance agreements.

On April 9, 1995, 30 days following its publication on March 10, 1995 in Malaya and

Manila Times, two newspapers of general circulation, R.A. No. 7942 took effect. Shortly before the effectivity of R.A. No. 7942, however, or on March 30, 1995, the President entered into an FTAA with WMCP covering 99,387 hectares of land in South Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Davao del Sur and North Cotabato.

On August 15, 1995, then DENR Secretary Victor O. Ramos issued DENR Administrative Order (DAO) No. 95-23, s. 1995, otherwise known as the Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 7942. This was later repealed by DAO No. 96-40, s. 1996 which was adopted on December 20, 1996.

On January 10, 1997, counsels for petitioners sent a letter to the DENR Secretary demanding that the DENR stop the implementation of R.A. No. 7942 and DAO No. 96-40, giving the DENR fifteen days from receipt to act thereon. The DENR, however, has yet to respond or act on petitioners' letter.

Petitioners claim that the DENR Secretary acted without or in excess of jurisdiction.

They pray that the Court issue an order:

(a) Permanently enjoining respondents from acting on any application for Financial or Technical Assistance Agreements;

(b) Declaring the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 or Republic Act No. 7942 as unconstitutional and null and void;

(c) Declaring the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Philippine Mining Act contained in DENR Administrative Order No. 96-40 and all other similar administrative issuances as unconstitutional and null and void; and

(d) Cancelling the Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement issued to Western Mining Philippines, Inc. as unconstitutional, illegal and null and void.

Issue :

Whether or not Republic Act No. 7942 is unconstitutional.

Ruling :

The Court finds the following provisions of R.A. No. 7942 to be violative of Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution and hereby declares unconstitutional and void:

(1) The proviso in Section 3 (aq), which defines "qualified person," to wit:

Provided, That a legally organized foreign-owned corporation shall be deemed a qualified person for purposes of granting an exploration permit, financial or technical assistance agreement or mineral processing permit.

(2) Section 23, which specifies the rights and obligations of an exploration permittee, insofar as said section applies to a financial or technical assistance agreement,

(3) Section 33, which prescribes the eligibility of a contractor in a financial or technical assistance agreement;

(4) Section 35, which enumerates the terms and conditions for every financial or technical assistance agreement;

(5) Section 39, which allows the contractor in a financial and technical assistance agreement to convert the same into a mineral production-sharing agreement;

(6) Section 56, which authorizes the issuance of a mineral processing permit to a contractor in a financial and technical assistance agreement;

The following provisions of the same Act are likewise void as they are dependent on the foregoing provisions and cannot stand on their own:

(1) Section 3 (g), which defines the term "contractor," insofar as it applies to a financial or technical assistance agreement.

Section 34, which prescribes the maximum contract area in a financial or technical assistance agreements;

Section 36, which allows negotiations for financial or technical assistance agreements;

Section 37, which prescribes the procedure for filing and evaluation of financial or technical assistance agreement proposals;

Section 38, which limits the term of financial or technical assistance agreements;

Section 40, which allows the assignment or transfer of financial or technical assistance agreements;

Section 41, which allows the withdrawal of the contractor in an FTAA;

The second and third paragraphs of Section 81, which provide for the Government's share in a financial and technical assistance agreement; and

Section 90, which provides for incentives to contractors in FTAAs insofar as it applies to said contractors;

When the parts of the statute are so mutually dependent and connected as conditions, considerations, inducements, or compensations for each other, as to warrant a belief that the legislature intended them as a whole, and that if all could not be carried into effect, the legislature would not pass the residue

independently, then, if some parts are unconstitutional, all the provisions which are thus dependent, conditional, or connected, must fall with them.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.

CASE DIGESTS IN POLITICAL LAW

SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW – 2003 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS

Reproduction in any form of this copy is strictly prohibited!!!

19

POLITICAL LAW COMMITTEE: Andy Nachura, Alexander Ragonjan, Maricel Abarentos, Jennifer Balboa, Avito Cahig, Jr., Ma. Cristina Constantino,Ricardo de Guzman, Ethel Degollado, Alder Delloro, Joyce Diňo, Christopher Godinez, Andre Jacob, Juanito Lim, Jr., Jonathan Mangundayao, RajiMendoza, Jeanne Montes, Charo Rejuso, Aimee Sabilala, Jennifer Sobremonte, Gerald Sotto, Jemina Sy, Ryan Sy Lita, Gloriosa Sze, Maria FeTaal, Joeshias Tambago, Mae Ventura, Elsa Villaflor.

