DEMOSPAIN INFORMES Y DOCUMENTOS DE TRABAJO

Has economy anything to do with neo-nativist identities

WIKA-Workshop 2018 Models of Future Cultural Relations

Realities, Challenges, Visions

Grupo DEMOSPAIN (SEJ-598)

Nº 2018 / 005

Este trabajo se distribuye bajo una licencia Creative Commons - CC BY-NC-ND 4.0

Usted es libre de: Copiar – Redistribuir y copiar el material el cualquier medio o formato. El licenciado no puede revocar esta libertad en tanto que usted siga los términos de esta

licencia.

Bajo los siguientes términos:

Atribución – Usted debe dar el crédito apropiado, ofrecer el vínculo a la licencia, e

indicar si se han hecho cambios. Puede hacer los cambios que quiera de cualquier

forma razonable, pero no de modo que sugiera que el licenciado está de acuerdo con

usted o con su uso de este material.

No comercial – Usted no puede utilizar este material con fines comerciales.

Sin derivados – Si usted mezcla, transforma o construye a partir de este material, no

debe distribuir esos nuevos materiales modificados.

Sin restricciones adicionales – Usted no puede aplicar términos legales o medidas

tecnológicas que restrinjan legalmente el derecho de otros a hacer todo aquello que esta

licencia permite.

Advertencias: • No tiene que cumplir con los elementos de la licencia para materiales de dominio público o aquellos

cuyo uso está permitido por la aplicación de alguna excepción o limitación.

• Esta licencia no ofrece garantías. La licencia puede no darle todos los permisos necesarios para el uso que pretende. Por ejemplo, otros derechos referidos a la publicidad, privacidad o derechos morales pueden limitar el modo en que usted use el material.

Freitag, 23.11.2018, 09:00 Uhr – 16:30 Uhr | WeltRaum | Institut für Auslandsbeziehungen, Stuttgart

WIKA-Workshop 2018

Models of Future Cultural Relations Realities, Challenges, Visions Programme (Each talk 25 min + 5 min questions)

9:00–11:00 h Panel 1: Visions and Challenges for New Cultural Relations

Welcoming Words (video message) Michelle Müntefering, Minister of State at the Federal Foreign Office (t.b.c.) Opening Dialogue Ronald Grätz, Secretary General of ifa (Institut für Auslandsbeziehungen) Prof. Dr. Caroline Y. Robertson-von Trotha, Chairwoman of the Academic Council on Culture and Foreign Policy Non-Simultaneity in European Development Dr. Zaal Andronikashvili, Literary Scholar and Publicist, Zentrum für Literatur- und Kulturforschung Berlin 30 minutes discussion

11:00–13:00 h Panel 2: Realities of a Neo-Nationalist Development Has Economy Anything to Do with Neo-Nativist Identities? Prof. Dr. Antonia María Ruiz Jiménez, Political Sociologist at Universidad Pablo de Olavide, Seville The Role of the Nation for Sovereignism and Retro-Modernisation in Central and Eastern Europe Dr. sc. pol. Kai-Olaf Lang, Expert for the CEE Region, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik Resentment, Neo-Nationalist Movements, and Reactionary Opinion Formation Dr. Zafer Yilmaz, Faculty of Economic and Social Sciences, Potsdam University 30 minutes discussion

13:00–14:00 h lunch

14:00–15:30 h Panel 3: Models of Future Cultural Relations

The Importance of Multilingual Brains for Cultural Relations Prof. Dr. Antonella Sorace, School of Philosophy, Psychology and Language Sciences, University of Edinburgh

Intercultural Cities: New Realities, New Dimensions, New Actors Dr. Stefanos Vallianatos, Head of International Relations Department of the Greek Culture Foundation

Cultural Relations as Conflict Prevention Dr. Jens Adam, Institut für Europäische Ethnologie, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin

30 minutes discussion

15:30–16:30 h Experts’ Fishbowl All speakers Subject to modifications

27/11/2018

1

Has economy anything to do with neo-nativist identities?

