ASAPHIL CONSTRUCTION vs INDUPLEX, INC

G.R. NO. 134030

The allegations in Tuasons complaint do not make out a case for a mining dispute or controversy

within the jurisdiction of the DENR. While the Agreement to Operate Mining Claims is a mining

contract, the ground upon which the contract is sought to be annulled is not due to Asaphils

refusal to abide by the terms and conditions of the agreement, but due to Induplexs alleged

violation of the condition imposed by the BOI in its Joint Venture Agreement with Grefco, Inc..

Also, Tuason sought the nullity of the Contract for Sale and Purchase of Perlite Ore, based on the

same alleged violation. Obviously, this raises a judicial question, which is proper for

determination by the regular courts.1[18] A judicial question is raised when the determination of

the question involves the exercise of a judicial function; that is, the question involves the

determination of what the law is and what the legal rights of the parties are with respect to the

matter in controversy.2[19]

The DENR is not called upon to exercise its technical knowledge or expertise over any mining

operations or dispute; rather, it is being asked to determine the validity of the agreements based

on circumstances beyond the respective rights of the parties under the two contracts. In Gonzales

v. Climax Mining Ltd.,3[20] the Court ruled that:

x x x whether the case involves void or voidable contracts is still a judicial question. It may, in

some instances, involve questions of fact especially with regard to the determination of the

circumstances of the execution of the contracts. But the resolution of the validity or voidness

of the contracts remains a legal or judicial question as it requires the exercise of judicial

function. It requires the ascertainment of what laws are applicable to the dispute, the

interpretation and application of those laws, and the rendering of a judgment based thereon.

Clearly, the dispute is not a mining conflict. It is essentially judicial. The complaint was not

merely for the determination of rights under the mining contracts since the very validity of

those contracts is put in issue. (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, the DENR Regional Executive Director was correct in dismissing the complaint for lack

of jurisdiction over Tuasons complaint; consequently, the MAB committed an error in taking

cognizance of the appeal, and in ruling upon the validity of the contracts.

Given the DENRs lack of jurisdiction to take cognizance of Tuasons complaint, the Court

finds it unnecessary to rule on the issue of validity of the contracts, as this should have been

brought before and resolved by the regular trial courts, to begin with.

BENGUET CORPORATION, petitioner,

vs.

HON OSCAR L. LEVISTE,

At issue in this petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction is the jurisdiction

of the regional trial court (RTC) to take cognizance of an action for annulment of operations

agreement entered into by and between two mining companies.

While admitting that the contract sought to be annulled is a mining contract, private respondent nonetheless opines that the action for its annulment does not fall under the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Mines. The reason given is that Section 7 (c) of P.D. 1281 contemplates a mining contract, valid and binding in all respects, but either the claimowner or operator refuses to comply with its terms and conditions. In the case at bar, the contract is null and void because of the mental incapacity of the late Celestino Dizon to execute the Deed of Ratification on the validity of which the validity of the Operations Agreement is in turn dependent. Thus, the principal issue in this case is not whether or not the claimowner or operator refuses to comply with the contract's terms and conditions, but rather the mental capacity of the attorney-in-fact to execute a prior agreement upon which the Operations Agreement is based. It is claimed that the Bureau of Mines and Geo-Sciences is not equipped to determine the question of mental capacity.

Anent the issue of venue, private respondent contends that the case does not affect title to or possession of real property, and therefore, is not a real action but an action in personam, for which venue is laid in the residence of the plaintiff.

We grant the petition. Presidential Decree No. 1281 which took effect on January 16,1978 vests the Bureau of Mines with jurisdictional supervision and control over all holders of mining claims or applicants for and/or grantees of mining licenses, permits, leases and/or operators thereof, including mining service contracts and service contractors insofar as their mining activities are concerned. 12 To effectively discharge its task as the Government's arm in the administration and disposition of mineral resources, Section 7 of P.D. No. 1281 confers upon the Bureau quasi-judicial powers as follows:

Sec. 7. In addition to its regulatory and adjudicative functions over companies, partnerships or persons engaged in mining exploration, development and exploitation, the Bureau of Mines shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide case involving:

xxx xxx xxx

(c) cancellation and/or enforcement of mining contracts due to the refusal of the claimowner/operator to abide by the terms and conditions thereof.