FUNDAMENTAL POWERS OF THE STATE

POLICE POWER

POLICE POWER; THE STATE UNDER ITS POLICE POWER, MAY ALTER,MODIFY OR AMEND MINING EXPLORATION PERMITS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE DEMANDS OF THE GENERAL WELFARE.

SOUTHEAST MINDANAO GOLDMINING CORP. vs. BALITE PORTALMINING COOP., et al.

[G.R. No. 135190, April 3, 2002]

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J:FACTS:

On March 10, 1988, Marcopper Mining Corporation (Marcopper) was grantedExploration Permit No. 133 (EP No. 133) over 4,491 hectares of land, which included theDiwalwal area.On June 27, 2991, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 7076, or the People's Small-Scale Mining Act. The law established a People's Small-Scale Mining Program to beimplemented by the Secretary of the DENR and created the Provincial Mining Regulatory Board(PMRB) under the DENR Secretary's direct supervision and control.Subsequently, a petition for the cancellation of EP No. 133 and the admission of aMineral Production Sharing Arrangement (MPSA) proposal over Diwalwal was filed before theDENR Regional Executive Director, docketed as RED Mines Case.On February 16, 1994, while the RED Mines case was pending, Marcopper assigned itsEP No. 133 to petitioner Southeast Mindanao Gold Mining Corporation (SEM), which in turnapplied for an integrated MPSA over the land covered by the permit.In due time, the Mines and Geosciences Bureau Regional Office No. XI in Davao City(MGB-XI) accepted and registered the integrated MPSA application of petitioner and thereafter,several MAC cases were filed.On March 3, 1995, Republic Act No. 7942, the Philippine Mining Act, was enacted.Pursuant to this statute, the MAC cases were referred to a Regional Panel of Arbitrators (RPA)tasked to resolve disputes involving conflicting mining rights. The RPA subsequently tookcognizance of the RED Mines case, which was consolidated

with the MAC cases.On June 24, 1997, the DENR Secretary issued Memorandum Order No. 97-03 whichprovided that the DENR shall study thoroughly and exhaustively the option of direct stateutilization of the mineral resources in the Diwalwal Gold-Rush Area.On July 16, 1997, petitioner filed a special civil action for certiorari, prohibition andmandamus before the Court of Appeals against PMRB-Davao, the DENR Secretary and BaliteCommunal Portal Mining Cooperative (BCPMC). It prayed for the nullification of the above-quotedMemorandum Order No. 97-03 on the ground that the "direct state utilization" espoused thereinwould effectively impair its vested rights under EP No. 133; and that the memorandum order arbitrarily imposed the unwarranted condition that certain studies be conducted before mining andenvironmental laws are enforced by the DENR.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the "direct state utilization scheme" espoused in MO 97-03 divestedpetitioner of its vested right to the gold rush area under its EP No. 133.

HELD:

NO

. MO 97-03 did not conclusively adopt "direct state utilization" as a policy inresolving the Diwalwal dispute. The terms of the memorandum clearly indicate that what wasdirected thereunder was merely a study of this option and nothing else. Contrary to petitioner'scontention, it did not grant any management/operating or profit-sharing

agreement to small-scaleminers or to any party, for that matter, but simply instructed the DENR officials concerned toundertake studies to determine its feasibility.As to the alleged "vested rights" claimed by petitioner, it is well to note that the same isinvariably based on EP No. 133, whose validity is still being disputed in the Consolidated Minescases. A reading of the appealed MAB decision reveals that the continued efficacy of EP No. 133

CASE DIGESTS IN POLITICAL LAW

SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW – 2003 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS

Reproduction in any form of this copy is strictly prohibited!!!