Antonia María Ruiz Jiménez

Has economy anything to do with neo-nativist identities

27/11/2018

2

Strength of territorial attachment

27/11/2018

3

Meaning of attachment

The economyand everyday natiohood

27/11/2018

4

The effects of the Great Recession: hypotheses

27/11/2018

5

27/11/2018

6

27/11/2018

7

27/11/2018

8

27/11/2018

9

Correlation between weakening of mean attachment and worsening in  in mean optimism

regarding current economic situation

Correlation between weakening of mean attachment and worsening in  in mean optimism

regarding future economic situation

27/11/2018

10

27/11/2018

11

27/11/2018

12

27/11/2018

13

ACHIEVED ASCRIBED

Feel

national Exercise

rights Achieved

pure Born in country

Parents from

country

Ascribed Pure

Education -0.00312 (0.808)

-0.0258 (0.054)

0.0632*** (0.001)

-0.0662*** (0.000)

-0.0183 (0.218)

-0.0632*** (0.001)

Gender: Female 0.00568 (0.929)

0.0553 (0.403)

0.0959 (0.278)

-0.0402 (0.504)

-0.00249 (0.973)

-0.0959 (0.278)

Problems paying bills (ref. always): -From time to time

0.414*** (0.000)

0.0666 (0.602)

0.297* (0.046)

0.227* (0.036)

-0.0599 (0.634)

-0.297* (0.046)

-Almost never/never 0.399** (0.001)

-0.0145 (0.914)

0.386* (0.017)

0.228* (0.049)

-0.0233 (0.864)

-0.386* (0.017)

Level in society (self-placement) -0.0309 (0.215)

0.0386 (0.142)

-0.0482 (0.183)

0.0194 (0.411)

0.0687* (0.015)

0.0482 (0.183)

Age -0.00267 (0.208)

-0.00465* (0.033)

-0.00677* (0.023)

0.00325 (0.106)

-0.00410 (0.096)

0.00677* (0.023)

Being unemployed -0.110 (0.335)

-0.220 (0.065)

-0.223 (0.138)

0.0362 (0.741)

0.0679 (0.604)

0.223 (0.138)

Country (ref. Germany): -Spain

0.781*** (0.000)

-0.341*** (0.000)

-0.951*** (0.000)

0.822*** (0.000)

0.121 (0.317)

0.951*** (0.000)

-Italy -0.0952 (0.376)

-0.585*** (0.000)

-0.577*** (0.000)

0.468*** (0.000)

-0.0437 (0.735)

0.577*** (0.000)

-Greece 0.907*** (0.000)

-1.263*** (0.000)

-0.606*** (0.000)

0.378*** (0.000)

1.547*** (0.000)

0.606*** (0.000)

-Portugal 0.230* (0.025)

-0.0822 (0.404)

-1.355*** (0.000)

1.045*** (0.000)

0.632*** (0.000)

1.355*** (0.000)

Constant -1.122*** (0.000)

-0.470* (0.027)

1.550*** (0.000)

-0.484* (0.012)

-1.796*** (0.000)

-1.550*** (0.000)

Observations 4725 4725 2572 4725 4725 2572 Pseudo R2 0.028 0.028 0.046 0.035 0.068 0.046 BIC 5909.6 5558.2 3135.5 6387.8 4801.0 3135.5  

27/11/2018

14

CONCLUSIONS

27/11/2018

15

I would like to thank the Centre for Cultural and General Studies and IFA for the opportunity to talk in this workshop. My name is Antonia Ruiz, and I am professor of sociology at Pablo de Olavide University. I have been researching nationalism and national identities for

more than 10 years now. I lead the research group DEMOSPAIN that you can look for on internet and where you will be able to read our most relevant finding. You can find me on ResarchGate also. Today I will talk on the relation between the economic crisis and changes on national identity. This is the perception that national identities are currently more exclusive, restrictive or locked than before; that xenophobic and inti-immigrant attitudes are related to this closure of identities; and the understanding that these change are somehow related to the strengthening of populist radical right parties, whose discourse is also nationalist and xenophobic. I will only briefly touch on the relation between the populist radical right and changes on identities later on. For most of the time I will concentrate on the relation between national identities and the economy and the economic crisis in particular.

