BISHOP OF JARO VS DELA PENA, 26 Phil 144

FACTS: In 1898, Fr. Agustin Dela Pena deposited in his personal account a sum of money entrusted to him for the construction of a leper hospital. Thereafter, Father De la Pea was arrested by the military authorities as a political prisoner. While under detention, Fr. Dela Pea made an order on said bank in favor of the United States Army officer under whose charge he was then for the sum thus deposited in said bank. The arrest of Father De la Pea and the confiscation of the funds in the bank were the result of the claim of the military authorities that he was an insurgent and that the funds thus deposited had been collected by him forrevolutionary purposes. The money was taken from the bank by the military authorities by virtue of such order and was turned over to the Government.

ISSUE: Whether or not Father de la Pea is liable forthe loss of the money under his trust.

HELD: The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. Father De la Pea's liability is determined by those portions of the Civil Code which relate to obligations. Although the Civil Code states that "a person obliged to give something is also bound to preserve it with the diligence pertaining to a good father of a family". It also provides, following the principle of the Roman law, major casus est, cui humana infirmitas resistere non potest, that "no one shall be liable forevents which could not be foreseen, or which having been foreseen were inevitable, with the exception of the cases expressly mentioned in the law or those in which the obligation so declares."

CA-Agro Industrial Devt Corp vs CA 219 SCRA 426Facts:On July 3, 1979, petitioner (through its President- Sergio Aguirre) and the Spouses Ramon and Paula Pugao entered into an agreement whereby the former purchase two parcel of lands from the latter. It was paid of downpayment while the balance was covered by there postdated checks. Among the terms and conditions embodied in the agreement were the titles shall be transferred to the petitioner upon full payment of the price and the owner's copies of the certificate of titles shall be deposited in a safety deposit box of any bank. Petitioner and the Pugaos then rented Safety Deposit box of private respondent Security Bank and Trust Company.

Thereafter, a certain Margarita Ramos offered to buy from the petitioner. Mrs Ramos demand the execution of a deed of sale which necessarily entailed the production of the certificate of titles. In view thereof, Aguirre, accompanied by the Pugaos, then proceed to the respondent Bank to open the safety deposit box and get the certificate of titles. However, when opened in the presence of the Bank's representative, the box yielded no such certificate. Because of the delay in the reconstitution of the title, Mrs Ramos withdrew her earlier offer to purchase.

Hence this petition.

Issue:Whether or not the contract of rent between a commercial bank and another party for the use of safety deposit box can be considered alike to a lessor-lessee relationship.

Ruling:The petitioner is correct in making the contention that the contract for the rent of the deposit box is not a ordinary contract of lease as defined in Article 1643 of the Civil Code. However, the Court do not really subscribe to its view that the same is a contract of deposit that is to be strictly governed by the provisions in Civil Code on Deposit; the contract in the case at bar is a special kind of deposit. It cannot be characterized as an ordinary contract of lease under Article 1643 because the full and absolute possession and control of the safety deposit box was not given to the joint renters- the petitioner and the Pugaos. The guard key of the box remained with the respondent bank; without this key, neither of the renters could open the box. On the other hand, the respondent bank could not likewise open the box without the renter's key. The Court further assailed that the petitioner is correct in applying American Jurisprudence. Herein, the prevailing view is that the relation between the a bank renting out safe deposits boxes and its customer with respect to the contents of the box is that of a bail or/ and bailee, the bailment being for hire and mutual benefits. That prevailing rule has been adopted in Section 72 of the General Banking Act.

Section 72. In addition to the operations specifically authorized elsewhere in this Act, banking institutions other that building and loan associations may perform the following services:(a) Receive in custody funds, document and valuable objects and rents safety deposits taxes for the safeguard of such effects.xxx xxx xxxThe bank shall perform the services permitted under subsections (a) (b) and (c) of this section as depositories or as agents.