Analyzing the objectives of P.D. 1281, particularly said Section 7 thereof, the Court in Twin Peaks Mining Association, 13 the case relied upon by petitioner, noted that the trend is to make the adjudication of mining cases a purely administrative matter. This observation was reiterated in the more recent case of Atlas Consolidated Mining & Development Corp. vs. Court of Appeals. 14

In the case at bar, it is not disputed that the subject agreement is a mining contract and private respondent, in seeking a judicial declaration of its nullity, does not wish to abide by its terms and conditions. These elements alone bring the action within the ambit of Section 7 of P.D. 1281. Whatever the basis for the refusal to abide by the contract's terms and conditions, the basic issue remains one of its cancellation, which is precisely what P.D. No. 1281 places within the exclusive original jurisdiction for the Bureau.

The reason underlying such refusal is indeed an irrelevant matter insofar as jurisdictional competence is concerned, for to make jurisdiction dependent thereon would not only be "ratifying two judicial bodies exercising jurisdiction over an essentially the same subject matter—a situation analogous to split jurisdiction which is obnoxious to the orderly administration of justice" 15 but also clearly ignoring the object of P.D. 1281 to make the adjudication of mining cases a purely administrative matter.

And if, perchance the law did intend to split jurisdiction, it could have done so by providing exceptions to par. (c), Section 7 of P.D. No. 1281. Not having done so, there can be no justification for restricting or limiting the Bureau's jurisdiction over "actions for cancellation and/or enforcement of mining contracts due to the refusal of the claimowner/operator to abide by the terms and conditions thereof."

In the light of our ruling that the jurisdiction over private respondent's action to annul the Operations Agreement pertains to the Bureau of Mines and Geo-Sciences rather than the regional trial court, the question of venue becomes immaterial.

SOUTHEAST MINDANAO GOLD MINING CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. BALITE PORTAL MINING COOPERATIVE

In the first assigned error, petitioner insists that the Court of Appeals erred when it concluded

that the assailed memorandum order did not adopt the direct state utilization scheme in resolving

the Diwalwal dispute. On the contrary, petitioner submits, said memorandum order dictated the

said recourse and, in effect, granted management or operating agreements as well as provided for

profit sharing arrangements to illegal small-scale miners.

According to petitioner, MO 97-03 was issued to preempt the resolution of the Consolidated

Mines cases. The direct state utilization scheme espoused in the challenged memorandum is

nothing but a legal shortcut, designed to divest petitioner of its vested right to the gold rush area

under its EP No. 133.

We are not persuaded.

We agree with the Court of Appeals ruling that the challenged MO 97-03 did not conclusively

adopt direct state utilization as a policy in resolving the Diwalwal dispute. The terms of the

memorandum clearly indicate that what was directed thereunder was merely a study of this

option and nothing else. Contrary to petitioners contention, it did not grant any

management/operating or profit-sharing agreement to small-scale miners or to any party, for that

matter, but simply instructed the DENR officials concerned to undertake studies to determine its

feasibility. As the Court of Appeals extensively discussed in its decision:

x x x under the Memorandum Order, the State still had to study prudently and exhaustively the

various options available to it in rationalizing the explosive and ever perilous situation in the

area, the debilitating adverse effects of mining in the community and at the same time, preserve

and enhance the safety of the mining operations and ensure revenues due to the government from

the development of the mineral resources and the exploitation thereof. The government was still

in earnest search of better options that would be fair and just to all parties concerned, including,

notably, the Petitioner. The direct state utilization of the mineral resources in the area was only

one of the options of the State. Indeed, it is too plain to see, x x x that before the State will settle

on an option, x x x an extensive and intensive study of all the facets of a direct state exploitation

was directed by the Public Respondent DENR Secretary. And even if direct state exploitation

was opted by the government, the DENR still had to promulgate rules and regulations to

implement the same x x x, in coordination with the other concerned agencies of the

government.i[17]