Within national identities the title refers to neo-nativist identities. And so I need to clarify what do we meant by that. Neo-nativist identities refer to a conception of the national group in which belonging is acquired by genetic characteristics at the moment of birth. This

type of identity is understood to be xenophobic and anti-immigration. However, I would like to clarify it further before looking at the empirical data. I will start by defining national identities in general, as a feeling of territorial attachment, and will clarify its twofold character. Then I will discuss a couple of theories linking economy and national identity, trying to discriminate the effects of economic crises both on the strength and on meaning of national identity, and develop the hypothesis that will be put to test.

National identity is a type of social identity. As such, it is the subjective feeling of being part of a group with whose members you believe to share something in common, such as gender or sexual identity, social class, etc. The difference with national identity is that the group is

imagined as inhabiting an objective or bounded territory (a country, a state, a region, etc.). Therefore, I will use the term feeling of territorial attachment as synonym of national identity. From an analytical point of view I will distinguish two dimensions within national identity: -The strength of attachment; the strength in the feeling of being attached to, or being part of, the group inhabiting a particular territory. -The meaning of attachment; that is the criteria to be a member of the group (when expressed by the elite), or the type of elements that you think to share with other members of the group (when expressed by citizens).

The levels on the strength of attachment to a group has been theorized by social and political psycologist mainly. The weakest link with the group is the cognitive level. In this level, the member of the group only acknowledge the existence of the group either implicit

or explicitly. It also bears some broad understanding about some of the elements or trait that the member of the group might have in common with other members: from an ethnia or skin colour to common democratic values. This common understanding will be usually more or less ambiguous, allowing for a considerable levarage in how people understand and negotiate their belonging to the group. The evaluative level implies a tronger link with the group. In this level, some characteristics of the group is positively evaluated by the member. It allows for the incorporation of the group’s identity within the self-concept, and implies the previous level of attachment. For a group’s characteristic to be possitively evaluated, both the group and the characteristic are asumed to exists. Pride to be national will be in this level. The conative level represents the strongest link with a group. In this level actions are oriented toward the group. It is the level represented in the picture here (Liberty leading the people, by Delacroix). But you do not need to die for your nation to be action oriented toward the group. There are also everyday actions that are group oriented, such as shoping choices in favor of “national products”, or hanging a flag on your balcony. It is difficult however to measure these three levels on attachment with conventional survey data. Surveys usually measure identity either with the Linz bipolar scale o with a scale of geographical closeness. How each level of closeness fit within this clasification is problematic.

Regarding the meaning of attachment, you might have heard of ethnic or cultural identities vs. civic or political identities. In DEMOSPAIN group we prefer to mix this classification with another one that distinguishes between ascribed and achievable identities. Therefore

we will have three different possibilities in how people understand their belonging, or define the criteria of belonging for others: -Ethnic ascribed identities: The group is defined or think off as been form by those who have a particular set of characteristics given upon them by birth, and therefore very difficult to change or acquire later on. Those are your ethnic, the colour of your skin, your kinship (ancestors)… -as they are ascribed by birth these are what we refer as nativist or neo-nativist identities. This is the type of identity more closed: if you do not have this characteristic at the moment of your birth you will be defined as not being part of the national group. -Cultural achievable identities: The group is defined or think off as being form by those who share a particular set of cultural characteristics and values, like a language, a particular religion, some traditions, foods, customs, etc. Although it might be difficult in some cases, all of these characteristics can be achieved and thus a person can became integrated as part of the national group. This type of identity is only more voluntaristic than the previous one in theory. States have enforced acculturation and integration. It also can exclude even those who want to be part of the national group by arguing that they are not able or willing to integrate. -Civic achievable identities: The group is defined or think off as being form by those who share a particular set of civic and political values: respect for human rights, the rule of law, democratic values, a common economic and welfare systems, common civic obligations and rights… Those who respect group’s values can be part of the national group. Therefore this will be the least closed type of identity. But it is not completely opened. As the previous one, people can be defined as not willing or able to integrate (as in the case with the debate on the Muslim veil defined as a sign of gender discrimination and therefore not compatible with democratic values). Or some values can be included in a set that exclude people form an ideological point of view, as McCarthyism will illustrate.