Teofisto Guingona, Jr., Antonio Martin, and Teresita Santos vs. The City Fiscal of Manila, Hon. Jose Flaminiano, Asst. City Fiscal Felizardo Lota andFacts:From March 1979 to March 1981, Clement David made several investments with the National Savings and Loan Association. On March 21, 1981, the bank was placed under receivership by the Bangko Sentral. Upon Davids request, petitioners Guingona and Martin issued a joint promissory note, absorbing the obligations of the bank. On July 17, 1981, they divided the indebtedness. David filed a complaint for estafa and violation of Central Bank Circular No. 364 and related regulations regarding foreign exchange transactions before the Office of the City Fiscal of Manila. Petitioners filed the herein petition for prohibition and injunction with a prayer for immediate issuance of restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the public respondents to proceed with the preliminary investigation on the ground that the petitioners obligation is civil in nature.Issue:(1) Whether the contract between NSLA and David is a contract of depositor a contract of loan, which answer determines whether the City Fiscal has the jurisdiction to file a case for estafa(2) Whether there was a violation of Central Bank Circular No. 364Held:(1) When private respondent David invested his money on nine. and savings deposits with the aforesaid bank, the contract that was perfected was a contract of simple loan ormutuumand not a contract of deposit. Hence, the relationship between the private respondent and the Nation Savings and Loan Association is that of creditor anddebtor; consequently, the ownership of the amount deposited was transmitted to the Bank upon the perfection of the contract and it can make use of the amount deposited for its banking operations, such as to pay interests on deposits and to pay withdrawals. While the Bank has the obligation to return theamount deposited,it has, however, no obligation to return or deliver thesame moneythat was deposited. And, the failure of the Bank to return the amount deposited will not constitute estafa through misappropriation punishable under Article 315, par. l(b) of the Revised Penal Code, but it will only give rise to civil liability over which the public respondents have no jurisdiction.But even granting that the failure of the bank to pay the time and savings deposits of private respondent David would constitute a violation of paragraph 1(b) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, nevertheless any incipient criminal liability was deemed avoided, because when the aforesaid bank was placed under receivership by the Central Bank, petitioners Guingona and Martin assumed the obligation of the bank to private respondent David, thereby resulting in the novation of the original contractual obligation arising from deposit into a contract of loan and converting the original trust relation between the bank and private respondent David into an ordinary debtor-creditor relation between the petitioners and private respondent. Consequently, the failure of the bank or petitioners Guingona and Martin to pay the deposits of private respondent would not constitute a breach of trust but would merely be a failure to pay the obligation as a debtor. Moreover, while it is true that novation does not extinguish criminal liability, it may however, prevent the rise of criminal liability as long as it occurs prior to the filing of the criminal information in court. In the case at bar, there is no dispute that petitioners Guingona and Martin executed a promissory note on June 17, 1981 assuming the obligation of the bank to private respondent David; while the criminal complaint for estafa was filed on December 23, 1981 with the Office of the City Fiscal. Hence, it is clear that novation occurred long before the filing of the criminal complaint with the Office of the City Fiscal. Consequently, as aforestated, any incipient criminal liability would be avoided but there will still be a civil liability on the part of petitioners Guingona and Martin to pay the assumed obligation.(2) Petitioner Guingona merely accommodated the request of the Nation Savings and loan Association in order to clear the bank draft through his dollar account because the bank did not have a dollar account. Immediately after the bank draft was cleared, petitioner Guingona authorized Nation Savings and Loan Association to withdraw the same in order to be utilized by the bank for its operations. It is safe to assume that the U.S. dollars were converted first into Philippine pesos before they were accepted and deposited in Nation Savings and Loan Association, because the bank is presumed to have followed the ordinary course of the business which is to accept deposits in Philippine currency only, and that the transaction was regular and fair, in the absence of a clear and convincing evidence to the contrary.In conclusion, considering that the liability of the petitioners is purely civil in nature and that there is no clear showing that they engaged in foreign exchange transactions, We hold that the public respondents acted without jurisdiction when they investigated the charges against the petitioners. Consequently, public respondents should be restrained from further proceeding with the criminal case for to allow the case to continue, even if the petitioners could have appealed to the Ministry of Justice, would work great injustice to petitioners and would render meaningless the proper administration of justice.

BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS VS IAC, 164 SCRA 630

FACTS: Arthur and Vivienne Canlas opened a joint current account in CBTC now Bank of the Philippine Islands. However, the bank teller erroneously placed the old account number of Mr. Canlas on the new account. Consequently, the subsequent deposits made by the spouses Canlas were not reflected in the new account. It was found out only when a check issued by Viviene was dishonored due to insufficiency of funds. Thus, the spouses Canlas instituted a suit for damages. The bank on the other hand alleged that it should not be held liable merely on account of the inadvertence of its employees.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Bank of the Philippine Islands is liable.

HELD: The Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative. There is no merit in petitioner's argument that it should not be considered negligent, much less held liable for damages on account of the inadvertence of its bank employee for Article 1173 of the Civil Code only requires it to exercise the diligence of a good father of family. The bank is not expected to be infallible but it must bear the blame for not discovering the mistake of its teller despite the established procedure requiring the papers and bank books to pass through a battery of bank personnel whose duty it is to check and countercheck them for possible errors. Apparently, the officials and employees tasked to do that did not perform their duties with due care.