Consequently, the petition was premature. The said memorandum order did not impose any

obligation on the claimants or fix any legal relation whatsoever between and among the parties to

the dispute. At this stage, petitioner can show no more than a mere apprehension that the State,

through the DENR, would directly take over the mines after studies point to its viability. But

until the DENR actually does so and petitioners fears turn into reality, no valid objection can be

entertained against MO 97-03 on grounds which are purely speculative and anticipatory.ii[18]

With respect to the alleged vested rights claimed by petitioner, it is well to note that the same is

invariably based on EP No. 133, whose validity is still being disputed in the Consolidated Mines

cases. A reading of the appealed MAB decision reveals that the continued efficacy of EP No. 133

is one of the issues raised in said cases, with respondents therein asserting that Marcopper cannot

legally assign the permit which purportedly had expired. In other words, whether or not

petitioner actually has a vested right over Diwalwal under EP No. 133 is still an indefinite and

unsettled matter. And until a positive pronouncement is made by the appellate court in the

Consolidated Mines cases, EP No. 133 cannot be deemed as a source of any conclusive rights

that can be impaired by the issuance of MO 97-03.

Similarly, there is no merit in petitioners assertion that MO 97-03 sanctions violation of mining

laws by allowing illegal miners to enter into mining agreements with the State. Again, whether

or not respondent BCMC and the other mining entities it represents are conducting illegal mining

activities is a factual matter that has yet to be finally determined in the Consolidated Mines

cases. We cannot rightfully conclude at this point that respondent BCMC and the other mining

firms are illegitimate mining operators. Otherwise, we would be preempting the resolution of the

cases which are still pending before the Court of Appeals.iii[19]

Petitioners reliance on the Apex Mining case to justify its rights under E.P. No. 133 is misplaced.

For one, the said case was litigated solely between Marcopper and Apex Mining Corporation and

cannot thus be deemed binding and conclusive on respondent BCMC and the other mining

entities presently involved. While petitioner may be regarded as Marcoppers successor to EP No.

133 and therefore bound by the judgment rendered in the Apex Mining case, the same cannot be

said of respondent BCMC and the other oppositor mining firms, who were not impleaded as

parties therein.

Neither can the Apex Mining case foreclose any question pertaining to the continuing validity of

EP No. 133 on grounds which arose after the judgment in said case was promulgated. While it is

true that the Apex Mining case settled the issue of who between Apex and Marcopper validly

acquired mining rights over the disputed area by availing of the proper procedural requisites

mandated by law, it certainly did not deal with the question raised by the oppositors in the

Consolidated Mines cases, i.e. whether EP No. 133 had already expired and remained valid

subsequent to its transfer by Marcopper to petitioner. Besides, as clarified in our decision in the

Apex Mining case:

x x x is conclusive only between the parties with respect to the particular issue herein raised and

under the set of circumstances herein prevailing. In no case should the decision be considered as

a precedent to resolve or settle claims of persons/entities not parties hereto. Neither is it intended

to unsettle rights of persons/entities which have been acquired or which may have accrued upon

reliance on laws passed by appropriate agencies.iv[20]

Clearly then, the Apex Mining case did not invest petitioner with any definite right to the

Diwalwal mines which it could now set up against respondent BCMC and the other mining

groups.

Incidentally, it must likewise be pointed out that under no circumstances may petitioners rights

under EP No. 133 be regarded as total and absolute. As correctly held by the Court of Appeals in

its challenged decision, EP No. 133 merely evidences a privilege granted by the State, which

may be amended, modified or rescinded when the national interest so requires. This is

necessarily so since the exploration, development and utilization of the countrys natural mineral

resources are matters impressed with great public interest. Like timber permits, mining

exploration permits do not vest in the grantee any permanent or irrevocable right within the

purview of the non-impairment of contract and due process clauses of the Constitution,v[21] since

the State, under its all-encompassing police power, may alter, modify or amend the same, in

accordance with the demands of the general welfare.vi[22]

Additionally, there can be no valid opposition raised against a mere study of an alternative which

the State, through the DENR, is authorized to undertake in the first place. Worth noting is Article

XII, Section 2, of the 1987 Constitution, which specifically provides:

SEC. 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils,

all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other

natural resources are owned by the State. With the exception of agricultural lands, all other

natural resources shall not be alienated. The exploration, development, and utilization of natural

resources shall be under the full control and supervision of the State. The State may directly

undertake such activities, or it may enter into co-production, joint venture, or production-sharing

agreements with Filipino citizens, or corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of

whose capital is owned by such citizens. Such agreements may be for a period not exceeding

twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years, and under such terms and

conditions as may be provided by law. In cases of water rights for irrigation, water supply,

fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of water power, beneficial use may be the

measure and limit of the grant. (Underscoring ours)

Likewise, Section 4, Chapter II of the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 states:

SEC. 4. Ownership of Mineral Resources. - Mineral Resources are owned by the State and the

exploration, development, utilization, and processing thereof shall be under its full control and

supervision. The State may directly undertake such activities or it may enter into mineral

agreements with contractors. (Underscoring ours)

Thus, the State may pursue the constitutional policy of full control and supervision of the

exploration, development and utilization of the countrys natural mineral resources, by either

directly undertaking the same or by entering into agreements with qualified entities. The DENR

Secretary acted within his authority when he ordered a study of the first option, which may be

undertaken consistently in accordance with the constitutional policy enunciated above.

Obviously, the State may not be precluded from considering a direct takeover of the mines, if it

is the only plausible remedy in sight to the gnawing complexities generated by the gold rush. As

implied earlier, the State need be guided only by the demands of public interest in settling for

this option, as well as its material and logistic feasibility.

In this regard, petitioners imputation of bad faith on the part of the DENR Secretary when the

latter issued MO 97-03 is not well-taken. The avowed rationale of the memorandum order is

clearly and plainly stated in its whereas clauses.vii[23] In the absence of any concrete evidence

that the DENR Secretary violated the law or abused his discretion, as in this case, he is presumed

to have regularly issued the memorandum with a lawful intent and pursuant to his official

functions.

Given these considerations, petitioners first assigned error is baseless and premised on tentative

assumptions. Petitioner cannot claim any absolute right to the Diwalwal mines pending

resolution of the Consolidated Mines cases, much less ask us to assume, at this point, that

respondent BCMC and the other mining firms are illegal miners. These factual issues are to be

properly threshed out in CA G.R. SP Nos. 61215 and 61216, which have yet to be decided by the

Court of Appeals. Any objection raised against MO 97-03 is likewise premature at this point,

inasmuch as it merely ordered a study of an option which the State is authorized by law to

undertake.

HELD:

NO

. MO 97-03 did not conclusively adopt "direct s tate ut i l ization" as a pol icy in

resolving the Diwalwal dispute. The terms of the memorandum clearly indicate that

what was directed there under was merely a study of this option and nothing else. Contrary to

petitioner's contention, it did not grant any management/operating or profit-sharing agreement to

small-scale miners or to any party, for that matter, but simply instructed the DENR

officials concerned to undertake studies to determine its feasibility. As to the alleged "vested

rights" claimed by petitioner, it is well to note that the same is invariably based on EP No. 133,

whose validity is still being disputed in the Consolidated Mines cases. A reading of the appealed

MAB decision reveals that the continued efficacy of EP No. 133

s one of the issues raised in said cases, with respondents therein asserting that

Marcopper cannot legally assign the permit which purportedly had expired. In other words, whether or

not petitioner actually has a vested right over Diwalwal under EP No. 133 is still an indefinite

and unsettled matter. And until a positive pronouncement is made by the appellate court in

the Consolidated Mines cases, EP No. 133 cannot be deemed as a source of any conclusive rights that

can be impaired by the issuance of MO 97-03.It must likewise be pointed out that under no

circumstances may petitioner's rights under EP No. 133 be regarded as total and absolute. As correctly

held by the Court of Appeals EP No.133 merely evidences a privilege granted by the State, which

may be amended, modified or rescinded when the national interest so requires. This is

necessarily so since the exploration, development and utilization of the country's natural mineral

resources are matters impressed with great public interest. Like timber permits, mining exploration

permits do not vest in the grantee any permanent or irrevocable right within the purview of the non-

impairment of contract and due process clauses of the Constitution, since the State, under its

all-encompassing police power, may alter, modify or amend the same, in accordance with the

demands of the general welfare. Addit iona l ly , there can be no val id opp os it ion rai sed

against a mere s tudy of a n alternative which the State, through the DENR, is authorized to

undertake in the first place. Worth noting is Article XII, Section 2, of the 1987 Constitution and Section 4,