Regarding the relation between the economy and national identities, we share the idea that economic systems belongs to what has been defined as banal nationalism, that is the habits that allow current nation-states to reproduce themselves. Welfare institutions and services materialise the

presence of the state within everyday experiences of citizens. Economic and consumption nets led citizens to be economically dependent on one another and make them aware to be part of the same group, therefore fostering a national sense of belonging. Within this understanding… Welfare nationalism can be defined as the discourses and ideologies in which welfare and national identity are intertwined and welfare provision is based on national membership. This idea is already present in the writings of Deutsch (1964) when he argues that by creating good living conditions, government creates attachment to the state; he furthermore asserts that it is necessary not only to maintain well-being but also to assure wide distribution of benefits throughout the population. Deutsch seemed to suggest that economic crisis or inequality may affect the strength of (territorial) attachment: he defends that social conflict and disintegrative tendencies emerge where the (re)distribution of wealth is too skewed. From a psychological point of view, Brown suggested changes in the meaning of identity. According to him, the existence of inequalities can be interpreted as the absence or incompleteness of nationhood, and will usually lead to the redefinition of the understandings of insiders and outsiders, favouring more restrictive interpretations of membership. The literature on welfare chauvinism points in the same direction, regarding the consequences of economic crisis for the understanding of national identity. Welfare chauvinism is the claim that welfare benefits should be reserved only for those belonging to the ‘native’ population, drawing a clear distinction between ‘us’ and ‘them’, linked not only to immigration but also to those deemed to be undeserving in the revised normative logic of welfare provision.

Based on these two theories, we will test the following hypothesis: On strength: -The strength of territorial attachment to the country has worsened on those countries where citizens’ perceptions and expectations about the economy has

also worsened, and viceversa. -Citizens with worse perception and expectations about the economy have weaker attachment to the country.

On meaning:

-Over the Great Recession period, the meaning of national identity has pivoted toward more ethnic ascribed meanings in countries where the crisis have been deeper. -Over the Great Recession period, the meaning of national identity has pivoted toward more ascribed meaning in countries where the populist radical right has had larger popular support. -The meaning of identity for citizens with worse economic situation pivots more toward ascribed meanings that it is the case with citizens with better economic situation.

Let’s start with hypotheses regarding the relation between the economic crisis and changes on the strength of identity.

For testing these hypotheses we have chosen a comparative research design, looking at Germany on the one hand and Southern European Countries on the other, given the differences in how they have experience the economic crisis.

The comparison has been difficult however for several reasons. Therefore our findings are only provisional. First, regarding the strength of attachment, several of the Southern European Countries are absent from the international database that best fit our purposes. This is probably due to the crisis itself, because carrying on

representative samples surveys is expensive. Only in Eurobarometer do we find the complete set of countries, because this is compulsory for all member states. But in these studies, strength of attachment is measured using a scale of closeness to different geographical units, among which the country is taken as representing the national-state. In our comparison we will be using Eurobarometers from 2006 and 2012.

We analyse first the crude correlation between changes in strength of attachment and economy at the aggregate level. Let’s look at the strength of attachment in our set of countries. You see how Portugal and particularly Greece have higher levels of attachment than any of

the other countries, while Germany and Italy are on the other extreme. And Spain is more or less in the middle.

If we compare the changes on strength of attachment between 2006 and 2012 they do not look impressive at first sight. Despite the weakening of identities, the percentage of citizens very attached to their countries remains large in most Southern European countries, and larger than in Germany. But if we look at the marginal changes between neighbour categories in the

strength of attachment we find some statistically significant changes.

This graph represents marginal changes in probabilities comparing 2012 to 2006. Horizontal lines to the right hand side of 0 represent an increase in the probability of the category, while lines in the left hand side represent a decrease. The point in the horizontal lines is the mean value of the category, and the length

of line represents the confidence interval. If the horizontal line touches the vertical red line with value 0, it means the different in the probability of the category (increase or decrease) in 2012 is not statistically significant compared to its value in 2006.