20

POLITICAL LAW COMMITTEE: Andy Nachura, Alexander Ragonjan, Maricel Abarentos, Jennifer Balboa, Avito Cahig, Jr., Ma. Cristina Constantino,Ricardo de Guzman, Ethel Degollado, Alder Delloro, Joyce Diňo, Christopher Godinez, Andre Jacob, Juanito Lim, Jr., Jonathan Mangundayao, RajiMendoza, Jeanne Montes, Charo Rejuso, Aimee Sabilala, Jennifer Sobremonte, Gerald Sotto, Jemina Sy, Ryan Sy Lita, Gloriosa Sze, Maria FeTaal, Joeshias Tambago, Mae Ventura, Elsa Villaflor.

is one of the issues raised in said cases, with respondents therein asserting that Marcopper cannot legally assign the permit which purportedly had expired. In other words, whether or notpetitioner actually has a vested right over Diwalwal under EP No. 133 is still an indefinite andunsettled matter. And until a positive pronouncement is made by the appellate court in theConsolidated Mines cases,

EP No. 133 cannot be deemed as a source of any conclusive rightsthat can be impaired by the issuance of MO 97-03.It must likewise be pointed out that under no circumstances may petitioner's rights under EP No. 133 be regarded as total and absolute. As correctly held by the Court of Appeals EP No.133 merely evidences a privilege granted by the State, which may be amended, modified or rescinded when the national interest so requires. This is necessarily so since the exploration,development and utilization of the country's natural mineral resources are matters impressed withgreat public interest. Like timber permits, mining exploration permits do not vest in the granteeany permanent or irrevocable right within the purview of the non-impairment of contract and dueprocess clauses of the Constitution, since the State, under its all-encompassing police power,may alter, modify or amend the same, in accordance with the demands of the general welfare.Additionally, there can be no valid opposition raised against a mere study of analternative which the State, through the DENR, is authorized to undertake in the first place. Worthnoting is Article XII, Section 2, of the 1987 Constitution and Section 4, Chapter II of the PhilippineMining Act of 1995.Thus, the State may pursue the constitutional policy of full control and supervision of theexploration, development and utilization of the country's natural mineral resources, by either directly undertaking the same or by entering into agreements with qualified entities. The DENRSecretary acted within his authority when he ordered a study of the first option, which may beundertaken consistently in accordance with the constitutional policy enunciated above.Obviously, the State may not be precluded from considering a direct takeover of the mines, if it isthe only plausible remedy in

sight to the gnawing complexities generated by the gold rush.

Republic vs. Rosemoor

Republic of the Philippines vs. Rosemoor Mining and Development Corporation, et al.

G.R. No. 149927 March 30, 2004

Panganiban, J.:

Facts: Petitioner Rosemoor Mining and Development Corporation after having been granted permission to prospect for marble deposits in the mountains of Biak-na-Bato, San Miguel, Bulacan, succeeded in discovering marble deposits of high quality and in commercial quantities in Mount Mabio which forms part of the Biak-na-Bato mountain range.

The petitioner then applied with the Bureau of Mines, now Mines and Geosciences Bureau, for the issuance of the corresponding license to exploit said marble deposits.

License No. 33 was issued by the Bureau of Mines in favor of the herein petitioners. Shortly thereafter, Respondent Ernesto Maceda cancelled the petitioner’s license stating that their license had illegally been issued, because it violated Section 69 of PD 463; and that there was no more public interest served by the continued existence or renewal of the license. The latter reason was confirmed by the language of Proclamation No. 84. According to

this law, public interest would be served by reverting the parcel of land that was excluded by Proclamation No. 2204 to the former status of that land as part of the Biak-na-Bato national park.

Issue: Whether or not Presidential Proclamation No. 84 is valid.

Held: Yes. We cannot sustain the argument that Proclamation No. 84 is a bill of attainder; that is, a legislative act which inflicts punishment without judicial trial.” Its declaration that QLP No. 33 is a patent nullity is certainly not a declaration of guilt. Neither is the cancellation of the license a punishment within the purview of the constitutional proscription against bills of attainder.

Too, there is no merit in the argument that the proclamation is an ex post facto law. It is settled that an ex post facto law is limited in its scope only to matters criminal in nature. Proclamation 84, which merely restored the area excluded from the Biak-na-Bato national park by canceling respondents’ license, is clearly not penal in character.