Chapter II of the Philippine Mining Act of 1995.Thus, the State may pursue the constitutional policy of

full control and supervision of the exploration, development and utilization of the country's

natural mineral resources, by either directly undertaking the same or by entering into agreements

with qualified entities. The DENR Secretary acted within his authority when he ordered a study

of the first option, which may be unde rtaken cons istent ly in accordance with the

const i tut io na l po l icy enunci ated above . Obviously, the State may not be precluded from

considering a direct takeover of the mines, if it is the only plausible remedy in sight to the gnawing

complexities generated by the gold rush

Rosemoor Mining And Development Corporation Corporation (Rosemoor),

ISSUE: W/N Rosemoor’s license was validly cancelled. – YES.RATIO:

Validity of License

PD 463, as amended, pertained to the old system of exploration, development and utilizationof natural

resources through l icenses, concessions or leases , but was omitted in the

1987Constitution as it was deemed violative of its provisions. This was replaced by

RA 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 repealed or amended all laws, executive orders,

presidential decrees, rules and regulations -- or parts thereof -- that are inconsistent with it. While RA 7942

has expressly repealed provisions of mining laws that are inconsistent with its own, it nonetheless

respects previously issued valid and existing licenses. In this case, the terms of Rosemoor’s license was

subject to PD 463, the existing law when it was granted. And under such law, it is clear that a license

should only cover 100 hectares without exceptions or consideration to the number of

applications. The intent of the law would be brazenly circumvented by ruling that a license may

cover an area exceeding the maximum by the mere expediency of filing several

applications. Such ruling would indirectly permit an act that is directly prohibited by the law.

Validity of Proclamation No. 84

Rosemoor’s license may be revoked or rescinded by executive action when the national interest

so requires, because it is not a contract, property or a property right protected by the due process

clause of the Constitution. This condition to the license was acknowledged by Rosemoor in its

permit. Moreover, granting that Rosemoor’ license is valid, it can still be validly revoked by the

State in the exercise of police power. The exercise of such power through Proclamation No. 84 is

clearly in accord with the regalia doctrine which reserves to the State ownership of all

natural resources. Proclamation 84 does not impair the non-impairment clause because the

license is not a contract. Even if the license were, it is settled that provisions of existing laws and

a reservation of police power are deemed read into it, because it concerns a subject impressed

with public welfare.PN 84 is also not a bill of attainder because the declaration that the

license was void is not a punishment. It is also not an ex post facto law because the

proclamation does not fall under any of the enumerated categories of an ex post facto law. And

an ex post facto law is limited in its scope only to matters criminal in nature

McDANIEL, petitioner,

vs.

GALICANO APACIBLE, Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources,

It is alleged and admitted that the defendant Juan Cuisia has made an application under this Act

"for a lease of a parcel of petroleum land in the municipality of San Narciso, Province of

Tayabas, Philippine Islands, which said parcel of land included within its boundaries the three

said petroleum placer claims 'Maglihi No. 1,' 'Maglihi No. 2' and 'Maglihi No. 3.' " It is also

alleged and admitted that the defendant Rafael Corpus "is about to grant the lease application of

the defendant Juan Cuisia, and to place the said defendant Juan Cuisia in possession of the said

three petroleum placer claims held by plaintiff."

Under the provisions of this Act, the authority of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural

Resources to make such a lease is confined to lands "containing petroleum and other mineral oils

and gas in the Philippine Islands."

The legal effect of such allegations and admissions in the pleadings is to carry with it and to

imply that the lands in question contain petroleum and other mineral oils. Otherwise the

Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources would not have any authority to make such a

lease, and the defendant Juan Cuisia would not want to lease the lands unless they did contain

petroleum and other mineral oils.