Germany is the only country in which the marginal probability of feeling very attached to the country has increased, while all the others categories have experienced a statistically significant decrease.

In Italy and Spain, most of the changes are not significant. However the increase in the probability of feeling not at all attached is statistically significant in both of them.

In Portugal and Greece we observe and similar pattern: being the two countries in which the attachment was stronger, we observe that the decrease in the percentage of citizens feeling very attached is statistically significant (they move to weakest categories, which are therefore significantly higher in 2012 than 2006).

But how do these changes relate to the economy?

We can see in these figures how citizens’ optimism regarding the current economic situation of their countries has changed in our set of countries during the Great Recession period. As compared to 2006, in 2012 German citizens were much more optimistic regarding their country’s current

economic situation than citizens in any of the Southern European countries.

Optimism regarding the future economic situation of the country also worsened more in Southern European countries than in Germany.

We can observe a very general correlation, in which positive increase in the strength of territorial attachment has only happened in Germany where optimism regarding current economic situation improved also between 2006 and 2012. On the contrary, were economic optimism have decreased also mean attachment have weakened.

The same thing is even clearer if we look at the correlation between gaining and loses on the strength of attachment and changes in optimism regarding the future economic situation of the country.

At the individual level this general correlation between optimism and national identity also holds. You have a table with the individual data analyses. We have proceeded by adding variables in groups to see if the importance of economic optimism is a good predictor of holding a strong national identity.

As you see in model one, those who feel more optimistic about the current or future national economic situation do also hold stronger national identities, and this feeling remain statistically significant after controlling for other explanatory variables. These findings together with the previous analysis seem to back the hypotheses linked to welfare nationalism: better economic conditions (as perceived by citizens) are linked to stronger national identities and vice versa. There are however some apparent contradictions that point toward welfare chauvinism as well. Therefore you may see that

As country’s inequality increases, the probability of holding strong attachment to the country does also increase. In a similar vein, being unemployed increases the probability of feeling strong attachment to the country after sociodemographic characteristics are taken into account.

We have had more problems regarding the measurement of the meaning of identity. Despite the existence of international database that focus on measuring national identity with some detail, many of the Southern European countries are not included in the samples (probably as a consequence

of the economic crisis in itself). We are limited, therefore to the use of EB 57.2 from year 2002, and IntUne database for 2007 and 2009. They include questions about the meaning of identity, but they are not exactly equal. A further limitation is that they do not really cover the period before and after the economic crisis. Only 5 questions have more or less clear correspondence in these two studies. For our comparison we have selected the most differentiated items, systematically following within the same dimension in all countries. Those are: Laws and Rights – Selected as reflecting civic achievable dimension of national identity. In this understanding what is important to be national is to share and respect common political and legal systems, as well as enjoy common rights and duties. Parentage – Selected as reflecting ethnic ascribed dimension. In this understanding what is important to be national is to have nationality parents or share common ancestors with fellow nationals. Language and traditions reflect our cultural achievable dimension, falling in between the previous two dimensions with some differences among countries. For the comparison between 2002 and 2009 we have left these two items out.

If we look first at the percentage of citizens upholding civic achievable identities we see an increase between 2002 and 2009 except for the cases of Greece and Portugal. We must clarify that ascribed and achievable identities are compatible. In these studies EB 57.2 and IntUne

the questions asked is how important each item of a list is to be national. And therefore, people can say that laws and right are important and at the same time that parentage is also important.

Let’s look then at the difference between the mean importance given to the ethnic ascribed and the civic achievable meaning of identity and its evolution over the period 2002-2009. What we see is that except for Portugal, civic achievable identities have become more important on average than the ethnic ascribed ones. The trend in particularly significant in Germany.

A point to be stressed here is that the dispersion between opinions has also decreased for the importance given to achievable identities, while it has increased for ethnic ascribed identities. That is, there is a larger consensus in the increasing importance that civic achievable identities receive, and smaller consensus regarding the importance of the ethnic ascribed understanding of national identities.