Also at the time President Aquino issued Proclamation No. 84 on March 9, 1987, she was still validly exercising legislative powers under the Provisional Constitution of 1986. Section 1 of Article II of Proclamation No. 3, which promulgated the Provisional Constitution, granted her legislative power until a legislature is elected and convened under a new Constitution. The grant of such power is also

explicitly recognized and provided for in Section 6 of Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution.

Caveat: Anyone who claims this digest as his own without proper authority shall be held liable under the law of Karma.

SANTA ROSA MINING COMPANY VS. JOSE LEIDO, JR., digested

Posted by Pius Morados on November 7, 2011

GR # L-49109 December 1, 1987 (Law on Natural Resources)

FACTS: Presidential Decree No.1214 was issued requiring holders of subsisting and valid patentable mining claims located under the provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902 to file a mining lease of application within one (1) year from the approval of the Decree. To protect its rights, petitioner Santa Rosa Mining Company files a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition confronting the said Decree as unconstitutional in that it amounts to a deprivation of property without due process of law. Subsequently, three (3) days after, petitioner filed a mining lease application, but “under protest”, with a reservation that it is not waiving its rights over its mining claims until the validity of the Decree shall have been passed upon by the Court.

The respondents allege that petitioner has no standing to file the instant petition and question

the Decree as it failed to fully exhaust administrative remedies.

ISSUE: Whether or not Presidential Decree No. 1214 is constitutional.

HELD: Yes, Presidential Decree No. 1214 is constitutional, even assuming arguendo that petitioners was not bound to exhaust administrative remedies for its mining claims to be valid in the outset. It is a valid exercise of the sovereign power of the State, as owner, over the lands of the public domain, of which petitioner’s mining claims still form a part. Moreover, Presidential Decree No. 1214 is in accord with Sec. 8, Art XIV of the 1937 Constitution.

G.R. No. L-69997 September 30, 1987

UNGAY MALOBAGO MINES, INC., petitioner,

vs.

HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, DIRECTOR OF LANDS, GREGORIA BOLANOS, AUREA ARAOJO, GERVACIO ARAOJO, MARIA BERNAL, FELIX DETECIO, JESUS ASUNCION, MELENCIO ASUNCION and BIENVENIDO ASUNCION, respondents.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

Before us is a petition which seeks to set aside the decision of the then Intermediate Appellate Court affirming the dismissal of the petitioner's action for annulment and cancellation of free patents granted to the private respondents on the ground that the petitioner has no personality to file an action for reversion, the lands involved being public In character.

On July 20, 1962, the President of the Philippines granted the following mining patents on mineral claims located at Ungay Malobago, Rapu-Rapu Albay.

1. lode patent No. V-52 to John Canson, Jr., on mineral claim known as "Catanduandes;"

2. lode patent No. V-48 to petitioner, on mineral claims known as "Junior;"

3. lode patent No. V-53 to John Canson, Jr., on mineral claims known as "Oas;"

4. lode patent No. V - 46 to petitioner on mineral claim known as "Ester;"

5. lode patent No. V - 51 to Carlos Stilianopulos on mineral claim known as "Jovellar;"

6. lode patent No. V - 49 to petitioner, in mineral claim known as "Manila;"

7. lode patent No. V - 50 to Carlos Stilianopulos on mineral claim known as "Polangui;" and

8. lode patent No. V - 47 to petitioner on mineral claim known as "Ligao;"(pp. 5-7, Decision Annex 1, Petition)

Way back on October 30, 1959, John Canson, Jr. and Carlos Stilianopulos assigned their rights to their mining claims in favor of the petitioner. The assignment of rights was recorded in the Office of the Mining Recorder of Albay on December 2, 1959.

The aforestated mining patents, after their issuance on July 20, 1962, were all recorded in the Office of the Mining Recorder of Albay on August 28, 1962 and transcribed on September 4, 1962 in the Registration Book of the Registry of Deeds of Albay. Consequently, the Register of Deeds of Albay issued the respective original certificates of titles pursuant to Section 122 of Act No. 496 in the names of John Canson, Jr., Carlos Stilianopulos, and the petitioner.