The growth and development of minerals add new resources and undiscovered wealth to a

country, and provide employment for labor. For such reasons, it has always been the policy of

the mining law to encourage the prospector. He has been the pioneer in the discovery of minerals

in all countries, and often his task had been sad and lonely, and he has had many bitter

disappointments.

In the instant case, the stipulation shows that the mining claims are situated in a comparatively

uninhabited district four miles from any port, and that they can only be reached over mountain

trails which have been maintained at the expense of the plaintiff. If it be a fact that the claims do

contain petroleum in paying quantities, it would be of immense value to the commercial interests

of the Philippine Islands. As evidence of his good faith, the plaintiff has expended P12,000 in the

development of the property, and has found evidence tending to show that the claims do contain

petroleum and other mineral oils. At this time and under such circumstances, it would be a gross

injustice to deprive him of his property rights through forms and technicalities. The locations

were made upon the unappropriated public domain, and to maintain them, and as evidence of

good faith, the law requires the performance of the annual assessment work, and that question is

not disputed or presented in the record.

To deny the writ would, in legal effect, take from and give to another the P12,000 which the

plaintiff has expended in good faith in the development of the property.

A number of important questions have been raised and discussed in the briefs of opposing

counsel which, under the pleadings, are unnecessary to the decision of this case. It having been

admitted, in legal effect, that the original locations were valid, and that P12,000 have been

expended in development, and there being no plea of forfeiture for failure to do the annual

assessment work, and the record tending to show that the original locations were made in good

faith, and that the lands in question do contain "petroleum and other mineral oils," it must follow

that the plaintiff is entitled to the writ prayed for in his petition, and it is so ordered.

Many of the authorities cited by the defendants are good law, but this decision is based upon, and

confined to, the stipulated facts and the admissions made in the pleadings, and for such reasons

the authorities are not in point.

Justice Johnson has pointed out that the language in his opinion above quoted may be

misleading. The purpose and intent of that decision was to hold that Act No. 2932 was void in so

far as it applies to valid mineral locations, which were made prior to the time that Act became a

law, and upon which the annual assessment work has been performed after the law was enacted.

In the instant case, we hold that, even though a valid mineral location was made prior to the

passage of Act No. 2932 and the annual assessment work had not been performed since the

passage of the Act, and that question is raised and presented by an appropriate plea and sustained

by the proof, any prior rights under the location would then be forfeited, and such lands would

then be subject to, and come under, the provisions of Act No. 2932.

G.R. No. 75962 June 30, 1988

GREENHILLS MINING COMPANY, petitioner,

The instant petition seeks the review of (a) the decision dated July 8,1986 issued by respondent Office of the President and signed by

Deputy Executive Secretary Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., declaring all mining claims located and registered within the Southern Zambales

Forest Reserve as null and void and granting private respondent Green Valley Company preferential right to possess, exploit, develop and

operate the area covered by its exploration permit, and (b) the order dated September 10, 1986 denying petitioner's motion for

reconsideration.

n upholding Green hills's prior right over the mining areas subject of conflicting claims, the Office of the President rightly relied on the provisions of Section 28(a) of Commonwealth Act No. 137 (now Section 13(a), Presidential Decree No. 463). Under this provision, and under the regulations implementing it, it is required that the lessor shall, first, secure a prospecting permit from the BFD and second, obtain an exploration permit in case of discovery of minerals in the area or when there is strong proof of mineralization. The records show that the petitioner's mining claims were backed up by no prospecting permit.

On the other hand, Green Valley had fully complied with such requirements, for which its claims should be declared superior.