This also means that over time the percentage of citizens who consider both law and rights (civic achievable) and parentage (ethnic ascribed) as important for national identity have decreased.

We have some data for 2010 (EB) which is however non comparable due to the way the question was asked. In this occasion the person had to choose the three most important items, instead of rating the importance of each item on the list. An unfolding analysis of the distance of citizens in

each country to each of the item show that Southern European countries are closer together to concept of national identity centered on parentage and place of birth (ethnic ascribed) than Germany. This, on the other hand, is closer to cultural and civic achievable understanding of identity. EB 73.3, 2010.

We now examine the relation between the meaning of identity and individual variables, particularly the economic situation of citizens. Here we are forced to use EB 73.3 (2010), since our previous database do not contain enough economic or even sociodemographic variables for this analysis.

As you can see, those with a worse economic situation (who always have problems to pay monthly bills) are less likely to feel national (greater probability of feeling national for those who only have problems from time to time or never). Achivable identities are more likely for those with better economic condition. Those with worse economic situation (who always have problems to pay monthly bills) are more likely to hold on to purely ascribed identities (lower probability for those who only have problem form time to time or never). Being unemployed, in this case do not seem to have an effect on the meaning of identity, but we have seen that it strengthen the feeling of attachment.

This is only a first exploration of the relation between economic variables and national identity. It must be taken with caution because we only have five cases and many limitations regarding the type of data that we have been able to use. Further analysis on the same topic does not show contradictions with these findings however, what may increase our confidence in them.

As conclusions we may point the following: -Regarding the strength of territorial attachment: 1. The aggregated change on countries is related to the direction on which citizen’s perception and expectations about the economic situation have evolved, not to the scope of those changes. 2. At the individual level, the strength of territorial attachment is, in fact, positively correlated both to citizens’ perception about the current state of the economy as well as their expectation regarding its future. Furthermore, it seems that the objective economic conditions of the country do also play a role on citizen’s strength of attachment. On the subjective meaning of attachment we can only back our hypotheses at the individual level, but no regarding countries as a whole. 1. Our data contradict the idea that over the Great Recession the meaning of attachment has pivoted toward more ethnic ascribed meaning of attachment, neither in countries where the crisis have been deeper, not in countries where the populist radical right has had larger popular support. On the contrary, our data shows that it is the civic achievable meaning of identity the one that has increased. Although these finding must be taken with caution, they are not necessarily contradictory with other political trends and particularly the emergence of populist radical right parties. Let’s consider fist what happens at the individual level. 2. We have noticed a significant positive correlation between citizens’ economic condition and the meaning of identity, such that those with worse economic conditions are more likely to hold ethnic ascribed meanings of attachment or neo-nativist identities. In general terms, our finding seems to support the idea that welfare chauvinism is present among citizens, at least in part as a consequence of the Great Recession. Thus, we see that economic hardship is positively correlated with the strengthening of attachment as well as with upholding an ascribed type of identity. Hence, increasing levels of economic inequality (as measured by GINI) as well as unemployment lead to the reinforcement of attachment to the country; while increasing difficulties to pay bills lead to ethnic ascribed identities.

So, at the individual level welfare chauvinism seem to be at work, but at the aggregate level the number of citizens upholding these types of identities, that we can refer as neo-nativist, do not seem to have increased. How do we relate this to the perceived strengthening of populist radical right parties and their nativist discourse? Are these finding inconsistent?

Even if the Great Recession has not lead to an increase in the number of citizens upholding ethnic ascribed or neo-nativist identities, it might be true that those citizens have strengthened their attachment (as suggested in our analyses) and this may had led to their political mobilisation in the context of the Great Recession: maybe they are no more people but they are more visible and politically active. Perhaps taking this conclusion too far now, we could even suggest that the perceived increase in the electoral success of populist radical right parties may have influence in the trend observed in our data: a decrease in the number of citizens that consider both the ascribed and the achieved meaning of identity equally important who have shifted toward pure achievable identities.

Thank you.