Subsequently, or from 1968 to 1974, the following free patents were granted by the respondent Director of Lands and the corresponding original certificates of titles were issued by the Register of Deeds of Albay:

1. Free Patent No. 458143 dated October 3, 1968 and corresponding Certificate of Title No. VH-12195 to appellee Felix Detecio;

2. Free Patent No. 427824 dated November 21, 1968 and corresponding Certificate of Title No. VH-12256 to appellee Melencio Asuncion;

3. Free Patent No. 433318 dated January 10, 1969 and corresponding Certificate of Title No. VH-12198 to appellee Jesus Asuncion;

4. Free Patents No. 422847 dated November 11, 1968 and No. 421947 dated October 28, 1969 and corresponding Certificates of Title Nos. VH-12185 and 12186, respectively, to appellee Maria Bernal;

5. Free Patent No. 408568 dated July 8, 1968 and corresponding Certificate of Title No. VH-11591 to appellee Gregorio Bolanos; and

6. Free Patent No. 0663 dated March 25, 1974 and the corresponding Certificate of Title No. VH-19333 to appellee Bienvenido Asuncion. (Rollo, pp. 200-201)

All of the above patents covered portions of the lots covered by the patents belonging to the petitioner.

The petitioner filed a complaint for annulment and cancellation of patents against the private respondents and prayed that all the free patent titles issued in their favor for properties over which original certificates of title had already

been issued in its favor be declared null and void.

The Director of Lands, who was impleaded as a formal defendant, filed his answer alledging, among others, that the petitioner has no personality to institute the cancellation proceedings inasmuch as the government is the grantor and not the petitioner, and it should be the grantor who should institute the cancellation proceedings.

On January 25, 1980, the trial court rendered a decision dismissing the complaint. It ruled that since the disputed properties form part of disposable land of the public domain, the action for reversion should be instituted by the Solicitor General in the name of the Republic of the Philippines and that, therefore, the petitioner lacks personality to institute the annulment proceedings.

The petitioner appealed to the then Intermediate Appellate Court.

On April 5, 1984, the appellate court affirmed the decision of the trial court. It ruled that the titles issued to the petitioner cover mineral lands which belong to the public domain and that these cannot be the subject of private ownership. According to the Court, under Section 101 of the Public Land Law, only the Solicitor General or the officer acting in his stead has the authority to institute an action on behalf of the Republic for the cancellation of the respondents' titles and for reversion of their homesteads to the Government.

In this instant petition, the petitioner raises two issues: a) Whether or not the appellate court committed an error of law when it ruled that the lands in question belong to the public domain; and b) whether or not the appellate court erred in discussing the complaint on the ground that the petitioner had no personality to institute the same.

With regard to the first issue, the petitioner maintains that since its mining claims were perfected prior to November 15, 1935, the date when the 1935 Constitution took effect, the applicable law is the Philippine Bill of 1902 and that under this Act, a valid location of a mining claim segregates the area from the public domain. (Gold Creek Mining Corporation v. Rodriguez, 66 Phil. 259).

The Solicitor-General, on the other hand, argues that the petitioner's mining patents covered by Torrens Titles were granted only in 1962 by the President of the Philippines, by authority of the Constitution of the Philippines. Under the then Constitution, except for public agricultural

lands, natural resources which includes all mineral lands, shall not be alienated. (Art. XIII, Section 1, 1935 Constitution) Therefore, what the mining patents issued in 1962 conveyed to petitioner was only the ownership of, and the right to extract and utilize, the minerals within the area covered by the petitioner's Torrens Titles but not the ownership of the land where the minerals are found.

We rule for the private respondents.

The petitioner has been beguiling, less than candid, and inexplicably silent as to material dates in the presentation of its case. Nowhere in the records of this petition is there any mention of a date before November 15, 1935 as to when essential acts regarding its mining claims were executed. It is silent as to when the land was entered, measured, and plotted; when the legal posts and notices were put up; when the claim was registered with the mining recorder; whether or not the annual amount of labor or development, and other requirements under the Philippine Bill of 1902 were followed. These may have been complied with but not necessarily before 1935.

A mere mention in the Torrens title that the provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902 were followed is not sufficient. The Philippine Bill provides the procedures for the perfection of mining claims but not the dates when such procedures were undertaken by any prospector or claimant. The same procedures would have to be followed even after the Jones Law of 1916 and the Constitution of 1935 were promulgated, but subject to the restrictions of

the fundamental law. The petitioner has failed to state if and when new procedures, different from the 1902 procedures, were provided by law to give a little substance to its case. The petitioner is completely and strangely silent about these vital aspects of its petition.