The cases of McDaniel v. Apacible, 4 Gold Creek Mining Corporation v. Rodriguez,

5 and Salacot Mining

Company v. Abadilla, 6 relied upon by the petitioner, and where we held that the appropriation of a

mineral land pursuant to a valid claim segregates it from the public domain, are not in point. The petitioner

assumes that the claims of other claimants recorded in 1933 and 1934 were still valid when the Southern

Zambales Forest Reservation was established in 1956. According to the office of the President, however,

the original claimowners had failed to perform annual development work on the claims in violation of the

provisions of Section 36 of the Philippine Bill of 1902. As a consequence, the area became "open to

relocation ... as if no location of the same had ever been made." 7 Conversely, assuming that the

government lost the property when the petitioner, or the original claimowners staked their claims in 1933

and 1934, it reverted to the public dominion upon abandonment thereof Accordingly, when President

Magsaysay established the Southern Zambales Forest Reserve in 1956, the areas covered by the said

abandoned claims already formed part of the public domain. The petitioner cannot, moreover, claim

privity of title with the owners of the prior locations. Such prior locations had been abandoned, or at most,

forfeited, and the petitioner's own location cannot be considered a continuation thereof.

PNOC-ENERGY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION (PNOC-EDC) v VENERACION

G.R. No. 129820

November 30, 2006

RED of the DENR Office in Zamboanga City: ruled in favor of VENERACION and ordered the PNOC to

amend its Mineral Production Sharing Agreement [MPSA] by excluding therefrom Block 159 *DENR

secretary: dismissed the appeal on the ground that petitioner's right to appeal had already prescribed.

ISSUES:

(1) whether or not the petitioner has already lost its right to appeal the RED's Order dated 12

April 1993; and

(2) whether or not the petitioner acquired a preferential right on mining rights over Block 159.

HELD: *On propriety of appeal: The correct mode of appeal would have been to file a petition

for review under Rule 43, before the Court of Appeals. Nevertheless, this Court has taken into

account the fact that these cases [which provided the doctrine] were promulgated after the

petitioner filed this appeal on 4 August 1997, and decided to take cognizance of the present case.

(1) YES, the right to appeal is lost. Petitioner's insistence that the 30-day reglementary period

provided by Section 61 of Commonwealth Act No. 137, as amended, applies, cannot be

sustained by this Court. By providing a five-day period within which to file an appeal on the

decisions of the Director of Mines and Geo-Sciences, Presidential Decree No. 463

unquestionably repealed Section 61 of Commonwealth Act No. 137.

Nor can petitioner invoke the doctrine that rules of technicality must yield to the broader interest

of substantial justice. The right to appeal is not part of due process of law but is a mere statutory

privilege to be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of the law.

In the instant case, petitioner failed to state any compelling reason for not filing its appeal within

the mandated period. Instead, the records show that after failing to comply with the period within

which to file their motion for reconsideration on time, they again failed to file their appeal before

the Office of the DENR Secretary within the time provided by law.

(2) NO, Even if petitioner had not lost its right to appeal, it cannot claim any mining rights over

Block 159 for failure to comply with the legal requirements.

SEC. 15. Government Reserved Land. – Lands reserved by the Government for purposes other

than mining are open to prospecting. Any interested party may file an application therefore with

the head of the agency administering said land, subject always to compliance with pertinent laws

and rules and regulations covering such reserved land. Such application shall be acted upon

within thirty (30) days. In such cases, the compensation due the surface owner shall accrue

equally to the agency administering the reserved land and the Bureau of Mines.

The law enumerates the following requirements:

(1) a prospecting permit from the agency that has jurisdiction over the area, in this case, the

OEA;

(2) an exploration permit from the BMGS;

(3) if the exploration reveals the presence of commercial deposit, the permitee applies before the

BMGS for the exclusion of the area from the reservation;

(4) granting by the president of the application to exclude the area from the reservation; and

(5) a mining agreement approved by the DENR Secretary.

In this case, petitioner complied with the first requirement and obtained a prospecting permit

from the OEA. In its correspondence with the petitioner, the OEA, however, advised the

petitioner on two separate occasions to obtain a "prospecting permit" from the BMGS, although

the OEA was probably referring to an exploration permit. The petitioner did not apply for an

exploration permit with the BMGS, nor would the BMGS have granted petitioner an exploration

permit because when petitioner wrote to the BMGS informing the latter of its intention to enter

into an MPSA with the DENR over Block 159, the BMGS informed the petitioner that the

respondent's claim over Block 159 had already preceded that of the petitioner. The advice given

by the BMGS was justified since at that time, the respondent already had a pending application

for the exclusion of Block 159 from the Malangas Coal Reservation. Thereafter, the petitioner

filed his MPSA application, without complying with the second, third and fourth requisites.

Since it ignored the sound advice of the OEA and the BMGS, the government agencies

concerned, and stubbornly insisted on its incorrect procedure, petitioner cannot complain now

that its MPSA was revoked for failure to comply with the legal requirements.

OBITER DICTA:

(1) Decisions of the Supreme Court on mining disputes have recognized a distinction between

(1) the primary powers granted by pertinent provisions of law to the then Secretary of

Agriculture and Natural Resources (and the bureau directors) of an executive or administrative

nature, such as "granting of license, permits, lease and contracts, or approving, rejecting,

reinstating or cancelling applications, or deciding conflicting applications," and

(2) controversies or disagreements of civil or contractual nature between litigants which are

questions of a judicial nature that may be adjudicated only by the courts of justice.

(2) Findings of fact by the Mines Adjudication Board, which exercises appellate jurisdiction over

decisions or orders of the panel of arbitrators, shall be conclusive and binding on the parties, and

its decision or order shall be final and executory. But resort to the appropriate court, through a

petition for review by certiorari, involving questions of law, may be made within thirty days

from the receipt of the order or decision of the Mines Adjudication Board.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Represented by the POLLUTION ADJUDICATIONBOARD

(DENR)

vs.

MARCOPPER MINING CORPORATION

FACTS:

Respondent MMC was issued a temporary permit to operate a tailings sea disposal system. In the

meantime, the National Pollution Control Commission (NPCC) was abolished by EO

No. 192dated June 10, 1987, and i ts powers and functi ons were integrated into

the Environmental Management Bureau and into the Pollution Adjudication Board

(PAB).On April 11, 1988, the DENR Secretary, in his capacity as Chairman of the

PAB, issued an Order directing MMC to "cease and desist from discharging mine

tailings into Calancan Bay."This was appealed by the MMC with the Office of the President

(OP).In line with the directive from the OP, the Calancan Bay Rehabilitatio n Project

(CBRP) was created, and MMC remitted the amount of P30,000.00 a day, starting from May

13, 1988 to the Ecology Trust Fund (ETF) thereof. However, on June 30, 1991, MMC

stopped discharging itstailings in the Bay, hence, it likewise ceased from making further

deposits to the ETF. The PAB sought for the enforcement of the order issued by the OP,

however, the CA acted on Marcopper’s petition and ordered the PAB to refrain and desist

from enforcing aforesaid Order. Hence, the instant petition.

ISSUE:

The Court of Appeals erred in ruling that Republic Act No. 7942 repealed the

provisions of Republic Act No. 3931, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 984,

with respect to the power and function of petitioner Pollution Adjudication Board to

issue, renew or deny permits for the discharge of the mine tailings.

HELD:

The SC held that the CA erred in ruling that the PAB had no authority to issue the

Order from the The rul ing of the Court of Appeals that the PAB has been

divested of authority to act on pollution-related matters in mining operations is anchored

on the provisions of RA 7942(Philippine Mining Act of 1995). However, Section 19 of

EO 192 vested the PAB with the specific power to adjudicate pollution cases in

general. Sec. 2, par. (a) of PD 984 defines the

term "pollution" as referring to any alteration of the physical, chemical and biological properties

of any water, air and/or land resources of the Philippines , or any discharge thereto of any liquid,

gaseous or solid wastes as will or is likely to create a harmful environment. On the other hand,

the authority of the mines regional director is complementary to that of the PAB.

While the mines regional director has express administrative and regulatory powers

over mining operations and installations, it has no adjudicative powers over complaints for

violation of pollution control statutes and regulations. Contrary to the ruling of the CA, RA 7942

does not vest quasi-judicial powers in the Mines Regional Director. The authority is

vested and remains with the PAB. Neither was such authority conferred upon the Panel of

Arbitrators and the Mines Adjudication Board which were created by the said law. The scope of

authority of the Panel of A r b i t r a t o r s a n d t h e M i n e s A d j u d i c a t i o n B o a r d

c o n f e r r e d b y R A 7 9 4 2 c l e a r l y e x c l u d e adjudicative responsibility over pollution

cases