Petitioner has not established by clear and convincing evidence that the locations of its mining claims were perfected prior to November 15,1935 when the Government of Commonwealth was inaugurated. In fact neither the original complaint nor the amended one alleged the perfection of petitioner's mining rights prior to November 15, 1935. All that petitioner offers as evidence of its claims were the original certificates of titles covering mining patents which embodied a uniform "WHEREAS" clause stating that the petitioner "has fully complied with all the conditions, requirements, and provisions of the Act of the United States of Congress of July 1, 1902, as amended, ..." In the absence of proof that the petitioner's claims were perfected prior to the 1935 Constitution, the provision of the latter with regard to inalienable lands of the public domain will apply.

Article XIII, Section I of the 1935 Constitution provides:

All agricultural timber, and mineral lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, and other natural resources of the Philippines belong to the State, and their disposition, exploitation, development, or utilization shall be limited to citizens of the

Philippines, or to corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by such citizens, subject to any existing right, grant, lease, or concession at the time of the inauguration of the Government established under this Constitution. Natural resources, with the exception of public agricultural land, shall not be alienated and no license, concession, or lease for the exploitation, development, or utilization of any of the natural resources shall be granted for a period exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for another twenty-five years, except as to water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of water power, in which cases beneficial use may be the measure and the at of the grant. (Emphasis supplied)

Therefore, applying the aforequoted provision to the case at bar, we conclude that the issuance of the lode patents on mineral claims by the President of the Philippines in 1962 in favor of the petitioner granted to it only the right to extract or utilize the minerals which may be found on or under the surface of the land. On the other hand, the issuance of the free patents by the respondent Director of Lands in 1979 in favor of the private respondents granted to them the ownership and the right to use the land for agricultural purposes but excluding the ownership of, and the right to extract or utilize, the minerals which may be found on or under the surface.

There is no basis in the records for the petitioner's stand that it acquired the right to the mineral lands prior to the effectivity of the

1935 Constitution, thus, making such acquisition outside its purview and scope.

Every application for a concession of public land has to be viewed in the light of its peculiar circumstances. (Director of Lands v. Funtilar 142 SCRA 57, 69).

In the case at bar, although the original certificates of titles of the petitioner were issued prior to the titles of the private respondents, the former cannot prevail over the latter for the provisions of the Constitution which governed at the time of their issuance prohibited the alienation of mineral lands of the public domain.

In the case of Republic v. Animas (56 SCRA 499), this Court ruled that a grantee does not become the owner of a land illegally included in the grant just because title has been issued in his favor:.

A patent is void at law if the officer who issued the patent had no authority to do so (Knight v. Land Ass. 142 U.S. 161, 12 Sup. Ct., 258, 35L ED. 974; emphasis supplied). If a person obtains a title under the Public Land Act which includes, by mistake or oversight, lands which cannot be registered under the Torrens System, or when the Director of Lands did not have jurisdiction over the same because it is a public forest, the grantee does not, by virtue of said certificate of title alone, become the owner of the land illegally included. (See Ledesma vs. Municipality of Iloilo, 49 Phil. 769)

Moreover, patents and land grants are construed favorably in favor of the Government, and most strongly against the grantee. Any doubt as to the intention or extent of the grant, or the intention of the Government, is to be resolved in its favor. (See Republic v. Court of Appeals, 73 SCRA 146, 156). Hence, as earlier stated, in the absence of proof that the petitioner acquired the right of ownership over the mineral lands prior to the 1935 Constitution, the titles issued in its favor must be construed as conveying only the right to extract and utilize the minerals thereon.

The appellate court did not likewise err in concluding that the petitioner has no personality to institute the action below for annulment and cancellation of patents. The mineral lands over which it has a right to extract minerals remained part of the inalienable lands of the public domain and thus, only the Solicitor General or the person acting in his stead can bring an action for reversion. (See Sumail v. Judge of the Court of First Instance of Cotabato, et al., 96 Phil. 946; and Heirs of Tanak Pangawaran Patiwayan v. Martinez, 142 SCRA 252).

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. The decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court is AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.